1 (11.30 am)

2 RT HON ADAM INGRAM

3 THE CHAIRMAN: Welcome back to those in the room and welcome
4 to our witness for our final session today, the
5 Rt Hon Adam Ingram. You were Minister of State for the
6 Armed Forces from 2001 to 2007.

7 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: I was, yes.

8 THE CHAIRMAN: We want to focus primarily in this hearing on
9 a number of personnel-related issues, many of which
10 remain of concern to the families of service personnel
11 who died in Iraq or to those who were seriously injured.
12 Now, we have already taken evidence from your
13 successor as Minister for the Armed Forces,
14 Bob Ainsworth, and we are shortly taking evidence from
15 senior military officers with responsibility for
16 personnel and medical issues.
17 I say on each occasion, we recognise that witnesses
18 give evidence based on their recollection of events and
19 we, of course, check with what we hear against the
20 papers to which we have access and which are still
21 coming in.
22 I remind each witness on each occasion that they
23 will later be asked to sign a transcript of the evidence
24 to the effect that the evidence given is truthful, fair
25 and accurate.

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1 With those preliminaries, I'll turn to
2 Sir Roderic Lyne. Roderic?
3 SIR RODERIC LYNE: As the Minister of State -- indeed the
4 longest-serving ever Defence Minister, if the biography
5 is accurate -- to what extent --
6 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: That was my description of myself, but
7 I think it's accurate as well, hopefully.
8 SIR RODERIC LYNE: It probably felt like it, too.
9 How far were you involved in the planning for the
10 military action in Iraq in the year or so before it took
11 off?
12 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: Well, I mean, the way the department
13 would have worked, working with the Secretary of State
14 would have been very much a component part of what I was
15 expected to do. In fact, the whole definition of what
16 the armed forces should be doing, what its structure
17 should be, was something that would sit with me.
18 In terms of being advised on what was happening,
19 I would be kept closely advised of all of that, but
20 a decision-maker in terms of the force component, that
21 would largely have been a military determination, but
22 I would be advised of it. You would be kept fully
23 informed of it, you would be kept appraised of some of
24 the difficulties associated with it. And, because of my
25 responsibility for the Defence Logistics Organisation,

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1 then clearly that was another important area where I had
2 to be very closely engaged and, as the process was
3 developing, we were engaged in a range of quite
4 fundamental changes within the department, both in terms of
5 future infrastructure, army structure and also in terms
6 of the Logistics Support Organisation, which was
7 undergoing major transformation and which continued to
8 undergo that transformation right through my time there.
9 SIR RODERIC LYNE: So things like the decisions to send
10 a division of ground forces in addition to air and naval
11 assets, the package 3, the big package that we opted
12 for, was something you were advised of but you weren't
13 actually involved in the argument over whether or not we
14 should do it, would that be right?
15 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: Whether or not we should do it?
16 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Yes.
17 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: I wasn't in the process of making
18 a decision as to whether we should or should not do it.
19 It so happened that I was quite prepared to justify, and
20 still do, what we did.
21 I was very closely made aware of the changing
22 parameters, ie going from the north and then into the
23 south, and what that meant in terms of how we could
24 deliver that. It meant new relationships with Kuwait
25 and the quick establishment of the relationships there.

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1 So I would have had full visibility of this, but it
2 wouldn't have been my role to have said -- I wouldn't --
3 "Let's put more aircraft in, more fast jets or more
4 helicopters" or "It seems to me the land component is
5 light or too heavy" or whatever. That would not be
6 a civilian or a Defence Minister's 's role, I would
7 argue.
8 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Was it important for the morale of the
9 army and the standing of the British military
10 internationally that we actually should have troops on
11 the ground there and not just in secondary roles in the
12 air and at sea?
13 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: For the morale?
14 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Yes.
15 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: I mean, I think the military mindset
16 was -- the military would rather be engaged than not
17 engaged, would be the mindset of the military, but that
18 doesn't mean to say that they would want to go to war
19 just for the sake of it.
20 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Specifically, we have discussed in
21 earlier sessions arguments that it appeared that the
22 army were very keen to be there -- not just the navy and
23 the air force -- in the war-fighting phase of campaign
24 because that's what the British army does and, if they
25 hadn't, it might have been a bit of a blow to their

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1 prestige. Was this an argument that you heard?
2 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: Not with any great recollection, but it
3 would just seem to me that the land component was an
4 absolute essential in what we were seeking to do. We
5 had to, in a sense, occupy the ground.
6 SIR RODERIC LYNE: But the Americans said they could do it
7 without us. We weren't essential.
8 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: The Americans may have said that, but
9 that was part of the discussions that were going on, and
10 that -- what was very clear, that once the determination
11 was made that there should be a coalition of forces --
12 and it was a genuine attempt to achieve a coalition,
13 albeit the US being the largest part of that, with the
14 UK second -- but to have other countries associated with
15 all of that and all the expertise that they could bring
16 to bear in terms of some of their specialisms was vital
17 in all of that.
18 It would have just seemed to me, perhaps, on
19 reflection, that not to have put an army component in
20 would have led to major problems because, how then do
21 you deal with an aftermath? Who then does the
22 rebuilding? It is certainly not the air and it is
23 certainly not the maritime component.
24 SIR RODERIC LYNE: So the major problems would have been to
25 do with the aftermath if we hadn't done that.

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1 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: No, no. I'm saying that there is
2 a kind of linear logic to all of that; that, if you
3 hadn't done it initially, you may have had to have done
4 it eventually.
5 Let me go back to my Northern Ireland experience.
6 I was a Northern Ireland Minister.[1] When the army was
7 put in -- not in my time -- put into Northern Ireland,
8 it was because many people maintained, and probably
9 correctly, that there was a complete breakdown in trust
10 in terms of the civil administration, mainly in
11 policing, and so the land element had to go in, the army
12 had to go in to stabilise, to create conditions, and
13 then you recreate the environment which allows the
14 civilianisation, what became known as the normalisation
15 in Northern Ireland.
16 So my experience and my instinct, I suppose my
17 knowledge, would have said that this was an essential
18 feature.
19 I don't think people were saying "it has to be" to me
20 "because our morale will be broken if we are not there".
21 If people are giving that evidence, I think they have
22 got to stand by that view. It was not one that I can
23 recollect that I don't think was necessarily current.
24 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Another argument to do with the aftermath
25 point that was made at the time was that, if we did --

[1] A Northern Ireland Office Minister

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1 if we played a leading part in the war-fighting phase,
2 then we could reasonably expect to draw down rather
3 quickly and let other people deal with the aftermath
4 rather than be landed with that, which was a perhaps
5 a less attractive bit of the package. In the end, of
6 course, we ended up doing both. Did you hear that
7 argument around the place?
8 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: I think there was a lot of genuine
9 awareness and quite deep frustration within the
10 Ministry of Defence about the lack of capacity and
11 determination and willingness to engage elsewhere within
12 the government machine. 45,000 or so military personnel
13 were engaged. You can count the others on a few hands,
14 a few fingers.
15 So there was no comprehensive approach at that time
16 and, as we know, that subsequently became an issue and
17 over which we then -- over time, which we then had to
18 attend to. But very quickly we established the
19 Post-conflict Reconstruction Unit because it was clear
20 where the gaps were, and the military taking on a role,
21 albeit in the main, but the military personnel who were
22 engaged in that role tended to be civilians, ie
23 reservists, in the rest of their working life and they
24 brought that expertise, whether they were engineers,
25 water engineers, mechanical engineers, infrastructure

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1 engineers, people who were able to recreate a positive
2 effect on the ground.
3 But there wasn't an equivalent army, if that's the
4 way to describe it, of civilians standing by in
5 Whitehall or elsewhere to move in to take on that role
6 and that became very apparent. That's why the
7 Post-conflict Reconstruction Unit was established,
8 mainly because of the pressure from the
9 Ministry of Defence.
10 SIR RODERIC LYNE: You mentioned that part of your area of
11 responsibility was logistics. Were you concerned at the
12 time that the military were given too little time to
13 prepare for the campaign? They worked on a rule of
14 thumb, they needed six months, in the end they only had
15 about three for this. Did that bother you?
16 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: Bother? I just got on with the job.
17 It was a case of you had to live within the reality. Do
18 you want a better scenario? Yes, you do. Do you want
19 more time? Yes, you do.
20 But the one thing again I learned, and I had been in
21 the job about two years at that point, was that the
22 military had a can do approach and that worked right
23 through the command chain. They just needed to identify
24 the problem, they then worked out a solution. If that
25 solution didn't work, they would look for another

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1 solution. It is a military mindset which is perhaps
2 unique in government. Failure is not something they
3 dwell on and, therefore, the reality was -- in one
4 sense, a short period of time, but of course the embeds
5 were already in the Pentagon at senior level, beginning
6 to look to see what the reality was. There was
7 a loosening of some of the pre-planning engagement on
8 the basis that we had a genuine attempt by the then
9 Prime Minister Tony Blair to seek another solution
10 through the United Nations, and any indication that
11 somewhere or other we had triggered in a very advanced
12 way, a military component, well, that would have seemed
13 to have contradicted everything we were generally trying
14 to do through the diplomatic and UN channels.
15 So there was a problem associated it, but it was one
16 that had to be surmounted in the military terms and, of
17 course, the change in the military strategy became
18 another issue that they had to attend to.
19 I remember well the advice being given by
20 Major General Pigott at the time, with his very complex
21 graphs about the movement of people on the ground. So
22 from the military planning point of view, they had
23 a very good grasp of what had to be done. Could then
24 all the bits be assembled in time, then was what had to
25 be determined.

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1 Conclusion? It was. There were weaknesses, but
2 they delivered.
3 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Did it allow enough time to prepare some
4 of the other aspects, the preparations for potentially
5 heavy casualties, to make sure that the welfare machine,
6 all the packages needed on the personnel side were also
7 geared up by the time the campaign started? I mean,
8 that was also, I think, within your area of ministerial
9 responsibility. Were you content with the preparations
10 on that side?
11 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: In one sense, strictly -- it didn't all
12 necessarily rest with me. We had other ministers and
13 that -- we could explore it, but we did restructure the
14 departmental responsibilities in 2003/2004 on the back
15 of some of the experience in terms of where the
16 responsibilities lay, who had responsibility for
17 veterans, personnel issues which, in the main, rested
18 with me, but was -- should that be my main focus? So
19 changes occurred at ministerial level in all of that.
20 I think the evidence you got from Lieutenant General
21 Sir Kevin O'Donoghue more or less -- I would stand
22 wholly behind his assessment as to what they were
23 seeking to achieve and what was achieved in terms of
24 medical care package, in terms of preparing for
25 casualties -- and I have heard different figures.

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1 I mean, I haven't been able to find any documents on it
2 but I remember things like the number of body bags,
3 because we thought there was going to be chemical and
4 possibly biological attack.
5 This was a guy who had done this: Saddam Hussein
6 had done this on his own people and our assumption was
7 he was likely to do it on us.
8 So there was a lot of preparation and a lot of
9 holding of breath, if that did eventually did arrive.
10 But that's the nature, I would say, of going to war in
11 very difficult circumstances.
12 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Your former colleague Sally Keeble told
13 us in her evidence that she had spoken to you about some
14 of the concerns that DFID had before the invasion. Do
15 you recall that? Do you recall what action followed
16 from that?
17 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: I remember her speaking to me. It was
18 in the lobbies of the House of Commons. I think she
19 spoke to me perhaps on one other occasion. I don't
20 think it was the concerns that DFID had. I think it was
21 her concerns that she had about the role that DFID was
22 not playing. She took a view that DFID was being
23 constrained by the then Secretary of State. I think
24 that -- Clare Short. I think that was common currency.
25 SIR RODERIC LYNE: That was how it appeared from MoD as

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1 well, was it?

2 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: Absolutely. It was a case of there

3 was, in one sense, a putting together -- because they

4 had the financial wherewithal to do it, but there were

5 significant constraints.

6 Now, some of that may have been anecdotal. It would

7 be a bit unfair to say I recollect the totality of the

8 discussions a long time ago, but it was a case of "Do

9 you know what she is doing?" -- this is Clare Short --

10 "She is stopping the senior people engaging with the

11 MoD". They probably knew that, and there were good

12 people within DFID who were trying to engage and

13 a Secretary of State who was, in a sense, running her

14 own show, saying this all had to be defined within a UN

15 approach. Her mandate was UN, not UK Government, if

16 that would be my -- I think that was my assessment at

17 the time and I don't think really I have changed in all

18 of that.

19 So those were points of frustration, and the other

20 issue was the whole funding of it, because people looked

21 at the DFID budget, saw it was massive and didn't quite

22 understand the constraints on that budget in terms of --

23 90 per cent, because of the Development Act, had to be

24 committed in a particular way.

25 Now, it took us a number of years to break that

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1 down, that -- both the logic of that and the mindset of
2 that and I think your previous witness showed the
3 efficacy of that change.
4 That change was occurring throughout, because the
5 Treasury were then giving tranches of money to DFID,
6 which should then have been -- and probably were
7 being -- put to good use in Iraq. But there were
8 constraints and there was a sea change on the change of
9 Secretary of State, and there was then more marshalling
10 of the co-ordinated and comprehensive components within
11 Whitehall, would be my assessment.
12 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Thank you.
13 THE CHAIRMAN: I'll turn to Sir Lawrence Freedman now. It
14 is going to be quite a long morning, not least for
15 stenographer.
16 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: Slow down?
17 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.
18 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Once the campaign in Iraq began, how
19 did your role develop?
20 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: How did it develop? Well, in the sense
21 that I would be constantly engaged with military
22 personnel, both in country and as a consequence of
23 visits to Iraq and, again, from recollection, I think
24 I visited in May 2003, October 2003. We had a periodic
25 pattern of visits from ministers. I saw my role as one

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1 getting ground truth of what was happening in Iraq.
2 I made it -- a very major part of my role was, well,
3 listening to what the command chain would be telling me,
4 the senior generals and whoever else, was to talk to the
5 ordinary soldiers on the ground. In fact, they weren't
6 ordinary, they were all of them pretty unique people and
7 exemplary people.
8 Using techniques like "I do not want a senior
9 officer with me when I'm talking to the soldiers", and
10 my after-visit reports would reflect all of this: one,
11 whether I was being advised at senior level about where
12 the weaknesses were and maybe in terms of equipment
13 supply -- support, supply, or whatever else, but also
14 what the individual serving soldier was saying about the
15 operational welfare package, about, you know, a whole
16 range of issues, about being able to contact families,
17 and so you would pick up the ground truth and then see
18 if you could then fix it.
19 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Would you say that was the main
20 purpose of your visit?
21 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: The main purpose of visit? No. Well,
22 there were two elements to it. The purpose was to get
23 the high-level strategic assessment, the feel for what
24 was happening, what the senior commanders were saying,
25 both the GOC and the operational commanders, where their

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1 really worry lines were, but also to pick up that which
2 was beginning to appear in the media. The urban myths
3 that were around about boots melting and people not
4 having combat, the clothing and so on, and just trying
5 to -- really just trying to establish ground truth at
6 the lower level, even the lower tactical level, to
7 understanding the strategic issues as well --
8 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: How did you find the reality matched
9 with what you'd been led to expect.
10 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: I don't think I had been led to
11 expect -- I don't understand that.
12 THE CHAIRMAN: In terms of briefings?
13 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: Oh, in terms of briefings?
14 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: You were presumably being kept
15 informed reasonably well before you went to Iraq. Was
16 what you found there in line with what --
17 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: No, I think that's why I used the
18 phrase "urban myths". We were reading in the press,
19 because people -- I have many anecdotal stories I can
20 tell about it, and I won't regale you with them, but
21 I had one of my own constituents, a mother, on behalf of
22 her son, complaining about the fact that her boy didn't
23 have size 11 boots, and this went on for weeks and weeks
24 until the point I said, "Well, is he running around
25 barefoot?" to her. Of course, he wasn't. He had bought

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his own boots, but she was annoyed that he -- she was saying he had not been issued with the size 11, and he had been.

So the urban myths were there, in terms -- and what was I being informed of? But we're talking over a number of years here --

SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Well --

RT HON ADAM INGRAM: Was there success? Were we achieving success? Yes, we were, up until a point, and then it became extremely difficult.

SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Can I -- there are very particular things we need to talk about, just to clarify what role you were playing.

First, during the actual military operations in the combat phase, as it were, did you have very particular responsibilities there or did your role really click in after the troops were established in Iraq?

RT HON ADAM INGRAM: Well, if I'm interpreting that question correctly, it just seems to me it is not the role of ministers to be instructing what the military should be doing on the ground, but to be kept well-informed of what was happening.

Of course we had regular, almost weekly, meetings following the Chiefs of Staff meeting. We had the ministerial meeting, where we would be fully informed,

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1 usually by direct -- with direct connection to theatre,
2 to Iraq, where the senior commanders would be telling us
3 almost what had happened five minutes previous, because
4 an incident may have occurred just as we were assembling
5 the personnel to that meeting.
6 So being kept fully-informed and being engaged in
7 helping, if there was a need to identify problems that
8 needed resolution, and then to work their way to that
9 resolution, whether it was equipment, supplies or
10 whatever else.
11 So that would be the way in which the interface
12 would occur and, also, when GOCs were returning at the
13 end of tour, again, invariably, they would come in and
14 brief me on their end-of-tour report, and I would tend
15 to go out and visit when a new GOC was in place and see
16 them at the end of tour.
17 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: If we move on to some specific
18 questions, one of the issues is the degree of stretch on
19 the military and the impact that this was having upon
20 the lives of service personnel.
21 I'm going to go into more depth with this with the
22 Deputy Chiefs of Defence Staff (Personnel) whom we will be
23 seeing in the next couple of weeks. But to start with,
24 could you explain briefly the concept of the MoD's
25 harmony guidelines?

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1 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: The concept of it? Well, six -- again
2 six months' deployment, 24 months' doing other things,
3 retraining, re-roling, before we changed the arms plot,
4 rest and recreation, reskilling or whatever -- the whole
5 range of things would happen in that 24-month period
6 and, again, it was very clear that the harmony
7 guidelines were being breached.
8 There was just no way, in terms of the intensity of
9 effort -- we had been involved in both Iraq and
10 Afghanistan, still engaged in Northern Ireland, still
11 having people in Cyprus, still having people in
12 Sierra Leone and other parts of sub-Saharan Africa, and
13 still having a significant lay-down in the Falklands.
14 All of that made it very difficult to meet harmony
15 guidelines, although it varied between the services --
16 the army under most strain, the Royal Navy under least
17 strain -- and significant key enablers within the army
18 having those specialisms within -- the pinch point
19 deliverers. They would be under quite considerable
20 stretch. So medics, engineers, a raft of people who
21 were under very significant strain. We knew that.
22 However, what was the solution? That was then
23 something we then had to attend to.
24 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: You knew it. Did you know it prior
25 to the invasion of Iraq that this was likely to put

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1 a strain on the guidelines?
2 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: I don't recollect being told
3 specifically that, but it wouldn't surprise me that
4 I had been told that. "Understand something, this will
5 put pressure on the system".
6 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Did you have discussions with
7 advisers about the degree of flexibility that was
8 tolerable -- they're guidelines rather than rules -- but
9 presumably you can take a certain amount of relaxation
10 but, after a while, it becomes intolerable.
11 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: Of course, it was an objective
12 rather -- as you say, it was an objective rather than
13 a contract we had. I mean, it was -- we hear a lot
14 about the military covenant. The military covenant, of
15 course, only applied in written form for the army. It
16 didn't apply for the navy or for the RAF or indeed for
17 the Royal Marines, which became very heavily used.
18 It just seemed to me -- and I would have used this
19 language -- that the military covenant had never been
20 honoured in this country. So it wasn't broken. It was
21 just, as ever, under huge strain.
22 It certainly wasn't honoured after the First World
23 War or after the Second World War or after Korea or
24 after the Falklands or within more recent memory. The
25 military covenant -- and I could go through what we

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1 inherited as an incoming administration -- a broken-back
2 housing system for personnel, an inadequate overseas
3 welfare package, a whole raft of things that needed to
4 be attended to, but which then had to be set against
5 priorities -- ie, is the resource available?
6 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: So the conclusion one could draw
7 from that is that, though these guidelines, these
8 objectives, existed, these were always going to be
9 difficult to honour? In fact, you would have had to
10 have an act of faith to believe they ever would be
11 honoured?
12 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: I think in the last part that would be
13 the case. I think there were some people who were, of
14 course, getting the full honouring of that commitment,
15 but knowing the stresses and strains that were on
16 a particular post within the armed forces, probably in
17 the main and within the army -- ie, the medics and the
18 engineers and other specialisms -- there was a quite
19 a significant shortfall in the mismatch between what we
20 believed to be the required number and what we were able
21 to recruit, and it is why, increasingly, and at that
22 time, of course -- and it had come out of the Strategic
23 Defence Review, the greater use and utility of the
24 reserves.
25 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: We will come on to the question of

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1 reserves later.

2 One of the consequences of this is the fact of the

3 dangers associated with the operations in Iraq. There

4 were practical and emotional issues for the personnel on

5 operations and back home with their families. We have

6 had very mixed reports of -- from families and military

7 personnel we have spoken to.

8 Again, it is a big area and we need to stay brief,

9 but could you describe how -- what was done for the

10 welfare of military personnel on tour and for their

11 families? How did these areas develop over the time of

12 the Iraq mission?

13 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: Of course, what was happening in

14 theatre became important in terms of the communication

15 means by which the serving personnel could communicate

16 back to their families and, at the beginning of a war

17 phase, and shortly after it, it is very hard to deliver

18 full communication and infrastructure. Indeed, even the

19 military infrastructure, ie in terms of operational

20 demand, was pretty fragile as well.

21 So you couldn't honour the commitment in terms of

22 the amount of time that each soldier or each serving

23 personnel would have to phone back to their family, but

24 as the lay-down became more established, and investment

25 could then be made in communications, and when we had

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the communications infrastructure, we could then improve the availability and the time, then, that individual personnel could spend on that, whether it be through e-blueys, which were obviously through the Internet, or on personal telephone calls, and we increased that from, I think, 20 minutes to half an hour. Again, as a result of pressure, but also because we had the capacity then to do it.

Improvements to the operational welfare package, off the top of my head, I think we were spending round about ú12 million in 2001/2002 financial year. By 2006/2007, it was just short of ú50 million. Now, people say that's not a lot of money, but that's quite a substantial increase and that showed the type of investment we were seeking to make in all of that.

In terms of the home base, well, of course, a lot would depend upon what battle groups would do, what the regiments would do, and I remember visiting the Desert Rats, who had just returned in Germany, and they had what was called a "home rat" system, which was an incredible package of protection for the families in their permanent lay-down in Germany.

So they were kept informed, kept advised. If fatalities and injuries occurred, there was good communication within the home base and the home return

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1 package was very well-thought-out as well, family events
2 and so on.
3 So it was a bit variable, but it wasn't because
4 others were not putting a lack effort in, it was just
5 that some people put exceptional effort in, and in many
6 ways they funded it themselves, but there was never --
7 I don't ever recollect a request saying "We need money"
8 and the answer was "No, you are not getting it". If
9 anything, "Let's see the case", and you would get it,
10 because we understood the importance of that.
11 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Again, we have to be quite quick on
12 these things but, first, we have raised the question of
13 reliability of troop transport between Iraq and the UK
14 and the impact this had on periods of leave.
15 Were you aware of that and what were you trying to
16 do about it?
17 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: The air bridge, as it was known, was
18 very fragile. We were dealing with aging aircraft, you
19 just need an aircraft to break down for a few hours and
20 the whole thing is thrown into dislocation.
21 It is why then, increasingly, that the procurement
22 of commercial aircraft was then put in place, but they
23 could break down as well, and there was nothing more
24 frustrating than hundreds of personnel hoping to get
25 home and then being contained somewhere else, whether it

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1 was Cyprus or Oman or Kuwait or wherever their through
2 passage was.
3 These were real issues, and there were not easy
4 solutions to it. If we had had more time to prove the
5 whole structure of expeditionary warfare and campaigns,
6 which we didn't have, apart from the fact there was
7 a major exercise -- which I don't know whether you have
8 touched upon or not in detail -- the Saif Sareea
9 exercise. 22,500 personnel were put into that exercise.
10 Why? It was to test equipment, it was to test the
11 concepts, but along then came -- well, at the same time,
12 but just in advance of the exercise -- Afghanistan, of
13 course.
14 Therefore, the switch from "live ex", as they were
15 known as, training exercises, and there was another
16 one -- a major other one to follow on from that to prove
17 some of these things, to find the weaknesses, then to
18 look at solutions, then how do you reprioritise -- we
19 didn't have that luxury, because they were then into
20 war-fighting in Afghanistan, many thousands of miles
21 distant, and then along came Iraq --
22 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: One of the particular problems of
23 the air bridge -- I mean, this is essentially a function
24 of the age of our air transports and the limited number
25 of air transports --

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1 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: Correct --
2 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: -- we had.
3 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: Well, the A400 then had not been
4 delivered. I couldn't solve that. I couldn't go down
5 to wherever it was being built and start assembling it,
6 nor could any senior commanders. This was something
7 that industry was delivering to us. It was why then we
8 looked at alternative means, and the C17s then became
9 part of the procurement process -- we first leased and
10 then purchased -- and I was one who had been arguing
11 that "Forget the A400, C17s carry more. It is a very
12 good aircraft, an exceptional aircraft. Let's just buy
13 more". But resources always apply. We had only so much
14 money to spend.
15 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Another issue you have mentioned
16 already in terms of urban myths is some of the shortages
17 of personnel equipment. Again, we have heard a certain
18 amount about this.
19 In general, was your view that, actually, these
20 things were exaggerated, things like food and toilet
21 paper, we have heard soldiers have to go and borrow them
22 from the Americans and so on. Is that in the category
23 of urban myth?
24 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: I always remember General Jackson
25 saying, if a soldier didn't carry his toilet paper in

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his pack, he wasn't much of a soldier, and if he didn't keep one in reserve, then he probably needed a bit more training. I don't think that's quite what he said, but you know the point I'm making.

SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: We can check it with him.

RT HON ADAM INGRAM: You can check it with him. He would probably be a bit more blunt than I can possibly be.

But there were shortages. There was no question about there being shortages. Part of the problem was that the volumes were being sent out. It was then that concept known as asset tracking, which is where the breakdown was because, again, we had not invested enough in that part of the process, something which Saif Sareea was designed to show up the weaknesses in.

Then the tussle -- the arguments within the department, would have been "Should we invest more in this?" As against what? That was something that, by and large, tended to be pushed aside, the whole asset tracking because it was a higher priority, and I mean, I think we paid a bit of a penalty in that, in terms of the morale aspect of it, because the urban myths I would say was people being sent and deployed in green uniforms. Well, they were, but they were not going out fighting in green uniforms. There was combat gear waiting for them in theatre, and those who were doing

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1 frontline fighting did not go out in green uniforms, and
2 yet, if you read the Daily Mail or others, you would
3 think that was the case.
4 Camouflage paint being washed off the tanks. It
5 didn't happen. But that was a headline, that was
6 a story.
7 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: So there were some things which were
8 exaggerated but other things that were real problems
9 because of --
10 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: I think there were real
11 (overtalking) -- there was no question there was real
12 issues, and I remember being at the Shaibah base and
13 looking at the ISO containers, of which there were
14 hundreds, and the Quartermaster saying "I don't know
15 what's in them", and that was an asset tracking issue.
16 So what did they do? They just ordered more.
17 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: We have taken some evidence on that
18 which is clearly important.
19 The last question from me at the moment is about
20 military housing and, again, something you have already
21 alluded to, but we heard from Trevor Woolley that the
22 level of spending on services accommodation had to be
23 reduced in 2004. It was one of the consequences of the
24 discussions that had been going on which, again, we have
25 taken a lot of evidence on.

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1 I am just wondering, given that you have already
2 mentioned the quality of the service accommodation as an
3 issue, how do you manage that sort of issue and balance
4 priorities when it clearly is so important to morale?
5 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: Because the scale of fixing the problem
6 was truly immense. It was an inherited disaster, both
7 in single living accommodation and in married
8 accommodation.
9 Geoff Hoon, to his great credit, it was one of the
10 things that he did, was to shift the resource in advance
11 obviously of both Afghanistan and Iraq from other areas
12 into accommodation, I can't remember the detail on that,
13 but it was quite a significant reprioritisation within
14 the department. But then, other priorities then take
15 place and we had a limited resource. It wasn't an
16 urgent operational requirement.
17 My own personal view? It should have been. We
18 should have been much more, as a nation, concerned about
19 the quality of housing; as a nation, not as
20 a Ministry of Defence. We had to go out as ministers
21 and justify, "Yes, we are now spending -- whatever the
22 figure was -- £4 billion, but it over ten years".
23 I come from the slums of Glasgow. I know what it is
24 like to live in the slums. I was witnessing conditions,
25 although I was a youngster by the time I left, that

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1 would have appalled my parents. So it wasn't lack of
2 commitment or understanding or need for change that was
3 missing, it was resource.
4 The point I made earlier about the military
5 covenant, it had never been honoured in this country and
6 we were trying fix that.
7 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: But nonetheless, in 2004, once
8 again, the more immediate priorities meant that you had
9 to scale back on something which you have described in
10 rather graphic terms.
11 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: The question of priorities must be the
12 language of government and, even if more money had been
13 made available -- I used to use that argument; that if
14 someone put £1 billion in front of me on the table, it
15 would have gone like that. We could have spent it
16 almost overnight in Defence, on good issues and right
17 causes.
18 But that wasn't the way in which we were being
19 funded, other than in terms of the urgent operational
20 requirements and, even then, everything had to be very
21 finely justified and there were constant tussles with
22 the Treasury in all of that as to whether it was a UOR
23 or whether it should come out of core expenditure and
24 then who carried the ongoing responsibility once that
25 UOR was procured.

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1 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Okay, thank you.
2 THE CHAIRMAN: Roderic, over to you.
3 SIR RODERIC LYNE: I would like to ask about Iraqi civilian
4 casualties. A lot of work has been done, research
5 published, by non-governmental organisations and
6 academics, estimating Iraqi civilian deaths, but the
7 British Government's line, which you started taking in
8 Parliament during the conflict, understandably at that
9 time, you said it is impossible to know for sure how
10 many civilians have been injured or killed, but then,
11 after the conflict in June 2003, you told Parliament:
12 "We have no reliable means of ascertaining the
13 numbers of Iraqi civilians killed."
14 Then the government stuck parrot-like to this line
15 ever thereafter. We had other ministers,
16 Baroness Symons, 2004:
17 "No reliable figures for Iraqi civilian deaths
18 since March 2003."
19 Kim Howells, 2007:
20 "The government does not collate figures for
21 civilian casualties in Iraq."
22 And Baroness Kinnock in almost exactly the same
23 words in February of this year.
24 Why couldn't the government make some settlement of
25 Iraqi civilian deaths when others could do so?

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1 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: To what purpose?
2 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Well, there was clear public interest.
3 You are constantly being asked in Parliament about it
4 and by saying "We don't have any figures for this", are
5 you not giving the impression that we don't care about
6 it?
7 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: No, I think the line was that we had no
8 reliable means of attesting to this. Remember, the
9 politics of Iraq was both a divided nation here and very
10 hostile opinion abroad. The idea that somehow or other
11 an NGO is the fount of all wisdom and knowledge and
12 accuracy I don't think stands up.
13 So if we were going to take the figures from
14 external sources, then we would have had to put effort
15 and verification into that. Should we have done so?
16 Perhaps, yes, and I'm not so sure it wasn't being done,
17 but perhaps some of the examination -- because there
18 were various figures being bandied around. There was
19 a whole raft of different agencies and organisations
20 saying different things. Some of them, I would have
21 questioned their motivation as to why they were doing
22 it.
23 Therefore, the concept of ground truth is absolutely
24 vital in this and, by establishing that fact, wouldn't
25 have altered where we were. Because we couldn't, in one

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1 sense, easily have stopped the civilian casualties
2 because it wasn't being carried out by us on the
3 civilians, it was being carried out by the tribal wars,
4 the family feuds, by the Sunni/Shia factionalism that
5 was taking place, by the Shia on Shia factionalism that
6 was taking place, but we, somehow or other, from a UK
7 perspective, were being vilified, attacked and
8 criticised that we had precipitated all of this.
9 I have to say I believe that to be a false logic,
10 because that may have happened at any time under
11 Saddam Hussein and, therefore, the establishment of the
12 facts perhaps should have been carried out by --
13 elsewhere in government. I don't really think it was
14 an MoD function in that sense.
15 SIR RODERIC LYNE: I was asking about government and perhaps
16 you could say, who, elsewhere in government, should have
17 been -- I mean, as part of the coalition in Iraq, we
18 must have had a better means of estimating -- obviously,
19 you can't be precise about this -- these figures than
20 people outside government and, if there is this wide
21 range that you talk about, of figures being bandied
22 about in the public, sometimes with an agenda attached
23 to them, would it not have been helpful if some part of
24 government had been able at least to give a ballpark
25 estimate that we could have some reasonable faith in, in

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1 order to inform public opinion and perhaps counteract
2 the effect of some of the wilder figures --
3 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: But I don't think we were discounting
4 the extent of the problem. I don't think we were saying
5 at any point there weren't mass casualties taking place.
6 What we were not doing was putting a precise or an
7 approximate figure on that. But we were not saying that
8 "These are downright lies and not true". We were just
9 simply saying we had not verified them and we had no
10 means of so verifying them. What was going to happen?
11 How did we verify them?
12 You have then to go to the hospitals. You then have
13 to put civilians or a military person at that hospital
14 counting the bodies in and the bodies out. So you need
15 force protection to do that. You put people at risk to
16 do that. Is that what people wanted, soldiers or
17 civilians being killed at hospitals? Because they would
18 have been at risk.
19 Within Iraq, people were killing their own, they
20 were also prepared to kill ours, and we know, of course,
21 that the bombing of the UN headquarters in 2003, the UN
22 withdrew. So the UN may have been the mechanism by
23 which we'd establish true facts, but they were
24 withdrawn.
25 So there were points at which, yes, it would have

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1 been desirable, but how do you achieve that objective?
2 Do you put other lives at risk to do that? I would say
3 no.
4 SIR RODERIC LYNE: You say it wasn't MoD's job. Should it
5 have been somebody else's job to deal with this?
6 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: Unquestionably. Is it something that
7 DFID could have funded? Is it something the FCO should
8 have taken ownership care of? The UN had become
9 engaged -- it was still engaged, but not in terms of
10 presence on the ground -- is it a role that they should
11 have played? Yes. Of course the answer to that is yes.
12 But what -- the very establishment of the facts
13 would not have changed what was happening. It would
14 have confirmed what everyone knew, but it wouldn't have
15 led to a solution, would have been the hard logic I'd
16 I would have had to have applied to that.
17 If I had been asked, as the Minister of the Armed
18 Forces, "Are you prepared to put units in every one of
19 the hospitals to count the bodies in and the bodies
20 out?" and it was my choice, "No", would have been my
21 answer.
22 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. I'll turn straight away to
23 Baroness Prashar and then I think after that we will
24 take a very short break. Thank you. Usha?
25 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: I would like to look at some of the

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1 early difficulties that bereaved families faced as
2 a result of the losses in Iraq.
3 What planning had been done in advance to ensure
4 that the MoD and other relevant services, like the
5 coroners, were ready to cope with the fatalities that
6 might have occurred?
7 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: I think there are two elements to that,
8 in terms of where -- where my responsibilities lay,
9 because I had no control over the coroners, that was
10 sitting elsewhere with the government and became an
11 increasing point of frustration, about the delays and so
12 on.
13 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: We will come to that later.
14 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: I appreciate that. Even -- just to
15 make the point, even today, one of the things we were
16 trying to fix -- and that was to have fatal accident
17 inquiries being held in Scotland -- has still not
18 happened.
19 Now, there is something wrong in the delivery of
20 government across the United Kingdom when you agree
21 something has to happen, but it takes you two years to
22 deliver, when you are dealing with human tragedy. So
23 that was an increasing point of frustration.
24 In terms of what the MoD -- where the MoD's
25 responsibilities lay, I guess we were not good in the

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1 early days because there was a military mindset that --
2 where they just consumed their own grief, in a sense,
3 that this was just something that happened within the
4 military.
5 Remember, we had been losing people in
6 Northern Ireland. Even fatalities in Northern Ireland
7 ran into many hundreds and we didn't have a mechanism,
8 which we now have, at that time. The Falklands, the
9 same, and so on, and I think it was part of the military
10 approach that they take the pain and increasingly
11 that -- again, mainly because of family pressure and
12 some public pressure, all of that had to change, but it
13 takes time to change a mindset that has been there for
14 decades, if not centuries, and yes, they did it very
15 rapidly.
16 We put in place, very early on, the support of
17 families. Again, progressively that improved over time.
18 The work that was then done under the Armed Forces
19 Act -- or Bill at the time and then became the Act --
20 all of that was laid down, again during my time,
21 2006/2007 and then delivered in 2008.
22 Another example of taking time to do it, mainly
23 because we needed, in a sense, legislative structure to
24 do it as well.
25 The Armed Forces Bill was a very big piece of

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1 legislation, dealing with a whole range of things,
2 military discipline and so on. The point I'm making
3 here is that it wasn't that we were unaware of the
4 problem; we were. Did we seek to fix it? Yes, we did,
5 from about 2002 onwards. Should we have done it better
6 from day one? Well, the answer to that is yes, but
7 that's always the science of hindsight.
8 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: One of the things the families
9 raised with us was the problem of notification of the
10 next of kin of those killed. You were aware of that
11 particular problem?
12 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: I became increasingly aware of it. It
13 would be unfair to say that, as a minister, you would
14 say "There is going to be a problem here", because you
15 would have assumed that there was an approach that was
16 sympathetic to that.
17 I don't think it would have been expected of
18 a minister to probe and to say "What you are going to do
19 here?" You just had to assume, because they had been
20 through decades of losing people, therefore you thought
21 they were good at that.
22 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: When this began to happen,
23 notification as an issue, did you become aware of it,
24 did you take any terms to rectify it?
25 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: The answer is yes, when we became aware

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1 of it, because of family pressure, because of public
2 pressure. I mean, this was, in a sense, the first war
3 that had been a 24/7 war, that you were waking up in the
4 morning and another story was on the --
5 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: What steps did you take to rectify
6 it?
7 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: We did set up -- I have to say, the
8 steps I took to rectify it, I think the military almost
9 simultaneously realised it had to become more
10 sophisticated. There was a greater -- I'm not saying
11 they weren't compassionate, but a greater compassionate
12 understanding of what they were then dealing with and,
13 indeed, one of the issues that was then recommended to
14 my area of responsibility was reputation of the armed
15 forces, because it was under huge pressure and strain.
16 On the one hand, they are our heroes but, on the
17 other hand, somehow or other, the whole lot of them are
18 people who just don't understand things. Well, you
19 can't be a hero and that, and of course, that was part
20 of the mistruth that was being peddled within the media.
21 The military became -- to repeat the point -- very
22 aware of where the weaknesses were, and I make this
23 point because I had a lot of dealings with families who
24 had lost people. I had done that in Northern Ireland as
25 well. There was a very heavy, ministerial engagement

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1 with families which had never, I would guess, ever
2 happened before, and probably -- for good reasons or
3 not, it had just never happened before in that sense.
4 So we were becoming increasingly aware of the pressures
5 on families, against a hostile political environment and
6 trying to justify a whole range of things in those
7 circumstances.
8 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Can I just ask something specific?
9 Because, in 2005, June, I mean, your housing policy
10 changed and regiments could stay longer in housing. Can
11 you give the background --
12 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: No, no, I don't think the housing
13 policy changed, I think it just -- the pace of change
14 was not as rapid. There was still -- we didn't stop
15 doing things in housing. It was just the amount of
16 money that had been committed in terms of housing had
17 changed --
18 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: No, but in the sense that they were
19 not asked to move out of the housing immediately, they
20 could stay longer.
21 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: Sorry. There was one example I'm aware
22 of where -- and again, that was during Geoff Hoon's
23 time -- the view was, "Well, this is going to dislocate
24 all the other arrangements, if you let this widow stay
25 in the house", and Geoff Hoon just said "So what? Fix

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1 it", and it was fixed.

2 I think, to the best of my recollection, we didn't

3 have a deluge of demand in that area. It may have been

4 beneath the surface, but it never became a reality and,

5 if it had been: yes, they can stay there, yes, we have

6 to be sympathetic.

7 We had been through it before anyway, in terms of

8 Sierra Leone, where we had the partner of the soldier --

9 the Special Forces soldier who was killed, and the

10 argument was there should be no compensation paid

11 because she was not married. Well, all those rules had

12 to change and we did --

13 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Do you accept more could have been done

14 to anticipate those difficulties earlier on rather wait

15 and respond to problems as they arose.

16 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: I don't think we were given the

17 privilege of having that capacity to think of every

18 eventuality. Ministers just -- someone -- if a minister

19 had said "You had better make sure all these things are

20 going to happen. We know how the Daily Mail is going to

21 misreport this and exploit failings", I don't think it

22 is within the capacity of anyone to do that, certainly

23 not ministers who are exceptionally busy dealing with

24 day-to-day, firefighting issues and looking so far ahead

25 to see every eventuality and saying "Get this fixed".

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1 You tended to deal with the issue as it came across
2 your desk. "Does it need fixed? Can we do it? Let's
3 do it".
4 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: As we heard earlier this week,
5 assumptions are made in planning in terms of what the
6 needs are likely to be.
7 Should there not have been planning done, in terms
8 of what -- the anticipated problems that might arise
9 from fatalities, in terms of, you know, getting in touch
10 with next of kin, about housing difficulties? I mean,
11 and all these things are part and parcel of the planning
12 assumption, are they not?
13 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: Well, it wasn't the first time we had
14 people being killed in action, and yet it had never
15 become an issue. I make the point: hundreds of people
16 had been killed over 38 years in Northern Ireland; it
17 never manifested itself as a problem, certainly not that
18 ministers had been made aware of.
19 Look, what happened during that period was an
20 intense examination of what was becoming a new reality,
21 a new climate, a new -- a need to have a completely new
22 approach to the way in which we delivered welfare, both
23 to families and to the armed forces personnel. This was
24 not -- I make the point -- the first time we had been in
25 conflict. We had been in conflict in the Falklands and

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1 in Korea, and we can go right back. It is why I keep
2 repeating the point: this wasn't something that was
3 broken, it was something we had to establish as a wholly
4 new way forward, and it wasn't necessarily delivered
5 solely by ministers, although we, on many occasions, had
6 to right it, to approve it. It was delivered by the system
7 itself. It realised: a big sea change happening here,
8 new attitudes have to apply.
9 You have a generational issue, people saying "In my
10 day, this is what we did". Well, this is not your day,
11 this is today. That was what was happening. That was
12 the dynamic at play.
13 THE CHAIRMAN: Let's break for five minutes.
14 (12.31 pm)
15 (Short break)
16 (12.37 pm)
17 THE CHAIRMAN: Welcome back. I would like to start us off
18 again with really a fairly broad question about the
19 security sector reform.
20 We know you visited Iraq and had many visits
21 in March 2005, and things had changed, and not for the
22 better, in the southeast. John Reid becomes
23 Secretary of State for Defence after the election
24 in May 2005, and one of the first things he does on
25 taking office is to call on Ronnie Flanagan, who is then

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1 HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary, to review the
2 policing contribution and, about the same time, the lead
3 responsibility in Whitehall moves to the Ministry of
4 Defence from the Foreign Office. I think it is common
5 ground and we have had a lot of evidence, that policing
6 in post-conflict situations is one of the hardest things
7 to do and get right.
8 You, yourself, have a great deal of background in
9 that, policing, not least in the policing/military
10 interface. So I wondered, was both the setting up of
11 the Flanagan Review and then dealing with it after
12 Ronnie reports, something that was very much in your
13 sights?
14 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: Absolutely, and it never went out of my
15 sight. It did go back to the time when I was minister
16 in Northern Ireland, at the time of Kosovo, when the
17 request came that we needed armed policing capability to
18 work alongside the military, ie our equivalent of
19 a Carabinieri or something of that mode, and why was it
20 RUC being asked? Because there wasn't a capacity within
21 the UK to do that. Not that there weren't armed police
22 officers, there were, but they were not trained in that
23 way.
24 We did agree that component to go out to Kosovo and
25 it then proved to me something which I didn't realise

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1 I was going to be charged with, in terms of
2 understanding and potential delivery on -- later on in
3 my future career.
4 The whole question of capacity building, as you say,
5 is something that has been examined. We have to make
6 our mind up whether we can deliver or we can't and, if
7 we can deliver, then it is not going to come from the
8 civilian police.
9 There was an incident where ACC White, who was an
10 ex-RUC officer, was working in Iraq, as part of the
11 international delivery, who criticised a comment made by
12 a senior police officer in this country that they were
13 not going to send civilian police officers out because
14 it was too risky. He made the comment "What are police
15 officers for if they don't take risks?"
16 Again, that gave me another indication of some of
17 the issues which were at stake.
18 If you do police mentoring and police training, you
19 have a police trainer there. It doesn't matter whether
20 it is someone from the Carabinieri or the Gendarmerie
21 or, I would say, our equivalent in terms of the
22 Royal Military Police, which is, I think, the second
23 largest, if not the largest, armed police force in the
24 country, in the UK.
25 You then need force protection, and the multipliers,

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1 depending on the circumstances, can be quite
2 significant. So one mentor can mean anything up to 14
3 protectors.
4 So what is it the army do, what does the MoD do?
5 They say "This is very expensive in human resource to
6 deliver in this, so should we be doing it?"
7 So, therefore, we have never really delivered it
8 with full commitment. We have never been charged in any
9 real way by a strong commitment, because the FCO, who
10 has ownership of the delivery of that part of capacity
11 building -- I'm not saying they weren't aware of the
12 need for it, there was just no intensity of effort in
13 finding a solution.
14 What was happening in Iraq, of course, was that much
15 of the police training was taking place outside of Iraq
16 in Jordan or in other areas, away from the difficult
17 areas, for the very simple reason that you reduce the
18 force protection component. But there is then
19 a weakness inbuilt into that, because best training
20 should be done close to the point of need and you can be
21 out on the street, you can be showing them what has to
22 happen in the circumstances.
23 Now, that, it was very clear to me, was a big
24 weakness in terms of capacity building. SSR, the one
25 thing that you need to get fixed early is your justice

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1 delivery, prisons, your court system, and you need
2 people apprehending the bad guys.
3 You can have the people apprehending the bad guys;
4 if you can't put them in prison or you can't give them
5 due process of law, there's no point apprehending them.
6 So police then -- because police are trained to
7 apprehend the bad guys, but then, if there is no
8 follow-through, what's the point of doing it?
9 So, therefore, the intensity of effort in delivering
10 of SSR, I believe was not fully supported -- it may well
11 have been understood, but was not well-supported, and
12 I still think today we talk about, "Yes, we are doing
13 a lot of police training". Are we, to the extent that
14 is required, as against the objective, rather than just
15 saying we are doing it because we need to say something
16 about it?
17 THE CHAIRMAN: It is a very important and difficult
18 question. It is not -- and you must tell us -- simply
19 a matter of policing, it is about the whole of a justice
20 system, building from scratch.
21 But I have got one policing dimension I would like
22 to ask you. We have heard about the systemic problem
23 with the Great Britain police force -- and
24 I deliberately say Great Britain -- being multiple and
25 not capable of taking direction from central government,

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1 risk and force protection cost, but there is also the
2 question of the applicability of the concept of the
3 unarmed civilian in uniform, which is the Great Britain
4 concept of policing. Is it transferable into failed
5 states post-conflict situations at all?
6 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: In a word, no.
7 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.
8 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: I mean, I could expand on it, but --
9 THE CHAIRMAN: I think that says it.
10 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: You cannot do it because the threat
11 level is -- that's why you have every police officer
12 armed in Northern Ireland, because of the nature of the
13 threat.
14 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. I'll move swiftly on, with time
15 against us. Martin.
16 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: I would like to ask about the question
17 of treatment of the injured personnel. The House of
18 Commons Defence Committee report in February 2008
19 described the clinical care for servicemen and women
20 seriously injured on operations as second to none, and
21 we will be hearing in a later session from a former
22 Surgeon General about how this standard of care has been
23 achieved, but what do you see as the main lessons that
24 the MoD has learned from the treatment of those injured
25 in Iraq?

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1 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: Of course, again, as part of the
2 generational change that had taken place, the collapse
3 of military hospitals, or the disbanding and closure of
4 military hospitals because the level of need had changed
5 over time -- and we did, again coming out of the
6 Strategic Defence Review and as part of the ongoing
7 process in advance of both Afghanistan and Iraq,
8 establish what we were trying to do in terms of quality
9 healthcare, because personnel were still being injured
10 and, obviously, for those who were injured coming back,
11 and we needed both the care within the hospital sector
12 and then you needed the aftercare.
13 It became very clear early on that there was
14 a problem at Selly Oak. It wasn't the question of the
15 quality of the medical care. It was the fact that they
16 were in mixed wards. You had soldiers who had been
17 attended to by civilian nurses, civilian doctors and in
18 the next bed there may well be a civilian injured person
19 or old person.
20 That became a big issue. My instinct initially
21 was -- and this is a personal view -- that if I was
22 injured, I just wanted the best medical care. I just
23 wanted to survive. I think there was -- that was
24 the kind of thought-process around it, "Let's make sure
25 that it is the very best" and it was. There was no

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1 question of the quality of the care.
2 But, as a result of a number of visits, ministerial
3 visits, it became abundantly clear we needed to do other
4 things. So progressively, the number of military
5 personnel, in terms of the medical care, changed to the
6 extent that -- and I don't have the current picture --
7 I think there are exclusive exclusively military wards
8 and military wings of the hospital.
9 The rehabilitation end, of course, was exclusively
10 military. Headley Court, it was only military people
11 who were there, in terms of rehabilitation, but of
12 course, that was the good bit of what we were doing, so,
13 therefore, it wasn't criticised. It was only the bad
14 bit that came under -- probably correctly -- the
15 critical scrutiny.
16 So again, perhaps similar to previous answers I have
17 given, we had to learn as we went along, and yet, it was
18 not unique. We had been treating injured personnel in
19 that -- in those facilities. It was because of Iraq,
20 because there was a hostility to what we were doing in
21 Iraq, so, therefore, we were uncaring, we were
22 indifferent. No, we weren't. We were actually learning
23 how better to do it --
24 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: When you left, were there still
25 specific improvements you felt needed to be made?

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1 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: It wasn't my immediate responsibility.
2 It was the Parliamentary Undersecretary of State who had
3 direct responsibility in that but, again, all ministers
4 took a very close interest. We all carried out visits,
5 we spoke to families, we spoke to patients as well.
6 I remember having quite heated discussions with one
7 or two of the patients about why they were -- I remember
8 one boy, who had lost his sight, saying why was
9 there not a specialist in theatre who could have treated
10 his eyes. I said "You go to other bits of the
11 United Kingdom and you will find there are not eye
12 specialists anywhere else".
13 Finding an eye specialist is quite difficult. We
14 may want it, but you can't necessarily get people to
15 join up to do it. So there were going to be gaps in
16 what we did, because the military is a voluntary
17 obligation, or a voluntary decision, and if specialists
18 do not join, if the neurosurgeons don't join or the limb
19 specialists don't join, we then have a problem.
20 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. I'll turn to Baroness Prashar.
21 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Thank you.
22 A number of families expressed concern that the
23 lessons identified in inquiries that followed upon
24 fatality were not learned or applied in order to prevent
25 others.

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1 Was there a system in place to ensure that lessons
2 were learned and applied in order to prevent repeat
3 occurrences?
4 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: Yes, I think part of the weakness and
5 part of the justified criticism, although it was hard to
6 remedy the criticism, was the length of time it took to
7 learn the lesson.
8 The Boards of Inquiry would be established, what
9 actually happened. You then charge very capable people
10 to look at an event. They then discover other aspects
11 to the event. They then discover more. It becomes like
12 a multi-layered onion, and then attribution of blame, if
13 necessary, courts martial came into all of this --
14 potential courts martial came into all of this. Were
15 there systemic failures? Was it equipment failures?
16 Was it people failures? Was it training failures?
17 So what looked like a simple incident which had
18 resulted in a tragedy could have many aspects to it and
19 Boards of Inquiries then could take an inordinate amount
20 of time, and then we had the coroner's inquest as well,
21 which then would probe other aspects or similar aspects
22 in a different way.
23 That was terrible for families. How do we fix it?
24 How do you establish the truth so you learn the proper
25 lesson so you do the proper fix?

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1 I have got to say there are times when you can't fix
2 the problem. If it has been an accidental discharge by
3 someone who kills a colleague, how do you stop that?
4 But you have to probe that, you have to find out: was
5 there anything else in there? But you will not stop
6 fatalities in war. It was part of the hard lesson we
7 had -- the hard reality we had to deal with. But how do
8 you minimise it?
9 Friendly fire was a very good example in all of
10 that. We could put blue-on-blue incidents, as they were
11 known as, you could put any amount of technical systems
12 in place, you could learn there was a failure in
13 identification systems. Human mistakes still occur.
14 The pilot of an aircraft may still press that trigger.
15 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: I mean, was it a question that
16 lessons were learned but there were difficulties in
17 applying them, or was it that the department was
18 approaching these cases on a case-by-case basis without
19 really referring to the overall --
20 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: I think there were two things. I think
21 what did happen would be that -- again, military
22 commanders had a huge amount of knowledge and expertise
23 and, if they, before a Board of Inquiry came to
24 a conclusion, or even the coroner's inquest, they may
25 say something needs to be done and they would do it.

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1 If it was a case of failing in training or whatever
2 else, they would do it. They would pick up very quickly
3 on that. So there was a kind of self-remedy,
4 self-remedial process, that would -- but you would need
5 to take more expert advice on that from military
6 commanders, as to what they could and wouldn't do in
7 those circumstances.
8 Military commanders operate on the basis of
9 110 per cent and more duty of care their people and, if
10 something happens which results in an unnecessary death,
11 then that weighs heavy. They have to find an answer to
12 it. Meanwhile, there is another process underway which
13 is the formal process, the Board of Inquiry, if it was
14 a particular type of fatality and, unquestionably, the
15 coroner's inquests.
16 So it was very difficult for families in those
17 circumstances, trying to explain to them the complexity
18 of all of that and, meanwhile, anything could be written
19 about that -- I don't want to keep going on about the
20 press, but the press just need to say what they believe
21 to be the case, which is not necessarily the truth.
22 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: It is not so much the press, but
23 what the families have said to us.
24 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: What I'm saying is, who feeds the
25 frenzy? It does tend to be the media. I'm not saying

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1 deliberately. I'm saying --
2 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: In this instance, it is not the
3 frenzy, it is the families who actually experience
4 inquiries and made comments to us that, in their view,
5 the lessons were not being learned. What you are
6 explaining to me is the complexity of it.
7 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: I think we -- there needs to be an
8 evidential base to make, and we need to know what it was
9 a particular family was saying as to what lesson was not
10 learned.
11 I think in an earlier comment I said you may
12 establish facts, but you cannot necessarily fix the
13 problem, and it may -- it may not just be human, it may
14 actually be mechanical or equipment-based or whatever
15 else. There isn't a solution to it; ie, a rifle
16 jamming, a piece of equipment jamming, or an
17 involuntary -- you know, delivery of a charge-out of
18 a weapon because of some mechanical weakness in it that
19 only occurs very, very infrequently.
20 So I would need to know precisely what the complaint
21 was and that is what we did. We would take every
22 family's concern and -- I make this point -- the
23 Secretary of State, myself and others, we would meet the
24 families, we had to share as best we could some of that
25 pain and we had to take a lot of criticism and try to

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1 best explain it, and that would happen with the military
2 as well in terms of the family support, the visiting
3 officers, those who were charged by the military to
4 carry out that interface with families and remembering
5 those people are not trained counsellors. Okay?
6 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Martin?
7 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: During your visits to Iraq, did
8 soldiers on the ground express to you their concerns
9 about the level of protection the Snatch Land Rover was
10 offering against IEDs?
11 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: To be honest, I don't remember that
12 ever being said to me as a result of a visit but I was
13 aware of what was that concern. Snatch Land Rovers were
14 still being used and they will be in use after we are
15 out of Afghanistan and after we are out of Iraq
16 because -- and I think we have heard the evidence --
17 they had a specific utility. You cannot take heavily
18 armoured vehicles into a built-up -- closely built-up
19 areas, and that was brought home to me by an Afghan
20 friend, who said to me, when I was visiting Afghanistan,
21 about the Germans: he said, "The difference between you,
22 the British, and the Germans is that you take risks to
23 meet us and talk to us. The Germans sit in their
24 heavily armoured vehicles and the people of Kabul think
25 the Russians have returned."

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1 So how do you win hearts and minds. You have to
2 take risks and as the threat changed, it was quite clear
3 that commanders on the ground realised that they needed
4 a different type of response. But in many ways that has
5 to be driven by the military imperative: What do the
6 professionals actually want, and then can we deliver?
7 And again I think the amount of effort that was thrown
8 into delivering armoured vehicles -- and even as we did
9 that, some of them were found not to have proper
10 efficacy: their axles kept breaking, they were not
11 properly up-armoured for the new threat. So you could
12 put a new piece of equipment in and it could be taken
13 out by a new threat.
14 The other aspect that we see to this is, it doesn't
15 matter how armoured the vehicle is, if you can get that
16 soldier dismounted and shoot him, then that's the type
17 of insurgency that we are dealing with. They can move
18 quickly, we have to move slowly because we have to build
19 up our protection, and we can't deliver it as quickly
20 overnight as they can change their tactics.
21 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Thank you very much.
22 THE CHAIRMAN: I would like to spend a little time on the
23 use of reserve forces. So, Lawrence?
24 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Yes. There were concerns, as you
25 know, about the 14 days' notice to report that some

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1 reservists had for Telic 1. Could you start by just
2 explaining how this situation had arisen and the lessons
3 that were learned from the experience with Telic 1?
4 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: In terms of the notice to --
5 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Reservists.
6 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: The notice given to reservists?
7 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Yes, to report.
8 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: I don't know if this answers the
9 question, but in the build-up to Telic 1 we had --
10 I can't remember the figures off the top of my head but
11 it was, I think, something like -- I may actually have
12 the figures. But there was notice put out to --
13 although I probably won't be able to find it quickly.
14 There was 14,500 notices -- no, I apologise, there were
15 14,500 reservists used during the whole campaign.
16 I thought I had the figures on that.
17 But there was a number of thousand of notices sent
18 out. I think it was 3,500 army, 500 navy and something
19 equivalent in the RAF, and the notices which were sent
20 out, they were always going to be substantially greater
21 than the ones who would actually be used because of
22 a whole lot of reasons why people would then not be
23 suitable, either (inaudible) their own family or
24 circumstances or whatever, or whether they were not fit
25 to be deployed. So you had to put a greater demand out

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than you were going to use, a bit like the number of people you recruit and the number of people you actually get into the training environment. It is always greater because of the failure rate.

We would put a lot of effort into the reserves because they were absolutely essential to what we were trying to do. I think I'm maybe repeating the same explanation, that we learned as we went along a bit in this, because again we had never sought to test the conclusions of the strategic defence review up until the point of Saif Sareea, and then that was overtaken by events, ie the real events of Afghanistan and Iraq.

Also in terms of -- the aftercare package for reserves was not good. There were good reasons for that sometimes because they are individuals, they don't have a family -- they don't have a regimental home to go to; they go back into their civilian life.

All of that changed as well. We put in place very early on the whole reserves mounting and training exercise. They went through the same pipeline as regulars, so that they were integrated in pre-deployment as well as at the time of deployment.

In term of notice of callout, again I would have to check this but I think we were constrained by law in all of this. I think there was a kind of legal format to

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1 that, you know, in terms of the notice of callout
2 because there was also legal protection for those in
3 terms of the demand placed upon them.
4 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Out of all this learning, was that
5 the concept of intelligent mobilisation? Can you
6 explain what this concept is and how it was applied?
7 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: I have never heard the phrase but I can
8 understand why someone would use it.
9 Yes, well, that's what the military does; it tries
10 to operate in an intelligent way, and there is no
11 point -- other than you have to mobilise almost
12 instantly because the threat is at the gate and you do
13 not have time to put other processes in place, then you
14 should do it as intelligent a way as possible, ie to
15 minimise the friction. The worst type of soldier is the
16 unhappy soldier, surely, and therefore it doesn't matter
17 whether that person is a regular or a reservist, they
18 should be treated properly as they are mobilised.
19 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Lastly, Bob Ainsworth mentioned
20 a review of reserve forces which would have been ongoing
21 in the latter part of your time as Minister of Armed
22 Forces. Could you tell us about this review and its key
23 findings?
24 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: I think there was an earlier review as
25 well and that was about the re- -- in some ways the

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1 rebrigading of the reserve component, mainly the army
2 component but not exclusively so.
3 It was about the utilisation of the reserves and the
4 closer integration of the reserves with their regional
5 or local regimental structure.
6 Going back to an earlier comment, I think part of
7 the military mindset was: the reservists are just not up
8 to it; we are getting people who we have got to over
9 man-manage.
10 But very quickly the experience told people that
11 that was not the case. One, they were tremendous,
12 enthusiastic people. They did need better training and
13 there were problems about choking off a lot of the
14 training days for the reservists because of resources,
15 an insufficiency of resources, which caused problems.
16 So review was looking at all of those lessons to be
17 learned. How do you make the reserves better focused,
18 greater utility and more rapid utility and therefore
19 instant capability in those circumstances?
20 So the weekend soldier, which had happened, and was
21 experienced during, a bit unfairly, I think -- that
22 comment would be applied during the Cold War period --
23 had in principle been written out in terms of the SDR,
24 had never been tested, was beginning to be tested, when
25 along came reality, and then intelligent mobilisation

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1 then would have come into play.
2 What have we done wrong here? And pre-deployment
3 training would be one of them, the early integration,
4 and then back -- in terms of the permanent interface
5 between regular and reserve when they were not active
6 there had to be greater integration. So that meant
7 reductions, it meant a whole new structure coming into
8 play, and I think during my time, where we did one major
9 restructuring of the reserves, almost universal
10 acceptance of what we delivered, not because of what
11 I had done but because of the intensity of effort from
12 the reserve part of the Ministry of Defence, the effort
13 they put in in consultation, explanation and
14 justification for the changes.
15 Normally, in the House of Commons, when a defence
16 minister announced something, there was an army against
17 you. On reserves there was a pip squeak because of the
18 work that the reserves and the Ministry of Defence had
19 put into getting it right, and the same was happening
20 with the second iteration.
21 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Just finally on the question of the
22 reserves, because of Iraq and also Afghanistan, we have
23 seen a far greater use of reserves in operations.
24 I just wonder your views on the significance of this,
25 including the relationship between the armed forces and

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1 the wider society. Do you see them as having more sort
2 of a bridging role, in addition to their actual
3 functional role, with a greater degree of integration?
4 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: I'm a wee bit away from that now. I'm
5 three years away from it now. It is clearly something
6 that the new review of the defence lay-down in this
7 country will have to attend to. We cannot deliver the
8 regular strength that we could in previous decades.
9 I inherited a notional figure in the SDR of 108,500.
10 We never met it. We were always about 6,000 to 7,000
11 short. The reality was the regular strength should have
12 been about 102,000. We almost got to optimum manning at
13 104,000 but we could not have gone into conflict, into
14 even medium-scale or beyond that, without the reserves,
15 the 30,000-odd reserve component.
16 And why? Because they deliver specialisms, they
17 were the comms people, they were the medics, they were
18 the engineers, they were the intelligent corps, they
19 were the very areas where we had problems in recruiting
20 in the regulars.
21 So, whether it is bridging or whether it is
22 integrated, there were fundamental changes over my
23 period. I think we will see more development in that
24 area -- would be my guess in this.
25 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Okay, thank you.

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1 THE CHAIRMAN: I would like to invite any general
2 reflections on the lessons from Iraq in just a moment
3 but I think, Roderic, you have got just one you want to
4 take.
5 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Bob Ainsworth told us that, with respect
6 to bereaved families, we simply weren't getting it right
7 and we met representatives of these families and they
8 too have been critical, including about the difficulties
9 they had getting information about what had happened to
10 their relatives who had died in the conflict.
11 What would your response be to that?
12 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: I mean, I think I have accepted that we
13 were not getting things right. I think at the early
14 stages that there was a mismatch between expectation and
15 delivery, and I have tried to explain some of the
16 reasons for that. But did we quickly, certainly within
17 MoD terms, change, maybe not quickly in terms of family
18 perception, change? I think we did.
19 Could we have predicted this? And I do repeat this
20 point: this was not the first time we had had
21 fatalities. It goes back to this mindset. 700 soldiers
22 had died in 38 years, I think is the figure or
23 thereabouts, in Northern Ireland.
24 Why did that not manifest itself? And therefore it
25 wasn't a case of people sleeping on the job or being

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1 indifferent, it is because something changed, and what
2 changed was the intensity of scrutiny that was going on
3 into that particular conflict and is now going on into
4 the conflict in Afghanistan.
5 We are in a different world now, is my assessment,
6 and that means fundamental change in understanding and
7 even to the extent of trying to predict it as best you
8 can, but certainly, if you can't, in delivery. If you
9 are getting it wrong, identify the problem and fix it.
10 There was another issue, of course, with families
11 and that was that if you conceded failings, we are in
12 a compensation culture as well and therefore you could
13 have a lawyer saying, "Be careful in your wording here,"
14 because there is another element to this and I give the
15 benefit of my experience as -- we established the
16 position of Victims Minister in Northern Ireland to deal
17 with the legacy in Northern Ireland and I was able to
18 use some of that experience in my role as Minister for
19 the Armed Forces.
20 But the ownership of grief is not unanimous within
21 a family. There are tensions. And you can have the
22 long-term partner wanting one thing in terms of the
23 grief and the mother of the lost son wanting something
24 else, and you can have splits between husbands, fathers
25 and mothers about what should happen. Some want to move

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1 on, some want more answers.
2 That creates unbelievable pressures on those who are
3 trying to deal with all of that, and sitting alongside
4 that is then the compensation culture, and the legal
5 process out there, the ambulance chasers, as they are
6 known as, going out trying to find cause to, in a sense,
7 exploit the grief.
8 I may sound hard and harsh in all of this but my
9 experience tells me that it is very wearing on ministers
10 and those who have the interface with the grieving
11 family. They are not trained to do that. Ministers are
12 not trained to be counsellors, they are trained to be
13 something else, and yet the expectation is they then
14 have to meet all those families, and that is not
15 difficult -- sorry, that is very difficult when you are
16 being accused of causing the death. And the same
17 applies, I would suggest, to -- in some cases, to
18 visiting officers as well.
19 So I'm saying that this is very -- again, I'm
20 repeating the point: it is in one way easy to make the
21 accusation, much more difficult to deliver a solution.
22 SIR RODERIC LYNE: In a word are you saying that the
23 compensation culture led to this lack of transparency
24 about circumstances --
25 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: I'm not saying it was the single

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1 motivation. I mean, I gave it as an example. It could
2 well be there. I don't want to sort of highlight
3 individual cases, of which there have been some quite
4 intensive inquiry -- into which there have been some
5 intensive inquiries. But, until the inquiry comes to
6 a conclusion -- and I'm not talking about this one but
7 we can think of others where there have been inquiries
8 into events -- the demand is still out there for answers
9 from the ministers, from the Ministry of Defence, before
10 there is a conclusion. So you have to hold off and if
11 you say something wrong or go over a line, you create
12 another crisis in the handling of all of that.
13 We now have an inquiry culture. It is as simple as
14 that, and I do pay tribute to all that you have been
15 trying to do.
16 THE CHAIRMAN: I don't want to prolong it but there was one
17 strand in all our meetings with the bereaved families
18 that did come through, which was that there was
19 a feeling that when someone was a victim of a friendly
20 fire incident, the defensive barriers were higher and
21 more difficult to get through in terms of information,
22 whatever. I don't know whether that was the experience
23 of ministers in the MoD.
24 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: Yes. I think I kind of alluded to that
25 slightly in terms of the complexity of friendly fire,

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1 and it could be the negligent discharge of a weapon, and
2 the instinct of the military family is to do the
3 wraparound -- the person who did that -- as much as trying
4 to, as best they can, look after the after-effect, and,
5 I mean, I don't have a military background. As I say,
6 I kind of became a bit native, grew into it, over six
7 and a half years and began to understand the buddy-buddy
8 culture and the need to say, "We sort our own problems
9 out," and if you do too much, "You civilians, you
10 ministers, you commentators, you destroy centuries of
11 tradition."
12 I really genuinely think that the military mindset
13 has changed dramatically in my time because of the
14 experience, and all credit to them. They are some --
15 they are the best people around in our society, I would
16 guess -- apart maybe from diplomats.
17 SIR RODERIC LYNE: He isn't one.
18 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: He isn't one? No.
19 THE CHAIRMAN: I don't know if you want to add further
20 reflections because you had such a long period of direct
21 experience and responsibility from the Iraq enterprise.
22 RT HON ADAM INGRAM: Well, I mean, I remain an
23 unreconstructed supporter of what we did, the liberal
24 intervention. I pose a question: was it right to do so?
25 My answer to that would be yes. You have to, at all

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1 times, question your judgment and your conscience.
2 I have never deviated from it. Is Iraq a better place
3 because of what we did? My answer to that would be yes.
4 Who delivered that? I would say the brave men and women
5 of Her Majesty's armed forces. Did they make
6 a difference? Yes, they have. Are Iraqis living in
7 peace and potential democratic future for them? Yes,
8 they are, because of the sacrifice and because they made
9 a difference. And alongside that would be all of the
10 civilians, who tend to be forgotten, many of whom also
11 put their lives on a similar line in taking risks on
12 behalf of that fundamental change.
13 So I mean, I just -- you wouldn't expect otherwise,
14 but I pay genuine and sincere tribute to the members of
15 Her Majesty' armed forces and those who serve within the
16 Ministry of Defence and it was a privilege to have been
17 able to be a minister for six and a half years with
18 them.
19 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much. I thank our witness,
20 Rt Hon Adam Ingram.
21 We resume at 3 pm on Monday next, when we are going
22 to hear evidence from Vice-Admiral Peter Wilkinson,
23 Air Marshal David Pocock and Lt Gen Mark Mans, who held
24 senior roles relating to military personnel from 2005
25 through to the end of the campaign in Iraq.

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1 With that, I'll close the session.

2 (1.17 pm)

3 (The Inquiry adjourned until Monday 19 July 2010 at 3.00 pm)

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