Tuesday, 6 July 2010

(10.00 am)

MR ANDY BEARPARK

THE CHAIRMAN: Good morning. In fact, good morning and welcome.

ANDY BEARPARK: Thank you.

THE CHAIRMAN: I will open this session. We will be hearing from Andy Bearpark. You were the CPA Director of Operations and Director of Operations and Infrastructure between June 2003 and July 2004 at the end of the CPA.

Andy Bearpark has provided us with a statement, which is now up on our website, and we are grateful for that.

I say on every occasion we recognise that witnesses give evidence based on their recollection of events and we, of course, check what we hear against the papers to which we have access and which we are still receiving and I remind each witness on each occasion that they will later be asked to sign a transcript of evidence to the effect that the evidence given is truthful, fair and accurate.

Without more ado, I'll ask Baroness Prashar to open the questions.

BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Thank you, Chairman.

Mr Bearpark, I want to start by establishing what

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1 you were sent to Iraq to do. I have read your statement
2 and in your statement you say that:
3 "Detailed terms of reference were prepared, but
4 these were not agreed or, I suspect, even seen by
5 Mr Bremer."
6 Why was that the case?
7 ANDY BEARPARK: There were two reasons: one an issue of
8 policy, and the other one an issue of process.
9 The issue of policy would be that, entirely
10 understandably, nobody knew exactly what could be done,
11 the situation was sufficiently chaotic, and when you are
12 talking about the jobs at the top of an organisation,
13 detailed terms of reference in a sense can't be written.
14 We could write terms of reference for a junior civil
15 servant. Writing terms of reference for
16 a Prime Minister would be infinitely more difficult.
17 I don't equate myself to a Prime Minister, but what
18 I mean is that a job at that level very rarely has
19 substantive terms of reference. The job I had done
20 previously in Kosovo had no terms of reference at all
21 so, in policy terms, that's a perfectly understandable
22 thing.
23 In process terms, the issue was quite simply,
24 I think, that Jerry Bremer's office in Baghdad was
25 simply not staffed at that stage to take that sort of

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1 decision. There was no -- what one thinks of a British
2 private office, where it is perfectly simple: the papers
3 go in the red box at night and the minister deals with
4 them overnight. That sort of system, at that stage, had
5 not been established in Baghdad.
6 So I don't know, but I'm very happy to guess that
7 John Sawers may have walked into Jerry's room and said
8 "Here are some terms of reference", and I'm equally
9 certain that Jerry would have said "Fine" and started
10 talking about something far more important.
11 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: What was your understanding that you
12 were being asked to do? I mean, what were you told that
13 you were required to do by the UK Government?
14 ANDY BEARPARK: There were two separate, specific angles to
15 that. The first one was that I was initially asked if
16 I would go out as Ambassador Bremer's deputy, and the
17 way it was put to me was very, very simple, that, under
18 the ORHA system, there had been an American, Jay Garner,
19 in charge, and there had been a British deputy
20 Tim Cross. Jerry Bremer and the CPA had replaced
21 Jay Garner and ORHA and, therefore, the British
22 Civil Service machine thought it totally logical that
23 there should be a new British deputy working for Bremer.
24 So that was part one of the equation. But part two of
25 the equation was that it was made very clear to me, and

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1 very acceptably clear, that this was not going to be
2 a political job, that there would be somebody else in
3 the system at that stage, John Sawers himself, later
4 Jeremy Greenstock, who would be dealing with the
5 politics and, therefore, I would be expected to
6 concentrate on what is my professional background
7 anyway, which is economic reconstruction and physical
8 reconstruction.
9 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: But did you sense that what was
10 expected of you by the UK Government was different to
11 what Jerry Bremer wanted you to do?
12 ANDY BEARPARK: The only difference between the two that
13 I detected was that the British Government would have
14 preferred to have a clearly-defined deputy role. They
15 would have preferred it if I was the deputy
16 administrator. This was never going to be acceptable to
17 Jerry. So, to that extent, there was a difference
18 between the two, but in terms of what I was being
19 expected to do on a day-by-day, week-by-week basis, no,
20 I didn't detect any difference.
21 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: But your title was amended from
22 Director of Operations to Director of Operations and
23 Infrastructure. Why was that the case?
24 ANDY BEARPARK: When I met Bremer in Basra in May 2003, he
25 asked if I would be the Director of Operations, but

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1 I don't think that's the actual title he used. My
2 recollection of the conversation is that he explained to
3 me why he didn't feel able to accept a deputy and said
4 "That doesn't matter, Andy, what I want you to do is
5 like being like a chief operations officer in a private
6 company". So that comment from Bremer got translated
7 through into the job title, Director of Operations.
8 About a week after I had been in Iraq, he asked if
9 I would take over responsibility, although, in CPA
10 terms, "responsibility" is a difficult word to use, but
11 he asked if I would take over responsibility for all the
12 infrastructure ministries with the exception of the
13 Ministry of Oil and that is when my title was amended to
14 Director of Operations and Infrastructure.
15 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: What did that mean in practice,
16 taking responsibility for all the ministries other than
17 the oil one?
18 ANDY BEARPARK: What it meant was being notionally in charge
19 of them but without power. So what it meant was that,
20 if anybody had cared to draw an organogram, my name
21 would have appeared in a box above those infrastructure
22 ministries but, in power terms, I had no direct power
23 over them, because the people who were appointed as the
24 heads of those CPA ministries were appointed by DoD in
25 Washington and considered themselves in some cases to

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1 have direct reporting lines to Ambassador Bremer anyway,
2 but in other cases to have direct reporting lines back
3 to Washington.
4 So, as I say, in simple organogram terms, it would
5 have looked very, very easy indeed, but in terms of
6 authority and power, the authority and power that I had
7 was of my own making, not by virtue of that title.
8 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: So you had the freedom to define
9 your own space in terms of what you wanted to do in
10 relation to that?
11 ANDY BEARPARK: Absolutely.
12 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: I will come back to that. What were
13 your specific responsibilities regarding the management
14 of finance and staff within the CPA?
15 ANDY BEARPARK: Within the CPA, I was -- I was responsible
16 for an enormous number of people in different ways, if
17 I may explain. I had an immediate office of around
18 6 or 7, which would be the equivalent of a British
19 private office. I then had what in some senses one
20 could think of as a department of about -- it varied
21 between 10 and 50 people, who reported to me for various
22 reasons at various times within the CPA building in
23 Baghdad.
24 But then I had operational responsibility for the
25 regional and field offices. Now, that would be the

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1 figure that comes up to easily 600/700, towards the end,
2 of people dotted around through the Iraq.
3 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: So what was the relationship with
4 Hilary Synnott and other British members of the CPA
5 outside Baghdad?
6 ANDY BEARPARK: There is a big difference between CPA Basra,
7 which was Hilary's organisation, and the other regional
8 CPAs, because CPA Basra was British and was run in
9 a particular way, but in terms of the theory of CPA's
10 management, if not the practice, I would have been
11 responsible for the operational side of CPA Basra; in
12 other words, looking after the staffing, looking after
13 the food, looking after the money flows, et cetera.
14 In reality, it was different, because it was run as
15 a British operation, but in theory those were the things
16 I was responsible for in the regional and field offices,
17 with the very clear distinction being that I was not
18 responsible for political, governmental policy; that was
19 dealt with by a different part of the CPA.
20 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: What about Hilary Synnott? Did he
21 report to you? How did that relationship work?
22 ANDY BEARPARK: Hilary would have had three separate
23 reporting lines. He would have reported to the
24 United Kingdom because he was a British appointee in
25 a British area. The second straightforward reporting

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1 line would be that he would report directly to
2 Ambassador Bremer, as a CPA regional coordinator in
3 Iraq, with Bremer being the administrator.
4 But then, I would hesitate to say that he ever
5 reported to me, but there was a third reporting line in
6 the sense that I was the one who could approve money
7 that he might want at certain stages. So in that sense,
8 he had a tripartite reporting line, but I would venture
9 to say that my part in it was minuscule and,
10 effectively, in real life, he had two reporting lines;
11 one to Bremer and one to the United Kingdom.
12 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Can I now move on to the question of
13 your responsibilities for engaging the Iraqis, you know,
14 what did that entail?
15 ANDY BEARPARK: I had very, very limited responsibilities
16 with regard to engaging the Iraqis. In direct terms,
17 I probably had no responsibilities for engaging the
18 Iraqis. My job was to make a coalition, and by
19 "coalition" I mean American machine work. So to that
20 extent, everybody I was working with, everybody I was
21 seeking to influence, would be American or very
22 occasionally British.
23 The involvement I had with the Iraqi side of
24 things -- sorry, with Iraqis, as well as the Iraqi
25 machine, was that I was heavily involved in the

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allocation of resources, whether those resources be the direct resources of a ministry or ultimately the famous 18.6 billion supplemental. In that context, I viewed it as my job to try to ensure that the people working with those sums of money were speaking to Iraqis non-stop to ensure that it was Iraqi views that were influencing decisions that were made.

But I think, as an example, if I may, I probably had 100 meetings with the Iraqis from the Ministry of Electricity because I had to take a very specific interest in the supply of electricity, but if I took the Ministry of Transport, I honestly cannot recollect meeting a single Iraqi in the context of the Ministry of Transport.

BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: You said you were ensuring that. How were you ensuring that there was engagement with Iraqis?

ANDY BEARPARK: By continued -- if I used the word "ensure" I should have been more correct to say "attempt to ensure". But by cajoling, by persuading and by explaining to people who hadn't been involved in that sort of issue the importance of doing so, the fact that, if they made those decisions in isolation from the Iraqis, even though that would be a very easy and comfortable way of making the decision, it would

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1 ultimately prove fruitless, because what we were going
2 to try to do would simply not be achieved.
3 So I was continually trying to engage with the
4 decision-makers to say, "Look, there is no point in
5 preparing a plan for what you want to do in the
6 transport sector without talking to the Iraqis".
7 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Are you suggesting that there was
8 reluctance to engage or they didn't have the ability to
9 engage? Were there problems in terms of the engagement
10 with the Iraqis?
11 ANDY BEARPARK: There was a very distinct, practical problem
12 in terms of engaging with the Iraqis, and that is the
13 physical isolation of the CPA staff in Baghdad, who were
14 isolated within the Republican Palace within the
15 Green Zone. This worked in both directions. It was
16 very, very difficult for the CPA staff to move out of
17 the Green Zone and it was very, very difficult for the
18 Iraqis to move into the Green Zone. So even when the
19 best will in the world existed, that engagement would
20 have been very difficult.
21 But that best will in the world didn't exist on many
22 occasions, because it is always far easier to prepare
23 your plans without discussing them with anybody. That
24 means you are not having them criticised. If you just
25 sit down and decide what you are going to do without

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1 opening yourself to question, it is a phenomenally easy
2 job. So there was also a distinct reluctance on the
3 part of some people to engage with the Iraqis because
4 they knew that, if they did so, those assumptions would
5 be challenged and their entire raison d'etre would be
6 challenged.
7 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Okay. What about responsibilities
8 engaging with international organisations, you know,
9 because that was part of your remit as well?
10 ANDY BEARPARK: That was part of, if you like, the part of
11 the mood music of the -- my original engagement by DFID.
12 In reality, it was slightly different and the reason
13 for that was that, at about the time of my arrival, or
14 very shortly thereafter, there arrived another person
15 who had reason to believe he had been appointed as
16 a deputy and that was Marek Belka, the Polish former
17 Foreign Minister and now former Prime Minister, I think,
18 and, as part of the jockeying for position between the
19 "robber barons", as I used to describe them, Marek ended
20 up being in charge of something called the CIC, which
21 was the Coalition Information Centre, I think from
22 recollection, and so that meant, in formal organogram
23 terms, Marek had become the person who was responsible
24 for engaging with the rest of the international
25 community.

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1 In the reality of Baghdad, it wasn't quite like that
2 because an enormous number of members -- sorry, an
3 enormous percentage of members of the international
4 community were people I had worked with before anyway.
5 So, if you like, there was no competition of any
6 description between Marek and myself, but the reality is
7 that he was running a formalised machine and I was
8 running an informal network.
9 So if, for instance, a World Bank mission arrived in
10 town, they would automatically make an appointment to go
11 and see Marek, but they would equally automatically turn
12 up in the canteen to see if I was having a cup of coffee
13 there so we could have a chat about what was going on.
14 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Can I just move on to look at the
15 reporting lines? You touched on them, but you say in
16 your statement that you were instructed by the Secretary
17 of State to get there as soon as possible and do what
18 you could do on the ground.
19 Did you receive any instructions from the Secretary
20 of State for an assignment or were you just left to get
21 on with the job?
22 ANDY BEARPARK: No, I had one meeting -- I had a number of
23 meetings with more junior DFID officials to sort out
24 modalities, et cetera, but I just had one substantive
25 meeting which was attended by the Secretary of State --

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1 at that stage, Valerie Amos -- and by the
2 Permanent Secretary Sir Suma Chakrabarti and others and,
3 if you like, that was the defining briefing moment.
4 So that was -- it wasn't a particularly long
5 meeting, I'm sure it was at least 30 minutes or maybe 45
6 or whatever, and the very straightforward instruction
7 I had was "Look, Andy, it is chaos out there. Nobody
8 has the faintest idea of what's going on", and I think
9 the exact words I remember were, "We know you have got
10 sharp elbows when you need to. Go out there and use
11 them and see what happens", and that was the brief.
12 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: You were seconded to CPA where you
13 reported to Jim Drummond but owed your allegiance with
14 the organisation. Is that --
15 ANDY BEARPARK: That's right. Because I was being paid by
16 DFID, I think the Civil Service rules would require that
17 I had a sort of Civil Service master in the UK, so to
18 that extent Jim Drummond --
19 THE CHAIRMAN: Sorry, could you go just a bit slower?
20 ANDY BEARPARK: Of course, my apologies.
21 As I say, the Civil Service would require that there
22 was somebody whom I technically reported to. I honestly
23 can't remember who that was in the early stages because,
24 glancing at some of the papers, I see that Jim didn't
25 come back from the Cabinet Office until later on in

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1 2003, so there must have been somebody before, but
2 I honestly don't know who. But that was, as far as
3 I was concerned, a purely notional reporting line.
4 Bremer was my boss and he knew that.
5 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Were you aware or conscious of the
6 UK's obligations as an occupying power during that
7 period and did that inhibit what you did on the ground?
8 ANDY BEARPARK: I was certainly aware of that and I was very
9 specifically given a document to read about that on the
10 plane on the way out there. So I was aware that Britain
11 did have responsibilities.
12 It very rarely impinged upon my actual activities.
13 In fact, I can only remember two ways in which it
14 impinged upon my activities. The first one was when
15 parts of CPA looked to me to be about to do things
16 which, in my view, as a non-lawyer, were completely
17 outside what you were allowed to do as an occupying
18 power, and I suppose the obvious one there would be the
19 privatisation of everything that ever moved in Iraq,
20 which was the ambition of one official and it did seem
21 to me that that was outside. So I merely, if you like,
22 reported that concern to the lawyers who were involved
23 and I had done my job.
24 The only other time that it impinged upon my
25 existence -- in a very nice way, not in

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1 a confrontational way -- was in the debate with the
2 field officers, and the field officers, including CPA
3 South, were, in my view, tending to breach those rules
4 by wanting to get too involved in long-term development
5 issues.
6 My interpretation of the rules was that our job was
7 to, if you like, administer on a caretaker basis, and
8 the example I always gave was that, in the education
9 field, it was absolutely right and proper that we should
10 ensure that the teachers were paid and the schools were
11 open. In my view, it was absolutely clear as well that
12 it was not for us, as a CPA, to try to change the system
13 from three terms a year to four. It struck me that that
14 was entirely outside the rules for an occupying power.
15 So in that sense, I was conscious of it, I was aware
16 of it and, as I say, to that extent it did impinge upon
17 what I was doing but not in any major way.
18 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: That didn't cause any tension
19 between your and Jerry Bremer's relationship? I mean,
20 were the Americans conscious of the rules, as an
21 occupying power, or were there different perspectives?
22 ANDY BEARPARK: I think that, of the Americans within the
23 CPA in Baghdad, people like Jerry Bremer would certainly
24 have been very aware of those rules. Whether they felt
25 obliged to follow them would be a different question and

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1 one that I wouldn't be competent to answer, of course.
2 Equally, I would say that, at one level down from
3 Jerry Bremer, there were a remarkable number of people
4 who had never even heard of the rules of occupying
5 powers and, even if they had heard of them, couldn't
6 have cared a jot what they said.
7 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: My final question is: what was your
8 formal relationship with Jerry Bremer and
9 Sir Jeremy Greenstock?
10 ANDY BEARPARK: With regard to Jerry Bremer, my position was
11 absolutely straightforward. On arrival, I reported
12 directly to him, as the Director of Operations and
13 Infrastructure. At a certain period in November 2003,
14 the two posts of chief operating officer and chief
15 policy officer were created at the request of the
16 Pentagon. Now, at that stage, I technically reported
17 through the chief operating officer to Jerry Bremer.
18 In reality, as I believe I have said, Jerry told me
19 to carry on reporting to him and, as I say, the issue
20 fell away, in that the chief operating officers never
21 really existed anyway.
22 As regards Jeremy Greenstock, I had no reporting
23 lines with Jeremy whatsoever. There was a very clear
24 and clearly understood division of labour, if you like,
25 in that I had been given by the British Government to

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1 the CPA, but my allegiance was meant to be 100 per cent
2 to the CPA and it was very important that I demonstrated
3 that allegiance every single day.
4 I would normally start every meeting by saying
5 "I may have a funny British accent, but I'm actually
6 American. My only boss is Jerry Bremer". Whereas
7 Jeremy Greenstock had a very, very clear position, in
8 that he was -- I honestly don't know the technical
9 title. In my view, he was the Prime Minister's special
10 representative, but whether he was actually was the
11 Prime Minister's special representative or just
12 a special representative for the UK was not an issue to
13 me, but it seemed to me that there was a very, very
14 clear distinction and a distinction that I have no
15 problem with.
16 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: So what you are really saying is
17 that to keep the confidence of the Americans, you had to
18 constantly kind of affirm the fact that your allegiance
19 has was purely to the CPA?
20 ANDY BEARPARK: Very much so.
21 THE CHAIRMAN: I'll turn to Sir Martin Gilbert.
22 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: I would like to ask a few questions
23 about CPA strategy objectives. We understand that the
24 CPA strategy was developed in July 2003. Could you tell
25 us what your role was in developing it?

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1 ANDY BEARPARK: In the very initial stages of the end
2 of June 2003 I had an involvement in the establishment
3 of the mechanism that would develop the strategy. In
4 other words, I was involved with the creation of what
5 I think was called the Strategic Planning Unit, I think
6 it was called the SPU, but I can't remember the detail.
7 I was involved in its creation. I was involved in
8 ensuring that it could exist but, once I had done that,
9 there was -- there was a quick power struggle and
10 whereas, at one stage, I thought of arguing that
11 I should control this as well, because of a number of
12 other battles that I had won at that time, it seemed to
13 me that that might be a bridge too far and so I agreed
14 that it did not need to report through me but could
15 report directly to Ambassador Bremer in his office.
16 So by July, that unit had come into existence and,
17 at that stage, my role reverted or became one of trying
18 to facilitate what they were doing, rather than control
19 what they were doing. So they were based just down the
20 corridor from me, perhaps no more than six doors away.
21 I would see them every single day. I would go and chat
22 with them every few days, whatever, but my role was
23 a facilitating role, not a directing role.
24 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Did you have any discussions on this
25 with Sir Jeremy or with London as an area of sort of

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1 inner discussion between you?
2 ANDY BEARPARK: From my memory, I cannot recollect
3 discussing it with Jeremy at all and I would actually
4 question whether that would have been possible, because
5 I can't remember when Jeremy arrived, but I thought
6 Jeremy didn't arrive until August, but my recollection
7 may be wrong. But certainly Jeremy didn't arrive until
8 a bit later in the process, so he wouldn't have been
9 there to discuss with him at that stage.
10 I do recollect discussing with officials in London
11 because they expressed an interest; they, like everybody, had
12 remarked upon the fact that CPA had no plan. This
13 wasn't a secret, and so they were curious, I think, more
14 than concerned, as to what CPA was doing about the fact
15 that it didn't have a plan. So they were suitably
16 curious about what was happening over the creation of
17 the Strategic Planning Unit.
18 So I don't have any detailed recollection of the
19 discussions, but I can recollect it being a topic of
20 discussion.
21 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: As well as concern, some input on
22 particular aspects, did they make?
23 ANDY BEARPARK: I'm not aware of any input that London made,
24 which is not to say there wasn't an input, but it
25 certainly did not register with me.

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1 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Based on your knowledge of Iraq at that
2 time, how realistic do you think the objectives were,
3 specifically in the areas of infrastructure and
4 employment, and also, of course, security sector reform?
5 ANDY BEARPARK: I think that the objectives were
6 unrealistic. I thought they were unrealistic at the
7 time and, with hindsight, I would certainly say they
8 were unrealistic, but I would question whether they
9 could really have been any better at the time. The
10 Strategic Planning Unit was a distinctly under-resourced
11 unit, as were most parts of the CPA. It was operating
12 with a very limited ability to engage with Iraqis,
13 I don't think there was an Arabic speaker in it, and it
14 was operating with a distinctly limited knowledge base
15 from which it could work.
16 So I think it was not in the least bit surprising
17 that substantial parts of it were overly optimistic. To
18 the extent that I recognised that at the time more than
19 some others, that was purely a function of experience.
20 I had seen these plans in Bosnia, I had seen these plans
21 in Kosovo and, as a rough rule of thumb, one could argue
22 that only 10 per cent will ever be achieved. So
23 in July 2003, why would I think differently then?
24 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: You have mentioned the Green Zone.
25 Perhaps, in that context, could you tell us to what

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1 extent, in order to inform its objectives -- what was
2 the CPA able to do to, as it were, engage with the
3 realities of Iraq outside the Green Zone?
4 ANDY BEARPARK: Very, very little. Even when I arrived
5 in June 2003, the security situation was not totally
6 benign. But at that period, June/July 2003, the problem
7 was not so much the slight absence of security, but the
8 fact that, because or as a result of CPA's being
9 dysfunctional, very few people within the CPA knew how
10 to access the resources that would enable them to move
11 out of the Green Zone and, to the extent that they did
12 know how to do that, it wouldn't have helped them
13 any way, because the official system that existed didn't
14 work and, therefore, if they were ignorant of it, they
15 were probably quite happy and, if they did know what it
16 was, they might try and they would fail.
17 But it meant that, for officials within the
18 Green Zone, to travel outside was very, very difficult
19 and there were many, many, many officials, more American
20 than British, for a reason I could explain, who never,
21 ever left the Green Zone, who would come into the
22 Green Zone at the beginning of a three-month tour and
23 would leave the Green Zone at the end of a three-month
24 tour without ever going outside the Green Zone.
25 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Were those reasons for security or

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1 otherwise?
2 ANDY BEARPARK: It was a combination of security which, to
3 start with, was reasonably benign but became worse and
4 the fact that, because CPA had no control over its
5 assets, it meant that, if you did want to move outside,
6 the formal system was that you would ask an American
7 military unit to take to you an appointment, but the
8 American military unit didn't actually view that as
9 being its priority in life, so your request would very
10 probably be turned down and, if it was accepted,
11 cancelled at the last minute.
12 So in the very early stage, if you like, up to,
13 say -- up to early August 2003, vehicles were available
14 and if you had the -- I don't know what the word would
15 be. If you had the initiative and the ability to find
16 a map, which is not easy in the circumstance like that,
17 you might commandeer a vehicle and be able to go and
18 travel around Baghdad, but it was that degree of
19 difficulty. So for a lot of officials it was a very
20 difficult process.
21 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: That leads me really to a point that
22 you touched on with Baroness Prashar and that is the
23 question of engagement with Iraqis. We read in the
24 United States Special Inspector General's report, "Hard
25 Lessons", the conclusion that it was lack of engagement

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1 with the Iraqis that really undermined the effectiveness
2 of the CPA strategy. Was that your view? Could you
3 comment perhaps on that in some detail?
4 ANDY BEARPARK: I think that the lack of engagement with the
5 Iraqis was a very serious problem on a number of levels.
6 I mean, one would be that, without that engagement,
7 whatever it was that CPA was trying to do would be based
8 on sand, on a lack of knowledge of what was required.
9 So at that level, it was a very serious issue.
10 But another angle, which I think was a very serious
11 issue, was that there was no real engagement with the
12 Iraqi people in terms of explaining to them what it was
13 that CPA was trying to do and that meant that myth was
14 able to grow very, very quickly.
15 At that stage, the CPA strategic communications
16 effort was entirely directed at the American people. So
17 there was an enormous effort to explain back to the
18 States what was happening, but zero effort to explain to
19 the Iraqi people what was happening.
20 To illustrate, I was routinely wheeled out to talk
21 to journalists about the supply of electricity and,
22 without even beginning to look at any notes, which
23 I don't have, I'm sure that I must have given at least
24 100, if not 500, interviews to American journalists
25 about the provision of electricity in Iraq.

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1 I can say with absolute confidence that I was only
2 ever allowed to give one press conference to the Iraqi
3 people, to Iraqi journalists. In that atmosphere, it
4 means that myths can grow very, very quickly and in very
5 dangerous ways. So one myth that grew, which is
6 absolutely ludicrous, sitting here in this building, was
7 that the electricity was in fact being produced but it
8 was being stolen by the Americans.
9 You know, this is -- sitting round this table, it is
10 just impossible to view, but in the heat, in the
11 circumstances of Baghdad, it became very easy for even
12 rational, educated Iraqis to think, "Well, maybe that is
13 true". So I think that that lack of engagement, at
14 every level, was a very, very serious problem/failing on
15 the part of the CPA.
16 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Engagement with the Iraqi Governing
17 Council, was that something you were able to do in terms
18 of discussing the CPA objectives?
19 ANDY BEARPARK: No -- sorry, I said, "No"; what I should
20 have said is that I did not view that as being part of
21 my responsibilities. I accepted that, in a sense, I was
22 physical, practical, economic things; other people were
23 politics. So I was aware of the Governing Council.
24 I probably -- I met with them occasionally, but I didn't
25 view them as being a focus in any way for my activities

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1 and I'm sure the same was true in reverse.
2 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Looking perhaps from outside in terms
3 of your specific responsibilities, do you think that the
4 CPA strategy was viewed by those who were operating it
5 as part of delivering an international reconstruction
6 effort or specifically a coalition effort?
7 ANDY BEARPARK: Paradoxically, I think both of those things
8 are true. I think in terms of designing of the
9 strategy, that was -- it was nothing to do with the
10 coalition. It was a purely American-led document. So
11 this was the American vision of what should happen, what
12 the objectives should be.
13 There was, however, even at that stage,
14 a recognition on the part of the CPA that the delivery
15 of these objectives would, in some cases, be impossible
16 without the wider involvement of the international
17 community.
18 So if you like, the CPA viewed the international
19 community as having no role whatsoever in terms of
20 setting the objectives, but as having a fairly useful
21 role in terms of delivering some of the objectives, and
22 the easiest way of expressing that would, as ever, be,
23 in financial terms, where -- I think the rough figuring
24 was that doing whatever it was that we wanted to do,
25 even though we didn't know what that was, was probably

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1 going to cost 60 billion and the Americans had decided
2 they were going to put 20 billion in. So there was
3 a roughly one to two relationship. So the international
4 community would be required to fill that two-thirds gap.
5 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: We have heard from other witnesses
6 about internal tensions within the United States system.
7 Did these impact at all on what the CPA was trying to
8 do?
9 ANDY BEARPARK: Yes. The tensions concerned were between
10 the Department of Defence and the State Department.
11 But, as ever in wars, people used proxies as well and
12 sadly USAID was used as a proxy warrior by the
13 State Department.
14 Yes, they had a very serious effect. They probably
15 had many serious effects, but the two that I think would
16 leap to my mind would be, firstly, that the battle had
17 in fact been won when the CPA was created and that
18 battle had been won by DoD and that meant that the CPA
19 was an entirely DoD-run machine.
20 One immediate consequence of that was that many --
21 and there are many -- experienced and able Americans who
22 knew about post-conflict theatres were directly and
23 deliberately excluded from coming to Iraq because they
24 were viewed as part of the enemy: namely, the
25 State Department. So that had a very serious effect on

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1 the workings.
2 The other one that springs to mind was that in --
3 rather from February onwards, in 2004, the battle
4 started to be fought all over again. So the defining,
5 if you like, issues of the period February 2004 to the
6 end of CPA were quite simply all the battles being
7 fought again as to who would have primacy, whether it
8 would be State, whether it would be DoD, et cetera. So,
9 yes, the battles, which are well-admitted by both sides,
10 had an enormous impact on what was happening.
11 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Was pressure for immediate results
12 a factor, pressure from Washington or even from London?
13 ANDY BEARPARK: I don't recollect any pressure from London
14 on anything, ever. As far as the Americans were
15 concerned, yes, there was often an enormous amount of
16 pressure for immediate results and very, very
17 counter-productive pressure, in the sense that there is
18 a limit as to how quickly some things can be done, and
19 I think I'm on record as describing the example of the
20 poor chap who was required to design the entire
21 6 billion programme for the electricity industry in
22 36 hours. This is Alice in Wonderland. It is nothing
23 else.
24 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: To what extent were views of
25 international partners, such as the World Bank and the

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1 United Nations, impacting on the strategy welcomed by
2 the planners?
3 ANDY BEARPARK: I think there the position changed
4 significantly over time. In the period from the
5 creation of the CPA to the end of August 2003, the CPA
6 moved substantially from distrusting, disliking, not
7 wanting to deal with the international community, to
8 recognising the importance of dealing with the
9 international community, and that was a very substantial
10 shift from its early days.
11 At the end of August came the UN bomb. Now, many
12 people think of that event in -- or describe the event
13 in terms of the tragic death of Sergio de Mello. That
14 is, of course, true, but there are two other aspects of
15 it which aren't always properly recorded.
16 The first one was it wasn't only Sergio who died.
17 There was an enormous loss of life, 27, I think, and
18 Fiona, an incredibly great British girl who was in
19 charge of some of the policy advice, died then. So on
20 that day, an enormous body of knowledge, wisdom and
21 ability was lost.
22 But the other factors were even more important than
23 that. The first one was that, for entirely
24 understandable and probably correct reasons, the UN
25 system -- and to that extent the UN system includes the

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1 World Bank and the IMF -- withdrew from Iraq. It is
2 very difficult to overstate the chaos that caused for
3 the CPA, because all your interlocutors suddenly
4 vanished and you didn't even know where there were.
5 They may have gone to Jordan, they may have gone to
6 Dubai, they may have gone back to Washington and, if you
7 like, recreating those linkages was always going to be
8 an uphill challenge, but that leads me on to the third
9 factor, which is equally important, which is that it
10 recreated the animosity within the CPA to the UN system.
11 I was very, very closely involved -- I was there on
12 the night of the bombing, I was there for all the
13 meetings down at the UN HQ over the coming week and
14 I was appalled, but recall that, whenever I would come
15 back to the Palace, people would say "Where have you
16 been?" and I would say "Fine, you know, I've just been
17 down to the UN HQ to talk about the evacuation." "Oh,
18 who cares about them? We knew they were an unreliable
19 partner, they were never going to stay anyway. They've
20 gone now. Let's get back to our old ways".
21 In a sense, my words trivialise an incredibly
22 important issue, which is that it did enable the UN
23 disliking elements of the CPA to feel justified in their
24 original behaviour, even though very slowly, carefully
25 and patiently during that period, June, July, August,

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1 the relationships had started coming together very well.
2 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Thank you very much.
3 THE CHAIRMAN: That's a very important observation, thank
4 you. Can I turn to Sir Lawrence Freedman now?
5 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Thanks very much.
6 You told a BBC interview in November 2006 -- I'm
7 quoting:
8 "The plan had to be created at the same time as it
9 was being implemented. Everything to do with the CPA
10 was being invented from scratch, from a zero base."
11 Now, you have had a lot of experience in this sort
12 of area, including Kosovo. What sort of planning do you
13 think might have made a difference, would you have
14 expected for a situation like this?
15 ANDY BEARPARK: I think there are two things that I would
16 expect and two things which are entirely achievable.
17 The first one is to actually have a plan. It doesn't
18 matter how flawed that plan proves to be. It doesn't
19 matter how imperfect it may be. Any military spokesman
20 will say that no plan ever survives contact with the
21 enemy. This is true in all walks of life, but the fact
22 is that it is far easier to amend an existing plan than
23 to create one from nothing. If you wake up in the
24 morning with no plan, you are nowhere.
25 The other angle is, in my view, even more important

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1 and that is that you must create the ability to do
2 things and that, I think, is the really glaring fault.
3 There have only been three organisations that I'm aware
4 of in the last 25 years that have been created from
5 scratch to cope with these issues. The first one was
6 the Office of the High Representative in Sarajevo
7 immediately after Dayton, the second one was Pillar 4 of
8 the United Nations Mission in Kosovo and the third one
9 was the CPA.
10 When you create something from scratch, it is
11 incredibly difficult to do. It would be difficult to do
12 in the UK, it is far more difficult to do in a war zone,
13 and it simply takes time to make it work. What that
14 means is that, for the planners, the people in the UK or
15 wherever, what you have to do is identify in advance
16 what can be done, what can be planned for which will be
17 required whatever may happen. The two most obvious ones
18 would always be transport and security -- sorry,
19 communication.
20 Well, in the case of CPA to deal with the
21 communications issue, I know that -- sorry, I know that
22 the CPA Baghdad had incredibly good communications. We
23 had perfect communication with Washington in every
24 possible sense of email, telephone, video conference,
25 et cetera. However, I think you have heard evidence

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1 from Hilary and others to the extent that, even at the
2 end of the CPA's existence, the regional offices were
3 reliant to a large extent on internet email accounts
4 with all the limitations that imposes. It seems to me
5 that is not difficult to plan for. You can do that in
6 advance.
7 You may not know what will collapse, you certainly
8 won't know which bit of the infrastructure will
9 collapse. You will know that some of it will, but you
10 will certainly know that you need to communicate to deal
11 with it. So I think, to that extent, pre-planning is
12 essential and practicable.
13 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Were you aware, before you were even
14 approached -- you must have been aware of the issue --
15 were you already thinking in your mind, "If I was doing
16 this, what would I be doing now?"
17 ANDY BEARPARK: I had been approached by the
18 European Commission towards the end of 2002 to ask if
19 I would go to Iraq, but the politics of the run-up to
20 the war was such that that mission was never going to
21 take place.
22 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Who approached you?
23 ANDY BEARPARK: Officials within the Commission in Brussels.
24 I had been in Kosovo for three years or so. They knew
25 it was time for me to move on. I think it was actually

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1 somebody in Chris Patten's staff who said would
2 I consider going over to Baghdad. That was at the end
3 of 2002. It then became clear there would be no EC
4 reconstruction mission.
5 So to that extent, it was no surprise to me when the
6 British phoned up. So, yes -- I mean, the thing was it
7 was very, very difficult to get information out of
8 Baghdad but not impossible. I had a number of friends
9 who were already working there, had been there through
10 the war doing humanitarian work, et cetera. So, yes, it
11 came as no surprise.
12 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: We have had lots of people telling
13 us how late the planning was and how little was there.
14 I suppose what we are trying to get a sense of is what
15 could have been done that would have made life an awful
16 lot easier for you and others when you had to deal with
17 the developing situation.
18 ANDY BEARPARK: I think I have to separate that into two
19 strands. The first one is that it would have been
20 distinctly helpful to have a plan of what they were
21 trying to achieve. But in a sense, that plan existed.
22 That was the one that had been done by the
23 State Department painstakingly over several years. The
24 problem was simply that it had been torn up at the last minute and
25 thrown away. So it was difficult to criticise the CPA,

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1 if you like, for not having created a plan, because the
2 CPA hadn't existed and, if one looked at the
3 US Government, one half of it would say "We have got
4 a plan". So I think that the absence of a plan was
5 certainly a problem, but it was, if you like, a given
6 and, therefore, just had to be coped with.
7 What was, I think, more culpable was the fact there
8 was no system in place to enable one to deal with the
9 absence of a plan; in other words, that was being
10 created from scratch.
11 Now, I know a number of people would argue that
12 ORHA, had it been allowed to continue, would do that,
13 but the reality is ORHA wasn't allowed to continue.
14 It was abolished within, I think, ten days of arrival.
15 So I think that was, if you like, the more culpable
16 element; the fact there wasn't a plan to deal with the
17 absence of a plan.
18 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Was that partly a question of having
19 identified the right people to be there and getting them
20 briefed up for their roles, getting them thinking about
21 it?
22 ANDY BEARPARK: Essentially -- essentially, yes. You know,
23 people had not been prepared in advance, people were
24 being parachuted in hour by hour, without knowing why
25 they were being parachuted in. There was no, as far as

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1 I could see, coherent thought at a capital level being
2 given to how to develop that process.
3 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Now, Jerry Bremer in his statement
4 to us said:
5 "It was evident to me from the start that the
6 pre-war planning had been inadequate largely because it
7 was based on incorrect assumptions about the nature of
8 the post-war situation on the ground in Iraq."
9 Now, was that a general view? Did he express that
10 view to you at the time? Was that the general view in
11 the CPA?
12 ANDY BEARPARK: That wasn't a discussion that was had very
13 often, because the CPA had no interest in history. So
14 it wasn't a discussion that would take place. But to
15 the extent that we ever touched upon it, yes,
16 I recognise what Jerry has said there, but I would have
17 to qualify it very, very heavily, and the qualification
18 is this: it is not that those involved in the pre-war
19 planning had made any incorrect assumptions; it is that
20 nobody had thought of the destruction that would be
21 caused by the looting and, if one is dealing with the
22 physical or, in some cases, even the social
23 infrastructure, I think that professionals would say
24 that something like 95 per cent of the damage was caused
25 by the looting and only 5 per cent by the war itself.

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1 Now, I'm sure that there are those who would argue
2 that the looting was predictable, but I'm not sure that
3 people had understood that at the time. So those
4 planners who made their plans were doing it on the basis
5 of an available set of information and I think, from the
6 planners' point of view, it is probably excusable that
7 they hadn't taken account of that looting.
8 Moving on to when Jerry made those comments, I can
9 see that, looking back, he would be saying "In fact, the
10 plan would have been useless anyway" and I can
11 understand why he would say that. That would be the
12 qualification I would put in.
13 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Another quote, this time from you
14 again in The Guardian in June 2007. You describe the
15 CPA as:
16 "... incapacitated by short-term planning and the
17 need to get quick results. This led to constant
18 chopping and changing particularly on police training."
19 Can you say a bit more about this tension between
20 the need for quick results and the need to think through
21 the -- a long-term strategic direction?
22 ANDY BEARPARK: The CPA suffered from a double whammy, that
23 the first part was the need for quick results, as
24 identified by all the stakeholders, whether it be DoD,
25 the Pentagon, the White House or even, at times,

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1 Number 10. So that led to frenetic decision-making
2 because we were talking about a condensed period of time
3 anyway. So when you have then got that pressure to
4 achieve results quickly, you have got very short periods
5 of time.
6 But then the second part of the double whammy was
7 the systems that existed within the CPA, and those
8 systems, such as they did exist, were very largely based
9 on American military systems and they have an unusual
10 perverse effect on this sort of issue.
11 If you are working with the US military and are
12 given seven days to consider an issue and, on the
13 seventh day, you will have to achieve the agreement of
14 the senior general, the reality is that the system will
15 only give you half a day to do the thinking because the
16 other six and a half days are required by a continuing
17 process of briefing higher and higher up the chain
18 before you reach your final decision.
19 Now, that's absolutely true of the US military, but
20 to a point it is true of the Pentagon civilian side as
21 well, where the instrument that was the ultimate, if you
22 like, thing, was the sort of, you know, midnight video
23 conference, and the midnight video conference determined
24 CPA policy, but it meant that an enormous amount of work
25 that would lead to what one would hope would be

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1 a rational decision had in fact been taken in a very
2 short space of time and might not be entirely rational.
3 But it was being operated by people who are not
4 stupid and one would never think they were stupid. So
5 what it would mean is that a decision would have been
6 taken. That decision would start to be implemented, but
7 it would then become clear that it was the wrong
8 decision. So you then had to, if you like, go back to
9 square one and start all over again.
10 So what you had was that stuttering thing,
11 whereby -- sorry, whereas, if people had accepted
12 a slightly longer and more considered decision-making
13 process, your results would have been far better at the
14 end of the day and, in fact, have come far more quickly.
15 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Do you think it would have been
16 better if you had had -- if the CPA had not been obliged
17 to report back, therefore, as much as you suggest it
18 did, if it didn't have to check every decision with
19 Washington in the same way?
20 ANDY BEARPARK: Yes, I think other books -- you have talked
21 many times about the 8,000-mile screwdriver and even the
22 most minute decision would be scrutinised by officials
23 in the Pentagon and in some cases the CPA might have no
24 role actually in making the decision. It might just
25 have been imposed by an official in the Pentagon who had

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1 sent out the emails saying "This is what you will do".
2 Now, did that have an adverse effect? Yes, it
3 obviously did. How could it have been different?
4 That's a different question.
5 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: You would have required more
6 delegation?
7 ANDY BEARPARK: Absolutely.
8 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Can we talk -- something we have
9 already touched upon, which is the question of managing
10 Iraqi expectations and you have already said something
11 about the lack of effort that was put into explaining to
12 Iraqi citizens what the CPA was up to and what it was
13 trying to do.
14 Again, looking back, were there better ways of
15 managing Iraqi expectations about the CPA? What extra
16 could have been done to prevent the sort of hostility
17 that did develop?
18 ANDY BEARPARK: There were definitely more things and better
19 things that could have been done. It does not mean that
20 life would have been perfect in any way. But, as I say,
21 the entire resource that CPA had, certainly for the
22 first six months, was directed to a non-Iraqi audience.
23 Had that resource been directed at the Iraqi audience,
24 it would doubtless have performed very imperfectly, but
25 it would still have performed. It didn't perform

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1 because it didn't exist.
2 So I think that, at a very trivial level, the only
3 Arabic speaker I can recall in the CPA strategic
4 communications division in the first three months was in
5 fact a seconded British official. So in that entire
6 machine which, in theory, was meant to be there to
7 correspond with -- to sort of get a message across to
8 the Iraqis -- you have only got one person who can speak
9 the language. This is not good. I don't know how
10 difficult it is to find Arabic speakers. I understand
11 the problems, but I do not think anybody was making
12 a serious effort to address those problems because they
13 had identified the wrong target, although, in their
14 terms, it was of course the right target, which was the
15 US media.
16 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: With the particular questions that
17 were notionally part of your responsibility, of
18 infrastructure, you have mentioned electricity
19 already -- again, this is an area where expectations do
20 seem to have been quite high, but also constantly
21 disappointed. Again, were there specific things that
22 could have been done to handle the electricity question
23 better?
24 ANDY BEARPARK: There were two things that could have been
25 done to handle the electricity question better in

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1 communications terms. The first one was that a lot of
2 the problem arose because of the transmission of power
3 up from Basra to Baghdad. Now, the issue there was
4 that, during the Saddam days, he had systematically
5 starved the rest of Iraq of electricity to give Baghdad
6 electricity 24 hours a day.
7 After the fall of the regime, Basra acquired 24-hour
8 electricity and was really rather pleased to have it,
9 but it was having it at the expense of Baghdad.
10 Officials in Baghdad -- and I cannot deny that I was
11 part of that decision-making process -- decided that we
12 would take some of Basra's power to give more power to
13 Baghdad. In terms of what we actually did, you know,
14 with hindsight -- I don't want to argue that our
15 decision was absolutely correct, but it certainly wasn't
16 a bad decision. But what was certainly bad was that we
17 didn't properly involve either the politicians or the
18 public in explaining to them what we were doing.
19 So for every single person who ended up with more
20 electricity, they were of course happy, but every single
21 person who ended up with less electricity, they were not
22 only unhappy, but they didn't know why they were not
23 getting it. So that was one issue.
24 The other parallel issue with communications and
25 electricity is that putting together electricity systems

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1 is not easy. It takes time. I don't think we ever --
2 I think the fault is perhaps that we didn't try, rather
3 than we didn't achieve. We never really tried to
4 explain to the Iraqis how long it was going to take. We
5 wanted to give good news. So we kept setting ridiculous
6 targets, 5,000 megawatts by the end of September, which
7 we achieved for 24 hours at the expense of an awful lot
8 of power cuts the following day.
9 So I think that we could have spent a lot more
10 explaining to the Iraqis why the problems existed and
11 managing expectations because, after a war, expectations
12 are always inflated, if you like, wherever the war is
13 taking place. People are looking forward to peace so
14 much and they believe -- whether regime change has been
15 involved or not, they believe their life will be better
16 and they don't necessarily rationalise it, but they
17 think everything is going to be better.
18 So you really do need expectation management if you
19 are not to allow resentment to build up.
20 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Just in terms of expectations on the
21 CPA side or the coalition side, there does seem a sense
22 that, immediately after the war, there was a feeling of
23 opportunity and possibility and then it just got
24 progressively more difficult. Did you have a sense of
25 progressively more difficult or was there a point at

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1 which -- whether after the hotel bombing or whatever,
2 you just thought this is now a completely different
3 order of difficulty?
4 ANDY BEARPARK: CPA -- and I include myself -- had the
5 problem of the frog in the water, where, as the water
6 temperature rises, at what point do you admit it is
7 getting a bit too hot? But my recollection of my
8 colleagues in the CPA is that we would draw a very clear
9 graph with a very clear turning point and that turning
10 point would not have been the Canal Hotel bombing, it
11 would have been the bombing -- the mortaring of the
12 Al-Rasheed Hotel, which I think would have been, from
13 memory -- and I don't have my diaries, but from memory
14 would have been October.
15 Now, I think our recollection would be that we were
16 very, very clearly on an upward slope until then. As
17 I say, we may have been the frog in the water, but we
18 believed that things were getting better. We believed
19 that CPA was getting better at what it was meant to do
20 and we were all optimistic.
21 So through June, July, August -- sorry, I was only
22 there in late June, but through July, August, September
23 we were optimistic that we were on an upward slope. We
24 had got through the worst of the problems and it was
25 going to be -- "okay" wouldn't be the right word.

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1 From September onwards, then the graph just went
2 sharply down. The trigger point, as I say, would have
3 been the mortaring of the Al-Rasheed Hotel. But that
4 was followed very quickly by the announcement that we
5 would be abolished at the end of June. So that changed
6 the dynamic completely. Once you know that your tenure
7 is only going to be six months, even the most naive
8 planners knew that the objectives they had set were not
9 going to be achieved within that period. So you have
10 got a very, very easy graph of optimism going up to the
11 mortaring of the Al-Rasheed and then a very sharp
12 downhill from there onwards.
13 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Just to conclude, do you think that
14 announcement of the limited lifespan of the CPA was
15 a mistake, that it would have been better to delay that,
16 even as you were working towards handing over to the
17 Iraqis?
18 ANDY BEARPARK: It is not an issue that I ever thought
19 deeply about. But my instant response to you would be
20 that there is often advantage in delaying that sort of
21 announcement. Even if the decision has been made, you
22 do not necessarily want to publicise the announcement
23 because, as soon as you do, you become a lame duck.
24 So, generally speaking, either keep it secret or, if
25 you can't do that, do it even quicker, and I think --

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1 this would not be a question for me, but I think the
2 academics and historians might want to argue one day
3 that, having made the announcement, maybe we should just
4 have abolished at the end of a year instead of waiting
5 until the end of June.
6 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Thank you very much.
7 THE CHAIRMAN: Roderic?
8 SIR RODERIC LYNE: I would just like to explore for a minute
9 the extent to which the British Government was able to
10 influence the CPA. Two years ago, you were quoted in
11 The Daily Telegraph as saying that one of the tragedies
12 was that the Brits were so light in their impact.
13 Bremer just didn't want any of their voices getting in
14 the way of his decisions. We were, as we have already
15 discussed, joint occupying power with the Americans.
16 You have also been quoted -- this time in
17 The Guardian -- three years ago, on this subject, where
18 you were reported to have said that British attempts to
19 be signatories to the formation of the CPA as a joint
20 occupying power under the Geneva Convention were brushed
21 aside by the Americans:
22 "Throughout its entire existence, the CPA was
23 a US Government department and no agreement was ever
24 signed between the British and the Americans because the
25 Americans refused even to consider it."

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1 You have spoken in a similar sense this morning.
2 Why did Bremer not want to hear British voices and,
3 was this just Bremer, or was this a wider attitude of
4 the American Government or the Department of Defence?
5 ANDY BEARPARK: There is no single causality on that issue.
6 I think that the Department of Defence in America,
7 having won the battle with the Department of State, was
8 a department that didn't culturally really understand
9 working with other governments. It was used to running
10 the biggest military machine the world has ever known
11 and other governments were, if you like, a bit
12 irrelevant. So I think things might have been
13 different, had it been State Department rather than DoD
14 who had won that battle.
15 Then, when we moved out to Baghdad, the reality on
16 the ground was that, although the British Government may
17 have been well-intentioned, the resources they were able
18 to put into the effort were minuscule compared to the
19 resources the Americans were putting into the effort and
20 that created an atmosphere and air, if you like, on the
21 American side of "Who really cares very much what the
22 British Government think?"
23 Then there were a whole load of parallel pieces of
24 mood music. The British Government represented its
25 persona at that time, if you like, through the

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1 Foreign Office. The Foreign Office was viewed by the
2 CPA as being distinctly untrustworthy because it was
3 known that the Foreign Office passed information direct to
4 the State Department in Washington against the wishes of
5 the CPA. So if you like, that created yet another
6 tension between the CPA and the British in a political
7 sense.
8 Then you have got -- there is, if you like, the
9 wrap-up effect that, if you have got all of those bits
10 of causality going on at the same time, it is just far
11 much easier to ignore the other party rather than try to
12 work through those issues. If you knew you were going
13 to be in that marriage for ten years, you might seek
14 counselling and try to sort it out. If you know it is
15 only a matter of months, who cares?
16 SIR RODERIC LYNE: You say that the British resource was
17 rather small, but the British put a significant amount
18 of resource into the campaign, a much higher percentage
19 than subsequently, and the British did produce useful
20 and not insignificant staff resources for the CPA,
21 including yourself.
22 Was there not some way in which that plus the
23 British Government's acceptance of joint legal
24 responsibility for Iraq could have been leveraged into
25 a greater degree of influence? Did we simply not make

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1 enough effort at the top political level to ensure that
2 our voices on the ground were heard and had an effect?
3 ANDY BEARPARK: Firstly, that British contribution was
4 perceived by the Americans as being much smaller than
5 the British perception of it, and to give -- to explain
6 that statement, I have seen tables -- I think in
7 Bremer's book but certainly in other places --
8 illustrating -- comparing the number of British staff in
9 the CPA in Baghdad with the number of US staff.
10 Unfortunately, what they gloss over is that that was
11 comparing civilians with civilians, whereas the CPA was
12 predominantly a military staffed organisation. So in
13 other words, even if the ratio of British civilians to
14 American civilians was roughly correct, however one
15 might define "correct", the reality is that to that
16 American figure, you would have to add 2,000 military
17 figures. So to anybody within the CPA it would be
18 immediately seen to be a tiny, insignificant British
19 contribution.
20 But the bigger question, I think that you ask or
21 rather the answer to the bigger question is insofar as
22 that could have been achieved, the feeling, certainly my
23 feeling -- and I think perhaps the feeling of most Brits
24 on the ground -- was that that accommodation could only
25 be reached at a London/Washington level; it was never

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1 going to be reached at a Baghdad level. So if the
2 situation was going to change in any way, it would only
3 change as a result of direct discussions or negotiations
4 between London and Washington.
5 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Then the implication of that, therefore,
6 is that London didn't push this with Washington, didn't
7 stand up to Washington and argue it out at the top
8 level. Presumably London/Washington, you mean
9 essentially Downing Street/White House, do you?
10 ANDY BEARPARK: Primarily Downing Street/White House but
11 I think there is another dynamic. On the one hand you
12 have the Downing Street/White House level, where the
13 perception we on the ground had -- it may have been
14 totally wrong -- was that we had reached a point where
15 the Prime Minister didn't wish to raise too many issues.
16 If you are in a Downing Street/White House
17 conversation, there is a limit to how many issues can be
18 raised and certainly a very distinct limit as to how
19 many issues can be resolved, and the feeling was that we
20 were, if you like, not number 1 on that list anymore,
21 but that feeling was very, very much magnified from --
22 sorry, in the perception of those of us in the field of
23 what was happening in Whitehall.
24 Our very clear, possibly incorrect, perception was
25 that all the issues of Iraq had been perceived of as

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very, very important in the run-up to the war, had been perceived of as very important in the first couple of months after the war, but then just fell off Whitehall's list.

Whitehall, as a machine, hadn't really approved of this war. It was a Downing Street war, it wasn't a Whitehall war and, therefore, the more junior, in that sense, parts of the British Government machine just wanted to forget all about it. So issues that one might have thought in different circumstances would have been high up the Ministry of Defence's or the Foreign Office's or even DFID's agenda, we didn't get the sense that they were high up on that agenda.

SIR RODERIC LYNE: So Downing Street wasn't putting it high enough up its shopping list with the White House. Whitehall, as a whole, was not giving you the sense of back-up. You had been sent out there to get on with the job and people, to some extent, were losing interest in what you were doing. Is that the picture you are describing?

ANDY BEARPARK: Absolutely. I can quantify it. In June before I went out to Baghdad, everybody in Whitehall wanted to meet me. I was the favoured son for at least 24 hours; the Cabinet Office, Number 10, DFID, the Foreign Office, MoD, various other agencies, et cetera,

1 everybody wanted a bit of the action. Within three
2 months, when I came back for debriefings, I'd find it
3 hard pressed to find anybody who could really care.
4 SIR RODERIC LYNE: You were a bad news story. If we had
5 made our voice louder from the top down, right through
6 to where you were operating, would it have made
7 a difference? Could things have been better? Did we
8 have ideas that might have improved it if we had fought
9 hard enough for them?
10 ANDY BEARPARK: I honestly do not know the answer to that
11 question, because I don't know what ideas we, the
12 British, might have pressed, had we had the ability to
13 press them. So I read retrospectively where we
14 criticise some of the decisions that the Americans took
15 but, had we been part of the power game at that stage,
16 I'm not sure that things would have been any different.
17 SIR RODERIC LYNE: But were you personally trying to achieve
18 things that you could have achieved if you had had, as
19 it were, heavily-built second row forwards pushing
20 behind you, but that you couldn't get through? Were you
21 frustrated in some of your objectives because of lack of
22 support?
23 ANDY BEARPARK: Never. I created a machine to support
24 myself which was entirely composed of US military and it
25 was a supreme machine, and (a) it was a supreme machine

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1 in terms of helping me achieve my objectives, but (b) it
2 was the only machine that would have been able to do
3 that, because it was an American machine.
4 So the British Government very kindly on occasions
5 offered me support, but I could never think of anything
6 to ask for. I was getting all the support that I needed
7 and more in a sense from that US machine, and enormous,
8 heavyweight or whatever British involvement would not
9 only have not helped me, it would actually have hindered
10 me.
11 SIR RODERIC LYNE: As you have said earlier, you essentially
12 declared yourself to be an American. So you achieved
13 your results by working within their system. Looking
14 back on it, can you identify any significant decisions
15 of the CPA that the British Government succeeded in
16 influencing, some of its actions that you would chalk up
17 as successes for the British Government in this period?
18 ANDY BEARPARK: I would find it difficult, but I think there
19 would be two things that would spring out to me. The
20 first one was the British involvement in the
21 privatisation process or, rather, the non-privatisation
22 process, where my view was that it was persistent, very
23 well-thought-out work at both a political and a legal
24 level by British officials, that prevented some rather
25 stupid things happening. So that I would give immense

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1 credit to.

2 The other one is that one of the few things that the

3 CPA did, which just about everybody admits was

4 a success, was the currency exchange, and that --

5 although the number of British staff involved in that

6 was, as ever, very small, compared to the number of

7 American staff involved in it, I think all of those

8 American staff would acknowledge that those few British

9 staff had an entirely disproportionate amount of

10 influence and influence for the good over what happened

11 with the currency exchange. So I think that would be

12 a distinct tick and a gold star.

13 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Jeremy Greenstock very consciously

14 decided that he did not want to be Jerry Bremer's formal

15 deputy, that he wanted to preserve his position as

16 British Government representative, and he told us that

17 part of the reason for this was that he wanted to be in

18 a position to be able to challenge Bremer, which would

19 have been harder if he had been his deputy.

20 Now, you were in the chain of command under Bremer,

21 as you have explained. Did that constrain you from

22 challenging Bremer, who is fairly powerful contact

23 anyway, or were you able to make your own views known

24 when you needed?

25 ANDY BEARPARK: I don't think that I ever viewed that as an

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1 issue that caused me difficulty. I owed my allegiance
2 to Bremer and was very happy to acknowledge that and
3 very, very happy on occasions perhaps to even carry out
4 things that I would not have chosen to do myself, had
5 I been in his position.
6 But equally, I have never felt in the tiniest bit
7 intimidated by powerful people and my bosses, so I found
8 little difficulty in expressing my views. I might do it
9 slightly more tactfully than in other circumstances,
10 because of the others around, but I certainly wouldn't
11 feel the least bit inhibited about telling him privately
12 if I thought he was totally wrong. So I found no
13 tension there.
14 SIR RODERIC LYNE: There were times when you were able to
15 change his mind on issues that mattered to you?
16 ANDY BEARPARK: Yes. I wouldn't want to overclaim that, but
17 I think that by virtue of expressing and meaningfully
18 expressing that absolute allegiance, it meant that he
19 was prepared to trust me more than would otherwise have
20 been the case, and was therefore willing to seek counsel
21 at times in a way that otherwise he might not.
22 SIR RODERIC LYNE: If you had had a Foreign Office label
23 from what you said earlier, you might have been less
24 trusted because the position would have been that you
25 linked with the State Department who were the real

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1 enemy?
2 ANDY BEARPARK: Very much so. I think, as far as Bremer and
3 his colleagues were concerned, I had no label. They
4 have never heard of or acknowledged DFID anyway. So
5 they knew I was British and they knew that some part of
6 British Government was paying me, but they couldn't care
7 less which part it was. But, no, they knew I wasn't
8 Foreign Office.
9 THE CHAIRMAN: We will break for ten minutes and come back
10 at 11.25 am.
11 (11.15 am)
12 (Short break)
13 (11.25 am)
14 THE CHAIRMAN: Let's resume. Martin? Over to you.
15 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: We understand that quite early in your
16 posting, you led a reorganisation of the CPA and we
17 wondered what changes you recommended and also did they
18 have the desired impact?
19 ANDY BEARPARK: I assume that the reorganisation we are
20 talking about is of the field and regional structure.
21 Yes, one of the first things that Bremer asked me to do
22 was to travel around Iraq. He identified correctly that
23 his three regional three officers were not functioning
24 very well and he also, at that stage, had begun to
25 formulate, although he hadn't rigidly formulated, the

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1 idea that he would like an office in every governorate.
2 So he tasked me to travel round the existing field
3 offices, to see what could be done to improve their
4 performance and, simultaneously, to tell him whether it
5 was practicable to open offices in every governorate.
6 I did that and I came back and explained to him what
7 the problems were with his existing regional offices and
8 what might be needed to address that. But then, in
9 parallel, I put together a plan -- a plan for the opening
10 of offices in all the governorates and he was very, very
11 comfortable with what I said and just told me to go away
12 and do it.
13 So doing it became a major part of my life for the
14 following ten or eleven months and, indeed, for the last
15 four or five months I was there running the operational
16 side of the field offices was probably well over
17 50 per cent of my workload.
18 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: In terms of communications and travel,
19 this was quite feasible?
20 ANDY BEARPARK: I had no problems whatsoever with travel.
21 I had made it a condition of going out to Baghdad that
22 I must be able to travel. So I had dedicated travel
23 resources of my own. I had, I think, around five or six
24 vehicles in my fleet purely for my own use, but I also
25 had access to American military assets on demand. So

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1 I could require helicopters or aeroplanes to be provided
2 for me.
3 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: In terms of the different CPA offices,
4 did the relationship between CPA South and CPA Baghdad
5 differ from that of the other governorate offices?
6 ANDY BEARPARK: Very much so. There were only four CPA
7 regional offices and the circumstances of the
8 personalities in -- and the general atmosphere of the
9 four was completely different. So there was no one
10 model, there was no one whatever. One of them was in
11 Kurdistan, one was in Baghdad, which was a totally
12 different dynamic. It was in the same place as us. One
13 was over to the west in Al-Hillah and that was
14 completely different from Basra.
15 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: In terms of your relationship with the
16 CPA Basra, and the fact that it was within our
17 governorate, what effect did that have on the programme,
18 on the policies?
19 ANDY BEARPARK: As I say, my responsibility was very clearly
20 as the operations manager for those four regional
21 offices as opposed to the policy manager. So my
22 relationship with CPA South in Basra was probably
23 characterised in two ways.
24 One of them was that, in terms of operational
25 support, whatever that may be, they would feel -- and

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1 not unreasonably, they would feel that, since I was
2 a Brit being paid by the British Government, would
3 I please listen to what they wanted and try to help them
4 to get it. That was perfectly reasonable. So there
5 that element to it.
6 But the other element was that Basra was a British
7 fiefdom. So in policy terms, I didn't view it as my
8 role in any way to second-guess people like
9 Hilary Synnott or his successors. They were very
10 clearly there to rule Basra and my job was not to get
11 involved in that side of things, but to give them the
12 administrative, financial and whatever support I could
13 when they required it.
14 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: In the "Hard Lessons" report there is
15 a description of the Programme Management Office, the
16 PMO, as "the first of many ad hoc organisations to
17 manage reconstruction".
18 Did the ad hoc nature of the organisation have an
19 impact on the reconstruction results? What is the sort
20 of meaning of the criticism of ad hoc?
21 ANDY BEARPARK: Well, the meaning is that there were those
22 who would argue that the ad hoc nature of the Programme
23 Management Office adversely affected its delivery and
24 the author of that particular sentence within the report
25 was very probably of the view that USAID would have

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1 managed it better because USAID had a history of
2 managing projects.
3 I would probably agree with the author, but
4 I wouldn't leap up with excitement agreeing with him,
5 because nobody really knows how to manage $18.6 billion
6 worth of projects in a very short time and in my own
7 mind I'm not sure so sure. I have read a book by USAID
8 in which they say absolutely openly, "If you had given
9 us the money, the world would be a wonderful place."
10 I'm not sure I really buy into that. I think
11 whoever was going to manage that money was going to have
12 very serious problems but, yes, the PMO did have very
13 serious problems.
14 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Thank you.
15 THE CHAIRMAN: Usha?
16 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Thank you. A couple of questions on
17 the CPA staffing. We have heard criticism about the
18 skills gap at CPA and also about the time lag between
19 identifying the need for staff and by the time you
20 actually received them on the ground.
21 Did you feel that you had the right number of people
22 with the right sort of expertise and did the UK actually
23 provide what you needed?
24 ANDY BEARPARK: As far as I was concerned, I was content
25 that I had the right number of staff with the right

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1 skill sets, because I had an enormous amount of control
2 in bringing together my staff. I perceived very early
3 on that British -- but I don't mean "British", anybody
4 other than American and American military staff were not
5 going to be of that much use to me to achieve my
6 objectives. So my focus was on making sure that the US
7 military gave me the assets that I wanted.
8 As far as the British Government was concerned, they
9 certainly met every request that I made. I made very
10 few demands of them, but those demands that I did make
11 were met unhesitatingly and immediately. So they
12 offered me, I think, two members of staff when I went
13 out there and, in fact, they had arranged for one of
14 them to be there even before I arrived. So I had no
15 criticism of any description there.
16 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: But did you have enough expertise to
17 attend to the challenges of repairing the
18 infrastructure?
19 ANDY BEARPARK: No, but I was never going to repair the
20 infrastructure. My job was to make sure that other
21 people did repair the infrastructure. So the repairs
22 were going to be done by people like Bechtel, who had
23 the first of the big contracts for $1 billion. So my
24 job was to ensure that Bechtel, the US army corps of
25 engineers, Kellogg Brown & Root, Halliburton or whoever,

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1 would be -- or in the south Mott McDonald, I think --
2 would be to ensure that they had the resources to enable
3 that to happen.
4 So on my operational staff, what I needed and what
5 I had was, if you like, just an enormous number of
6 Mr Fixits, who could go around and work their way
7 through the system. It was other bits of the machine
8 who would have the electrical engineers, the roads
9 engineers, whoever it would be.
10 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: You said something about the
11 involvement of the military. Can you say a little bit
12 more about that, that you were able to draw on their
13 expertise and, how did that relationship between the
14 civilians and the military work? How did that
15 cooperation work?
16 ANDY BEARPARK: It didn't work particularly well. Despite
17 what I have read, my observation was that there was
18 a lack of closeness in the relationships at the top of
19 the military machine and the top of the civilian machine
20 and that that lack of closeness, whether it be apparent
21 or real, would be interpreted down the line as being
22 a rift, even though there may be no rift.
23 A bit like sometimes you need a photograph of the
24 two politicians shaking hands, even though they hate
25 each other, you need that photograph for the people

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1 further down. So that was one issue.
2 The other issue, though, was this: it was that CPA
3 was notionally a civilian organisation headed by
4 a civilian, but every single lever that it had at its
5 disposal was a military lever,
and civilians are not always very good at
7 pulling military levers. So you had a very, very
8 disjointed system, where the senior staff may be
9 civilians, but the only people who would be able to
10 implement whatever policy they thought should be
11 implemented would be the military. So it was
12 a dysfunctional system in that sense.
13 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: So what you are saying is the
14 military did not see itself as delivering CPA's
15 objectives. It is what they were asked to do. What was
16 the perspective?
17 ANDY BEARPARK: The military, and particularly the US
18 military, I'm speaking of now -- correctly perceived CPA
19 to be dysfunctional. That's beyond dispute.
20 What I think is perhaps not always widely understood
21 is that, having perceived CPA to be dysfunctional, the
22 general military response was therefore to ignore it.
23 So although, in theory, I'm quite sure any military
24 commander in Baghdad would have said that he was there
25 to serve the CPA, perhaps his tongue might have been in

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his cheek when he uttered the words. He would perceive himself as having to develop and implement an agenda regardless of the dysfunctionality of the CPA.

BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Finally, did the CPA make good use of the Iraqi expertise and did very many Iraqis work for the CPA or not?

ANDY BEARPARK: As far as I recall, virtually no Iraqis worked for the CPA. There were, I think, two -- no, sorry, I'm losing my train of thought now.

There was a very small group of Iraqis who were actually employed by the CPA, and they would almost certainly have only been interpreters. I can't think of anything else. The cleaners probably came from elsewhere, from Pakistan, wherever. But there would be a small group of Iraqis who were employed by the CPA in that role.

If one is looking at a wider or more policy-type role or operational role, there were very few. There had been a group of Iraqis -- I am afraid I can remember the acronym -- I'm not even sure I can. I think it was called the IRDC or the ICDC -- I honestly can't remember -- but that was a group of Iraqis that had been established before the CPA existed and the idea was that they would form, if you like, part of the channel between the CPA and the outside world. They became

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1 marginalised very, very quickly indeed.
2 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: So that wasn't an effective channel.
3 You weren't able to use that channel effectively?
4 ANDY BEARPARK: No, it may have done -- I can remember
5 meeting with them several times in the first weeks I was
6 there and then I never found them again there
7 afterwards. They just vanished. So I assumed they had
8 been either disbanded or moved out, but I know not
9 which. So the answer is there were very, very few
10 Iraqis within the CPA at any time.
11 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Thank you.
12 SIR RODERIC LYNE: A couple of questions on resources.
13 Ambassador Bremer spoke to us of the chronic
14 under-resourcing of the CPA's efforts and in your
15 statement you have said that the issue of financial
16 resources is complex and that project resources were
17 controlled in a rather opaque fashion. Was the CPA
18 seriously under-resourced?
19 ANDY BEARPARK: The CPA, as a whole, was probably
20 drastically over resourced in the sense that there were
21 3,000 people in the building doing the work of 300. But
22 the point that Bremer would be making, and which I would
23 fully support, was that the CPA had no control over its
24 own resources and that meant that the CPA was unable to
25 identify those it would require to work for it and then

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1 go out and recruit those people. There was simply no
2 mechanism, not a limited mechanism. There was no
3 mechanism to enable to that happen.
4 So CPA could not recruit staff, it could not recruit
5 short-term staff, it could not buy in expertise, it
6 could not even feed itself because all the resources
7 were controlled by other bits of machines elsewhere. So
8 I think that is what would have been in Jerry's mind
9 when he said that CPA was drastically under resourced.
10 An extension of that would be that there was
11 something called the joint manning document, which was
12 another of these fictitious bits of planning, but
13 fictitious or not, it was the list of posts that were
14 meant to exist and be filled within the CPA, and I think
15 that the figure on the civilian side of that is that the
16 CPA only ever achieved 50 per cent of the posts that had
17 been identified in that document.
18 So that, again, would have been in
19 Ambassador Bremer's mind if he said that this was
20 drastically under resourced, but the reality is that
21 those 50 per cent of the posts in the joint manning
22 document that were not being filled were, of course,
23 being filled, but they were being filled by military
24 personnel, not civilian personnel.
25 SIR RODERIC LYNE: What about the financial resources?

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1 There was the $18.4 billion approved by the Congress,
2 much of which I understand never really came through in
3 the CPA period. Did you and your colleagues in the CPA
4 have the finance you needed to do the job you were
5 trying to do?
6 ANDY BEARPARK: Yes. The 18.4 billion is, in a sense,
7 irrelevant to the performance of the CPA in terms of
8 project accomplishment, because the timescale of its
9 approval was such that it would never have been able to
10 deliver anything within the timeframe of the existence
11 of the CPA.
12 So in the CPA's time of existence, the funding
13 channels that were relevant were the first two chunks of
14 1 billion from the original US supplemental and
15 1 billion of that was being handled, give or take a few
16 hundred million here or there, by Bechtel to do the
17 emergency engineering work. So that was already putting
18 out -- I think the figure was 860 million into the
19 system to do work while the CPA was in town.
20 The other one was the 1 billion which had been given
21 to either Halliburton or KBR, but they may have been the
22 same at the time -- to do the repair of the -- the
23 essential repairs on the oil fields, but even after --
24 those were 2 billion of appropriated funds. Far more
25 important than the 2 billion of appropriated funds were

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1 the seized and vested assets and the UN money, which,
2 over the period of CPA's existence, from memory, came to
3 around 24 billion. I could be out by a couple of
4 billion, to be honest, but it was 20-something billion.
5 So we were not in any way resource-constrained in terms
6 of amount of money. We may have been very constrained
7 in terms of our ability to spend the money.
8 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Who was controlling these finances? You
9 say this was a rather opaque arrangement.
10 ANDY BEARPARK: Yes, because the funding channels were very
11 varied and, to an outsider, distinctly opaque. So going
12 back to the small-ish -- although it would still be
13 billions that were being spent on CPA itself, that would
14 be controlled through a US military channel, through the
15 logcap contracts which were let out of Washington
16 every ten years, or whatever it would be, and would then
17 be controlled by the Pentagon. So you had a very clear,
18 if at times untransparent, chain of accountability but
19 one which the CPA weren't involved in. We were
20 a customer, but we had to involvement in the process.
21 If you then look at the original allocations under
22 the first supplemental, then the billion that had gone
23 to Bechtel was controlled through a USAID contract and,
24 therefore, the accountability chain would be through
25 USAID, and that, if you liking gives an example of where

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1 the systems creak, because Bremer had a letter from the
2 President giving him authority over all resources in
3 Iraq.
4 But that doesn't really work. I mean that's a bit
5 like the British Prime Minister giving
6 Jeremy Greenstock -- he didn't, but giving
7 Jeremy Greenstock a letter saying that he would have
8 authority over all British resources in Iraq. Well,
9 fine, he could have signed that letter, but in legal
10 terms it wouldn't affect the responsibility of the
11 accounting officer to Parliament from DFID, and exactly
12 the same was happening on the American side, that USAID
13 had to account for their money to Congress. But that
14 was the USAID appropriated money.
15 Then, if you move on to vested, seized and oil
16 money, you would have a different set of considerations
17 there and CPA considered vested and seized monies to be
18 our personal toy. We really didn't see that anybody
19 else should ever have any interest in that, and these
20 were billions, but then, when you got on to the UN
21 money, the Oil For Food programme money, then you would
22 be talking about the IAMB, the International
23 Accountability something or other. But that was the
24 international body set up to monitor those funds, but
25 that body never met until, I think, January 2004, by

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1 which time we had spent most of it.
2 So what it meant was -- and this is not unusual --
3 what it meant was that every pocket of money had
4 a different set of controls, a different set of
5 procedures and, to somebody who is familiar with that --
6 and there are people who are familiar with it; I mean,
7 I had never known it to be any different in an
8 international setting -- it is not particularly
9 difficult to understand, but to anybody who hasn't been
10 brought up with that system, it can look very, very
11 opaque indeed.
12 SIR RODERIC LYNE: It sounds complicated. Was it a factor
13 in adding to the chaos?
14 ANDY BEARPARK: The duplicity or multiplicity of funding
15 channels was not a factor in adding to the chaos. It
16 may have been for a few people who met it for the first
17 time and required a bit of -- sort of, you know,
18 aid 101, but, no, the factor that added, not to the
19 chaos, but which disrupted everything, was the absence
20 of a proper procurement mechanism with most of those
21 funds. Because, as I think I am on record as saying,
22 there is no point in approving money for electricity
23 supplies if there is nobody who knows how to go out and
24 buy them. It is just pointless.
25 Now, early on in its existence, the CPA had decided

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1 that the procurement mechanism should be used certainly
2 for seized and vested funds, almost certainly for DFI
3 funds -- Development Funds for Iraq funds -- generally,
4 albeit not for appropriated funds, would be based on the
5 US military contracting officer scheme.
6 Now, in terms of accountability, that was probably
7 a very sensible decision to make. In terms of
8 implementation, it was an absolute nightmare, because
9 the US military didn't have enough contracting officers
10 and the contracting scheme for the US military is
11 a very, very precisely defined scheme where you were
12 breaking American law, wherever you may be in the world,
13 if you deviate from those procedures.
14 So for a guy like me to say "Let's be flexible about
15 it" is not a very sensible thing to say. It is designed
16 as a rigid procedure, and the US military, with the very
17 best will in the world -- and the best will was there --
18 had been running down the number of contracting officers
19 throughout the preceding decade, and so, when we
20 suddenly came along and said "Send us 20 on the plane
21 tomorrow", there weren't 20 in the world at that stage.
22 So we had to get them trained up and qualified, but the
23 rigidity of the system is such that it took a long time.
24 So, to apologise and try to summarise the answer,
25 the problem was not the multiplicity of funding

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1 channels, the problem was the rigidity and slowness of
2 the procurement channel.
3 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Thank you. That's very clear.
4 You said earlier that the Oil Ministry, which is
5 almost the most important ministry in the town, was
6 excluded from your areas of responsibility. Last year,
7 in an interview, you described the CPA's performance in
8 the oil sector as a total disaster.
9 Can you amplify: (a) why you were excluded from this
10 area; and (b) why it was a total disaster?
11 ANDY BEARPARK: It was never, ever said to me officially --
12 and it was certainly never, ever put in writing, but
13 every member of my staff or anybody I ever knew said
14 that it was perfectly obvious that I couldn't be put in
15 charge of oil because I really wasn't American when it
16 reached that point and that oil would remain as an
17 American interest.
18 So it was a very specific instruction from Bremer
19 that I was not in charge of the Oil Ministry. Sadly, at
20 one stage, he'd forgotten he had issued that
21 instruction, so the Oil Ministry started reporting to me
22 by accident. So I developed a greater knowledge of what
23 the Oil Ministry was doing than I ever intended to.
24 Yes, it was a disaster -- I honestly can't remember
25 what was in my mind when I gave that interview, but it

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1 was a disaster in any number of ways to choose half
2 a dozen at random. I mean, smuggling was an enormous
3 problem and one where it was felt perhaps that the
4 British were not doing as well as the Americans would
5 have wished them to do in reducing the smuggling.
6 Attacks by insurgents were a major problem. We were
7 losing the oil pipeline for periods of time -- for
8 substantial periods of time, when we couldn't export
9 and, therefore, weren't making money.
10 At a trivial but important level, we didn't even
11 know what was going on, because I, at an early stage,
12 tried to tour some of the oil facilities to find out
13 what we were exporting and it gives an indication of the
14 fragility of the system, which was that when I went to
15 the nearest pumping station outside Baghdad, I asked --
16 I was shown figures showing exactly how much oil was
17 being pumped through that station, but the figures were
18 in English. Ones I could recognise.
19 When I asked a bit more closely, it turned out that,
20 in fact, all the meter dials that I could see had Arabic
21 numbers on them and the American military officer who
22 went there every day to check the figures didn't speak
23 a single word of Arabic, and why should he? Nor could
24 he read an Arabic dial. So what it meant was he was
25 just taking the word of some guy -- who might not even

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1 be the right guy, for all we knew -- as to how much oil
2 was pumping through that station. So that was another
3 one.
4 Then there were very odd commercial drivers with the
5 oil, which -- well, because we were not producing enough
6 refined product ourselves within Iraq -- even though we
7 may have been exporting unrefined oil, we were not
8 producing enough diesel or petrol or whatever for the
9 cars. So we were actually importing substantial amounts
10 of product from Kuwait, Turkey, et cetera, and the
11 contracts that governed that supply were handled in some
12 cases by the same companies who were responsible for
13 repairing the facilities that would replace that supply,
14 and the supply was being done on a purely cost plus
15 basis; in other words --
16 SIR RODERIC LYNE: "Companies" meaning American companies or
17 Iraqi companies?
18 ANDY BEARPARK: American companies. So what it meant was
19 that for a company involved in both the import of fuel
20 on a cost plus basis and the repair of a facility that
21 would remove the need to import that fuel, there were
22 those who have argued in the literature that they may
23 not have had the necessary commercial incentives to
24 complete the repairs.
25 So there were a lot of oddities like that about the

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1 system and, as I say, I do not know which one was in my
2 mind when I gave that interview.
3 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Final question from me on this subject:
4 was there an American assumption that the UK would
5 provide a higher level of financing for CPA South than
6 we actually did, because we had taken the lead
7 responsibility for these four provinces in the
8 southeast?
9 ANDY BEARPARK: At a senior level, I think the feeling was
10 that the Brits were making a perfectly reasonable and
11 fair contribution down in the south in every possible
12 sense, in terms of manpower, in terms of money,
13 et cetera, et cetera.
14 At a middle level, there was a problem, and the
15 problem was that, at the time involved -- and I'm now
16 thinking of summer to autumn 2003 -- the British -- and
17 it would be very difficult to define whether that was
18 politicians, diplomats or whom -- but never mind -- the
19 British were very much allowing the British press to run
20 with the story, "We, the Brits are doing it all properly
21 in Basra. If only those Yanks up in Baghdad would learn
22 from us, they could do a better job".
23 Now, that story did cause a lot of resentment at
24 certain levels in Baghdad. I don't think anybody would
25 try to rationalise it, but the fact is that the story

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1 ran time and time again. So that led people to think it
2 must be the official British Government policy to run
3 that story, even if it wasn't.
4 A result of that was that, at a middle level, there
5 were certainly American officials within CPA Baghdad who
6 would say to me, "Look, why are you coming whinging at
7 us yet again, Andy, to try to get some resources for CPA
8 South? You Brits know how to do it so well, why don't
9 you fund it as well, if you are that clever about it?"
10 So there was certainly an atmosphere like that.
11 THE CHAIRMAN: I would like to ask you a couple of questions
12 on the security dimension of things, clearly an
13 overwhelming part of the context. Looking at
14 Jerry Bremer's statement to this Inquiry, he said:
15 "In Iraq the coalition had three major challenges:
16 to provide security for the citizens of Iraq; to help
17 the Iraqis rebuild their economy; and to help the Iraqi
18 people put their country on the path to representative
19 government."
20 He said:
21 "The coalition military had responsibility for the
22 first of those, the CPA for the other two."
23 Well, separating out responsibility for security and
24 the future of Iraq, first of all, just on the causes,
25 after the initial looting phase, the violence began to

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1 build and build, particularly in Baghdad and the centre.
2 Did the CPA have a view of its own as to what was the
3 causality behind that?
4 ANDY BEARPARK: Firstly, my recollection of the figures
5 wouldn't be quite the same as the one you just
6 described, but I may well be wrong, and that's what
7 I mean about the frog in the water.
8 My recollection is that after the looting in Baghdad
9 security actually stabilised or possibly even improved
10 marginally in the July/August period, and it was only
11 then that it sharply declined. But that recollection
12 could be wrong.
13 Yes, I mean, the CPA view was, I think, pretty
14 strongly that the violence was being -- the lack of
15 security, the violence, was being caused by a number of
16 different factors, of which the -- in those days we
17 characterised -- if I can remember the initials, but
18 they don't matter -- I mean, one of them was the Former
19 Regime Loyalists, FRL. So this was people who had been
20 loyal to Saddam Hussein and that was a clearly defined
21 group in our minds.
22 The second one at that stage was Al-Qaeda, whether
23 that be true or not, but that was our code name, if you
24 like, for external forces, and then the third one was
25 criminal elements.

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1 So at that stage CPA -- to the extent that we had
2 a collective view, that was our view, that we were
3 dealing with those three groups of people and that,
4 therefore, we had to analyse the security situation
5 through that prism.
6 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. The CPA had within its set of
7 objectives developing a capacity for Iraqi security
8 forces to look after themselves over a period. How did
9 that fit with the American military view, talking about
10 that summer and autumn of 2003, about the security
11 problem? Did they think they owned it in its entirety?
12 ANDY BEARPARK: No. I think they felt that they owned the
13 security problem only specifically in the areas where
14 US troops were in charge. So they felt that they owned
15 the security problem in the north because that was
16 entirely the American area of responsibility. They felt
17 they owned the security situation in Baghdad because
18 Baghdad was American, but then, once you moved outside
19 of Baghdad and the north, the position would vary
20 immensely.
21 So all of the south was non-American, but if you
22 looked at the centre, parts of the centre were American
23 and parts of it weren't, and I think, in terms of the
24 US military, they felt total ownership when they were in
25 command, but they didn't really feel total ownership of

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1 the other areas.
2 THE CHAIRMAN: With a resulting gap --
3 ANDY BEARPARK: Yes.
4 THE CHAIRMAN: -- in ownership of the problem?
5 ANDY BEARPARK: Absolutely. I think the British were
6 commendable in terms of filling the gap in the south.
7 The British did own the south and took responsibility.
8 That was certainly not the case with other coalition
9 troops in other parts of the country who viewed their
10 role to be, I don't know, advisory presences rather than
11 actually part of a military force.
12 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. Developing the civilian side of
13 security, if I can put it that way, and capacity within
14 the whole of the law and justice system, and
15 specifically the police, who felt that they actually
16 owned that? Was it the CPA in this period? The
17 military who took on a lot of the training
18 responsibility accepted some by doing that, but did they
19 own the problem?
20 ANDY BEARPARK: No, the police -- the police problem -- the
21 training of the new Iraqi police force was perceived of
22 as an entirely civilian lead, even though military
23 resources might be required. So it was an entirely
24 civilian lead led by the CPA and led for a large part of
25 the process by Doug Brand, whom I think you have seen,

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1 but that was a very clear thing, that it was a civilian
2 lead that might require a military resources rather than
3 a military lead, et cetera.
4 THE CHAIRMAN: Right. Again, thinking of the period
5 from June when you arrived through to the late autumn,
6 the threat was changing and increasing. Did the CPA
7 have sufficient situational awareness and understanding
8 of the changing scale of threat and its potential impact
9 on CPA's own work across its objectives or was it, as it
10 were, a dawning or even late realisation of what was
11 happening on the security front and the impact that
12 would then have on reconstruction?
13 ANDY BEARPARK: No, I think it is quite clear that, at the
14 time, CPA underestimated the speed with which the
15 security situation was deteriorating and the effects and
16 consequences of that deterioration. As I say, whether
17 it be false or whatever, we were in our happy state of
18 denial until the mortaring started and, once the
19 mortaring started, that was the wake-up call that things
20 were getting worse.
21 But, to be honest, the sort of semi-denial stage
22 really went on all the way through to January
23 or February of 2004.
24 THE CHAIRMAN: You said earlier in your evidence that it was
25 the attacks on the Al-Rasheed Hotel in late October,

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1 which, if any time was, was the turning point, but did
2 even that, as it were, bring the leadership of the CPA
3 to realise what was happening? Because you have just
4 said that it really -- dawn only broke
5 in January/February of 2004.
6 ANDY BEARPARK: It is a difficult analogy, dawn only broke
7 in January/February 2004, but there was a false dawn
8 earlier on and the easiest thing to do is to just
9 explain that in absolutely practical terms.
10 What happened was that at the time or after the
11 second round of mortaring on the Al-Rasheed Hotel, it
12 was judged too difficult to live in the Al-Rasheed
13 Hotel, so the CPA staff had to decamp to live in the
14 palace. That, if you like, at a personal level, brought
15 it home to a lot of people that things had changed; ie,
16 they were sleeping on a palace floor, whereas previously
17 they had been sleeping in a hotel bedroom.
18 So that, if you like, was the false dawn, but
19 I think they were probably focusing -- and I do include
20 myself -- on the personal inconvenience rather than the
21 structural change, and the structural change was the
22 true dawn in January.
23 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Last point from me. It is really
24 to pick up one of the conclusions in the "Hard Lessons"
25 report from the Special Inspector General.

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1 The conclusion was that the CPA should not have
2 attempted large-scale infrastructure projects in the
3 dire security environment which existed by implication,
4 I think, from autumn onwards of 2003. Do you agree with
5 that conclusion?
6 ANDY BEARPARK: Yes, but I think I would quibble or argue
7 with definitions. Essentially, CPA stopped attempting
8 anyway because the security situation was so bad that it
9 forced CPA to stop. I think that the potential benefits
10 to the Iraqi population and to the relationship between
11 the coalition and the Iraqis was such that I wouldn't
12 have wanted to say "Just give up completely". I think
13 there were other ways that things could have been
14 achieved.
15 But in terms of an enormous, bigger than any ever
16 reconstruction programme the world has ever known, it
17 just wasn't going to happen.
18 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much. Lawrence, over to you.
19 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: I just want to ask a couple of
20 questions about Iraqi capacity. I think it is a sort of
21 standard mantra on the development side that the key
22 thing is to develop local capacity, build it up over
23 time, so that they can take over as the occupying
24 forces -- or however they are described forces, the
25 external forces -- leave.

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1 Now, the problem in this area seems to be, first,
2 that Iraqi capacity was assumed to be quite high at the
3 start and then turned out to be far less than envisaged,
4 and then, secondly, the whole de-Ba'athification
5 process. I just wonder if you could comment on both of
6 those factors.
7 ANDY BEARPARK: As far as the first is concerned, I think
8 there may be some points where I would differ from the
9 orthodoxy. The fact is that Iraq had a perfectly good
10 human capacity before we went and smashed it. It was
11 a perfectly functioning country with a perfectly
12 functioning health service, this, that and the other.
13 Now, we smashed that capacity, but you don't destroy
14 human beings in that sense. So potentially, that
15 capacity could have been reconstructed far more quickly
16 than it actually was.
17 It was made a lot more challenging by the looting.
18 Had that looting not taken place, it is my view that
19 a large number of Iraqi ministries could have been up
20 and running within days, if not weeks -- sorry, days or
21 weeks of the end of the invasion. The looting made that
22 a lot more difficult, but it was a challenge and not an
23 insuperable challenge and, in fact, the problem on that
24 side became the reverse problem -- I can't remember what
25 the syndrome is called -- where bits of the

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international community managed to convince themselves that the Iraqis could never cope without them, and people would do things like produce a five-year plan for the handover of a ministry, and you would feel like saying, "Why don't you make it five minutes? The guys knew what they were doing before you arrived. I think they will when you leave".

On the other point, the de-Ba'athification point, even after all these years I'm not sure that I have a view that would be particularly helpful. I read -- I was not involved at the time. So I have no idea who argued for and against and all the rest of it, but when I observed the effects of the policy, I don't believe that the effects of the policy were quite as severe as some of the critics of the policy point out, but that's a belief or an assertion on my part. I have no evidence to support it.

It seemed to me that at a senior -- my interaction with the senior levels of the Iraqi Civil Service was very limited, as I have explained in another answer, but to the extent that it existed, the issues that I seemed to be dealing with were ones of personal rivalry and jealousy, rather than de-Ba'athification. So X was trying to do down Y, not because Y had been a Ba'athist but because X wanted to gain an advantage and this was

his one opportunity to do so.

So I don't feel personally able to express a view or a definitive view on whether it was as serious a problem as some people argue or whether it wasn't, but I have my doubts.

SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Just finally, what you suggested was the issue was not building up Iraqi capacity, but recapturing it and recreating it. But do you think that was an integral part of CPA thinking or was the pressure still on a short-term actions that could produce short-term results?

ANDY BEARPARK: No, that wasn't part of CPA's thinking. CPA viewed itself as a crisis management organisation in that sense and viewed capacity building as being something which the aid donors may or may not do in due course. So it didn't involve itself substantially in the question of capacity building.

SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Could it have done?

ANDY BEARPARK: It could have done. It would have required a slightly different mindset and a slightly different resource to enable it to have done that.

If I could give a detailed but not too long example, it would be that, when it came to the repair of the electricity system, the CPA could be argued to be responsible for everything. The actual repairs were

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1 being carried out under one of two systems, one of them
2 was the US army corps of engineers system which had no
3 interest in any form of Iraqi involvement whatsoever.
4 Just shoot them, get them out of the way and repair the
5 substation. That was straightforward. But, at the
6 other extreme, capacity building was going on, because
7 under the Bechtel contracts, because they were imbued
8 with the USAID philosophy, they were doing capacity
9 building as they reconstructed.
10 So it wasn't that none of it happened, but it was
11 that CPA, as an institution, didn't view it as its
12 business.
13 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Thank you very much.
14 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Can we now move on to the transition
15 to the decision to transfer sovereignty to the Iraqis?
16 That led to, I think, acceleration of some aspects of
17 the CPA's work and seizing some others. Were you
18 involved in these decisions?
19 ANDY BEARPARK: I was -- yes, but my primary involvement at
20 that stage was in the -- in how the decision impacted
21 upon the field network.
22 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: But from your point of view, were
23 the priorities right that were selected for the
24 remainder of CPA's life? I mean, what did you think of
25 the priorities determined?

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1 ANDY BEARPARK: I don't think there was a desperately
2 sophisticated system of deciding on priorities at that
3 stage, but to the extent that decisions -- and most
4 decisions were being made by default, what was possible
5 and what wasn't possible. But to the extent that
6 decisions were being taken, my view was that they didn't
7 look particularly stupid and that some of the sillier
8 parts of these strategic visions were just being quietly
9 forgotten about anyway, and the focus seems to be on
10 things that actually mattered.
11 So, as I say, I don't think there was a structured
12 process leading to that, because CPA would always want
13 to pretend it could do more than it could anyway, but
14 equally I don't think it was causing any particular
15 difficulty.
16 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: How did the Iraqi partners react to
17 these decisions?
18 ANDY BEARPARK: I don't think they did react, in a sense.
19 I think, in one sense, at a political level, the
20 Governing Council or whatever it would be, their view
21 was simply that it was right to hand over sovereignty as
22 quickly as possible, so they weren't really interested
23 in the detail, they just wanted sovereignty handed over.
24 Then, if you look down one level, at whether it be
25 a minister or a department, then I don't think there

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1 would be a composite view. It would very much
2 a ministry-by-ministry, minister-by-minister view and
3 you know, if their particular interests were being met,
4 they would think it was a wonderful system. If their
5 particular interests weren't being met, they would think
6 it was a stupid system.
7 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: But from your point of view, did the
8 truncated CPA timetable have -- what impact did it have
9 on the CPA's ability to utilise the reconstruction
10 funds?
11 ANDY BEARPARK: I don't think that the truncated timetable
12 was an issue. I think the real issue was just that, by
13 then, security was spiralling out of control, rather
14 than sliding downhill and, therefore, in fact, security
15 and security considerations were trumping absolutely
16 everything. The only aspect where the truncation had an
17 impact upon reconstruction and the expenditure of money
18 was that it reopened the battle between the Department
19 of Defence and the State Department, and so, something
20 like the final three months of the CPA's existence were
21 just one permanent battleground as to who would handle
22 the 18.6 billion, and in what way, after the CPA was
23 abolished.
24 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: But what role did you play in
25 developing the post-CPA strategy for the US and the UK?

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1 ANDY BEARPARK: I had a very, very considerable involvement
2 with the US development of strategy, partially because
3 by then I was one of the few people who had the
4 experience of what had happened so far, that they wished
5 to draw upon, partially because each side, if you like,
6 thought they could pray me in aid of what they wished to
7 achieve. So I had a very substantial involvement in the
8 development of the US strategy.
9 I can't remember having any involvement at all in
10 the development of UK strategy because, as far as I was
11 aware, that was being handled directly -- I'm sure
12 Jeremy's successor would have been involved in a big
13 way, but essentially it was a Basra/UK involvement
14 rather than one that involved the CPA in Baghdad.
15 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: But were you surprised that
16 a decision was made to disband the CPA entirely after
17 the transfer of power to the Iraqi interim government?
18 ANDY BEARPARK: No, I think my view at the time was that the
19 CPA was perceived to have failed. It was perceived to
20 have been dysfunctional and, therefore, even though one
21 could construct a logical organisational or management
22 case for maintaining it in a form after the transfer of
23 power, in political and presentational terms it would
24 only be sensible to abolish it.
25 Even if you kept the same people in the same

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building, you could and should abolish the CPA to mark that change, not only for the Iraqi people, but for the international community.

BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: So from your point of view it was the right decision?

ANDY BEARPARK: Yes.

BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: But as the transfer of sovereignty was approaching, what assumptions were being made about the capacity of Iraqi politicians and technocrats to step up to these responsibilities, and were these assumptions realistic?

ANDY BEARPARK: I think there was no consistent picture that would emerge on that. It would be very, very much a ministry by ministry analysis, and the dynamics could work in either direction. I mean, it could be that you had an Iraqi ministry which was actually very competent or you could have an Iraqi ministry which was actually very incompetent, but since you still had the same American advisers there, you could have a case where you had an Iraqi ministry which was very competent but where the American adviser had decided to take a view that they would require at least 20 years before they could be done without, and therefore the dynamic, his dynamic -- or his or her dynamic would be to say, "No, they are not ready to do those things." So I think it

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1 is impossible to generalise across the range of
2 ministries. This was very much a ministry by ministry
3 analysis.
4 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Are you saying it wasn't very
5 sophisticated?
6 ANDY BEARPARK: No, I'm saying it was very variable. The
7 factors involved in each ministry were very different
8 and therefore one had to look at each ministry alone,
9 and you couldn't just generalise and say, "This is the
10 picture across the board," and in fact that was
11 recognised by Bremer and CPA, in that each individual
12 ministry was given a separate handover date for when it
13 would be handed over to total Iraqi authority.
14 Now, given the chaotic circumstances of Baghdad or
15 Iraq, at the end I'm quite sure we just bundled them
16 across the table and said, "Here, have them." But we
17 tried to have a rational approach to say when was
18 a ministry certified as being capable -- being
19 appropriate for handover.
20 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: So what you are saying is the
21 variation was appreciated but practically it wasn't
22 always possible to --
23 ANDY BEARPARK: Absolutely.
24 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Thank you.
25 THE CHAIRMAN: Lawrence, I think you have got a question you

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1 would like to put.
2 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: It goes back over the sort of broad
3 discussion that we have been having and it is
4 hypothetical. One of the issues for the UK was whether
5 to concentrate on the south or to look across Iraq as an
6 occupying power with the United States.
7 Now, as we know, this goes into a situation where we
8 did concentrate on the south, and you have described how
9 the CPA was very much an American operation. I'm just
10 wondering whether you think it would have made a lot of
11 difference to how this story turned out if the British
12 approach had been quite different; instead of having our
13 own bit in the south, we put what effort and resources
14 we had into Baghdad and into the CPA?
15 ANDY BEARPARK: My suspicion is that the story would not
16 have turned out significantly different, but in Basra
17 there was immense British influence, and the British
18 fiefdom, for a number of years, but then it vanished and
19 just went away and became part of an American Iraqi
20 fiefdom anyway. So in the long-term, had the British
21 not been in Basra, I don't think that the south outcome
22 in Basra would have been substantially different.
23 If I look at the other side of the coin, which would
24 be the British being in greater numbers or greater
25 influence in Baghdad, then I don't think that would have

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1 made any difference either because they would never have
2 been there in sufficient numbers or with sufficient
3 power or influence to substantially change the outcomes
4 in the rest of Iraq.
5 So I don't think it would -- the -- I don't think
6 the outcome would have been different in the mega sense,
7 in the big picture sense, had we behaved differently.
8 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Thank you.
9 THE CHAIRMAN: I think we have come pretty much to the end
10 of our agenda. I'm going to ask you in a moment for any
11 general reflections, drawing on the whole of your
12 experience, that you might like to offer, but I have got
13 one or two particular points. You said first thing this
14 morning, as a rough rule of thumb you might achieve
15 10 per cent of an initial plan in any of these
16 post-conflict reconstruction situations. That seems
17 a pretty low number but no doubt realistic. Do you
18 think London and Washington, speaking of their two
19 political governmental systems, really get that?
20 ANDY BEARPARK: No, I don't think they do. Institutionally,
21 I don't think they really understand what's going on,
22 and the reason I say that is that they are very powerful
23 machines, whether one is looking at number 10, the
24 White House or whatever it may be. But,
25 institutionally, they tend to look at a small, single

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1 issue over a very short timescale. Certainly on British
2 side "long-term" means the Sunday newspapers. So it
3 makes it quite difficult to keep a sense of the broader
4 picture that you require to come up with that
5 10 per cent figure.
6 So, no, I don't think they do.
7 THE CHAIRMAN: And applying your 10 per cent rule of thumb
8 to Iraq in your time, looking at CPA's objectives as
9 they were forming when you arrived, what had been
10 achieved by the time it was folded? 10 per cent might
11 be about it? Does the rule of thumb stand up in the
12 Iraqi situation? Was it even worse?
13 ANDY BEARPARK: No, I think the 10 per cent does stand up.
14 I think it is very easy for anybody, especially me, to
15 tell jokes about how awful the CPA was, but the reality
16 is some things were achieved and were achieved tolerably
17 well. But the currency exchange is only one, and I know
18 it is an easy example, but the reality is that an
19 enormous exercise took place, nobody got killed and the
20 amounts of money that got stolen were relatively small.
21 So I think there are success stories as well as
22 failures, and even if one looks at some of the failures,
23 I would argue that they were potential successes waiting
24 to happen, in the sense that they were steps in a
25 process that had to be gone through before you achieve

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1 the state you might wish to achieve. I certainly don't
2 want to put the marking higher than 10 per cent but
3 I'm happy with 10.
4 THE CHAIRMAN: One specific point and then I'll ask for your
5 general reflections, and the specific point is: you
6 mentioned just in passing about the state of Iraq at the
7 time of the invasion, as being a functioning country,
8 a functioning governmental system, and you mentioned the
9 health service as being perfectly functioning.
10 We have heard quite a lot of evidence on the other
11 side of that specific question, that the impact of
12 sanctions all the way through, up to 2003 -- and
13 Saddam's use, as it were, in perverting the effect of
14 sanctions -- on something like the health system,
15 feeding through into infant mortality and life
16 expectancy, that really it had gone a long way down
17 hill. I don't know whether you would like to reflect on
18 that -- by 2003, before the invasion.
19 ANDY BEARPARK: I think my description would be that it was
20 the output or the objectives that had been seriously
21 perverted, rather than the processes that would enable
22 the service to be delivered. So in a number of cases
23 the -- if you like, the fact that Iraqis were unable to
24 get access to the latest technology or, more
25 importantly, the latest training would have an effect

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1 and it would mean that your doctor or your electrical
2 engineer was not as well trained as he would have been
3 had those sanctions not been in place, but it doesn't
4 mean that he wasn't there, and so if one could strip
5 away all the other factors, then I think the bringing up
6 to speed, if that's the phrase, for those Iraqi
7 professionals would have been a relatively quick and
8 painless process.
9 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.
10 Well, I am going now to invite to you give us
11 general reflections. Of course, your long experience
12 goes right back into the heart of the British government
13 system in number 10 as well as various difficult places
14 and situations around the world. Are there reflections
15 you would like to offer us?
16 ANDY BEARPARK: The temptation, but, indulge me, you needn't
17 worry, is, of course, to speak for the next four hours
18 and offer you the 500 recommendations. I appreciate you
19 would not be pleased with me.
20 I would like to go for four reflections on the basis
21 of what I saw in Iraq.
22 The first one is that stabilisation or post-conflict
23 reconstruction is not the same as development. It is
24 a mistake that's too commonly made and it has a very
25 important consequence. This is a UK-specific

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1 reflection, and it is that, as long as the
2 Stabilisation Unit is based within DFID, it will not be
3 fit for purpose by definition, because DFID is an
4 organisation, which I was proud to work for for many
5 years, whose mission is to eradicate poverty.
6 Stabilisation has got nothing to do with eradicating
7 poverty. Nor, indeed, should the stabilisation unit be
8 placed in the MoD, which is there to fight wars or keep
9 us secure, or the Foreign Office, whose purpose is
10 diplomacy. If it is to become fit for purpose, it must
11 be free-standing, with a minister who is accountable to
12 the Cabinet, Parliament, whatever it may be.
13 The second one is that -- and I have said this, so
14 I can do it very, very briefly -- planning is essential
15 even if it is wrong. You are better off with a bad plan
16 than no plan. It is as simple as that.
17 But that leads on to the third one, which is that
18 you must design your delivery mechanisms in advance.
19 The problem is that delivery mechanisms sound nerdish.
20 No senior diplomat, civil servant or policy maker is
21 ever going to want to talk about delivery mechanisms,
22 but if he doesn't have a delivery mechanism, he isn't
23 going to be able to deliver his policies. It is as
24 simple as that. So they must be designed in advance.
25 That would be a third one, and then the fourth one

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1 is that -- and this is one that we haven't touched on
2 today -- but it is -- I feel very strongly that we must
3 improve, systemically and with a step change,
4 civil/military cooperation. The general description of
5 civil/military cooperation is that, "It was awful when
6 I arrived but it was pretty good when I left." Well, it
7 seems to me that on that basis it should by now be the
8 most perfect science the world has ever known, but it is
9 not, and that is not because of a lack of desire, it is
10 because of systemic problems.
11 Until the senior policy-makers face up to that and
12 come out of denial, they are not going to redress -- or
13 resolve those issues. At the moment -- and probably for
14 the last five years -- they have been in total denial.
15 You are not allowed to say that it is not consistently
16 getting better. But when you are allowed to say it,
17 there are in fact things that can be done to make it
18 substantially better than it is now, and everybody would
19 like that resolved. There is no blame out there, there
20 is no competition out there.
21 My summary.
22 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much. A for instance on that
23 last point as to systemic reasons? Time (inaudible)
24 difference, for example?
25 ANDY BEARPARK: No, civilian/military cooperation involves

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1 the relationship between two immensely different things.
2 Now, the civilian side can very often only afford
3 a limited interface. The military can afford an
4 unlimited interface. So in a place like Basra -- but
5 Basra could be Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Helmand,
6 whichever it may be -- at any one stage there are
7 probably 100 military people doing planning of one sort
8 or another. The only resource that the civilians can
9 offer is one quarter of somebody's time.
10 But let's call that one whole person. If that whole
11 person is out there, there will be 100 meetings taking
12 place every day, where in theory he should be present.
13 He can only be present at one. So 99 military planners
14 are going away saying, "DFID is useless," and only one
15 of them is admitting that DFID does actually know what
16 it is talking about." But that just can't work. That's
17 a systemic problem.
18 But it is a systemic problem which can actually be
19 resolved very quickly -- this was recognised in Bosnia
20 anyway in 1994/1995 -- which is that, whatever your
21 limited civilian resource is, it must match exactly into
22 where you insert it into the military machine. If you
23 can only afford one person, that person has to be the
24 equivalent of the Commanding General. If you can afford
25 three people, you can place them two ranks down, and if

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1 you can only afford one junior person, that person must
2 be on the personal staff of the Commanding General.
3 These things are not actually rocket science,
4 I believe is the military saying, but they do appear to
5 be lessons that have not been learned.

6 THE CHAIRMAN: This has been an exceptionally valuable
7 session. We are very grateful to you. Thank you.
8 Now, we are going to resume hearings at 1.30, when
9 we will hear from Martin Howard in his role as
10 Director General of Operational Policy in the
11 Ministry of Defence between 2004 and 2007.
12 (12.30 pm)
13 (The short adjournment)
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