Private Evidence

The Iraq Inquiry’s approach to the publication of private evidence

The Iraq Inquiry has heard evidence from a number of witnesses in private. In the vast majority of cases, that evidence was heard in private because it was likely to cover material which, if disclosed publicly, would be likely to cause harm to the public interest, in particular on the grounds of national security and international relations. This is in line with the Protocol between the Iraq Inquiry and Her Majesty's Government regarding documents and Other Written and Electronic Information (external website).

A very small number of witnesses have been seen in private because of their relatively junior status at the time, or where the Inquiry has accepted that there is another genuine reason why a witness would have difficulty appearing or being entirely frank in public, in line with paragraph 1b) or c) of the Inquiry’s Protocol for hearing evidence in public, and for identifying witnesses.

Paragraphs 22 to 27 of the Inquiry’s Protocol for witnesses sets out the Inquiry’s approach to publication of private evidence. In the interests of transparency and in order to help understanding of the public sessions, the Inquiry has published the transcripts, subject to redactions or summarising where necessary. This is in line with the Protocol between the Iraq Inquiry and the Government regarding documents and other written and electronic information.

Unless otherwise stated, all of the redactions made in the private transcripts published on the Inquiry’s website have been made for one of the reasons explained in paragraph 7 of that Protocol. Where single words have been redacted, a random number of additional characters have been used to replace the word, so it is not possible to tell what the missing text is. Otherwise, all redactions are shown in full.

In the course of private hearings, the Committee and witnesses often referred to classified documents. Where the document or an extract from it is important to the public understanding of the evidence, the Inquiry has sought declassification of that document or extract. Where the Government has agreed to declassification, those documents will be published on the Inquiry’s website.

The Inquiry has received some evidence which it has agreed to publish anonymously, as it is satisfied that the criteria in paragraph 4a) and/or 4b) of the Protocol for hearing evidence in public, and for identifying witnesses are met.

List of witnesses seen by the Inquiry in Private hearings.

For detail of witnesses seen at Public hearings please visit our Witnesses who have given oral evidence in public page.

A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z

A

The Hon Dominic Asquith CMG - Director Iraq, 2004 to 2006 and HM Ambassador to Iraq, 2006 to 2007

B

Jonny Baxter - Head of DFID Baghdad, 2007 to 2008

Maj Gen Graham Binns CBE DSO MC - General Office Commanding Multi National Division (South East), 2007 to 2008

Maj Gen Adrian Bradshaw CB OBE - Commander 7th Brigade 2003

Sir Anthony Brenton KCMG, Minister, Washington DC (including periods as Charge d'Affaires), January 2001 - March 2004

C

Lindy Cameron - Head of DFID Baghdad, 2004 to 2005

Edward Chaplin CMG OBE - HM Ambassador to Iraq, 2004 to 2005

Simon Collis - Consul General Basra, 2004 to 2005

D

Sir Richard Dearlove KCMG OBE - Chief SIS, 2001 to 2004

Tim Dowse CMG - Chief of Assessments Staff, 2003 to 2009

Directors of Special Forces

DSF1
DSF2
DSF3

L

Lt Gen Sir Graeme Lamb KBE CBE DSO - General Officer Commanding Multi National Division (South East), 2003 to 2003 and Senior British Military Representative – Iraq, 2006 to 2007

Maj Gen Michael Laurie CBE - Director General Intelligence Collection, 2002 to 2003

Ian Lee - Director General Operational Policy, Ministry of Defence, 2002 to 2004.

29 October 2002, letter between MOD & no 10 drawing up options fordifferent packages (Watkins to Sir David Manning "Iraq: UK military options")

M

Sir David Manning GCMG CVO - Foreign Policy Adviser to the Prime Minister, 2001 to 2003 and HM Ambassador to Washington 2003 to 2007.

Julian Miller CB - Chief of Assessments Staff, 2001 to 2003

P

Sir David Pepper KCMG - Director GCHQ, April 2003 - July 2008

Christopher Prentice CMG - HM Ambassador to Iraq, 2007 to 2009

R

Kathleen Reid - Head of DFID Basra, 2007 to 2008

General Sir John Reith KCB CBE (private session) - Friday, 15 January 2010

Matthew Rycroft - Foreign Affairs Private Secretary to the Prime Minister 2002-2004

S

Sir John Scarlett KCMG OBE - Chairman, Joint Intelligence Committee, 2003 to 2004

Sir John Scarlett KCMG OBE - Chief of SIS, 2004 to 2009

Maj Gen Jonathan Shaw CBE - General Officer Commanding Multi National Division (South East) 2007

Sir Nigel Sheinwald - Permanent Representative to the European Union 2000-2003; Foreign Policy Adviser to the Prime Minister and Head of the Defence and Overseas Secretariat 2003-2007; HM Ambassador to Washington DC covering the period 2007 to 2009.

SIS officers below the rank of Chief

SIS 1
SIS 2
SIS 3
SIS 4: Transcript part 1 and part 2

SIS 5
SIS 6
SIS8 – this individual, who was working on particularly sensitive matters, gave evidence on the detail of his work and how it interfaced with the wider HMG effort. The Committee has concluded, in line with its Protocols, that it would not be possible to redact and publish the transcript without rendering it unintelligible. The Inquiry will, however, draw on the evidence received in reaching its conclusions and will reflect on how best to explain this in its Report.
SIS9 – this individual, who was working on particularly sensitive matters, gave evidence on the detail of his work and how it interfaced with the wider HMG effort. The Committee has concluded, in line with its Protocols, that it would not be possible to redact and publish the transcript without rendering it unintelligible. The Inquiry will, however, draw on the evidence received in reaching its conclusions and will reflect on how best to explain this in its Report.
SIS11 – this individual, who was working on particularly sensitive matters, gave evidence on the detail of his work and how it interfaced with the wider HMG effort. The Committee has concluded, in line with its Protocols, that it would not be possible to redact and publish the transcript without rendering it unintelligible. The Inquiry will, however, draw on the evidence received in reaching its conclusions and will reflect on how best to explain this in its Report.