

1 Wednesday, 26th January 2011

2 (2.00 pm)

3 Evidence of SIR DAVID RICHMOND

4 SIR JOHN CHILCOT: Good afternoon and welcome, everyone.

5 Welcome to our witness. This afternoon we will be  
6 hearing from Sir David Richmond. We will be taking  
7 evidence from Sir David in relation to his role as  
8 Deputy UK Special Representative to Iraq during 2003/4  
9 and then as UK Special Representative to Iraq from March  
10 2004 until the end of the Coalition Provisional  
11 Authority, the CPA, in June 2004.

12 We will later in the session be discussing also some  
13 aspects of Sir David's role as Director General Defence  
14 and Intelligence in the Foreign & Commonwealth Office  
15 between 2004 and 2007.

16 Now a copy of Sir David's valedictory on leaving  
17 Iraq in June 2004 has now been published on our website  
18 and we will refer to this document during our  
19 questioning.

20 As I say on each occasion, we recognise that  
21 witnesses are giving evidence based on their  
22 recollection of events. We, of course, check what we  
23 hear against the papers to which we have access and  
24 which we are still receiving.

25 I remind each witness on each occasion he will later

1           be asked to sign a transcript of the evidence given to  
2           the effect that that evidence is truthful, fair and  
3           accurate.

4           With those preliminaries, I will ask Baroness  
5           Prashar to start the questions.

6   BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Thank you. As the Chairman said, we  
7           will start by looking at the CPA period.

8           Could you please confirm the dates you served in  
9           Iraq, distinguishing between the period you served as  
10          a Special Representative and as a Deputy Special  
11          Representative?

12   SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Yes. I mean, I arrived in Iraq  
13          I think it was on 25th July 2003 for a handover with  
14          John Sawers, the then Special Representative. He left  
15          on 28th July. I took over from him on that date I acted  
16          as Special Representative -- indeed I called myself the  
17          Special Representative at the request of the Foreign  
18          Office until Jeremy Greenstock arrived on 15th  
19          September, when from then onwards I acted as his deputy,  
20          although there were periods, really about a week or even  
21          ten days each month, when he was back in London or  
22          travelling in the region or to Washington when  
23          I was standing in for him in Baghdad. Then Jeremy left  
24          towards the end of March. I took over from him as  
25          Special Representative and remained until the end of the

1 Coalition Provisional Authority on 28th June 2004.

2 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Thank you. What instructions did  
3 you receive before you went to Iraq? What were your key  
4 responsibilities?

5 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: I think there were really three things  
6 that were impressed upon me when I did my briefing in  
7 London before leaving for Baghdad. The first was really  
8 a thirst for information about what was going on. They  
9 wanted me to establish a good working relationship with  
10 Bremer and to find out as much as I could about what was  
11 going on and ensure that London were kept fully  
12 informed. This was really the most basic requirement.

13 Then we were in the process of building up the  
14 British contribution to the CPA. British secondees were  
15 going out there to fill various roles within the  
16 organisation. It was clearly my responsibility and  
17 Jeremy Greenstock's, when he arrived, to ensure they  
18 fitted into the organisation, that they able to operate  
19 effectively and look after their safekeeping and well  
20 being which became an increasing burden as time went on.

21 Finally I believe a broad brush was to try to ensure  
22 an orderly transition to a representative government,  
23 sovereign representative Iraqi government and associated  
24 with that was obviously trying to handover to them in  
25 the best possible condition, which meant the whole range

1 of issues that the CPA dealt with during the course of  
2 its existence.

3 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Who gave you the briefings and the  
4 instructions before you went?

5

6 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Well, I saw various people in London.  
7 I didn't have an extensive briefing in London, largely  
8 because at the time there was very little time between  
9 finishing my previous job in Brussels and going out to  
10 Baghdad and I needed a little bit of time with my  
11 family. I saw what was by then the Iraq Policy Unit,  
12 although it was in a period of transition at that point.  
13 I don't think John Buck had arrived as Director. I saw  
14 Edward Chaplin as the Middle East Director. I also saw  
15 the Prime Minister. I saw Alastair Campbell, because of  
16 concerns about communications issues, a range of people  
17 in the Foreign Office, but mainly the Foreign Office.

18 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: So you were clear about the  
19 priorities in what you were going out there to do?

20 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Yes.

21 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Who were the reporting lines in both  
22 your roles when you were in Baghdad? How did that work  
23 in terms of the reporting lines?

24 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Well, the reporting was to the Foreign  
25 Office primarily and that's where sort of the Iraq

1 telegrams would go in the first instance, although they  
2 were obviously circulated all the way round the relevant  
3 departments in Whitehall. I worked closely with John  
4 Sawers, who was the Political Director, with the Iraq  
5 Policy Unit. Neil Crompton was probably my main  
6 contact, because he handled the political and policy  
7 aspects of the Iraqi transition.

8 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Neil Crompton was in London?

9 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Yes, he was one of the three senior  
10 figures within the Iraq Policy Unit but he had primarily  
11 the political and policy aspects. There was another  
12 section that was dealing I think with the security  
13 issues. There is a third section. I can't remember  
14 exactly what its responsibilities were.

15 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: In Baghdad you were working to John  
16 Sawers. Is that how it worked?

17 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: No, I just had a handover with him  
18 because he was about to leave. Of course when Jeremy  
19 arrived, I acted as his deputy, yes.

20 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: In the interim who were you working  
21 to, were you working with Bremer or who were you working  
22 for?

23 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: I was working with Bremer. I was the  
24 Special Representative and worked with Bremer, yes.

25 SIR JOHN CHILCOT: But not to him?

1 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Not to him, no, for reasons you have  
2 discussed already in this Inquiry.

3 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Sir Jeremy Greenstock explained to  
4 the Inquiry that he decided to focus on politics in Iraq  
5 because he lacked resources in his own hands to dispense  
6 on any of the material things. What is your  
7 understanding of what he meant by this?

8 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Well, I think it struck him, as it  
9 struck me and I think to a very large extent John Sawers  
10 as well, that the area where we could make the greatest  
11 contribution as representatives was to the political  
12 process. This is because as diplomats that's the sort  
13 of thing we know or are expected to know something  
14 about. Of course there were a huge range of other  
15 issues and secondees from London, experts in their  
16 various fields did come out to make an important  
17 contribution in a number of different areas, but they  
18 were the experts and we relied on them to make their  
19 contribution in those specific fields.

20 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: What was your focus when you served  
21 as Special Representative in Iraq? Was it different to  
22 that of Jeremy Greenstock?

23 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: No, I would say it was identical.

24 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: So you focused upon politics too?

25 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Yes, politics followed by security

1 issues, but politics, yes.

2 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: What was your understanding of who  
3 was the most senior representative in Iraq representing  
4 UK priorities and concerns regarding reconstruction  
5 during the CPA period?

6 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: The Special Representative, so Jeremy  
7 Greenstock when he was there and me when I took over  
8 from him.

9 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Even on reconstruction issues,  
10 because if you are focusing on politics, who was  
11 focusing on reconstruction?

12 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Well, I mean, we were expected to be  
13 able to report what was happening on the full range of  
14 issues and we certainly tried to do that. I looked at  
15 the files. There are reports on a very wide range of  
16 issues covering the whole of that 14 month period by  
17 John Sawers, by Jeremy Greenstock and myself. We  
18 relied, of course, on talking to the experts in the  
19 relevant field. That was sometimes the Americans who  
20 were the leaders in particular areas of concern or  
21 interest. Where possible, of course, we relied upon the  
22 British secondees and I would often ask them to write  
23 reports on the work in their particular areas which  
24 would then be sent back to London.

25 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: But what was your understanding of

1       Andy Bearpark's responsibilities and how they related to  
2       your responsibilities and those of Sir Jeremy  
3       Greenstock?

4   SIR DAVID RICHMOND: He was, of course, part of the CPA. So  
5       there was a slightly different relationship between him  
6       and Bremer and the relationship that Jeremy and I had  
7       with Bremer. I think I read his evidence. He said, you  
8       know, he made a conscious decision to essentially be  
9       a part of the CPA, to almost become an American.  
10      I think that was the right decision on his part. Bremer  
11      relied heavily on him in a wide range of areas,  
12      particularly on infrastructure and services and on.

13   BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Yes, you are right. He did tell us  
14      that his allegiance was 100% to the CPA, but what did  
15      that actually mean for the UK 's priorities in the field  
16      of reconstruction, because if he was working completely  
17      to the CPA what did that mean for the UK's priorities?

18   SIR DAVID RICHMOND: I think there is a sort of dichotomy  
19      there which I don't really recognise. I think we all,  
20      whether we were members of CPA or Special  
21      Representative, had the same objectives. We were all  
22      working for the same basic goals. From time to time,  
23      particularly in the political area, maybe sometimes in  
24      the economic areas as well, there were differences of  
25      emphasis or differences of view about how you arrived at



1           those goals, but it's not as if there was a sort of  
2           American policy and British policy. There was a joint  
3           policy. We were all working to those policy objectives.  
4           From time to time, of course, there were discussions  
5           about the best way of achieving those objectives.

6   BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: So you are saying that the  
7           objectives were agreed, but the means of achieving those  
8           objectives, there could have been some discussion about?

9   SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Yes.

10   BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: How did your role and that of  
11           Sir Jeremy Greenstock relate to the objectives and  
12           responsibilities of the British Office in Baghdad?

13   SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Well, we worked very closely -- sorry.  
14           The British office. I am sorry. I was thinking of the  
15           military people. Yes, we also worked closely with them.

16   SIR JOHN CHILCOT: Could you say something -- I am sorry to  
17           interrupt you.

18   SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Yes.

19   SIR JOHN CHILCOT: I am slightly puzzled to know what the  
20           British office was constituted for?

21   SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Yes. That came into existence before  
22           I arrived in Iraq. My understanding of the sequence of  
23           events is that the assumption was made in London that  
24           after the fighting was over that we would need to  
25           establish effectively an embassy, but, of course it,

1       wouldn't be an embassy, because we were occupying the  
2       country. So in diplomatic terms it couldn't be  
3       an embassy, that's why it was called a British office.  
4       It was established in the old British Embassy where  
5       I had myself once worked. The aim was that they would  
6       be -- the British Office under Chris Segar would be the  
7       British representatives in Iraq looking after British  
8       interests, but then, they were, as I say, in the old  
9       embassy building. They were not inside the Presidential  
10      Palace where the CPA was set up, and as a consequence  
11      was very difficult for Chris Segar to get eyes on what  
12      was actually happening in the CPA.

13         I think that was one of the reasons -- there may  
14      have been others as well -- that's one of the reasons  
15      Sir John Sawers was appointed as Special Representative  
16      and sent out there early in May to work closely  
17      alongside Bremer because we didn't have visibility as to  
18      what was going on.

19    BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: How did you work with the British  
20      office in Baghdad? How did your responsibilities relate  
21      to those of the British office?

22    SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Well, once -- I think this must have  
23      been true as well for Sir John -- once there was  
24      a Special Representative, the Special Representative  
25      concentrated primarily on what was happening within the

1 CPA and what the CPA was trying to achieve. The British  
2 Office I think found a slightly different role for  
3 itself than the one that was originally intended. They  
4 developed their contact with a wide range of Iraqi  
5 society, with Iraqis in business, particularly in  
6 universities and the educational system, which we didn't  
7 have time to do. So they gave us a breadth of view  
8 which we would not have had if we had relied solely on  
9 the people in the Special Representative's office.

10 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: So they were kind of a support and  
11 complemented what you were doing?

12 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: I would say they complemented what we  
13 were doing absolutely.

14 SIR JOHN CHILCOT: They have would have had a range of  
15 Consular responsibilities, would they?

16 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Yes, they would have done, yes.

17 SIR JOHN CHILCOT: But also some share of the political  
18 responsibility?

19 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: They talked to a range of people.  
20 Obviously there was some overlap between contacts, but  
21 essentially we sort of divided up the contact and they  
22 were talking to people that for one reason or another we  
23 were not talking to. Now, of course some of those  
24 conversations were about the politics of the situation  
25 and they were reporting that back to London, yes.

1 SIR JOHN CHILCOT: Last supplementary question from me.  
2 Were they conceived of at any point as being the embryo  
3 of what would become the British Embassy in Baghdad?  
4 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: I think that was always the intention  
5 that that's what they would be, yes.  
6 SIR JOHN CHILCOT: Thank you. I will turn to Sir Roderic  
7 Lyne now. Rod.  
8 SIR RODERIC LYNE: As you just mentioned, you once worked in  
9 the British Embassy in Baghdad, I think that was in 1979  
10 to 1982. Against that background, you must have been  
11 one of the very, very few people working in the CPA who  
12 had previously lived in the country. Would that be  
13 right?  
14 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: I think that's almost certainly true,  
15 yes.  
16 SIR RODERIC LYNE: When you arrived there soon after the  
17 military campaign were you at all surprised by the  
18 assumptions that had been made in planning for the  
19 aftermath of the campaign, the assumptions about Iraq?  
20 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Of course, lots of different  
21 assumptions were made as far as I can work it out.  
22 I mean, I do remember -- and this was long before I was  
23 appointed to go to Iraq -- being very clear in my own  
24 view that the overwhelming majority of Iraqis would  
25 welcome the disappearance and overthrow of Saddam

1 Hussein. He was a deeply unpopular figure, but I didn't  
2 think it followed that the Iraqi people would want to  
3 show a huge amount of gratitude to those who were  
4 responsible for his overthrow. I think that may seem  
5 contradictory to our way of thinking, but I don't  
6 think it was contradictory to an Iraqi way of thinking.  
7 You will see there is a sentence in the valedictory  
8 which you have released this afternoon in which I say  
9 the Iraqis rejoiced at the defeat of Saddam Hussein but  
10 did not consider themselves a defeated nation. In my  
11 view that's an extremely important distinction and  
12 explains a great deal of the problems that we faced.  
13 A better understanding of that might have led to better  
14 preparation for what happened once the fighting was  
15 over.

16 SIR RODERIC LYNE: To what extent did other people at the  
17 senior end of the CPA, who now were responsible for  
18 running Iraq, have the sort of understanding of its  
19 history and its culture and its make-up that you had?  
20 Were there other people who had this understanding?

21 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Well, there was Ryan Crocker. I mean,  
22 I actually attended his farewell supper, which would  
23 have been about 27th July 2003. Now he had been there.  
24 I think he went out with ORHA. He had also been in  
25 Baghdad at the same time or roughly the same time as me

1 in the US interest section, as it then was, in Baghdad.  
2 Now he is one of the State Department's leading  
3 Arabists.

4 SIR JOHN CHILCOT: I am so sorry. Could you for the  
5 transcription go a bit slower, please?

6 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Sorry. He was one of the State  
7 Department's leading Arabists. He subsequently, of  
8 course, became US ambassador in Baghdad. He  
9 certainly had a very good understanding of Iraq. As  
10 I say, he left almost to the day when I arrived, and  
11 I felt thereafter there were one or two -- there was  
12 Hume Horan, a former US ambassador in the Middle East  
13 available to give advice to Bremer. I felt they were  
14 very light on people with experience of the Middle East  
15 specifically and experience of Iraq, yes.

16 SIR RODERIC LYNE: And Bremer himself had no previous  
17 experience of the Middle East?

18 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Not that I am aware of, no.

19 SIR RODERIC LYNE: You obviously speak Arabic. Were there  
20 others around who spoke Arabic?

21 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Yes, there were. There weren't a lot,  
22 though, no. The one exception to that was that, of  
23 course, they had rounded up a group of Iraqi exiles who  
24 had been living in the United States. They were brought  
25 in as special advisers. I think some use of their

1 talents was made in some of the ministries as advisers  
2 and support. They didn't really -- they were not really  
3 involved in the political process. I didn't have much  
4 visibility of them, because that's where I was focusing  
5 my attention, but there was some effort made to ensure  
6 that they had people who had local knowledge and  
7 language skills. I don't think they functioned -- they  
8 didn't function at the senior levels of the CPA.

9 SIR RODERIC LYNE: It wasn't among the decision makers?

10 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: No.

11 SIR RODERIC LYNE: You arrived there just after Security  
12 Council Resolution 1483 had been passed and that, of  
13 course, laid heavy responsibilities on the United  
14 Kingdom as the joint occupying power.

15 What briefing were you given about those  
16 responsibilities before you went out?

17 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: I find it very difficult after so many  
18 years to recall exactly what was said about that.  
19 Certainly I would have seen -- been shown the  
20 resolution. I would almost certainly have read it in  
21 Brussels before I came back to London for the briefing  
22 there. As I recall it, my feeling was that the people  
23 were very pleased with the outcome of the negotiations  
24 in New York on that resolution and the feeling was that  
25 the resolution gave us the authority to do what we

1           believed we needed to do in Iraq. It was not really  
2           an issue I recall during our time there whether we had  
3           the right authority to do what we wanted to do. That  
4           came up very occasionally with things like privatisation  
5           and so on, but not often.

6   SIR RODERIC LYNE: But in general you and the other UK staff  
7           in the CPA did understand the sort of specific  
8           responsibilities and indeed limitations on occupying  
9           power?

10   SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Yes. My reading of the resolution is  
11           that it gives us quite wide responsibilities to look  
12           after the welfare and the interests of the Iraqi people  
13           and that allows for a fairly wide interpretation of what  
14           we were able to do.

15   SIR RODERIC LYNE: The resolution recognised the specific  
16           authority's responsibilities and obligations under  
17           applicable international law of the USA and UK as  
18           occupying powers and we were jointly described in it as  
19           the authority with a capital A.

20           Now Sir Jeremy Greenstock told the Inquiry that he  
21           had agreed with the Prime Minister before he went to  
22           Iraq that Ambassador Bremer was responsible to both the  
23           United Kingdom and the United States for the  
24           administration of Iraq under resolution 1483, but he  
25           went on to say to us that Bremer did not act as if he



1           was responsible to London as well as to Washington.

2           Who did you understand was responsible to London for  
3           ensuring the UK met its responsibilities under the  
4           resolution?

5   SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Well, the formal position has to be  
6           that Bremer was the head of the CPA. The CPA was  
7           a joint Coalition Provisional Authority. Therefore he  
8           was running the administration of Iraq on behalf of the  
9           occupying powers, the UK and the US. Did he have  
10          an obligation to report all that he was doing to London?  
11          That's -- it was never going to happen. That's for  
12          sure. Anyway there were UK special representatives  
13          there to ensure that London were kept fully informed of  
14          what was happening. That was -- I always saw that as  
15          one of my key responsibilities.

16   SIR RODERIC LYNE: Did Bremer ever report to London?

17   SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Well, he always met the Prime Minister  
18          and the Foreign Secretary when they came to Baghdad.  
19          I don't think he ever actually came through London  
20          during his time, but then he very rarely left Baghdad  
21          throughout the 14 months. He paid three or four quite  
22          literally flying visits to Washington and that was it.  
23          He stuck it out in Baghdad throughout.

24   SIR RODERIC LYNE: So the reporting chain to London  
25          essentially was through Sir Jeremy Greenstock and you?

1 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Yes.

2 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Acting under Ambassador Bremer?

3 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: No, we weren't acting under Ambassador  
4 Bremer, because we were the Prime Minister and Foreign  
5 Secretary's special representatives. We were working  
6 with Ambassador Bremer, a point that was made earlier in  
7 the hearing.

8 SIR RODERIC LYNE: So you were representing the joint  
9 authority to London?

10 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Yes.

11 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Now what about the decision-making? We  
12 have had a number of witnesses suggesting to us that the  
13 UK was not always a joint decision maker in the CPA.

14 Were there mechanisms during your posting to enable  
15 the UK to exercise the joint decision-making power that  
16 we were supposed to have under the resolution?

17 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: The decisions in the CPA were made by  
18 Bremer. I mean, I think we have to be absolutely clear  
19 about that. Indeed, he insisted upon that. He had been  
20 appointed by the President to run the CPA and he made  
21 the decisions, but he set up the British  
22 representatives' office adjacent to his own. We had  
23 constant access to him. I was always able to put the UK  
24 point of view. He always listened to that point of  
25 view. He didn't always react to it. In fact, he often

1        didn't react either negatively or positively. That was  
2        just his style. That was the way he operated, but  
3        except on a few occasions, and there were occasions  
4        where there were difficulties, it was a very tense and  
5        difficult environment and so there were moments which  
6        were difficult, but he was accessible and available, and  
7        as I think Jeremy Greenstock also told you, I mean, we  
8        ensured we were inserted in different ways and at  
9        different levels into the political process.

10        There were UK representatives working in the  
11        governance team, which was the team which was  
12        responsible for the political process, who made  
13        an enormous contribution, who were in themselves highly  
14        influential. So I didn't think that, you know, the  
15        British point of view went unheard.

16        I go back to an earlier point, which I think is  
17        important. It is not as if there was a sort of British  
18        policy and an American policy and then there had to be  
19        some sort of arm wrestle to see whose policy came out on  
20        top. This was a collective endeavour. We were working  
21        together to achieve objectives which we held in common.  
22        Where there were disagreements they tended to be, as  
23        I say, on essentially tactical points or, you know, "We  
24        face this difficult situation. What is the best way  
25        out?" There might be a number of different views about

1           what the best way out was. The British might have one  
2           view or there might be two or three views even within  
3           the British team about what might be the best way out of  
4           the situation in which we found ourselves.

5           So it was -- I think I have tried to describe quite  
6           a complex process, but not one in which I felt we were  
7           excluded.

8   SIR RODERIC LYNE: Do you recall any occasions when you  
9           strongly disagreed with the decision taken by Ambassador  
10          Bremer?

11   SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Disagreed with a decision by Ambassador  
12          Bremer? There were a number of moments where I think  
13          perhaps the most serious incident that I can recall was  
14          in early April, which you will recall -- early  
15          April 2004, when you recall things started to go very  
16          badly wrong in Iraq, because we suddenly found ourselves  
17          fighting effectively on two fronts. There was the  
18          Muqtadr Al Sadr uprising but also the American military  
19          operation in Fallujah. I was very concerned at that  
20          point. This was just after I had taken over from Jeremy  
21          Greenstock, a week or so, that we were getting ourselves  
22          into trouble. It was always a mistake to find  
23          yourselves fighting on two fronts.

24                 What the Americans were doing in Fallujah which was  
25                 being broadcast all over the Arab media was causing

1       serious problems all round, certainly the Sunni part of  
2       Iraq but also I think the Shia part of Iraq. It was  
3       clear to me this had to stop if we weren't going to face  
4       very, very serious problems. I was in constant contact  
5       with London throughout that period and made very clear  
6       my views about that. I spoke to Bremer and made clear  
7       what my views were about that.

8               What's difficult for me to judge actually is exactly  
9       what Bremer thought himself. As I have already  
10      mentioned, he always listened, but he didn't often  
11      react, you couldn't always tell whether he agreed with  
12      what you said or disagreed with what you said. One  
13      thing he would never do is expose differences between  
14      himself and the US military in the presence of the  
15      British. So I could go in there and say, you know,  
16      "Fallujah, this is going badly wrong. We have to stop.  
17      We have to rethink this". He would sort of clearly take  
18      note. You couldn't always tell whether he was saying  
19      "Absolutely right" or thinking, you know, as at one  
20      stage the American military were, that if they stopped,  
21      this would be disastrous from their point of view,  
22      because they would lose -- it would be seen as a defeat,  
23      and that this would embolden the opposition and the  
24      insurgency in Iraq and therefore they had to press on to  
25      the bitter end. That was the dilemma that was faced at

1           that point.

2           I think ultimately Bremer came down on the same side  
3           as me and told the military that they had to rethink  
4           that policy. As I say, he didn't really discuss those  
5           sorts of intra-American differences in front of me.

6   SIR RODERIC LYNE: So on that occasion do you feel they  
7           changed their approach as a result of the stance taken  
8           by you and others on the British side?

9   SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Well, certainly not exclusively because  
10          of the stance that we took. I mean, I am certain that  
11          action was being taken in Washington, but there were  
12          Iraqi pressures as well which would have had  
13          an influence. There were people on the Iraqi governing  
14          council who were threatening to resign, which would  
15          have had serious implications for the political process  
16          and Lakhdar Brahimi, who had just arrived to help with  
17          the transition to the interim government was seriously  
18          concerned. I bumped into him one afternoon. He was  
19          visibly distressed by the pictures he was seeing on Al  
20          Jazeera television and saying "I can't stay under these  
21          conditions". So there were a range of different  
22          pressures pushing for what I think in the end was the  
23          right course, which was to halt the operations in  
24          Fallujah, despite the negative implications of that.

25   SIR RODERIC LYNE: Can you give us other examples of

1 occasions on which British influence had a positive  
2 effect on decision-making in the CPA which might not  
3 otherwise have been the case, where we actually changed  
4 the course in a particular direction?

5 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: I mean I think there were several.  
6 They were part of a process. Again I don't think this  
7 was -- I don't on the whole see this as the US versus  
8 UK. It was a question of trying to make a judgement  
9 about what the best course was or, as always in the CPA,  
10 the least bad course was. Undoubtedly Jeremy 's  
11 influence was very important in the change of direction  
12 of the political process which led to the 15th November  
13 agreement. It is a dreadful phrase, but actually it was  
14 a very clever idea and became in essence the policy that  
15 was then followed.

16 In my own case Iran was an interesting issue. We  
17 I think had a more sophisticated view of what the  
18 Iranian position was in Iraq. The Americans took a very  
19 black and white view of Iran and saw them an extremely  
20 malign influence in Iraq and wanted to -- they arrested  
21 journalists. They wanted to throw out various embassy  
22 staff, Iranian embassy staff. They wanted to remove  
23 intelligence officers. I am not saying necessarily  
24 these were the wrong decisions, but they certainly had  
25 implications for the UK because we had an embassy in

1       Tehran and the Americans did not. We, of course, had  
2       our troops in southern Iraq where Iranian influence was  
3       strongest.

4               So we wanted to ensure that these actions were done  
5       on a timing and in a way which minimised potentially  
6       damaging fallout for UK interests, but also to make  
7       clear to the Americans from our understanding of the  
8       situation in Iraq that although Iraq was clearly a very  
9       influential -- Iran was clearly a very influential  
10      player in Iraq both directly and indirectly, there were  
11      some important limitations on Iranian influence in Iraq.

12             I turn to the historians. There is a fault  
13      line going back thousands of years between the Persians  
14      on the one side and the Arabs on the other. Just  
15      because they were co-religionists, they were Shia, did  
16      not mean that Iraq as a whole or even the Shia community  
17      in Iraq looked to Iran necessarily for leadership.  
18      Undoubtedly the militia looked to them for arms and so  
19      on. Certainly I don't say they were not interfering.  
20      They undoubtedly were. I think it was a more  
21      complicated picture than I think the Americans  
22      understood to begin with. I think we were instrumental  
23      in persuading them it was a more complicated picture.

24             The other issue I remember being concerned about and  
25      having some quite important meetings with the Americans,



1        was what happened to the sort of security structures  
2        after the handover of sovereignty to the interim  
3        government. Initially the American view was, of course,  
4        their forces were going to remain in Iraq. That was  
5        obvious, but they would then control the Iraqi forces,  
6        particularly the Iraqi Army that was being built up at  
7        that stage. I was very strongly of the view that you  
8        couldn't say you had handed over to a sovereign  
9        government if the armed forces of that sovereign  
10       government were not under the control of that sovereign  
11       government. After a while they accepted that point,  
12       particularly actually after what happened in April when  
13       sort of the Iraqi forces -- they tried to use them in  
14       Fallujah and they just disappeared. It was quite clear  
15       they were not going to operate under American control.  
16       So the Americans accepted that at that point, but they  
17       still wanted complete freedom of action for US forces  
18       after sovereignty had been handed over. Again I didn't  
19       think this was a right way to approach this issue. Of  
20       course the Americans had to be able to defend  
21       themselves. Of course in practice they were the ones  
22       who were going to ensure Iraq security for a long time  
23       to come, but there had to be a mechanism whereby they  
24       consulted with the new Prime Minister and the new  
25       government on important security operations.

1           I think in the end those mechanisms were put in  
2           place, but that was not something that the Americans  
3           originally intended. They were pushed in that direction  
4           by us, but of course not only by us.

5   SIR RODERIC LYNE: On the subject of Iran, in the long  
6           valedictory that you wrote in June 2004 that has been  
7           declassified today I think I am right in saying that the  
8           word "Iran" doesn't appear. Does that imply that up to  
9           June 2004, looking at what was significant in the  
10          picture of the previous year in Iraq, that malign  
11          influence from Iran did not appear to you to have been  
12          a particularly important factor?

13   SIR DAVID RICHMOND: It was an important factor. I mean,  
14          you know, I don't -- you are right. I could have  
15          mentioned Iran. I could have mentioned Syria. I didn't  
16          mention Syria either I don't think.

17                I think I was looking primarily internally.  
18          Undoubtedly they were providing arms to Muqtada Al Sadr  
19          and he, of course, led this sort of Jaysh Al Mahdi.

20   SIR RODERIC LYNE: But it wasn't a fundamental reason why  
21          things were going wrong at that stage?

22   SIR DAVID RICHMOND: No, definitely not.

23   SIR RODERIC LYNE: We will maybe talk about it in your later  
24          incarnation later in this session.

25                I would like to look at one or two aspects of the

1 CPA and how financial decisions were taken. Jeremy  
2 Greenstock told us that with regard to the oil sector  
3 that this was kept very closely American. The Americans  
4 wanted to run the oil sector. No non-Americans were  
5 taken into the American confidence on spending of money  
6 and the management of the oil sector in Iraq, and he  
7 cited those two things, spending of money and management  
8 of the oil sector, as two of the clearest examples of  
9 how partial the partnership was on the ground with the  
10 Americans.

11 In the period where you took over from Jeremy did  
12 that change at all?

13 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: On the financial side -- there was, of  
14 course, Iraqi money being spent, but also increasing  
15 amounts of American money and I don't think we found it  
16 surprising that the Americans were exercising control of  
17 it. There was a committee that made financial  
18 decisions. The UK, as I recall, was represented on that  
19 committee. There was a secondee from DFID who sat in on  
20 the committee, because after all this was the area in  
21 which they were expected to have expertise. I doubt  
22 frankly that they were able to play a very influential  
23 role, though. This was -- Jeremy is right, this was  
24 an area where the Americans kept a fairly tight grip.

25 On the oil side, well, we did have a British

1           seconded. This was Bob Morgan, who was killed in  
2           May 2004. He was working in the oil industry. I don't  
3           know how close he was to the real decision-making.  
4           Probably not that close, but it wasn't as if he was  
5           entirely excluded from the oil mission. I believe he  
6           had had a predecessor as well, a British seconded who  
7           was there before him. So there was British involvement.  
8           I think fundamentally Jeremy is right in saying that was  
9           an area where we did not have much involvement.

10       SIR RODERIC LYNE: A regulation was issued by the CPA on  
11           15th June 2003 that gave Ambassador Bremer complete  
12           control of the disbursement of the funds of the  
13           development fund for Iraq.

14           Do you recall whether we were content that our share  
15           of the responsibility could be discharged in this way?

16       SIR DAVID RICHMOND: If it was 15th June it was before my  
17           time.

18       SIR RODERIC LYNE: But it had effect in your time?

19       SIR DAVID RICHMOND: I think -- yes. I think it is fair to  
20           say they should have had more oversight in that area  
21           than we did, given that we were jointly occupying Iraq.

22       SIR RODERIC LYNE: Thank you. Sir Jeremy also told us that  
23           he wasn't responsible for the use of CPA money. He said  
24           "London had made it quite clear that they didn't expect  
25           me to be responsible for this". Who was responsible for

1 the use of CPA money?

2 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: I have not really understood the  
3 question.

4 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Well, Jeremy was told that he was not  
5 expected by London to be responsible for the way that  
6 the CPA's money was actually used?

7 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Oh, I see. Bremer took responsibility  
8 for that.

9 SIR RODERIC LYNE: That was Bremer?

10 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Oh, yes. Bremer was very insistent  
11 that he made the decisions. That was his style.

12 SIR RODERIC LYNE: And did we know how that money was being  
13 spent?

14 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Oh, yes, I think we had visibility of  
15 that, yes. Budgets were published for 2003 and 2004.  
16 We were involved in some of the areas where a lot of the  
17 money was being spent, namely the security sector  
18 reform. We had people in some of the key ministries  
19 where large sums of money would have had to be  
20 disbursed. We had people in the Health Ministry, for  
21 example. I think we had somebody in the Education  
22 Ministry. So yes, we had a reasonable view of what was  
23 happening with the money, yes.

24 SIR RODERIC LYNE: But we had a particular problem in the  
25 south. I mean, down in MND (South-East) we were taking

1 the lead, and we have heard from several witnesses that  
2 it was very difficult to get CPA to send enough  
3 resources to the south.

4 Was that something that you were aware of? Perhaps  
5 you were lobbied over. Were you able to do anything  
6 about this?

7 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Yes, there were certainly occasions  
8 where I was asked to speak to Bremer about this and  
9 I did, and I think we got -- Bremer accepted that even  
10 though this was a British area of responsibility,  
11 nevertheless Iraqi funds belonged to the whole of Iraq  
12 and some money should go south. I think in principle he  
13 accepted that. It may well be one of the many things  
14 where even though there is agreement within the CPA that  
15 certain things should happen, those things did not  
16 always necessarily happen.

17 SIR RODERIC LYNE: A slightly different argument that has  
18 been put to us is that we couldn't expect to have that  
19 much influence over how resource decisions were taken  
20 when the UK was putting in such a small percentage of  
21 the resources. As Jeremy Greenstock said, we were less  
22 than 1/20th of what the Americans were putting into it.  
23 Andy Bearpark said that the efforts or the resources put  
24 in by the British Government were miniscule compared to  
25 the resources the Americans put in.

1           Did that reflect what you saw as well, that because  
2           we weren't paying very much of the piper we weren't  
3           calling very much of the tune?

4   SIR DAVID RICHMOND:  Yes, I think that's certainly true on  
5           issues like is the money going down to Basra or not?  
6           Even if Bremer had said "Yes, in principle this should  
7           be happening" I am sure there were plenty of people in  
8           the system who felt "Hang on a minute.  Are the Brits  
9           pulling their weight?  They are down in Basra, shouldn't  
10          they be paying for what's happening down in Basra?" I am  
11          sure there was a view within the CPA as a whole.  That's  
12          why perhaps things that Bremer promised would happen  
13          didn't always happen in that way.  Yes, there was a --  
14          you were very -- we -- I was very conscious, Jeremy was  
15          very conscious when we were there that compared with the  
16          American contribution on whichever measure you took, the  
17          military, financial, the number of civilians that had  
18          been sent out that, the disparity between our  
19          contribution and the Americans' was enormous.  The only  
20          place where I think we can say that we perhaps achieved  
21          more perhaps than our resources would -- you would  
22          expect us to achieve with our resources was the CPA  
23          because I suppose we had something like one of the 12  
24          people in the CPA were British, which is a fairly small  
25          percentage.  Nevertheless we did send good people.  They

1           worked hard and made themselves influential within the  
2           system.

3   SIR RODERIC LYNE:   Then we had, of course, taken on the  
4           responsibility of joint occupying power, which ought to  
5           have given us quite a lot of traction.

6           Coming back to a point you made earlier, within this  
7           financial picture the Americans were spending more than  
8           us but they never actually spent very much of the  
9           \$18 million that were voted by the congress. I think  
10          they ended up spending something like 366 million of  
11          those \$18 billion. We spent considerably less than  
12          that. As you said earlier, most of the money that was  
13          being spent was actually Iraqi money.

14          Was that something at the time that you were very  
15          conscious of and that, therefore, consulting the interim  
16          administration over how Iraqi money was spent, very much  
17          in the spirit of resolution 1483, ought to have been  
18          an essential part of the picture?

19   SIR DAVID RICHMOND: I think the very short answer to that  
20          question is yes. I think although we now know how  
21          little money was actually being spent, American money  
22          was actually being spent in that particular period in  
23          Iraq, I don't think that was always obvious to us at the  
24          time. I think our impression was that rather a lot of  
25          American money was being spent, and although only a very



1       small percentage of that famous 18.4 supplemental got  
2       spent before the end of June 2004, I mean, they were  
3       some quite sizeable sums. Compared with 18.4 billion  
4       not, but 500 million here, 400 million there that the  
5       Americans allocated quite early on, particularly to  
6       companies like KBR and Bechtel and so on, who were  
7       supposed to go in and restore the power lines and do  
8       various other work on the infrastructure. In the  
9       initial period there were quite sizeable sums of money.

10       The commanders had some important sums available to  
11       them as well. So even if only a very tiny proportion of  
12       18.4 billion was spent by 13th June 2004, I think  
13       probably quite large numbers of American money were  
14       being spent in Iraq in addition to the money that was,  
15       in fact, Iraqi money.

16       SIR RODERIC LYNE: Thank you.

17       SIR JOHN CHILCOT: Just a supplementary on that last point.

18       Was it evident that the money available to American  
19       military commanders was US money flowing down through  
20       the DOD and the military system? None of that was Iraqi  
21       money, was it, because we have had much evidence that  
22       British commanders had relatively much less access to  
23       funds of their own than the American counterparts? That  
24       was American money?

25       SIR DAVID RICHMOND: I'm reasonably confident that was the

1 case for quite some time. I think even the American  
2 commanders began to run out of money. I have frankly  
3 a very vague recollection that there was some discussion  
4 about where extra money -- because it was generally felt  
5 that this was money that was being usefully spent --  
6 where additional funds could be found for them. I am  
7 not absolutely sure that I now recall what decision was  
8 eventually taken.

9 SIR JOHN CHILCOT: Thank you. I will turn to Baroness  
10 Prashar now.

11 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Can we look at the question of the  
12 strategy and objectives of the CPA?

13 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Yes.

14 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: What was your understanding of what  
15 were the UK's strategic priorities for the CPA before  
16 you went out there? Were you given any indication what  
17 were the strategic priorities of the CPA?

18 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: No, I don't recall being given in  
19 a sense a detailed list of strategic priorities. There  
20 were some specific issues that were mentioned to me  
21 before I left. I have already mentioned communications  
22 as one. Services was clearly another issue which was  
23 exercising everybody, including London, and continued to  
24 do so throughout the period I was there.

25 I mean, I think there was a sense in which we were

1        pretty much starting from scratch in almost every single  
2        department, be it education, be it health, be it justice  
3        and rule of law, currency, banking system, independent  
4        central banking. You could just go on and on.  
5        Everything a government might do was in one centre or  
6        another in Iraq broken or in disarray. In broad brush  
7        terms we were going to try to contribute to putting  
8        these things on a firmer footing so that we were handing  
9        over to an interim government, whatever time that was,  
10       and in July 2003 that was unknown, were handing over the  
11       sort of ship of state in reasonable shape. I don't  
12       think it was more specific than that.

13    BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Because the papers that we have seen  
14       reveal that the UK was surprised by the production of  
15       the CPA Vision document which appeared in July 2003.  
16       I think you arrived just after that?

17    SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Yes, yes.

18    BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: What were you told about the UK's  
19       involvement in the development of the CPA Vision  
20       document?

21    SIR DAVID RICHMOND: I am pretty sure I was unaware of the  
22       CPA's Vision document until I arrived in Iraq at the end  
23       of July.

24    BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: And I presume you read it when you  
25       got there?

1 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Yes. I certainly had a look at it at  
2 one stage. In fact, by the time I arrived they were  
3 already working on something called I think -- I have  
4 forgotten what it was called now -- anyway Implementing  
5 the Vision I think is what it was called. This was one  
6 of these documents that the CPA loved to produce with  
7 all sorts of deadlines, 30 days, 60 days, 90 days, all  
8 of which would be regularly missed, because it was all  
9 too difficult.

10 I mean, I don't fault that. I am sorry. I am being  
11 slightly cynical about that. You have to have  
12 objectives and it makes sense to set yourself some  
13 deadlines. Even if you miss them that is better than  
14 having no objectives and no deadlines. So I think they  
15 were right to set out some clear objectives. They were  
16 right to try to map out a path for reaching those  
17 objectives. The trouble was that in Iraq for all sorts  
18 of reasons it was extremely difficult to do these  
19 things.

20 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Did it strike you as realistic,  
21 because given your knowledge ...

22 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: You know, when I first arrived in  
23 Baghdad and went to the Presidential Palace I was really  
24 quite impressed, I have to admit to see the hive of  
25 activity that was going on. There were all these people

1 sort of striding around very purposefully working  
2 incredibly long hours, this enormous American "can do"  
3 spirit. It was really quite impressive. Of course, as  
4 you spent some time there and got to understand what was  
5 going on a little better it was quite clear that the CPA  
6 had all these levers that were pulling but actually  
7 nothing much was attached to the levers and not much was  
8 actually happening. This was not entirely the CPA's  
9 fault, this was the nature of the situation in which  
10 they found themselves. So in a sense was the strategy  
11 unrealistic? Yes, given the conditions in Iraq. There  
12 was no way you can achieve all the things that were set  
13 out in the strategy on the sort of timelines we were  
14 setting ourselves, or even for long after those  
15 timelines.

16 The security situation deteriorated, it became more  
17 and more difficult. It may not have been when it was  
18 drawn up in July.

19 SIR JOHN CHILCOT: Slower.

20 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: I am sorry. It may not have been so  
21 ambitious when it was drawn up in July. Although the  
22 security situation was not ideal it had not deteriorated  
23 in the way it started to do really in August onwards.  
24 Once that security situation started to deteriorate,  
25 objectives -- strategic objectives which might have been

1           sort of doable on the sort of timescale we had become  
2           increasingly undoable.

3   BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Do you have any idea of how much UK  
4           partners were engaged in the development of this  
5           strategy in Baghdad itself even if it took London by  
6           surprise?

7   SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Well, we would have been engaged to the  
8           extent we had secondees in the relevant departments.  
9           Through sort of July and August of 2003 we were building  
10          up the number of secondees. We got up to about 100. We  
11          did have secondees at different levels, of course, some  
12          quite senior, some quite junior, in most areas of the  
13          CPA's work. There were areas -- I think we have really  
14          covered the areas where perhaps we had least visibility  
15          and the least access and presence, but in virtually  
16          every other area there was someone from the UK seconded  
17          and because, as I say, they were good people. Even if  
18          they were relatively junior, they often made quite  
19          an impact. Therefore, they would have been involved --  
20          if they had been there in July, they would have been  
21          involved in drawing up the strategy. If they were  
22          thereafter wards they would have been involved in its  
23          implementation.

24   BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: We had the UK strategy for Iraq  
25          which was agreed in October 2003, the UK's strategy.

1        Were you involved in Baghdad in that, and were the  
2        secondees involved in that or was this something that  
3        happened in London with complete dislocation from what  
4        was on the ground?

5        SIR DAVID RICHMOND: You can tell from my bemusement that  
6        I don't recall this. Equally I would be amazed if there  
7        had not been consultation between London and Baghdad.  
8        I don't recall it, no.

9        BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: How relevant was their strategy to  
10       your role in Baghdad? I mean, if you don't recall it,  
11       you would have seen it. Was it relevant to what you  
12       were doing in Baghdad?

13       SIR DAVID RICHMOND: The areas I focused on in Baghdad  
14       were, as mentioned, sort of the political process and  
15       certainly the security sector. There, you know,  
16       whatever strategy we might have drawn up in October it  
17       was going to be different in November. So in that  
18       sense -- that's probably simply why I don't remember it,  
19       because could you draw up a strategy in October but  
20       given the conditions in Iraq and the way things were  
21       changing both politically and in terms of the security  
22       situation, that strategy would have been overtaken very  
23       rapidly, except in the broad lines yes, we had  
24       a strategy that we wanted to build up Iraqi security  
25       forces. Yes, we had a strategy that we wanted to have

1 an Iraqi intelligence operation. Those broad lines, yes  
2 that was all agreed between us. How you did this and  
3 how quickly and what numbers and what emphasis you put  
4 on the police and what emphasis you put on the army and  
5 the Iraqi Civil Defence Corps, the ICDC, all those  
6 questions were constantly being reassessed and adjusted  
7 as the security situation developed.

8 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: But your recollection is it didn't  
9 have much effect in terms of achieving much because you  
10 were very much overtaken by the events on the ground?

11 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: I think that's fair.

12 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Okay. Thank you.

13 SIR JOHN CHILCOT: I will ask Sir Martin Gilbert to pick  
14 things up. Martin.

15 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: I'd like to turn to the United Nations'  
16 dimension for a moment. UNSCR 1483 set out detailed  
17 expectations of what the working relationship between  
18 the authority, between us and the United States on the  
19 one hand and the UN Secretary Generals and special  
20 representatives on the other hand would be. These  
21 included working together with the UN to form an Iraqi  
22 interim administration, to tackle challenges including  
23 human rights, Iraqi civilian police capacity, legal and  
24 judicial reform, infrastructure, civil and  
25 administrative capacity and also the return of refugees



1 and displaced persons.

2 Can you tell us how in practice the authority worked  
3 with the Secretary General's Special Representative and  
4 what your own input was in that?

5 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Yes. Of course, when I arrived Sergio  
6 Vieira de Mello had already arrived as the UN Special  
7 Representative. I knew him slightly from a previous  
8 posting in New York, not well but I certainly knew him.  
9 John Sawers took me along to meet him before he left  
10 Baghdad at the end of July. He was certainly coming  
11 into the CPA for meetings with Bremer during the course  
12 of August. I went out to the Canal Hotel, where the UN  
13 had its headquarters, I think two days before he was  
14 killed. That would have been on 17th August. He was  
15 killed on 19th. There is no doubt in my mind that he  
16 and, therefore, the UN would have played a very  
17 influential role in Iraq, and I say that for two  
18 reasons.

19 First, because of who he was. He was an exceptional  
20 individual, widely recognised as so, and I don't think  
21 someone of his qualities could have failed over time to  
22 have made himself extremely influential in the Iraqi  
23 situation. There is another very specific reason why  
24 I say he would have been influential, was because he had  
25 a direct link to Ayatollah Sistani, which neither Bremer

1 nor the UK special representatives had. Indeed he had,  
2 so we are led to believe -- I have no reason  
3 particularly to question this -- he had suggested to  
4 Ayatollah Sistani that elections could be held in Iraq  
5 really quite quickly. It was this fact that caused  
6 a huge amount of complications in the autumn of 2003 as  
7 we were trying to find a political process that would  
8 lead to the transition to a sovereign government.

9 Had he not been killed he, of course, would have  
10 been the link with Sistani, and the problems we had with  
11 Sistani I think would have been far fewer. The fact he  
12 had that -- because at the time in August you have to be  
13 clear we had not realised in the CPA that Sistani was  
14 going to be as influential as he was. We knew that he  
15 had issued this fatwa and so on but we did not know the  
16 fatwa was going to be an insurmountable obstacle. That  
17 became apparent as time progressed.

18 Of course, he had a significant effect on the  
19 political process on two further occasions during that  
20 14-month period. As I say had Sergio Vieira de Mello  
21 been there, that relationship would have been managed  
22 much more readily and smoothly than it was. So I think  
23 yes, it was clearly a tragedy and a disaster that he was  
24 killed.

25 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: What action was taken after his death

1           to maintain the consultation with the UN while they were  
2           still there?

3   SIR DAVID RICHMOND: I mean, a great deal of immediate  
4           support was given to those that remained. They were  
5           offered accommodation in the Green Zone which they  
6           turned down. They decided to stay roughly where they  
7           were and therefore a huge amount of security obviously  
8           was put in to protect them.

9           I think Bremer probably had a slightly more  
10          ambivalent attitude about the UN, though I think he  
11          would have worked very well with Sergio Vieira de Mello.  
12          I think his attitude to the UN more generally was  
13          a little bit more ambivalent, but nevertheless he made  
14          it absolutely clear the UN were welcome to take up  
15          residence in the Green Zone. I think the decision by  
16          the UN to withdraw from Iraq which they took around  
17          about the middle of September after a security review,  
18          I think that decision was regrettable, and it meant for  
19          several months they were not really playing any sort of  
20          role in Iraq.

21          It also meant when Lakhdar Brahimi arrived initially  
22          in the end of January 2004 and then again in April 2004  
23          he was really working on his own. Had the UN been there  
24          they would have built up a range of contacts and he  
25          would have been able to draw on their knowledge and

1           experience of Iraq. Of course, when he did arrive he  
2           didn't have that knowledge and experience to draw on.  
3           That was a handicap for him.

4   SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Were there ever occasion when you were  
5           able to take up UN concerns put to you with Bremer,  
6           things that he was not perhaps so keen on following  
7           through?

8   SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Well, as I said, the UN was really out  
9           of the picture from 19th August onwards until Lakhdar  
10          Brahimi arrived at the end of January. They were just  
11          not there. So there was nothing for me really to in  
12          a sense take up with Bremer.

13   SIR MARTIN GILBERT: After his arrival was still six months  
14          while you were there?

15   SIR DAVID RICHMOND: I am sorry. I missed that.

16   SIR MARTIN GILBERT: After his arrival, after Brahimi's  
17          arrival?

18   SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Well, he came in January and stayed for  
19          a relatively short period, about a week or two as  
20          I recall, and then came back in April. No, I worked  
21          very closely with Brahimi, whom I had also met before in  
22          New York. Jeremy knew him extremely well and he worked  
23          very closely with him while he was still Special  
24          Representative. I was able to sort of slip into those  
25          shoes afterwards.

1 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: There is one further aspect of 1483 and  
2 that's that it encouraged the United Kingdom and the  
3 United States to inform the United Nations Security  
4 Council at regular intervals of our efforts under the  
5 resolution.

6 Did this take place? Were you involved in that  
7 process?

8 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Well, I am sure it did take place, but  
9 it would have been done between London and New York. It  
10 wasn't done from Baghdad. So I was not involved in that  
11 process.

12 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Thank you.

13 SIR JOHN CHILCOT: Right. I will ask Sir Lawrence Freedman  
14 to take up the questions now. Lawrie.

15 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: You mentioned your role in the  
16 political process. You started discussing that.  
17 Leaving aside the Sunni outreach strategy, which we will  
18 just discuss in a moment, but just before that what was  
19 your role in helping keep the political timetable  
20 announced in November 2003 on track?

21 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: I don't think the problem was with the  
22 timetable. I had been pressing really since I arrived  
23 for a timetable and for a political process. I mean,  
24 I think it is mentioned in the valedictory report you  
25 published my concern that we were very slow and this was

1 an issue in terms of insurgency and so on. So I was  
2 keen to see a timetable. That was I thought one of the  
3 good things about 15th November agreement, was at long  
4 last we had a process and timetable. I had some  
5 concerns about the process itself. The timetable was  
6 clearly very short, but obviously we were beginning to  
7 realise that our shelf life was also diminishing as the  
8 security situation deteriorated. So although I probably  
9 thought at the time it was really a bit too short for  
10 doing what needed to be done, that was the decision,  
11 which, of course, I accepted, and when you consider what  
12 happened in April of 2004, perhaps the people who chose  
13 the end of June were wiser than I was.

14 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Eventually Ayad Allawi emerged as  
15 Prime Minister with his government. What role did you  
16 play in those events that led to Allawi taking over?

17 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Well, the agreement was with the UN  
18 that it was the role of Lakhdar Brahimi to choose the  
19 interim government. In fairness to the Americans  
20 I think they were very careful not to try to impose upon  
21 him their choices and their views. They certainly had  
22 views. They certainly had choices, but I think they  
23 were quite careful not to impose those views.

24 That said, as I have mentioned already, he was  
25 unable, Lakhdar, he was unable to draw on a lot of

1       experience and knowledge of the personalities in Iraq  
2       and therefore he did rely on discussion with myself and  
3       with Jeremy, when Jeremy was there, and with the  
4       Americans to help this process. He certainly found  
5       individuals who ended up joining the government who were  
6       not, shall we say, previously known to the CPA or were  
7       not part of the group of Iraqis with whom the CPA  
8       worked. So he undoubtedly succeeded to his credit,  
9       given the circumstances, in widening the base of Iraqis  
10      with whom we worked, which was very important, because  
11      we were trying to handover to a representative  
12      government. We were aware Iraqis with whom we were  
13      working were not really as representative as we would  
14      have wished.

15           On the choice of Prime Minister, I mean, this was  
16      a long and complicated saga, as indeed was the choice of  
17      President. Initially Lakhdar Brahimi favoured a man  
18      called Shahrستاني and both I and Bremer separately met  
19      Shahrستاني and I think we both sent back reports to our  
20      respective capitals saying that he seemed as if he would  
21      be suitable to be the Prime Minister. There was no  
22      reason why we should particularly object. I don't think  
23      he was ever -- he wasn't the Americans first choice.  
24      I think the Americans probably wanted Ayad Allawi to be  
25      the Prime Minister, which is what he became. The

1 concern at the time was that he was a secular Shia and  
2 that he would not pass the Sistani test. Of course,  
3 having had no less than three difficult moments with  
4 Sistani we knew we had to have a Prime Minister who did  
5 pass that test. You asked what my role was. I mean, it  
6 was a sort of a brief moment, but there was a meeting  
7 going on at which various candidates were being  
8 discussed and Lakhdar Brahimi was essentially saying  
9 that his first choice, Shahrستاني was not going to fly  
10 for a variety of different reasons, and one or two other  
11 names were being thrown around, all of them not  
12 apparently particularly suitable.

13 So I sort of just asked the question had Sistani  
14 raised an objection to Ayad Allawi and Brahimi said no.  
15 That came as a considerable surprise to everybody in the  
16 room, except Lakhdar Brahimi. That was a God send to  
17 me, to those who wanted to see Ayad Allawi as Prime  
18 Minister. There was no objection from Najaf. I think  
19 within 48 hours he was consecrated Prime Minister.

20 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: In this part of the political  
21 process you were working with Brahimi as much as Bremer?

22 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Yes. More with Brahimi than Bremer on  
23 this specific issue of choosing the government.

24 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: In your valedictory you said: "The  
25 other major political problem you faced was the lack of



1 internal leadership, particularly but not exclusively  
2 Sunni, as a result of Saddam's policy of eliminating all  
3 political rivals. The CPA was forced to rely on exiles  
4 and on political parties which were organised on ethnic,  
5 sectarian lines."

6 With hindsight do you think the CPA could have done  
7 more to encourage the election of political leaders who  
8 were more indigenous, as it were, that lived through the  
9 Saddam period and were less bound by ethnic sectarian  
10 lines?

11 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: I think quite a lot of effort was put  
12 into it but I admit that we did not succeed. I think  
13 actually if you look, you will be perhaps more familiar  
14 with this than I am -- if you look at what happened  
15 after 2004, these difficulties remained for really quite  
16 a long time in the Iraqi system. Eventually now we do  
17 have the -- the distinction between exile and indigenous  
18 over time, as you will see, disappeared but it was still  
19 a factor up until June 2004, and certainly on the Sunni  
20 side there were real problems, problems when they set up  
21 the governing council. Lakhdar Brahimi found this  
22 a problem. He was very determined, rightly, to try to  
23 find some new Sunni individuals who could play  
24 a leadership role and he found that extremely difficult.  
25 He didn't find it any easier than the CPA had found it.

1           So yes, we failed, but I think it was because of the  
2           circumstances I have described there, the situation  
3           which we found ourselves in rather than a failure to  
4           recognise the problem or to put sufficient effort in  
5           trying to remedy it.

6   SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Thanks. Then there is another  
7           question of the nature of the leadership, the  
8           representation of the political processes and  
9           institutions which is the role of women. Again do you  
10          think more could have been done there?

11   SIR DAVID RICHMOND: I would count that as one of the minor  
12          success stories of the CPA to be honest. John Sawers  
13          and Jerry Bremer when they were setting up the Iraqi  
14          governing council were very insistent there should be  
15          women members. I think there were three at that stage.  
16          We said that the Iraqi governing council had to choose  
17          the Ministers in that sort of first government that was  
18          set up at the end of August-beginning of September 2003.  
19          There were no women.

20          So my conclusion was that left to their own devices  
21          I think there would have been very few women involved in  
22          the process, but we learned from that lesson, and in  
23          drafting the transitional administrative law, the TAL,  
24          which was in effect the interim constitution and the  
25          electoral process and representation in the assemblies

1           and so on, we insisted on a quota for women. There were  
2           also women in the interim government we handed over to.  
3           Quite a lot of work was done by various people,  
4           including some of the British secondees to try to set up  
5           women's groups to encourage their participation in the  
6           process.

7           No, I would say that was a minor success story.

8   SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: How much was that being pushed from  
9           London? Did you get a sense --

10   SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Yes, that was very pushed from London.  
11           Also by Ann Clwyd as well who was a very strong  
12           supporter of that.

13   SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Do you have any recollection of UK  
14           Ministers being involved in this, or just a sense of  
15           general instructions, encouragements?

16   SIR DAVID RICHMOND: I think the latter.

17   SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Thank you very much. Let's move on  
18           then to Sunni outreach.

19   SIR JOHN CHILCOT: Just a cue. We will probably take  
20           a break after this set of questions on the outreach.  
21           Thanks.

22   SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: In Ambassador Bremer 's book he  
23           mentioned your particular responsibility for Sunni  
24           outreach. Can you take us through this with first where  
25           did the initiative come from and what were you asked to

1 do?

2 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Yes. Well, the concern about the Sunni  
3 community feeling that they had somehow been  
4 marginalised by what had happened in Iraq sort of was  
5 growing through August and September 2003. Quite  
6 interestingly, I don't think it was flagged up as  
7 a problem earlier than that, perhaps surprisingly. I  
8 don't know. Certainly it was a growing problem in the  
9 early autumn of 2003, and Ambassador Bremer and Jeremy  
10 Greenstock had a meeting, I think the end of  
11 September/beginning of October -- I wasn't actually in  
12 the country, I was back in London at the time -- and  
13 they decided they needed to have a policy, an outreach  
14 to try to bring the Sunni community inside.

15 It was clear that the Sunni representatives that we  
16 had on the Iraqi governing council -- there were five of  
17 them -- that they weren't really resonating with the  
18 wider Sunni community, regrettably. There was a decision  
19 we needed to do something about it. In my absence they  
20 decided perhaps I was the right person to take the lead  
21 on this.

22 We started a series of meetings to try to work out  
23 a policy. I mean, the problem was relatively easily  
24 diagnosed. The Sunnis had played a very dominant role  
25 in Iraqi state under Saddam Hussein. They made up

1 a large part of his security forces. They had a lot of  
2 the officer ranks within the army and the Special  
3 Republican Guard. They had a lot of senior positions in  
4 the Ba'ath Party, although the Ba'ath Party itself was  
5 secular and there were people who were not Sunni in the  
6 Ba'ath Party, but they had certainly a lot of the more  
7 senior positions. Saddam himself came from Tikrit,  
8 which is part of the Sunni heartland in Iraq. So the  
9 removal of the Ba'ath Party, the removal of the regime  
10 of Saddam Hussein, the idea there was going to be  
11 a democratic future for Iraq in which Sunnis were  
12 perhaps 20% of the population -- nobody really knows --  
13 just the figures suggest that their previous sort of  
14 place in the sun was going to disappear.

15 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Just on that I remember seeing  
16 somewhere Sunni disbelief that they were such a small  
17 section?

18 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Yes.

19 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Was that your impression at the  
20 time?

21 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Yes. Oh, absolutely, but then, you  
22 know, everybody thought -- I mean, if you asked each of  
23 the different groups what percentage of the Iraqi  
24 population they thought they represented, it would have  
25 added up to about 130%. I honestly don't know. I don't

1 think anybody even now knows -- there was a lot of talk  
2 about a census while we were there which never took  
3 place. I really don't know now. Nobody really disputes  
4 the figure of roughly 20, maybe a few more percent.

5 Certainly they are a much, much smaller community in  
6 Iraq than Shia. That is clear.

7 So the reasons why -- and so they had  
8 disproportionately lost out through the process of  
9 disbanding the army and de-Ba'athification because of  
10 those positions. This had a huge effect on employment  
11 in the Sunni governorates, provinces of Iraq.

12 Diagnosing the problem was not really the issue. It  
13 was what you did about it was the problem. We did talk  
14 to a lot of people. We spoke to some of the Sunni  
15 leaders, the Sunni community who had not been included  
16 in the Iraqi Governing Council. I went to Ramadi, which  
17 is the capital of Al-Anbar province, where Fallujah is,  
18 and again one of the cradles of the insurgency, and the  
19 Governorate Coordinator there, a very good American  
20 coordinator there, Keith Mines I think his name was,  
21 arranged a very good selection of people for me to meet  
22 to find out what their concerns were. We had a series  
23 of meetings in the CPA with the American divisional  
24 commanders in Al-Anbar and Ninevah and Diyala, the  
25 provinces where the Sunni were clearly in a majority and

1 the Governorate coordinators. So we had a pretty good idea  
2 of what the problems were and what we needed to try to  
3 do.

4 The first problem was clearly employment. Keith  
5 Mines provided some very interesting figures about  
6 numbers of people who had been without employment as  
7 a result of the disbanding of the security forces and  
8 the army just in Al-Anbar, you know, this was something  
9 like 30,000 people not counting the conscripts. This  
10 was regular soldiers, officers, members of the security  
11 forces of various -- this was very large numbers.

12 We drew up eventually a programme again with 30  
13 days, 60 day, 90 day targets and so on which covered  
14 a range of issues. Employment was certainly the first  
15 of these, and Ambassador Bremer, who was very  
16 supportive, put aside some funds, no doubt Iraqi money  
17 to create job creation schemes. We hadn't at that point  
18 opened recruiting centres in these key Sunni provinces  
19 for recruiting into the new Iraqi army. So we agreed  
20 that that process needed to be accelerated.

21 I think there was a decision that we should step up  
22 recruitment into the Iraqi Civil Defence Corps, the ICDC,  
23 which would soak up some of these people. We talked, as  
24 we did, at regular intervals throughout the time I was  
25 there about de-Ba'athification and whether the process

1       could be made more flexible. We talked about trying to  
2       reconnect them with the political process. That was  
3       much more difficult, because we couldn't really identify  
4       them. We did look at the tribes, quite an extensive  
5       look at that. There was a very good American who had  
6       done a lot of work on that in inside the CJTF7, not  
7       inside the CPA as it happens, but the tribes were a very  
8       difficult issue. I don't think I have time to go into  
9       it now.

10       Anyway it wasn't clear the leadership was going to  
11       emerge from there. So we were encouraging some of the  
12       members of the Iraqi governing council, who we knew for  
13       one reason or another had links with the Sunnis, people  
14       like Ayad Allawi, people like Jalal Talabani to use  
15       those links and they did, they organised meetings and so  
16       on.

17       So quite a lot happened. Did it make a difference?  
18       Sadly not. This all coincided with the marked increase  
19       in the insurgency towards the end of October, beginning  
20       of November. I attended a meeting with General Abizaid  
21       and Sanchez and Bremer at which we discussed this. They  
22       agreed there was going to be a carrot and stick  
23       approach, but I was very concerned that there was going  
24       to be too much stick and not enough carrot, collective  
25       punishment and so on. So that was one factor.



1           I don't think the American military -- I have to be  
2           very careful about this. There were some very, very  
3           good American senior commanders around who did  
4           everything that anybody dealing, you know, sort of  
5           textbook how to handle insurgency, they could have  
6           written a textbook. They were excellent, but there were  
7           an awful lot who were not in that mould. I think  
8           certainly in Al-Anbar it was not well handled.

9           De-Ba'athification we never really properly got to  
10          grips with because of -- I think it was just allowed to  
11          be run by the Shia essentially, a mistake. Whether the  
12          money got through I think quite often it didn't for the  
13          employment schemes. Eventually the sort of Sunni  
14          outreach programme was sort of just before Christmas,  
15          just after the capture of Saddam Hussein, was sort of  
16          supposedly woven into a wider reconciliation programme,  
17          but although the principle of reconciliation programme  
18          was a very good idea, I don't think it ever got very far  
19          quite honestly.

20          Getting them involved in the political process,  
21          I mean, it was extremely difficult. Again I think this  
22          is in the valedictory. Even after we had found our way  
23          through the 15th November agreement to a departure, we  
24          had come up with this idea of caucus elections and so  
25          on, but we couldn't say how they were going to be run

1           and they were eventually blocked. So it wasn't possible  
2           to go to the Sunnis and say "Here is a political process  
3           and your part in this is as follows. This is how you  
4           get involved and influence the process." We were never  
5           able to do that. In the end we only had a military one,  
6           and not until much later a very effective one.

7   SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: That's very helpful. I have  
8           a series of very small questions just following from  
9           that. I presume from what you were saying that the  
10          Sunnis saw you as a representative of the CPA rather  
11          than the British Government?

12   SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Yes.

13   SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: And that the views that were  
14          expressed to you by the Sunnis you met more or less were  
15          what you would have expected to hear?

16   SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Oh, yes. As I say, the diagnosis of  
17          the problem was not difficult. We saw a lot of them in  
18          various guises. I went and met a former Saddam Hussein  
19          general who was living in retirement in Baghdad. They  
20          all said exactly the same thing.

21   SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: When you left Iraq did you pass this  
22          particular responsibility on to somebody else?

23   SIR DAVID RICHMOND: I passed the responsibility on to the  
24          interim government.

25   SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Yes.

1 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: And I had hopes that Ayad Allawi, who  
2 because at one stage very early in his career had been  
3 a senior member of the Ba'ath Party, although he was  
4 Shia himself and wanted to bring back some of the former  
5 generals and wanted to soften some of the harsher  
6 aspects of the de-Ba'athification policy, I had hopes he  
7 would be able to make an impact on this problem. In the  
8 end it was a problem that had to be solved within Iraq  
9 and by Iraqis. Well ...

10 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Just one part of the diagnostic.  
11 You mentioned tribes and you refrained from going into  
12 a disposition on them, but there is an argument that the  
13 way that the whole system was set up didn't fully  
14 appreciate the role of the tribal leadership, which is  
15 one area where there was still leadership rule around.  
16 Do you recognise that as an argument? You could have  
17 more decentralisation, if you like?

18 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Yes. It is a complicated picture.  
19 I mean, the influence of the tribes declined greatly in  
20 the sort of latter part of the last century.  
21 I certainly didn't have the impression when I had been  
22 in Iraq in 1980 that they were hugely influential. Of  
23 course Saddam didn't allow them to be. Also because  
24 Iraq was becoming increasingly urbanised and their real  
25 sense of power is out in the country, and they don't

1        have an influence in cities, but it is not really where  
2        their real source of power is.

3            Of course, as Iraq became more difficult in the sort  
4        of -- conditions in Iraq became more difficult in the  
5        1990s for all the reasons we know about, I suspect  
6        actually the tribes became more important and Saddam  
7        relied on them. Also they were both, you know,  
8        a source -- a prop for his regime but they were also to  
9        some extent a threat. He used I am sure both the  
10       carrot and the stick. He created what were called  
11       Saddam sheikhs. So you could never be quite clear what  
12       the proper leadership of the tribe was, to what extent  
13       they had been tainted by their association with Saddam  
14       Hussein.

15            When I arrived in Iraq I had not expected because of  
16        my previous experience -- it just shows you that your  
17        previous experience is not always an advantage -- I had  
18        not really expected the tribes to be a particularly  
19        influential factor in Iraqi political life. I think as  
20        time went on I think we recognised that probably they  
21        could and should play more of a role, but it was still  
22        very difficult to identify who the right people were.  
23        There were, for example -- this is the American Colonel  
24        who specialised in all this -- there were not only  
25        a large number tribes in Iraq, but there were also a

1 number of tribal confederations, no less than 11  
2 different confederations bringing the tribes together.  
3 It wasn't as if you could say these are the tribes and  
4 they come together in this one organisation, go along to  
5 that organisation and you have got a line of  
6 communication into the tribes. It would have had to  
7 have been done province by province, or almost province  
8 by province, and I suspect some of that did happen with  
9 the local Governor coordinators. I am sure that some of  
10 the military commanders would have had lines into the  
11 tribes, but it is true they did not feature greatly in  
12 the thinking of the CPA, and indeed would have met  
13 resistance from the Iraqis we were working with, most of  
14 them who were not tribal. Some of them were, but most  
15 of them were not.

16 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: That is very helpful. Thanks. From  
17 what you said presumably you were not that surprised by  
18 the low level of Sunni/Arab participation in the first  
19 elections in January 2005?

20 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: No, I was -- well, no, I was surprised.

21 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: You were surprised?

22 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: I thought they would participate.

23 Iraqis -- all the Iraqis I met were very keen on  
24 exercising the vote, and if the Sunnis were to believe  
25 their own propaganda and had whatever percentage of

1 population, it was more than 20, then they had every  
2 reason to participate in the vote. I mean, I think what  
3 happened at Fallujah in November, although obviously  
4 after my time in 2004, and no doubt other events as  
5 well, led them to boycott that election. I am sure that  
6 was a factor in the fact that the insurgency continued  
7 and indeed got worse. When I left I thought they would  
8 participate, yes, in the vote.

9 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: So you think it was things that  
10 happened after you left, particularly Fallujah, that  
11 turned the tide?

12 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: It's slightly harsh to say it is all  
13 the fault of the people who came after me. So no,  
14 I wouldn't say that, but I think it's certainly  
15 unfortunate that that was the case.

16 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Was there much else you could have  
17 done do you think looking back to improve participation?

18 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: It is not clear to me really how much  
19 thought had been given to what would be the consequences  
20 of the invasion of Iraq and removing Saddam Hussein and  
21 what this would -- and bringing democracy particularly  
22 to Iraq would be. It shouldn't have been impossible to  
23 work out that we were going to have problems with, you  
24 know, a built in majority and another community with  
25 a built in minority, leaving aside the Kurds for

1 a moment as a separate complicating factor, but if  
2 people had worked that out then I had no sense that  
3 anybody had done anything about thinking, "Well, if that  
4 is the case, how are we going to deal with this  
5 potentially extremely difficult issue?" We know how  
6 difficult it is because of a similar situation in a way  
7 in Northern Ireland. It amounts to, you know -- in the  
8 end we found solutions to that problem, but within  
9 a democratic system it is actually quite difficult, but  
10 a straightforward first past the post winner takes all  
11 is an extremely difficult situation to deal with. It  
12 requires quite a complex constitutional political  
13 process. Checks, balances, power sharing.

14 We began to try to put some of that in place when we  
15 drafted the TAL, but the reality is we should have been  
16 thinking about these issues right from the beginning.

17 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: You mentioned the Iraq  
18 de-Ba'athification and mentioned the problem of finding  
19 political leadership. You have now mentioned the lack  
20 of awareness on our part and presumably the American  
21 part on the consequences or what seemed at the time  
22 almost an inevitable transfer of power from Sunni to  
23 Shia. Are there any other lessons, things you would  
24 like to say about this situation of the Sunni outreach?

25 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: No. I think we have covered it very

1 well.

2 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Thank you very much.

3 SIR JOHN CHILCOT: We will take a break now and come back in

4 about ten minutes.

5 (A short break)

6 SIR JOHN CHILCOT: I will ask Sir Martin Gilbert to pick up

7 the questions. Martin.

8 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Looking at the question of our

9 influence on the United States generally, what

10 difference did the establishment of the Iraq

11 stabilisation group in Washington in September 2003

12 chaired by Robert Blackwell have on our ability to

13 influence decision-making in the CPA?

14 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Well, I think it is quite difficult for

15 me to answer that question. The impression we had at

16 the time I think was that -- and that may be because of

17 the establishment of that group -- that from that --

18 roughly that time more and more of the decisions were

19 really being made in Washington rather than by Bremer in

20 Iraq. That's certainly the feeling we had at the time.

21 I don't know whether that's actually true but that is

22 the perception at the time.

23 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Did you see any difference in how

24 Ambassador Bremer interacted with you and Sir Jeremy

25 Greenstock after the appointment of Blackwell?



1 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: No. What we used to say was that, you  
2 know, Bremer was -- his understanding of the situation  
3 in Iraq -- obviously he arrived, as we discussed  
4 earlier, without very much previous knowledge of the  
5 region, certainly not of Iraq and he had a steep  
6 learning curve, but by the autumn of 2003 -- and he had  
7 a very, very good understanding of what was happening in  
8 Iraq and the forces that were at play, but it is about  
9 this period that we sensed that there was some loss of  
10 confidence in him in Washington and, therefore, this  
11 decision to set up this group to start taking some of  
12 the decisions in Washington. I don't know that we  
13 always felt the decisions in Washington were better as  
14 a result.

15 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: I want to turn to those decisions in  
16 Washington, because we know that Mr Blair spoke  
17 frequently to the President on Iraq and raised issues of  
18 concern. Did this help unblock problems for you in  
19 Baghdad, these interventions, these conversations?

20 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Well, certainly it is always helpful  
21 when the Prime Minister speaks to the President.  
22 I mean, there were a number of occasions when we wanted  
23 the Prime Minister to do this, that or the other. The  
24 fact that now at this distance I can't actually remember  
25 what the issues were makes we think they were perhaps

1 not as important as we might have thought they were at  
2 the time. The Prime Minister, of course, has to make  
3 a judgement about which issues are most important and  
4 which ones he needs to raise. That judgment may not be  
5 the same as the one we would make sitting in Baghdad,  
6 but no, there were obviously occasions where he raised  
7 issues.

8 I think the November 15th agreement, if we talk  
9 about a little bit about that, that sort of explains the  
10 situation. We had had a seven point plan that Bremer  
11 had which was for handing over authority -- handing  
12 authority back to the Iraqis. This had really come  
13 unstuck. It wasn't a bad plan at all. It was almost  
14 a classic way of going about these things, but it had  
15 come unstuck largely because of the opposition of  
16 Sistani to certain aspects of that plan. Although we  
17 were sort of perhaps slow to realise that they had hit  
18 an insurmountable obstacle and there was a lot of time  
19 lost, certainly by the middle or end of October there  
20 was a realisation that we were going to have to come up  
21 with a plan B, and Jeremy Greenstock has certainly  
22 talked to you about that.

23 A plan was being developed and Bremer went back to  
24 Washington around about 13th or 12th November, something  
25 like that, one of his, you know, very flying visits. He

1       came back with what became the 15th November agreement.  
2       There were certain aspects of it which we were  
3       expecting, including the idea that there might be some  
4       interim constitution, which I think was then called the  
5       fundamental law and then became the TAL. We were  
6       certainly expecting an end date, although I think we  
7       were expecting one a little later than 30th June, but  
8       I think we -- certainly I was expecting that there would  
9       be elections before we handed over. We would handover  
10      to an elected interim government. It was a surprise and  
11      shock to me to discover when Bremer came back from  
12      Washington that this was not the case.

13         Now I don't know -- this decision had clearly been  
14      taken in Washington by the people in Washington. It was  
15      not what the CPA had been expecting. I don't know to  
16      what extent the British Government was involved in that  
17      decision to do things in a different way. I imagine  
18      they were, but I don't know.

19   SIR MARTIN GILBERT: You didn't have a sense that our Prime  
20   Minister was somehow being involved at your request or  
21   as a result of your concerns to London in order to pass  
22   them through to Washington?

23   SIR DAVID RICHMOND: No, I think he was. He was. He chose  
24   carefully the issues he wanted to raise and it was  
25   always helpful when he did raise them, particularly

1           because it gave -- if you are taking a line in  
2           Baghdad -- obviously it is helpful if your  
3           interlocutors, in this case Ambassador Bremer, realises  
4           it is not just a personal opinion that you are  
5           expressing but the opinion of your government and it is  
6           one that the Prime Minister takes so seriously that he  
7           raises it with his President. So clearly that helps  
8           your ability to influence the process in Baghdad, yes.

9   SIR MARTIN GILBERT: As a result of your experiences in this  
10           area were there particular lessons that you took back  
11           from your time in Iraq about the UK's ability to  
12           influence the United States?

13   SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Well, I think in very broad brush terms  
14           our ability is limited. I don't think there is any  
15           escaping that. I think that's largely for the reasons  
16           that Jeremy Greenstock has said. You know, our  
17           contribution compared with the American contribution was  
18           just so much smaller in the end. In a sense we had  
19           an influence that was possibly greater than what our  
20           contribution was, for various reasons, the relationship  
21           the Prime Minister had with President Bush, for example,  
22           nevertheless that disparity was a fact of life and one  
23           that, you know, we need to recognise if we embark on  
24           joint enterprises with the Americans.

25   SIR MARTIN GILBERT: You were in Iraq for almost the

1       entirely CPA period. Of course security deteriorated  
2       during this period. Andy Bearpark has told us that  
3       there was a risk that the CPA did not necessarily  
4       recognise how serious the security threat was becoming  
5       at this time. He said to us:

6               "CPA, and I include myself, had the problem of the  
7       frog in the water whereas the water temperature rises,  
8       at what point do you admit it's getting a bit too hot."

9               Do you share that view?

10   SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Certainly not insofar as it concerns  
11       the British contingent in the CPA, and I say that  
12       because we had, you know, weekly and at times daily  
13       meetings of our little security group, security  
14       committee in Baghdad, which Jeremy -- when I took over  
15       from Jeremy I would share with the control risk security  
16       advisor who was permanently present in Baghdad together  
17       with other senior people there, in which we were  
18       constantly reviewing the security of our British staff.  
19       We were acutely aware of when the risks were increasing  
20       and there's a whole succession of steps that we took  
21       over time to increase the security for our staff.

22               I mean, we had a relatively small number of staff,  
23       which made it a little bit easier for us to put in place  
24       the security measures that we thought were necessary.  
25       The Americans had much larger numbers of staff and did

1 not, perhaps because of the numbers that were involved,  
2 put in the same degree of security measures for their  
3 staff that we did.

4 For example, all our staff travelled in armoured  
5 vehicles really right from the beginning and throughout  
6 the process. The American members of CPA did not. When  
7 we started having a serious problem with mortaring and  
8 rocketing of the Green Zone, we moved all our staff into  
9 the car park with a concrete roof. The Americans, most  
10 of them, remained highly exposed in these prefabricated  
11 trailers. So it's possible that more should have been  
12 done on the American side, but I don't think the British  
13 were ever less than acutely aware of the security risks  
14 and the way they were developing over time.

15 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: In your valedictory at the end of June  
16 2004 you comment on the extent to which US and UK  
17 decisions had exacerbated the developments?

18 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Yes.

19 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Do you have anything to add to that  
20 with the benefit of looking back from now, 2011?

21 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: No. I have sort of re-read what  
22 I wrote. I mean, I am very careful to qualify these  
23 famous decisions about disbanding the army and  
24 de-Ba'athification, you have had a lot of discussion  
25 about them. Obviously one could expand on what is in

1 the valedictory, but the basic judgments I still think  
2 now even with the benefit of hindsight are correct.

3 I would say, which is not mentioned, at least not  
4 directly, in that report, the question of expectation  
5 management. We should have done a lot better at being  
6 clear what we could and indeed could not do, and we did  
7 not communicate that to Iraqis, which brings me on to my  
8 only other additional point, which is touched on, but  
9 perhaps could have had a paragraph to itself with a bit  
10 more space, which is the communication. I think this is  
11 another issue which I know you have discussed with other  
12 witnesses. There was a lot of concern about --  
13 particularly on the American side about how they were  
14 communicating to the audience at home.

15 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Yes.

16 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Clearly that's extremely important.

17 You have to have, you know, the consent of your  
18 electorate as to what is going on, but I sometimes  
19 thought that they gave insufficient priority to  
20 communicating to the Iraqis and our means for doing so  
21 were limited and we should have done a great deal  
22 better.

23 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: And I believe that was one of the  
24 things, in fact, that you asked the Prime Minister to  
25 take up or you asked London to take up?

1 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Yes, that's true. I had forgotten  
2 that. We certainly did, yes. This was one of the areas  
3 which the Americans very firmly controlled -- we put  
4 some very good people in as individuals but we didn't  
5 run the communications. That was done by American  
6 secondees. As I say, their focus seemed to me to be too  
7 much, but insufficiently focused on communication to the  
8 Iraqis and, of course --

9 SIR JOHN CHILCOT: I think we would like to pursue the  
10 communications issues in a little while actually.

11 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Okay.

12 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: If you could elaborate on one point you  
13 made in the valedictory. You say:

14 "A case can be made for saying that the coalition  
15 would have faced a serious security challenge whatever  
16 action it had taken, but it is hard to escape the  
17 conclusion that CPA policies and US military tactics  
18 made the situation worse."

19 Could you elaborate on that?

20 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Yes. Of course, it's a hypothetical  
21 question. Are there things we would have done or if  
22 they had done things differently would there not have  
23 been an insurgency? It is a very difficult question to  
24 answer. The issue we discussed earlier about the fact  
25 the Sunni were being eclipsed and were going to lose out



1 in any democratic Iraq compared certainly to what their  
2 position had been prior to the removal of Saddam  
3 Hussein, that might in my view mean we would have faced  
4 some sort of insurgency.

5 Anyway, I think it is almost certain that the mere  
6 fact that there were a large number of American troops  
7 in Iraq presenting themselves as a target meant that we  
8 would have had the Al Qaeda external threat that  
9 developed very rapidly while we were there. I certainly  
10 think a case could be made we would have faced  
11 an insurgency, an internal insurgency with, you know,  
12 external Al Qaeda involvement regardless of what we had  
13 done.

14 The mere fact of invading and occupying Iraq would  
15 have guaranteed that. I certainly think that case can  
16 be made, but again none of this is new to you. The fact  
17 that immediately after the invasion there was no attempt  
18 made to prevent looting, to secure the situation for  
19 whatever reason, was disastrous, because, of course, for  
20 ordinary Iraqis it was not so much the insurgency that  
21 contributed to their sense of insecurity. It was crime  
22 and kidnapping and so on, and that virus of instability  
23 and insecurity was let loose in those early days in  
24 those very first few days after the capture of Baghdad  
25 and we never managed to get rid of it.

1           On what we did -- actually the other point that  
2           I think I do make in the valedictory is of course there  
3           was some intelligence evidence found subsequently that  
4           orders had been given to parts of the security forces in  
5           the Ba'ath Party apparatus to melt away and then to  
6           mount a campaign, a guerilla campaign against the  
7           coalition forces. I mean, I find that highly plausible.  
8           Whether it is true or not I don't know. I certainly  
9           find that plausible.

10          For all those reasons I think we would have probably  
11          met an insurgency almost whatever happened. Did we  
12          exacerbate it? Yes, we did. We have talked about  
13          de-Ba'athification and the Army, although both of those  
14          decisions need a lot of very careful qualification for  
15          all sorts of reasons.

16          The other thing, you know, we have already discussed  
17          very briefly, is the fact that for a long time we were  
18          not able to explain to the Iraqis what the political  
19          process was that was going to lead to the end of  
20          occupation and the establishment of their own sovereign  
21          government or to tell them what the timeframe for that  
22          was. That was undoubtedly unhelpful. That's down to  
23          the CPA.

24          On the American military side -- again we have  
25          touched on this -- I stress-I don't want to be too

1       sweeping about this -- I met as I travelled around Iraq  
2       some outstanding American officers doing a very good  
3       job. There was an excellent officer in Kirkuk, for  
4       example. The fact that Kirkuk didn't become a more  
5       serious problem than it was, was due to his efforts in  
6       the early days there, but there was a perception among  
7       Iraqis of the way they drove round in their Humvees with  
8       the mirrored shades and all the rest of it. I mean, it  
9       is trivial, but it is obviously sometimes these trivial  
10      things which set the tone and the wrong tone was being  
11      set. There is no doubt about that, but beyond that is  
12      the military tactics, and although there were some very  
13      sophisticated military tactics, for example, from  
14      General Petraeus up in Ninevah, I think elsewhere it was  
15      much less subtle, and there was a lot of rounding up of  
16      large numbers of people, detaining them, no-one able to  
17      say whether they were being detained for good or bad  
18      reason, no proper triage. So you get families who  
19      wonder why they have people who have disappeared. You  
20      can see immediately how this detainee problem, how these  
21      raids were conducted were turning the population against  
22      the American in some vital parts of Iraq. So that's why  
23      I say that they were making it worse.

24    SIR MARTIN GILBERT: I have one last question for the  
25      moment. In his public hearing last week Mr Blair argued

1       that the UK hadn't foreseen support between Iran and Al  
2       Qaeda in encouraging violence in Iraq.

3             Mindful that this is a public session, were you  
4       warned at the outset of the threat Al Qaeda would pose  
5       in Iraq and did you see any evidence of collusion  
6       between Al Qaeda and Iran during your period?

7   SIR DAVID RICHMOND:  I don't -- I think there was -- before  
8       there was Al Qaeda in Iraq there was something I think  
9       called Ansar al Islam, which is another group.  I think  
10      they figured a great deal, as I recall, in my first  
11      month or two in Iraq and then disappeared from the radar  
12      and after that what we heard about was Al Qaeda and  
13      Zarqawi in terms of external threat.

14            I think there was some suggestion -- I don't know  
15      whether it is true -- that the Iranians had let whoever  
16      these people who were in Ansar al Islam into Northern  
17      Iraq, where presumably they didn't stay, because I don't  
18      think the Kurds would have welcomed them, and they  
19      presumably then went further.  How significant this  
20      group was I don't know.  I rather doubt it was hugely  
21      significant.  There is absolutely no doubt that Zarqawi,  
22      who had links, clearly had links to AQ was hugely  
23      significant, yes.  His name began to get mentioned again  
24      quite early on, because there was a bombing at the  
25      Jordanian Embassy in the first half of August, although

1 I don't know we have ever conclusively established who  
2 was responsible, I think that's when his name first  
3 appeared, because he was a Jordanian himself.

4 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Thank you.

5 SIR JOHN CHILCOT: I will turn to Baroness Prashar now.  
6 Usha.

7 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Can we now look at the question of  
8 our civilians and duty of care and all of that?

9 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Uh-huh.

10 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Mr Blair directed in May 2003 that  
11 the UK should increase the number of secondees we were  
12 sending to the CPA. Now while you were there were you  
13 involved in advising London on the priority of posts to  
14 be filled and the skills and experience and seniority  
15 required in the secondees? Was there any assessment  
16 made by you which you were feeding back to London so you  
17 could get the right type of secondees?

18 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Yes, I was. I mean, quite a few had  
19 arrived or were already on their way when I arrived at  
20 the end of July, because I think the Prime Minister said  
21 he wanted to see a much bigger UK contribution in early  
22 June. So they had two months to be working on this  
23 before I arrived in Iraq, but, you know, most people  
24 came for six-month stints. That meant there was  
25 a fairly constant turnover, and that meant that I and

1 colleagues working with me were involved in making sure  
2 that we got replacements for those that were returning  
3 to London, making sure that we were getting them into  
4 the areas where we thought they could do most good,  
5 exercise influence, where their skills were put to best  
6 use, yes.

7 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Do you think the CPA received the  
8 right people needed from the UK at the right time in the  
9 right places?

10 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: I think we did pretty well on that.

11 I mean, there was a sort of little bit of a generation  
12 gap, perhaps inevitably, given the security  
13 circumstances, in that you got a large tranche of  
14 relatively young people, because they were single and  
15 didn't have families and children to worry about, and  
16 therefore were more willing, of course, to travel to  
17 what was a dangerous place. We also had quite senior  
18 people, whose families had grown up, again less  
19 concerned. So there was sort of a missing middle to  
20 some extent, but I think that's probably inevitable in  
21 the situation.

22 We had some very good people, senior people, people  
23 like Andy Bearpark and Doug Brand at the senior level  
24 who exercised, you know, important roles within the CPA,  
25 but some of the younger ones did outstanding work for us

1 as well.

2 Again, as I mentioned in this valedictory, this was  
3 a place where -- you know, it was a very fluid  
4 situation. If you were good, prepared to take the  
5 initiative and so on, it didn't matter what age you  
6 were. You could play an important part, and many of the  
7 British secondees absolutely seized that initiative.

8 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: You didn't feel that you were  
9 lacking in skills that you needed?

10 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Yes. The CPA as a whole, there were  
11 a number of issues. There were slots that were never  
12 filled. I think actually, looking back on it, that was  
13 less of a problem than the sheer turnover of staff.  
14 I think I read somewhere -- and this strikes me as  
15 entirely plausible -- that at the end of fourteen months  
16 only seven people had served with Bremer from beginning  
17 to end.

18 You really do have to reflect that if you are trying  
19 to rebuild a county with that sort of turnover, that  
20 lack of continuity, you are clearly going to have  
21 problems. I think that lack of continuity was a far  
22 greater problem than a lack of skills, but there were  
23 problems over lack of skills.

24 I recall writing a report at some stage really early  
25 on in August about the electricity situation. I think

1       there were eight people working in the Electricity  
2       Ministry as advisers, three of which had relevant  
3       experience. That's certainly not the only reason that  
4       we never got the electricity to work properly, but it  
5       didn't help.

6   BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: This lack of continuity, was it due  
7       to the time they were expected to serve or the terms and  
8       conditions? Why was there not this continuity?

9   SIR DAVID RICHMOND: I think it was felt this was a posting  
10       that involved considerable hardship in terms of living  
11       conditions, which were not easy, and as time went on,  
12       an increasing amount of danger, and that six months was  
13       therefore a reasonable term. You will know, of course,  
14       that six months is the standard tour of duty for British  
15       soldiers. I am not saying that, you know, civilians are  
16       under exactly the same pressures as soldiers, but you  
17       would have mortars and rockets aimed at the Green Zone,  
18       so there was a parallel there.

19   BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: The other issue is that the CPA was  
20       kind of predominantly staffed by US military personnel.

21   SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Yes.

22   BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Any observations how you can sort of  
23       influence a military-dominated scenario? Are there  
24       issues there in terms of military-dominated staffing and  
25       how you work with them as civilians?



1     SIR DAVID RICHMOND: I think -- I don't think the fact that  
2         there were quite a lot -- I am sure there were. I don't  
3         think they were a majority. I think that might not be  
4         correct, but there were a lot -- right -- of military  
5         personnel in the CPA. They didn't walk round in their  
6         military uniforms. You wouldn't necessarily know they  
7         were military, and quite a few of them were reservists;  
8         in other words, they had been called up, but they had  
9         a civilian life and job.

10         The same is true certainly in the early days in  
11         Basra, where a lot of the staff were military, but, you  
12         know, they were exercising functions, some of them, that  
13         they had exercised in civilian life. So I don't think  
14         it was a problem in that sense.

15         I mean, the two issues I would flag up in that broad  
16         area is, one, the fact that there was a lack of clarity  
17         between the civilian -- the CPA and the American  
18         military about who was really making decisions, and that  
19         most of the time was not a serious problem but was  
20         a problem when we got to things like Fallujah in  
21         April 2004. I certainly felt that was a serious problem  
22         then.

23         Just very briefly on Basra, I did not have a lot to  
24         do with Basra, but I did go down there at the request of  
25         General Lamb on I think 10th August 2003 after the Basra

1 riots. It was absolutely crystal clear to me and I am  
2 sure to everybody else that the military and civilian  
3 arms had to be working hand in glove and at that stage  
4 were not for all sorts of reasons.

5 The lesson I would draw is if you have similar  
6 circumstances, you have to make -- you have to ensure  
7 that they are absolutely joined at the hip.

8 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: You have discussed earlier the  
9 question of security. Can you tell us a little bit  
10 about what changes were made to security for staff as  
11 a result of the deterioration of the security situation  
12 and what was your role -- what role did you play in  
13 those changes?

14 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Well, when I took over from Jeremy  
15 Greenstock as the Special Representative, I chaired  
16 this -- you know, our internal security committee,  
17 which, as I say, at times was meeting daily, given the  
18 security situation.

19 I mean, we did have the armoured vehicles. We did  
20 also -- the sorts of things which we were doing is  
21 assessing which routes around Iraq were safe for them to  
22 go on. As time went on fewer and fewer routes were safe  
23 to travel by road. If people had to travel, they had to  
24 try to find a helicopter. That was a sort of  
25 progressive problem.

1           Then as attacks increased in Baghdad -- you know,  
2           this is all classic stuff -- it was avoiding patterns in  
3           movements. So we would say to people although up until  
4           then they might have been going to the Ministry, you  
5           know, six days a week, perhaps they should only go  
6           three. Perhaps they should sometimes go in the  
7           afternoon and sometimes in the morning -- all the things  
8           you could do to not make yourself a predictable target.

9           I think we increased -- going to the airport, of  
10          course, was a major security headache in itself, and we  
11          increased -- you know, we started off I think with two  
12          vehicle convoys. We increased it to three.

13          There are a whole range of things that we did. In  
14          the end, of course, we started sending people home. If  
15          their presence was not essential, and they couldn't get  
16          out of the Green Zone and do what they were supposed to  
17          do because of security, we said, you know, "There is no  
18          point in you staying".

19          That said, I mean, we just about managed to keep the  
20          show on the road throughout my time there despite the  
21          security concerns.

22   BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: What about duty of care, because  
23          Sir Hilary Synnott expressed frustration during his time  
24          at the CPA about the different type of care arrangements  
25          applied to civilians by different departments? Did you

1       have similar frustrations and are there any  
2       alternatives?

3       SIR DAVID RICHMOND: I don't think we had quite the same  
4       problem that I know Hilary Synnott has mentioned. He had  
5       a smaller organisation and therefore one or two would  
6       have a disproportionately large effect. I suspect  
7       within the CPA there were just so many people it would  
8       barely be noticed really. I am afraid no, I don't have  
9       a strong view.

10       Civilians are not soldiers. I would say that.  
11       Everybody who came to Iraq was a volunteer. I always  
12       made it clear to the British staff that they were  
13       volunteers, and that if for any reason, you know, they  
14       decided that they wanted to go home early, that was  
15       their decision. There was absolutely no disgrace in  
16       that. They all had families to think about and so on.  
17       It had to be their decision. No-one would criticise  
18       them for it if they took that decision.

19       I have to say even in the worse circumstances when  
20       we had the very serious problems in April 2004 and when  
21       we lost Bob Morgan and Mark Carman, which was the only  
22       British CPA civilians we lost, and everybody was told,  
23       you know, that no-one is forced or obliged to stay, not  
24       a single person came to me and said they wanted to go  
25       home. They all stayed, and I have great admiration for

1           them.

2   BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Are there any observations you would  
3           like to offer us in terms of how the UK supports its  
4           staff in secure environments for the future? Any  
5           observations you would like to offer us?

6   SIR DAVID RICHMOND: I think we were really at the limit of  
7           the sort of security that can be provided to civilians  
8           working as they were in the CPA. It is difficult to  
9           think what else you could do beyond the measures that we  
10          already employed.

11          There was a lot of debate both while I was in Iraq  
12          and subsequently back in London about the sort of -- you  
13          know, whether you have first to get the security right  
14          and then you can start doing all the civilian  
15          reconstruction and rebuilding or whether, you know, the  
16          two have to be done hand-in-hand.

17          Well, up to a point we showed they could be done  
18          hand-in-hand, but my strong feeling is really for  
19          a successful reconstruction operation you have to have  
20          security. If you don't have that security, everything  
21          is just ten times harder and what you will achieve will  
22          be ten times less.

23   BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Thank you.

24   SIR JOHN CHILCOT: You mentioned a little earlier the  
25          communications issue, and I think Sir Lawrence would

1           like to pursue that.

2   SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:  Yes.  In your answers to Sir Martin

3           you indicated that you shared what we know to be the

4           Prime Minister's concerns about communications, that

5           there was a problem in a lot of the American

6           communications -- a problem that the Americans basically

7           were running it.  The secondees we had were too small,

8           too few in number to be that effective, and there was

9           perhaps over much attention to American audiences rather

10          than to the Iraqi audience.  I think that's more or less

11          where we are.

12  SIR DAVID RICHMOND:  Yes.

13  SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:  A couple of points on that.

14          Firstly, I also recall you saying just before you went

15          you spoke to Alastair Campbell.  Other than saying

16          communications are important, was he giving you any

17          particular advice or instructions about how he hoped you

18          would operate?

19  SIR DAVID RICHMOND:  I think essentially what he was doing

20          was offering his support.  I think it was over Kosovo

21          and so on that, you know, he played an important role in

22          trying -- there were some serious problems over

23          communication with that intervention and I think he sent

24          a team out to Brussels to help NATO communications and

25          so on.  I think he was saying that, you know, we were --

1           he was keen that we should be able to draw on that  
2           experience, and that if we needed more people, he would  
3           find them.

4   SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:   Did he?

5   SIR DAVID RICHMOND:   We -- I don't think we asked for a lot  
6           more people.   What we wanted was Arabic speakers for  
7           obvious reasons, and we had Charles Heatley and his  
8           successor, both of whom were very good Arabic speakers,  
9           but we probably could have done with more.

10           I think -- again this is perhaps looking back on it  
11           -- I am not quite sure I really made the suggestion at  
12           the time; I should have done -- what we really needed  
13           was an Iraqi spokesman for the CPA, who could front for  
14           the CPA on things like the sort of Al Jazeera discussion  
15           programmes to put the CPA case as an Iraqi, literally as  
16           a representative of the CPA, one of those American  
17           advisers that I mentioned earlier on in the hearing.   If  
18           you could have found the right person -- it would help  
19           to have two or three who were able to take on that  
20           position and to make the case -- I think that would have  
21           helped us a great deal.

22   SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:   What were the principal means of  
23           communicating with the Iraqi population?   You have  
24           mentioned Al Jazeera just then, which was not  
25           an instrument of communication under our control.

1 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Certainly not.

2 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: So what means of influence were  
3 available to you?

4 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Well, there was -- they did set up  
5 an Iraqi television station, Iraqiya, but I think it  
6 took quite a long while to get that going. I think we  
7 discovered that actually most Iraqis preferred to watch  
8 satellite TV rather than terrestrial TV or the coverage  
9 of satellite TV was much greater than terrestrial TV.  
10 That's why they were listening to -- watching Al Jazeera  
11 and Al Arabiya. We knew from polling that these were  
12 the stations they were watching. It took a very long  
13 time I think to sort of get Al Iraqiya on to the  
14 satellite.

15 There were problems over programming. You have to  
16 put programmes on the television that people want to  
17 watch, not just CPA propaganda. That should have been  
18 slotted in here and there. You have to have soaps and  
19 entertaining programmes that they are going to watch.

20 You would have thought this would all be relatively  
21 easy, but it proved, for reasons I have never really got  
22 to the bottom of, hugely difficult, and two or three  
23 different people came out from the US with apparently  
24 the right qualifications to sort of take this by the  
25 scruff of the neck and deal with it, and it for whatever



1       reason never really happened. Each time you would go in  
2       and say, "Look, it is not happening", we would be told,  
3       "Don't worry. We have registered the problem. X is  
4       coming out and they are going to do X and Y", and it  
5       just never really quite happened.

6   SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Was the problem largely one of  
7       managing Iraqi expectations or was it also sort of black  
8       propaganda about how the coalition was all about will or  
9       all about taking over the country? What was the major  
10      problem you saw in the communications area?

11   SIR DAVID RICHMOND: I mean, I think it is -- I think it was  
12      all of that. You know, on Al Jazeera, for example, you  
13      know -- I've watched it, although my Arabic isn't really  
14      up to it, but you can get the gist. They are having  
15      these discussion programmes and there are people, you  
16      know, slagging off the CPA and saying all sorts of  
17      things. There is nobody there really putting the  
18      contrary view. That needs to be put by an Iraqi. It  
19      can't really be put by a US spokesman. Obviously even  
20      an Iraqi, I am not saying he wouldn't have had problems.  
21      He would have done, but at least it would have been  
22      an Iraqi voice speaking in Iraqi Arabic. Of course,  
23      yes, you need to get your news bulletins out.

24            You know, there were lots of decisions on, you know,  
25      de-Ba'athification and the army, which -- you know, the

1 decisions were not necessarily wrong in themselves, but  
2 the implementation was wrong, and the explanations about  
3 what was happening was wrong. If people just don't  
4 really understand what is going on, they will naturally  
5 think the worst or there will be plenty of people  
6 encouraging them to think the worst, and a great deal of  
7 that was certainly going on.

8 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Was this an issue that the Iraqis  
9 raised with you when you were talking to them --

10 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Yes.

11 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: -- that you should explain yourself  
12 better?

13 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Yes. I mean, there were particularly  
14 members of the Iraqi Governing Council were complaining  
15 about that, to which, I mean, our answer was, "You get  
16 out on Al Jazeera", and some of them did in fairness,  
17 but don't forget they had their own agendas. Their  
18 agendas were not necessarily the same as the CPA's. So  
19 they weren't necessarily putting a CPA point of view.  
20 They were putting their own point of view  
21 understandably.

22 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: So if we were doing something  
23 similar again, what would be the major lessons? Have  
24 a plan to start with?

25 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: You have to know from the beginning.

1       Some of the decisions you take right at the beginning  
2       are probably the most crucial decisions you will take  
3       throughout that period. They will be taken almost  
4       certainly, as ours were, with insufficient knowledge.  
5       That's just the reality of the situation. It is not  
6       anybody's fault. So you have to be in a position to  
7       explain those and go on explaining them as time goes by,  
8       but you have to do that at the beginning, because if you  
9       don't do it at the beginning, the opposition view is  
10      entrenched and very difficult to shift.

11   SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: So it is the initial period that's  
12      the critical one?

13   SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Well, if you haven't done it at the  
14      beginning, you are constantly playing catch-up,  
15      absolutely. You have to go on doing it throughout the  
16      period, but yes.

17   SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Thanks very much.

18   SIR JOHN CHILCOT: Okay. Well, we are at a chronological  
19      point where the CPA is coming to an end. I think  
20      Sir Martin would like to ask some questions about that.

21   SIR MARTIN GILBERT: I'd like to ask about the impact of the  
22      November 2003 announcement that the CPA would cease to  
23      exist by June 2004?

24   SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Yes.

25   SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Andy Bearpark told us that it very much

1 changed the incentives making the CPA work and Hilary  
2 Synnott said the entire focus of Baghdad's attention had  
3 shifted from trying to make something work into what are  
4 we going to do to run down.

5 In your view what impact did the November 2003  
6 announcement have on the CPA's ability to progress both  
7 political security, and indeed, reconstruction?

8 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: I did see those comments. I don't  
9 entirely agree with them, because in my conception the  
10 whole raison d'etre of the CPA was to do itself out of  
11 business. Our job was to handover to a representative  
12 Iraqi government. So it was always the case that we  
13 were in a sense running ourselves down, or at least  
14 handing over to others. My impression was, and  
15 certainly it was Bremer's intention -- he made it very  
16 clear -- was not that we should somehow run things down,  
17 but actually speed up the process of handing over. So  
18 he had this plan whereby each of the ministries was  
19 going to be -- would have to meet certain criteria and  
20 if it met those criteria, it could be declared  
21 independent and the American advisor would stop having  
22 a supervisory role and become exactly that, simply  
23 an advisor and the Minister would have complete control  
24 over that Ministry. His aim was that this process  
25 should have happened before the formal handover of

1 government at the end of June. I think to a large  
2 extent that more or less that happened.

3 So I don't really agree, though it is probably  
4 true -- and this partly explains Hilary Synnott's  
5 concerns -- I suspect that the provinces became  
6 secondary to what was happening in Baghdad, and they  
7 probably -- I mean the relationship was never an ideal  
8 one. There were always problems with it for all sorts  
9 of reasons, but I suspect it became more difficult  
10 afterwards. There was a really intense focus by then on  
11 the CPA on trying to get the process right in Baghdad  
12 after we were going to hand over to a government in  
13 Baghdad. We needed to do that. It didn't mean we  
14 entirely forgot about what was happening in the  
15 provinces. There was a sort of promulgation of laws  
16 about the powers of local provincial governments and so  
17 on took place in that run-up to the handover.

18 So people were aware of the issues but I am sure it  
19 is right to say the focus was increasingly on what was  
20 happening in Baghdad. The Ministries were there. The  
21 government was there.

22 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: By the time of the handover what was  
23 your own assessment of the Iraqi capacity, political,  
24 administrative and technical, and would more time have  
25 enabled the Coalition to have increased Iraqi capacity

1 in practice?

2 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Yes, more time would have allowed us  
3 clearly to have done more but our shelf life was over.  
4 That was also clear. I think probably we had an  
5 exaggerated view of how much we had achieved in terms of  
6 setting up the ministries. I think we had achieved  
7 a lot. It depends, you know, how you judge these  
8 things. If you judge from an almost zero base, which  
9 effectively was what it was in May 2003, then I think we  
10 had done a lot. Had we done enough to ensure these were  
11 fully functioning ministries able to conduct all the  
12 policies and do all the things they needed to do? The  
13 answer as far as I am aware is no. Of course I didn't  
14 have visibility after 28th June, but from what I have  
15 heard it suggests that perhaps understandably there was  
16 still a long way to go.

17 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: In reflecting on his time in Iraq  
18 Sir Jeremy Greenstock told us that he believed:

19 "The year was fundamentally a failure."

20 In your valedictory you also cite failures but you  
21 are optimistic in other areas.

22 What are your reflections on the UK's impact over  
23 the CPA period?

24 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Well, I think I would probably stick to  
25 what it says in that valedictory, I mean, I don't think

1 we did have a huge impact overall for the reasons that  
2 Jeremy has cited. I would say -- perhaps you would  
3 expect me to say this -- but I would say that the  
4 contribution within the CPA was, you know, greater than  
5 would have been suggested purely by the relatively small  
6 number of people we had.

7 Also, you know, in a sense we were a part of the  
8 CPA. So it is not really a question of what the UK  
9 impact was. It was what the CPA's -- the Authority's  
10 impact was. I think that's really how we saw it. I try  
11 to make an assessment. Of course I now have the  
12 advantage of hindsight. So I know what happened.

13 I say I think there are a number of grounds for  
14 optimism. I don't think what I listed there was wrong.  
15 I think they were all grounds for optimism. Not all of  
16 those grounds proved to be firmly based sadly.

17 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Are there any particular lessons you  
18 would like to share with us on your CPA experience and  
19 on the role of the CPA?

20 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: I think I would agree with a lot of the  
21 things that Jeremy Greenstock has said to you. I think  
22 the only -- the point I would like to make, if this is  
23 just a sort of more general lesson learned from my time  
24 there, I mean, the point itself is not really  
25 particularly original and you have heard it from

1 a number of others about whether we really ever had the  
2 resources that we needed to do all the things that we  
3 had set ourselves, whether our reach exceeded our  
4 capabilities.

5 I think that is the case, but I think there is  
6 more -- I feel on reflection that there is a sort of  
7 a more insidious problem there, which is that knowing  
8 that our resources were limited we tended to construct  
9 best case scenarios, which fitted the resources that we  
10 knew we had available, and frankly my lesson -- the  
11 lesson I learned from the CPA, the most important lesson  
12 perhaps is, of course, it is not always the best case.  
13 There are a whole range of different cases, some, you  
14 know, really very difficult to deal with. Now you can't  
15 always plan for worst case, because we would probably  
16 never do anything at all on that basis but you have to  
17 do more than just plan for best case.

18 I make the point particularly, because although  
19 quite a lot of lessons were learned in Iraq and Basra  
20 and applied to the subsequent deployment in Helmand, my  
21 view is that is one lesson we did not learn. We again  
22 planned on best case and found out actually it is not  
23 like that at all. We have to ask ourselves, you know,  
24 what we are doing wrong that leads to that very  
25 difficult situation.



1 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: That's very helpful. Thank you very  
2 much.

3 SIR JOHN CHILCOT: I will turn now to Sir Roderic Lyne after  
4 your period in Iraq you went back to the Foreign Office.  
5 Rod.

6 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Yes. As you said earlier, you took up  
7 the post for Director General for Defence and  
8 Intelligence in the Foreign Office and I think you held  
9 that from effectively in the middle of 2004, presumably  
10 after your leave period, until 2007, and that included  
11 some responsibilities that covered Iraq.

12 What I'd particularly like to ask you about is the  
13 way that we handled hostage issues. We are in a public  
14 hearing and obviously this is a matter that is sensitive  
15 in terms of security and our method for obvious and good  
16 reasons.

17 Within those constraints can you set out the role  
18 and the responsibilities of the person in the post that  
19 you held, Director General Defence and Intelligence in  
20 the Foreign Office, that you encountered when British  
21 citizens were taken hostage in Iraq?

22 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Yes. For all those hostage takings in  
23 Iraq, not only in Iraq, of course, but in Afghanistan  
24 and elsewhere, Gaza and so on, there was Whitehall  
25 machinery for handling those cases and I chaired the

1 Cobra meeting which brought together the Whitehall team,  
2 and the Whitehall team included all the relevant  
3 agencies and the relevant departments and the relevant  
4 bits of the Foreign Office, Geographical Department,  
5 Consular Department, News Department and people working  
6 in my own division of the Foreign Office handling  
7 counter-terrorism matters and so on. All these people  
8 were brought together. I chaired those meetings.  
9 I reported to the Foreign Secretary. They were very  
10 difficult issues to handle. There is no doubt about it.

11 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Had guidance, had warnings been issued by  
12 the British Government to British citizens about this  
13 hazard, both at the time that you were serving in Iraq  
14 and then in your subsequent period as Director General?

15 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: To the best of my knowledge throughout  
16 this time there was the strongest possible Foreign  
17 Office advice not to travel to Iraq unless, of course,  
18 you were part of, you know, the British team and you had  
19 appropriate security arrangements made.

20 SIR RODERIC LYNE: But increasingly over this time you had  
21 some people who already lived there or were married to  
22 Iraqis -- and were married to Iraqis. You had other  
23 people who increasingly were going out there as contract  
24 workers as well as those who were under the direct  
25 protection and authority of the government. So this was

1       presumably a situation in which more people were exposed  
2       to this risk. Simply saying "Don't go there" doesn't  
3       answer the problem if you are actually -- people are  
4       having to go.

5               So were there sort of gradations within the kind of  
6       warning and advice that was given about this? To what  
7       extent can one preempt this by guiding people?

8   SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Well, I was not -- it was not part of  
9       my responsibility to issue travel advice with regard to  
10      Iraq or anywhere else. I don't think anybody could have  
11      been ignorant of the dangers of living and working in  
12      Iraq at that time. We had seen how the security  
13      situation had deteriorated throughout 2003 and the first  
14      part of 2004. I think that most of the people who went  
15      out there would have been well aware of what the  
16      problems were and would only have gone if they had taken  
17      the necessary precautions in terms of their own  
18      security, and I think that was the case with really  
19      almost everybody who went there.

20   SIR RODERIC LYNE: Did you feel that British citizens were  
21      at greater risk than citizens of other European  
22      countries because of the prominent role that British  
23      forces were playing in the coalition? Next to the  
24      Americans we were obviously the most identifiable?

25   SIR DAVID RICHMOND: I don't really think that's the case,

1           because there were Italians who were kidnapped and they,  
2           of course, were part of the Coalition, but they were not  
3           an occupying power. There were French people who were  
4           kidnapped who were certainly nothing to do with the  
5           Coalition. I think they were ready to kidnap any  
6           foreigner.

7   SIR RODERIC LYNE: When you say "They", was it one group,  
8           was it more than one group? Who were the people who  
9           actually took hostages during this period.

10   SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Yes. The use of "They" is a bit  
11           loose. There were undoubtedly different groups taking  
12           hostages, because -- I mean, I can say that with  
13           certainty. There is very little we really know about  
14           these groups. I can say it with certainty because some  
15           of them were Shia groups and some were Sunnis. We were  
16           at least able to work that out. So they were different  
17           groups. It was not one single group that was  
18           responsible. There is some evidence, you know, that  
19           there were different groups involved, that there were  
20           different motives involved. Some were purely political.  
21           Some may have had some mixed political and financial  
22           motives. Some were probably purely financial. It was  
23           very difficult to know what these groups were.  
24           Intelligence on them was extremely limited.

25   SIR RODERIC LYNE: Did the pattern change at all after

1           Zargawi's death in 2006?

2       SIR DAVID RICHMOND: I think it probably did, because  
3       I think most of the Iraqi kidnappings that I dealt with  
4       were 2004 and 2005. Whether that is the reason that  
5       they diminished or simply people were making sure they  
6       kept out of harm's way I don't know<sup>1</sup>. [

7       SIR RODERIC LYNE: The period when you were back in London  
8       and chairing these Cobra meetings and looking at these  
9       incredibly difficult and very worrying situations the  
10      Iraqi authorities -- Iraqis had assumed sovereignty  
11      within their own country. What level of cooperation  
12      were we receiving from the Iraqi authorities in handling  
13      these cases?

14      SIR DAVID RICHMOND: I think it's -- it would be easier to  
15      ask that question of the people who were actually on the  
16      spot in Baghdad than it is to ask me. I mean, there  
17      were certainly a certain amount of cooperation,  
18      cooperation in the sense at the level of the police, but  
19      as we were well aware, the police was a very -- the  
20      Iraqi Police were a very inadequate force at that time  
21      and their capabilities extremely limited, and indeed in  
22      some cases we suspect penetrated by some of the groups  
23      who were probably involved in some of the kidnappings.  
24      So they were not in a sense a particularly reliable or  
25      solid partner in these issues. We also, of course,

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<sup>1</sup> The witness added after the hearing: "Five British citizens were kidnapped in the summer of 2007 by a Shia group".

1       dealt with the political leaders, asking them to use  
2       their influence, but again I suspect that for reasons we  
3       have touched on earlier about -- certainly on the Sunni  
4       side I suspect we were not really able to reach people  
5       who had influence with these groups, and indeed if the  
6       kidnappings were AQ-related, as I suspect at least one  
7       of them was, it is not clear to me that any Iraqi  
8       politician would have had any influence of any sort.

9       SIR RODERIC LYNE: Reflecting on this now, and looking back  
10      at the cases which ended tragically, and some cases  
11      which ended in the end more successfully, do you  
12      consider that there is more, in any respect, that the  
13      government could have done? Are there some lessons that  
14      have been learned or should have been learned from the  
15      experience, all aspects of it, which presumably you were  
16      looking at in the Cobra Committee of these episodes of  
17      hostage-taking?

18     SIR DAVID RICHMOND: I think that it's difficult to see that  
19      we could have done more in terms of the attention paid  
20      to these cases at all levels from the Foreign Secretary  
21      down, all the resources devoted to them both in London  
22      and in post, a huge, huge effort was put into every  
23      single one of these cases. The problem with all of them  
24      was that you are working in a situation where you have  
25      very, very limited knowledge of what is actually

1       happening on the ground. Intelligence input is normally  
2       extremely sketchy and almost impossible to say how  
3       reliable it is. So you are trying to devise a strategy  
4       for dealing with these cases, for trying to get the  
5       hostage out alive, but very difficult to know what you  
6       are doing because you are not really clear what you are  
7       dealing with.

8           Are there lessons that could be learned? Yes,  
9       certainly there are lessons we learned and some of those  
10      lessons we applied in subsequent kidnappings. Some of  
11      the intelligence that we picked up in one kidnapping had  
12      a bearing on what happened in a subsequent kidnapping,  
13      but we were still in most cases working in the dark  
14      really. I have to say they were among the most  
15      difficult issues I ever had to deal with in my career in  
16      the Foreign Office.

17   SIR RODERIC LYNE: Thank you.

18   SIR JOHN CHILCOT: I will ask Baroness Prashar to take up  
19      other aspects of your role in the FCO and then we will  
20      be coming to the final stage of this and I will ask for  
21      any final reflections you want to offer.

22   BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: As the Chairman said, can we just  
23      look at your role in relation to counter-terrorism  
24      strategy as such? If you can explain what were your  
25      responsibilities in relation to all activity in Iraq on

1 counter-terrorism?

2 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Well, as DG Defence and Intelligence I  
3 was responsible for the overseas aspects of the  
4 Government's counter-terrorism strategy which was called  
5 CONTEST, and I chaired various groups that looked at  
6 various different aspects of our Overseas CONTEST  
7 Policy. One of these groups was looking at the threat  
8 on a country by country basis. We were trying to  
9 prioritise where we would put our limited ability to  
10 provide assistance to foreign governments in dealing  
11 with what was almost certainly a threat within their  
12 country, but also we were assessing a threat from that  
13 country to citizens in this country. We had a list of  
14 priorities that we drew up and for each country we tried  
15 to develop a strategy which would indicate the way in  
16 which we could try to help deal with that threat  
17 vis-a-vis that particular country.

18 Iraq, in a sense, was always very near the top of  
19 the list of those priorities for reasons which must be  
20 fairly obvious, but for a long time we never really drew  
21 up a specific strategy for Iraq simply because there was  
22 an entire department at the Foreign Office, indeed  
23 a huge effort around Government as a whole devoted to  
24 Iraq, and therefore to, you know, in a sense everything  
25 that we were doing in Iraq in every way was



1 a contribution to a broader counter-terrorism strategy.  
2 So we didn't devise a specific one.

3 Towards the end of my time in that particular job  
4 I suppose -- I can't remember now -- the beginning of  
5 2007 or something, we began to think that actually  
6 things had moved on in Iraq and perhaps we should begin  
7 to treat Iraq in the way we treated some of the other  
8 countries which were very near the top of our priority  
9 list and draw up a strategy. I think we went through  
10 the stages of drawing up that strategy and I think that  
11 we had gone to the Prime Minister's diplomatic advisor  
12 and so on. I am not sure honestly how far we got with  
13 the implementation of it but we were at least thinking,  
14 you know, the position of Iraq is changing and therefore  
15 perhaps we need to start thinking in a slightly  
16 different way from the point of view of  
17 counter-terrorism strategy about Iraq than we had done  
18 hitherto.

19 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Can you just explain to me how did  
20 you and your team work with other parts of the FCO on  
21 Iraq including on counter-terrorism and insurgency and  
22 how did you work with other parts of Whitehall?

23 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: There was an Overseas Contest Group  
24 which I chaired and that had representation from all the  
25 relevant parts of Whitehall agencies, Home Office, MoD,

1       probably DFID, various bits I have forgotten, but also  
2       the relevant departments of the Foreign Office. So if  
3       you were discussing Iraq the geographical department in  
4       the Foreign Office would be represented as well as the  
5       specific department, counter-terrorism policy  
6       department, which dealt with counter-terrorism in the  
7       Foreign Office. So they would all be represented at  
8       this group which I chaired.

9       BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: So there was an effort to kind of  
10       fit together the counter-terrorism strategy with the  
11       wider Iraq strategy. Would that be the case?

12       SIR DAVID RICHMOND: No, I don't think that's quite right,  
13       because we were drawing up the Iraq strategy at  
14       a time -- well, yes, of course it had to be consistent  
15       with the wider Iraq strategy. Absolutely. Up to  
16       a point we thought the wider Iraq strategy completely  
17       subsumes anything we might want to do purely for  
18       counter-terrorism reasons. Anything we might think of  
19       doing was already being done as part of the Iraq  
20       strategy, but Iraq was moving increasingly towards  
21       self-sufficiency in a number of different ways and the  
22       way we interacted with the government was going to  
23       change over time. Therefore it might be appropriate in  
24       addition to what we would continue to do in Iraq that we  
25       had a separate counter-terrorism strategy for Iraq in

1        addition to all sorts of other assistance and support we  
2        might be providing in other fields, and that's why we  
3        began to draw up that strategy. As I say, I am not  
4        quite sure how far it got, at least in my time. No  
5        doubt things developed after I left.

6        BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Any observations on difficulties or  
7        lessons to be learned from that experience?

8        SIR DAVID RICHMOND: No, I don't think so. I mean, the  
9        issue really -- the difficult issues from our point of  
10       view were really about prioritisation. There was only  
11       so much we could do. The hard decisions were really  
12       where you did it more than in a sense what you did.  
13       What we did was not the same everywhere but was similar.  
14       You looked to see where the deficiencies were and what  
15       you could help do to remedy then, but I think over the  
16       time that I was involved with it there was a feeling we  
17       had started off with too wide a ranging priorities and  
18       therefore were spreading our resources too thinly and as  
19       I was sort of coming to the end of my time I think we  
20       had narrowed the priorities down to a much smaller  
21       number and therefore concentrated our resources.

22       BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: You also hinted there were issues to  
23       do with the implementation and how far they implemented  
24       your strategies?

25       SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Only in connection with Iraq. We drew

1       that up very late in the day. These strategies we had been  
2       running for certainly the three years I had been in the  
3       job, which more or less coincided with the start of the  
4       overseas CONTEST strategy. So we had a lot of  
5       experience of doing it with different countries. We  
6       simply had not done it with Iraq. We said there is so  
7       much effort going into Iraq anything we do would be sort  
8       of supernumerary. We were just beginning to say  
9       actually that situation is changing in Iraq. Perhaps we  
10      need to rethink that. Perhaps we can devise a specific  
11      strategy for Iraq. That we did. When I say I am not  
12      sure what happened to it, it might simply be because  
13      I had ceased doing the job. I was not there to see it.

14   SIR JOHN CHILCOT: I'd like to finish by asking my  
15      colleagues if they have any further questions and then  
16      to invite your own reflections. We have had a great  
17      many already in this valuable session, both on your time  
18      at the CPA and as DG Defence and Intelligence.

19           One point you did mention, and you may want to  
20      return to it a little bit. You have mentioned  
21      continuity and the advantage of that.

22   SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Yes.

23   SIR JOHN CHILCOT: I note that not only had you served  
24      earlier in Baghdad for a substantial time as an Arabic  
25      speaker and you did the best part of a full year, unlike

1 most.

2 Is that the sort of pattern we should be looking for  
3 in other cases for the future?

4 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: Yes, yes, the continuity. I mean,  
5 inevitably people learn a lot, even those who -- I mean,  
6 there were people -- this is a point that's worth making  
7 very briefly. There were quite a few Americans in the  
8 governance team, young Americans who had not served in  
9 the Middle East and had no experience of Iraq, but they  
10 were extremely able people, and by the end of the time  
11 some of them did serve well over a year. They were  
12 there from -- those seven people who were there  
13 throughout the Bremer period, at least three of them  
14 came from the governance team, the people who were most  
15 closely involved with the political process. Although  
16 they were not Arabists and they were not Middle East  
17 experts, by the time -- by 30th June, 28th June 2004,  
18 gosh, they were expert. They had learned a huge amount,  
19 but that's something you learn over time. They had been  
20 there 14 months.

21 If you were in -- I mean, in the American case it  
22 was often less than six months. People were coming out  
23 for three months and that's almost worse than useless.

24 SIR JOHN CHILCOT: Yes. Any other final reflections?

25 SIR DAVID RICHMOND: I think I made the one reflection that

1 I had sort of mentally made a note that I wanted to  
2 make.

3 SIR JOHN CHILCOT: In that case our thanks to you, to our  
4 witness this afternoon, for a valuable session.

5 We resume tomorrow afternoon starting at 2 o'clock,  
6 when we shall be hearing from Lord Boyce, Chief of the  
7 Defence Staff. He gave evidence to the Inquiry right at  
8 the start in December 2009, and we have one or two  
9 points that we need to pick up again.

10 With that I will close this session. Thank you all  
11 very much.

12 (4.45 pm)

13 (Hearing adjourned)

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