

Tuesday, 13 July 2010

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE**

**THE CHAIRMAN:** Welcome back to Rifkind Hall.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** Is that what it's called now?

**THE CHAIRMAN:** For the formalities, welcome to our witness again this afternoon, Sir Richard Dearlove. We are grateful to Sir Richard for making time for this return visit to the Inquiry. The purpose of this second hearing is simply to cover those issues we have not had time to cover in our previous session.

I explained at the start of the previous hearing the information relating to the Inquiry's protocols and the procedure for checking the transcript after the hearing. You will have seen this again before our meeting today. I won't repeat it.

Instead I'll turn to Sir Martin Gilbert.

**SIR MARTIN GILBERT:** [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** [REDACTED]

**SIR MARTIN GILBERT:** [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** <sup>1</sup> [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

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<sup>1</sup> The witness explained SIS' deployments during the Iraq military campaign and the changes it made to the Service's mode of reporting in order to meet the challenges facing HMG during the conflict.

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

SIR MARTIN GILBERT: [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]?

SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE: [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

SIR MARTIN GILBERT: [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]?

SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE: [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]





[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
Basra was, I think -- I still think -- a remarkable achievement because there was very little loss of life [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]<sup>3</sup>

**SIR MARTIN GILBERT:** Are there any lessons to be learned from the SIS military co-operation?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** <sup>4</sup> [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

As I said, a lot of this -- SIS, frankly, during the Cold War had not done much of this. Then you got the Falklands, which worked -- the history of the Falklands War from the intelligence point of view is very, very interesting as well, as somebody knows a great deal... I was quite heavily involved in aspects of that.

**SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:** [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** [REDACTED] I thought you had researched it more thoroughly than I have.

We had this extraordinary situation beginning to build up,

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<sup>3</sup> The witness went on to outline SIS' contribution towards the taking of Basra.

where SIS found itself being deployed in support of the military more frequently than any of us had really expected, if you take a historical view. This hadn't been the role of the Service during the Cold War at all.

**SIR MARTIN GILBERT:** [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:**

<sup>5</sup>

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

**SIR MARTIN GILBERT:** We have touched on the role of SIS as a provider of tactical intelligence. Do you have any thoughts on lessons to be learned from that aspect?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** Well, there's an issue there because the Service's role tends to be strategic. I think that the conclusion I came to, that in an event like Iraq, it's difficult

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<sup>4</sup> The witness outlined his views on possible lessons and emphasised the importance of effective communication (in theatre, in London and between the two) and of being able to use experienced officers where required.

<sup>5</sup> In discussing further lessons learned from SIS military co-operation, the witness emphasised the importance of training, preparation and familiarity.

to separate strategic and the tactical, and I think the proof of the pudding really is in the eating. Did they play a useful role? Yes, they actually played a very important role, and were doing things which the military themselves would have found very difficult to do. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

So I think in a future situation you could look back at the Iraq example and try to extrapolate from that how you should actually deploy people [REDACTED]

**SIR MARTIN GILBERT:** Thank you.

**THE CHAIRMAN:** I would like to pick up that very point. Is there an argument to stand back [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and say: how do we, for a major expeditionary military adventure, provide the necessary levels of intelligence at both strategic, top level command, and tactical, J2? And then where does SIS fit into, where does Int Corps fit in, where do Special Forces fit in? Or should we simply take what we have learned and grow from that?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** I would tend to a more organic approach, and not lay down too strictly. Making sure you've got the capability, you've got the capability [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] It's really about training and preparation, and I think it's quite possible.

The one thing I do think is valuable is to exercise so that you have opportunities for those groups to work together,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

I think there was a lot of learning on the job in [previous operating environments] [REDACTED]

But I would advise having annual initiatives where you brought these groups together to exercise.

**THE CHAIRMAN:** Last point. It's rather an obvious one, I know, but I would be interested in your comment. Risk of mission creep for SIS being drawn from its high level strategic effect into the hunger in the green army at different levels for anything you can give them.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** I know that's a problem. In a way, I think, the limited resources almost controls that naturally.

**THE CHAIRMAN:** Sub-stabilising.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** You haven't got large numbers. But I do remember that the people who were deployed [REDACTED] the hours they worked were completely abominable. They really, really were working 20-hour days, I think, during the height of the conflict, and there weren't many of them. They were very small groups of people, and the pressure on them in terms of communication with London and keeping London in touch was tough.

**THE CHAIRMAN:** I'll turn to Rod Lyne, and another example of SIS being asked to do a lot.

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** Just on that last theme, presumably the people you deployed [REDACTED] were Arabic speakers, were they?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** I would need to go and check back, but the majority of people who were initially involved in Iraq were all Arabists of different levels of competence, but they were Arabists. That's obviously where SIS can make a strong contribution.

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** But your overall resources of Arabists within your fairly limited overall resources overall weren't very great.



**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** They were better than anybody else's.

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** Yes, but at a certain point you ran through those.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** No, I think we did. We had continued producing Arabists at a reasonably sustained rate in SIS, where the Foreign Office hadn't been training as many as we had been. But inevitably, if you are in a major crisis, you run out.

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** [REDACTED]

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** I want to talk a little bit about the search for WMD, which after the campaign became a priority task -- we can perhaps ask a bit later on how high a priority task -- for quite a number of people, including SIS.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** You are talking about after the military conflict?

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** After the campaign. What evidence of WMD were you expecting or hoping to find after the campaign?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** Well, I think that we might have found

some buried equipment. We might have found traces of chemical weapons production, traces of weapons or, let's say, CW fill.

I think the general view was there would be bits and pieces, but I emphasise "bits and pieces" because I think a lot of it, if it had been there, would have been dismantled, gone astray. If there had been chemical munitions or fill for chemical munitions, it would have been poured away and treated with bleach.

The trouble is that I think we knew that we were looking for physically bits and pieces in a very big country, with an adversary who had had a lot of practice in disguising the existence of this stuff.

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** And one or two bigger bits and pieces of missiles --

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** The biggest bits and pieces -- they are still somewhere. It's not in dispute somewhere there are -- I can't remember how many Scuds were left, 16 Scuds were left -- what we knew was left from the previous regime which had probably been dismantled into sections and buried. The Iraqis buried stuff they didn't need to bury. That's what's so extraordinary. Do remember that in the search for WMD, they dug up aeroplanes that the Iraqis had buried, God knows why.

I think we felt that there would be, let's say, a forensic trail. The example that I would point to -- I mentioned it last time -- is I'm still sure in my own mind, and if you want me to extrapolate why -- they weaponised rocket artillery with VX.

**THE CHAIRMAN:** I would like to come on to that.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** Yes. If you assume that that was the case, what is interesting is that they didn't actually find -- there's nothing secret about it, but the rocket artillery that the Iraqis had, which was a mobile -- if you go back and look in

Janes, exact numbers were known as to what units they had and how many vehicles. None of that was found. The basic equipment wasn't found. So what happened to them? Where did it go? It wasn't in dispute that they had it.

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** Did we have reason to think that some of this stuff was missed because mistakes were made perhaps in the early days?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** <sup>6</sup>

[REDACTED]

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:**

[REDACTED] ?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:**

[REDACTED]

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** Presumably the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary were expressing a fairly lively interest in the search for WMD.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** I think they expressed, as far as I recall -- it was very important to them. Politically it was very important to them.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

I think the other thing that was really not understood -- it was eventually understood by us in London -- was just how adverse and dangerous after a period of time it became for the inspectors. So to employ the inspectors aggressively -- I'm talking about the Iraqi Survey Group inspectors -- they needed massive protection. There were large numbers of soldiers on the US side who, because they were so pressed, couldn't be deployed. So it became very, very difficult for them to carry out thorough inspections, and I think this comes out pretty clearly from talking to Duelfer.

**THE CHAIRMAN:** We would like to come on to that in a minute, the ISG protection.

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** Did you find that you were having to act as the main channel of information to the Prime Minister on this search as it went on?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** Well, he certainly was keen to know -- it was an American initiative. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I was talking to the PM, to the Foreign Secretary. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

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<sup>6</sup> The witness set out his views on what might have occurred.

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** <sup>7</sup> [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

Does that reflect what you were hearing from Number 10?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** I don't think it reflects -- I think it reflects more concerns that I had, that if we fail to turn up anything, obviously this was going to rebound to an extent on us. I was very keen that we had effective -- and there were some strange incidents during this period which became -- now they are almost irrelevant, but, for example, there was a whole thing to do with containers dumped, which you have probably seen the reference to, on the bed of the river, which then proceeded -- I think they sort of authenticated that they were there, and they were removed. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

They were gone.

**THE CHAIRMAN:** Famous story.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** Famous story. What was all that about?

As far as I recall, there were several incidents which were similar in nature, where we thought we have found something at last, and then the actual sort of recovery ...

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** While this was going on, you were obviously focusing also on the sources who had given information beforehand.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** We were trying to track down --

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<sup>7</sup> Sir Roderic referred to some evidence the Inquiry had seen that suggested that there had been concern that Number 10's confidence in the agencies had been damaged by the press coverage in the summer of 2003 and that unless Iraq's WMD could be found SIS' credibility would be tainted.

SIR RODERIC LYNE: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

THE CHAIRMAN: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SIR RODERIC LYNE: On the sources that eventually were withdrawn, like CURVE BALL, the validation process, or I suppose revalidation or investigation -- I may not have the right term -- took quite a while. I think it wasn't complete by the time you retired.

SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE: <sup>8</sup> [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] But I think once we were able to talk to CURVE BALL face to face, we understood a number of the inadequacies. We pursued an investigation in relation to every source. Okay, they didn't necessarily happen at the speed now with the benefit of hindsight, but we had a lot of other things to do. But every source was tracked down.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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<sup>8</sup> The witness outlined the steps below to verify the reporting it had received from the source which had provided the majority of reports on mobile facilities for the production of biological agent and other sources

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** We have had quite a detailed look at CURVE BALL in some of the previous sessions and at the documentary. I don't think I need to pursue that one. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** Final question. Overall in the period, in the months after the campaign, when there were a lot of important things for your officers to do in and around and on the subject of Iraq, how much resource was consumed by trying to answer the unanswered questions about WMD, and was it, in your view, more than was justified in the list of priorities?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** <sup>9</sup> [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

No, I think it was important to devote some resources to this, but I don't think it was more than --

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** [REDACTED]

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<sup>9</sup> The witness described SIS' engagement with the ISG, the resources devolved by SIS to the search for WMD and the balance between that work and other priorities.

[REDACTED] I think we saw it as a fundamental part of the situation we had to deal with. I didn't really separate it, and say this is historical, therefore it's less important. I did feel, in relation to the whole issue, that we had to pursue this as far as we could and as thoroughly as we could.

**SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:** I want to talk about the ISG. Just a question following on from that discussion. You have indicated that the expectations were for finding bits and pieces. I think that was the phrase you have used.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** Yes.

**SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:** You're not the first person who has suggested that to us. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

I'm just interested in the management of expectations at the political level of what it is they were likely to get, and whether they understood that it may be something that was forensic, to use your words, something which carried on a plausible story, which seemed compelling in itself but wasn't something you could possibly show in front of the television cameras.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** I'm sort of reluctant to say that -- I don't think the Prime Minister -- I think he knew we were looking for evidence, you know, rather than a massive weapons store with something which was -- I'm pretty sure that by the time we got into dealing with the Iraqi Survey Group the Prime Minister realised what the problem was.

I'm just trying to think when this occurred. I remember that George Tenet was asked a similar question at one of the



congressional inquiries, pretty soon, and said, well, one could be looking for a tank the size of that table in terms of its volume, and that would be a very significant quantity of sarin.

So actually some of the things that would have been important could also have been pretty small. You know, it could have been almost stuck in someone's shed, not that I would like to have had in the shed.

**SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:** It indicates the problem, going the whole way back, is that perhaps why you were so dependent upon agents and their reports is that the physical manifestations of this were likely always to be quite hard.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** Yes.

**SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:** It goes right back to the way this issue developed of the expectations generated by the dossier, of the nature of what it means to have holdings of WMD.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** Except, you know, we did actually have the record of UNSCOM and UNSCOM's discoveries. So admittedly that was when the Iraqi military had been in a different state. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] even, I think, the discoveries they make, which were very significant, some of them weren't necessarily physically dramatic.

**SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:** Which takes us on to the ISG. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] What influence at all did you have over it?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** None. Unfortunately, none.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> The witness went on to set out his views on the operation of the ISG.



something. But I also remember the figure for the number of unguarded Iraqi ordnance dumps across Iraq, and strictly speaking, all of those should have been inspected, but it was completely impossible to do so.

**SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:** [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

**THE CHAIRMAN:** [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

**SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:** [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

**SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:** [REDACTED]

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

**SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:** [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

**SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:** Did you try to influence what ISG reported in its interim report [REDACTED]?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** No. We were really -- ISG was an American exercise. We were forced to stand back really. But I don't think they appreciated politically how important it was for us, or if they did, you know, it didn't really cut any ice with them.

**SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:** [REDACTED]?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. But, as I remember, by then it was getting rather dangerous to inspect. So the opportunity to go out and look at some of these places depended on the military giving them significant protection. That's the American military.

**SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:** [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

**SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:** What did you think of [the Duelfer report]?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** Well, it's pretty interesting and it's pretty impressive. Considering the difficulty, I think a lot of people who love to tell you how much they know about Iraq, if you say, "Okay, have you read the Duelfer Report?", they look at you blankly. The British media have no idea what's in the Duelfer Report, and the Duelfer Report is very interesting. Its

conclusions are quite revealing too because it doesn't sort of say -- you know what the Duelfer Report says, so I'm not going to repeat that.

**THE CHAIRMAN:** But its conclusions are inconclusive.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** Its conclusions are inconclusive. I don't think this issue is by any means cut and dried. I just don't accept that. I just think there's so much doubt still. I was very keen -- when I retired, there was an inspector who you may have known, a British weapons inspector called Terry Taylor. You know Terry well.

Well, Terry, at one point, found an American entrepreneur who was quite keen to get Terry to do a magnum opus on this whole issue. Terry is one of the people that understands the whole history -- or understood the history of the issue -- and I think could have tried to pull all this material together, to give it a clear interpretation. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

**SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:** We have had a suggestion that when it came to Kay -- going back to Kay now -- you and John Scarlett urged that it would be better to have no report at all, rather than a negative report. Can you recall that?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** This is Kay?

**SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:** Yes, this is with Kay.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** I don't recall that actually, but my view certainly, I think, would have been that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the job hadn't really been thoroughly tackled. There was still a lot of work to do. So if Kay produced a report it would look definitive, when we knew that the cheese was still full of holes.

**SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:** Then in February -- moving on again to February/March 2004 -- there was some discussion between John Scarlett and Charles Duelfer about whether the nuggets from Kay's first report -- I think the interim one -- should be included in Duelfer's report. Did you discuss that with John Scarlett at all?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** I don't recall that at all. What date was that?

**SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:** February/March 2004.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** No.

**SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:** Finally --

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** I should say that by that stage, February 2004, the JIC was much more concerned with the relationship with Duelfer than I was because the JIC was looking at this issue from a more sort of assessment way than SIS was.

**SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:** Just finally, you mentioned you thought it was a very interesting report and so on, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
What was your sense of the political appreciation of Duelfer here? Did they [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] try to make more of Duelfer, which did confirm --

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** To be fair, in the UK the attitude to Duelfer was one of greater interest because they felt to an extent -- I wouldn't say it vindicated their view, but it actually illustrated what a complex issue this was, and that there probably wasn't a black and white answer. Certainly I don't think any of the politicians read Duelfer, but they certainly read the summary that was produced by the JIC when Duelfer eventually came out.

**THE CHAIRMAN:** I'm going to attempt an oversimplified account of the ISG history, but I will ask you to offer a comment if you like.

Really the whole of its history, through Kay, through Duelfer, to the end, was really about the [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** Yes. It was badly affected --

**THE CHAIRMAN:** And curdled the whole enterprise.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** It was badly affected by the political hinterland that lay behind the issue in Washington.

**THE CHAIRMAN:** I would like to move on to something you mentioned at the last session we had, which was about VX. You said:

"I'm absolutely of the view, and I think I can make a pretty convincing case, that Iraq had weaponised VX, and that that material has never been found."

I would like to ask you about what is the evidence. We have now seen a little bit. When, where, how are they capable of doing it, and what's its significance in 2002/2003, as opposed to 1996/1998?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** Okay. Well, first of all, I will just read -- I did make some notes because I looked up this stuff before my previous session.

First, there [was some reporting] which [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] talked about trickle(?) production of VX and weaponisation, and this dates -- he said that was in 1998, which is later than -- previous productions --

**THE CHAIRMAN:** It's post UNSCOM.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** It's post UNSCOM, yes. That's the significance of that.

**SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:** Was UNSCOM at the end of 1998?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** No. I think the source made it clear that he was reporting about after UNSCOM. Anyway, what I'm saying is that I think there are two or three reports which have never really been questioned, as it were.

**THE CHAIRMAN:** Including, for example ...?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** I think that's probably --

**THE CHAIRMAN:** That one?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** That's right. There is a small series

[REDACTED]

**THE CHAIRMAN:** [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

**THE CHAIRMAN:** I'm just wondering whether, to save time this afternoon and to make it easier to get a properly, carefully given account, could we ask you for a short written statement? Would that be the best way?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** I can just whip through them. I'm sure you are aware of the [REDACTED] reports on the purchase of atropine, which is the antidote, and CW protector suits. That was in November 2002.

**THE CHAIRMAN:** Yes.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** <sup>11</sup> [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]





the references of the various bits of paper. But that's all that I wanted to mention in relation to that.

**THE CHAIRMAN:** The other point you made was whether, when the ISG looked at a particular finding of rocket artillery, they actually knew what they were looked at and just moved on without recognising it.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** That was UNMOVIC.

**THE CHAIRMAN:** It was UNMOVIC? Sorry, it was.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** It was UNMOVIC<sup>12</sup> [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

**THE CHAIRMAN:** You don't know what's inside the warheads.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** You don't know what's inside the warheads.

**THE CHAIRMAN:** Lawrence, do you want to add anything on that because you have expertise?

**SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:** Not particularly. In this particular source, that we have just had in this section of the document, there doesn't seem to be -- what sort of technical evaluation would have gone on?

**THE CHAIRMAN:** [REDACTED]

**SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:** [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** [REDACTED]

**SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:** [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]?

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<sup>12</sup> The witness explained the significance of this incident.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:**

<sup>13</sup>

**SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:**

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**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:**

**SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:**

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:**

**SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:**

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:**

**THE CHAIRMAN:** Thank you. Let's move on. That was a helpful section.

Rod, over to you for [the new source on trial in September 2002]<sup>14</sup>

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** I just wonder if you could take us through [the new source on trial]. You won't remember all the dates in detail.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** I can't claim I have been through the file.

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** If you have been through the file.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** I haven't read the file.

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** We have got half a dozen documents. Perhaps I can talk you through it.

The first reference that we have in chronological terms is in what was presumably one of your regular meetings with Jack Straw, on 5 September, where you ran through a list of points, you

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<sup>13</sup> The witness outlined the steps that he understood would have been taken to evaluate the reporting.

<sup>14</sup> SIS withdrew the reporting from this source in July 2003

mentioned that it was possible we might have a significant increase of relevant intelligence, which you identified as [this new source on trial].

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** Yes.

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** That's the first reference. Then on 11 September you briefed John Scarlett by telephone.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** Yes.

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** Your private secretary made a note of that conversation. Then on 12 September you had a meeting with the Prime Minister where you went through it. Then you had another discussion with the Foreign Secretary on the 27th.

So that was how the case built up. In the middle of this, of course -- we are talking 2002 -- the dossier is published, but this information is not put into it. This is very new information.

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** Through an intermediary --

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** Yes.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** <sup>15</sup> [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** [REDACTED]

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** [REDACTED].

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<sup>15</sup> The witness explained what SIS had known about the new source on trial and what they had understood his access to be.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** [REDACTED]

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** [REDACTED]

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** [REDACTED]

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** [REDACTED]

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** [REDACTED]

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** How important did this case appear to be at the time it became apparent?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** Well, potentially important. But the reason in my mind why this case is important, or looks important, is it offers -- if the case is good<sup>16</sup> [REDACTED]

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** Last time we met you said that it was a rare thing for you to brief ministers on sources. In this particular case, at a fairly early stage, you do give the Foreign Secretary and then the Prime Minister a heads-up. That indicates that it is an unusual case?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** Well, it looks a very unusual case at this

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<sup>16</sup> The witness explained that the source had indicated to SIS that he would be able to provide additional intelligence in the near future and explained what the significance was thought to be.

stage.<sup>17</sup>

It's quite clear, if you issue a report like this in the climate in which we were working, these reports are going to attract an awful lot of senior attention. So I'm sort of pre-empting that by saying to the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister, look, you know, there is this stream of reporting, which of course isn't-- the script at the top of the [SIS report] would have been "new source on trial".

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** In the situation they are in, inevitably, they are going to be pretty interested in the prospect of getting this intelligence.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** Absolutely. We issued two reports, and that's it, because we never -- so by the time we get to the inspections, it's pretty clear that this isn't going to happen. So it doesn't really have a bearing. The two reports are issued in September, as far as I remember. Well, they are around early September.

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** Yes. The first one is issued on 12 September, I think it is.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** And at my insistence, they are not included in the dossier which comes out at about that point.

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** Yes.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** My reasons for doing that is actually restrictive security because I want this source retained, if the source is real, for the inspection situation which we know is

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<sup>17</sup> The witness referred to documentary evidence that showed that proper procedures had been followed in issuing the report.

probably going to come down the track.

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** This is a period in which the dossier is published. The Prime Minister says in his personal foreword that he regards the intelligence on Saddam's programmes as being beyond doubt, and then in the House of Commons he says that Saddam's WMD programme is "active, detailed and growing".

The JIC reports up to that point, quite hard to substantiate "growing", but would it be fair to say that if the Prime Minister at least had knowledge in his head that there was this appearing to come on track, with the prospect of [additional material] that that could well justify him saying "growing"?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** It could have accounted for "growing", but I think I had warned him that this was a new source on trial. So the conversation we had on 10-September. But if you look at what he said, he actually says "beyond doubt based on the assessed intelligence", and I mean, this isn't part of the assessed intelligence. So the introduction to the JIC actually refers to the assessed intelligence.

My own view of these reports [from the new source on trial in September 2002] is, okay, maybe -- do you not issue them? I think if we went through this again, I would definitely issue the reports.

The [appropriate SIS officer] assessed them as credible. I think we are being far -- I mean, these reports have become an issue, but maybe they account for the Prime Minister saying "growing". I don't know. I'm not sure whether that is true or not.

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** I'm not familiar with your validation procedures. They're well above my pay grade. Do you think that they had done all that could feasibly have been done -- we talked about this a bit last time -- to validate this stuff before the

report went out? You were asked by the Foreign Secretary if the file was genuine, to which you said "yes". Now, he was a genuine person, but presumably what Jack Straw actually meant is: are you confident that the intelligence is genuine?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:**

<sup>18</sup>

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** When you briefed the Prime Minister, which you did with [another SIS officer], the note says that David Manning was present, which I think one would expect, Jonathan Powell, and also Alastair Campbell.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** Yes. I'm really -- I don't think Alastair was there. I know there's confusion over this. Frankly --

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** It's [the other SIS officer] writing the note. He got David Manning's christian name wrong. He called him

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<sup>18</sup> The witness described the challenges of attempting to evaluate the new source on trial in September 2002 prior to military action and explained how SIS had gone about validating the reporting in summer 2003. His view was that those within SIS responsible for handling the reporting initially had done their jobs correctly. It was simply that, in dealing with this type of material, it was very difficult to say categorically it was correct.



"Steven Manning", but presumably it was David Manning.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** Maybe Alastair was there.

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** He is quite hard to miss.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** I know he's quite hard to miss. Maybe he was, but I don't have any recollection. David was definitely there.

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** Yes.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** I mean, my memory of that meeting is that it was myself, [SIS9], David and the Prime Minister. But if the record showed differently, I may well be wrong on that.

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** Do you remember the Prime Minister's reactions to the information?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** Not specifically. I mean, the Prime Minister -- this was one of the very rare meetings when he had -- David had asked, I think, me to sort of give him a briefing which would give him more of a flavour for what was actually going on on the ground. Certainly the Prime Minister had an appetite for that sort of briefing, which was a pretty rare event. That didn't happen very often. I had taken [the other SIS officer] along, being our primary expert on Iraq, and there was a fair amount of general discussion with [that officer] about Iraq and about the difficulties and the problems that we were facing in relation to this issue.

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** Jack Straw obviously retained an interest in this. There are later discussions you had with him in which he was enquiring about the appearance or non-appearance [of the additional material] and then eventually it doesn't come.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:**

<sup>19</sup>

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** But this was the nearest we got to the famous silver bullet?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** Yes. Well, other than the [the material the intelligence gave to UNMOVIC]

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** We already had some of this other stuff.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** We had a certain amount of stuff from [another source]. We had some other stuff, which was quite haphazard, about bits from the nuclear programme being hidden in individual houses, and, if you recall, we found some of that stuff. But then we were looking for another line of intelligence which would give us --

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** You say that you would still have issued the report, as it were, now, because it was important stuff. Are there any ways in which you would have handled it differently? You will be aware that we have had some witnesses suggesting that it was a bit precipitate going to ministers with it so quickly.

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<sup>19</sup> The witness described the tactics SIS had employed in attempting to secure the additional material.

Do you think that's justified or not?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** I think in the circumstances, I don't agree with that. The reason I don't agree with that is because if you issue a report like that in the middle of a crisis, you're going to get a phone call from a ministerial office within a short period of time.

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** Because you don't have to see the report. You don't have to see the report.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** Well, I agree.

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** Once you see the report, it lights a touch paper.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** I can see myself sitting in front of an inquiry, answering the question why the hell I didn't issue a report. Actually this is quite potent now, particularly in relation to homeland security. I'm just using this as an example. What about counter-terrorist threat material? If you don't issue that -- and very often you don't know whether it's fabricated or not. You issue it because you've got to issue it.

Okay, that's a different situation, but in a way it's not dissimilar. What do you do? Sit on the stuff? I don't think you do in the circumstances. It's impossible.

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** It's your trade, not ours. You tell us. I don't know if --

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** Well, you don't. You can't sit on something as potentially important as that.

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** Is there something between sitting on it and putting it out? Is there more that you can do --

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** The reason you are focusing on this, with

the benefit of hindsight, the intelligence looks significant because of what didn't happen, what we didn't find. But, of course, the context for [the new source on trial] at the time is we believe the regime is armed with WMD. We don't see that as important in relation, let's say, at the particular moment in time. Okay, I agree, it looks different now. But as the Prime Minister's foreword says, "assessed intelligence beyond doubt", and he's not even referring to the stuff.

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** Yes. I think the reason why we are all focusing on it is because there wasn't a multiplicity of recent sources for that intelligence. A lot of it was historic. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Final question from me, and then I think probably we have probably earned ourselves a cuppa.

**THE CHAIRMAN:** Possibly.

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** Possibly? Oh, Chairman.

It took a while to withdraw the intelligence, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** Yes. You wouldn't withdraw reports like that unless you had specific reason to do so. I mean, you don't -- I imagine that they were withdrawn at the point we managed to interview [the new source on trial].

**SIR MARTIN GILBERT:** The waiting was vexatious, but it wasn't a red flag?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** Yes.

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** It was six months, roughly, from --

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** We were pretty scrupulous about withdrawing the reports. We were scrupulous about withdrawing the reports and the sources we had interviewed and had doubts about.

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** Half a year, roughly, elapsed between [the new source on trial] appearing, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The withdrawal was later than that, but up to the conflict we hadn't withdrawn.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** Well, there was no reason to do so.

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** No reason to do so. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** That didn't say anything.

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** Didn't say anything?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** Well, it didn't at the time.

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** Okay.

**THE CHAIRMAN:** I think my colleague was right. Let's have a cup of tea for ten minutes.

**(A short break)**

**THE CHAIRMAN:** This is an afternoon for three letter acronyms. We have done the ISG. We move to the CPA. I'll ask Baroness Prashar to pick that one up.

**BARONESS USHA PRASHAR:** I would just like to ask a few questions on the CPA period.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** Yes.

**BARONESS USHA PRASHAR:** Can you recall what were the views of the SIS [REDACTED] of the policies and working of the

CPA?

SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:

**BARONESS USHA PRASHAR:**

SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:

**THE CHAIRMAN:**

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:**

**BARONESS USHA PRASHAR:**

SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:

**BARONESS USHA PRASHAR:** Did the SIS have any views on de-Ba'athification and disbanding of the Iraqi army?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** I certainly had strong views. Well,

I mean, I had views. I'm sure [REDACTED] did have views too. But the army is disbanded, and policy and de-Ba'athification, as far as I'm concerned, goes ahead without significant input from the UK. That's my impression anyway.

I mean, certainly when the army had disbanded -- I mean, if you had asked me what I would have favoured at the time as a policy, and I think people -- I would have favoured a military council to run the country initially. By that, I mean not Republican Guard or Special Republican Guard. The periphery of the structures around Saddam Hussein were such that there were people in the military who were far enough detached from the regime to have been usable, if you see what I mean.

So I was deeply alarmed when the army was disbanded.

**BARONESS USHA PRASHAR:** Was this view based on the intelligence that you had or just a general observation?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** Just general. I would say specifically it was dealing with the Iraq problem over a period of time, what might work. But I should hasten to add, this is my personal view. There is no way this was UK policy or anything like that. But if you had asked me what I would have favoured.

**THE CHAIRMAN:** We have heard a great deal of evidence about disbandment and separately about de-Ba'athification. Disbandment, the main argument seems to run, the army went away and went home. But of course there was still the officer corps and cadre, and that crosses over to de-Ba'athification, doesn't it?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** To an extent, yes. But the trouble is that de-Ba'athification just removed all the administrative structures.

**THE CHAIRMAN:** Understood. It was rather what you have just said

about the possibility of a military council would have been possible, unless pretty severe, three to four levels down, de-Ba'athification had not happened in the army as well.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** But you could have de-Ba'athified from the top down. Rather than actually sweeping away -- it's very arrogant to sweep away everything and think that you can rebuild the country from the ground up. Historically that's probably very seldom happened, and no one has really tried it. It's a very courageous thing to do, but in my book a slightly crazy thing to do.

**BARONESS USHA PRASHAR:** Did you have much contact with John Sawers and Greenstock?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** I only saw -- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I visited Iraq in 2003, I think, late 2003. I certainly saw Jeremy Greenstock then. I saw Bremer. I saw [Sanchez]. I saw the people that one would expect to see.

**BARONESS USHA PRASHAR:** [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** [REDACTED]

**BARONESS USHA PRASHAR:** What contacts with senior military commanders in Iraq? Any contacts with them?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** Certainly with the British commander, the



relationship was very close and frequent. I remember when I went there, the senior British commander -- I can't remember who it was now -- certainly I had a number of meetings with him. He came to dinner. [REDACTED]

The relationship with people like -- the American military commander then was [Sanchez]. Getting in to see him was -- I got in to see him, but not many people did, I think.

**BARONESS USHA PRASHAR:** Through the contact with the military, were you able to influence the security strategy?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** I would say not.<sup>20</sup> [REDACTED]

**BARONESS USHA PRASHAR:** [REDACTED]?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** [REDACTED]

**THE CHAIRMAN:** [REDACTED]?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** [REDACTED]

**BARONESS USHA PRASHAR:** [REDACTED]?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

THE CHAIRMAN: [REDACTED]?

SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED].

THE CHAIRMAN: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]?

SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

THE CHAIRMAN: [REDACTED]?

SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

THE CHAIRMAN: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]?

SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

THE CHAIRMAN: [REDACTED]

BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: [REDACTED]

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<sup>20</sup> The witness outlined his discussions with the US in the post-conflict period. He also commented on the impact of those discussions in the period following military action."

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE: [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]?

SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE: [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]?

SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE: [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]?

SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE: [REDACTED]

SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: [REDACTED]?

SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE: [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Thank you.



[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

So I think it's only in my final months as Chief that you begin to get a very significant deterioration. I should have looked up the dates, but I think from the late autumn 2003 onwards it really starts going bad quickly.

**SIR MARTIN GILBERT:** And to what extent are jihadists from outside Iraq seen at that point?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** I think one realises that it's a combination of problems; that it's partly a foreign jihadists, but it's also Sunnis. It's also dead-end Ba'athists, and then you get, you know, the rising problem of Shia militias.

**SIR MARTIN GILBERT:** And the Iranian dimension?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** And the Iranian dimension. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

**SIR MARTIN GILBERT:** In terms of your knowledge and evolving knowledge of the different elements of the insurgency, how are you communicating your information, both in Iraq, to our people

in Iraq, and also back here in the UK? What was the procedure by which you did this?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:**

<sup>21</sup>

[REDACTED]

**THE CHAIRMAN:**

[REDACTED] ?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:**

[REDACTED]

THE CHAIRMAN: [REDACTED]?

SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE: [REDACTED]

THE CHAIRMAN: [REDACTED]?

SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE: [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

THE CHAIRMAN: [REDACTED]

SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE: [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

THE CHAIRMAN: [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]?

SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE: [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

THE CHAIRMAN: [REDACTED]

SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE: [REDACTED]?

THE CHAIRMAN: [REDACTED]

SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE: [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

THE CHAIRMAN: [REDACTED]

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<sup>21</sup> The witness described the situation in theatre and the dissemination of SIS material in Whitehall; this included intelligence reports and other situational reports from theatre which were fed into Whitehall meetings.

[REDACTED]

SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

THE CHAIRMAN: [REDACTED]?

SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE: [REDACTED]

SIR MARTIN GILBERT: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]?

SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SIR MARTIN GILBERT: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]?

SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SIR MARTIN GILBERT: My last question is perhaps a more general question as to what extent did the deteriorating security





Did you feel that the Prime Minister was getting a rather confused pattern, one picture from [REDACTED] and then --

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** Well, he probably was. He was getting a pretty tough -- I mean, I would have been going to meetings with the Prime Minister and giving him a pretty blunt account of what my people were saying about what was going on in Iraq.

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** You were the messenger with bad news. Were you getting shot? You can't have been a very welcome guest.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

**THE CHAIRMAN:** You've got mid-term elections in the United States in late 2004.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** Yes, you have. And growing concern.  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** Okay. So your message was received. Did you feel it was wholly believed?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** I think it was believed.

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** The Prime Minister knew that --

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** I think the Prime Minister knew that we were getting into a mess. Bear in mind by that stage the Shia problem was not dominant. That came later. So we were looking

more at the issue of Sunni insurgency. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] They could have achieved a much better relationship with the Sunnis earlier, in my view. We had that opportunity. Eddie Chaplin was there then, wasn't he? Was Eddie there?

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** Edward Chaplin?

**MARGARET ALDRED:** In July 2004.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** Yes. That must be right at the time, because I remember we see him as potentially important in trying to get to grips. I think he must have gone on a preliminary visit before he actually was posted there. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** [REDACTED]

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

**THE CHAIRMAN:** His significance being as a long serving Arabist?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** Yes, and somebody who knew the place well, and actually understood the dynamics, the local culture.

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** I just want to ask a little bit about how your board worked because, as you know, we have read the minutes of the board. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

Can you just tell us how the board operated, and what the relationship was between you as Chief and your sort of sous-chef?

Was this a formal instrument or informal? How frequently did it meet? What kind of discussions were you having?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:**

<sup>22</sup>

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:**

?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:**

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:**

?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:**

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** In the period leading up to the conflict, where there are a range of views around Whitehall, let alone around UK plc about the strategy on Iraq, were you having debates with some of your senior lieutenants? Were some of them expressing concerns, contrary views, about the strategy or about SIS's role or about your role? Any of that coming?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** Yes. It was one of the major issues that the service was talking about. I'm looking here

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<sup>22</sup> There followed a discussion of SIS internal processes.

[REDACTED]

I would need to go back and look through, but it's pretty clear that there would have been extensive discussion of these issues at the time.

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** Do you recall having difficulty holding all of your colleagues and keeping them on side with the policy? Were there strains and tensions? There certainly were in other bits of Whitehall. Some other people have reservations.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** I think this is the point at which SIS has a clear role and function. You are not a policy-making body. I can recall us being concerned as individuals and as a service with how badly things appeared to be going, but the Service really is striving to fulfill its role to the best of its ability. And I think it would be true to say that you are not going to get SIS officers striding round Whitehall saying the policy on Iraq is rubbish. They don't do that.

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** No, but inside, within the privacy of your own meetings?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** Within the privacy of our own meetings, I'm sure -- but what you have to bear in mind, the UK as a group -- I mean, it's not just SIS that's unhappy.

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** No.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** There's an extensive body of opinion across Whitehall that's unhappy. Very unhappy.

SIR RODERIC LYNE: That's clear.

SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE: [REDACTED]

THE CHAIRMAN: Can I have a PS at some point?

SIR RODERIC LYNE: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]?

SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE: [REDACTED]

SIR RODERIC LYNE: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]?

SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE: [REDACTED]?

SIR RODERIC LYNE: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]?

SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE: [REDACTED]

SIR RODERIC LYNE: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]?

SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SIR RODERIC LYNE: [REDACTED]

SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE: [REDACTED]

SIR RODERIC LYNE: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]?

SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE: [REDACTED]?

THE CHAIRMAN: [REDACTED]

SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE: [REDACTED]

SIR RODERIC LYNE: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** [REDACTED]

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** I'm more interested in the wider atmosphere that you had to cope with, and the extent to which there was a problem.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** You've got deep concern about the direction of events. You've got the Service attempting to do its best in the collection of intelligence and, [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** Your Service is obviously different from other bits of Whitehall because it's led by its Chief. It's not led by a Secretary of State. It reports to them. A strong tradition of that sort of clear leadership within the Service and of very strong loyalty to the Chief; part of the DNA of the Service, as somebody else has put it to us.

How do you balance that when you are Chief with challenge, oversight, debate, making sure that you are not just being obeyed, but you are actually carrying people with you? Is that a problem in the Service?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** Well, I think if the Service is run in the way that I think it should be -- I mean, basically, in SIS you can't really afford dissenters. Dissent [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] can cause phenomenal problems. So actually what happens in SIS is that you spend a lot of time making sure that you have achieved consensus.

If you ask me how I ran the Service, I think one paid a lot of

attention to achieving consensus, particularly on issues affecting the individual. So I'm talking there about structural changes in SIS, issues where people might feel that they had been unhappy or unfairly treated. I can remember [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] you know, this was a cause of considerable -- I wouldn't say unhappiness, because it was very carefully debated and discussed across the Service, and it's a change that actually worked well. It was well handled, but not without problems whilst it was being implemented. Of course, this is to do with the impact of IT.

There were very, very occasional situations where you as Chief might have to decide what you did. There were very, very rare occasions where I probably said to my board, look, thanks for your advice, I have heard it, but I think we should do this and I will take responsibility for it. But those occasions are incredibly rare and unusual.

Usually the Service is a very consensual place. So that you are not losing people off the edges because the incidents that you can point to where we did, okay, maybe they are people who had strong strange personal views, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** I think that really has covered the ground I wanted to cover, which was very much to ask, as you have just



told us, how you ran the Service and, as it were, achieved consensus within the organisation in what was obviously a pretty fraught situation, not just for you, but for anybody in charge of any bit of Government at the time.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** We lived through pretty extraordinary times, going back to 9/11, and how we were able to -- we talked about this last time. It was almost a unique period historically, and I think the Service in my view coped with it extremely well, given its resources were pretty -- we had had nearly 25 per cent cut at the end of the Cold War. I think I said to you, we were at our smallest historically when all of this started.

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** Your successor made one or two changes to the board. They made it meet less often, brought outsiders on to it.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** No, I had two non-executives.

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** You had outsiders too? Who came every week?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** No, no. They came about every six to eight weeks. The first two non-executive directors came on when I was Chief. So that wasn't new.

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** Right.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** And they were quite helpful. But we couldn't involve them<sup>23</sup>, of course. They were involved in discussion of personnel, structures, IT contracts, all of that sort of stuff. They were not allowed to sit in on any operational discussions at all. But they were very helpful.

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** Thank you.

**THE CHAIRMAN:** Lawrence, I think you wanted to raise a final

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<sup>23</sup> Witness clarification: the non-Executive Directors couldn't be involved operationally.

**SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:** Just a couple.

SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:

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We had a similar situation from time to time with Iraq, which is -- I mean, I regard that as standard behaviour by politicians. If they are pursuing a controversial policy and they want to justify it, and they know that there's intelligence that supports their policy and shows it's working, I don't have any problem with them asking, but I do have a problem with agreeing, depending on what our assessment might be of the situation.

**SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:** So given that Campbell was looking for these controlled explosions, how did you try and diffuse them?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** Well, by saying "no way". There's an exposed -- I think if we felt a source was exposed, we would take a really tough line. I took a tough line on a number of occasions with Alastair, and I think so did other senior SIS officers, to say we need to keep control of the security of our sources.

**SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:** [REDACTED]

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** [REDACTED]?

**SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:** [REDACTED]

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** [REDACTED]?

**SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:** [REDACTED]

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** [REDACTED]

**SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:** [REDACTED]

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** [REDACTED]

SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]?

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SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE: [REDACTED]

SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: [REDACTED]

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SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE: [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

**SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:** [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** [REDACTED]  
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[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED].

**SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:** Thanks very much.

**THE CHAIRMAN:** Usha, I think you have a last question.

**BARONESS USHA PRASHAR:** Just a brief question. Going back to what Sir Lawrence Freedman was asking about, the controlled explosions and the role of Alastair Campbell. We have talked very much about your relationship with the Prime Minister. What

was your relationship with Alastair Campbell, and how much was he acting at the behest of the Prime Minister and what was he pushing because of his role as a press officer?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** Well, Alastair had a relatively close relationship with me and with John Scarlett, as far as I recall. The initiatives that he was taking on the press, on the Prime Minister's behalf, he was the lead figure. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

I had got to know Alastair obviously pretty well because I travelled with the Prime Minister on a number of his overseas trips, when there was an intelligence component to his meetings. So we all travelled in the same aircraft in the first class cabin at the front, with all the press at the back, paying for it, if I remember rightly. So, you know, we had an easy relationship personally.

**BARONESS USHA PRASHAR:** But there was no tension in terms of what were his expectations, what he wanted to put into the media, and the role --

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** I think, to be fair to Alastair, if we said to him, look, there's no way you can do that, he would listen to us.

**BARONESS USHA PRASHAR:** He would back off?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** He would back off. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

**SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:** Did he apologise to you over the dodgy dossier?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** I don't recall. It wasn't Alastair's way to apologise particularly. The dodgy dossier was -- you know about it. It was a complete mess.

**THE CHAIRMAN:** We are getting into general conversation now. Are there any final questions?

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** I have got one. One final question, if I may, just sparked by what you were saying about politicians and their understandable wish to use intelligence where they can and the need to make sure they don't damage sources.

Do you think from that that it should be very much the exception for politicians, political leaders, to be given raw intelligence, rather than intelligence that has been through the filtration of the JIC which, among other things, is intended to give greater protection to sources?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** I would be reluctant to make a general rule. I think a wartime leader, whoever it is, will always require the need to read reports, not just assessed material. It would depend on the individual, but I would be very reluctant to make a hard and fast rule like that, because --

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** That implies that the process --

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** The Prime Minister over Iraq was in such a difficult situation. You know, the challenges he faced, having taken the decisions he did, were formidable, and in that situation, I think, you know, you are going to want to be, at certain moments in time, hands on. This is human nature. You can't say, "Oh well, we are going to have an insulation between you and the Prime Minister. He's only going to read stuff" --

you know, if I had been in his shoes, I would say, "Hang on, that's ridiculous. Show me the original stuff. Plus the fact I want to know who your sources are".

**SIR RODERIC LYNE:** Well, I suppose one question: do ministers need to know who the sources are? And the other question is: does the process of assessment damage the material or does it add value to the material by setting it in context?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** Well, obviously the assessment, because he's going to read the assessments as well. So it's not as though they don't. But they are going to want to see both.

Do ministers -- no, very rarely do they need to know who your -- I would say they don't. Strictly speaking, they don't need to know. When I say who they are, I'm not saying his name is such and such.<sup>24</sup> [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] You don't want him to have the responsibility of precision.

But I just don't believe in a crisis that you can absolutely be that strict. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

**SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:** I would like to ask another question, because it was based on an SIS -- it did have an SIS --

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** It did have an SIS element to it.

**SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:** Which was quite interesting. It looked like a preparatory document for people who are going to be inspectors or spend time in Iraq in some way.

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<sup>24</sup> The witness explained the level of detail that he would go into in explaining to the Prime Minister the identity of a source.



Given what we have just discussed in January, it is interesting as to how this happened in February.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** Well, I think, if I remember rightly, we were asked specifically for some material which Alastair could use to brief the press. That was the request in relation. It was in relation to the ISG, wasn't it?

**SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:** No, this is UNMOVIC.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** All right, for UNMOVIC. I think the [SIS] officers responsible produced the material.

Now, what I don't think I was aware of is that it was going to be combined with other material. I mean, I think that we produced a small amount of material which we thought would serve the purpose. The fact that it was then put together with a plagiarised PhD thesis -- I mean, I don't recall beforehand having any idea that that's what was going to happen. So, I mean, the problem was that the SIS bit, actually, if you look at it, is quite good.

**SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:** Is it?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** And rather impressive. You have debased the currency by wrapping it up with all this other stuff. I think that's what we were very unhappy about, particularly, you know, when it became such a product which was sort of made fun of.

**SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:** Thank you.

**THE CHAIRMAN:** Thank you. A couple of last points from me, very short indeed. One is: much earlier, referring to the US commander of the Multinational Force in the CPA period, you mentioned the name [REDACTED] We think it was probably Sanchez.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** Sorry, it was Sanchez. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

**THE CHAIRMAN:** Second, you kindly offered to do a short note on the VX matter.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** I will do that, yes, with the references.

**THE CHAIRMAN:** I would just like to pick up a point from a question Rod Lyne was asking about feeling within the Service in the run up, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Last evening, the Commissioner of Police gave a long lecture, and Bill Hughes of SOCA then, in the Q and A, gave a five-minute speech with no question mark at the end. So I turned to him, to the Commissioner, and said, "I think the question is: do you agree?"

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] 2002/early 2003, the question of the legality of the war was very much to the forefront, but the legitimacy -- and I recall these debates because they were quite intense -- was a personal matter. Legal was institutional, Service; legitimacy was for me, my conscience. Do you agree?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** Yes, I do.

**THE CHAIRMAN:** Thank you. In that case, I thank our witness. I'll close the session at this point. Thank you very much. Unless, of course, you had some further reflections you wish to offer us in the remaining time?

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** I thought as to whether I should offer any, but I think probably not.

**THE CHAIRMAN:** Thank you.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** If I did have anything important, I'll write you a memo.

**THE CHAIRMAN:** Yes, of course.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** The point I made last time was about having an NSC, but I think I would stick by that.

**THE CHAIRMAN:** That's in our transcript from last time.

**SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE:** I mentioned that last time.

**THE CHAIRMAN:** Thank you.

**(The hearing adjourned)**