

Statement to Iraq Inquiry  
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Acting Deputy Chief Constable, Senior Police Adviser and Director of Law and Order for the Coalition  
Provisional Authority of Iraq July 2003 to January 2004.

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1. My name is Stephen White and I am a retired member of the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). I served in the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and PSNI from 23<sup>rd</sup> July 1978 until 30<sup>th</sup> September 2004 achieving the rank of Assistant Chief Constable on 1<sup>st</sup> April 2001. During 2003 I volunteered to serve in Iraq and was given the temporary (acting) rank of Deputy Chief Constable between 14<sup>th</sup> July 2003 and 14<sup>th</sup> January 2004 when I was posted as "Senior Police Adviser and Director of Law and Order, Southern Iraq" attached to the US led Coalition Provisional Authority and based in Basra.

2. I make this statement voluntarily and welcome the opportunity to give evidence to the Iraq Inquiry. The information provided by me in this statement is based on my memory of events which took place almost seven years ago but it is supported by contemporaneous personal notes; paper copies of documents and emails made at the time; and, newspaper and other media coverage relating to my work in Iraq.

3. By way of preamble I wish to record the following: I was a willing and dedicated professional volunteer and consider it a great privilege to have served in Iraq. However, I reflect on my time there with some sadness and much frustration. I truly believe that there was a wasted opportunity, soon after the removal of Saddam Hussein and his regime, for "the West" and in particular UK policing to provide much needed support to the liberated country, specifically its four southern provinces. However, due to many problems and difficulties (even if these can be explained or justified for a variety of reasons) I believe that the contribution and efforts of a few highly committed individuals were prevented from making more significant differences during my time in country. This is not just my personal view. I believe this conclusion is supported by the facts and the analysis shared by many others.

4. In my own case, at the outset, I willingly 'signed up' for a potential two to three year posting but due to many factors which I will specify (including lack of resources and information) I left Iraq after six months service. My CPA "line manager" in Southern Iraq, Sir Hilary Synnott, in his book, recorded that "For its part the British Government sent a senior police officer from the Police Service of Northern Ireland with considerable experience in counter terrorist operations . . . Assistant Chief Constable Stephen White was told on being recruited for the job that he was to be in operational charge of the Iraqi Police in the South. But he quickly learned from the unit in the FCO and from the CPA Headquarters in Baghdad that there was no question of him, or anyone else at this stage assuming such a direct, hands-on role. This was both a disappointment and a missed opportunity". I agree with that conclusion.

5. Therefore, for me, it is of the utmost importance that the Inquiry understands that any criticisms which I make; failures which I highlight; and lessons which I suggest, are not made for petty point scoring reasons or motivated by personal vindication. They are offered because I genuinely believed then, and still do today, that UK police expertise if prepared and mobilised properly can offer much to Iraq (and in other theatres).

6. I was fortunate to be afforded a second chance to support reforms and post conflict efforts in Iraq – for five years as Head of Mission of the European Union's Rule of Law Mission for Iraq, under the auspices of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). This in itself is evidence of my commitment to Iraq. My EU experiences in Iraq, from December 2004 to December 2009, also

colour my views and the recommendations provided in this statement. I now provide evidence as requested, commencing with an outline, in chronological order, of my major experiences and reflections on my six months in Iraq from the summer of 2003. I commence, as requested, with issues relating to my appointment and follow the sequence of headings provided in the notice to appear before the Inquiry.

7. Although time prevents me from summarising every event neatly under the headings provided, I believe when followed as a narrative some of the key challenges stand out starkly – lack of, or at least constantly changing, plans; complicated lines of reporting where information and analyses were not always shared, or at least agreed; frequent changes of leadership; inappropriate and mismatched resources; competing organisations (such as military and civil commands) and tensions between individuals; and, dominating all of the above, a deteriorating security situation with rising violence, disorder and crime being tackled mostly unsuccessfully by an effective local police service. The headings (below) will be used as a guide to the following statement:

Your appointment

- Notice of and preparation for your posting to Iraq
- Lines of reporting – to the Coalition Provisional Authority and to the UK
- Support provided by the FCO (as the department responsible for civilian secondments to the CPA), other UK government departments, ACPO and your home police service

Policing strategy

- The overall plan for policing in Iraq, the UK's role and contribution and the arrangements for determining this plan
- How policing fitted in with wider security sector reform
- The arrangements and responsibility for developing overall strategy for policing / security sector reform
- How your own objectives and priorities in Basra were determined
- Co-ordination between various nations, Intergovernmental Organisations, Whitehall and between military and civilian structures

Delivery

- The situation on the ground when you arrived and how it developed
- What you were trying to achieve
- The factors that affected what you achieved
- The level of financial and human resources at your disposal
- Your relationship with military and other civilian staff in Basra
- Your relationship with CPA Baghdad
- Your relationships and interactions with Iraqis, including your view of the effectiveness of the Iraqi police

8. I begin this evidence by relating in chronological order the events, based on my notes, which were the main milestones and defining moments for me personally and for policing in South Iraq during the six months from 14<sup>th</sup> July 2003 to 14<sup>th</sup> January 2004. I will conclude this statement with my view regarding lessons learned.

9. On the 6<sup>th</sup> June 2003 ACPO circulated, to all Chief Police Officer ranks, a bulletin titled "Secondment Opportunity: Senior Policing Adviser to the CPA – Iraqi Interior Ministry". On reading it, particularly the skills profile, I felt that I had exactly the career experience needed for such a task. It was also clear that situation was urgent – with a cut off date for applications on 10<sup>th</sup> June and deployment to theatre before the end of June.

10. This obviously left little time for preparation, but this was not my major concern, being used to fast moving situations, my main worry related to time of deployment because I was in charge of major public order operations in Northern Ireland up to 13<sup>th</sup> July. However, after making enquiries I submitted an application for the post on 9<sup>th</sup> June. In my letter to Chief Constable Paul Kernaghan I made it clear that I possessed strengths which could be used to good effect in Iraq such as: leadership; strategic planning; implementation of change management programmes; vast experience of working with the British Army; budget and resource management; training; international development; counter terrorism and public order management; and others. I was deeply aware that I had no experience in the Middle East; Arabic language skills; and no cultural, political or security briefing as yet – but assumed such support would be forthcoming in due course.

11. On 11<sup>th</sup> June I was informed that ACPO had put my name forward to FCO and I attended for interview a few days later. The 3 person panel at the FCO comprised of [name redacted], [name redacted] and a police officer – [name redacted]. I had made some hurried research and was aware that the policing strategy for Iraq (contained in a 3 page FCO UN Department document dated 3<sup>rd</sup> June) consisted of 3 phases. Phase one (in which I assumed I would play a key role, if selected) was the deployment of a 3000 strong International Police Monitoring Force (IPMF) to Baghdad and Basra “to conduct joint patrols with the current Iraqi police force and coalition military. The aim of this would be to provide on-the –job monitoring and mentoring assistance to the Iraqi Police. This IPMF would be under the command of a Police Commissioner who would also take responsibility for taking decisions in conjunction with the CPA-IM and senior Iraqis on the future of the Iraqi Police Force.” When I attended for interview I was prepared, with evidence, to demonstrate that I could perform the role of the IPMF Police Commissioner and contribute to later phases e.g. overseeing training and police reform programmes. During the interview I displayed my knowledge and experience of comprehensive police reform programmes – particularly the Northern Ireland police change management programme (Sir Ronnie Flanagan had appointed me as the programme director for the RUC/PSNI’s change management team) and the Mongolian Police democratisation programme – for whom I had written a community policing strategy.

12. After my interview, which was conducted in a professional manner albeit that I thought it was conducted by reasonably junior officials, the police officer accompanied me out of the building and we spoke on the steps. At this point he informed me that I had done well and asked, if I was to be chosen, which of the “two posts” would I prefer – Basra (operational command) or Baghdad (supporting the US-led strategic planning team)? This was the first I had heard of the other (Baghdad) post. I immediately opted for the Basra post – assuming it would be more hands-on, operational command of a large task force, working alongside the British Army which I was very familiar with and in a UK-led region. On accepting the post which was later formally offered to me, I was still of the opinion/belief that this would be my role. On reflection, this became a major issue for me, the CPA regional co-ordinator (Sir Hilary) and those I worked with for much of my six months as it became clearer, bit by bit, that such a role, task and strategy was never going to be implemented.

13. It is also worth mentioning at this point that my appointment in late June generated a fair degree of media interest – nationally, but particularly so in Northern Ireland where my appointment led to BBC Northern Ireland seeking permission from my police service and the FCO to make a fly on the wall documentary. Later this was to cause some controversy so I wish to make it clear that the FCO and PSNI supported the venture.

14. On 24<sup>th</sup> June I attended a “pre-mission briefing” at the FCO. Another ACC (Doug Brand from South Yorkshire) had also been appointed and it was clear that the priority was to have us deploy immediately, “to send a signal to the Americans that HMG see policing as a key part of security

sector reform (SSR)". It was accepted that I would deploy immediately after major operations concluded in Northern Ireland and apart from a one week recce in July, I would take up my post in mid August. At the briefing I made it clear that I had two key concerns – the need for a clearly defined role/job description and to whom would I be responsible. During my first months in theatre these concerns cropped up frequently – not so much that I was in doubt, but others had many and varied opinions on these issues.

15. On 25<sup>th</sup> June I attended another meeting with CC Kernaghan and ACC McDermott of the Ministry of Defence Police (MDP). It was clear that there were many unanswered questions floating around; however, I was reasonably relaxed, believing at this stage that matters would of necessity be fluid and still in a stage of formation. I expected that most matters could be resolved on the ground working with partners but I did note that MDP raised concerns about command and control, their function in the overall strategy and about conditions.

16. There was evidence of some tension or areas of debate between ACPO and FCO - for example CC Kernaghan insisted that FCO should know exactly what the role of UK police should be and mentioned that ACPO have the lead on Islamist awareness training. [name redacted] stated that this was counter intuitive as the FCO have skills in this area. There were also some indications of tensions in the US camp. There was some talk that "Slocombe" was taking an interest in policing and "Kerik may be sidelined". I noted that [name redacted] stated that the military had produced a paper on policing reform. This became a critical issue during my time in Iraq – i.e. who was ultimately in charge of policing strategy - the military (CJTF7) or the civilian CPA? At this stage these names were new to me, I now of course know Bernard Kerik quite well and the talk that day was that he (former Commissioner of NYPD and then at that time head of the interim Ministry of Interior in Baghdad) may not be in it for the long haul – perhaps only setting up the Baghdad police and then returning to USA. I also learned that Dyncorp (a major US commercial concern) were in charge of a project to "get people and equipment" but not part of the overall strategy. (This was to become a critical issue – the availability and use of private contractors). I also heard that HMG had the perception that it was not fully involved in the decision making process. I noted that representations were made to Washington and HMG is trying to reshape and influence decrees to make sure that they are not so reactive. It was therefore imperative, we were told, that Brand gets fitted into CPA structures and influences policing. In my notes I recorded "Kofi Annan meeting PM and UN (having previously said 'no') may get involved in policing" and that Kerik had objected. My notes continue "FCO want DB just to get in there and get Kerik's ear and then the (his) role can grow with authority".

17. It was clear that all was not settled, but again this caused me no great concern as I expected order and certainty to take some time with so many competing factors. I asked if there would be one single police commissioner and was told no. [name redacted] continued "Stephen is very fortunate in that he can bring whoever he wants into the CPA South Region – provided Olson agrees". This referred to the Head of CPA South Region at that time – a Danish diplomat. I understood that in effect he would be my line manager on the ground. I made the point that Brand and I needed to work closely together so that my "best practices in Basra" would be supported by the central, Baghdad-based, policy makers/adviser. Likewise, I asked for his advice to Baghdad (Kerik) to be relayed to me so that I could support it or pilot it.

18. During this briefing I heard that the military were taking control (of policing) e.g. the Department of Defence was i.c. not the State Department. I heard that a "Gendarmerie model" is being considered and that Slocombe was impressed by this after talking to a Spanish Guardia Civil general. I also heard that EU would not be immediately involved but this would continue to be explored and that they may, sometime later, have a mission like their one in Bosnia. The briefing

continued with [name redacted], the police officer attached to FCO, pointing out that one UK officer was already in Baghdad – [name redacted] who was giving “eyes and ears briefings” to FCO. The picture painted was of more confusion, frustrations and difficulties. My notes state that “Kerik is surrounded by advisers and gate-keepers – nothing is coming through”. “[name redacted] feels marginalised. His informal approach is not appreciated. He is training the Facilities Protection Service but is not being fully appreciated or used”. I also noted “Some seminars are being planned for senior officers” and “Olsen will be pushing for Danish officers to be involved in training.” Other comments which I recorded showed that there was a view that people are trying to muscle in and “take over” the policing mission. At the time I saw all this as typical of a large and complex task with many stakeholders and competing organisations, countries, agendas and even cultures. In hindsight it now seems clear that the seeds for major turf wars, confusion and dysfunctional relationships were already sown.

19. Then the briefing went into details of our conditions of service and allowances. Not all details were known, but for me this was not a problem, I was simply keen to deploy and try to make some progress on the issues raised. I was informed that in Basra I would be under British Army housing, protection and feeding. This was all fine by me – in a real sense I felt that having been supported by the army in Northern Ireland for all my police career here was an opportunity to help them. Again with hindsight this was obviously not exactly what they anticipated either from me personally or UK civpol in general. The coalition military forces (certainly in the South) were keen to relinquish police training and mentoring duties, but as things turned out, they were not relieved of any duties in 2003 because the police task force never materialised.

20. Another briefing session took place, this time from [name redacted] who had recently returned from Baghdad. He described CPA operations in Baghdad as “bunkered down” and “still under attack” but Basra as “normalised” with “good community relationships”, “patrols on the ground in soft headgear and no armour”. He also described OHRA as being “no more” with CPA now “the lead organisation under Bremer”. He explained that CPA orders and regulations were being issued on such issues as border controls and financial controls and that the Geneva Convention Occupying Forces regulations continue to apply.

21. RN Captain [name redacted] gave a briefing. I noted his words “we are about influencing US policy, but playing in a US game”. He explained that the Iraq Policy Unit (IPU), to which he was attached, chairs a working group with MOD, FCO, DFID, Home Office and I think there may have been an intelligence presence. The aim was to ensure that the UK approach is coordinated. He said that “the original, US, security sector reform (plan) was not originally strategic or holistic – some progress is occurring. Slocombe’s focus has been on rebuilding the army”. “Kerik was given the lead in rebuilding the Interior Ministry – primarily the police”. He explained that Kerik and Slocombe had recently met, that Slocombe was not originally focussed on policing, but a plan is starting to come together. “Kerik is difficult to communicate with and already has his plan and does not need anyone to tell him how to do his job. Douglas Brand is going into a difficult position – the amount of influence depends on the person”. Again on reading these notes, almost exactly 7 years later it is striking how certain issues were already identified and these would continue to be played out during my time in Iraq.

22. In relation to my own post, [name redacted] stated that my “arrival is likely to receive a welcome. Olsen the Danish head of CPA South has a small team – some DFID and some military”. When I questioned him about my role he offered the view that my role would be “primarily as policing adviser at the starting point – the only senior policing adviser to Olsen as the RMP and MDP will work initially under military command”. “Eventually you may become police commander and

then hand over to Iraqi Police". Again my belief was confirmed that an international task force would be formed although [name redacted] said at the meeting that he was not so optimistic that they (resources) would be found.

23. We were informed of the murders a day or two previously of six RMPs in the southern Maysan province. [name redacted] also informed us that Kerik had passed the latest police strategic plan to Bremer and there was an assumption that it had been accepted. I also heard that "Olsen is thinking of leaving and if so UK will be replacing that person". My final note from that briefing, underlined, states "[name redacted] will be our boss and (in my case) Olsen". This is exactly as I recall the chain of command being described – the head of CPA South to be my line manager in theatre and [name redacted] my FCO line manager. I was somewhat surprised that someone more senior (for example the Foreign Secretary or other minister) had not met us or briefed us, but all in all I was reasonably satisfied with the information provided. Iraq was clearly a "moving picture" and I was reasonably content that with resources, once established in post, I could adapt to the situation and successfully bring my skills and experience to the issues.

24. Later in the afternoon I sat in on a video conference in the War Cabinet Room chaired by the Deputy CDS with delegates in Washington, Brussels, Baghdad and Basra. The recent killings of 6 RMPs were discussed and I then recorded the main issues identified by the Deputy DCDS as being: "the development of a mission plan; a campaign design to deliver the mission (largely US); and a general sense of UK effort and effect – 'this relationship is key'". I recorded further notes and updates from for example FCO, MOD, DFID. The FCO identified lack of consultation as a big issue; their need to be more adequately involved. MOD sought news on "Olsen"; FCO reported that he may leave South Region. A British general from Washington reported that the US saw a "need to internationalise the situation in Iraq".

25. Several other key issues were discussed such as command and control in Iraq over the next 18 months; the need for a mission plan and campaign; for other troops to be involved; the fact that an overall strategy was currently being developed; the need "to unlock the money"; deal with protests (in Iraq); the new army; and Olsen's departure. This list is not exhaustive but my notes show that the security situation was (even then) described as "worsening" with more sophisticated and better planned attacks.

26. Nevertheless, there were positive feelings about the British contribution. The DCDS indicated that roles and responsibilities needed to be sorted out and a Brigadier was to be despatched to Baghdad to "scope Britain's role in the future". There was some criticism of ORHA (now CPA) Central reported from ORHA South under Olsen - that words were not being turned into action. In his summary DCDS reiterated military support (I assumed from MNDSE) for Olsen (and any successor). I left this meeting with the clear impression that it was the military (i.e. UK military) who were really in touch with the situation. I was impressed by the fact that the "top brass" was leading and involved and affording Iraq priority; the amount and variety of resources deployed; by the live regular briefing and feedback sessions; their prioritising of objectives; knowledge of the US position; and support to ORHA (later CPA) South. My opinion was that I would find a natural synergy with the military activities in Basra and all the issues raised were matters I could perhaps assist with – depending on my role, location, access, resources etc. In short, despite all the many challenges and problems which were highlighted (not least of which was security) I felt confident that I, and UK and/or international policing, could contribute positively.

27. On the afternoon of 25<sup>th</sup> June I attended a pre-meeting at FCO chaired by [name redacted] (temporary head of UND) where I noted that "casualties taken (yesterday) in Iraq has changed the

picture” – “our starting point was that things would be OK within the military footprint”. This was the normal operating procedure for many years, in some areas of Northern Ireland, so I was not unduly concerned. I learned that the MDP had offered a team of 20 trainers. My main questions related to the role for police including MDP – would we be trainers, mentors or monitors? I learned that the policing “plan” for Southern Iraq had 3 constituent parts – the National Iraqi Police, the International Police Monitoring Force (IPMF) (which I assumed I would command) and a “UK group” which included the 20 MDP officers led by a Superintendent Joe Elder.

28. This was the first time I had heard this plan. I also learned that the “academy project” (something which I was hearing about for the first time but would become heavily involved in) had already been agreed and funding approved. This was not an accurate statement. Matters were not yet completely clear. (I accepted this). It appeared that some believed that the MDP police officers would operate under military control and would be involved only in training. I asked at the time “What does PJHQ want the MDP team to do?” “Are there buildings and facilities already there?” I was told that limited property was available but not the eventual training academy and was told (by Chris Scott, from PJHQ) that the deadline for the academy was 1<sup>st</sup> October. I learned that a TIP programme (Police Transition and Integration Programme) was to be taught to all former Iraqi Police (based on courses already used elsewhere such as Bosnia and Kosovo). One of the contributors stated that “Whatever the TIP is or MDP do, it must be in line with the overall policing plan/strategy i.e. Kerik’s plan – that is if there is a plan”.

29. At this meeting a briefing was given on the murders of the 6 RMPs and the different histories of and situations pertaining in Basra and Maysan. I agreed to go to Iraq in mid-July (my earliest opportunity) with a small scoping team from MDP. It was felt that perhaps this would allow time to “take breath” (to mid July) and adopt a more structured, progressive deployment.

30. All present agreed that the main thing was to have joined-up strategic thinking and agree “the basics” for establishing the TIP programme. I understood that during this time (i.e. the next few weeks) some more clarity might be found with [name redacted] undertaking to speak to potential UK contributors, the possibility of me meeting the RMP Provost Marshall (home from Basra) and further assessment of the security threat. Following from these events I would lead the scoping mission to Southern Iraq with a few MDP officers and start making preparations to launch the UK (police) mission.

31. Another meeting followed immediately (also in the FCO) concerning MDP deployments. The agenda had 5 items: security update; legitimacy of policing activity; security sector reform - UK strategy; UK contribution to policing in Baghdad and Basra; and, division of responsibilities – strategic and operational. I took short notes. They recall that the security situations in Basra and Maysan provinces were discussed and in summary the overall mission would not be deflected.

32. Captain [name redacted] described Maysan as like “South Armagh in the 70s” and this for me clearly reinforced that any police activities there would require military accompaniment – but at this time I did not form the opinion that UK police resources may not be dedicated to the area. [name redacted] went on to outline, in relation to SSR, that “the UK are engaging with US” in particular Walt Slocombe who is leading reform. [name redacted] explained that Slocombe had oversight of criminal justice system reforms and “no strategy is developed yet but UK is contributing to it”. I then heard for the first time (but not the last) that according to Prime Minister Tony Blair (as [name redacted] put it) “the southern AO (area of ops) i.e. UK AO is to be an exemplar for this reform”. This made it crystal clear to me – that as a UK police officer, soon to be the most senior on the ground I understood that the Prime Minister, HMG, expected me to deliver results.

33. Being a results-driven professional in a results-driven service, I felt perfectly comfortable with this brief – at that time. There was some discussion, to which I contributed fully, about the fact that some areas of improvement and influence can be addressed even in the absence of detailed strategy. I agreed with the concept that “we” could and should demonstrate as soon possible the British role and intentions through an early implementation strategy of “quick wins”. With hindsight my commitment to the notion of “quick wins” and then having to face the frustration of no resources to deliver them, was at the root of my eventual frustration in Iraq.

34. As a senior officer in the UK police service, working in Northern Ireland for almost all my career, I was very comfortable adhering to national instructions and guidelines – but also driving specific changes needed in a particularly divided, volatile region. I was forming the view that South Iraq had a similar position in Iraq and CPA South the possibility of a similar relationship with CPA HQ (Baghdad). Later I was to discover only some people understood such a view and shared such a notion but [name redacted] at this meeting again pointed to lack of clarity from Baghdad and the USA and suggested that I (and my team when allocated to me) “need to be flexible in approach”.

35. I noted that I was being asked to go to Basra and make an assessment about “what assets we can contribute and when”. I noted that FCO was “rowing back” from the initial plan to deploy MDP resources immediately and was taking a more structured and measured response than even two weeks ago. The real urgency, as expressed by [name redacted], was to get access to decision and policy makers. I noted him as saying “the only way we (UK) can influence is to imbed with the decision makers. Bremer and Rumsfeld are the decision makers and we need to be alongside them ASAP”. His words made sense to me but I felt really perhaps persons of a higher rank and position probably needed to be saying them.

36. My main point for action from the meeting was to immediately focus on what my resources would be. I recorded that I need to “get ACPO to agree ‘my team’ – the skills, staff remit, etc.” MDP clarified that their officers would deploy only under ACPO direction. CC Kernaghan said that he agreed with the “small team first” approach and I made it clear that I was of the opinion that we (and myself in particular) were clearer about what we are trying to achieve and the steps to take. There was further discussion on the need for an organisational chart, the need for UK police to be armed and other matters before a Home Office delegate stated that “The exam question is not being answered. If the PM says we need more policing and the RMP are reducing by 75% and we are just about to scope, when more police?” At this point it becomes very clear that despite the operation to remove Saddam and change the regime in Iraq commencing in March 2003 (and presumably planned for months if not years beforehand) there was no agreed (UK) plan for policing operations, training and wide-scale reform.

37. I asked the obvious question in response – “What can we do now, (if UK police officers are expected on the ground now while RMP are withdrawing) and I am being asked to take operational command but I have no resources?” CC Kernaghan replied “All the Home Office have asked ACPO to deliver is (nothing) other than two ACCs”. It was pointed out that the MOD had agreed to send 19 MDP police (of which four are trainers). Despite some further discussion, I left the meeting unclear about resources and timings – other than my upcoming scoping mission in July. My final note that day contains open questions - “Which pieces of the jigsaw are definite? Will there be an IPMF? Will 6000 international officers be deployed to Iraq?” I then flew back to Northern Ireland to take command of major public order operations which consumed all my time to 13<sup>th</sup> July.



38. Shortly after the meetings I received a 3 page copy of minutes taken by Kernaghan. The final section, "Actions Agreed", paragraph 1 contained details of my first task – to go to Basra and undertake a training needs analysis and in addition "assess what non-training CIVPOL support was required, if any, and make recommendations in respect of the Southern AO accordingly". Paragraph 2 informed me of the chain of command for reporting SSR: "Bernard Kerik would be the individual to whom ACCs Brand and White would report to in terms of SSR". Although this added another person to my reporting requirements (previously outlined as [name redacted] in the FCO and Olsen in Basra) I was not unhappy or in any way confused by this seemingly sensible direction.

39. Kernaghan's notes (like my own) made it clear that the PM wanted success ("the PM was authoritatively quoted as wishing to see the Southern AO [de facto the British zone] develop as an exemplar for the whole of Iraq"). However this was in spite of the fact that it was acknowledged, again in Kernaghan's notes that, "as yet no agreed CPA [USA/UK] strategy has been agreed, let alone promulgated". As someone who is used to getting on with things in difficult and complex situations, none of this deterred me – I saw my future job as one giving me the opportunity to develop plans and influence situations, something which motivated me greatly. A few days later I read an article in Police Review quoting Kernaghan about Baghdad "I would only be happy with British volunteer officers providing training in a secure compound" but at that stage it appeared to have no relevance to what I was about to embark on in Basra.

40. On 30<sup>th</sup> June I received an email from [name redacted] explaining that conditions in Basra were "primitive to say the least". Then two more documents were sent to me – one was an email dated 7<sup>th</sup> July containing initial terms of reference in a letter dated 2<sup>nd</sup> July from [name redacted] (FCO) to Kernaghan (ACPO). The other was a copy of a letter from [name redacted] also dated 2<sup>nd</sup> July to MDP outlining terms of reference for the two officers who would join me in Basra as part of the UKPAT (police advisory team) - the first time I had heard that terminology as opposed to IPTF or IPMF. Both letters made it clear what my role was: "to undertake a TNA and assess ... the conditions in theatre and liaise with HMG (IPU) and ACPO with a view to ascertaining under what circumstances and with what purpose further UK policing assets should be deployed . . . and Stephen White's responsibility will be to implement CPA strategy in Basra alongside the UK military forces activity". I now note that this was copied to Alistair Harrison, Head UND, which looks like he was the third person to hold that post, full time or temporarily since my first interview (a few weeks previously). The conditions of service were contained in the terms of reference and they included the fact that "officers will work on the basis of six weeks on, two weeks off". This seemed generous but later was to cause difficulties – not least because it meant that rarely were the three UK civpol in theatre at the same time.

41. At a short meeting/conversation with [name redacted] (FCO) on 10<sup>th</sup> July I received a few more details. [name redacted] told me that Brand had been well received in Baghdad and that FCO wished me to go to Baghdad to make contact with Kerik "who may not stay there more than 2 months". [name redacted] said that Brand and I "may end up taking over the show". I was told press lines would be out the next day and for national media coverage issues to liaise with the FCO Press Office, but to address local requests via my own force. I was informed that there had been some discussions with the NIO about the availability of the full time PSNI reserve officers (the PSNI was effectively running down this complement of trained and armed officers). I also learned that Kerik had asked the Foreign Secretary for 100 UK police officers and that the Home Secretary had asked UK Chief Constables to respond to this request to find 100 armed officers. As this would be a slow process, PSNI had been contacted. (The PSNI had, in the past, been able to rapidly deploy armed officers to Kosovo). I also learned that a disused airbase in Hungary was to be used to train Iraqi police. Finally, I was told that I would be met by two MDP police in Heathrow on 14<sup>th</sup> July who would

have equipment, uniforms, my weapon and ammunition and they would be my team for my first deployment to Iraq. The above is a true (and as comprehensive as I can supply) account of the events leading up my deployment to Iraq including briefings about my role, task, resources and the situation in country.

## Deployment.

42. On 14<sup>th</sup> July I was met in Heathrow by the two MDP officers who would accompany me to Basra, and for most of the next 5 months be my only UK police companions. They had brought vital equipment for me including a pistol, ammunition and body armour. At my request prior to leaving Northern Ireland my force had provided me with refresher weapons and tactics training. The majority of uniform items issued were sadly unsuitable for the climate with temperatures often in the 50s (centigrade) and on one memorable day above 60. We were driven to Basra from Kuwait.

43. I first met the Regional Coordinator for South Region - Ambassador Ole Olsen - in the CPA building. We discussed a range of issues and I particularly recall him telling me that several nationalities were already working on police reform in the region with international expertise from Italy, the Netherlands and Denmark. We agreed on the need for coordination and I agreed to go to Baghdad on the following Friday to ensure that there was good coordination between Baghdad and Basra (i.e. the South), and, between the UK and USA. I was then taken on an introductory tour of the location by Major [name redacted] (RMP). He expressed his number one, immediate, concern as the safety of the building. He showed me an organisational chart for the region on which I appeared as "Director of Security – Law and Order" with responsibility for customs, border issues, the criminal justice system and prisons (this was all news to me). He presented (using PowerPoint) the military operation and informed me that as 2<sup>nd</sup> in command of the RMP, his aim was to hand over all these (Law and Order issues) to me.

44. So on my first day in country it became very clear that the military in the South (MNDSE) saw me (i.e. UK civpol) as their relief – from all law and order reform duties – not just police reform. This expectation was to become very evident and the cause of much tension throughout my tour of duty. I learned that countries in the Coalition had military police officers in the region – all carrying out various tasks to support civilian policing. [name redacted] explained that UK military "Rule of Law Strategy" aimed to restore civil order and included the following priorities: deter criminals; assist and monitor the police reconstruction; rebuild the legal system. I asked if this was agreed with CPA and was told that this was "MOD/UK policy – so far as military involvement is concerned". [name redacted] explained how Coalition military police officers (such as RMP) and Italian Carabinieri were working to their limit on "CIMIC" activities but that the CPA was not yet effective. Again, this was to become a key theme in almost all my dealings with the military – the fact that the civilian (CPA) was not delivering while the army were engaged in tasks not particularly suited to their resources.

45. A second presentation from [name redacted] covered "MNDSE Military Police - Support to Civil Police Reform". I learned that their "concept of ops" was to get "Iraqis back to policing with professional standards having been set and monitored" and that MNDSE police evaluation teams (PET) were the cornerstone of the process. I learned that this plan was developed by the Provost Marshall of the 1<sup>st</sup> UK Division RMP who was the "policing adviser to the GOC. I was impressed with the comprehensiveness of the plan, but somewhat surprised that I had not been told of it back in the UK. The activities and aims included: police accountability and oversight; training (including firearms); a complaints system; review committees; the issuing of police ID cards and uniforms; and the handling of a weapons amnesty. When I asked him, [name redacted] told me that he was unclear about the formation of an International Police Task Force.

46. I found this interesting as it seemed that the UK military were expecting UK police to take over (not an IPTF). I was told again, as I had been in FCO meetings that the size of the RMP contingent in MNDSE was to be dramatically reduced. I then had a short meeting with Janet Rogan, deputy to Olsen. She also expected me to take on the role of Director of Law and Order. Considering

she was a UK diplomat I found it odd that her view of my role differed so much from the terms of reference set by the FCO only days beforehand. I explained that personally I was willing to be flexible but pointed out that I had no executive authority.

47. I pointed out that I needed clarity on this point particularly if my team and I were expected to accompany Iraqi Police and especially if additional senior police experts were soon to be arriving from other coalition countries (as I had just heard that Denmark and Spain may be sending senior officers to the region). She agreed with all my points especially, my fear that “there may be too many chiefs and not enough Indians”. Her response also included the statement that “we needed ‘the plan’ to guide us all”. By this I took it that she meant a Baghdad/CPA plan – evidence that a definitive policing plan had yet to be produced. We discussed the possibility of proactive pilot schemes (the “quick wins” discussed in Whitehall which could show willingness and our capabilities) but she advised me to be mindful of Baghdad’s role in all of this. In terms of law and order Janet explained that the key priority is to “stand up” the Iraqi (operational) side of the various departments i.e. the police, military, customs, immigration, border guards, justice, fire and emergency – and the ‘Home Office’ i.e. Ministry of Interior (MOI) strategy and policy side.

48. She stressed the absence of, and urgent requirement for, (Iraqi) strategy and policies. I discussed the difference between what the FCO (UND) terms of reference required of me (an immediate TNA and assessment of other civpol requirements, hopefully then followed by a command role) and what she and Olsen required – a senior figure to oversee all the CJS reforms. She told me this would be no surprise to Baghdad as Kerik had already had a look at Basra, as had a UK person working on prison reforms in the MOI in Baghdad. My notes record that Janet explained to me that they (CPA South) had told CPA HQ (Baghdad) that “we are setting up a strong law and order pillar” and that they “will not know the detail”. She explained that what was needed, and what she envisaged was a senior figure to oversee all the planned CJS reforms, but not necessarily in a hierarchical sense (although I would be the line manager of all the police).

49. I voiced my concerns (again) about what could be done at the regional and provincial level as opposed to national initiatives, before we had policies and directions from the centre. Her answer reassured me, echoing the sentiments I had heard in London about getting on with things and being an exemplar, setting the pace etc. I learned that 8am meetings were held each day for all CPA staff (they could all fit into one room), that a number of pillars were in place and in the case of the law and order pillar some staff (2) were already in Basra e.g. [name redacted] dealing with criminal justice, and a single person dealing with customs (who shortly left Iraq within days or possibly weeks). It seemed (and was) woefully inadequate, especially compared to military resources, but there was a belief that more international experts would join the CPA South team. I noted, while talking to Janet, that in her view my job would have three elements – Director of Law and Order, Senior Police Adviser to CPA South and Police Adviser to Iraqi Police.

50. My main thought after less than one day in country was about the ‘disconnect’ between London and Basra even in simple matters like how the Danish Regional coordinator (and his UK deputy) envisaged my job title and role and how much the British military (especially the RMP) expected from UK civpol. The next morning I discussed these expectations with my two-man MDP team and was joined by a TA RMP captain (who was a police officer back in England). He expressed a view that the army was keen to leave Basra and leave policing and other criminal justice issues with UK civpol and CPA.

51. I then spent more time being briefed by Major [name redacted] who explained that he had been tasked to produce, for CPA, an operational budget forecast for the next 6 months (which

included policing). It was clear at this time, that the military were also staffing the CPA units to quite a degree. I made the point that my team must be involved in anything to do with our job description. [name redacted]'s information highlighted the pace of things in Basra and the obvious need for civpol (and other civil expertise) to have been there from the outset. I was made aware of the threat level (medium to high) and of recent incidents (such as an IED attack in Basra two days previously) and tensions which were manifesting themselves in street protests and disorder.

52. I was informed that the RMP had selected the current Chief of Police in Basra (Brigadier Aklo) and the commander of the police academy (Colonel Sadiq). Arrangements were made for me to meet these Iraqi police officers and to visit the site already chosen (by RMP) to be the Basra police academy. This was the police academy project discussed at one of my first meetings in the FCO and it is important to note that some initial work (such as finding the site and appointing an Iraqi head of training) had already taken place even before I arrived in Basra. Later there were to be various claims and statements about how this important project (which I assumed responsibility for) had been initiated.

53. I met Colonel Sadiq (who had been an Iraqi police officer since 1983) that day (16<sup>th</sup> July 2003) and learned that he had 8 staff (none of whom had any training experience) helping in the academy although building and refurbishment work had not yet commenced. He had been appointed to training just two weeks previously. I learned (for the first time) about the Iraqi criminal/penal code and the ineffectiveness of local police e.g. the fact that "they would do nothing at VCPs without the British being there" and the range of basic training needs; from patrol skills to weapon handling, from arrest techniques to interviewing skills. I then visited the proposed site for the academy (near Az Zubayr approximately 12 miles from Basra) and asked Sadiq for his opinion. He told me he thought Basra would be better for security reasons, but the UK military had already chosen the site which was now the subject of contract bids. I learned that Kerik had visited and approved the site. This is an example of how, on arrival, I found that certain matters were already settled and I inherited other people's plans which appeared to be approved. UK civpol and the local Iraqi commander had not been involved in the choice of, design and type of academy, yet the military were planning to hand this and other projects over.

54. Back in Basra I met and was briefed by 19 Brigade's "police team" which included a TA sergeant (who was a UK police officer). I learned that inspections of police stations were taking place and early work had commenced on local training and discipline. I agreed that we (UK civpol) should meet them regularly and was again left in no doubt that the military expected UK civpol to take over programmes. My next meeting (this was still day 2 of my deployment) was with the local Basra chief of police (Brigadier Aklo) and his Iraqi political adviser. We were briefly joined by GOC Major General Graeme Lamb and the CO of RMP who had both been visiting police stations and not impressed by the lack of activity. I had an informative meeting with the Iraqi Chief and he made it clear just how bad things were. He requested police training to start "below zero" because he was not dealing with fresh recruits but 'unfresh'. He said he liked the site for the police academy and could secure it, contradicting Sadiq's views.

55. Later I discussed the academy project with Major [name redacted] and learned that it was (in his view) to be a regional resource for all 4 southern provinces. I indicated to [name redacted] my desire to engage with police chiefs in each province and all those internationals involved in police reform. He offered assistance with travel and security. The next day, I attended my first CPA team meeting chaired by Ambassador Olsen. We were advised by Olsen to write up project proposals and submit them to Janet Rogan "to make best use of funds". I briefed him and others about the police academy and my willingness to take the project forward. He encouraged me to take it forward and

press Baghdad for funding. At that time the estimated cost, prepared by RMP, was approximately \$1.2million. Later that day I read papers prepared by RMP on the project. This project became an example of the kind of “bottom-up” policy and strategy making which was happening in MNDSE – in this case successfully. Even though Kerik had visited and approved the site, it was taken forward at local level with little involvement from Baghdad other than funding.

56. The first academy project paper was prepared on 9<sup>th</sup> June 2003 and reported that an initial visit had occurred on 21<sup>st</sup> May 2003 to secure a site, originally only for Basra province. An RMP warrant officer was the original project manager and the hope was for a 6 week building/refurbishment programme once contracts were awarded. A second paper now entitled “Regional Police Training Academy” aimed for an opening on 1<sup>st</sup> October. The delivery of training curricula and programmes were expected to be provided centrally from MOI Baghdad. The paper noted that CPA had requested an International Police Task Force (of which 65 officers will go to the academy). I read that Kerik had visited the site on 16<sup>th</sup> June and CPA had officially endorsed it. This encouraged me (it appeared that the South was moving ahead as HMG wished) and reinforced my belief that an IPTF was to be reality in the future. I noted that I would need to appoint a suitably qualified project manager once (my) resources were allocated. I also read in the (army) paper that the site was endorsed in a “Strategic Policing Plan for Iraq” and I noted, as a priority, that I needed to see a copy of this plan.

57. On 17<sup>th</sup> July I met Brigadier Bill Moore, 19 Brigade Commander who chaired a weekly Joint Security Meeting (called SCM – Security Committee Meeting). The agenda reflected current priorities: coalition forces security update; actions taken since last week; Basra chief of police’s update; plans for training; discussion on the feasibility of neighbourhood watch schemes; security of universities and hospitals and kidnappings. The intelligence and security briefings indicated key areas of concern to be crime, extremism and terrorism. There was also discussion about the need to establish an Iraqi Police “Special Branch” with me, RMP Major Tichener (sadly murdered shortly after) and Chief Aklo requested to pursue this matter. I noted this as yet another requirement which UK civpol might handle in the future, along with training and mentoring (classroom and on the job), establishment of public order units, police budgetary management.

58. Training and monitoring of Iraqi police was discussed at length and I made it clear that until appropriate civpol resources were deployed the training currently provided by RMP and soldiers should continue as I did not see it as being “at odds” with any future, more comprehensive professional police training. I took substantial notes from this first SCM meeting and it was made very clear to me (even on my 3<sup>rd</sup> day in theatre) that the UK military had many concerns about security and policing; were making comprehensive local plans; trying to deal with many non-military tasks; and expected UK civpol resources to assist in many ways – not just in training. My notes indicate that this included local community policing forums, neighbourhood watch schemes and many other schemes to harness public support and minimise vigilantism. I noted as priority actions the need to prepare a community policing strategy and to hold a seminar/workshop for senior police leaders to take such matters forward. I also noted that the future police team in Basra would require a political adviser.

59. I then had a very useful meeting with Brigadier Moore. I admired his honesty when he shared his concerns openly with me – which included the overly benign picture being painted about Basra. The UK military had fired 700 rounds in the last two weeks. He expressed a view that the FCO and Home Office “were not tied in”. He was of the view that when he finished his tour there must be “interim control” of the Iraqi police. He saw this responsibility as falling to me (the senior police

officer) and an international police force although he was not impressed by ACPO's response to date.

60. Later I was briefed by the Chief of Staff (MNDSE) who described the situation as "we are managing imperfection". He explained that there were 16,000 troops from various nationalities and although RMP resources were reducing the Italians, Portuguese, Czechs, and Dutch were providing military police resources throughout the 4 southern provinces. He talked about a timely withdrawal while the Iraqis still supported the coalition forces' presence, the overriding importance of policing and poor post-war planning. He related clear priorities echoing what Janet in CPA had told me – deter criminality; assist and monitor police reconstruction; rebuild the Iraqi legal system; reform the Iraqi prison system; and detain war criminals. He made it very clear that the military, while tackling these issues as best they could, expected CPA to lead in these matters.

61. It was obvious to me that a large vacuum would occur in the area of police support (having heard about the resources under military command such as the Italian Carabinieri and Portuguese GNR) unless an IPTF under CPA command would be deployed quickly with sufficient security cover, to replace them. The COS made it very clear that, in his opinion, Baghdad is where the power lies and that moving against it would be unwise. I learned that Bremer was "writing his 'Vision for New Iraq'" and the CPA South idea for a law and order directorate may not fit into Baghdad's plans. As an example he pointed out that border police would be trained by the army and this was already agreed in Baghdad.

62. At this time, it seemed to me that the British Army was better briefed than CPA South, better resourced than CPA, had a clear plan with priorities, established local contacts – but was lacking in civpol strategic and operational support, despite making use of TA soldiers and RMPS who were police officers in GB. I met and was briefed by Brigadier Brearly from the British army, a military adviser and liaison officer to CPA. It appeared to me immediately that a reciprocal senior ranking police officer from CPA could do a similar job if imbedded with MNDSE. Brearly informed me that in his view CPA Baghdad was making policy in isolation, "but nevertheless it is policy". In many regards after the first meeting I saw him as an ally, one of a few "opposite numbers" on the military side, but like so many others he was to leave soon. I suspected that the military's relatively short tours of duty may cause problems (if UK civpol were to be around for years) similar to Northern Ireland with constant briefings and restarting of relationships.

63. On the 18<sup>th</sup> July (day 4) I flew to Baghdad and was briefed by Douglas Brand who painted as I noted at the time "quite a depressing picture". He was settling in and was "now accepted" by Kerik but he described the situation as a "Baghdad two step" with progress one minute and setbacks the next. I then had a one hour meeting with Kerik. I noted that we were well received (I had never met him before but he knew of me as I had worked with NYPD and knew his NY chief of police well) and that he gave a reasonable briefing on his job (as shadow minister of interior) and his strategy. The key facts I recorded included: the importance of vetting police recruits; his acceptance of my role as envisaged by Janet (director of law and order); well advanced police training plans for a training academy in Hungary which would provide TIP and recruit training and most importantly how he saw my role. In my notes concerning his welcome to me I noted that he saw me as "a police commissioner for Basra and the South Region's 4 provinces". He reiterated the need for an international police task force (of 6500) to police Iraq and that they would have executive powers. In colourful language he explained that he would take 5000 for Baghdad and allocate me 1500 for Basra/the south. This meeting from the man in charge of MOI and policing in Iraq left me in no doubt of my future role – which at the time I was extremely satisfied with. It never materialised.

64. It would be fair to say that within 4 days of being in Iraq and consulting with the military, CPA Basra, CPA Baghdad and local Iraqis I was aware of many of the challenges and various conflicting views about the way ahead. All this was set against a very serious growing threat of crime, disorder and violence (not least against Coalition Forces and the international community). I received a number of briefings which at times presented a very unclear picture. I was being told that a strategy was still being written and therefore not promulgated. However, I was also told there were advanced plans – e.g. for training in Hungary with agreed curricula. Later in Baghdad I saw a Bosnia police training curricula with the word Bosnia struck out and Iraq written on it. I was being told at one time the IPTF for which I had been recruited as commander would be unlikely, yet the man in charge of MOI and policing in Iraq was telling me directly I would have 1500 officers, with executive authority, to command in the South.

65. It was made clear to me that in MNDSE extensive and to my mind quite valid work with Iraqi police was being done by the army and military police. Also, that their expectation was that I and civpol would be relieving them of these tasks in the very near future. Yet at this stage, with only two officers, I was simply carrying out a scoping mission. It was blindingly obvious to me that hundreds, if not thousands of international police advisers, mentors and monitors operating within a security footprint would be required to deal with all the policing problems existing and likely to come about.

66. My immediate personal concern was about my role, resources, powers and responsibilities and indeed who I would work with and report to. It seemed the CPA (both in Baghdad and Basra) had clear views that I would work with and to them (although in Baghdad the clear priority was operational policing, not overseeing all criminal justice reforms as Basra saw things). The army (i.e. MNDSE) had a different view – that I would be able to contribute to “their policing plans” and quickly replace RMPs and other military resources. At the time, I saw merit in me (and as many [UK] civilian police assets as could be mustered) working with the GOC at his Basra airport HQ. The drawback to this idea was his HQ was at the airport remote from the city - but at least there was a plan, projects, partnerships – and at that time relatively free (but protected) movement around the provinces.

67. It is worth recalling that the brief given to me and written in the press lines issued before I deployed, contained the aspiration that “HMG is looking at the deployment of up to 100 police to work as part of the CPA reform strategy”. I formed the view that this full complement should be deployed as soon as possible and for many (if not all) to work alongside me in MNDSE. In an email from CC Kernaghan (2<sup>nd</sup> July) before my deployment he had urged Brand and me to “think outside the box in relation to any resources subsequently required in Iraq . . . we may be able to present options to HMG which are not currently contained within that conventional box. However, ultimately whether or not HMG avails of additional options is a matter for them.” This email, and subsequent information when I heard that the FCO had approached PSNI about recruiting retired officers for Iraq, served to convince me that serious efforts were being made to raise 100 police officers (retired or otherwise) to work with me – soon.

68. Consequently, on 19<sup>th</sup> July I returned to UK (for various PSNI commitments and some leave) and arranged to brief FCO on my findings. The 2 MDP officers stayed in Basra keeping me informed – for example that several Danish police trainers had arrived, that Ambassador Olsen had left, that Sir Hilary would replace him etc. During this time, as I later learned, Brand had asked for UK police resources to be allocated to him (Baghdad support staff, atrocities investigators and body recovery assets). In emails about this request Kernaghan pointed out to FCO (and others) that “all requests for additional UK support are (to be) processed in an agreed manner with a clear audit trail”. Kernaghan made it clear that he had not received “a formal request from the FCO and endorsed by the Home



Office . . . (and) ACPO has no requests from the FCO/Home Office outstanding". This made the process to be followed very clear to me, but also demonstrated that communications and copies were going to many quarters (FCO, IPU, UND, Home Office, MOD and CPA) which in turn might result in one or other group thinking that requests alone meant agreed allocations, even before decision making had taken place. It also made it clear to me that Brand, in CPA Baghdad, was asking for a share of the 100 possible UK civpol assets. So I was unsure if my requests would be attended to promptly and in a positive way.

69. In my opinion it is important when retrospectively considering the development of policing strategy for Iraq in 2003; policing plans; determination of priorities; UK contributions; and relationships that such examples and incidents are taken into account, used as examples and, to a degree, explanation of what things were like and what occurred during that time. I have no doubt that individuals and organisations were doing their best, but with security deteriorating, leaders leaving and new ones arriving, the scale of the challenge and the lack of civilian resources it was probably inevitable that tensions would arise and disjointed activities occur. For my part I tried to stick to my original (fairly wide and flexible) brief about assets while at the same time deliver a specific TNA.

70. Before flying back out to Basra to complete the scoping mission I met [name redacted] at the FCO. I heard that Kerik was leaving and Brand may take over his role. I was informed that there was some good news regarding international police assets but the bad news was that they will be focused in Baghdad which will reduce the initiative in Basra. The plan for Iraqi police training to take place in Hungary was still on but FCO had concerns about how much consultation there had been. There was some talk of Brand "getting sucked into Ops, not a strategic role" and "strategy not getting out". I was informed that the US was considering outsourcing "some of the things they do not have the capacity to deliver". This again made me feel that the use of retired (PSNI) officers was an option. I noted the comment that "when Kerik goes, his culture goes with him" and understood what that meant. Although he had been clear enough with me, he did not impress me as a sophisticated police officer with a strategic, community based approach – more in the style of tough, "wild west" law enforcement. I learned that attempts were being made to involve the international community such as UN, OSCE, EU and that an important donor conference in Madrid was scheduled for late October when SSR and policing would be discussed.

71. With regard to my own situation I was to "have first shout on the MDP officers, even if they came in dribs and drabs, to deliver training". I was told that "Basra will be getting 50% of the attention Baghdad gets" but encouraged that we agreed that my action plan on return to Basra was to urgently complete the TNA and identify trainers' needs such as armoured vehicles and equipment. I was asked to prioritise what was needed urgently out of the "100" and told that they could all go to Basra if it proved necessary to deliver there. Yet again I was reminded, by [name redacted] this time, that "Basra is to be the exemplar".

72. In the afternoon I met Sarah Macintosh FCO UND and was informed that an IPTF was not being raised (at least not any time soon) and encouraged to "make policy and implement (it)". I now know that on 31<sup>st</sup> July Kernaghan sent a memo to Chief Constables England and Wales (I am unaware if it went to PSNI) indicating that a trawl notice would shortly be sent from IPU FCO "seeking volunteers to form a pool of officers for potential deployment to Iraq". In this 3 page "personal briefing" Kernaghan points out that "Douglas Brand has been appointed as Chief Police Adviser to the MOI (Baghdad). His main task being to support the Iraqi Chief of Police (Baghdad). Stephen White has taken up a similar appointment based in Basra." It appears that since my

deployment a few weeks earlier a view about my role had developed which was not in line with the CPA view that I was “Director of Law and Order for Southern Iraq”.

73. Most importantly the paper, which I do not recall seeing at the time, places heavy emphasis (quite rightly) on the security risks and movement difficulties, the need for all officers to be firearms trained, the scarcity of resources and legitimate concerns over liabilities for pensions and injuries. The paper reinforced the view that 100 police was the number being discussed. “A deployment of 100 officers drawn from a larger pool of trained personnel is a relatively minor commitment for the entire service”. The paper requested support for officers who express a desire to join the pool but clearly pointed out that “deployment will not be authorised until the conditions and specific tasking justify it. Equally the risk to personnel cannot be overlooked”.

74. The paper ended with the words “our professionalism is desperately required in Iraq and I am confident the UK police service will rise to the challenge”. Although I did not see the paper at the time, it is clear to me that there was at least an expectation that 100 UK civpol may eventually deploy to Iraq but that the security situation was a major factor. During the time I was out of Iraq, Sir Hilary met my small team in Basra and in an email to me from Chief Supt Elder, dated 31<sup>st</sup> July; I learned that the Ambassador “was keen for the civpol team to develop a transition plan for the handover from the military to the civil police. He expects to have something by October with an update to the plan for December”.

75. Reflecting on these two events alone – Kernaghan’s paper and Sir Hilary’s request it is clear that at that time there was (with CPA South and FCO) an expectation that civpol would take over some functions from the military – but that the UK contingent would be no more than 100 officers. Squaring this circle could only be possible, to my mind, if an IPTF was formed of which the UK personnel would be a part. An alternative would be the use of retired police or civilian contractors to bolster numbers. On 1<sup>st</sup> August an FCO press release announced that ACPO was now seeking up to 200 volunteers (deadline 5<sup>th</sup> September) intended to sustain the deployment to Iraq of up to 100 officers at any one time. Statements from Baroness Symons (FCO) and Caroline Flint (Home Office) confirmed the importance of British policing expertise to assist reforms in Iraq. The press note also confirmed the role which Brand and I would play in reporting back resource needs, conditions and timings for deployment.

76. Back in Basra on 18<sup>th</sup> August I met Major [name redacted] and Assistant Commissioner Kai Vittrup, the recently arrived commander of the Danish police contingent, to agree working relationships and division of labour. Vittrup’s priority, set by the Danish Government, the Danish Police and agreed by the now-departed Danish Ambassador Olsen, was to set up (in 4 of the 20 classrooms in the police academy which RMP and my team were now working on) 3 training courses – training the trainer; basic investigation skills; and management. This appeared to be their singular focus although Kai indicated that he might undertake to mentor the Basra police chief, something I had earlier asked Supt Elder to commence, especially in relation to budget management and equipping his force (e.g. with vehicles and uniforms).

77. I asked Vittrup to assume the role as my second in command. He refused and I explained that in this case I would appoint Elder – simply to ensure when I was not in the province some could act for me. A proud and professional man, Vittrup and I had a difficult relationship which is really all I wish to say about that except to note that I respected him and later we worked together in the EU as friends and colleagues. In my opinion we were both victims of circumstances when, apparently, our two governments sent us to the same place with the same role at the same time – and we did not realise that for some considerable time.

78. There is a very basic lesson to be learned here, but in Basra and throughout Baghdad at that time, many other very obvious difficulties could have been avoided if UK and international civpol had been involved in planning from the outset. Throughout the next few days I faced many difficulties allocating tasks to the small team of MDP and Danish police and in particular managing army expectations. I learned that Janet Rogan who was acting as regional coordinator would be leaving.

79. My priority was to consult widely and prepare a plan for policing. This I would present to Sir Hilary (and the GOC as I believed that coordination of CPA and military activities was of paramount importance). For example I had further meetings with Brigadier Moore and visited Al Amara where I was impressed by the work, especially the basic training and monitoring which the army and RMPs were doing with local police, again using some TA members who were civilian police in UK. As on so many occasions to follow, I was treated with great respect by the military in the provinces, but it was clear that they expected great things from UK civpol. Time and again they became disappointed, frustrated and eventually disillusioned when requests for permanent civpol resources to relieve them were unanswered.

80. At this time, I visualised myself (thinking flexibly and focussed on UK needs) not purely as a CPA South resource but as senior police adviser straddling the two wings – civilian (CPA) and military (MNDSE). In an email dated 19<sup>th</sup> August to [name redacted] (my allocated line manager in FCO) I explained that despite the dearth of information and policies I was happy to push on and develop programmes that would contribute to police reform. I pointed out that although “I will not have an IPTF to manage as envisaged” with more British police expertise “we can radically improve on this” (i.e. the training provided by RMP and further police training planned by my small Danish contingent). I indicated in my email that I felt I could play a role “alongside the GOC’s team” but that “managing expectations is central to all this”.

81. On 20<sup>th</sup> August I discussed this with General Lamb. I have retained comprehensive notes on the many points made and recommendations I offered concerning the many stakeholders involved in police reforms. FCO had instructed me to “manage expectations” so I made clear to him what I saw as the priorities which civpol might be able to deliver against (if my business case was successful for UK and other international assets). I noted that the general “endorsed and welcomed all my proposals” which included my co-location with his HQ since I saw that as the location from where the only really meaningful, comprehensive policing programmes were being directed in the south and crucially we would be dependent on military secure transport.

82. My draft plan, which I shared with the GOC, included; senior police advisers alongside his brigadiers and battle group commanders working with local chiefs of police and governance support teams; trainers in the academy, in stations and as mentors to the army PET teams; (police) operational planners; investigators; and policy writers and monitors working on such topics as a code of conduct, internal affairs and standards.

83. I also shared my draft outline plan with Janet Rogan who was still in Basra at this time. She told me that she wished to share it with (UK) Director of Ops Andy Bearpark “as we are all answerable to Baghdad” and advised me to share it with the Iraqi local Governor. That evening I sent a long email to [name redacted], copied to Kernaghan, Brand and others, reporting my meeting with the GOC and offering a synopsis of progress and actions required. My main hope was that by taking “a parallel approach to MNDSE’s ‘police reconstruction’ efforts” as opposed to a separate one “better relations between CPA police advisers and all police (by which I meant military police in particular) will result”. I noted that “MNDSE staff believe that Dutch and Italians will be pleased to

receive advice and guidance from the CPA police team". I reported that "I intend to commence writing a basic police reform strategy and work programmes which will be simultaneously implemented such as training, personnel, structures, operational performance, standards, complaints, ethics and a range of other issues which should in no way clash with any eventual plans from CPA Baghdad. If anything they should complement any "master plan" and pilot/evaluate potentially national initiatives. Work on the police academy by MDP officers and work on supervisor and instructor training by Danish officers are current examples of this. I am told that Doug Brand already acknowledged on a visit here that the MOI do not yet have detailed plans and therefore support pilot schemes."

84. This extract from the email again demonstrates my view at the time that we (in the south) should get on with things. At this time I met a new member of (my law and order) staff [name redacted], who for the next number of months was to be my sole "criminal justice/legal reform expert". Around this time (21<sup>st</sup> August) there was much concern about the security situation after the 'UN bomb' in Baghdad and the worsening situation in the Maysan and Basra provinces. I learned from Brigadier Moore at a security meeting that a police support unit was to be set up in Basra "funded by coalition forces" – another example to my mind of the army getting on with things while CPA and civpol hesitated. At this time I met Major Matt Tichener, RMP, who was working on police reform and support in Basra and we agreed to work together. Since he had vehicles and weapons he agreed to provide me with transport and allow me to accompany him to inspect police stations, VCPs and operations to get a flavour of things on the ground. I also met Lt Colonel George Mendez who was battle group commander in Basra and heard about his battalion's efforts on police training and support. I requested a full list of all the initiatives taking place throughout the brigade area (2 provinces).

85. At this time I saw these activities as forming part of a comprehensive policing plan for Southern Iraq – which I or someone else would eventually be responsible for. As local representatives were at the meeting I also asked for some idea of the statistics and priorities for crime, disorder and violence. This became a long running issue with almost daily "horror stories" of murders, riots, kidnappings, looting, power lines blown up etc.

86. A short time after this the governor explained to me that as opposed to him trying to prevent rioting outside our CPA building (as I had asked him) he would soon join in as the coalition were doing nothing to alleviate problems while children were dying (from lack of water and provisions, including power and fuel for generators). I discussed matters face to face with the governor who, although welcoming, gave me a very dire picture of what life was like in Basra. Echoing the words of Kerik, about the need to carefully vet police recruits, he informed me that we, the coalition, had "rehired the bad people (into the police) again and now the good police are scared". He felt that lots of money, \$25 million he claimed, had been spent on local police but as yet there was no result. He felt the leader, who had been put in place by the British forces, was weak – Brigadier Aklo, a former Navy officer with no policing experience. He claimed that recruitment was corrupt and I explored with him what was needed to recruit a representative police force. (I am conscious that this sounds like wisdom with hindsight, but such basic matters must be addressed pre and post invasion otherwise in the urgency and complexity of things which followed, big mistakes will occur).

87. I discussed the UK model of a police authority and local police committees to call police to account. I asked him if such a model could work in his society and culture. He agreed and explained that a committee of sorts existed but that it was not fully effective. I saw this as an important element in any future strategy which I might deliver and two days later met the full group to

continue my local consultation. I explained how confidential phone lines dedicated for reporting crime work in UK and there was support for such an initiative in Basra.

88. Later I had my first in depth meeting with Aklo the chief of police. I explained that as one of my responsibilities I would monitor his performance (as would the police committee). He admitted that some of his officers were criminals but blamed “Bremer” for directing him to rehire old police and not allowing him to start from new. He gave me a full account of his needs and problems – including funds and equipment.

89. During the next few days matters took a turn for the worse when Major Tichener and two of his RMPs were shot dead as they drove to the CPA to meet me and take me to a meeting. Then when another crew took me for a meeting with the Basra Governor, I was surrounded by local gunmen who attempted to take my gun from me before I could meet him. They turned out to be his bodyguards but it is fair to say that I personally felt tension and fear rising throughout the city and some international staff in the CPA building started to leave, fearing for their security. On 24<sup>th</sup> August I attended a meeting with Janet Rogan, Brigadier Moore, and the head of UN Basra to coordinate what the three groups were doing. Sir Hilary had not yet arrived in theatre and his arrival was seen as an opportune time to improve communications and coordination. This indicated to me that things had not been so good, but within a short time, due to the deteriorating security situation, the UN reviewed all its programmes in the area, reduced staff and eventually from my recollection “stepped out” of the area.

90. My notes over this period show that security was the overriding issue and while best practice would dictate many outside consultations before writing any strategy or policies I did what I could under the very restrictive circumstances, especially when army/RMP transport was withdrawn. For example I invited senior figures, such as Judge Laith, the provincial chief justice, to meet me in the CPA building to discuss, among other things, his views on policing. This was to be a crucial meeting for me as he explained how the Iraqi criminal law and procedures should work – and it became clear to me that police training in isolation would not suffice. This one meeting later influenced my recommendations for, and design of, the EU’s first integrated rule of law mission (for Iraq) which I commanded for almost five years. I gathered information as best as I could about what police development was occurring in the other two provinces which I was unable to visit at that time – Dhi Qar and Al Muthannah – and tried to identify an agreed vision for future policing and consensus about the main priorities (in the South).

91. On 25<sup>th</sup> August the RMP assets were withdrawn from my team (effectively I had worked with them for 10 days in theatre) and therefore at that time, my strategy development efforts were confined to mostly “desk work”. I allocated tasks to my 2 MDP colleagues – Acting Ch Supt Elder would be the main man for Basra in general, looking at finance, communications, the training academy and assisting me with the business case for resources in particular; Acting Inspector Millar would act as staff officer, team information officer and look at TIP; with both officers assisting me to collate activities for the strategy paper which I hoped to prepare within days. The Danes were focussed on their training tasks and although their contingent commander sent some of them to my daily meetings, they were not willing to become involved in anything which they saw as falling outside their national remit. They were awaiting word from the Danish Foreign Office on the possibility of additional resources.

92. On 25<sup>th</sup> August I had my first meeting with my new “in theatre boss”, Sir Hilary Synnott, along with other senior CPA colleagues. The first meeting was dominated by the security situation. I was impressed by his calm but serious focus and clearly articulated aim – “to maximise effectiveness

whilst minimising risks". His analysis agreed with my own – there was clearly an enormous mismatch between civilian and the military staffing levels and expectations of each other. At the meeting (as would often be the case) there was discussion about releasing funding to projects. Problems seemed to be of two main types – either Baghdad was not approving expenditure (perhaps due to slow bureaucracy and lack of clear policy), or, CPA South was not approving and supporting projects or pushing for them hard enough. As yet I had no experience of asking for funding (from CPA) but constantly I would hear military personnel complain of the difficulties in getting funding (from Baghdad – directly or via CPA South). In terms of the threat outside and to the building we were housed in, I offered my security analysis and made recommendations for improvements. In the short time allocated to me, I also pointed out the equipment and expertise which my team required. I then undertook, at this general meeting, to provide Sir Hilary with a strategy paper, knowing I would have a later, one to one meeting with the ambassador.

93. Next day (26<sup>th</sup>) I had this first one on one meeting with Sir Hilary. I explained my task and how it had evolved and changed; the vision for policing and plans which I was putting together (in the absence of direction); and, critical success factors which I had identified – notably resources and security. At this meeting I summarised my FCO brief, as I then understood it, with the following headings: stay strategic; in the absence of policy – make it; manage expectations (as there is little likelihood of an IPTF or even any "Law and Order" staff in the near future); agree security arrangements; and work closely with other internationals on policing e.g. the Dutch and the Italians. He confirmed that Basra was to be the role model but at the moment we, that is CPA South, were seen as dysfunctional. He indicated that his three main issues were: leadership; agreed priorities; and getting things right with Baghdad. For him the key was to iron out all difficulties with CPA Baghdad. We agreed to talk regularly and for me to inform him of my needs after this meeting.

94. I then briefed Ch Supt Elder on how we should proceed with the business case for resources and pointed out that if we feel it necessary, we should ask for an international force with executive powers. By that evening (27<sup>th</sup>) I had finished my draft paper on strategy, containing a bid for UK police resources - which was to be sent to the FCO and ACPO, via Sir Hilary. In all, I made a case for 91 officers including field trainers and mentors and informed Sir Hilary that he would see the final paper first.

95. Also that day (27<sup>th</sup> August) I learned, from a military source, of a conference, for Chiefs of Police, to be held in Baghdad on the 2<sup>nd</sup> September at which, apparently, presentations were to be given on standards, structures, finance and equipment. With some difficulty I was able to confirm that I would be able to attend, along with Brigadier Aklo – by writing directly to Kerik. I had not even have been told of the meeting officially let alone invited. This was the beginning of my realisation that my small team and I, down in CPA South, did not really seem to feature in MOI plans and I needed to do something about that.

96. At the same time as I was briefing Sir Hilary and preparing the bid for police resources I was regularly meeting military and RMP commanders, occasionally managing to fly or be driven to the HQ at Basra airport. There was still a view in the military, which I shared, that it would be useful to have a senior police officer (probably me) alongside the military at MND HQ to ensure that CPA and RMP policing projects were linked – and to enable handover. This was not favoured by Sir Hilary as he had a small enough team of UK police alongside him. However, such incidents like hearing (almost by accident) of a major police conference in Baghdad, to which all provincial police chiefs – and their *military advisers on policing* – were invited, made me realise that even CPA in some quarters such as MOI, do not regard civpol as important. This appeared to be despite the fact that I

had met and been briefed by Kerik about 6 weeks previously when he had promised me the large contingent of civpol resources.

97. On 28<sup>th</sup> August I flew to Baghdad for a memorably difficult meeting. Before doing so, I submitted my report to Sir Hilary, to be copied the FCO and ACPO. Considering I had only been in Iraq for a total of 15 days, I consider the report, and the various attachments I included, as a reasonable and accurate assessment of priorities. As can be seen from reading it, I was still of the belief that an international police task force (for me to command) should be still on the agenda. Kerik had told me this would happen; Kernaghan had encouraged thinking “outside the box”; and Sir Hilary had instructed me to include it, if I believed it to be the correct response. My view was that it was – and if UK civpol could not resource it, perhaps other countries could. The document is reproduced in full as Annex A to this statement (without the PowerPoint slides which accompanied it for briefing purposes).

98. With hindsight I can see that this report may have been seen as harsh criticism despite my obvious attempt to negate this with recommendation 10. The plain fact was that a major mismatch was occurring in the South. The military were delivering all the police support programmes. They in turn were frustrated with CPA – both in Baghdad and Basra because, in my case, I had no resources. I was being told by FCO to get police reform moving and to get on with things and if necessary in the absence of Baghdad directions (even though they had most of the funding). I now had a supportive leader, who also expected results, so my report was a plain speaking set of recommendations and bid for UK resources to the area which HMG wanted to “be the exemplar”. The final slide of my PowerPoint presentation, which was for a restricted audience, contained my honest view that without the recommendations being supported, and in particular the resources allocated to me, we would fail – and I specifically pointed out that the Prime Minister would fail (in his aim of having the south become an exemplar). This may appear dramatic but it was my honest view at the time.

99. Within hours of arriving in Baghdad I realised my report and recommendations may not be appreciated in the spirit I had offered them. I had a meeting with a UK RN naval captain and another official from the IPU, ostensibly to brief them on my plans and priorities. The captain stopped me before I had come to my conclusions and recommendations. He said that we did not need “antagonism”; the UK police adviser in Baghdad has been “getting plaudits and has emailed you everything”. This is exactly what I had hoped to avoid (personality-based issues) and I was somewhat shocked at this person’s approach – I can only assume he perceived me very differently from how I saw myself and my contributions. My colleague, Inspector Millar, countered that we had only received one email from Baghdad but I attempted to steer matters to concrete requests.

100. It was at that stage, and only at that stage, when I was told by the captain that there was a Vision Document and a Strategic Plan. He then gave me copies. This was a defining moment for me and seemed to epitomise all that appeared wrong – in terms of miscommunications, competing agendas and views, and leadership. I was disappointed that a naval officer who I barely knew, based in the FCO’s Iraq Policy Unit, had come to Baghdad, stopped my presentation before its conclusion and then told me that he had policing documents I had never been shown. It seemed that the briefings I had been given back in London – about getting on with things – had been completely misleading and I was now “presenting a problem” (my words). Even now I still recall the disappointment. I realised that perhaps the IPU should have provided me with a line manager. Had FCO, ACPO or any other line manager or colleague shared these documents with me in theatre I could have incorporated them in my report.

101. I then was also told that Kerik was leaving the MOI in a few days along with one of his senior US police advisers. I was told that my colleague, Brand, ("doing a similar job" as me) may become the new interim MOI – in effect my Iraq boss. I formed the clear opinion that Baghdad and MNDSE HQ were the main locations from and to which information flowed and that the little CPA building, stuck downtown in the middle of a Basra neighbourhood was even more isolated than I had originally thought.

102. After the meeting, back in Basra, I briefed Sir Hilary and my notes recall that we agreed to hold back until directions came from Baghdad or until his meeting with head of IPU and Director of Ops in Baghdad. Sir Hilary informed me that he "recognises USA has supreme authority". My business case for UK civpol resources was to be withdrawn – although at this stage only Sir Hilary had received it. His view was that UK police resources were going to be scarce and we should discuss their allocations with Baghdad (in particular Brand).

103. On 29<sup>th</sup> I emailed my report (without the PowerPoint presentations) to ACPO, IPU, Doug Brand at MOI Baghdad, FCO and the MNDSE military liaison officer. In the email I explained that recommendations 2 and 9 "can pend" but wished all recipients to see my report in its entirety. I wrote among other things, "Some important clarity was received yesterday (28<sup>th</sup> August 2003) e.g. Douglas Brand's future appointment (which I warmly welcome); the Iraq Policy Unit's counter view to my FCO brief (i.e. to make policy in the absence of direction); and the "MOI 60/90 day Strategic Plan to create an effective and accountable police system which I received yesterday" . . . "My sole aim is to contribute positively to the CPA's aims and UK priorities, especially in Basra. I am now clearer about the need to await directions from CPA Baghdad and reiterate the need for all our activities – CPA Baghdad, CPA South and Iraq Policy Unit to be joined up. I wish to feed in and be fed out all relevant information to ensure policing plans are coordinated".

104. The next day I gathered my small team of 2 MDP and 3 Danish police officers and we discussed how we could best work together and progress our various projects. I learned that day that 11 more Danish police trainers may be deployed to work in Basra. That evening there was a security threat; higher than most evenings when shooting was a regular occurrence. A car bomb had exploded and I took command of the "police room" and enacted agreed drills. The Ambassador came to my room with his US protection team and outside the building the army took operational control. This was just one example of the ongoing security situation which affected us each day and of the environment I was working in. The following day, 30<sup>th</sup>, I wrote to Kerik supplying him with a report on progress made to date, future priorities and projects. I explained some of the projects we were working on including the regional training academy, preparation of training courses, establishing a police committee and mentoring the local chief of police. I outlined what I saw as future plans and activities and indicated that I welcomed the opportunity to discuss matters with him in Baghdad at the future conference and to working closer with MOI. A copy of my correspondence to Kerik is reproduced at Annex B to this statement:

105. (I did not receive a reply from Kerik and the next time I saw him would be his last day in Baghdad). I also sent an email copying the report to Kerik's main police strategist Carr Trevillian but despite calling at his office three times in person in Baghdad never met him. That day in Basra 30<sup>th</sup> August, along with Supt Elder, I also spent time with the Basra Chief of Police working on his budget and spending plans (life continued as best we could) and attempting to assist with court related matters in a meeting with the local chief justice. My office was becoming a port of call for any problems relating to criminal justice. I received a local staff member to join my team – mostly as an interpreter to work with my single criminal justice expert. So at this time there were now 8 of us in total for all of Southern Iraq – 3 UK police, 3 Danish police, a Lebanese born criminal justice expert



and a local interpreter. It is almost laughable (but too serious a matter to be so) that this was, for almost 5 months, the size of my entire team – for 4 provinces in southern Iraq (although some more police trainers arrived from Denmark – only to work on their specific Danish Government approved project). Nevertheless, we did everything we could, working extremely long hours, and in the case of the UK police taking security roles also within CPA Basra.

106. One of our key projects was the training academy which was proceeding in two stages – the first 4 classrooms which the Danes hoped to start using by October (when their new trainers would arrive) and the whole complex (over 20 classrooms) by December. Superintendent Elder was doing an excellent job on this project, including arranging security. I had written to the Governor requesting public involvement in a training committee which I was planning to establish to ensure local input on curricula, priorities, cultural issues etc. As far as my team were concerned, as soon as some UK civpol trainers were allocated to us, there was work for them to be done – preparations and actual training as soon as classrooms became available from early October.

107. It was at this time that I brought the Chief of Basra police and the Basra Chief Justice together in my office. Both had many complaints about each other, yet previously they would not meet. This prompted my ideas on integrated training for police, judicial investigators and other members of the criminal justice system – ideas which were not to become implemented until the EU rule of law mission was established under my command in 2005. Many other issues were swirling around at the time – for example the Danish police commander expressed great dissatisfaction that he was never acknowledged by Baghdad. Although I had invited him to accompany me and had written to Kerik supporting what the Danes were doing, asking for funding for example, he felt that his country's contributions were not known up in Baghdad.

108. I also attended a meeting with Sir Hilary and Neal Compton (IPU) when it was established that I should report to Sir Hilary in Iraq and 'David' of IPU. I learned that my support for military/GOC's plans needed to be more carefully articulated –especially in Baghdad. Sir Hilary undertook to write to Whitehall to bring the resources issue to a harmonious conclusion. Around this time movements around the provinces, and from and to Kuwait, were severely curtailed due to the security threat.

109. On 2<sup>nd</sup> September in Baghdad I attended a conference with the Basra chief of police. The day before I had offered to brief Kerik on progress in the south, but the offer was not accepted. I did however meet the head of the Italian Carabinieri contingent imbedded with the military in Dhi Qar province who warmly invited me to his AOR. The contrast between military units (including MPs) in the south with their thirst for partnership and professional support and the CPA Baghdad atmosphere was always starkly in focus – in my experience.

110. At the conference, after a short briefing on the need to have local people involved in police projects, including oversight, Kerik arrived. He announced that he was leaving, made a valedictory speech and introduced the new Iraqi Minister of Interior (Brand was not to act in this role for the interim after all). Kerik praised everyone's patience while he and his team had analysed the policing needs for Iraq listing "resources, equipment, cars and weapons" specifically. He announced that 3 weeks ago "we acquired the contract for pistols" and on September 13<sup>th</sup> "50,000 handguns will move from Austria to Iraq". He announced that "Bremer has authorised \$100million to be spent on your people – on uniforms, cars, AK47s. Every police officer in Iraq will have the same equipment, across Iraq". He explained about a massive recruitment budget and hiring programmes for 2004; the enemies which still posed threats; and, the need for clean, honest police officers with integrity to fight for freedom. The new Minister took the floor and Kerik left. There were briefings on training

plans, mostly Baghdad centric without mention of UK or other partners, but I did confirm that a new recruit programme and training syllabus was being prepared for national delivery, including in the South.

111. Later, by chance, I joined Kerik for a meal in the US Embassy cafeteria. He informed me that he was leaving immediately and we wished each other well. We did not discuss anything in detail which would affect policing plans in the south. The next day back in Basra after briefing Sir Hilary, he informed me that he was attending a meeting next Monday (at No.10) and policing was top of the agenda. He asked me to resurrect, refine and resubmit my policing plan to [name redacted], copied to Neal Crompton and David Richmond. I also heard that plans for an Iraqi training establishment in Hungary were now off. My immediate view was satisfaction that at least in the South we were forging ahead with the regional academy project. I noted (as I often did) my gratitude for Sir Hilary's support. Despite all the tensions and arguments which I became involved in at these difficult times, he was unflinching in his support – I believe because he knew that I was doing my best to deliver (at the time and for the future) and manage the many stakeholders surrounding me.

112. On 4<sup>th</sup> September I emailed [name redacted], Kernaghan and Brand to inform that Sir Hilary had instructed me to refine and resubmit my report on policing plans for the south – to [name redacted] (IPU). I had also telephoned Brand to inform him of developments earlier. In [name redacted]'s reply she says "Yes it would be helpful if you could refine your report and resubmit it, having discussed it with Douglas . . . my team leads on policing and David's on SSR as a whole so grateful if you could send it to me at the same time you send it to David". Up to this point I had been sending all reports to UND copied to ACPO, with some copied to IPU. It now seemed that IPU would be the main recipient and I would copy to UND and ACPO. I have no knowledge if UND had shared all my reports with IPU up to this point.

113. My notes at this time show that Sir Hilary made it very clear to me that the Prime Minister was meeting President Bush; that security was no. 1 on the agenda; and, "No 1 priority was police". It was within this context that I heard my paper was being resurrected. Over the next several days I travelled out to the two provinces and met the heads of the Dutch military police contingent (in Al Muthannah) and Italian Carabinieri contingent (in Dhi Qar) working within the MNDSE framework on police reform. I was impressed by what I saw – training, mentoring, inspections and operational duties (such as joint patrols) were being performed with Iraqi police counterparts and although the programmes were not comprehensive, the models seemed to work well considering limitations. However, many specialist police management needs were identified – especially in the whole area of financial and resource management. I also held a meeting with the RMP project team in 19 Brigade HQ. As was often the case I heard that the military had little confidence in CPA. This drip feed of negativity, despite my little team covering the four provinces, working up to 16 hours a day and moving projects forward as best we could, was extremely wearying and did little for morale or relationship building. I am sure it was a consequence of the military having expectations of CPA and UK civpol which were unfulfilled (perhaps for many genuine reasons) but it became a constant cloud over proceedings.

114. But that evening in the 6pm meeting Sir Hilary announced that a "tidal wave of activity is now occurring in the UK". He had been in Baghdad and agreed that UK police might come to Basra in waves – originally 20. I was unaware why that particular number was agreed but, at this time I was instructed to circulate my new report. I did so at the end of the first week of September and took into account inter alia what I had learned at the Baghdad conference, Danish policing plans which they had shared with me, MNDSE policing programmes which I had visited, and Sir Hilary's instructions. I prepared a 4 stage schematic outlining my proposals which would eventually lead to

civpol taking over MND police projects (stage 3) and eventually making preparations to hand over policing to local police and local governance (stage 4). My report included a detailed (reduced) bid for 43 officers to be allocated and deployed to specific duties – from liaison officers with MNDSE and 19 BDE; trainers; public order specialists; finance and oversight experts; and a mentoring and monitoring team to run model police stations (something the Danes were beginning to attempt). I pointed out in a further email to 8 recipients (including FCO, ACPO, IPU and Brand/CPA Baghdad) dated 8<sup>th</sup> September that if 20 UK civpol, not all 43, would be allocated to the south, I requested to be involved in prioritising their posts.

115. On 9<sup>th</sup> Sept I wrote an email to Brand congratulating him on his new role, asking for an in-depth briefing, pointing out I had asked for 43 officers but had learned that he was recommending the release of only 20 and that they would be used solely for TIP training. I also raised my concern that we needed to agree on the security threat assessment. There were constant threats and real attacks ongoing in the Southern provinces and the effectiveness of local police was rated as very poor, however, I was keen that the same message (about Basra in particular) was being sent from the two senior UK police officers in Iraq. My main request was for a meeting so that we could exchange information as it seemed that within days of Sir Hilary's optimistic news, my efforts and requests were being greatly diminished.

116. In FCO press guidelines dated 10<sup>th</sup> I read that 210 UK police volunteers had come forward, that deployment would only take place after Brand and I had reported back; and, also, that "the intention is to establish an international team of police experts numbering some 5700 in Iraq." It appeared to me that it might be some time before any UK police would be sent to support my efforts, but now the IPTF was back on the agenda. During this time the Danish police contingent leader presented me with a paper containing "their plans", the most significant aspect being their desire to work closer with UK civpol, as I had asked for.

117. This period represented a typical week in Iraq – observation at first hand of the many needs and the work being done on policing by military assets; raised hopes of being listened and responded to, then aspirations being dashed or diluted again; and a sense of déjà vu about the IPTF (the command post I had volunteered and been recruited for). My team and I continued to make decisions and plan actions – for example travelling to Kuwait to obtain quotes for much needed vehicles for the Iraqi police and bidding for funds from Baghdad. In Brand's immediate answer to me he explained that the 100 UK civpol were "envisaged to be part of a contribution to an IPTF to bring about recruit and field training for some 35-40 thousand police within 2 years. By releasing 20 officers to you at this time it will enable you to deal with TIP as that is the most important course for the existing Iraqi police at the moment . . . Subject to the outcome of the forthcoming donors conference in Madrid the rest of your 'bid' could come from a variety of different countries."

118. With hindsight I now realise how all this may have seemed normal at the centre (Baghdad) or London, but having been in country at that time, for almost 2 months and realising that no resources were likely to be available for weeks, perhaps months, and those that would be, were for TIP training only, I wondered if I had not been analysing and reporting to little effect. Nevertheless I engaged as fully as I could with all aspects of law and order and security as possible and encouraged my team to focus on their various local projects – particularly the police academy. I prepared a paper on police committees, submitted to Sir Hilary and the GOC, recommending a tiered approach to police and community involvement and civic accountability. I was briefed by Major [name redacted] that the GOC and Brigade Commander were supportive of my paper on the structures and functions of police committees. (Maysan provincial CPA governate later ran with the model, with me providing advice at that location). I prepared an assessment for IPU, ACPO, FCO and Brand on security

arrangements for UK police deployed to South Iraq and requested that the 20 civpol be sent to me by mid-October as some classrooms were ready and my small team really needed some support to prepare the whole training complex.

119. On 14<sup>th</sup> September I travelled to Baghdad and met Brand and then Sir Jeremy Greenstock – after briefing him I recorded his words – “the South must succeed”. On 15<sup>th</sup> I was successful in convincing the Americans in charge of funding to release me the first tranche of funds (\$360K) for the police academy project and was surprised to be given them in cash which I personally carried back to Basra. I learned from UK that I was to be afforded some protection – armed civilian bodyguards and an armoured vehicle. On 16<sup>th</sup> September I sat in a meeting of Iraqi Ministers chaired by Paul Bremer when he explained to the interim Iraqi ministers that they now had budgets and that senior advisers in each ministry were there to support them. I heard that the military side (CJTF7) and the civilian side (CPA) consult with each other before every major policy shift and reach mutual agreements. Bremer observed and directed that ministries now needed to coordinate with each other. There was much talk about the economy and donor aid and significantly I learned about funding to be made available in regions for high impact projects, but it appeared like a lot of the funding would be for the military commanders in the form of CERPs – Commanders’ Emergency Response Programmes.

120. On return to Basra I learned from the military that the Basra Governor and Advisory Council had reduced in rank the Basra chief of police and installed a new one. As agreed with Sir Hilary I wrote to the UK Brigade Commander about this. I made a very positive effort to remain on good working terms with the army, who I realised were becoming more and more disillusioned with UK civpol. For example I agreed for Ch Supt Elder to sit with the Brigade Commander on the Joint Security Committee for Basra and contribute to that forum. Mr. Elder had spent some considerable time working with the Basra chief of police and was disappointed that the chief was removed without any prior notice to him. I visited Maysan province and supported and advised the British battle group commander with several issues – not least how to deal with the local militia, whose chief the colonel decided to install as local chief of police. On 18<sup>th</sup> September I read that the majority (perhaps as high a number as 80) of UK civpol contributions may be going to a new academy in Jordan to train Iraqi police recruits – with the other 20 possibly for the academy in Basra – but that this has to be set within the context of an overall policing strategy – to be provided by the CPA, under US leadership. It appeared to me that the staff model that Chief Supt Elder and I had put together would be dependent on other external factors and was unlikely to be delivered at any time soon.

121. On 18<sup>th</sup> September I emailed [name redacted] my concerns that I had received a copy of a document called “Iraq Policing Next Steps”. I informed her that “it is the most important communication I have received since arrival in country since it is the first formal response to my various papers containing recommendations, plans and resource bids to move the process of police reform forward in Southern Iraq”. I continued, “I was surprised that it came as an attachment on an email from . . . concerning my request for a satellite phone. I am also disappointed to learn (according to the chart) that the only commitment to the area (4 provinces) will be an unspecified number of trainers to work in the regional academy. As I have been at pains to point out in my reports and everyone I have spoken to (including Sir Jeremy, Sir Hilary and the GOC) the way to effect police reform must be multi faceted and not simply through training”. I asked to be informed of the reasons, if my bids for resources were to be unsuccessful – specifically if it was based on security or other reasons. In a reply I was informed that Susan was ‘unsighted on the document’ but wished to discuss it with me. It appeared to me that many different parties were involved in

assessments and decisions about police resources. However, I did not feel involved to the extent I would have expected to be – as the UK's most senior police officer on the ground.

122. On 22<sup>nd</sup> September I was copied in to an email from CC Kernaghan to [name redacted], Home Office, in which he summarises recent emails from Brand and me as “we need people to deliver professional service in Iraq and are frustrated at we perceive as delays in providing personnel”. He pointed out the need for all civpol to carry personal protection weapons and wrote, “Iraq is a combat zone and civil police officers from the UK have never before been deployed to an active combat zone”. Later in his communication he pointed out that the concept of an International Coalition Police Force (ICPF) “requires thought and staff work now”. I agreed with the paper's sentiments, especially when he concluded with the line, “In essence, the FCO, with the support of allied departments and agencies, needs to provide quicker and more authoritative feed back to DB and SW”. However, my main concern was would another new concept (ICPF) and a bleak security assessment result in even longer periods of delay in UK civpol resources being deployed to me. At this time the Danish police were from time to time sending more civpol resources to join our team – for example 2 more arrived on 19<sup>th</sup> September. In contrast it appeared to me at the time that with the UK more new issues were being raised and there was still no progress on resources for the south.

123. On 22<sup>nd</sup> September, with Supt Elder, I organised a police leadership conference, focussing on modern democratic policing and challenges for leaders at times of great change. The conference was for the new chief and for all colonel ranks and above in Basra. It was attended and addressed by both Sir Jeremy Greenstock and Sir Hilary. The new chief of police made a short contribution asking for our assistance and included an explanation that “democracy was against God's will”. He also asked for more ammunition.

124. This neatly sums up some of problems and level of debate which was ongoing even in the most senior Iraqi police ranks at the time. Security dominated everything and even the following day I visited the Basra city police station which had suffered a gun and grenade attack, followed by a failed attempt on the police chief's life. Then I heard from 19 Bde Commander that MOI/Baghdad had sent an instruction direct to Maysan directing that all militia members must be removed from the police. He feared this would cause great instability in the British controlled city of Al Amara. I flew to Al Amara in Maysan province often to support the battle group commander and the regional CPA office. For almost of all these visits I was alone and simply spent time encouraging, advising and interacting with key figures in the coalition and local communities. I recognised the importance of what the Brigadier was saying and took this to Sir Hilary and Sir Jeremy recommending the militia (the FAWJ) remain an integral part of the local police.

125. My notes from a meeting with Sir Hilary around this time, in relation to how we communicate with Doug Brand in Baghdad, advised me not to bombard him with stronger reports (requesting support for resources) but to provide him with evidence and information and tell him we are acting on our recommendations. On 16<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> October several more Danish civpol arrived and on the 18<sup>th</sup>, along with my Danish colleagues, I organised the official opening of the first classrooms in the regional police academy. Training there commenced immediately – as the Danes had been directed to do by their government, not on TIP, but on management, investigation and training of trainers. In my view this was a shining example of a discrete and unilateral, but complementary, contribution to police reform in Southern Iraq that moved forward with small (15 maximum) staff levels but relevant expertise and equipment.

126. For example the Danes had obtained their own armoured vehicles. It is worth noting that at this stage two different views were emerging about where best to locate civpol trainers. The Danes were adamant that they should sleep and live in Basra and travel to the academy. The UK security view was that civpol should work and stay in the academy – even in days when there was no training, as there was army cover in situ. These facts highlight differences in national threat analyses and risk assessments which also had potentially disrupting effects. I recall at the time asking the Danes to be flexible and to break patterns – perhaps staying some nights in the academy to prevent setting targets. With my 2 MDP colleagues I continued to prepare the academy (in all aspects – including security assessments, training equipment, logistics etc.) to accommodate civpol trainers and Iraqi students.

127. Around this time I learned in an email (13<sup>th</sup> October) sent by Robert Chatterton Dickson, from the ‘new’ Iraq Directorate (copied to me by Sir Hilary’s now PS, [name redacted]) that 25 UK police would be trained in firearms up to the end of November (28<sup>th</sup>) to deploy to the academy. I was asked to set out the timelines to which I was working; human resources needed and when; financial requirements; and, how I was coordinating with Baghdad and the military. I had never heard of the new directorate or this person, but was pleased to hear that some progress was taking place – albeit not to December – even if I was being asked to repeat information already provided in various forms and at various times.

128. Around this time my involvement in a media event was to both cause harm, and in my opinion, prompt action.

129. The FCO and PSNI press offices had approved a BBC (Northern Ireland) documentary which had already filmed footage before my deployment to Iraq – and the film makers were well aware that my original role was to command an IPTF. Consequently when they arrived in Basra their first questions were about my resources. For 3 – 4 days the cameras and interviewers followed me; nothing was staged and nothing excluded other than security briefings.

130. During one of the morning meetings I read out an email from ACPO stating that no UK civpol would be coming to South Iraq unless they lived, worked and remained in the police academy. The BBC interviewer immediately asked me how I felt and I regret that I gave a, perhaps too honest, response. I had been driving and flying all around the country, doing my best to comply with the London FCO brief; deal with the Baghdad situation and constantly changing information; attempting to pacify military dissatisfaction with civpol responses; trying to keep many stakeholders informed and supported; acting as a security adviser in a challenging environment; and doing so with two UK police staff. I made the comment (and many other explanatory ones which were not all broadcast) “I can understand why people are concerned. I mean it is a dangerous place and people are being killed but at the end of the day our job is to minimise that risk and try to something that makes it safer eventually for everyone. If people are sitting in Whitehall or the shire counties of England, thinking we better not take any risks, it’s too dangerous for UK police officers then I am embarrassed as a professional police officer”.

131. These were exactly my sentiments at the time. I was working in a difficult situation but so were men and women from various professions and parts of the world – they were coping, bravely and effectively, in all sorts of projects (economic, health and agriculture for example). It greatly affected me that it seemed that ACPO was making decisions about life on the ground, without being there, and seemingly ignoring the fact that one of their colleagues was there with clear responsibilities and relevant experience. The reference to the “shire counties” was not aimed at any one or any force in particular (although I later learned that it had been taken very personally). My

thoughts were focussing on those PSNI (serving and retired) officers who like me had the tactical training, cultural awareness, firearms skills, conflict resolution abilities and experience of working with the British military. I genuinely felt that if some Chief Constables felt that the job was beyond their officers, I knew a group who I was confident could perform in Basra and the other provinces (within a military security “footprint”). I was being embarrassed daily whenever senior military colleagues in theatre were asking me when “we” would relieve them of some policing tasks.

132. The film clip became a news item UK-wide, not just for a Northern Ireland audience. Apparently, many negative opinions were offered (about me) and the Foreign Secretary (prompted by a question in the House of Commons) promised to investigate matters raised by me. I gave a BBC interview in which I made it clear that I was not critical of HMG policy but supported it and was trying to implement it. I made the point that I had volunteered to deliver it after all and I needed resources to do so. I specifically made the point that international experts, not just British, were needed.

133. Throughout that time I recall feeling unsupported and isolated – but for the stark exception of two people. Their understanding and support will always be greatly appreciated. The first was Sir Hilary who in an email to FCO officials stated, “You will have seen the quotes and misquotes from DCC Stephen White. I can understand the concern about the story and the need to put it in a proper perspective. But, in doing this, it will be essential not to make matters worse. I fear that this would be the case if Stephen were to appear to have been repudiated by the CPA, by HMG or by other senior police officers. This could risk sparking off a detailed investigation to see who was right, which could be yet more embarrassing, not least because Stephen has a reputation for integrity and honesty – as well as speaking his mind. . . the fact is that Stephen was recruited with a remit that was very different from what it is now. We in CPA South made detailed recommendations about policing in the South within a considered strategy. These were held back and eventually superseded essentially because for some time there was no central CPA strategy. I reported at the time that the relevant directorate in Baghdad appeared to be dysfunctional. Jeremy’s reporting was similar. Subsequently we observed reactions from ACPO about security issues which seemed to bear little relation to reality on the ground and which did not reflect consultation with security specialists here. Despite the absence of guidance, Stephen has midwived a significant training facility which will be up and running in four days, with more Danish than British support . . . This is a CPA success. . . I hope we do not fall into the trap of denying what is essentially true and of repudiating those who might imply some such possibility. We would do better to act on the issues themselves”.

134. Any words of mine, about what I was expressing during interviews and why, may appear self justifying, but these frank comments from my “commander in the field” are testament to what was really happening in south Iraq concerning police reform. In my efforts to implement government policy – to make Basra successful; to make the south an exemplar – I felt blocked on all sides and out of the loop.

135. The second person to offer real support was, at that time, NIO Security Minister – Jane Kennedy. I had worked closely with the minister for over two years during my time as regional commander of the south region of Northern Ireland, right up to my deployment to Iraq. She telephoned me to Basra when she watched the full BBC programme – which was now entitled “Basra Beat”. She sent me her support and that of Adam Ingram who I also knew from his time as Security Minister in Belfast. She offered to help, if possible, and I agreed to brief her, the Armed Forces Minister (the cabinet post now held by Adam Ingram) and Bill Rammell (representing the Foreign Secretary) when next back in London, which I did. During my meeting with them, I felt that I

was talking to, and being listened to by, people in London who were open minded, senior, and people of influence.

136. On 19<sup>th</sup> October an FCO official [name redacted] visited me in Basra. I briefed him on the full chronology of events regarding resources starting from the time of my recruitment, briefings and various bids for UK civpol. He gave me an undertaking that he would actively pursue my requests.

137. Between mid October and November I continued as before – for example; overseeing the academy project, supporting the Danish contingent, acquiring police vehicles and equipment, and spending time with Rory Stewart (who was acting as regional coordinator in Maysan Province) recommending and assisting efforts there for civilian oversight of policing. The local, recently installed, Chief of Police (former militia commander) had been murdered in Al Amara on 24<sup>th</sup> October when he had exited from a mosque. I flew to the scene next day where I saw for myself the paucity of investigation and follow-up even for such a high profile crime. I attended the murdered man's funeral wake along with the British battle group commander (Lt Colonel Castle) and sensed the local tensions - reports were coming in of Jihad having been called against all non-Muslims in the area. I advised Stewart and the battle group commander as best I could about replacing the chief and managing policing in the province. We then met the local supervisory committee to discuss security and policing with local representatives.

138. Such efforts and incidents only further convinced me that civpol expertise was greatly needed in theatre. I believed that the provision of provincial police advisers and investigative experts to work alongside the military, the CPA and local Iraqi police in each province could contribute a lot. I spent several days in Maysan and eventually managed to have one of the Danish superintendents take over from me so that I could return to Basra to respond to other critical issues.

139. Orders continued to be issued to the military down their communication channels, about policing, with no reference to me (or perhaps to CPA). For example on 27<sup>th</sup> October Sir Hilary copied me into an email and requested me attend a meeting to discuss "changes relating to the security sector, to the effect that CJTF7 have issued instructions about an enhanced role for CJTF7 and the military in connection with police training. . . I have heard nothing of this on the CPA net – nothing from Douglas Brand nor from Slocombe. Nor have we seen, or been consulted about, the military instruction . . . we surmised that the CJTF instructions might have been framed with US considerations in mind, without taking account of the different circumstances prevailing down here. In particular we need to establish that our, and the Danes', longstanding and highly successful police training programme is not rendered worthless; and determine how best to supplement the RMP effort with the experience which CPA (South) (especially DCC White) has in civil policing".

140. Such an event, for me, simply confirmed what I had pointed out so many times – that in the absence of professional civpol experts under CPA command, the military felt they had no option but to take over many aspects of police reform. Only five hours previously I had sent another email to Brand, FCO, ACPO, IPU repeating my request for provincial police advisers and resources other than trainers who apparently were to be sent sometime in December. I repeated this again in an email of 30<sup>th</sup> October to IPU (copied to usual sources) pointing out that even if the military were to take over more police responsibilities; in the south, I still recommended advisers in each province and specialists like police public order trainers who could work with the army.

141. On 31<sup>st</sup> October Sir Hilary sent a message back to IPU with concerns, but also an action plan on how we in the South could respond to the latest military initiatives to take over police training. We would try to speed up the building and refurbishing of the academy, work closer with RMP if



they were now going to provide trainers there and try to handle the “[phrase redacted]” as the new order at face value seemed to threaten the continuance of their 3 courses which at that time had just started to gain momentum. Sir Hilary indicated that losing them would be a blow. (It would leave the whole region with only 2 civpol officers, in addition to me).

142. I availed of two weeks leave late October/early November and met the government ministers as agreed. In London I also met my own PSNI Chief Constable who for the first time indicated that he may be able to assist by providing 4 or 5 middle ranking officers to Southern Iraq. I prioritised the posts as I saw them – a liaison officer to be located with the GOC at MNDSE to bridge the gap between CPA and the military; senior advisers for Basra and Maysan provinces; a training manager; and a public order specialist.

143. On return to Iraq I was briefed by Ch Supt Elder (13<sup>th</sup> November) on developments which had taken place during my absence notably that a coordinators and commanders conference had taken place on 4<sup>th</sup> November in Baghdad between the highest ranks within the CPA and CJTF7. A strategic plan was discussed establishing the main milestones to be achieved in coming months, based on 5 core CPA priorities: governance; economics; essential services; security and strategic communications. Minutes from that meeting which I later received demonstrate to me that it was a new plan – as Bremer took time to introduce and explain it and its core elements. In relation to police, the notes record that: “The current plan for developing the Iraqi police force addresses security nationwide. The next step is to do the recruiting, training, equipping and deployment of these forces. The overall plan calls for centralized security force with some powers and authorities left for governorate institutions (outlined in the governance paper). To allow for an accelerated deployment of the Iraqi police forces, CJTF7 was encouraged to assist.”

144. At around this time the US proposed handing governance of the country over to Iraqi authorities in the summer of 2004 and a lot of attention was focussing on local governance and oversight of policing. I prepared papers for Sir Hilary and his political adviser and had already set in motion a project with the Maysan provincial CPA (using the opportunity to appoint a new police chief as a catalyst to obtain community involvement). I learned that my comments were asked for after the cut off date set by CPA Baghdad but they would be useful anyway. In any case, I continued to provide strategic advice and guidance on this issue, of which I had considerable experience, to both military and CPA officials. I prepared guidance papers on the functions of police committees and duties of committee members, briefed Iraqi and “internationals” on models and gained the agreement of the Danes to send one of their Superintendents to Maysan as a (part time adviser).

145. There were a great many very specific challenges to policing in that Province, not least the existence of a large Marsh Arab militia (the FAWJ). Based on the facts that I had, I advised my authorities about the situation and recommended their acceptance into the police. This was a specific, but not lone, example of Baghdad plans not taking account of local peculiarities. During 13<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> I met CC Kernaghan who had come to Basra but, as he was unable to leave the airport, I travelled to meet him and spent the evening and overnight with him. Sir Hilary joined us on the 14<sup>th</sup> and after he had reinforced my requests for UK police Kernaghan seemed to amend his views about support for UK civpol deployment. I also continued to visit the regional police academy which I planned to have opened by the end of December – although this was dependent on having UK civpol trainers in theatre, and prepared, in time.

146. On one trip as we drove to the academy, on 19<sup>th</sup> November, my two-vehicle convoy was attacked and casualties ensued when a fairly substantial IED was detonated as we passed by it outside the Basra courthouse. My vehicle was practically unscathed but the second (soft skin)

vehicle alongside us was put completely out of action by the blast which ruptured its fuel tank, crystallised all its glass windows and blew the tyres of their rims. We (Insp Millar and myself) played a full part in evacuating a heavily bleeding CRG casualty from the disabled vehicle and assisted moving him to medical aid in a Czech military hospital, whose location I knew of. Insp Millar was with me at all times and I am of the opinion that he and all the private security detail acted with great gallantry and professionalism. I played the matter down fearing it would jeopardise the deployment of UK police to Basra. It is a major regret that Millar and others there were not more formally recognised and my later attempts to do so were not successful.

147. In the aftermath of the attack, I provided details and lessons learned to security advisers and ensured the road was put out of bounds fearing secondary devices, briefed my home force, reported the incident back to London and ACPO, conducted a media interview and provided counselling and support to my colleague. I have no record of any ACPO or police service actions to investigate or follow up the situation after my initial reports and further "sitreps", although the RMP prepared an "Initial Case Report – Attempted Murder CCRIO no. 64721/03". I did receive an email with press lines on the incident and expressions of relief that injuries to the bodyguard were not worse. This was sent from the Head of the "Iraq Security Sector Unit" – another recently formed unit – at least as far as I was concerned. I wrote to the chairman of the company which provided the bodyguards, one of whose men was seriously hurt in the explosion. They visited me in Basra later and thanked me for my actions. Instructions continued to be sent out from Baghdad. On 20<sup>th</sup> November an "INFO MEMO" was released by CPA Baghdad on the subject of "Regional Policing Procedures". I now know that the author was a UK member of CPA, although as the senior UK police officer in the UK-led region of Iraq I was never consulted (or to my knowledge met the person).

148. Between 22<sup>nd</sup> and 24<sup>th</sup> November in an exchange of emails between myself and [name redacted] I expressed my concerns as it appeared that good and bad news was coming in equal measure. I had read that some UK resources might be allocated to my command before the end of the year, yet in a report from Kernaghan (now more than 4 months after I had first arrived in Iraq) I also read that "the deployment to Basra has not yet been formally requested and is subject to an appropriate security assessment".

149. On 24<sup>th</sup> November I submitted an update to Sir Hilary, copied as always to FCO, ACPO and Doug Brand in Baghdad. In the 3 months since I had submitted my 1<sup>st</sup> September report (incorporating my 26<sup>th</sup> August bid for resources), no deployment UK police aid had come to Southern Iraq – although I had recently learned that 24 UK police trainers were to be deployed to the regional training academy on 15<sup>th</sup> December, after almost all the preparatory work would have been completed by my small team. I explained which activities I hoped to complete by the end of 2003 and outlined a modest set of plans up to June 2004, predicated on the assumption that no further UK civpol would arrive during those 6 months.

150. However, on 25<sup>th</sup> November in an email from Doug Brand it appeared that my proposal for provincial police advisers (which I had discussed with Hugh Orde and IPU officials) was being supported (even if not resourced). In what, for me, was the first sign of CPA Baghdad support for any of my plans other than the police academy Brand wrote "I fully support the deployment of the advisers, something we are just undertaking in CPA MOI from the pool of recently arrived American contracted police advisors." In my opinion, this illustrated once again the dilemma we faced in the South. We were not getting any resources (other than finance) from Baghdad – we were not even consulted about allocations of these contractors – and we were not getting any civpol from elsewhere other than some more trainers from Denmark and this was late November. Brand in his email suggested, "It would be helpful if FCO would raise the issue of the provision of European police

advisors for MND (SC) with the EU". It seemed to me at the time that we were "half in and half out" of the national/CPA plans. (As with all the emails and reports I refer to in this statement, I retain a copy of my update report of 24<sup>th</sup> November and emails relating to it.)

151. On 26<sup>th</sup> November an important milestone occurred – even though I was already well into the final third of my six month tour of duty. The Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, who had obviously been briefed following the exchanges in London which Minister Jane Kennedy had facilitated, met me for a face to face meeting in Basra. It was a memorable meeting, in that I genuinely felt for the first time that the professional expertise which I had been asked to bring to Iraq was valued and that my advice was being listened to – by the right person. I was shocked when he told me that he was being told that; there were no delays in getting police out to Basra (in fact none had arrived since my advance party came to the place in July, despite requests and reports); that there was no sleeping accommodation for UK police in CPA South (as there were many portakabins available such as the one I lived in); and that the police academy was not ready (as it had been open and functioning since mid October and all I needed were some more police to help us open and use the many other empty classrooms). This final point was frustrating to hear, because to my memory only one person (a military officer attached to an FCO Iraq unit) had visited it and, in what was a classic "Catch 22" situation, it appeared that (in UK) some were saying it was not open to justify not deploying trainers – yet the reason why it was not open was because no trainers were deployed to it.

152. The Foreign Secretary instructed his PS to record notes during our meeting during which I also informed him that apparently his Office had not yet formally asked the Home Office for civpol. I reported the meeting back to FCO and also mentioned the fact that others including the GOC and the senior Basra CPA coordinator had supported the facts that I had given to the Foreign Secretary. I was pleased to hear from FCO that "the message certainly got through to the Foreign Secretary" and that now "furious" activity was taking place back in UK. In recalling those few days I felt no sense of triumph or success – just relief that, as the man on the ground with the responsibility and "job title", I was perhaps not being second guessed, kept out of the loop or misread.

153. Since my arrival I had been expending all my energy and expertise, with the utmost professional judgement and security awareness possible, in supporting Sir Hilary and HMG endeavours in Southern Iraq. I had identified the many challenges and priorities, I had witnessed the army doing the best they could without civpol support and, without in any way trying to be personal or blame passing, I had been extremely frustrated that I was not supported (in terms of equipment, expertise and personnel). I recall quite vividly that, only after the Foreign Secretary's visit to Basra and our meeting, did I feel confident that this would really change. After our meeting he Foreign Secretary, during his journey back to London, informed me that resources would be forthcoming. On 2<sup>nd</sup> December I chaired a meeting with UK and Danish civpol and military assets to coordinate our activities – specifically to "share information and current plans under CPA and Divisional responsibilities . . . and form a joint action team" to deliver training in the South. Detailed plans and costings were shared now that I was confident that training would commence (on 27<sup>th</sup> December) at the academy. We (my UK civpol team) required 44 interpreters, food and logistic support for staff and 460 students and all the training lessons and resources to be in place. The military were excellent (offering two lieutenant colonels as members of the project team and 20 trainers [10 RMP and 10 Carabinieri]), providing security and accommodation for UK civpol at Az Zubayr and weapon training.

154. The "two sides" - CPA and MNDSE - started working together with great energy and aimed to train 6000 TIP students by 30<sup>th</sup> June 2004. My role was overall oversight and command, having gained Sir Hilary's and the GOC's approval, and funding, for the project. Ch Supt Elder and Insp Millar

(still my only two UK staff) along with the Danish senior police trainer, Ch Supt Sorensen, would take responsibility for all police and training management issues until the arrival of a UK chief inspector who was due to arrive in mid December as part of the first (4) UK civpol to join me (exactly five months after my mission commenced).

155. Around the same time, I travelled to Baghdad and met CPA's new senior police adviser (Kerik's recent replacement) Steve Casteel. Doug Brand and my Danish colleague, training expert Ch Supt Sorensen attended. Having tried previously to ensure that the US-led MOI team were aware of, and hopefully valued, what we were doing in the South, I was delighted that the meeting ended with agreement; that CPA South had a unique asset in Basra province which could train up TIP to 460 students a day (once the 24 UK civpol arrived) and, importantly as we had been breaking new ground, that new specialized courses piloted by the Danes (management, basic investigation skills and training of trainers) would continue and be fitted into the "National Police Training Strategy". Casteel seemed enthusiastic and agreed with me that there was potential for the Az Zubayr site for developing into a National Police Academy delivering specialist courses for police from all over Iraq. (I still was following the agenda of making Basra an exemplar). We discussed the fact that the military (CJTF7) had now taken over responsibility for delivering TIP training to the Iraqi police (and looking for locations). I argued the case that "it makes no sense for MNDSE to purchase or refurbish classrooms on another site when we already have a site which we can share and where CIVPOL trainers can work alongside MNDSE trainers i.e. Military Police and Carabinieri". We agreed on one site to deliver TIP training in the South and agreed that CPA South will formally invite MNDSE to share our location. We discussed funding plans for non TIP training which I would apply for and I heard that an undersecretary would be appointed to MOI specifically responsible for training and eventually the academy would fall under their responsibility for funding and staffing. All in all, I felt that major progress had been made in those few days in late November and early December and attempted to keep all in UK updated and in touch with a, for once, quite fast moving scene. I reported on the Baghdad meeting to Sir Hilary, FCO and usual channels.

156. On 12<sup>th</sup> December the first UK Civpol began to arrive, allowing only two weeks and in most cases a few days for meeting them, briefing them, allocating their tasks and allowing them preparation time before the grand opening of the academy. Sir Hilary wrote to me on 21<sup>st</sup> December, "Having visited the academy . . . I believe that you are right to feel a sense of pride both about the development of the academy and about the prospect of the TIP course starting on 27<sup>th</sup> December. Had you not pressed forward to try to implement our earlier plans, we would not be in this positive situation now. I am also grateful to IPU for their help at a time when policy was less than clear". In his email Sir Hilary agreed with me that: although responsibility for police training "ultimately rests with CJTF7 . . . the 'Commander's Intent' is very clear and you are evidently fulfilling it. I hesitate to claim that this operation may be a model of its kind in Iraq, so I will only whisper that I believe that it might be".

157. These few lines, for me, encapsulate both the successes and failures; and, frustrations and obstacles up to that point – more than 5 months after I had deployed to Iraq. The military had taken over police training; something which I still feel very strongly is wrong. However it is understandable because there was no alternative – international civpol resources never materialised up to that point. Yet, despite only having two UK civpol colleagues, we had obtained funding in Baghdad; created good working relationships with the Danes, coalition forces and local Iraqi police; engaged a contractor; and, opened an excellent facility with a range of training courses – and perhaps put one project in place which might "make the South an exemplar".

158. I believed at the time and still do that it was only after the Foreign Secretary had been to Basra and allowed me to brief him personally that any tangible support in the shape of certainty about resources which then started to arrive a few weeks later. I agreed with Sir Hilary that the IPU had, particularly from that point, been supportive – and that one RAF officer in particular, Group Captain [name redacted] attached to IPU, spent sufficient time with me and seeing things for himself on the ground, to recognise the potential of the academy project and other ideas included in my various plans and resource bids. The UK-led Brigade also provided great support in terms of protection, logistical support and military trainers at the academy. At last they could see UK civpol doing something substantial.

159. On 11<sup>th</sup> December a prison expert joined my team – the former governor of Pentonville prison, albeit only one person, but nevertheless an experienced expert. During December all my law and order work continued – including support to prison and judicial reform, and handing over uniforms and fleets of police vehicles to Basra police. However, over the Christmas period, including Christmas Day, the main focus was on the academy project. My aim was to provide visible leadership and detailed guidance on all aspects of working there to the UK civpol and other colleagues starting to perform duties there.

160. Knowing my tour of duty was coming to an end I prepared a report to Sir Hilary (copied to FCO and ACPO) detailing my team's achievements during the six months up to end of December 2003, plans up to June 2004 and an itinerary of UK and Danish police activities. I submitted the report to Sir Hilary on 18<sup>th</sup> December (a copy is reproduced at Annex C). This was, in my opinion, an important document for my successor and a record of what a small team did in an attempt to make the south an exemplar. Sir Hilary passed it to Bremer and I learned that Steve Casteel and the MOI in Baghdad had received it. Adam Ingram (Armed Forces Minister) and others in the military also received it. Sadly, every senior police adviser who I ever met after January 2004 informed me that they had never seen the report which contained very useful briefing materials.

161. On 21<sup>st</sup> December I visited Al Amara again to assist and advise on the methodology for selecting a new chief of police and establishing a public safety committee. On 27<sup>th</sup> December I officiated at the opening of the police academy which received substantial media coverage in Iraq – Sir Hilary was unable to attend, although he and I spent time on Christmas Day with the CPA, and military, police trainers there. On 4<sup>th</sup> January the academy was visited for considerable time by Prime Minister Blair who thanked me for the efforts involved in getting it to the stage it was. On 6<sup>th</sup> January the academy was visited by the MOI adviser Steve Casteel and we had a frank exchange of views; it was the first time a senior CPA/MOI figure had visited me in Basra. He informed me that 1500 police contractors were to be employed and deployed to Iraq – some would be allocated to the south. I made him aware of my proposals and recommendations for the next six months as contained in my report. He informed me that he had a copy of it. This, I assumed, would be my final opportunity to make someone in authority (US-led CPA authority) aware of what the policing priorities were in the South and what had been achieved so far. I am content that I did so.

162. During the period approaching Christmas and immediately after it, I was in quite frequent communication with Group Captain [name redacted] and IPU about my recommendations and plans for the first 6 months of 2004. He also received a copy of my "six month report" and was the only person I recall asking my views on how implementation might take place. For example on 30<sup>th</sup> December he asked me for more thoughts, details and an "outline of how the mentoring/monitoring is envisaged . . . in a form that could be passed directly to the prospective contractors". I have copies of my emails to [name redacted] explaining the need to build on all the (police reform) work already done in "the South" by MNDSE and latterly my team including the Danes. I was keen to bring

all the various strands together and share information between all the main actors before I left. This included the still draft National Training Strategy, the planned new shape of the MOI, the SSR responsibilities now under CJTF7 – and the GOC's new SSR team (which I joined) now headed by a Dutch Colonel. I also pointed out that the Danes were now working on plans which I approved and Casteel had endorsed to provide follow-up mentoring to students who had attended their management courses. I concluded one email, "Any contracted body of ex-police officers coming to Iraq need to be sighted of all that has gone before and all that is currently in hand . . . consequently any new body of mentors need to be of sufficient number and skills (with transport and security infrastructure) to work in tandem with senior provincial advisers, the management trainers and follow-up evaluators from my team and the army battle group commanders".

163. On reading the emails it appears to me that just before my six month tour ended I had clear UK lines of communication – between me and FCO/IPU. I was communicating regularly with [name redacted] and he was ensuring that I was receiving useful information and seeking my views and recommendations on a range of very important issues (relating to UK policy). In one of my last emails to him I explained the fairly serious staff situation which now faced us; I was soon to leave and Ch Supt Elder had already finished in Basra just before the end of 2003. Sir Hilary appointed a prison expert as my replacement as Director of Law and Order and the Danish Assistant Commissioner would act as senior police adviser, but he too was due to leave - in one month.

164. The issue of replacements was not resolved before I left Basra and I was not asked at any time to brief the next senior UK police adviser to go to Basra. I hoped that my comprehensive report would be of guidance to him. [name redacted] reassured me that at least it was well received by the military. He wrote, "On your comprehensive report it clearly points up that much has been achieved and it bodes well for the future. I have copied the report widely to MOD and PJHQ". Before leaving Basra on 12<sup>th</sup> January I briefed Sir Hilary on outstanding issues, leaving him a letter as well. I briefed my interim successors – the Danish police officer and the UK prison governor and left them in no doubt that I wished them well and was willing to help from afar if they needed any information which I held.

165. On 14<sup>th</sup> January I officially terminated my duties in Iraq but retained a keen interest in the area. My immediate first duty on returning to Belfast was to select 5 middle ranking PSNI police officers for deployment to Southern Iraq as: 2 provincial advisers with investigative skills; a training expert; a public order expert; and a liaison officer to work alongside the GOC at MNDSE (posts which I had requested since August). As requested by [name redacted] from IPU I wrote "A mentoring and monitoring paper for police performance in Southern Iraq" which I hope assisted the formulation of strategy and policies for a programme which was eventually launched and brought much needed police expertise to the area (including many recently retired PSNI officers) and co-wrote (with an British Army Brigadier) a paper for RCDS and ACPO's Terrorism and Allied Matters Committee on police missions overseas. Later that year, at FCO's request, I participated as the senior police adviser (and training specialist) on the EU's Iraq Expert Team which produced recommendations leading to the launch of the EU integrated rule of law mission for Iraq – called 'EUJUST LEX'. I had the privilege of becoming the 1<sup>st</sup> Head of Mission for EUJUST LEX until I relinquished the post at the end of 2009. Lessons learned during my first tour of duty with the CPA in Basra informed many of my recommendations and much of my approach to the leadership of the EU Mission – which continues today following several requests by successive Iraqi governments for its renewal.

#### Lessons for the future

166. I believe that many lessons can be, and hopefully were, learned from the six month period during which I served in Iraq. Chief amongst these are issues around preparation, leadership, resourcing, handover and debriefing of those charged with command of police missions.

167. On 19<sup>th</sup> January I visited the FCO in London. [name redacted] had asked me to attend with an agenda as follows: “What next in CPA (South) – where can we improve, are there issues yet to tackle?; Ideal manning; Policing post – CPA(South); Looking back – what lessons are there in CPA (South) policing, given resource constraints?”. My notes record that I raised the following issues: I quote, “role (flexibility, but clarity when received); leadership and line management (UND, IPU, Baghdad, ACPO); communication and consultation; strategic planning (Iraqi and regional involvement); the big question – unresolved (was it about making Basra work or wait for US led initiatives – the 1500?); do people understand change management?; Kerik v Casteel vision?; Sir Hilary – the policy was absolutely correct – no varnish; role, who in charge and style of mission.” I can explain these issues in some detail.

168. Under recommendations I wrote “senior post for police officer in FCO/IPU; formal meetings/updates as opposed to ad hoc; assumption of FCO knowledge; and position of UK/Danish civil (police) advisers never understood”. I also noted “PSNI position unclear ref advisers; replacement for me; role of consultants/non serving; Dyncorp – who leads; police committees/training committees; infrastructure v skills e.g. organised crime – if serious, invest; Pls (performance indicators) for structure, style, service delivery, systems, skills, staff etc. – strategic vision. Although quite a few years have passed since I returned from Iraq I still recall how important these issues were at the time. Since returning to the police and then during my second career in the European Union I have written and spoken quite a lot about the subject of lessons learned or “best practices” for police missions/contributions to post conflict reconstruction. Using my experiences as recorded in this statement and my notes as a case study, along with the experiences of those who worked with me and followed me, I believe a comprehensive list of lessons learned could be gleaned and used to good effect for future interventions.

169. In summary, those which I offer are in two broad categories: issues specific to my experiences and evidence; and, more generic, strategic issues.

170. In terms of generic issues to be raised I have offered before, in many forums, a checklist of critical success factors which provide a strategic framework to use when planning and implementing major police reform programmes. There are many other concepts and models offered by theorists and consultants. Likewise there are practical examples and templates to follow for comprehensive change programmes – such as the “Patten Report” – “A New Beginning - the Report of the Independent Commission on Policing in Northern Ireland”. The checklist I recommend was first offered during preparation of a paper for RCDS and ACPO in 2004 which I co-authored with a British army general who had also served in Iraq. The issues raised in that paper and my recommendation for a fundamental review of UK contributions to international policing were discussed at meeting I attended in the FCO on 21<sup>st</sup> June 2004. I am not aware what happened after that date. The main lessons to be learned, from my perspective can be encapsulated in the next few paragraphs of this statement.

171. Any plan for future international police interventions should focus on a comprehensive list of critical success factors – all of which must be addressed immediately after a request or decision is made to deploy. The list is as follows:

172. An agreed vision of success; political will; a strategic plan with clear priorities and core guiding principles; local community involvement at every stage; legislation; sufficient quantities of appropriate resources (funds, skills, staff); leadership; and security. These are all enablers. My experience tells me that where one is absent, or lacking, attention must be paid to that factor and others become even more important. In Iraq, where plans were missing, effective, visible leadership became even more important. Where there was a lack of security, attention to that point and investment was required immediately. Where soldiers were in large numbers yet police expertise was really required, that issue need to be grasped significantly. Critically, a clear desired outcome and end state needed to be known and shared enthusiastically by all involved in the enterprise – and locals should have been involved to a much greater degree. These are, of course, my views and I speak only from my experience.

173. Specific lessons could be learned from the six months I served in Iraq and also the period before I deployed. Many of the main ones from my experiences relate to roles, relationships and resources.

174. Pre-deployment, I believe, there was a need for police strategists to be involved long before the invasion, so that options for styles of police/law and justice interventions, and resources required, were considered and prepared for. To enable this people and procedures needed to be in place.

175. I suggest that there needs to be a permanent senior police presence in the FCO. The idea of only one ACPO officer having the “international portfolio” in addition to his/her Chief Constable’s role is nowhere near sufficient for the task, if it is to be performed at the necessary level. Likewise one police officer in the FCO’s International Police Unit is insufficient. This is no reflection on the individuals. On return from Iraq, I offered my services to CC Kernaghan as a deputy (in a part time capacity). He accepted, however when one looks at the issue it requires something more permanent. If no serving ACPO rank or position can be created, there are several recently retired senior officers suitably experienced in leading international missions who have much to offer.

176. Effective planning and preparations require systems and resources. There are models elsewhere to learn from not least national police services’ international units e.g. the Danish Police. If the UK continues not to have a national police service, it should at least have trained national reserves or contingencies which can be called upon and deployed to international theatres with minimum delay. Each international requirement should not cause decision making to start from scratch; there should be agreed protocols, systems and personnel who are experienced and equipped to move things forward quickly, for example in areas such as: security and risk assessments; equipment and logistics; leadership structures; offering concepts of operations and more detailed operational planning; cultural preparations and political briefings; and coordinating with all other departments and organisations – including indigenous stakeholders. The EU’s ESDP model for scoping potential missions, agreeing mandates, planning concepts of operations and having detailed operations approved and resourced is one I am very familiar with and recommend it as worthy of study. It is not the only model, but it puts in place specific structures and systems to ensure that missions and interventions are given regular, and agreed, political and strategic direction at the highest level and operational command and support at another. The reasonably recent EU “Civilian Crisis Management Intervention” model is far from perfect but it is worthy of consideration to address many of the problems that I, UK and CPA encountered – not least the leadership and reporting issues.



177. At a practical level, practitioners such as senior police advisers must be given a clear role – and informed if it changes. It is one thing to be told to be flexible, but to constantly hear about different roles, expectations and reporting lines leaves them in almost impossible positions. I realise that this is not unique to police advisers – it can happen to donor countries and organisations – but a lot depends on having a clear mandate, agreed parameters, a set amount of flexibility, shared analyses of the situation and priorities, and, leadership. With the exception of my “on the ground commander”, the CPA regional coordinator, I was not sure if what I was attempting to do was understood, appreciated and supported. This is why visible leadership is so important – leaders need to see things for themselves (often) and be seen (often). This is not personal criticism of any person, police officer or official, but it reinforces and strengthens relationships if the commander in the field knows that his line managers (in my case) located in UK or Baghdad actually appreciate the conditions, issues and priorities one is facing. Field commanders require direction, appraisal, feedback, recognition and information on a regular (face to face) basis.

178. Clear agreements need to be made between contributing countries. When Denmark sent a senior police officer to Basra and he found a UK police officer already there, he was not aware and problems ensued. This is an obvious example of the need for better communication and needs no further explanation.

179. More problematic is the mismatch between civil and military resources, and, civil and military tasks. In South Iraq hundreds of military personnel were dealing with policing (from a period which commenced immediately after regime change in April 2003). UK police, however, provided only three officers, two of whom were from the MOD, from July up to mid December 2003. It is clear that plans, actions and resources did not match. A clear and unambiguous response to army expectations and concerns (i.e. that no resources were to be deployed until practically the end of 2003, and then only for training) may not have helped the situation, but working relationships may have been better as a result. When the CJTF7 direction was issued instructing the military to take responsibility for police TIP training and the focus of civil police contributions moved to Jordan, it became clear that the martial authorities would be carrying much of the weight of police reform in Iraq. I am still of the belief that a better division of labour could have taken place – certainly in some parts of Iraq.

180. Complex situations need integrated responses. The law and order problems in Iraq were not only to do with policing. The local criminal justice system, based on Iraq’s Criminal Law Procedures legislation of 1974, establishes laws and procedures which relate to an inquisitorial system – police often working under the direction and supervision of investigating judges and examining magistrates. Few internationals in Iraq seemed to know this or take cognisance of it. Police training and support was planned without sufficient involvement of Iraqis – particularly the judiciary – and the CPA judicial element was woefully undermanned. In the south, I had one lawyer. Likewise, for the whole area of detention and prison reform, I had only one expert (who arrived after 5 months). Integrated approaches are required and integrated teams are essential. The EU rule of law mission (EUJUST LEX) addressed support to Iraq criminal justice reforms in this way with teams of judges, police, lawyers and prison experts. This was greatly appreciated by successive Iraqi Governments and Ministries who were involved in designing the interventions. Similarly, it is essential that those charged with the responsibility for police reform actually understand its complexity and multi stranded approach – if it is to be successful. Police capacity building is not just about recruiting, arming and training large numbers. Principles and concepts such as community policing, civilian oversight and accountability must be understood and addressed – and tailored for local communities and cultures. A classic example is the term “community policing” for which there is no Arabic

translation (no verb 'to police'). Unless time and effort is taken to prepare lessons, mentoring and support which is meaningful in the local arena, few positive results will occur.

181. Something which is often identified as a necessity, but difficult to implement, is the need for common language. For example the international body of police for Iraq, so often discussed though never stood up, was variously referred to during six months as IPTF, IPMF, ICPF, PAT, CPATT etc. Not the biggest problem, but an issue nevertheless.

182. In the way that there were various FCO groups – UND, IPU, Iraq Directorate, Iraq Security Sector Unit - it would have been useful if each unit was proactive in explaining its remit and strengthening its particular relationship with persons in Iraq from whom it sought information, or who its decision might affect. I was clear that I had to report to UND in FCO, MOI in Baghdad and Regional Coordinator in Basra but I was also aware that I should inform ACPO, the UK adviser in Baghdad, IPU in London, the Danish police and also military colleagues working on police reform. I was never fully confident that I was completely in the loop (or matrix) of all the other communications passing between the others. Perhaps this is inevitable when functions are not co-located – however a system of liaison officers may have helped, such as I had recommended operating between me, my team and the GOC and his commanders.

183. Finally, at this stage, I wish to recommend again that all police interventions and international deployments have guiding principles. These should serve to: solve problems around the style of intervention; answer questions about how much flexibility commanders have; help prioritise resources and efforts; and, determine parameters to remain within. For example for the EU's Iraq rule of law mission I set three main principles: "security is paramount; Iraqi involvement at every stage; and, flexibility and responsiveness to Iraqi needs". Along with a clear legal mandate; evidence of political will; an agreed concept of operations incorporating a vision of success; an operational plan; systems for leadership, reporting structures and accountability the EU (although running a very different type of mission in Iraq) provides some ideas, in my opinion, about how lessons learned in Iraq may be addressed.

#### Concluding comments

184. I offer my statement and attachments with the sole intention of assisting the Iraq Inquiry come to some conclusions, specifically about UK police involvement in the early period of Iraq post Saddam and particularly in the 4 southern provinces. I repeat my view that no UK person in Iraq, during my time there, did anything other than their best at what they thought was their duty and perceived to be the main task they were given. Nevertheless it is clear, as I revisit the events I was involved in, that different departments and different individuals were definitely "not on the same page at the same time". When I read emails, documents and my own notes from the time, I can only conclude that senior colleagues and myself were doing what we believed to be right; what was expected of us (in ACPO, in Baghdad, in Basra). But, we were given different agendas to follow and parameters to work within. While one may have been instructed to prioritise working harmoniously and at pace with the American policy makers, I was very clear that my brief was to get on with things in the absence of policy – and make the South successful. Within the FCO departments, with whom I interacted, the priorities and messages I heard were sometimes different. The contrast in messages given during a Baghdad meeting with an IPU representative and those given by UND representatives in London is a clear example.

185. The gap between expectations held about UK civpol by the British military and the possible deployments actually being discussed between ACPO, Home Office and FCO was enormous –

something I had to deal with almost every day. This was not unique to the UK as it also seemed to be the case at the highest levels between CPA and CJTF7. I am certain that no other situation identical to that which pertained immediately after Saddam's removal will occur again – but similar issues could easily occur again in another deployment if strategic planning and comprehensive preparations do not take place. In particular, it is my hope that such preparations and plans are put in place for police and other civil interventions. There is much to learn from the events in Iraq and much to learn from other systems (for example, as mentioned, the European Union's ESDP Civilian Crisis Intervention concepts and methods). However, in the absence of a national police service; an international police contingent; and, full time international police command structures, I suspect the UK will find that its current system (with governance by local Police Authorities and autonomous, operationally independent Chief Constables) does not lend itself to speedy, focused, post-conflict reconstruction responses. I conclude this statement by once again recording my highest praise for Ch Supt Joe Elder, Insp Mark Millar and all colleagues who worked with me in CPA South. I was most fortunate in having such steady, courageous and professional companions who served their countries well.

## **ANNEX A**

### **Strategic Report on the Police Reform Programme in Southern Iraq**

28<sup>th</sup> August 2003

From: Deputy Chief Constable Stephen White,

Senior Police Advisor and Director of Law and Order,

Coalition Provisional Authority, South Region.

To: Sir Hilary Synnott, Regional Coordinator, CPA South Region

[name redacted], Head of UN Peacekeeping Dpt, FCO Whitehall

Paul Kernaghan, Chief Constable, Association of Chief Police Officers - International Portfolio.

## **INTRODUCTION**

Since my arrival on Sunday evening 17<sup>th</sup> August I have in the past days carried out a comprehensive analysis of policing developments in the four provinces which are coordinated by CPA South. I have tried to retain a strategic view but events in Basrah require immediate operational attention.

This report's findings and conclusions are based on, amongst other things,:

- \* Vision documents, legal orders, military orders, relevant e-mails, ACPO papers and such directions and guidance which can be found.
- \* Discussions with GOC, Brigadier 19 Mech Bde, CO 3 RMP, head of CPA and many of their respective staff and two thorough intelligence briefings (G2 and J2).
- \* Visits to policing projects in provinces – Maysan and Al Basrah.
- \* Briefings from Danish and British officers in CPA south police advisory team.
- \* Prolonged meetings with the Basra governing council's governor, deputy governor, council members; heads of political parties; sheiks; NGO's; and journalists.
- \* My directions on appointment to this position and more recently in London (FCO 150804).

As for the last point I have already recorded, by email, progress reports in respect of ascertaining the security situation, recommending the deployment of UK police advisors, managing the expectation of the stake-holders involved in policing developments in south region, coordinating all our efforts and attempts to close the information gap between CPA Baghdad.

With the exception of the last point, which the regional coordinator is addressing as one of his priorities, some progress has been made in all respects.

## **SUMMARY**

This report identifies the strategic priorities to ensure that longer term objectives are achieved in the region and, of necessity, matters which should be expedited with haste in order to solve the emerging security crisis in Basrah. Urgent bolstering of the civil police effort in Basrah is required to address public confidence in CPA/CF and policing.

**My key conclusions are:-**

- Rec 1 - A senior home office official with appropriate numbers of expert staff should be immediately seconded to CPA South law and order directorate to address all the other CJ and public service issues – prisons, courts, fire service, customs, immigration etc.
- Rec 2 - The business case for 91 UK police officers, armoured vehicles and civil protection teams should be actioned immediately.
- Rec 3 - The potential pool of resources which exists amongst retired RUC and PSNI officers should be tapped into without delay.
- Rec 4 - An armed international police force of substantial size, with executive powers would effect a significant improvement in Basrah – this deployment should be expedited.
- Rec 5 - RMP duties in respect of police training and other support to civil police reform in Iraq should be, wherever the security situation permits, taken over by international civil police advisors.
- Rec 6 - Security as appropriate should be provided by CF military forces by accompanying or protecting civil police advisors.
- Rec 7 - All efforts must be made to join up UK efforts and, in particular, the exchange of information between the police advisory teams in Baghdad and Basrah.
- Rec 8 - All policing strategies, policies and programmes which are in place in CPA / MOI Baghdad must be communicated to CPA south and ideally consultation should occur during the policy development stage.
- Rec 9 - In the absence of contrary MOI direction, policies developed and projects initiated in CPA south region should receive immediate approval and funding from CPA/MOI unless they step outside the broad recruitment, training or operational aspirations so far promulgated from CPA. Delegated budgets would greatly enhance and speed up this process.
- Rec 10 - Finally, that this report is received as constructive expert opinion addressing CPA South's specific problems and therefore specific UK issues.

**Current situation and recommendations**

The police reform programme in Iraq's south region has progressed significantly but due to under resourcing (in terms of staff and expertise); the crime and security situation which is deteriorating; and, the absence from the centre of information, policy, guidance and financial systems which speedily unlock funding, urgent action is now required to achieve the stated vision of an effective, modern, accountable Iraqi police service under local governance within 2 or 3 years.

CPA South police advisory team has one DCC, one Chief Supt, and one Inspector from the UK and 3 Danish officers of mid to senior rank. They will be together for the first time on 29<sup>th</sup> August. They have the capacity to move on a number of projects such as the establishment of the regional training academy but are grossly under resourced to effect wide-spread reform at the required pace.

The senior advisor DCC White has been asked by CPA to be the director of the law and order directorate which only has one other member of staff (lawyer) and address prisons, fire service, customs, immigration, border security, courts and this will seriously dilute his impact on policing.

Rec 1 - A suitably qualified home office official is required to head up this directorate and assess resource requirements.

At my request, a comprehensive survey has been carried out by CO 3 RMP Provost Company at MND SE across the region in respect of police reform projects being progressed by UK forces (Maysan and Al Basrah), Italian forces (Dhi Qar) and Dutch forces (Al Muthannah).

Progress is being made but all military forces request support from civil police. In particular, in the Basrah province, site of the CPA team's office and the regional academy, there is the immediate problem of escalating crime and terrorism. This is rapidly decreasing the public's confidence in the police and the CPA/CF.

Consequently the senior police advisor and the UK chief superintendent have both attempted to positively influence the situation particularly after the tragic murder of the RMP Major; he had been monitoring the Basrah chief of police and overseeing projects in Basrah. This vital work needs to continue and be enhanced.

A business case has been forwarded via regional coordinator CPA south to support the request for 91 UK police officers of various ranks to be deployed to the four southern Iraqi provinces. It includes bids for armoured vehicles and protection teams.

Rec 2 - The business case for UK civil police support to southern Iraq is urgently approved and expedited.

I am aware of UK public opinion, Chief Constables' duty of care responsibilities and the potential for the ACPO/FCO trawl to fall short. There is a pool of expertise in Northern Ireland. Retired RUC/PSNI officers have skills which would be appropriate in a number of posts and several have contacted me to offer their services. The NI Police Retraining and Rehabilitation Trust have offered to assist in placing the right skills in the right place if asked by the FCO to assist.

Rec 3 - The optional plan to advertise for retired officers in Northern Ireland should be implemented without delay.

It is clear that the Iraqi police have little public support or trust at this point. In the Basrah province there is clear consensus on this amongst all those public officials I have consulted. There is consensus on four points in this province (and likely in all four provinces in the region - although not fully tested):

- 1) Crime and security is a major concern for most Iraqis.
- 2) Local police are seen as corrupt, lazy, ineffective and badly lead. With the exception of the last point even the local chief of police agrees.

- 3) Locals believe strongly that CPA/CF have direct and indirect responsibilities for the situation. They quote, for example, CPA's appointment of the chief (who has no police experience) and the direction to reemploy former police who they suspect to include former secret police and inherently ineffective officers.
- 4) Local people want to get involved in policing activities to improve the situation but feel they are not being allowed to "take the law into their own hands."

More can be done to take the lead role in police reform from MND forces.

- Rec 4 - An international police task force with executive powers and suitably experienced officers should be drafted into the region as soon as practicable.
- Rec 5 - They, or in the absence of them, international police advisors, should take over the MND SE and military police duties and accompany local Iraqi police patrols and supervisors to mentor, bolster, and monitor local police.
- Rec 6 - When ever and where ever appropriate, because of the multi faceted threat to police and all CPA related resources (from organized criminals and terrorists) a military "security footprint" should be provided by CF. This would include border security, 'surge' operations, routine patrols and cover wherever there are predictable patterns, e.g. training academy journeys.

There are many examples of communication problems between CPA South and CPA Baghdad – not just in relation to the development of police policies and approvals for funding. One thing is certain – if UK efforts are not joined up as we attempt to address the UK led reforms in Basrah and the rest of the south we are skirting with disaster.

There are numerous examples of poor communication. CO 3 RMP has received no policy documents from CPA/MOI Baghdad despite, thus far, leading on police reform. A conference on police reform has been notified to the military writing them to accompanying chiefs of police but, at time of writing no notification has been given to the senior advisor and police team, CPA South.

Excellent liaison and sharing of information exists between CPA South's policing team and MND / Brigade and the RMP Coy. This can and will be improved. GOC and CO 3 RMP agree to the benefit of my establishment of "police desk" at MND SE HQ. As soon as sufficient staff arrive this will become a permanent feature to coordinate efforts, share vital operational information and eventually facilitate handover.

Lack of communication is not simply a UK problem. Italian brigade returns state "lack of strategic direction in certain areas hampers our initiatives at local level" and quote examples. There is consensus that things could improve greatly between CPA Baghdad and CPA South in terms of communicating, this applies particularly to policing issues.

- Rec 7 - All efforts must be made to join up UK efforts and, in particular, the exchange of information between the police advisory teams in Baghdad and Basrah. A joined up media strategy is another pertinent example.

Both teams exist to achieve the same objectives and regular information sharing and reporting, copying of reports should be the norm not the exception.

Rec – 8 All those policing strategies, policies and programmes currently being planned or completed at MOI Baghdad, must be communicated to CPA south's police advisory team to maximize effectiveness.

It is clear that MOI policing policy is still evolving and it is also clear that immediate results are expected in Basrah. There are many proposed initiatives and ideas at battle group, brigade and divisional level in MND SE; at CPA South; and from the local police and local governing council. The perception is that the main obstacles, in addition to the under resourcing of civil police efforts, are the policy gap between MOI Baghdad and CPA South, poor communications, and, the inability to unlock the funding mechanisms.

Rec - 9 In the absence of contrary directions from MOI Baghdad, policy development and police reform projects ( in south region) should receive immediate approval and funding, (ideally through delegated budgets) from CPA/MOI provided they do not step outside the broad operational recruitment and training aspirations so far promulgated from CPA/MOI.

An example of this would be the proposal to establish a police committee in Basrah. This idea has been well received by the governor and local representatives. Delegated budgets would enhance and speed up this process.

### **Conclusion**

It is clear that some excellent progress has been made in the reconstruction of Iraq. This includes policing plans and policies at MOI Baghdad and at project/ground level in southern Iraq. The latter has been delivered almost exclusively by MND SE military resources. It is appropriate for CPA South to play a fuller role and resources are needed to enable this.

The current UK interest in Basrah, in particular, needs urgent civil police support. Increased resources, clear directions and strategic leadership will be greatly enhanced if the key stake holders are in regular, timely and relevant communication.

Rec 10 - My final recommendation is that this report is seen as constructive and based on expert professional opinion and comprehensive research.

Stephen White  
Deputy Chief Constable  
Senior Police Advisor

### **NOTE:**

Annexes include:-

- A Business case for UK officers' deployment to Southern Iraq
- B Copy of e-mail to FCO, ACPO, CPA Baghdad and CPA South updating progress on 20/08/03
- C Copy of PowerPoint presentation – 'schematic for CPA's policing plan in Southern Iraq'

N.B. A power point presentation to highlight the issues is available.



## **ANNEX B**

Update on Policing Reform – CPA South Region 30<sup>th</sup> August 2003

DCC Stephen White, Senior Policing Adviser

To: Bernard Kerik, Ministry of Interior,

Coalition Provisional Authority, Baghdad.

### Summary

Since arrival in country, two weeks ago, I have reviewed all policing activities in the four provinces which make up the Southern Region of Iraq. I have established working arrangements with the five other police officers in the CPA South's Police Advisory team and identified our priorities, capabilities, and planned projects. After wide consultation I have completed a strategic review of police reform in Southern Iraq and submitted copies of my findings to the CPA Regional Coordinator, the UK FCO, UK's Iraq Policy unit, Douglas Brand and the UK's Association of Chief Police Officers.

In effect it outlines my recommendations to ensure that the UK contribution to CPA's vision of an effective, modern, accountable police service is maximized, joined up and progressing in the required direction. Clearly, with many stakeholders and competing priorities (e.g. national and regional), there is a need for effective information sharing, and, agreed authorities to pilot and progress programmes which will deliver the vision.

Following my discussions at Baghdad (28 Aug 03) with liaison officers from UK's Iraq Policy Unit and discussions with CPA South's Regional Coordinator I received clarification about the UK's priorities; a copy of CPA's 60 and 90 day plan to advance strategic objectives; and, an agreed approach to future developments.

I am now in a position to outline how the CPA's police reform plans will be advancing in the 4 southern provinces until further resources, particularly any UK police, are allocated to the team.

### Current Situation

We have six officers in the Police Advisory Team based at Basra and we have responsibility for 4 provinces – Al Basrah, Maysan, Dhi Qar and Al Muthannah. There are 3 Danes and 3 UK officers. The senior officer (DCC White) is also the regional director of law and order.

A number of flagship and pilot projects are in hand.

These include:

- the regional training academy;
- preparations for training TIP, patrol skills, training of trainers, supervision / management;
- issuing a code of ethics;
- establishing a police committee with the local governing council;
- organization restructuring;
- mentoring and monitoring local chief of police in aspects of strategic, operational, and financial management – as well as public accountability. This includes projects relating to recruitment, equipment, budgeting and a police support unit.

We also advise and support the CPA staff at all levels in respect of policing related issues.

I have established relations with the local governing council's Governor, Deputy Governor and councillors, political representatives, sheiks and others who constitute a pilot police committee. This committee has the potential to play a key role in developing accountability mechanisms for police plans, priorities, performance and reporting. Subcommittees will be formed to look at training, public safety, financial management and other topics in order to advance citizen representation, consultation, involvement and confidence in the local police.

There is understandably a focus on Basra but all projects are being piloted and developed with a regional implementation in mind – depending on positive evaluation and resources available.

After consulting widely with military commanders at Division, Brigade and battle group level, and the Provost Marshall 3RMP, I have a clear picture of all the police training and reconstruction programmes which they have initiated and currently deliver. At the moment it is correct to say that, in terms of police training and monitoring, the CF military resources in the Multi National Division (SE) are by far the main deliverers. They have the resources. However we provide advice and whenever possible will take over duties from them.

I have established a police desk in the MND SE HQ with the support of the GOC. Unfortunately resources are not available to man it more than infrequently but we are attempting to work with and eventually take responsibilities from military police involved in police reform.

I have collated a priority list of the military's request for civil police assistance. The aim is to enhance and complement their programme of activities. I agree with their analysis of where best police expertise should be deployed.

Having reviewed the urgent and short term needs, I forwarded a business case for 91 police officers for Southern Iraq. This has been forwarded to the CPA Regional Coordinator, who agrees with the analysis and supports the request. However it pends until it can be discussed with Douglas Brand – clearly, at this moment, UK officers will be in short supply whilst in big demand.

#### Future Plans and Activities

The key aim of the CPA South Police Advisory Team is to maximize the effectiveness of its resources in order to contribute to CPA Ministry of Interior Strategy. Our hope is that effective communication and information sharing will involve us being consulted, our efforts evaluated and our projects being used to contribute to emerging policies.

We have established priorities and a resource plan to concentrate our efforts on the projects already mentioned above while assisting the development of effective operational practices.

The Basra Chief of Police is particularly being supported, mentored and monitored. His operational command and practices, financial management, and public accountability are all priorities. We have pilot projects about to commence in terms of training, supervision and patrolling in his area. A police support unit is being established and trained. Equipment expenditure and other aspects of budgeting are being closely supervised and direction is being provided. We are in the process of taking from the RMP in Basra some of those training and mentoring tasks already commenced by the late Major Matt Tichener and his team.

The UK and Danish police have agreed on respective lead roles and responsibilities in respect of our projects. The UK team needs additional resources urgently if it is to take on any further tasks and this matter is being pursued.

The Danish Government has approved 11 more officers to join their colleagues. They have been given a specific budget and timescale (end of Dec 2003) to deliver on agreed projects i.e. training of trainers and supervisors. We are incorporating them in our overall training plans and they are playing an important role in the Regional Training Academy project. In addition, their head of mission Kai Vittrup is working with the Basra Chief to examine police management structures.

#### Conclusion

The team of police advisers in CPA South is moving forward on a number of projects in support of MOI strategic objectives for policing. With more resources we could do more. The Regional Coordinator is fully aware and supportive of our approach – as is the military commander.

We aspire to work closely with the MOI policing team in Baghdad and look forward to the forthcoming national conference in Baghdad for Chiefs of Police. It will be an opportunity to establish more contacts and to learn of the strategic plans and policies currently in place.

Stephen White  
Deputy Chief Constable  
Senior Policing Adviser and Director of Law and Order  
Coalition Provisional Authority  
Southern Iraq  
30<sup>th</sup> August 2003

## ANNEX C

*[Coversheet redacted on data protection grounds; text from coversheet provided below]*

Coalition Provisional Authority (South)

Law and Order Directorate

Civil Police Advisers' Six Monthly Progress Report

July – December 2003

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## Foreword

*by Stephen White, Director of Law and Order*

It gives me great pleasure to submit this report to the Regional Coordinator of the Coalition Provisional Authority, Southern Iraq. It records the achievements of the Danish and UK civil police advisers during the period from July to December 2003. It is my opinion that all members of the contingent should be proud of what they have accomplished during this time. Despite being small in number we have made a very meaningful contribution to the development of modern, democratic, and effective policing in post conflict Iraq. This report also highlights our plans for the first six months in 2004. Central to these plans is capacity building for the indigenous police service. Our aim is to establish structures, systems and skills which provide culturally and professionally appropriate foundations for the future. Whatever July 2004 and beyond holds for the Iraqi Police Service, in terms of Ministry of Interior strategies or future international police assistance, our objectives and future targets are compatible with and complementary to modern police reform programmes. It is not surprising, since we do not have an operational executive role that our main efforts have concentrated on training, education and development. Professional advice has been provided to many and varied forums and individuals. Along with the mentoring of senior police

officers in Basra this has been a key element in our programme of activities.

This report provides specific details of our efforts so far. Highlights include the provision of equipment to the Iraqi police such as fifty five police vehicles, thousands of uniforms and, of course, the police academy at Az Zubayr. The latter is an ambitious project which will play an essential role in CPA's and the Minister of Interior's national police training strategy. It has proved to be a superb example of effective partnerships. Not only between UK and Danish police officers and other CPA staff members from finance and reconstruction departments but also between CPA South and military resources in the Multi National Division South East. On 18th October the first wing of the academy opened with Danish police trainers delivering management, investigation and training of trainers' courses. These will continue to be delivered and developed throughout 2004.

By 27th December UK police trainers, along with Carabinieri and UK military police officers will commence a large scale training task to process at least six thousand former Iraqi police through the Transition and Integration Programme ("TIP") introducing them to human rights protection and other modern democratic police practices. We have set ourselves comprehensive, demanding but achievable training targets for 2004. In essence these relate to achieving full capacity at the academy, maximizing our mentoring and advice contributions, and, establishing systems for the local governance of policing.

Although it is clear that with extra staff we could have contributed an even more meaningful contribution to police reform in Iraq I believe that substantial progress has been made by CPA South's civil police advisers. I am confident that in 2004 we will deliver even more. The sometimes difficult security situation has also been a major factor in all that we have been able to do. It has taken courage, determination and professionalism to get us to where we now are. I would therefore like to take this opportunity to formally record my thanks to all the police officers and other staff for their sterling efforts in 2003. I look forward to working with them in the New Year.

Stephen White  
Deputy Chief Constable  
Director of Law and Order and Senior Police Adviser  
Coalition Provisional Authority  
Southern Iraq

## **Security Sector Reform**

*by Stephen White, Director of Law and Order*

### **The Context**

Security sector reform (SSR) is one of the key priorities for the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). Throughout all of Iraq much of the effort in this area has been focused on reforming the police service. This has also been the case for the CPA's law and order team based in Basra. At the time of reporting (mid December) the team comprises of twenty police officers, one lawyer heading up the justice reform sector, an immigration expert with temporary support from an army major to lead on border, customs and immigration issues, and just joining us a senior prison official to lead on reform in that sector. Although some very significant work has been carried out in other areas of the security sector, particularly the judicial system, this report concentrates on our contributions to policing.

In the CPA Strategic Plan security is one of the five listed priorities. The list in full is: Essential Services; Governance; Security; Economy; and, Strategic Communications.

In security terms the desired end state is described as follows: "A secure environment

for people and property that enables citizens to participate fully in political and economic life.

The Iraqi government will have the means, including its own defence and police forces, to resume its responsibility for external and internal security, including policing of its borders. Relationships with regional states and with the international community will be established. The roles and accountabilities of organisations providing security will be clearly defined within a legal framework. And the legal framework will also regulate the private possession and use of weapons.”

To achieve the envisaged environment Coalition Forces (CF) and CPA staff members have been set eight key tasks. These are: provide basic law and order using Coalition forces; defeat internal armed threats; create an effective and accountable police system; create a Facilities Protection Service; form the Iraqi Civil Defence Corps; establish mine action programmes; develop effective border security; and, develop an emergency management command and control system for Iraq that can coordinate police, fire, rescue and emergency medical assistance in the event of a natural or manmade disaster. The civilian police (civpol) team at Al Sarraji (CPA South’s HQ at Basra) has focused on the third of these key tasks.

### Achievements so Far

It became clear (around October) that the international police mission in Iraq would not be one with executive powers or sufficient resources to play an operational role. Coalition forces, since the end of the main conflict, have been proactively delivering law and order. Their task is evolving towards joint operations with the Iraqi police and eventually into more of a support and monitoring role as the new police service grows in capacity and effectiveness. In most parts of Iraq it is military commanders who have lead responsibility for standing up, training and monitoring police performance.

CPA South’s civpol team is therefore quite a unique asset. Although we are not empowered with executive authority we can and do provide expertise aimed at improving the effectiveness and accountability of the local police. Our efforts have been mainly directed towards the provision of appropriate advice, support and training. Our services have been much sought after and not just by local police commanders.

Our clients range from senior CPA staff at regional and provincial levels to CF military commanders and senior Iraqis engaged in local governance and infrastructure. The latter includes the provincial governors, interim councils, security committees and representatives of various institutions and groupings.

On the 14th July 2003 the first civil police arrived at CPA South - three UK officers including the Deputy Director, Chief Superintendent Joe Elder. He has led the project to build a police academy at Az Zubayr which will train students from all four provinces in the South.

In early August we were joined by three Danes under the leadership of Commander Kai Vittrup who acts as mentor to the Basra chief of police and

oversees a pilot mentoring scheme. The Danish contingent has in recent months grown in size to fourteen officers. They have been instrumental in designing, delivering and evaluating three valuable training courses: management and supervision; training of trainers; and, basic investigation skills. This has been a considerable investment which will pay long term dividends.

We have been most careful to ensure that everything we have planned and delivered at the police academy (the first wing of which was opened on 18th October) is compatible with any CPA aspirations and recorded strategies. In November a draft National/Ministry of Interior police training strategy was issued by “Baghdad”. Having recently discussed this plan and our programmes with the Ministry’s Senior Adviser our work has not only received his endorsement but the academy is being considered as a national centre of excellence. This is particularly encouraging and shows that in a fast moving scenario with compressed deadlines a small group of dedicated professionals can make a very significant contribution. I am particularly indebted to Chief Superintendent Erling Sorensen who has taken the lead in our advanced training programmes.

The building of the academy and the delivery of a large scale comprehensive training programme by the end of the year was a key target which I set for the “civpol” team. The project team has, against all odds, met that target. At a cost of USD 1,200,000 the academy comprising of twenty two classrooms, catering, administrative support and accommodation for 360 residential students with the ability to take another 100 ‘day students’ and an international group of nearly fifty trainers provides a solid foundation for police developments for years to come.

A lot of the work done during the past six months could be categorized as preparatory work, filling the policy and equipment gaps until the Ministry of Interior’s directions and intentions, such as centralized distribution of uniforms, vehicles and strategies, started to flow. For example we have procured fifty five police vehicles for the Basra, Maysan and Highway Police. We also supplied thousands of police shirts and winter uniforms. These contributions have not only professionalised and motivated the police service but reassured the public by raising the visibility of security forces.

Of necessity we have focused on police leadership. In September we held the first strategic leadership conference for police commanders – colonel ranks and above. This important event was opened jointly by Sir Hilary Synnott and Sir Jeremy Greenstock. It highlighted the need for modern democratic policing principles and practices and the role of leadership at a time of change. Importantly it included a contribution from a representative from the local citizenry pointing out their expectations from the police in a new regime.

So far, to reinforce the importance of leadership, all the courses delivered at the academy have been geared towards middle management (the future commanders) and graduates have been followed up with oversight and support from Kai Vittrup’s small team to ensure that lessons learned have been put into practice.

## The Future

From 27th December 2003 to 30th June 2004 we plan to deliver the mandatory TIP course (transition and integration programme) to 6000 students – former police officers in the previous regime. The Ministry of Interior has decided that no recruit training will be delivered in Southern Iraq. This will take place in Jordan and in the North. The TIP course will be delivered mostly by the twenty four UK police officers (who arrive from 12th to 19th December) assisted by ten Carabinieri and ten Royal Military Police. An important objective for next year is to have indigenous trainers who have graduated from our ‘train the trainers’ course join this

team.

Next year we also aim to deliver advanced courses to well over 300 students. This will be UK and Danish trainers continuing the excellent work already piloted by Erling Sorensen's team. The new Ministry of Interior structure should be in place early in 2004 and we intend to work closely with the undersecretary for police training when appointed to secure the status of the academy and the accreditation of all the courses we have designed.

Mentoring of local chiefs of police will continue to be given high priority. The appointment of four international senior police officers to act as provincial advisers will be critical to this objective and the continued development of local police accountability. This will build on the work already completed by educating local representatives on local governance and establishing police committees. Progress already made in Maysan can be taken further now that a CPA directive has been issued on the subject.

Military efforts to support security sector reform are being reorganised by the General Officer Commanding the Multi National Division South East and the Brigade Commander for Basra and Maysan provinces. Effective relationships and joint working arrangements have already been established to ensure all resources at our disposal are used to best effect. For example army plans to mentor and monitor police performance will be informed by civpol expertise here at CPA South and that includes ensuring compatibility with the Ministry's plans for field training and mentoring which should go live in March as far as the South is concerned. Under the codirection of CPA's Law & Order Directorate and the Division's SSR group things have never been more "joined up" than they are now.

In so far as possible we have maximized our strategic communications and PR efforts. Frequently we have briefed visitors, local and foreign, on our aims and efforts and we have used the media and local forums whatever possible to explain and gain support for our overall strategy.

To summarise I am confident of two things. The first is that all the efforts of the civpol team in CPA South have proved to be valuable in terms of necessary groundwork and future developments. They are compatible with and helped to inform national policing strategies.

The second is that we are in much better shape to continue our work with Coalition forces, local government institutions and all the other partners engaged in security sector reform. We have a clear strategy, specific targets and have just achieved a critical mass in terms of numbers and expertise. With a more streamlined directorate now focusing on the three justice sectors: policing, courts, and prisons and expertise increasing in the latter two areas I am confident that the next six months, while equally challenging, will see the successful achievement of targets in the vital areas of public safety and security.

## **Monitoring and Mentoring**

*by Kai Vittrup, Senior Police Adviser for Basra Province*



In the period from August to December there has been a very close mentoring of the Chief of Police and his senior officers in the Al Basrah Province. In relation to this the first steps taken have been to reduce and modernize the organization of police headquarters' functions in an effort to make central departments and their staff more effective. In doing so all the efforts of my team have been compatible with the overall CPA strategy to create a modern, effective, and accountable Iraqi Police Service.

Besides the reorganization of HQ our work has involved the refurbishing of police buildings and purchases of furniture, uniforms and equipment to make the police both work and look like a professional police service.

During the period the intention has been to ensure that the academy training, the monitoring of the students, and, the mentoring of the police all meet in combined efforts to gain a synergic effect.

It is my belief that the Law and Order Pillar – Danish and British police officers - in close cooperation with the British military and the Iraqi Police and in spite of lack of resources has achieved that intention in the sense that the Iraqi Police today are more visible, more engaged in policing and have moved positively in the direction of a civilian police service to maintain law and order.

The present Chief of Police Brigadier Mohammed Al Ali was appointed by the Governor's Security Council and has demonstrated the will to improve the policing of the entire Al Basrah Province and especially Basrah City.

To ensure that this happens we have identified the need to reorganise and consolidate the command structure. Some major changes have already been accepted. A number of larger and smaller Headquarters and Sub-Headquarters have been reduced to one main Headquarter and three Sub-Headquarters and a number of districts have lost their status as a Headquarters and will be named districts stations.

Instead of forming new headquarter departments for every new problem such as guarding hospitals, courts, schools, patrol service, check-points and tourists a new department called Tactical Support Unit will be established. This will consist of a SWAT team (former PSU) and a reserve division to support the districts in tackling increasing crime rates, larger demonstrations, riots, guarding and other tasks which may arise. The Tactical Support Unit will be under the command of the main Headquarters' Operational Section which will decide priorities from requests from various districts and between various tasks.

The staff structure in the Main Headquarter will be divided into more streamlined and efficient sections. This will compare favorably with the present structure where a new section is established whenever they faced new problems. In addition the serious crime department will be transferred from a Sub-Headquarter location to the Main Headquarters in order to work more closely with a reestablished forensic department.

The staff structure in the Main Headquarter will be mirrored in the Sub-headquarters, the districts and the police stations. Furthermore a standard concept for a model police station will be developed and implemented in the total organization to make the change of command efficient and complete.

To visibly reinforce professionalism and the change from a military oriented police force to a civilian police service suitable uniforms have been supplied by CPA South's civil police team. Up until now 3000 shirts with police badges and the Iraqi flag on both arms and 3000 new dark blue pants have been issued.

Furthermore 4000 winter coats with similar badges and flags and reflecting material, together with the inscription “Police” in English and Arabic will be issued before the end of December. One Police station and a part of the Sub-Headquarter for Traffic Police are under way to be restored. Furniture costing more than USD 50,000 has been delivered to the main Headquarters, district HQs and stations together with 300 newly developed barricades for check points.

The mentoring programme was slightly delayed by the change of the Chief of Police two months after my arrival and – similar to everyone else – is from time to time limited in terms of movement due to security reasons. Nevertheless the present Chief of Police has been very cooperative which on the other hand has made the mentoring and also the monitoring programme more easily introduced.

Officers who participated in the basic management course have been monitored after they returned to their workplace. This has had a visible effect. Practical projects have been developed at the stations and improvements have been evaluated e.g. the pattern of foot patrolling has improved, local people have talked about a higher level of service and, from a situation where the stations in the beginning of August almost had nothing, many now have cars, furniture, stationary and new shirts.

A further challenge must be faced when more than 3000 trained policemen from the Facility Protection Service will be transferred into the Iraqi Police in the Basrah Province. At the same time a number of police officers and policemen will retire, be pensioned out of the service or dismissed for failure to reach the minimum criteria. The new ID card will be issued to all Basra Police which will eventually total 6,100 policemen and officers.

It is clear that Basra police face many challenges. The need for continued support from CPA South is obvious. The prospects for the coming four months involve us in speeding up the development of the Iraqi Police. It is clear that the mentoring programme must continue and we are planning to continue its development. We also plan for more stations to be restored and for the structure in each station to be similar. There will be criminal investigators in each district and investigators in each station. More modern patrol cars and modern police equipment will arrive and the Forensic department in the Main Headquarter will received its first special equipment.

## **Police Training Facilities**

*by Joe Elder, Deputy Director of Law and Order*

The UK element of the Law and Order Team deployed from the UK and arrived in Basra on 14<sup>th</sup> July 2003. The team comprised of the Deputy Chief Constable Stephen White, who was appointed as the Director Law and Order CPA South and Chief Superintendent Joe Elder who was appointed as the Deputy Director Law and Order CPA South together with Inspector Mark Miller with special responsibility as a Police Training Advisor. Immediately on arrival the team commenced a process of evaluation and assessment of the scale and scope of work to be carried out within the AOR of CPA South. The team “hit the ground running” by making visits to Baghdad, the provinces of Maysan, Al Muthanna, Dhi Qar and a number of police stations in Basra province.

A disbanded former Fedayin training camp at Az Zubayr had, prior to the team’s arrival, been identified as a suitable location for a Police Training Academy and a provisional budget of \$USD1.2 million had been set aside by CPA Baghdad for the reconstruction project. In spite of the initial work to secure provisional funding a great deal of work needed to be done on this project at an early stage to reassess the scale of the reconstruction project and to establish the student capacity of the academy. The

UK project team was established and comprised of Ch Supt Joe Elder as project manager for reconstruction and Inspector Mark Miller as project manager for resource procurement. The CPA South Field Engineer Support Team was consulted and tasked to provide expert engineering advice for the reconstruction of the academy and they helped to modify and develop the plans that had previously been drawn up. Frequent visits to the RPTA site had to be made to look at the best use for the buildings and what building and renovation work would be required to make it viable as a police academy with classrooms, residential accommodation and the various support departments needed. A site plan was drawn up to utilise all the buildings in the Police Academy grounds.

As the coalition forces advanced on Basra during the conflict phase of the war the site of the academy had been abandoned by the Fedayin and soon after all buildings within had been extensively looted, some building had also been set on fire. Anything and everything that was portable was removed, there were no doors, windows, electrical switches, ceiling fans, sanitary ware and every piece of electrical cabling was taken. In spite of the wide spread looting within the grounds of the academy there were literally tons of military debris including uniforms, respirators, ammunition magazines, military documents and in some areas items of unexploded ordnance (UXO). It was necessary for the site to be cleared of all UXO before any detailed inspections could be undertaken.

A detailed structural survey was conducted by the FEST team and the results were positive in that the buildings were structurally sound and would require only minor works to the fabric of buildings however the cosmetic appearance and internal fixtures and fittings would require a substantial level of work to put right. The project team decided on a building work specification that included installation of new doors and windows, new electric wiring throughout, replumbing and toilet / bathroom fittings, air conditioning in every room, decoration and exterior repairs. This was to provide a facility that was not only suitable by Iraqi standards but also one that European police trainers would be satisfied to work in.

A detailed business case and project plan was made and forwarded to the Ministry of Interior in Baghdad for endorsement and a request for funding to be released was made by Chief Superintendent Elder. After weeks of communication and protracted negotiation, CPA Baghdad agreed to the plans and authorised the release of the first part of the USD 1.2 million budget. On 11<sup>th</sup> September 2003 Chief Superintendent Elder, accompanied by DCC White, visited Baghdad and collected USD 360,000 to commence the project.

In mid September the plans for the development of the overall academy site had to be comprehensively altered. Two companies of UK military and an artillery battery moved in to the grounds of the academy and occupied over half of the buildings that were planned to be used for accommodation and classrooms. The status of the site as the location of the Regional

Police Training Academy (RPTA) was well known within CPA South and MND (SE) however a breakdown in the channels of communication resulted in permission being given through the military chain of command for the units to occupy the site for an undetermined duration. This unforeseen event necessitated serious changes to the plans for the RPTA. The original plan was now unsuitable and much effort had to go into salvaging the plans for the academy to reconfigure the layout of sleeping accommodation and classroom facilities. With the loss of the buildings occupied by military personnel, the plans had to be adjusted to include the purchase of purpose built container classrooms and a container kitchen and dining facility. It also meant that a much smaller area within site was available for use. However, the team was focused on achieving a fully functioning police academy and did not allow this setback to destroy the plans they had made. Negotiations with the military units resulted in a demarcation of the academy boundary and the development of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) whereby the military would provide force protection and life support to the Civpol trainers who would be resident at the academy. Shortly after the arrival of the UK team, a Danish contingent of civilian police officers arrived in theatre. The Danish team had a training project to deliver management training together with a 'Train the Trainers' programme which was due to commence in October. Attempts were made by the Danish team to secure an interim training facility to deliver this training however suitable facilities were impossible to obtain within the timescales and the reconstruction project management team therefore arranged for the renovation of part of the site to allow this training to commence. Six classrooms, an office complex and toilet facilities were identified and a project request was submitted at short notice to CPA South for approval. The project was approved and funding in the sum of USD 100,000 was awarded to allow this work to take place.

A security survey of the site was commissioned and a comprehensive report detailing all the security requirements for the physical security of the academy was submitted to the project team. The requirements of the security report presented the project team with some practical difficulties in procuring Alaska barriers and watch towers, particularly within such tight time scales. The team visited a US military base in Kuwait which was decommissioning and was able to secure the required number and type of barriers and watch towers. Creative negotiations enabled the hardware to be transported to Iraq and delivered to the academy with days to spare.

The building work was completed on time, the security requirements were met, watch towers were placed at strategic points around the academy perimeter, the entrance was re-modeled with concrete barriers to make a chicane and the perimeter wall was repaired. A facility to allow for up to 140 day students was successfully completed and on 18<sup>th</sup> October the Regional Police Training Academy (RPTA) was opened by the CPA South Regional Coordinator Sir Hilary Synnott.

Throughout October and November further detailed and intensive work progressed to complete the reconstruction of the RPTA. The CPA South Contracts Officers, at the request

of the project team, placed contracts for building work to complete the sleeping and classroom accommodation for students and trainers, provision of purpose built containers for classrooms and canteen facilities, and equipment for classrooms, bedrooms and offices.

Various types of training equipment were ordered to provide up to date

On 10<sup>th</sup> November Ch Supt Elder visited a secure location in Southern Iraq and collected USD 840,000 this being the balance of the USD 1,2 million allocation for development of the RPTA. Work has progressed and is on track for an opening date of 27<sup>th</sup> December for the Transition Integration Programme Training (TIP) to start at the RPTA. The academy will have residential accommodation for 360 students at any one time and additional classroom space for 100 day TIP students and 60 students on other training courses (management, investigation and train the trainers courses). Twenty-four UK trainers have arrived and they will work with 10 RMP and 10 Carabinieri military police to deliver TIP to as many Iraqi Police re-hires as possible by 30<sup>th</sup> June 2004.

It is hoped that in 2004 the RPTA Az Zubayr will be recognized as a national centre of training excellence and not only a regional facility. A great deal of effort has gone into the RPTA by the project team in the Law and Order Directorate CPA South and we are justifiably proud of the facility that we have provided. This has been achieved in the face of some difficulties and many challenges have had to be overcome along the way to establish the RPTA. This will be a high standard training academy that will be well suited to train the Iraqi Police and, ultimately, to be handed over to the Iraqi Police Service as a fully equipped training facility at some point in the future.

## **Police Training Programmes**

*by Erling Sorensen, Senior Training Adviser*

### **The Institutional Context**

The Iraqi Police was formed in 1920 and operated as a civil force based on a Police Law until it was militarized by the Bath regime in 1970, and since then the police has been part of the repressive regime of Saddam Hussein. The Police was not the worst human rights offenders but often the most visible, poorest educated and most corrupted force, which probably contributed to the creation of the low status it presently has.

The former police and security structures comprised two main branches who reported to Saddam Hussein respectively the Ministry of Interior, and there were three levels of police:

The lowest level was the Non-Commissioned Officers who possessed little formal education (normally only completing primary school), and when hired they were trained within their provincial area in an unstructured training program that could last up to three months.

The mid-level was Assistant Officers completed secondary school – very often from the Police High School, and subsequently the underwent on-the-job training at the duty station, where they were normally assigned to administrative functions as assistants for the Police Officers.

The upper level was Police Officers – graduates from secondary school and further three years of education at the Police Academy in Baghdad. The curriculum was heavily

influenced by military doctrine, which did not offer any traditional managerial training. Currently the investigative responsibilities and supervision rest with the investigative judges and investigators. Investigators are categorized as either police investigators or as the investigative judges' investigators. Regardless of affiliation, they rarely leave their offices, but leave it up to the patrolling police officers and crime scene officers to obtain and bring evidence, witnesses, suspects and, sometimes, even the injured party to the investigative judges. The investigative judges have the authority to decide on suspect's custody, searches of persons and premises, experts' examinations of injured parties and suspects, etc. The investigators' and crime scene officers' access to traditional investigative tools and equipment is very limited or non-existent. When the investigative judge concludes his investigation it is transferred to the prosecutor's office.

The Iraqi Police cooperate, ostensibly without hesitation, with the coalition forces, which have exerted huge efforts in locating and refurbishing police stations working with expatriates and in basic training to the Iraqi Police which, however, amounts to just a few days for each policeman.

The need of the militarily trained Iraqi Police to change into a civilian police is decisive for the future of the Iraqi Police. The fact that the first contacts and training offered to the Iraqi Police was and still is to a large extent Coalition Forces is actually continuing the military approach to policing which is not conducive to the understanding that the police are no longer military and that militarization must wind up. However, to date, except in the south, there has been no alternative.

Based on the Police Advisers' contacts and meetings at all levels of the police, the Iraqi Police has expressed in many ways and on many occasions that the Iraqi Police has a great interest and acceptance towards whatever assistance is offered in terms of training and equipment, as a way to improve capacity and reputation.

The Chief of Police in Basra and many others in the Iraqi Police recognize that the Iraqi Police suffers a widespread lack of ethical standards, lack of respect for the law and lack of education and training. At the same time they, however, impatiently express high hopes and determination to find answers to these problems with the assistance and cooperation with expatriate experts. The Iraqi Police in the four governorates of the southern Iraq are distributed [ 1] as follows as per 22<sup>nd</sup> November 2003:

#### **Province Police stations Policemen and Officers**

Basrah 35 5,627

Maysan 26 5,689

Dhi Qar 15 2,069

Muthanna 14 1,287

**22<sup>nd</sup> November 2003 totals 90 14,672**

#### **Gender Considerations**

The Police Adviser team has found no evidence of women police officers in governorates in the southern region and only a few women are employed by the police and in administrative functions only.

#### **Human Rights Considerations**

Peacekeeping operations have demonstrated the importance of deploying international civilian police as soon as possible alongside the military components – for instance experts with experience in managing police departments, in training the police and in building local policing capacities. Although the campaign in Iraq differs from peacekeeping operations, the lessons learned and referred to above were often obtained through difficult experience and there seem to be quite a few similarities. Such lessons learned have not yet been fully implemented in Iraq, where coalition forces and Iraqi Police are still not capable of providing an adequate feeling of security for the population in Iraq living under occupation. Due to the lack of sufficient number of troops to effectively patrol and secure the cities of southern Iraq, coalition forces have had to improvise in order to provide basic training for the police and basic security for the population. The

troops, many of which are not trained in the field of basic policing and investigation, have had to make up for the insufficient numbers of both military police and international civilian police. However, although untrained Iraqi police, ordinary military troops, insufficient military police and a few civilian police advisers assigned to CPA in Basra do not constitute a guarantee against human rights violations, there are for the time being no reliable information on human rights violations being committed by Iraqi law enforcement agencies. Long-term stability and human rights protection requires rule of law and creation of transparent, accountable systems of government that are based on human rights. An essential precondition for this is, that the coalition and others contribute by training, equipment and in-kind assistance to build institutions (police, prosecution and courts), which in a short, medium and long term perspective may improve the rule of law. Furthermore, there is still an urgent need for visible changes that are qualified to inspire the population with respect and confidence, that the joint efforts of the coalition forces, the CPA and local institutions (police, prosecution and courts) are actually capable of safeguarding law and order and in turn the human rights situation. Finally it should be noted that the Iraqi Police was – and still are – typically equipped with AK-47 rifles or pistols, and that apart from these, they have not yet the traditional police equipment like batons and handcuffs, which must influence negatively the options of proportionate use of force and firearms. Likewise, by the end of September 2003, the police in the four provinces in the southern region had only received some basic training delivered primarily by military battle groups.

### Training Needs

An efficient and effective police force is essential to the present and future acceptance of a self governing Iraqi society, as well as to the capability of that society to optimize its own development potential within a framework of sustainable democracy that also protects and promote the human rights for all who come within jurisdiction and influence.

Training the Iraqi Police to plan, manage, monitor and evaluate its work towards national and international acceptance and to do so with full awareness of and respect for the principles of democracy and human rights makes a significant contribution to the process of Iraqi development. At the same time, it contributes towards lowering the risks of misunderstanding and external concern by enabling the Iraqi Police to provide effective and efficient crime prevention and detection by ways of transparent law enforcement services that adhere to internationally recognized standards.

The Police Advisers assessed the needs for training based on information collected since the occupation by the military – in particular the Royal Military Police – and the Police Advisers assigned to CPA (South). The information seems reliable and – combined with observations during visits and meetings at police stations and headquarters – sufficient in terms of identifying fields of particular interest in development assistance.

Based on the information mentioned above, the fields of particular interest were no doubt first and foremost the lack of management (command and control) and initiative at all levels of the Iraqi Police. Secondly the crime rate and the obvious lack of investigative resources within the

courts system call for development of an investigative capacity within the Iraqi Police in order to provide necessary resources for crime prevention and crime detection as soon as possible. Finally, in order to ensure sustainability, there is a need for trained Iraqi police trainers to take over as soon as possible.

The Danish led and funded police training pilot program for 2003

With a view to target fields of particular interest a police training pilot project was designed early August in cooperation with the Iraqi Police. The project envisaged that Basic Management Courses should commence early October 2003, that Train the Trainers Courses should commence early November, that Basic Investigation Courses should commence mid November, and that all of these components should be considered parts of a Danish led and funded police training pilot program limited to 2003,

however, if successful with an option of a more comprehensive continuation of the police training project in 2004 involving other international police. Complementary to the training program monitoring and coaching graduates from Basic Management Courses should commence at their duty stations immediately after the courses. At the same time Danish Police Advisers should initiate a short term monitoring and mentoring program at the Basra Police Headquarters as a preliminary explorative process in cooperation with the Chief of Police and his line managers with a view to define and precisely target feasible future training components aimed at administrative and operational capacity building.

The training was planned to commence on 1<sup>st</sup> October 2003 at the Regional Police Training Academy in Basra (Az Zubayr), but the commencement of training was delayed till the 18<sup>th</sup> October due to mainly the missing cash flow in general for projects at that time.

The training in 2003 comprised:

6 three week Basic Management Courses (120 Lieutenants and Captains)

2 three week Train the Trainers Courses (20 Lieutenants and Captains)

4 one week Basic Investigation Courses (in total 40 Lieutenants and Captains)

All training courses were successfully accomplished from 18<sup>th</sup> October to 18<sup>th</sup> December 2003.

In addition to the output of graduates, an output in the form of text books and training manuals in English and Arabic were developed, revised and completed during the training project. These training materials are part of the objective to achieve sustainability of the project at the Regional Police Training Academy in Basra and, possibly, at a later stage as part of the new Iraqi national police training curriculum.

These accomplishments were made possible only with the high degree of cooperation exerted by all parties involved to fulfill the aims and objectives of the police training project – the parties being the Iraqi Police in general and the Chief of Police in Basra, Brigadier Mohammed Al Ali, and in particular the Dean of the Regional Police Training Academy, Colonel Sadeq Abd



Radhi, and internal staff at CPA in general and in particular in the Law and Order Directorate. None of this, however, would have been possible without the commitment and determination of the Danish trainers, the Project Manager and the monitors to complete the training courses and the monitoring despite increasingly difficult security conditions and procedures during the project period. The accomplishments in 2003 were the main motive for the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs decision to continue the assistance to the capacity building in 2004. The assistance comprises funding of/for a continuation of the management training, training the trainers and investigative training with sustainability being the main objective and:

- an administrative and operational capacity building program including coaching, monitoring and mentoring key staff
- assistance to police training curriculum development
- small scale donations of equipment for crime lab technicians and crime scene Investigators

The continuation of the management training, training the trainers and investigative training in 2004, with sustainability being the main objective. The total number of officers to be trained in this programme in 2004 is approximately 800, of which 470 from January to June, and 325 from July to December. Plans for July to December are predicated on the Iraqi government inviting the Danish contributions to continue.

## **Strategic Seminar**

*by Joe Elder, Deputy Director of Law and Order*

Within days of arriving in country the UK Civpol team commenced a demanding schedule of visits to Iraqi police stations in and around Basra taking the opportunity to meet and talk with operational Iraqi police officers. It became evident to the UK Civpol team at CPA South that the strategic management of the Iraqi Police Service was highly centralised with edicts issued from Baghdad to the provincial level. Lines of communication appeared to be a 'top down' process with very little room for initiative or creativity on the part of management of the police at all levels. There was no evidence of any senior Iraqi police officers within the Basra province taking a strategic overview of policing or of a comprehension of the scale of the new challenges facing them as they moved forward to an accountable, efficient and effective organisation. It was felt that it was necessary to hold a strategic level seminar for all Basra based Iraqi police officers at the rank of Colonel and above to generate strategic thinking and to raise awareness of a number of strategic issues which they would face in the months and years ahead.

On 22 September 2003, all senior Iraqi police officers at the rank of Colonel and above from the Basra province police attended at CPA South HQ for what was to prove a highly successful seminar.

The seminar was opened by the Regional Coordinator for CPA South, Sir Hilary

Synnott, who addressed the seminar audience in Arabic.

The audience was also addressed by Sir

Jeremy Greenstock Prime Minister Tony Blair's special envoy to Iraq. The attendance of Sir Hilary and Sir Jeremy at the opening of the seminar gave special significance of the occasion and of the subject matter to the Iraqi police officers present.

Sir Hilary's address covered a number of key points, set out below

Regime change provides opportunity for a new police service in Iraq.

Most importantly the people of Iraq have expectations and legitimate demands in respect of policing.

They (the people) wish the police to be effective, accountable, fair and impartial, representative, respectful of people's human rights, open and transparent and to operate in a way that encourages the public to work with the police with mutual trust and confidence.

Police leaders, especially those in the most senior positions, carry a great responsibility to manage and deliver the required changes.

Managing change requires a range of personal and professional attributes- vision, strategic planning, determination, project management, visible leadership, decisiveness, understanding of and commitment to the principles of modern democratic policing and, the ability to listen and respond to public concerns and suggestions.

Thus the tone of the seminar was set. The seminar proceedings were facilitated by Chief Superintendent Joe Elder of MDP who introduced the guest speakers throughout the day and facilitated the discussion and answer session at the end of each talk. This format was successful in that it enabled the audience to participate fully and avoided the debate being conducted between the chair and, on behalf of all IPS, by the senior Iraqi police officer present.

First speaker of the day was Mr.

Robert Wilson, the Political Advisor

at CPA South. Mr. Wilson

addressed the audience, entirely in Arabic, on the relationship of the police with government and the separation of the police from the legislature, judiciary and military in a democratic society. The subject of his discussion was beyond the experience of the audience however there was lively debate on how the police could function with a degree of political independence and separation from military discipline and accountability under a separate police discipline code. The session ended on a positive note with more questions than time would allow.

The second and third sessions of the seminar were given by Deputy Chief Constable Stephen White of PSNI, who gave a talk on the Principles of Modern Democratic Policing and the Role of Leadership in Managing Change. These sessions by far stimulated the highest level of discussion amongst the audience and it was evident that the principles were of great interest to all concerned within the audience. DCC White's talks covered the areas of

Policing in Partnership

Community consultation

Community involvement, and;

Joint problem solving mechanisms  
Respect for and Protection of Human Rights  
Fairness and impartiality  
Accountability  
Openness and Transparency  
Representativeness, and;  
Effectiveness  
Strategic leadership  
Management of change

At the end of DCC White's talk the Chief of Police for Basra replied with a statement of gratitude for the seminar. He informed the seminar that much of what he had listened to was a revelation for Iraqi police officers and presented new challenges for his officers. He expressed a desire to embrace the new principles and gave an assurance that he would encourage the officers under his command to do the same. He requested the UK police officers to give him and his officers continued help and support in working towards an accountable, effective and efficient organisation. DCC White gave an assurance that support would be given to the IPS in the form of mentoring for the Chief of Police, assistance with financial planning for the operating budget, support in the form of management training by Danish police officers, assistance with obtaining essential resources to enable the IPS to function such as vehicles and uniforms and the building of a training academy where his officers and men would receive training and the establishment of police committees.

The final presentation of the day was made by an Iraqi national, Mr. Haider Samad Al Hussein who was an Iraqi national employed by CPA.

Mr. Hussein spoke to the assembled Iraqi police officers giving a moving account of his life in Iraq under the Ba'ath Party regime. Of how his father had been taken away one day and never seen again, the effect of spending nine years under house arrest and his treatment and torture during his frequent terms of imprisonment during those nine years and how members of his family had to flee Iraq in fear of their lives. He then gave an account of his dream for the future of Iraq, of how he wished

to live in peace and follow his dream of becoming a doctor. He spoke of raising a family and being able to take them on a walk along the banks of the Shatt Al Arab without fearing being robbed or killed. Most importantly he stated to the IPS his expectations of the IPS and their role by treating people with dignity and fairness and in providing safety and security for the citizens of Iraq.

Interestingly, the IPS were in total silence throughout the duration of Mr. Hussein talk, his personal account reminding them of the repressive regime that was being left behind and the enormity of the Iraqi peoples expectations for a new Iraq. At the end of his talk the IPS officers embraced Mr. Hussein thanking him for the courage to speak out.

The seminar was closed with a question and answer session with DCC White, Chief Supt Elder and Mr. Robert Wilson taking questions. The day's event proved to be a great success for all concerned. The UK Civpol officers gained a valuable insight into the culture of Iraqi policing. The information and lessons learned have helped us to focus our efforts in the support of our IPS colleagues and will continue to be of benefit to our successors in the coming months.

It is the intention of the CPA South Law and Order team to deliver strategic seminars to the senior police officers working within the remaining provinces in CPA South AOR.

# The Transitional Integration Program

*by Inspector Mark Miller*

In July 2003 the CPA Civpol Law and Order Directorate visited the Ministry of Interior in Baghdad with a view to establishing lines of communication and for a strategic level briefing on the way ahead. The then interim Minister of Interior, Mr. Bernie Kerik tasked the CPA South Law and Order Directorate with the delivery of the Transition Integration Programme (TIP) to the members of the Iraqi Police Service who had served as police before the war (pre-April 2003). On return to CPA South the team immediately commenced the preliminary work to meet this task.

Initially there was an expectation by the military that a team of UK police trainers would arrive to deliver the TIP programme. Proposals were put forward by the Director of Law and Order, DCC Stephen White, who asked in late August for police resources including 20 UK trainers and 1 senior police manager to run the police academy. It was requested that the first contingent police training staff should deploy to Iraq in October 2003.

Plans to deliver the TIP programme included an assessment of the scale of the task, identifying the number of officers to be trained and a scoping study to establish the provincial requirements. A copy of the programme was obtained from CPA Baghdad and work was commenced to design lesson plans. The TIP programme was originally designed to be a four week course, three weeks classroom based training followed by one week's firearms training. The subject matter covered by TIP includes the following:

- Democratic policing principles
- Human rights
- International law basics
- Community policing
- Iraqi criminal law
- Police ethics and code of conduct
- Police use of force standards
- Officer survival
- Interviewing suspects, witnesses and victims
- Police report writing
- Communications
- Handcuffing
- Searching of suspects
- Patrol procedures
- Firearms – Glock 17 and AK47.

The decision was made at CPA Baghdad that new recruits or, those officers recruited post April 2003 would not receive the TIP course. This meant that all police recruited after the war would have to receive an eight week recruit course at a site to be confirmed. The impact of this decision was that considerable work needed to be carried out to establish which officers were recruited after April 2003. On the face of it this sounds a relatively simple task however there was suspicion amongst former police personnel that enquiries being made as to the start date of their employment was for the purpose of establishing who may have been part of the former regime. Consequently a great deal of effort went into establishing the status of all police personnel as either new recruits or rehired former police.

Unfortunately, no deployment of UK police occurred in October 2003. This meant that the TIP programme could not be delivered from the date originally planned.

In November 2003 CPA Baghdad made the decision to reduce the TIP programme from four weeks to three weeks. The subjects covered would be the same, but evaluation of courses run in the Baghdad area led to the conclusion that three weeks would be sufficient to deliver the material. One week would still be allocated for firearms training.

In early November an order from Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF7) in Baghdad directed military commanders to take responsibility for the delivery of TIP-training. Several strategic meetings took place in CPA South, MND (SE) Divisional Headquarters and with the Ministry of Interior senior advisers in Baghdad. The result has been to bring all the civpol and military resources together in a combined effort focused on the new police academy in Az Zubayr. In essence although the coalition military forces have taken the responsibility for TIP in Southern Iraq there will be a strong civilian police input. CPA has built the academy, prepared the materials and contributed senior staff to manage the academy and deliver training in partnership with military resources.

During the first week of December DCC White was informed by the FCO that twenty four UK police officers would be deployed to Iraq to deliver TIP training at the RPTA. The police officers were scheduled to arrive on three separate days on the 12th, 17th and 19th December. In addition to the UK Civpol contingent MNDSE agreed to provide ten Royal Military Police and ten Carabinieri to work on TIP. This would give a training team of forty four civilian and military police personnel to deliver the courses.

A target of delivery of TIP to 6,000 Iraqi Police Service personnel has been set, this target to be achieved by 30<sup>th</sup> June 2004.

CPA South is the only region in Iraq where civilian police officers will be in a position to deliver training to the Iraqi Police Service. This is another milestone achieved by the Law and Order Directorate CPA South and one that we are pleased to have achieved.

## Police Vehicles

*by Joe Elder, Deputy Director of Law and Order*

As stated elsewhere in this report the UK Civpol team conducted detailed visits to various IPS facilities to gain an understanding of the organizational structure and resource needs of the IPS in Basra province. It was immediately obvious that the police vehicle fleet being used by the Iraqi police in Basra was in a poor state of repair. The majority of vehicles consisted of ageing pickup trucks which, were in a bad state of repair, many of which had considerable structural damage to the body of the vehicle such as broken light clusters, cracked windcreens and bodywork damage.

With the exception of the traffic police, regular police vehicles had no obvious means of identification that the vehicle was a 'police' vehicle. By European standards these vehicles would be banned from the roads due to the unsatisfactory construction and use. There were a small number of newer vehicles being used, predominantly 4x4's. These vehicles had been donated by the coalition forces and were generally being used by IPS senior officers and were not available to operational police officers.

Clearly there was an imminent need to provide a quantity of vehicles which were readily identifiable as police vehicles and equipped with warning lights and audible sirens. Because of the operational independence of the Traffic Police from the IPS and the separation of budgets it was necessary to run two separate but related projects to supply vehicles. I commenced work with the Chief of Police for Basra on the production of a spending plan for submission to the treasury to secure an operating budget for the IPS. The

spending plan included a funding line for the provision of police vehicles and a request was forwarded for a vehicle budget of \$521,000 USD. The spending plan was approved and the funds deposited in the IPS bank account.

Concurrent to this activity I submitted a project proposal to the CPA South for the provision of Highway Patrol vehicles to be used by the Basra Traffic police. The specific requirement here was to enable the Traffic Police to operate away from their stations on the main highways and in particular on the Military Supply Route from the Kuwait/Iraq international border crossing point at Safwan, North to the provincial border of Basra/Dhi Qar. The provision of these vehicles would enable the traffic police to combat the growing number of attacks on CF convoys, carjackings and serious violent crimes taking place on the main highways in Basra. A project budget allocation of \$150,000 USD was approved for this project.

Funding for police vehicle from the IPS operating budget and the CPA South was completed within days of each other and it was possible to negotiate a single contract for the supply of forty double cab 2.0l petrol Mitsubishi pickup trucks (the IPS preferred choice). A dealership in Kuwait was identified and the UK Civpol team visited Kuwait to agree the vehicle specification for "POLICE" markings in English and Arabic to the front, rear and sides of the vehicle and a Blue flashing roof mounted light bar.

Additionally the vehicles assigned for the traffic police were to be marked "HIGHWAY PATROL" and fitted with Motorola radios.

The delivery of forty police vehicles from Kuwait to Iraq proved to be problematical requiring correspondence with the Kuwait Ministry of Interior for permission to mark the vehicles with police livery and for the export of the vehicles to Iraq. These difficulties were overcome with visits to Kuwait and formal correspondence to the Kuwaiti authorities. The deal was completed within the timescale of the vehicles being prepared by the dealer and we were able to meet the timelines agreed between Law and Order and the dealer. What proved more difficult was sourcing eighty plus drivers and escorts for the move from Kuwait to Basra.

A coordinated effort between US military, RMP and I resulted in a convoy of forty Iraqi police vehicles and eight escort vehicles being delivered to CPA South HQ at Al Sarraji on Tuesday 11 November. During the journey from Kuwait to Basra the convoy came under attack from youths throwing stones at the vehicles, fortunately there was only minor cosmetic damage to the lead vehicle. The arrival of the vehicles marked the first major contribution of operational equipment to the Iraqi police in Basra.

To mark the occasion a formal handing over ceremony was held at Al Sarraji. Sir Hilary Synnott handed over the highway patrol vehicles to Colonel Thari Mahmud Thamir, head of the Basra Traffic Police. Ambassador Henry Hogger presented the remaining police vehicles to the Chief of Basra Police, Brigadier

Al Ali. The event gave an opportunity to project the positive work of CPA and was of great interest to the national and international media.

The Law and Order Directorate continue in their efforts to assist the IPS to enlarge the vehicle fleet. Delivery of fifteen vehicles was made to CPA for Maysan Province police on 15 December. A project is also under way to provide four, thirty seat personnel buses for the Regional Police Training Academy, a further five highway patrol vehicles and a two ton recovery truck. Additional work is also underway to provide maintenance for the growing vehicle fleet and it is hoped that two mechanics will be employed by the Basra police. The Mitsubishi dealer in Kuwait has agreed to train these mechanics free of charge.

## **Police Accountability and Local Governance**

*by Stephen White, Director of Law and Order*

The CPA/Ministry of Interior's "60/90 day plan" issued to me on 27th August contained fifteen priorities in respect of policing. One of them is entitled "civilian oversight of policing". However, before that date work had commenced in CPA's south region in the vital area of police accountability and local governance. For instance, before any civilian police arrived in theatre, coalition forces in Basra had established a security committee to identify local concerns and priorities. Among other things they were exploring civilian oversight of police checkpoints in order to ensure fair and effective performance.

In mid August, along with CPA's deputy regional coordinator, I spent several days with Basra's provincial governor, deputy governor, local council members, and religious and tribal leaders. After hearing their concerns and suggestions in respect of policing considerable time was spent exploring the concept of independent oversight of policing. I used the "UK- style police authority" model as a reference point but stressed the need for structures and systems that are culturally appropriate and not overly ambitious. There was an enthusiastic response and of particular interest was the "new" idea of public involvement in policing plans and monitoring of police (chiefs') performance.

Proposals were put forward to public representatives and the CF military commanders to expand the remit of the current security committee and to integrate this with their aim to involve local citizenry in public safety schemes such as a practical form of neighborhood watch.

Further work in this area has been, and continues to be, done in Maysan province from September until the present time.

This was prompted by a number of local policing issues such as the integration of a local militia (the FAWJ) into the new Iraqi police service and then the tragic assassination of their leader who had been installed as a chief of police.

Frequent discussions with the provincial governorate coordinator and her team, the CF military commander, local police and elected representatives have led (at the time of writing) to firm actions taking this matter forward. Currently announcements and advertisements have been issued to seek applications for public members of the Maysan Public Safety Committee. Advice has been given about the function of such a committee and guidelines have been drawn up for the selection criteria and the role of committee members. Training and support will continue to be provided to this important project. The Maysan public safety committee will have three primary functions – participating in the preparation of an annual police plan; monitoring and assessing police performance; and, oversight of the police chief including involvement in his selection. All of this CPA South-led preparatory work is compatible with and now informed by the CPA Baghdad's recent (20 November) "Info Memo" on regional policing procedures. Comments and suggestions from this office were forwarded when the draft proposals were circulated from the centre and are reflected in the final document.

Of particular importance is the degree of clarity which is now coming through in respect of public consultation, citizen involvement in police planning and the evaluation and appointment of chiefs of police. Although the memorandum is a very light document (one and a half pages including a section of definitions) it can and will be built on by the practical experiences and their evaluation in Maysan.

The recently published future structure for the Ministry of Interior shows two key posts which, when filled, will have particular interest in this important pilot – the Undersecretary for Security and Policing and the Undersecretary for Public Safety.

In my transition plan and resource bids submitted in August and September I identified critical posts – these included provincial police advisers for each of the four provinces and one oversight expert such as a serving or former chief executive of a police authority. I am pleased to report at time of writing that the Police Service of Northern Ireland is advertising for volunteers to take on the former role. Until now I have personally led this development project. It is my hope that new staff will play a central role in the delivery of this important strategic priority.

The new strategic plan with a lesser number of priorities still identifies this area as a key task. Regime change would be exemplified if we can establish meaningful local governance of, and partnership approaches to, policing.

## **TABLE OF PROGRESS AND ACHIEVEMENTS**

**July 14 Three UK police officers arrive at CPA South**

**July 20 DCC White appointed Director of CPA South Law & Order**

**Aug 7 Three Danish police officers arrive at CPA South**

**Aug 25 Police committee plan presented to Cmdr 19BDE**

**Aug 28 Transition plan and civpol resource bid presented**

**Sep 2 Modified civpol resource bid submitted**

**Sep 18 Danish police trainers arrive**



**Sep 23 Strategic Seminar for senior Basra IPS**  
**Sep 28 Danish police trainers arrive**  
**Oct 18 First wing of police academy opened and first management course at RPTA started by Danish police**  
**Oct 21 Danish monitors arrive**  
**Oct 22 Police vehicles sourced in Kuwait**  
**Oct 25 Director's project in Al Amarah ref police committee commenced**  
**Nov 3 A review team from the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs recommends a continuation of the police training project**  
**Nov 6 Danish police trainers arrive**  
**Nov 11 40 police vehicles handed over to IPS Basra and Traffic police**  
**Nov 18 Agreed process for police committee with Maysan prov. coordinator**  
**Nov 21 Received the Draft Police Training Plan from CPA Baghdad**  
**Nov 24 Updated police reform plan submitted to regional coordinator UK**  
**Nov 25 Foreign Secretary Jack Straw briefed in Basra by DCC White**  
**Dec 2 Strategic SSR meeting with Brigadier 20 BDE and Director L&O**  
**Dec 3 Joint project meeting held with MNDSE ref TIP training**  
**Dec 3 (also) Ministry of Interior Strategic Priorities received**  
**Dec 4 CPA/MOI Baghdad endorsement of CPA South training strategy**  
**Dec 8 2004 Strategic Plan for Law & Order submitted to reg. coordinator**  
**Dec 12 Four UK police trainers arrive**  
**Dec 13 Adverts for Maysan police committee agreed & circulated**  
**Dec 13<sup>th</sup> 15 police vehicles handed over to Maysan police**  
**Dec 15 Winter jackets presented to Basra police & Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs approved a continuation of the police training project in 2004**  
**Dec 17<sup>th</sup> 10 Carabinieri arrived at the Regional Police Training Academy**