

The following submission was made via the Iraq Inquiry website:

Dear Sir John

I am writing to comment on the position taken by Alistair Campbell during his evidence to you on the 12th of January when he stated that the purpose of the Dossier was not to make a case for war; I and those involved in its production saw it exactly as that, and that was the direction we were given

In 2002 and 2003 I was the Director General Intelligence Collection in the Defence Intelligence Staff, in the rank of Major General. I reported to the Chief of Defence Intelligence (CDI), Air Marshall Sir Joe French. My responsibility was to command all defence intelligence collection operations, delivering raw or analysed intelligence to the Defence Intelligence Assessment Staff, who also worked for CDI. [REDACTED]

I was one removed from the discussions in the Cabinet Office and the JIC though I attended the latter occasionally, but not during the period in question as CDI was always present. Obviously he would come back from such meetings with feedback and fresh requirements.

Alistair Campbell said to the Inquiry that the purpose of the Dossier was not "to make a case for war". I had no doubt at that time this was exactly its purpose and these very words were used. The previous paper, drafted in February and March, known to us then also as the Dossier, was rejected because it did not make a strong enough case. From then until September we were under pressure to find intelligence that could reinforce the case. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I recall Joe French frequently enquiring whether we were missing something; he was under pressure. We could find no evidence of planes, missiles or equipment that related to WMD, generally concluding that they must have been dismantled, buried or taken abroad. There has probably never been a greater detailed scrutiny of every piece of ground in any country.

During the drafting of the final Dossier, every fact was managed to make it as strong as possible, the final statements reaching beyond the conclusions intelligence assessments would normally draw from such facts. It was clear to me that there was direction and pressure being applied on the JIC and its drafters.

In summary, we knew at the time that the purpose of the Dossier was precisely to make a case for war, rather than setting out the

available intelligence, and that to make the best out of sparse and inconclusive intelligence the wording was developed with care. The question that needs to be asked is, if there had been no remit to draft the "Dossier", would the JIC in their normal process have produced papers that would have come to the same assessment as the Dossier?

Michael Laurie

By: Michael Laurie

Email: [REDACTED]

Date: 27/01/2010 12:19:37