

1

Monday, 5 July 2010

2 (2.00 pm)

3

MS SALLY KEEBLE

4 THE CHAIRMAN: Good afternoon everyone and welcome to our
5 witness, to Sally Keeble. You were Parliamentary
6 Undersecretary of State in the Department for
7 International Development between, I think, May 2002
8 and June 2003.

9 After you left DFID in June 2003, you wrote to the
10 Prime Minister, Tony Blair, on 16 June 2003, setting out
11 your concerns about DFID's performance on Iraq. This
12 letter has been declassified and we can use it as the
13 basis for this session.

14 Two other letters have also been declassified which
15 we can draw on in this session: the Prime Minister's
16 response to you, dated 25 July 2003; and
17 Sir Suma Chakrabarti's letter to Sir Andrew Turnbull of
18 4 July 2003, which I understand you have seen.

19 SALLY KEEBLE: Yes.

20 THE CHAIRMAN: These documents are being placed on our
21 website now. Our witness has also produced a statement,
22 which is being placed on our website now, and thank you
23 for that.

24 I say on every occasion we recognise that witnesses
25 give evidence based on their recollection of events and

1 we, of course, check what we hear against the papers to
2 which we have access and some of which are still coming
3 in.

4 I remind each witness on each occasion that they
5 will later be asked to sign a transcript of the evidence
6 to the effect that the evidence given is truthful, fair
7 and accurate.

8 With those preliminaries out of the way, I'll ask
9 Baroness Prashar to open the questions.

10 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: As the Chairman said, thank you very
11 much indeed for your statement. In your statement you
12 say that you visited DFID Iraq teams in London; one was
13 the monitoring team and the policy teams.

14 SALLY KEEBLE: That's right.

15 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: What was the purpose of these
16 visits?

17 SALLY KEEBLE: The purpose was really to understand what the
18 staff were doing, to see the circumstances in which they
19 were working and, also, because things were difficult,
20 obviously, at the time, to show a level of ministerial
21 interest in what staff were doing whom I had
22 a responsibility for as a junior minister in the
23 department.

24 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: So this was basically to brief
25 yourself in terms of what was going on?

1 SALLY KEEBLE: That's right.

2 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Did you form any impression or
3 assessment when you had these discussions?

4 SALLY KEEBLE: Yes, I think, as I set down in the letter to
5 the Prime Minister, I was very surprised that the
6 monitoring team didn't have language skills. You know,
7 they said they were monitoring for the humanitarian
8 impact, which was all fair enough and obviously very
9 important, and they were producing reports which were
10 circulated which were very important, but I was very
11 surprised about the language skills issue.

12 For the staff, the other staff, in the policy team
13 which I visited slightly later on, I thought they were
14 working obviously under -- they were working under
15 a great deal of pressure. It was a very difficult
16 policy area, it was a very difficult time. There was
17 a lot of controversy about the war and I had just
18 assumed that, within the group, somebody would have been
19 to Iraq, albeit that -- it was obviously challenging for
20 them to be able to do that, and I was a bit taken aback
21 by the fact that nobody had been and only one person had
22 worked specifically on the country as one of a range of
23 other countries and I was very struck by that.

24 THE CHAIRMAN: A little slower.

25 SALLY KEEBLE: Sorry. I mean, at the time, as I say, my

1 purpose in visiting was to see what they were doing and
2 understand what they were doing. It wasn't to increase
3 the pressure that was already on them and that was
4 really why -- I don't have the date of the visit, I have
5 to say. That was really why I put my observations to
6 the Prime Minister. What I didn't want to do was to
7 appear to be criticising staff. You know, I think were
8 doing a very difficult job under a great deal of
9 pressure.

10 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: But you also say that you regularly
11 attended departmental meetings on Iraq.

12 SALLY KEEBLE: Yes.

13 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Can you recall who else was in those
14 meetings and what was discussed?

15 SALLY KEEBLE: Those were, you know, quite large meetings.
16 There were a range of officials and obviously the
17 Secretary of State as well.

18 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Did you make any contribution?
19 I mean, you attended them. Did you make any
20 contribution? Did you raise any issues?

21 SALLY KEEBLE: I made some contribution. I didn't make
22 a lot. I raised an issue one time about the need for
23 a plan. I also raised issues about the financing. In
24 particular, I raised issues when -- issues about how
25 much of the funding which had been allocated had

1 actually gone out -- or how much of the programme had
2 been specifically allocated as -- to particular
3 projects, as it were, and how much had been disbursed,
4 because I was concerned about that, and I made
5 contributions on that. I also at one point made
6 contributions when there was an issue about whether or
7 not they should have a plan.

8 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Did you have any impact? Were you
9 able to influence and, if you made a contribution, did
10 that have any impact?

11 SALLY KEEBLE: I sometimes -- I got some information about
12 the disbursements and, after I made the point about the
13 planning, that was picked up as well.

14 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: But you also say in your statement
15 that you played a deputising role for the Secretary of
16 State and answering oral questions and so on. Did you
17 deputise in any other capacity on Iraq?

18 SALLY KEEBLE: No.

19 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: So that was just a kind of general
20 deputising?

21 SALLY KEEBLE: Yes, that's right. It was answering
22 questions, but I did not have the -- I obviously didn't
23 have the policy lead on it and I did not have
24 a decision-making role, no.

25 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Did you discuss Iraq often either

1 with the Secretary of State or the Permanent Secretary?

2 SALLY KEEBLE: I think -- I can recall, I think, two

3 sessions with the Permanent Secretary and not very many

4 private ones with the Secretary of State, no.

5 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: So I mean did you seek to get more

6 involved because, you know, were you seeking to have

7 meetings on Iraq? Because you were briefing yourself,

8 you know, and you obviously had concerns. Did you

9 actually try to get more involved?

10 SALLY KEEBLE: Well, I had a range of other

11 responsibilities, as you can see. I went to the

12 meetings. I obviously had to keep myself informed,

13 which I did through sort of reading the papers as they

14 came through and I did the two meetings to the

15 department -- to the different sections of the

16 department. I mean, I wasn't quite clear what further

17 you were thinking.

18 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: No, in terms of -- because, if you

19 had concerns, did you seek to have meetings, did you try

20 to have discussions with them, raise your concerns with

21 the Permanent Secretary or the Secretary of State?

22 SALLY KEEBLE: I think the actions that I took are written

23 down here. I raised some issues in the meetings.

24 I also, once it -- once there were the real pressures

25 because of the financial programming, I raised it with

1 the Director of Government Relations. Then, because
2 things were progressing quite fast, things were moving
3 fast and all this took place in quite a short space of
4 time, I also decided that the way that I could best
5 ensure that -- that my concerns were properly put
6 through government and that lessons -- the lessons that
7 I might be able to contribute were actually taken were
8 by writing to the Prime Minister and raising it with him
9 in a meeting when I left government.

10 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Were you at any time engaged on
11 discussions on Iraq with Whitehall or with international
12 partners on DIFD's behalf?

13 SALLY KEEBLE: Not with international partners, no. Oh and I
14 had some discussions -- I had a couple of meetings with
15 the -- I can't remember her title now, but it was one of
16 the senior officials, who talked about the work she was
17 doing across Whitehall.

18 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: You don't know which department that
19 was?

20 SALLY KEEBLE: Yes, yes, yes, it was one of the DFID
21 officials. She will be a witness here later on.¹

22 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Okay. In a letter to
23 Sir Andrew Turnbull, Sir Suma Chakrabarti's letter which
24 has been declassified, the 4 July letter, he states:

¹The witness later clarified that she had meant to refer to Dr Nicola Brewer CMG, Director General Regional Programmes DFID June 2002 - August 2004. Dr Brewer did not appear at a public evidence session, but submitted a witness statement to the Inquiry which was published on 12 October 2010.

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1 opportunity for DFID to participate in Whitehall
2 discussions. This hampered our own planning to some
3 extent but, more importantly, complicated our efforts to
4 be joined up with the rest of government." Did you
5 experience such difficulties in engaging with Whitehall
6 or what was happening to DFID colleagues?

7 SALLY KEEBLE: I think this probably relates in
8 particular to another letter that has been declassified,
9 which I think relates to a time before I was in the
10 department, when the new strategy policy for Iraq was
11 being prepared. I'm sorry, I should just say in response
12 to your earlier question, I also spoke to a colleague in
13 the Ministry of Defence raising my concerns and I have
14 set that out in my witness statement as well. So I
15 should have referred to that. So I think there was
16 a constraint earlier on, which is documented in the
17 letters that have been released and there is also,
18 obviously, the constraint which I think has also been
19 referred to generally, about engaging with other
20 stakeholders and the fact that obviously, for DFID, that
21 meant, because it had to relate to different UN agencies
22 and NGOs, then that put a particular constraint on as
23 well and I had assumed, when I read this letter, which
24 was quite recently, that that reference also -- that
25 that point also referred to the constraint about talking

1 to stakeholders.

2 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Thank you very much.

3 THE CHAIRMAN: I would like to ask one supplementary, if
4 I may. You had held office for two years, I think, as
5 a Parliamentary Undersecretary in the former Department
6 of -- whatever it was then, Environment, Transport.

7 Can I ask: was Clare Short, your Secretary of
8 State's approach to using her junior ministers one that
9 you recognised from your previous experience or was it
10 different?

11 SALLY KEEBLE: My previous experience was just one year.

12 I mean, I think it was a very different kind of
13 department. In the previous job it was, you know -- it
14 was a much larger department and there was a lot more
15 decision-making because it was management of a lot more
16 in the way of programmes, you know, transport
17 programmes, housing programmes, and suchlike. So there
18 were larger amounts of money going through that you were
19 taking decisions on and it was very different in nature.

20 THE CHAIRMAN: So it is not really possible to draw
21 a comparison?

22 SALLY KEEBLE: I think it is very hard to draw a comparison
23 and I think there were -- there were, you know,
24 different arguments you could put on either side.
25 I think, you know -- so I think it is very hard to

1 compare.

2 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. One other point, just for the
3 record. I think you mentioned elsewhere that you had
4 had some discussion with Adam Ingram in the
5 Ministry of Defence, the then minister for the armed
6 forces.

7 SALLY KEEBLE: Yes.

8 THE CHAIRMAN: Was that specifically on your Iraq-related
9 concerns?

10 SALLY KEEBLE: That's what I referred to, which I forgot to
11 mention to Baroness Prashar earlier, that I spoke to him
12 a couple of times just about what was happening.

13 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. I'll ask Sir Lawrence Freedman to
14 pick up the questions. Lawrence?

15 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Before we turn to the concerns you
16 raised in your letter to the Prime Minister, I would
17 like to ask you about a concern you raised in your
18 statement, rather than in your letter.

19 You mention a discussion in February 2003 of DFID's
20 role in the post-conflict period. Were you present at
21 that meeting?

22 SALLY KEEBLE: Sorry, which ...?

23 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: February 2003? There was
24 a discussion of what DFID's role was going to be in the
25 post-conflict period.

1 SALLY KEEBLE: Yes, I was present. I think it was discussed
2 quite a number of times. I was present at one
3 discussion -- at least one discussion about that.

4 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: You expressed concern in your
5 statement that the issue of whether DFID would
6 concentrate on one sector was not resolved. Do you
7 think this was part of a sort of wider government lack
8 of clarity on this issue?

9 SALLY KEEBLE: I certainly thought that that issue about the
10 role should have been sorted out very much earlier. In
11 fact, the debate continued and it continued -- at sort
12 of cross-government level rather than at my level.

13 THE CHAIRMAN: For clarity, you are referring to
14 a geographical sector, I take it, not a functional
15 sector like health or education?

16 SALLY KEEBLE: That's right.

17 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: It is basically about the south --

18 SALLY KEEBLE: Yes, it was a south versus a more general
19 role and that seemed to me one of the things which I was
20 going to actually point to, perhaps at the end, was that
21 I think this was one of the issues that should have been
22 sorted out very much earlier.

23 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: This is an issue, obviously, we have
24 come across a number of times. It is important because
25 we ended up in the south. It is not clear at what point

1 we did actually agree to that.

2 Can you recall from this meeting what seemed to be
3 the major issues? I mean, was your concern that it
4 should have gone one way or the other or that you had
5 particular view, that it should, for example, be the
6 south, or you were just concerned that no decision had
7 been taken?

8 SALLY KEEBLE: What concerned me was that particularly once
9 we got into the New Year and once we got
10 into February -- and although nobody knew exactly when
11 the action was going to happen, there were timeframes
12 and there were discussions about limits -- that there
13 were a number of critical issues which were still being
14 debated, this being one of them, and there were --
15 I mean, there were arguments for either case. I mean,
16 I, you know, I thought that -- well, there were some
17 clear arguments made for having geographic sector
18 because, you know, there should be a relationship
19 between British aid and British military, as it were,
20 you know, in brief.

21 There were obviously also very good arguments for
22 saying, you know, DFID had a pro-poor mandate and it
23 should, therefore, be going in on the basis of need, but
24 it just seemed to me that, if you are having that debate
25 in early to mid-February, so close to the action, that

1 it was very hard then to do planning around any other
2 logistical support, and the decision as to how -- what
3 the architecture should be and what DFID's place should
4 be in it should have been the previous autumn.

5 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Clare Short I think would have been
6 associated with the idea that was still there after the
7 war, that the British contribution to be exemplary in
8 some respect. Do you recall that as being part of the
9 argument for a particular sector in the south?

10 SALLY KEEBLE: I think the exemplary discussion was one that
11 took place in Cabinet and across government. The main
12 discussion that took place, as I recall, in the
13 department, was around whether it should be based in the
14 south or whether it should be more based on need across
15 the country --

16 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: If there was going to be a debate --

17 SALLY KEEBLE: -- but the exemplary one was linked in the
18 discussions that took place in Cabinet and so on.

19 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: But it would be hard to be exemplary
20 unless you had a very particular sector to work on?

21 SALLY KEEBLE: Yes, that's right. Yes, yes.

22 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Give us some sort of flavour of the
23 what the sort of views were back and forth on this issue
24 and what were the -- you have given one argument as to
25 why it might be helpful to be in the south -- just in

1 the south, what were the arguments for a broader view?

2 SALLY KEEBLE: Well, one of the arguments about the
3 exemplary role was about the financial cost of it as
4 well, and I mean, that, as I think I have set out very
5 clearly, was always a major concern of mine.

6 The other arguments was about the -- whether
7 international development assistance should be
8 associated with the military and the other one was
9 obviously that DFID had -- its mandate was for pro-poor
10 development and, therefore, assistance should be
11 provided based on need. So there were a lot of
12 discussions. At the same time, there was also a lot of
13 discussion about the legality of the post-war
14 reconstruction and what the exact powers were of the --
15 what the legal powers were and the legal authorities
16 were of the occupying powers.

17 I was -- in fact, I was out of the country on
18 a visit for some of that discussion, but that was
19 obviously a very critical one, as it affected thinking
20 about how the department was going to engage after the
21 war.

22 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: What effect did you think the lack
23 of clarity on this issue had on DFID's own planning?

24 SALLY KEEBLE: I think -- I mean, I think -- I think it was
25 a very obvious constraint, along with the constraints

1 about deployment and finances. I think -- I think it
2 was a problem.

3 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Just finally, you didn't actually
4 raise this particular problem in your letter to the
5 Prime Minister, you raised the other issues you
6 mentioned. Was there any reason why?

7 SALLY KEEBLE: I think -- I agree it is not clearly there.
8 There was an issue about relationship with the CPA,
9 which I think partly went into that debate as well.

10 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Okay. That's fine, thank you.

11 SALLY KEEBLE: Thank you.

12 THE CHAIRMAN: We'll turn to Sir Martin Gilbert now.
13 Martin?

14 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: If I could turn to your letter to the
15 Prime Minister, you left DFID in the reshuffle of
16 12 June 2003. You then had a telephone conversation
17 with the Prime Minister and you wrote to him on 16 June.
18 You set out in your letter a number of concerns
19 about DFID's performance, during the planning and
20 operational phases of Iraq. Could you tell us what it
21 was that prompted you to write your letter at that time?

22 SALLY KEEBLE: I actually had a phone call. It wasn't after
23 the reshuffle, it was actually before. The reason
24 I wrote the letter at the time I did was that I was
25 concerned about what had happened and I -- I wanted to

1 make sure that my concerns were properly logged into
2 government so that something could be done about them
3 and I wasn't -- I certainly didn't want to do that
4 publicly because, from what I had seen, that did not --
5 you know, didn't ensure that your views got the best
6 airing that they might inside government and, of course,
7 we were still at war and, you know, with the troops
8 still in theatre, I thought it wasn't a proper way to go
9 about things.

10 So I decided -- and I decided this quite some time
11 actually before the reshuffle -- that I was going to
12 write to the Prime Minister and I was also going to use
13 my sort of exit interview, as it were, to talk through
14 my concerns with him and I also gave him a copy of the
15 letter there so that those issues could be taken
16 forward.

17 At the time, if you recall, during that June things
18 were starting to improve a bit in Iraq, the insurgency
19 hadn't started yet and the way I looked at it, the
20 things that I was concerned about, the decisions needed
21 to have been taken the previous autumn and what I wanted
22 to make sure of was that the concerns I had had been
23 logged so that if -- you know, lessons could be learned
24 for the future. So that they could look to -- you know,
25 extract whatever was of value. But that's why I did it.

1 But I had made my decision that I was going to do that
2 quite some time before.

3 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: How long before the reshuffle was the
4 telephone conversation where you expressed your --

5 SALLY KEEBLE: Oh, that was shortly before, but I was --
6 I was certainly clear by mid-April that I was -- that
7 that was what I was going to do.

8 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: In your letter you deal, among other
9 things, with the organisational and staffing
10 arrangements and you expressed your concern about DFID's
11 lack of planning overall and also about the level of
12 experience of the two Iraqi teams. In reference to one
13 of the teams you wrote:

14 "I was very concerned about the level of experience
15 and support it had and the general morale. I would have
16 expected DFID to set up in an advance of the military
17 action a solid team with the management support and
18 facilities needed to operate quickly and effectively on
19 an issue that was such a high priority in government."

20 What led to that particular concern and how long had
21 that been building up in your mind?

22 SALLY KEEBLE: I don't have the date of the visit, but that
23 relates back to the first question. What I was
24 concerned about was that this -- that this unit had been
25 brought together after the action had started, as

1 indeed, you know, a lot of the other units dealing with
2 this had been set up very late on.

3 Whilst -- you know, all the people in it, I wouldn't
4 criticise in any way whatsoever. I thought they were in
5 a very difficult position, but I thought, if you looked
6 at the skill mix of a policy team dealing on Iraq, that
7 I would have expected that there would have been more
8 direct experience of actually working on Iraq -- on Iraq
9 issues, given that, obviously, practical experience in
10 Iraq was going to be difficult because of the nature of
11 the previous regime and, again, with a media monitoring
12 unit, I mean, it is not, you know, a criticism of the
13 individual staff, but if you look at the skill mix of
14 a team dealing with media monitoring for Iraq, that that
15 might have included somebody with relevant language
16 skills, and that was my concern about it.

17 It wasn't a criticism of the individual staff
18 involved there and I certainly didn't want, in this
19 quite difficult circumstances, to increase the pressure
20 on them.

21 I suppose one thing that it did make me think was it
22 did make me wonder about the sort of arrangements for
23 the preparation, given that, you know, this is the
24 position the staff were in.

25 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Did what you were seeing with regard to

1 DFID's involvement in Iraq contrast with what you had
2 seen during your year with DFID's involvement in other
3 areas? The level of preparation and ...?

4 SALLY KEEBLE: Well, the level of personal experience
5 certainly did, because most -- I mean, DFID had a -- has
6 a phenomenally -- you know, experienced and highly
7 skilled workforce and that was partly why I was so
8 surprised then that -- and I had seen them operating in
9 all kinds of areas and on all kinds of policies and it
10 was, therefore, of a surprise to me to find that this
11 was the case with this -- you know, with these two
12 particular teams.

13 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: In this letter to Sir Andrew Turnbull
14 in answer to your own letter to the Prime Minister
15 Sir Suma Chakrabarti wrote:

16 "DFID moved very swiftly to put together a high
17 calibre and senior Iraq team. We instructed the
18 immediate transfer of key officials into the Iraq team
19 at short notice."

20 He added:

21 "Because of our relatively small bilateral
22 development programme over the previous decade, not
23 surprisingly a few DFID staff had previous experience
24 working in Iraq.

25 "However [he says], all were development

1 professionals, many with previous experience of working
2 in post-conflict environments."

3 I infer from your statement to the Inquiry that this
4 was not your perception. Is that right?

5 SALLY KEEBLE: Of those particular teams - he may have been
6 talking about people who were deployed elsewhere. I'm
7 sure that all the people employed in the different teams
8 were development professionals. What I'm specifically
9 talking about is the skill mix.

10 Now, the -- I mean, I'm sure there is a debate about
11 the extent to which you can have humanitarian skills in
12 the general and apply them to particular circumstances
13 and, I mean, I personally would argue that, in addition
14 to general skills, you also need some country-specific
15 skills, particularly if you are working in a very
16 difficult operating environment.

17 One of the issues which I would certainly point to
18 for, you know, lessons learned, certainly lessons I have
19 learned, was that -- there is -- you know -- it is
20 important to have the staff who have, you know, country
21 experience and very specific experience in these areas
22 that are very difficult and are of great strategic
23 importance to UK Government.

24 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: That's very helpful. If I could turn
25 now to the financial planning and disbursements aspects

1 of your letter. You wrote:

2 "I would have expected forward planning of the
3 £210 million to be allocated in regular tranches and
4 then, given the domestic interest, for the spend to be
5 closely monitored and regularly reported. Certainly
6 I would have expected more of the £210 million to have
7 been allocated by now ..."

8 At the time of your letter:

9 "... for the spend profile to go through the next
10 phase of reconstruction."

11 What led to those particular concerns about the
12 allocation of money?

13 SALLY KEEBLE: If I can just sort of scroll back just a bit,
14 one of the things also which I had learned in my
15 previous department was that, for spending public money,
16 you need to have the sort of budget worked out in
17 advance so -- because, you know, the big issue was the
18 disbursements and the service delivery.

19 So that's why I became very concerned when we got
20 into February and then March and there wasn't much extra
21 in the kitty for Iraq. So the 210 million, if that had
22 been -- if that package of money had been put together
23 even in the January or preferably in the autumn of the
24 previous year, then I think that would have helped and
25 that would have given me -- certainly that would have

1 perhaps made things easier.

2 But the -- as it was, you know, we inched along
3 into February and then March and the money was allocated
4 on a, you know, as needs emerge basis. So you know, it
5 wasn't because of a strategic approach, as it were, that
6 the department or the government had, it was on a -- it
7 was on a as the needs emerged from the UN agencies,
8 which actually went into the conflict underfunded. You
9 know, they didn't have the full amount that they needed
10 or that they had appealed for.

11 Then there were also difficulties, obviously, about
12 people being able to spend the money that they had, and
13 you saw that with the MoD as well, with their
14 quick-impacts projects money that they had.

15 So the one of the allocations to one of the
16 Red Cross organisations, that had to be reallocated
17 because of -- you know, there weren't refugees, so the
18 money couldn't be used for the purpose for which it was
19 originally earmarked, and it seemed to me that there was
20 a -- there had to be a question mark about the -- about
21 why it was that the money hadn't been sorted out far
22 enough in advance and why the disbursements ran well
23 behind the initial allocations.

24 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: You raised concerns in your letter to
25 the Prime Minister about what happened to money that was

1 originally allocated for humanitarian needs which,
2 fortunately, the humanitarian crisis didn't take place
3 on this scale that had been prepared for. How much of
4 the 170 million was spent on supplies that were not in
5 the event needed in Iraq? Was that an issue with you
6 when you were writing the letter?

7 SALLY KEEBLE: Yes, I mean, there were -- you know, because
8 the UN agencies had asked for the money, one assumed
9 that the needs were there, but there was an issue about
10 the money being allocated, the money then being
11 disbursed and, if it wasn't needed in one area, what
12 then happened about reallocating it and where was it
13 spent.

14 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: What happened about the reallocation,
15 what was your concern with regard to it?

16 SALLY KEEBLE: Simply that there was enough -- you know,
17 that the needs on the ground were being met. That was
18 my main concern, given that, I think, you know, we had
19 the appeals from the UN for different amounts of money
20 which weren't met prior to the action and I think for,
21 you know, everybody looking at what unfolded in Iraq, it
22 was clear that there were very substantial needs, not
23 the needs that were originally expected, because there
24 wasn't a chemical and biological weapons attack,
25 mercifully, and there weren't the refugees moving

1 around.

2 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Another of the concerns which you had
3 in your letter is that of monitoring and reporting.

4 SALLY KEEBLE: Yes.

5 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Can you explain to us what led to those
6 concerns?

7 SALLY KEEBLE: This was really an extension of the financial
8 arrangements. There was actually a lot of reporting of
9 the headline figures. So there was regular reporting of
10 the amounts, you know, the headline amounts. What was
11 it? There was 115 million allocated, 91 remaining,
12 there was 120 million allocated by central government --
13 by the Treasury in late March. So there was -- then the
14 allocations to the individual organisations. There was
15 the Red Cross organisations, towards the end of March,
16 had a very big allocation of round about 30 million and
17 so on.

18 So there was reporting of the headline figures.
19 There wasn't the reporting of the detailed spend, and
20 then, when things didn't happen, like the -- you know,
21 the -- I think it was about 14 million of one of the
22 Red Cross allocations, it wasn't spent. It was about
23 making sure that that was picked up and that people were
24 told about what had happened to that money.

25 My concern about that was largely because, you know,

1 this was a controversial military action, there was
2 a high level of public interest and there was also
3 a high level of public interest in what happened in the
4 post-conflict reconstruction.

5 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: My last question really follows on from
6 that and, again, in his letter to Sir Andrew Turnbull,
7 Sir Suma Chakrabarti stated:

8 "Our management of financial aid in this crisis was
9 rightly being driven by needs on the ground and our
10 professional assessment of what was required at each
11 stage DFID's spending plans being announced in
12 Parliament and published."

13 Sir Suma went on to explain that any money and goods
14 no longer needed would be transferred to other needs
15 reflecting the evolving situation on the ground in Iraq.

16 Would you like to offer any comments on these
17 points?

18 SALLY KEEBLE: The headline figures were announced, that's
19 true. The disbursements -- I mean, that was an issue
20 which I raised and specifically asked about, as indeed
21 with the reallocations, as well, of, you know, where
22 money was underspent.

23 I think there was an issue that when the -- when the
24 UN put in its appeals for money, the fact that they
25 weren't fully met. Now, that wasn't entirely down to

1 us, that was obviously down to other donors as well, but
2 we were looking normally to do what was seen to be our
3 usual contribution, which is, I think, 5.6 per cent,
4 whereas, I mean, it did seem to me that this was our war
5 and that we ought to have been contributing more than
6 one might usually contribute to a UN appeal.

7 I think I'm right in saying that, by the end
8 of April, late April, the main UN flash appeal, which
9 was \$2.2 billion, was something like 18 per cent only
10 met, and the final figure that I saw for that was it was
11 88 per cent met some time later on in the year, but that
12 was only including the Oil For Food money.

13 So there were real issues about the amount of money
14 that was going on and it was in response to appeals
15 rather than having -- you know, we didn't see
16 a strategic plan upfront, which is what you might have
17 expected or what I had certainly been used to seeing
18 elsewhere. "We have got X much money. This is roughly
19 how we think it will be spent", obviously it is going to
20 depend on what happens and, you know, what we see
21 happening on the ground, but you didn't get that kind of
22 feel for it.

23 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Thank you.

24 THE CHAIRMAN: I'll turn to Sir Roderic Lyne now.

25 SIR RODERIC LYNE: I would like to look in a little more

1 detail at the CPA that you mentioned in your reply to
2 Sir Lawrence Freedman. In the letter to Prime
3 Minister Blair you argued that DFID's international
4 expertise in policy and experience should have been
5 fully deployed from the start as part of the coalition
6 effort -- that means deployed into the CPA -- and that,
7 after Clare Short left, you had expected that there
8 would have been a much more rapid re-engagement of DFID
9 with the CPA, which I think raises the question of why
10 DFID were so slow to get involved with the CPA.

11 Now, we had a response to this from
12 Sir Suma Chakrabarti, when he gave us evidence
13 in December and he said that:

14 "In fact, Clare Short had actually been telling us
15 to engage when we didn't have the authority from the
16 centre to engage, the UN, for example, back in the
17 autumn of 2002."

18 Do you recall the Secretary of State trying to get
19 DFID to engage at that fairly early stage with looking
20 at the post-conflict reconstruction or did you feel that
21 her attitude to the war was a factor in the slowness
22 that you describe in your letter?

23 SALLY KEEBLE: The Secretary of State was certainly pressing
24 for engagement with the UN early on, which is what
25 I think Sir Suma is pointing to and -- you know,

1 I completely agree with that. I think the issue about
2 the deployments was -- in some ways a slightly different
3 one because that was engaging with, you know, the
4 coalition, as it were, rather than with the UN and --
5 I mean, I just think that, you know, the numbers speak
6 for themselves. I think there were two advisers
7 embedded with the military, two others in Kuwait, one in
8 Washington with ORHA, as it was then, one in Amman, one
9 in Tehran², for a large part of the early stages of the
10 action and, by the time I left DFID, I think there
11 were -- I think I'm right in saying about nine in
12 Baghdad and six in Basra and presumably still one in
13 Washington.

14 Now -- I mean, I think it is a matter of judgment as
15 to whether that's a large number or not. I didn't think
16 it was a very large number. Certainly not, you know,
17 for the -- you know, for the numbers for the early
18 stages, the two with the military and the two in Kuwait
19 and I would have -- I think there were also some
20 consultants actually at the end, to be honest. I would
21 have expected, given that, you know, we were very large
22 players in this action, for us to make a more
23 substantial contribution and DFID also did have a lot of
24 very skilled staff.

25 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Yes. I mean, the numbers that you quote

² DFID confirmed that one member of staff was conducting work for DFID in Tehran between March - April 2003.

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1 are pretty similar to those that were quoted by
2 Sir Suma Chakrabarti in his letter to
3 Sir Andrew Turnbull that is now published, in which he
4 said DFID had 16 officials in the CPA and that the
5 number was rising. That's fairly similar to the numbers
6 you have just quoted. Clearly, as far as he was
7 concerned, that was quite a good number at that stage
8 and it went on up from there, but your argument really
9 is that there should have been more sooner in terms of
10 DFID's input.

11 SALLY KEEBLE: I think my particular concern, both with this
12 and with the financing was -- and with hindsight,
13 which -- you know, I know is a wonderful thing, but it
14 was -- there was an opportunity between the early stages
15 of the action and probably the end of June for some
16 constructive work to be done. Once the sort of
17 insurgency started, I think things really did get very
18 much more difficult and I don't think that we were in
19 early enough with the reconstruction and that applies to
20 the money and to the numbers of people.

21 SIR RODERIC LYNE: I mean, you went into a bit more detail
22 about that in the letter to the Prime Minister, where
23 you said there were of course difficulties because of
24 Clare's position, some of the consequences of her
25 decisions were disastrous, specifically the lack of

1 pre-planning, the difficulties in providing humanitarian
2 supplies for the troops, the refusal to contribute
3 £6 million towards the dredging of Ummn Qasr and the
4 refusal to engage fully with ORHA.

5 I mean, the implication of what you say there is
6 that it was very much because of your then Secretary of
7 State's attitude to the conflict -- I think that's what
8 you mean by her position -- that DFID was slow off the
9 mark in the planning with ORHA, subsequently with the
10 CPA. Was it essentially because of her position or were
11 there other factors that led to this?

12 SALLY KEEBLE: I think -- when I wrote this letter, what
13 I was trying to do is to look for the lessons learned.

14 Now, I think, you know, it was very clear that the
15 Secretary of State, the then Secretary of State, had
16 particular views on this. But the bulk of my letter
17 dealt with the staffing, the engagement with the CPA and
18 the financing and it seemed to me that that was where
19 the lessons were going to be learned, and that's why the
20 vast bulk of my letter deals with the other issues that
21 we have talked about. But, you know, I acknowledge
22 there that the Secretary of State had her own position
23 on these things, which she has made very clear publicly,
24 but I think -- you know, moving forward, I think it was
25 about looking at the -- you know, the lessons that can

1 be learned in organisational terms and in policy terms
2 for how it might be possible to minimise the prospect of
3 something like this happening again.

4 SIR RODERIC LYNE: That's -- I mean -- obviously a very fair
5 and constructive point. I suppose the point that I'm
6 just trying to pursue a little further is to what extent
7 the fact that she had a personal view on the war, which
8 was different from that of the Prime Minister and the
9 rest of the Cabinet at this stage, prevented her
10 department from doing all the things that in your view
11 it could have done and should have done at this stage?

12 SALLY KEEBLE: Well, I mean, you know, I wouldn't want to
13 answer for the details of what the Secretary of State's
14 views were at the time. Now --

15 SIR RODERIC LYNE: She has made it very clear herself in
16 evidence and so on.

17 SALLY KEEBLE: Yes. Obviously those were a factor, but
18 I think that there were issues around the thinking about
19 the planning, about the relationship between DFID and
20 the military, about the timing for rollout of
21 reconstruction and humanitarian aid, which I think are
22 critical for moving forward.

23 Now, I think some of those lessons have been learned
24 in the stabilisation unit, but it would seem to me
25 that those are the critical issues, whilst recognising

1 that of course the views of the individual senior
2 politicians involved in this had major factors to play
3 in what happened at the time.

4 SIR RODERIC LYNE: In your statement to this Inquiry, you
5 have referred to the fact that there were criticisms in
6 DFID about the performance of the CPA and presumably, if
7 DFID was not very impressed with the way the CPA was
8 performing, that wouldn't have been an incentive to send
9 more people there.

10 Are there lessons to be learned from the CPA period
11 about how you construct that kind of authority and what
12 sort of input we should make in a situation like that to
13 post-conflict reconstruction, where we are operating
14 with other more powerful partners?

15 SALLY KEEBLE: I think there were. There were certainly
16 criticisms and those criticisms weren't just in DFID,
17 they were in other departments as well and it -- I mean,
18 I have -- you know, I saw the reports on the CPA.
19 I had, you know, nothing other than that on which on
20 judge its performance, but it seemed to me that some of
21 the critical things were that there wasn't agreement
22 about who should be in the lead. There wasn't agreement
23 about its relationship with some of the UN agencies as
24 well. Insufficient time to get people in place, and
25 that was a major cause for problems, and I think, again,

1 that it was an issue about when the decisions were made,
2 the decisions about ORHA and the decisions about the CPA
3 were made very late on.

4 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Possibly without a huge amount of
5 consultation between coalition partners?

6 SALLY KEEBLE: Yes, indeed. Yes, indeed.

7 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Thank you very much.

8 THE CHAIRMAN: Thanks. Over to Sir Lawrence Freedman,
9 Lawrence?

10 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: In your letter to the Prime Minister
11 you said:

12 "I pondered deeply throughout the crisis how it
13 might be possible to change the course of events."

14 I was just wondering what action you took at the
15 time to tackle the concerns you have detailed to us
16 today.

17 SALLY KEEBLE: I raised some of the financial ones in the
18 meetings which I have set out. I spoke to the head³ of
19 government relations about the need for the financial
20 plan because that was something I was particularly
21 concerned about and I spoke to my colleague,
22 Adam Ingram, but those were quite brief discussions.

23 It also then became very clear to me that some of
24 these -- that some of the issues of concern, the things
25 that needed to have been sorted out quite some time

³ The witness commented afterwards "I think it may have been Director of Government Relations".

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1 previously, and with things at that stage hopefully
2 improving in Iraq, I decided that the way to raise it
3 was with the Prime Minister and to make sure that any
4 lessons that could be learned out of that would be
5 learned.

6 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: So in a sense, by the time you
7 became aware of the problems, in a way it was already
8 too late?

9 SALLY KEEBLE: To an extent, to an extent. I mean, in the
10 autumn there were reports written which pointed to
11 future reports and then they pointed on to future
12 reports and, by the time that was through, we were all
13 but in the war.

14 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Sir Suma Chakrabarti expressed
15 disappointment to Sir Andrew Turnbull that he didn't
16 raise these concerns at the time within DFID. Now, you
17 said in your letter to the Prime Minister:

18 "I found it very difficult working in a department
19 that had underperformed on such a key issue and where,
20 as a minister, I was, for a variety of reasons,
21 prevented from helping to shape the course of events."

22 You have said to us and you have said in your
23 statement you thought that your views were best
24 progressed by being put to the Prime Minister. But why
25 didn't you raise your concerns with either the Secretary

1 of State or the Permanent Secretary?

2 SALLY KEEBLE: As I have said, I raised some of the concerns
3 at the time. We were also -- this was a very narrow
4 timeframe from the time when it was clear that the
5 reports weren't coming and, you know, they should have
6 been. It was perhaps February, mid to late February,
7 and by -- you know, from then until the time I wrote the
8 letter was, what, three or four months? Four months.
9 So it was actually quite a narrow timeframe in terms of,
10 you know -- you know, the entire action around Iraq.

11 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: But you must have had some
12 opportunities to see the Permanent Secretary, for
13 example, at the time. There must have been some
14 meetings with him.

15 SALLY KEEBLE: There were very few one-to-ones.

16 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: You have already indicated you had
17 a few one-to-ones with the Secretary of State as well.

18 SALLY KEEBLE: You know, I took the opportunities that there
19 were in the meetings. I think what -- and I have set
20 out how I felt it was best possible to take these issues
21 forward. I certainly didn't want to precipitate, you
22 know, a major confrontation in the department in the
23 middle of what was already a very fraught period, and
24 I think that what was also important was that the -- you
25 know, when I did put my concerns down -- and I put them

1 down in writing and I raised them personally to make
2 sure that they could be dealt with, you know, that they
3 could have been dealt -- you know, the response could
4 have been provided then to the details of the points
5 which I made.

6 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: But you didn't ask for a meeting to
7 raise them before that point? You didn't say to
8 Clare Short --

9 SALLY KEEBLE: I didn't ask for a separate meeting, no.

10 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: When you wrote to the
11 Prime Minister, did you meet with him directly?

12 SALLY KEEBLE: Yes.

13 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: What were the basic features of that
14 meeting?

15 SALLY KEEBLE: I gave him a copy of the letter. I had
16 already put it in to make sure that this was logged,
17 just so that the points could be dealt with, the points
18 could be noted, and I talked -- I talked through the
19 issues. I didn't expect an immediate response. Yes.

20 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: So he listened, but --

21 SALLY KEEBLE: Yes.

22 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: -- there wasn't any substantive
23 action coming directly out of that meeting?

24 SALLY KEEBLE: He very obviously wasn't going to give
25 a response then, nor would I have expected him to,

1 because I would have expected that to have gone in and
2 then him to have got the officials to look at it and
3 then take it forward.

4 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Just for clarification, you have
5 referred a couple of times to the head of government
6 relations. Is that in Number 10?

7 SALLY KEEBLE: Yes.

8 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Is that Sally Morgan?

9 SALLY KEEBLE: Yes.

10 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Can I just clarify one point? You said
11 there were very few one-to-ones -- I think that means at
12 the top level of DFID -- DFID is one of the smallest
13 departments in Whitehall and, at the top of it, there
14 are three people: the Secretary of State, the
15 Parliamentary Secretary which, at the time, was
16 yourself, and the Permanent Undersecretary. Presumably
17 your offices were pretty close to each other. Certainly
18 there are only three of you, so you can meet without
19 a lot of formality when you are only talking about three
20 people, either as three or one-on-one.

21 So was something really not right with
22 communications at the top of DFID in the time you were
23 there?

24 SALLY KEEBLE: No. I mean, there were a lot of papers
25 coming forward in the autumn. There were -- it was

1 pointing to, you know, reports then coming forward. We
2 had a couple of one-to-ones. We had one in which there
3 was a discussion about -- about sort of attitudes
4 towards the war and there was one at the end where
5 Sir Suma made clear that there had been some, you know,
6 discussions which had gone on across Whitehall, some
7 private discussions.

8 But I think -- you know, at the time, in the context
9 of what was happening, we were right in the middle of
10 a -- of a very controversial and very difficult military
11 action. My job was to deputise. You know, I did not
12 have a policy lead on it. I had concerns which I raised
13 and you might say, not very -- you know, not repeatedly
14 which I certainly raised, particularly about the
15 financial issues, which I understood the best at the
16 time, and I then had to work out how to take my concerns
17 forward.

18 I think you then -- you know, you then have a number
19 of options. I felt that my views were going to be best
20 expressed, as I have said previously, by putting them
21 formally in writing and raising them with the
22 Prime Minister. I didn't feel that it was -- that they
23 were going to be taken forward just by raising them
24 inside the department, and there was also a lot of
25 pressure on the department internally at the time and

1 I -- you know, it was a question about timing and
2 opportunity, I suppose, as well.

3 SIR RODERIC LYNE: You didn't have the sort of atmosphere in
4 the office where, if something was bothering you, you
5 could just pop into Suma Chakrabarti's office or catch
6 Clare Short for five minutes between appointments for an
7 informal chat? It just didn't work like that at the
8 time?

9 SALLY KEEBLE: No, I mean, I remember there was one
10 particular issue about the war that I was particularly
11 concerned about and I did go and speak to the Secretary
12 of State on that. It was one particular submission and
13 that was resolved. But these bigger and more general
14 issues, it seemed to me were also more substantial and
15 also had to be dealt with in a different way.

16 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Thank you.

17 THE CHAIRMAN: Last point, Martin?

18 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: I do have just one small point. In
19 your letter to the Prime Minister you end rather
20 powerfully and you say that:

21 "I found it very difficult working in a department
22 where, as a minister, I was, for a variety of reasons,
23 prevented from helping to shape the course of events."

24 What were those variety of reasons and would the
25 Prime Minister have understood them?

1 SALLY KEEBLE: I don't know. I mean, you are absolutely
2 right, but I did have very strong feelings about it
3 which was in part because we were in the middle of
4 a conflict, I suppose, like all other MPs at the time,
5 you know, we had constituents who were tied up in it and
6 ultimately we were answerable for what was happening,
7 you know, on the ground. I was also answerable because
8 I was a minister and I was responsible -- I had
9 a partial responsibility for one of the departments that
10 was delivering on the post-conflict reconstruction. So
11 I did feel very strongly about it.

12 There were a variety of reasons, which I think you
13 have asked me about quite extensively and which I have
14 discussed, about why it was -- it was difficult to get
15 them dealt with at the time, not least because I think
16 it would have been, you know -- it would have been quite
17 improper to have sparked off a sort of major policy
18 issue right in the middle of military action. I just
19 think that would have been wrong.

20 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Thank you.

21 THE CHAIRMAN: I think we are coming close to the moment
22 where I would like to invite any further or final
23 reflections you wish to make, but just to round off the
24 story, you wrote to the Prime Minister and talked with
25 him. What the Prime Minister then did was to ask his

1 Cabinet Secretary to look into the matter. He raised it
2 with the Permanent Secretary for the department
3 concerned.

4 I don't think we have seen or heard of any evidence
5 to suggest that the Prime Minister raised it with the
6 Secretary of State, and you probably wouldn't have been
7 surprised by that at that point. She had gone. But do
8 you think what the Prime Minister did was a sufficient
9 response to your representations to him, both as process
10 and in terms of being taken seriously?

11 SALLY KEEBLE: I thought it was quite cursory. You know, he
12 said he was going to -- what -- that he hoped things
13 would now move forward. I had also expected so with
14 Valerie and Hilary there. What happened, of course,
15 quite soon after that, was that the insurgency started
16 very seriously and one of the things it seemed to me
17 then was that, you know, whatever delays had been or
18 ground lost because of the delays through what happened
19 over the funding, and the deployment and so on of DFID
20 was as nothing compared with the sort of forces that
21 were unleashed then.

22 I did ponder at the time as to therefore what, you
23 know -- as to what impact actually DFID's performance or
24 delayed performance had.

25 THE CHAIRMAN: You mentioned -- and I think with an

1 approving note in your voice, the subsequent creation of
2 the stabilisation unit and there was also a pool of
3 funding for different departments to address the
4 reconstruction. After you had left the government
5 in June, did you see some signs, if you like, of
6 progress, in terms of DFID's contribution and its place
7 within the Whitehall money?

8 SALLY KEEBLE: Yes, and certainly around the
9 Stabilisation Unit, which I thought, you know, was
10 extremely important because it dealt with the issue of
11 the joint working across Whitehall. It dealt with
12 issues about funding and it dealt with issues of
13 staffing as well. There is obviously an issue then
14 about how you decide to deploy the staff and the timing
15 of plans and so on, but I think that was important.

16 I think the debate, albeit it has been very
17 fraught -- that -- about relations with the
18 United States and about the legality issues as well,
19 have also been very important.

20 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Well, closing off and wishing to
21 give you an opportunity to add or indeed amplify
22 anything you have said, you have laid particular
23 emphasis this afternoon, as you did in your statement,
24 on a number of things, the issue of planning and its
25 timing, particularly planning for people, planning for

1 the funding. You drew specific attention, I think, to
2 the lack of Iraq-specific skills in terms of country
3 experience, language, whatever. I think there is
4 a question there, which it might be helpful to have
5 a comment from you about, which is: how far it is
6 possible, in terms of contingency planning, for the
7 various failed and failing states around the world to
8 acquire that set of skills on a contingent basis? Is
9 that something that it is practicable to do?

10 SALLY KEEBLE: I think it has to be mapped out at least and
11 the other thing is that, if you look at -- there was
12 some coverage of the fact that in the United States,
13 that exiles were involved in doing -- in providing some
14 of the information and the UK has got very large numbers
15 of people here from most of the failed states,
16 I suspect. So, you know, I think there has to be some
17 thought as to how we ensure that we do have the relevant
18 country-specific information.

19 I mean, I fully understand the importance of the
20 sort of generic humanitarian skills, and those are
21 obviously very important, but I think that where you are
22 operating in a very difficult environment, I think the
23 country-specific skills and expertise and knowledge
24 must, you know, obviously make life very much easier and
25 make it much easier to deliver quite quickly.

1 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. There is just one other point
2 I would like to ask you. You have had your own career
3 before you came into government and national politics,
4 but you had a great deal of experience in communication
5 strategies and public relations and the rest of it.

6 Looking at the United Kingdom's relationships with
7 the United Nations, its agencies and the NGOs in the
8 Iraq context, do you think we actually had
9 a constructive and positive strategy to keep in touch
10 with them or was it actually blocked or deficient?

11 SALLY KEEBLE: Well, I think one of the things obviously
12 that was very important in all the arrangements that
13 were made was the Secretary of State -- the then
14 Secretary of State's standing in the UN and I think that
15 was very important.

16 THE CHAIRMAN: Because it was very high?

17 SALLY KEEBLE: That's right, and I think that, you know,
18 that of itself was important in maintaining
19 relationships. The -- there were -- the department put
20 information around to the NGOs. There was also a lot of
21 information actually coming out of the UN to them as
22 well. I think the area where there were real failings
23 was around the Arab media and the whole issue of the
24 hearts and minds on the ground was something that was
25 quite a substantial problem.

1 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Is there anything else you would
2 like to add? You have given us an hour or more of your
3 reflections, and thank you for those, and a very helpful
4 statement.

5 SALLY KEEBLE: I think the -- the one area was about the
6 architecture for the delivery, which I think, with
7 hindsight -- I mean, that wasn't perhaps so immediately
8 obvious to me at the time, although I made the remarks
9 about the CPA, but the fact that it hadn't been thought
10 through, how things were to be delivered or, you know,
11 the international architecture was -- I think that was
12 quite an important factor. I mean, obviously the UN
13 agencies were going to do most of the work on the ground
14 and it was an issue about funding then.

15 I think the other thing which was a major issue was
16 the thinking about the speed of the rollout of
17 humanitarian work and who should be doing that. The
18 military did some. I think they built a pipeline and
19 they did some food distribution, I think sometimes with
20 mixed results in terms of the food distribution. So
21 I think there also needs probably to be some thinking
22 about how you integrate the humanitarian work and the
23 post-conflict reconstruction or the longer-term
24 reconstruction, who does that and how the phasing works,
25 and I would hope perhaps that that's something that the

1 Stabilisation Unit is also looking at.

2 THE CHAIRMAN: Well, thank you very much.

3 With that, I thank our witness this afternoon,
4 Sally Keeble, and I'll close this session now. We
5 resume hearings at 10 o'clock tomorrow morning, when we
6 will hear from Andy Bearpark, who was Director of
7 Operations and Infrastructure for the Coalition
8 Provisional Authority from June 2003 to June 2004.
9 Thank you all very much for attending.

10 (3.06 pm)

11 (The Inquiry adjourned until 10.00 am the following day)

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