

Statement of Philip Watson Read, OBE, MA.

I am Philip Watson Read, a former police Chief Superintendent. I retired from the police service in December 2006, after serving for 30 years with West Yorkshire Police. I was awarded the OBE for services to Iraq in December 2004.

Between 2006 and 2008 I attended the University of Bradford Peace Studies Department where I studied International Politics and Security. I graduated in 2008 with a Masters Degree with Merit. My final dissertation was about post conflict police reform with particular reference to Iraq.

I was deployed to Iraq in February 2004 as the Senior Police Advisor CPA (South) in Basra. My deployment ended in early September 2004. I was deployed on secondment from my force to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. I spent from February to the end of June in Basra, and was then deployed to Baghdad to stand in for Deputy Chief Constable Douglas Brand who was leaving Baghdad where he had been the UK's senior police advisor for a year.

My appointment.

I was appointed after I responded to an advert for the post which was published in late 2003 in the West Yorkshire Police internal weekly orders. The secondment had the personal support of the Chief Constable, the late Colin Cramphorn and the West Yorkshire Police Authority.

In late 2003 my application was received by the FCO and I was interviewed for the post by a panel of 3 people at the FCO in London. I believe the panel was made up of staff from both the International Policing Unit and the Iraq Policy Unit;

and a [redacted] were two names I recall. I was successful and appointed subject to successfully qualifying to be issued with a sidearm, which was a mandatory requirement for the posting. I was to given temporary promotion for the duration of my secondment, approved by my Chief Constable and the Police Authority. I was made acting Assistant Chief Constable, the next rank up from my current rank.

My preparation comprised of:

Prior to my actual interview for the post with the FCO I was able to meet and discuss the posting with Deputy Chief Constable Douglas Brand. He had been posted to Iraq since July of 2003 and had been working in Baghdad. I was able to meet him sometime in November or early December in South Yorkshire when he was at home on leave. He was able to brief me about the situation in Iraq and the scope of the task in hand. He made it clear he needed a senior Police Advisor in the south to link with him and emphasised the importance of whoever was appointed working with him.

The secondment required me to be armed so I attended a 3 day 'conversion' course to qualify me to be armed with the Glock pistol. I was a former authorised firearms officer with West Yorkshire Police. The Chief Constable ensured I underwent 3 days training which 'converted' me from the revolver pistol to the Glock semi-automatic. I had exclusive use of two West Yorkshire Firearms trainers.

In mid January 2004 I attended a 6 day FCO approved Hostile Environment Awareness Training Course, (HEAT).

In terms of personal briefings; I no longer have any notes but I can recall the following meetings.

I attended the Permanent Joint Headquarters at Northwood sometime during January 2004. There I was briefed by two Lieutenant Colonels about the military mission in MND (SE). I recall that their military operations were explained to me, military lines of command and which nation was assigned to which province, and the overall military aims. I recall two things in particular from our discussions, they emphasised the need to get civilian police expertise on the ground and recognition from the senior officers briefing me that the military only had limited skills in civilian policing. The second point was the need for me to ensure that once in country I regularly met and briefed the General Officer Commanding, who at that time was Major General Andrew Stewart. This point was emphasised.

I also revisited the FCO where I picked up my personal issue equipment. I was given a verbal briefing from [redacted] who was I believe attached to the Iraq Policy Unit. He outlined what was required. I cannot now recall the detail of that briefing, nor do I now have any notes to refresh my memory, but again I recall the main thrust being that the military could only take policing to a basic level and civilian policing expertise was required to improve the Iraqi Police Service. Again he emphasised the need to ensure I liaised with the General Officer Commanding.

I also met [redacted] from the Home Office. She was very supportive and requested that I copy her in to my weekly reports from Iraq.

My own Chief Constable was keen to brief me. He had spoken to Chief Constable Paul Kernaghan of Hampshire Police, the ACPO link for International Policing. My

Chief Constable gave me advice and I was under no illusion that he fully supported my secondment and indicated that I could contact him at any time for help and support.

Finally, I did my own research, meeting two Iraqi nationals living in West Yorkshire and obtained some background information about Policing in Iraq.

I deployed in early February 2004 to the CPA in Basra.

Lines of Reporting

My lines of reporting were not straight forward. I was to report to the in-country CPA Regional Co-ordinator, UK Ambassador for CPA (South), Mr. Patrick Nixon. I was also subordinate to Deputy Chief Constable Douglas Brand. He worked in Baghdad and was the overall UK Policing Advisor for Iraq; I was his deputy in the South.

I also produced a weekly report for the FCO in London. This was sent to

at the FCO, and at the Home Office. I also copied in DCC Doug Brand in Baghdad.

Lines of reporting were further complicated by the gap in my predecessor leaving Iraq and me arriving. My predecessor Stephen White, an Assistant Chief Constable from the Police Service of Northern Ireland had left Iraq at the end of December 2003 I believe, and I arrived around the 10th February. In the meantime the Prisons Advisor, Mr Gareth Davis had by necessity become the head of the Rule of Law pillar in which prisons, police and judiciary sat within CPA (South). The lines of reporting within CPA (South) had been determined prior to my arrival, with Gareth Davis representing policing at weekly CPA meetings. I therefore reported through

him. That said, I got on well with Gareth and I had regular personal meetings and briefings with the CPA Regional Co-ordinator, UK Ambassador Mr Patrick Nixon.

Contact with DCC Doug Brand in Baghdad was more problematic. Communications by telephone or e-mail were extremely difficult. I recall it taking 3 days to finally make contact or get a reply to an e-mail.

Support Provided

I felt in principle I had good support from the FCO, the Home Office and my own force. Dealing with my own force first, they appointed a senior personnel officer as my single point of contact. She had direct contact with the Assistant Chief Constable responsible for Personnel.

The FCO had provided moral support and reasonable equipment. Mr [redacted] was my single point of contact. It was also clear that [redacted] in the Home Office not only wanted me to keep her updated operationally, but had said that if I had any concerns I could raise them with her direct. So I felt I had good moral support.

I was also made aware that Chief Constable Paul Kernaghan was ACPO lead officer on international policing and was keeping a close eye on the mission. I did indeed communicate with him direct from Iraq on issues of concern on 3 or 4 occasions.

Where I think support was lacking in the mission was in terms of an operating budget. I had no access to funds to support the work my team and I were doing. On the basis that our full life support, food, welfare, etc was provided no provision was made for an operating budget. Mobile telephone, sim cards were expensive and in demand. The Law and Order pillar were given phones to share, so I shared a phone

while in Basra. We lacked other pieces of equipment which did not become evident until we arrived in mission and would have made life more bearable.

The Danish police contingent deployed with a £200k cash float, enabling them to buy further phones, pay for meals when entertaining Iraqi counterparts, and some basic welfare essentials like fridges and cooling fans. I was unable to make such purchases.

Upon my return in September 2004 I was debriefed and offered support from my home force immediately upon my return. I was also given a month's paid leave.

It was some time later, the following year 2005 when I attended a two day formal debriefing with the FCO at the Ministry of Defence Police Force Headquarters at Wethersfield. I considered this debrief reasonably good, but too late to be of any real value to me.

Policing Strategy

The overall plan for policing in Iraq.

Before I deployed there was not, to my knowledge one overarching coalition plan for police reform in Iraq. If there had been one in existence then the people briefing me before my departure did not make me aware of it. On my arrival in Basra, UK Ambassador Patrick Nixon, who was very supportive of my role, told me to do what I thought was right, I was the civilian expert.

On my arrival I found that the coalition military were already heavily involved in police reform and had undertaken a lot of work in auditing manpower, police stations and equipment and were then starting to put things in place to stand the police up. They introduced a radio system into police stations and were sorting out nominal roll and payroll issues. It soon became apparent, given the sheer weight of military numbers and the work they were delivering that my role could only seek to enhance and guide their efforts. The military had already formulated their own plans for police reform which I then actively sought to try and support and influence.

Initially there did not appear to be any sense of an overall policing plan emanating from Baghdad. Within a week or so of my arrival in Iraq, I went to Baghdad and met with DCC Douglas Brand. Partly because he was not sighted on what was happening in Basra, and partly because he was extremely busy with issues in Baghdad he simply told me to get on with working out what needed to be done in the south and keep him updated. He arranged to come down to Basra a couple of weeks later where I briefed him on my plans which he approved. DCC Brand was then able to tell me something of what was being planned in Baghdad and we discussed how I could support this in the South.

As I began working some co-ordination of plans did emerge. There were plans to provide a nationwide command and control system with each province having its own control centre referred to as the Provincial Joint Operation Centres (PJOC's).

I was also aware of steps being taken to provide a forensic science capability nationally. A national programme of scenes of crime training was being delivered in

United Arab Emirates, by the German authorities. 17 Iraq Police Service (IPS) operatives in my region were trained during my deployment with another course provisionally scheduled for September 2004. Upon completion of the course students were provided with a basic personal scene of crime officer's kit. I undertook projects to complement and support this.

Other evidence of a co-ordinated plan was the TIP training course. The Transitional Integration Course was being delivered to provide former regime police officers with a course designed to help them make the transition from the old style of policing to a new more democratic style, and also to have some common minimum standards. It was flawed for a number of reasons.

In the South the TIP training was being delivered at a number of sites including the Az Zubayr Police Academy outside Basra, where I was responsible for around 22 British civilian police officers. (There were also other police trainers at Az Zubayr including Danish and Italian Carabinieri, and at some point Czech police)

My police trainers told me that the TIP course had been taken from Kosovo where it had been used to train Kosovo police, but little had been done to tailor the course to Iraqi needs and culture.

Secondly, what started as a 4 or possibly a 5 week course plus a firearms training element was cut down to 3 weeks and before I left there was talk of reducing it further to 2 weeks plus 2 days for firearms training. I believe the reductions in the

length of the course were made to ensure sufficient numbers of police were trained to meet military training targets. Quantity rather than quality.

Finally, the quality of the trainers was in doubt. First of all in many parts of the country training was being delivered by military personnel who were teaching a civilian policing training course. Secondly, the 22 British civilian police officers working at Az Zubayr and training the Iraqi Police Service, whilst serving police officers were not all qualified trainers. They had been recruited by the FCO for general police duties, but once recruited were told they would be delivering training at Az Zubayr. So despite their best efforts they were not necessarily the best people to deliver training.

Az Zubayr Police Training Academy was underfunded and my staff struggled to make any improvements. On my arrival there was a big issue about improving physical security at the site. Steps were taken but money was always the issue. There were other issues also, for example, there were no telephone lines or computer links and communications were extremely difficult. There was a need to improve some of the infrastructure issues like the toilets and the provision of improved drinking water but funding was initially hard to come by.

It is worth mentioning at this stage that on the morning of the 21st April 2004 suicide bombers targeted a number of sites in Basra and the environs. One target was the Az Zubayr Police Academy. There were two attacks at the site. The first targeted Iraqi police officers and local staff queuing to enter the site through security. The second attack 30 minutes later targeted the rescuers. Some 10 people were killed,

not including the bombers, believed to be 4 in total, and many scores of people injured, including 1 of the UK police contingent, though not serious. This was obviously a serious and devastating incident, which also caused serious damage to the site. However, due to the enormous efforts of the police contingent and the military, the site was again up and running within, I think, two weeks.

In terms of the UK's role and contribution and the arrangements for determining any plan, I saw a heavy military hand in charge of police reform planning. There were concerns I believe in Baghdad that police reform was taking too long, (one of the reasons the TIP training course was shortened) and that the military could not withdraw from Iraq until the Iraq Police Service could stand on its own feet.

I am aware now, having read Paul Bremmer's memoirs; the US Administrator in charge of the CPA and having spoken personally with Paul Kernaghan, that there was very little pre invasion police reform planning on the US side and none on the UK side. Following the invasion, by July 2003, DCC Douglas Brand worked in Baghdad as the senior police advisor, influencing planning on behalf of the UK.

I was also disappointed that there was no handover from my predecessor ACC Stephen White. I was aware that he had been able to establish the Az Zubayr Police Academy, which in itself had been a major success. It had been opened I understand by UK Prime Minister Tony Blair in December 2003. However, I was not able to establish what had been done or planned to be done with wider police reform from the CPA in Basra, other than, as I said earlier substantial work being undertaken by the coalition military.

So in absence of handover notes I set about doing what I could to advise the coalition military and develop my own immediate priorities, in consultation with DCC Brand and his direction from Baghdad.

How policing fitted in with wider security sector reform.

Much was being done by the coalition military to reform the Iraqi Armed Forces with police reform as an afterthought to the military intervention. This is evidenced by a series of statements and evidence provided to HMG Defence Select Committees between 2004 and 2008.

In the UK in January 2005, Chief Constable Paul Kernaghan, told a government Defence Select Committee that, 'Pre the toppling of the Saddam Hussein regime, there was no liaison...with the British police in any shape or form.' (House of Commons 2005b)

Kernaghan revealed that the first contact with the Association of Chief Police Officers was '72 hours after the famous statue toppled in Baghdad.' (Ibid) The statue was toppled on the 9 April 2003. The committee hearings also revealed an internal FCO paper of December 2004 which reported the 'low level of mutual understanding between military and civilian police.' (House of Commons 2005b Q257) The primary focus for UK planning was, according to Mr Howard, the then Director-General, Operational Policy, UK Ministry of Defence, 'the future of the Iraqi Army and not its police', (House of Commons 205a p55) In fact Howard went on to say that,

'establishing a civilian police force 'from scratch' was not something MOD assumed it would be engaged in prior to going into Iraq. '

The coalition military did subsequently 'engage' in police rebuilding on a large scale. This I believe evidences that the security sector reform priority was military reform, with little or no thought given to police reform before the invasion.

The rationale repeatedly put forward for this lack of post invasion planning by UK officials was that, 'In the run up to the launch of the operation, it was important to avoid giving the impression that conflict was inevitable, as we still hoped for a diplomatic solution to the crisis.' (House of Commons 2004 para 356) (House of Commons 2005a p15)

This was not accepted by the select committee who said, 'we believe that it was a misjudgement by the [UK] Government to have decided that planning to meet the needs of the Iraqi people following a conflict was particularly sensitive — more sensitive, even, than the deploying of military forces. This misjudgement unnecessarily constrained planning for the post-conflict phase.' (Ibid)

Policing post invasion was not in my view widely considered as an important component of wider security sector reform prior to the invasion.

The arrangements and responsibility for developing overall strategy for policing / security sector reform.

Despite what I have said about the lack of post invasion planning, there were arrangements in place to develop strategy for policing in 2004. In Basra and the South, the coalition military responsible for the 4 provinces in the south held regular weekly or fortnightly meetings, working on their reform agenda. Much of this had been determined by them before I arrived and their plans were in action. However, I was encouraged to attend and contribute. This was run by the UK military Provost Marshall, a Lt. Col. in charge of the Military Police. This was a strategic meeting where activities and plans were co-ordinated between the 4 provinces. The Provost Marshall ensured I had a voice at these meetings and did openly defer to me as the policing expert.

I also organised my own weekly meetings with my own team leaders. I quickly developed plans approved by DCC Douglas Brand and set about putting them in place. I linked in with the military at their meeting and encouraged local military officers to attend my meetings, which they did.

However, the plans being decided upon and delivered were more tactical than strategic. There appeared to be a lack of strategic vision about the style of the police force we were trying to shape. This is the view of former Chief Constable Paul Kernaghan who I met in 2008 as part of my MA dissertation research, and this appeared evident in 2004.

How my own objectives and priorities in Basra were determined.

Developing my own objectives and priorities was not straight forward. As I have said I found that the coalition military were already engaged in many activities to strengthen the police. I felt I needed to do three things, look at what I could do in an advisory capacity to help guide and influence military strategic thinking on police reform. This was very difficult and I only ever felt I was only tinkering with the edges in many cases. Secondly, with my small team to look at the gaps in what the military were doing and start to take steps to fill those gaps. Thirdly to review the work ongoing at the Az Zubayr Police Academy and look at what could be done to improve the work being undertaken there.

Another complication was the arrival of two DynCorp international police advisors from Baghdad some 6 weeks or so after my arrival. I was now working with the coalition military, and had my own objectives that I was pursuing with the agreement of DCC Douglas Brand. I was in discussions with the FCO to bring in 3 UK Superintendents to coach and mentor three of the 4 Provincial Chiefs of Police and the Dutch military were arranging to provide the 4th mentor through the Marechaussee, a military gendarmerie style police service.

I was told the two DynCorp international police advisors were former police officers from the US and were working in Baghdad. They would be coming to Basra to scope the feasibility of bringing in more DynCorp advisors to undertake police reform, specifically working as mentors in police stations. This appeared to be a decision made by US Authorities in Baghdad. DCC Douglas Brand told me to receive them and to work with them and look at how best to use them.

Clearly extra resources were very welcome but it was unclear how these were going to be managed and co-ordinated and whether the plan was sufficiently joined up.

The complications were that I was unsighted on their terms of reference and any master plan they were working to. It appeared they had come to look and see what they could do to help. DynCorp were talking initially in terms of bringing 190 or so staff to Basra, which in itself had complications. This figure was later revised to around 60. The security situation in the region was declining and force security, provided by the coalition military was becoming an issue.

This was also at a time when the FCO were looking to contract a UK company to bring in around 40 policing advisors to undertake a similar mentoring role in police stations. The complication was that I would have more direct control over the UK contractors and no command or control over the DynCorp advisors. Clearly co-ordinating these resources and agreeing a common approach to police reform including the style of policing we wanted to introduce was going to be an issue.

Bagdad was keen to send DynCorp policing advisors. The US DynCorp police advisors who were to be working on the police stations mentoring the Iraqi Police were operating to a different policing style; one based on a US model and arrived with no clear vision of the reforms they wanted to make. I did include them in my planning, although it was made quite clear they were not answerable to me. In the event I left before they had made much progress.

To summarise I developed my objectives and priorities by scoping what was already being done and then using my knowledge and experience to develop my own objectives through what I called the IPS Improvement Programme. I designed and delivered these objectives through a small team of people. In order to co-ordinate and structure the activities of the international contingent (initially UK and Danish police, later joined by the contractors, two US DynCorp and UK ArmorGroup) the Team Leaders meeting was introduced. Initially the meetings were held weekly then later less frequently as work progressed. The meetings were also attended by two or three UK military Major's who were based in Basra and took the trouble to attend and contribute to my team leaders meeting and certainly helped to formulate my plans.

My team consisted of; me, a deputy, a staff officer, 3 Superintendents who were the Chief of Police mentors, and based in each of the 3 provinces they were responsible for. I had a Chief Inspector Crime and a Chief Inspector responsible for the cadre of officers at the Az Zubayr Police Academy. I also liaised with the Danish Team Leader, a Chief Superintendent in charge of a small team of Danish police officers who were delivering crime and management training at the Academy. I also liaised with the Dutch Col from the Marechaussee who was mentoring the 4th provincial Chief of Police and based in that province, and the two DynCorp international policing advisors.

Weekly reports and updates were communicated to DCC Douglas Brand in CPA Baghdad, as well as the FCO and at the Home Office.

Co-ordination between various nations.

The co-ordination between various nations differed. In the main countries were doing their best to get on with the job and of course the CPA in Basra was staffed by multi nationals from the respective coalition countries.

Co-ordination between Intergovernmental Organisations, Whitehall and between military and civilian structures.

In relation to intergovernmental organisations and Whitehall, I did not particularly experience anything on which I can usefully comment. The relationship between military and civilian structures was at times problematic in relation to communications and liaison. Also there was a duty of care issue for civilians that required far more robust safety measures for their movement and deployment. The police officers deployed were civilians and were subject to these restrictions.

The military were not as restricted in their movements and this caused resentment in the military as there were times when the restrictions placed on civilians got in the way of the job. I do know that many civilians took substantial personal risks to carry out their work. It is worth pointing out however that the military took enormous risks to carry out their work. Just attending meeting could be a life threatening event.

The real issues I felt were in relation to communications. The CPA (South) was situated the palace at Basra and the main military command under the British was at the International Airport outside the city. For the civilians, moving to the airport was not easy. The military, understandably for security reasons would not allow the use of insecure e-mail account contact, and the secure lines for computer or telephone

links were at times nonexistent. It took weeks to get a secure telephone line installed. A day later it was accidentally removed by a lorry moving through the grounds. It took some time for it to be reinstalled. To overcome this I looked at the feasibility of one of my staff volunteering to work at the airport as a liaison officer but this did not come to be. Mainly because this was outside any of my staff's terms of reference, and no-one volunteered.

Other than this I felt the relationship was generally good. Two of my three Chief of Police mentors were embedded with coalition military and again the relationship was broadly good. The Police Academy at Az Zubayr was also co-located with the military. They were very obliging in helping and accommodating my staff.

What was I trying to achieve?

As I stated earlier, I assessed what was needed to be done in terms of filling gaps in the work the military coalition were doing. Through my Team Leaders meetings and the assessments I made when I first arrived, I developed the IPS Improvement Plan.

I was able to further my plans by the provision of funding through the Commanders Emergency Response Programme, (CERP's) this was seized money that enabled the military commanders to allocate funding to specific projects designed to support the rebuilding programme of Iraq. Funding was allocated to the military and some to the CPA, and through the CPA (South) (in co-ordination with the Military to ensure no duplication), I was able to access and spend US\$3.2 million, which was allocated across the 4 provinces before the end of June 2004.

This IPS Improvement Programme focused on a number of key areas.

Crime Information, getting basic crime reporting standards into police stations.

Command and Control, assisting with the introduction of radio systems and advising on the Provincial Joint Operations Centre being introduced by the military in co-ordination with Baghdad.

Scene of crime capacity. Whilst the provision of a forensic laboratory was outside our capability and was being looked at by CPA Baghdad, there was work we did to introduce some improved scene of crime capability to complement the national activities in this area. US\$800k was spent on scenes of crime and forensic equipment.

Custody. This initiative involved reducing the number of custody suites to between 6 to 14, per province depending on the size of the province. This enables more focused specialist custody training courses to be designed and delivered and the equipping of the custody suites to establish a more human rights compliant and accountable custody regime. US\$25k has been set spent on custody equipment. US\$900k was spent on prison and police prisoner conveyance vehicles.

Mentoring of Chiefs of Police. This was introduced and delivered with varying success. It was not possible to mentor these individuals on a daily basis for a variety of reasons, but nevertheless some mentoring took place co-ordinated through the Team Leaders meeting.

Academy Improvements. A programme to improve both the infrastructure and the training curriculum at the Az Zubayr Police Academy was undertaken. US\$56k was spent on computer and IT upgrades. US\$9k was spent on improving the firing range.

In addition, training provision at the Academy was re-aligned. Better use was made of staff and those we had trained as trainers and with no impact on the TIP's training the following courses were designed and delivery commenced in late June 2004. Utilising the skills of the 22 UK police officers; an intermediate crime course, a short course in stop and search checks and maximizing vehicle checkpoints and an intelligence analysis course. Other courses were being developed as I left the mission.

Additionally, and away from Az Zubayr Police Academy my team developed a very effective public order training course. A large number of IPS officers were trained in riot control by a very capable Police Service of Northern Ireland police Chief Inspector. The military were impressed by the standard of the trained officers and through the CERP's fund I was able to complement the training with US\$10.5k of public order equipment.

I was also able to purchase the following:

Ballistic Vests – US\$ 1.2 million.

Surveillance equipment and vehicles – US\$ 106k

Motorcycles and associated safety equipment – US\$ 100k

The procurement of this equipment was not easy. The process was managed quite rightly though the CPA (South) following strict CPA procurement rules, requiring the usual specification documents, tenders from 3 suppliers and a managed process for awarding contracts. The problems were the need to complete the process before the

middle of June 2004 ahead of the handover of sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government. This created an enormous amount of work. Neither my deputy nor I felt we had the skills or resources to do this, but in the absence of anyone else on our small team my deputy and I simply did our best.

In addition to this I worked with the UK military in designing and conducting a process to refresh the Basra senior command. This involved writing role profiles, designing recruitment and selection processes and conducting interviews.

The factors that affected what you achieved

The level of financial and human resources at your disposal

The factors which affected what I could achieve were as follows. I was not informed of the master plan before I deployed and at times it felt uncoordinated, partly because of communication difficulties with both the UK military in Basra and the CPA in Baghdad. My main problem was lack of staff. I had far too few staff to fully undertake the massive amount of work that we should have undertaken, but greater numbers would have presented problems in accommodation and equipment. When we were sharing mobile phones and at times computers we felt underequipped. The opportunity to bid into the CERP's funds that were available to CPA (South) was a major benefit to my work, but I lacked the necessary skills to complete this task on my small team, and it was left to my deputy and me taking us away from other duties.

In terms of other financial support I have already mentioned the lack of an operating budget.

Your relationship with CPA Baghdad

My relationship with CPA Baghdad was good despite the lack of communication available. DCC Brand kept me updated when he could. I did at times feel there was a lack of co-ordination between CPA Baghdad and CPA (South). The example I cite is that for a number of weeks Baghdad wanted us to take delivery of an 'Academy in a box', seemingly unaware that we already had a Police Academy at Az Zubayr, which had been opened by our Prime Minister.

The Academy in a box was everything we would need to set up an academy, portacabin, classrooms, accommodation, kitchens, toilets and generator etc. It was a number of weeks before I could convince Baghdad that we had an academy which had been successfully training the TIP course and now other specialist training for some time.

Relationships and interactions with Iraqis, including my view of the effectiveness of the Iraqi police.

My relations with the Iraqi counterparts were generally good, although I was not clear on the level of corruption. I heard lots of anecdotal evidence but no concrete evidence. There were third hand suggestions of prisoner abuse and steps were taken with the coalition military to deal with this, through ensuring proper procedures were put in place and regular checks made. The reforms to custody was one of the

projects I began working on to ensure procedures limited the opportunity for prisoner abuse.

The effectiveness of the Iraqi police service varied significantly across the provinces. While some were incompetent and barely carrying out the basic functions of policing with no concept of service to the public, others were making a reasonable job of it given the serious security situation, the lack of equipment and training.

The selection procedures I have mentioned that I conducted with the Basra senior command gave me a real insight into the potential. One test included a series of operational questions about the strategy and plans they would employ in a series of operational policing situations. Some of the answers were very good and gave me hope that some of the leadership knew what they are doing.

That said the force clearly had a long way to go, and the close control and influence of the Ministry of Interior over local policing was an issue in that it stifled local initiative.

Lessons for the future.

Planning.

The failure to plan for post invasion police reform is a lesson for the future. The plan however would have to consist of a number of phases. The first phase should aim to ensure local police and security forces have law and order control over citizens. Easier said than done, when as we know many police simply walked off the job in

many parts of Iraq in the days following the invasion and Debaathification removed leadership. Secondly, a serious look at establishing the model of police that would best suit the environment. The UK model is not an ideal model to transfer to a post conflict environment; it would need a quasi military capability to combat insurrection on the scale seen in Iraq. This planning phase, which could be commenced pre invasion, should include stakeholders from the host country at an appropriate time. The next stage would be to develop that model through institutional infrastructure building and training, with countries best suited to deliver that donating resources and capability.

Another lesson which has been clearly learnt in Iraq is the need to reform the Ministry of Interior. They require reforms to meet the new demands and this has now taken place in Iraq, and some 3 years down the line this has been undertaken.

Finally on planning, all the questions I have been asked to cover have related to policing, but the steps taken in Iraq to also reform justice and prisons, with advisors working together (in Basra within a rule of law pillar, police, prisons judiciary) was and is clearly the right approach.

Staffing issues

I feel that too few police advisors were deployed too late. Proper pre-invasion planning would have decided the numbers. In terms of what I felt I needed extra when I was deployed, at least half a dozen more police advisors to work on specific police improvement projects, a Military Liaison Officer and staff officer to embed with Military Command and two project workers with project management, bidding, and

accountancy skills. Specifically these two people would work up bids, manage contracts and finalise projects.

Operational Budget

The contingent should have been deployed with a £200k operational budget.

Diplomatic Passport

Travelling across the Iraq/Kuwait border was extremely difficult given the history between Iraq and Kuwait. UK Personnel had some serious difficulties at the border. However it was noted the ease with which our European counterparts passed through immigration checks having been issued with a Diplomatic Passport. I would strongly recommend that personnel working in post conflict countries are issued with diplomatic passports.

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