

Tuesday, 15 December 2009

(10.00 am)

SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK

THE CHAIRMAN: Good morning.

SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Good morning, Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN: Welcome everybody and our witness,
Sir Jeremy Greenstock.

The objectives of this morning's session are to develop further the picture of the United Kingdom's objectives for Iraq and their implementation as seen from Baghdad between September 2003 and March 2004.

Sir Jeremy, you appeared as a witness on 27 November giving evidence on developments at the UN on policy towards Iraq from 2001 until the beginning of the military action in 2003, and we would like in this session to cover also your perspective on the UN's involvement in the planning process for post-invasion Iraq.

I think we will have between two and three hours this morning. We will break at about 11.00 or 11.15 for a break and then come back.

Just to recall, as I do each time, that the Inquiry has access to many thousands of government papers, including the most highly classified, for the period we are considering and we are developing continuously the

1 picture of policy debates and decision-making processes,
2 and these evidential sessions are an important element
3 in informing our thinking and implementing the
4 documentary evidence. It is, therefore, important that
5 witnesses are open and frank while respecting national
6 security, and we do recognise that witnesses are giving
7 evidence based on their recollection of events. We, of
8 course, check what we hear against the papers of the time.

9 I remind every witness that he will later be asked
10 to sign the transcript of the evidence to the effect
11 that the evidence they have given is truthful, fair and
12 accurate.

13 To start us off, looking back at your time as UK
14 Ambassador to the United Nations, Sir Jeremy, I would
15 like to ask about the planning by the UN and its
16 agencies, insofar as there was a planning process before
17 the invasion, how they would want to be and planned to
18 be involved, if at all, in post-invasion Iraq. Could
19 you take us into that, please?

20 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Certainly. The circumstances at the
21 UN, you will remember, were really divided, I think, for
22 the purposes of this conversation, into two. One, the
23 attempt to find a diplomatic way through the whole saga
24 of Iraq and Saddam Hussein's refusal to comply with
25 UN Resolutions, which members of the Security Council

1 felt might or might not lead to the need for the use of
2 force, and second, the preparations for what might
3 happen in the future, as a matter of contingency for
4 governments and for the United Nations itself.

5 And the UN, as a secretariat, I think, was very
6 conscious that the options in front of them, the
7 contingencies that they might have to prepare for, were
8 quite broad. It might be nothing, it might be the
9 running of a country, it might be anything in between.
10 They were not being particularly well informed by the
11 protagonists amongst member states as to what might
12 happen, but the UN Secretariat is very competent at
13 finding out what is going on behind the scenes, and
14 I think they are aware of what those options might be.

15 THE CHAIRMAN: Can I just interject to ask was there
16 an inhibition on planning by the UN and its agencies for
17 fear of being seen to endorse or expect a military
18 intervention?

19 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Yes, certainly. The approach of the
20 Secretary General himself, Kofi Annan, was extremely
21 important in this -- I think I'm going to come on to
22 answer your questions fairly fully, Chairman -- in that
23 he had had to deal personally with Saddam Hussein and
24 with Iraq in 1998 and in early 2002, the first half of
25 2002. His officers were engaged in the Oil For Food

1 programme through the Office in Iraq Program under
2 Benon Sevan. He had been watching this very closely and
3 he had himself said, publicly and privately, that he
4 believed that there were sometimes good causes to
5 threaten or even to use force in the upholding of
6 UN Resolutions.

7 Therefore, he was not, in what he was saying,
8 absolutely and irrevocably against the use of force; he
9 just wanted any use of force to be under proper
10 UN authorisation and done collectively and
11 internationally through the agreement of member states,
12 preferably with the Security Council unanimous about it.

13 Throughout the saga of Iraq, the Security Council
14 was virtually never unanimous. He was extremely pleased
15 that under 1441 we were unanimous, but he feared a quick
16 breakdown in that unanimity if the tensions continued.

17 In going through the papers again, Chairman,
18 I reminded myself that the first contact that we had
19 with the United Nations Secretariat over actual planning
20 for what might happen in Iraq after a conflict was
21 in October 2002, when my mission had its first exchange
22 with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations,
23 Mike Sheehan, and talked to them about the models that
24 they were looking at for possible UN participation after
25 a conflict.

1 THE CHAIRMAN: This would have been an exploratory contact
2 rather than fully prepared objectives on our side which
3 we wished to see the UN adopt?

4 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: This was probably at their request,
5 they wanted to know what leading members of the Security
6 Council felt might be necessary and to give our advice
7 to them on the kind of contingency planning that they
8 should be doing. And they let us know at that stage,
9 I think I recall, that they were looking at the Balkans
10 model, particularly the Kosovo model of pillared
11 structures under a UN special representative with
12 a pillar for security, a pillar for economics, a pillar
13 for policing and justice, a pillar for humanitarian
14 supply, et cetera.

15 So those sorts of conversations would have been
16 going on between the Secretariat and other members of
17 the United Nations as they thought relevant from that
18 time onwards.

19 The Office of the Coordinator of Humanitarian
20 Affairs in the United Nations was also involved, because
21 increasingly, as the UN in this period looked at the
22 possible contingencies, they were thinking about
23 humanitarian disaster, about refugees, about the failure
24 of supplies to the population, about the continuation of
25 the Oil For Food programme and other practical things to

1 keep a population alive when all government services had
2 broken down, and that's what they were focused on.

3 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

4 Did that, on the UN's side, extend into
5 contemplating the possibility of military invasion with
6 a chemical or, indeed, biological warfare component to
7 it and the effect of that on a civilian population,
8 because that was very much in the minds of the people in
9 the UK Government at the time?

10 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: I don't recall having
11 a conversation, or my mission having a conversation with
12 the Secretariat about that particular contingency. I'm
13 not sure that the UN itself would have been able to do
14 anything about it in practice because they didn't have
15 supplies of equipment, of antidotes, of gas masks or
16 whatever. They would have needed to come to member
17 states, and I think that was probably beyond them at
18 this stage.

19 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

20 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Then in February 2003, the Deputy
21 Secretary General, Louise Frechette, set up her own
22 ad hoc group to look at the possibilities for UN
23 involvement in a post-conflict Iraq, and we had
24 discussions with them. And at that stage there were
25 very clear indications that the UN did not want to be

1 involved in the administration of Iraq as their
2 responsibility. They did not think that this would be
3 something that they would have the capabilities for.
4 They were rather attuned to supplying an administration
5 with the kind of services that the UN and its agencies
6 are very good at in terms of food supply, some policing
7 perhaps, help for the political process and other
8 aspects of services to a population or a territory in
9 trouble but not to take full responsibility.

10 THE CHAIRMAN: Did that reflect at all the successful UN
11 engagement in East Timor, which was much smaller in
12 scale of course than Iraq would potentially be?

13 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: That would have been one of the
14 experiences which the UN had gone through.

15 THE CHAIRMAN: They did take administrative responsibility
16 in East Timor.

17 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Yes, in a much smaller territory
18 with a far smaller population in the end with much less
19 contentious circumstances. I think Kosovo, the Balkans
20 were more of a model for the UN, being on a bigger
21 scale.

22 Then, as we came up towards the period when
23 diplomacy broke down, around the middle of March, the
24 Secretariat and the agencies involved briefed something
25 called the Humanitarian Liaison Working Group, which was

1 a working group of member states concerned with the
2 situation in Iraq, which we were on, as UK, on the
3 preparations that they had got to by that stage. That
4 was on 13 March and we learned there that they were
5 assuming a refugee population inside Iraq of some
6 600,000. That was the sort of scale that they were
7 thinking of. And they were focusing on food, medicine,
8 water, shelter, fuel, those sorts of things, as I said
9 earlier, as supplies behind a political administration.

10 Then the conflict itself started on 20 March, but
11 activity in the Security Council continued actually
12 while the conflict was on. We looked at the Oil For
13 Food programme, which needed to be rolled over to be
14 continued and we passed Resolution 1472 towards the end
15 of March, while the conflict was going on. So there was
16 that side of preparations as well.

17 I think an important meeting I should mention to the
18 panel was one I had with the Secretary General himself
19 on 24 March, that is four days into the conflict, when
20 I wanted to see what his views were on a UN presence in
21 Iraq after the conflict was over, the timing of which at
22 that stage, of course, we didn't know. I would have
23 done this under instructions to see what his views were,
24 and he was still looking at a range of possibilities.

25 He had behind him a Secretariat that was full of

1 resentment, that the UN had been, as they saw it,
2 bypassed in the decision to go to war and didn't want
3 the UN through the Secretariat to have anything to do
4 with the UK and the US in their responsibility for what
5 had happened. So there was quite severe resentment
6 inside the Secretariat.

7 And at the other end of the spectrum, his own view
8 and the view of some others, that the UN should not be
9 absent from its responsibilities in a territory in
10 trouble after a conflict was over.

11 THE CHAIRMAN: So mood and responsibility were very much in
12 tension, were they, inside the UN Secretariat?

13 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Yes. I think on this subject there
14 was always tension and I think that
15 Secretary General Annan did very well to manage those
16 tensions as we moved through the various stages of this
17 period.

18 He realised that the UN would not be able to do, as
19 it were, too much in Iraq at the top political and
20 administrative level for two fundamental reasons: one,
21 the UN itself could not cope with that volume of
22 business that would be necessary to administer Iraq; and
23 secondly, the United States would not allow it. He was
24 very conscious of that. And I remember in that meeting
25 encouraging him at least to take the first step of

1 appointing a personal envoy, a personal representative,
2 whatever you called him, for Iraq so that we could do
3 some business with his office at a level below
4 Secretary General, so we had a socket to plug into as
5 far as the Secretariat was concerned. And he said he
6 would consider that, but it was some days before he took
7 any decisions on that.

8 THE CHAIRMAN: Was that your own suggestion, Sir Jeremy, or
9 was this something agreed between you and London to put
10 to the Secretary General? I don't know how it worked.

11 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: I doubt whether London would have
12 instructed me to put a question. I usually had quite
13 full tactical flexibility, but it might have been in
14 a number of questions that, in the correspondence with
15 London, they were interested in the UK Mission finding
16 out. But I think I put it, as my suggestion, to the
17 Secretary General that he waste little time in
18 appointing a personal envoy.

19 THE CHAIRMAN: I have got one other question at this stage.
20 It is just to ask: given the partly self-imposed
21 limitations on the UN's involvement in post-invasion
22 responsibilities but also given the reality of the
23 United States' rejection of a major role for the UN at
24 the time, was it very late in the day that
25 Louise Frechette's group was set up? It's February,

1 with the probability by then of a March
2 invasion, if there was going to be one. I'm struck by
3 the compression of planning timetables everywhere,
4 really, not least in New York.

5 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: I think you should regard the
6 Frechette group as a formalisation of a number of
7 activities that were happening anyway and the
8 Secretary General asking his deputy to make sure that
9 she coordinated at a senior level the various thing that
10 were going on for some months by that time.

11 So I don't think it all just began then. As I said,
12 we first talked to the Department of Peacekeeping
13 Operations some five months previously.

14 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

15 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: I should also mention a meeting the
16 next day, 25 March, that the Secretary General called
17 with the five permanent members of the Security Council,
18 at ambassadorial level, because the previous day,
19 24 March, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice had
20 visited New York. I only caught up with that fact after
21 the event.

22 The UK, I don't think was consulted about her
23 visit -- to talk to the Secretary General about a role
24 for the UN after the conflict was over. And Mr Annan
25 reported to the five ambassadors on his conversation

1 with Condoleezza Rice at that lunch the next day and we
2 talked about the options for the Secretariat as the
3 Secretary General understood were possibilities after
4 his conversation with Dr Rice. And the
5 focus, I think, on that conversation was really in how
6 quickly we could get the Iraqis themselves up and
7 running, getting their government going, getting
8 ministries going, taking back responsibility.

9 The UN is always, and was at that time always,
10 concentrated on getting responsibility back to the
11 sovereign people of that territory.

12 THE CHAIRMAN: There is a question there, I suppose. The US
13 assessment was that there would, with the help of
14 émigrés and others, be a nearly fully functioning Iraqi
15 administration available quite quickly, the best case
16 scenario, which of course didn't eventuate. But it
17 would also be part of UN basic thinking: we need to get
18 Iraq back under Iraqi government as soon as possible
19 and, therefore, presumably it is possible. So there are
20 two best case versions coming together, are there?

21 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Yes, I think it was less in the UN's
22 psychology to assume that the best case would happen, if
23 you are comparing those two. That's the difference
24 I would make.

25 THE CHAIRMAN: Okay, but not necessarily assuming?

1 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Yes, because they were also, as
2 I mentioned earlier, assuming things would happen that
3 were much worse in terms of the reality in terms of
4 refugee flows and other things. But it was certainly in
5 the UN's mind to be there for as short a time as
6 possible with a country that was not, in pure
7 development terms, incapable of running its own affairs,
8 as smaller, poorer territories elsewhere in the world
9 might have been.

10 So they wanted to get things back on to an even keel
11 in terms of the international norm as quickly as
12 possible.

13 You will note, Chairman, that Dr Rice herself was
14 sketching out possibilities in the same area, because at
15 that stage their policy for the Office of Reconstruction
16 and Humanitarian Affairs, ORHA, under
17 General Jay Garner, was to be on the ground for as
18 little time as possible, to get out and hand Iraq back
19 to a competent group of Iraqis who could run their own
20 country.

21 So there wasn't that much difference at that stage.

22 There were differences, but they were bridgeable
23 perhaps, between the US and the UN.

24 THE CHAIRMAN: And there was also a US military expectation
25 of drawdown fairly quickly, wasn't there, at that time?

1 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Correct. That's probably another
2 line of thought, but that was true.

3 During the conflict period, before 9 April, these
4 conversations continued. The Secretary General had
5 an informal lunch with all members of the Security
6 Council to talk about these things. The atmosphere was
7 actually quite constructive on 2 April, talking about
8 how to get the UN back into business in Iraq, with,
9 I think, members of the Security Council being quite
10 clear in their observation of the US approach at this
11 stage that the Americans saw limits in the UN's ability
12 to take over the administration of Iraq or in the
13 American wish for the UN to do so.

14 The US saw the UN, I think, very much as an
15 ancillary supplier of services rather than as partner in
16 the administration of Iraq, and that was beginning to
17 come through in the eyes of the other members of the
18 Security Council at that lunch on 2 April.

19 You will see in the documents -- you probably
20 already have seen -- that on 4 April I sent a telegram
21 back to London, UKMIS 614, with my advice on
22 post-conflict arrangements from the UN's point of view,
23 where I commented that I thought that the United States
24 was going at this a bit too top down with the US in sole
25 control.

1 I pointed out that I thought the Secretary General's
2 role was going to be crucial in his own decisions on how
3 the UN should be involved in post-conflict Iraq, that
4 I thought we should encourage him from London to appoint
5 a personal envoy and that I thought I had caught an
6 indication from him on who he wanted to appoint in
7 Rafiuddin Ahmed, his Pakistani senior adviser, and that
8 appointment, indeed, came on 7 April.

9 So those conversations were going on, but I also had
10 to brief my fellow Security Council members on the
11 Hillsborough meeting, because they were watching what
12 the US and the UK were up to. And on 7 and 8 April
13 there was the Hillsborough dialogue between the US and
14 the UK between President Bush and Prime Minister Blair
15 about the role that the UN would play, on which you have
16 had evidence from other witnesses. And since I was not
17 there at Hillsborough, I only caught the reporting from
18 it, but it was an important moment of gauging exactly
19 what the United States might allow by way of a vital UN
20 role and President Bush's description of that.

21 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

22 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: I think the only other thing I would
23 say in this section of your questioning, Chairman, about
24 UN planning was that the Secretary General was, I think,
25 explicit in saying to me and to others that he was

1 feeling his way as events unfolded on how the UN should
2 be involved and to what degree, feeling his way in terms
3 of how situations developed on the ground, in how he
4 could match the requirements for the UN with UN
5 capabilities and with what the responsible states for
6 matters on the ground might allow by way of a UN
7 presence; in other words, he had no pre-conceived ideas,
8 although he himself was reluctant to have the UN in too
9 prominent a role because of the capacity and the
10 responsibility questions.

11 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. I would like your general
12 reflection on the extent to which, in terms of the UN
13 itself, detailed contingency planning is possible when
14 events are unplannable and uncertain.

15 Did the UN in this case strike the right balance, in
16 your judgment, between careful pre-planning on the one
17 hand, but maintaining flexibility and adapting to events
18 as they unfolded?

19 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Yes, I think I would comment at this
20 point that the UN in these areas is an extremely
21 competent and resourceful organisation up to a certain
22 ceiling of resource availability.

23 If there had been a huge refugee flow in Iraq as
24 a result of widespread military action, then UNHCR,
25 World Food Programme, Unicef and other agencies would

1 have been in there very quickly, were planning for this
2 in Geneva, so I didn't see them from New York in detail,
3 but they would have brought the resources to bear to the
4 extent that member states gave them funding for this
5 very quickly and very competently, and they would have
6 been able to handle this kind of flow of refugees
7 without a serious loss of life, which is quite
8 a remarkable capability.

9 THE CHAIRMAN: One thing has been coming through in evidence
10 to this committee, which is the surprise on pretty much
11 everyone's part about the very fractured and broken
12 nature of the Iraq was found in March/April.

13 Tim Cross, for example, going to Baghdad a few days
14 after the invasion, genuine surprise, lack of knowledge
15 all round about just how bad things were in terms of
16 infrastructure, civil administration, everything.

17 The UN had a presence in Iraq in the lead-up. It
18 could see what was there on the ground. Was there equal
19 surprise in the United Nations as there was apparently
20 in Washington and, indeed, London?

21 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: I don't think there was surprise
22 amongst the UN professionals about the state of Iraq's
23 infrastructure and government capabilities and
24 government services, but it is relevant to your
25 question, Chairman, that these broke down to a much

1 greater extent than even they were expecting in the
2 aftermath of the conflict because of the looting, the
3 sabotage, the disappearance of everybody in the
4 government system on the Iraq side, which it wasn't the
5 UN's job to forecast or predict; it was the
6 responsibility of the invading powers to do that, or to
7 have contingency arrangements for it. But I don't think
8 anybody predicted the degree of destructive, wanton
9 violence, which didn't have any particular political
10 purpose to it, in the days after 9 April.

11 Remember that the United Nations had been feeding
12 Iraq through the Oil For Food programme, through the
13 ration card system. They had many millions of Iraqis on
14 ration cards, doling out food in the villages and towns
15 all over Iraq, but this was a highly centralised,
16 dictatorial government under Saddam Hussein. And when
17 you take the top away, everything just falls apart.
18 I think they were partly expecting that.

19 On top of that you had the destruction of buildings,
20 the infrastructure, et cetera, all the ministries and
21 the disappearance from their desks of all the civil
22 servants. So even the rickety system that the UN was
23 dealing with under Saddam just disappeared in front of
24 their eyes.

25 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. I know several of my colleagues

1 would like to ask questions as well. So I think before
2 we turn to your time in Baghdad, I will just check who
3 would like to ask. Lawrence?

4 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Yes, I should just follow on from
5 that question. I'm interested in the general attitudes,
6 because it wasn't only the UN bureaucracy you had been
7 dealing with: All the other delegations, NGOs and so
8 on. There was a lot going on in New York and we have
9 heard about how weapons of mass destruction -- everybody
10 assumed there was something there. There were few
11 doubters on that.

12 Are there similar sort of general assumptions at
13 work here as well? You mentioned the expectation of the
14 humanitarian disaster as the main focus of activity. Do
15 you think this was a general view, that the real thing
16 to worry about with Iraq was the immediate aftermath in
17 terms of feeding and dealing with refugees and so on?

18 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Yes, we quite often got from the
19 secretariat at senior levels -- and I don't know whether
20 you are calling Sir Kieran Prendergast as a witness, but
21 he will give you a very clear view as
22 Undersecretary General for Political Affairs, and the
23 main liaison under the Secretary General with the
24 Security Council on these issues -- the feeling that not
25 only were the United States and the United Kingdom

1 risking losing international sympathy and support for
2 what they were doing in political terms through the use
3 of force, but they were also causing everybody else,
4 particularly the UN, a huge amount of trouble in what
5 they were going to produce on the ground in physical
6 terms, with a destroyed country.

7 "And here you are invading a country and expecting us
8 to pick up the pieces. We are not sure we are going to
9 respond to that. Why don't you deal with the
10 consequences of your own activities?"

11 I used the word "resentment" in my earlier answer.
12 There was a feeling of anger that we were dragging them
13 into something that was not their responsibility, they
14 hadn't asked to do, was not a natural product of
15 developing world deficiencies and other things that the
16 UN deals with, but almost an act of wanton destruction
17 of a country's ability to look after itself.

18 So at the far extreme there was a certain degree of
19 anger about all of this and a wish that we would behave
20 differently. When they got that off their chest, they
21 began to think "what should we be responsible for. We
22 have got to save lives here, we have got to make people
23 capable of looking after their own lives again and we
24 will try and do our best?".

25 We haven't, Chairman, come yet to the business of

1 the passage of Resolution 1483. So all that kind of
2 conversation about the responsibilities involved came up
3 in the negotiation of that draft resolution.

4 But the Secretariat were in quite an angry mode over
5 all of this, but at the same time they got down to the
6 planning work in quite a responsible way.

7 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: But the basic assumption was in
8 a sense short-term in focus, that the real need where
9 the UN and everybody else might have to put their
10 biggest effort was to deal with the immediate
11 humanitarian crisis as much as putting the country on
12 its feet for the long term.

13 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Yes, and if you recall, that was
14 actually the impression they got of the US approach also
15 under Garner and ORHA, and they would have had their own
16 conversations, probably much more extensive than with
17 the UK, with Garner and his team and with the
18 United States.

19 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: I'm interested in not just with the
20 Secretariat, but with other delegations -- particularly
21 from the Middle East -- what they were saying to you
22 about where this was likely to lead. You have already
23 explained that nobody quite expected things to be so bad
24 in terms of the infrastructure and wanton destruction
25 and so on. But in terms of the politics of Iraq, what

1 sort of warnings were you -- were you given warnings by
2 other delegations as to what we might be letting
3 ourselves in for?

4 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: We got a whole range of things.
5 There was, you know, some support. Eventually the
6 coalition was composed of 40-odd countries. There were
7 people who believed that Saddam Hussein got what was
8 coming to him. There were people who believed that we
9 were probably exceeding our international authority in
10 doing what we were doing, but they didn't mind seeing
11 the back of Saddam Hussein. There were people who felt
12 we were being rash, but they probably understood why we
13 were going to this degree to deal with Saddam Hussein,
14 and there were people who felt that we had far exceeded
15 any possible legal or legitimate authority that we had
16 and we were going to cause problems in a country whose
17 history was violent and whose people would show us that
18 they had the capacity for violence, which would shock us
19 to the core when we actually had to deal with them.
20 There was that whole range.

21 In the last category, I remember, was my Egyptian
22 colleague, now Egyptian foreign minister, Ahmed Aboul
23 Gheit, who said "you will not believe the degree of
24 violence of which these people are capable when you come
25 to it. So be careful what you take on".

1 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: How were you able to report this
2 back or did you just lodge it in your mind for future
3 reference? What sort of impact did these sorts of
4 statements make, because the Egyptians know Iraq pretty
5 well?

6 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Yes, and so do the British from 1920
7 onwards.

8 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Not an encouraging experience
9 either.

10 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: I would have reported these, in
11 answer to your question. I would have reported the
12 range of comments, and I remember reporting in some form
13 or other my Egyptian colleague's comments.

14 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Thank you.

15 THE CHAIRMAN: Roderic?

16 SIR RODERIC LYNE: You said that from the autumn onwards,
17 the Office of Humanitarian Affairs was beginning to
18 think about contingencies. Did it involve our own
19 Department for International Development in this, were
20 they consulting DFID?

21 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: I can't remember specific
22 conversations, but yes, they would have been consulting
23 DFID or they would have been asking London what they
24 were prepared to put in by way of funding for the
25 humanitarian activity that would be necessary, as they

1 would have been asking their whole range of normal
2 donors and DFID would have been brought into this
3 straight away.

4 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Do you recall what kind of response DFID
5 was making? Was it putting out a signal that it was
6 ready to engage in this sort of planning and prepare for
7 a response?

8 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: I can't recall being asked to put
9 a response through my office or my mission, but the
10 UK Mission has a counsellor for economic and social
11 affairs that deals with the humanitarian area.

12 There was at that time a secondee from DFID in my
13 mission. He and she would have been involved with the
14 humanitarian side of the secretariat to discuss these
15 things, and DFID might well have asked them to suggest
16 that we were ready to put in a certain sum, or DFID
17 would have told the Secretariat directly that they might
18 have wished to fund certain things or try and help in
19 certain ways.

20 But it depends on the timing of your question,
21 Sir Roderic. But as we went to war in the planning
22 phase, there wouldn't have been any intensive
23 involvement in what was going on in New York on behalf
24 of DFID itself; it was doing its own thing in London and
25 we would have conveyed their answers.

1 SIR RODERIC LYNE: On a separate area, you have stressed
2 that the United Nations did not want to take
3 responsibility for the administration of Iraq and,
4 indeed, did not feel that it had a capacity to do so,
5 and that this was clear when Louise Frechette got her
6 ad hoc group together in February. But we have heard
7 from other witnesses that the planning assumption in
8 London was that post-conflict the United Nations would
9 take responsibility for the administration. That was
10 the preferred route for the British Government, which
11 was one of the reasons why the British Government was
12 not preparing itself for a role in all of this.

13 How was it that in New York there was one rather
14 clear assumption that the UN would not take
15 responsibility, but in London there was a different
16 assumption?

17 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: I think the British wish was that
18 somebody else would take the responsibility for the
19 administration of Iraq; the British wish was that under
20 good collective international arrangements, the UN would
21 have a leading political role. But we were also
22 conscious -- and I'm surprised if this didn't come out
23 from your previous conversations with witnesses -- we
24 were also conscious that the United States was going to
25 place a very definite limit on the degree of

1 responsibility that it would allow anybody other than
2 the United States in dealing with Iraq after the
3 conflict.

4 So I didn't see any particular dichotomy from my
5 New York standpoint. We would have liked a leading
6 political role for the UN. I would have advised -- and
7 I think did advise -- that we must remember that the UN
8 has a limited capability at the top end of running
9 a difficult country or a large country, that they don't
10 have their own resources, they have to have resources
11 supplied to them for each emergency situation, and that,
12 therefore, from my viewpoint, we must look at this as
13 being a partnership with the United Nations. And if we
14 come to talking later about my own approach to Baghdad,
15 et cetera, I saw myself as being in partnership with the
16 Americans and the United Nations on the ground in
17 Baghdad to deal with the situation as we found it and as
18 we were instructed to try and progress it.

19 But I didn't see any particular -- your question
20 implies more of a double perception than I saw from
21 New York.

22 SIR RODERIC LYNE: What we have been told effectively is
23 that until the Iraq Planning Unit was set up in the
24 Foreign Office as a pan-Whitehall body in
25 early February, that there had been an assumption that

1 the administration post-conflict would be led by the
2 United Nations. But what is curious is that this seems
3 to have been an unrealistic assumption all along.

4 Then there was -- as you say, later it became clear,
5 but it only became clear at a fairly late stage, that
6 the Americans, through the Department of Defense and
7 ORHA, were actually going to do it themselves. But that
8 assumption persisted until a rather late stage.

9 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: A late stage before the military
10 action started?

11 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Yes, it persisted until early February
12 essentially.

13 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: It wasn't really until February that
14 anyone was getting their act together even in
15 Washington. So, frankly, I think you can exaggerate
16 this dichotomy.

17 I think it was our natural wish as the UK that the
18 United Nations would be in the lead and we would have
19 a defined smaller role somewhere. But we must have been
20 conscious that the United States would have its own
21 views on the degree to which it wanted the
22 United Nations involved at quite an early stage, because
23 that would have been clear from the nature of US
24 planning.

25 But we weren't clear ourselves on what kind of

1 post-conflict administration the US were thinking of
2 until Jay Garner was appointed, which itself was
3 early February or something; it wasn't until
4 early February that he began to gather a team and to
5 have conversations with others about what he might do.

6 So once that process had started, then I think we
7 would all have been quite realistic that this was going
8 to have to be a mixed operation of US/UK with as much UN
9 as we could get, particularly in terms of taking the
10 political responsibility, so that we weren't seen to
11 take over a country as two western powers, but there was
12 a clear UN label on the administration, but with the
13 practical work having to be done in the early stages by
14 member states, because the experience of the UN in
15 coming into a new country is that they take a long time
16 to get their act together in an emergency situation.

17 I don't think that I would have given advice on
18 anything other than the lines I have just described to
19 you.

20 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Thank you.

21 THE CHAIRMAN: I would like to take us into the period
22 leading up to 1483, but I wonder, could we start off by
23 asking: what was your understanding of the
24 responsibilities of the United Kingdom immediately
25 post-invasion as an occupying power, together with the

1 Americans, and how did that evolve towards 1483 in
2 a formal, in effect, acknowledgment or mandate to fulfil
3 that function?

4 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: The responsibilities of the
5 United Kingdom immediately after the conflict was over
6 were, of course, not easily clarified. I don't know
7 whether anybody has used this phrase with you in witness
8 statements before. I haven't seen it. But there was
9 a view that our invasion of Iraq could be a catastrophic
10 success; that is, it would happen so quickly and
11 Saddam's regime would collapse so fast that we would be
12 left holding the baby without the materials for looking
13 after it.

14 And that, indeed, was what happened.

15 THE CHAIRMAN: Particularly in the south and immediately
16 after the invasion?

17 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Yes, there was -- we may go into
18 this in greater detail than you have gone into it with
19 other witnesses, but there was some unclarity even in
20 London as to whether we would take over the south as
21 a separate area, whether we would be a separate
22 administrative power, whether we would be in
23 partnership, in a coalition with the United States for
24 the whole of Iraq, et cetera. And that was clarified
25 only after discussion, perhaps at Hillsborough. I don't

1 know whether it was fully clarified there.

2 But we, I think, as UK, by the time 9 April came,
3 were conscious that we had to secure the territory where
4 our military found themselves. In an overall
5 scenario --

6 THE CHAIRMAN: Both as a practical matter but also a matter
7 of international law and our responsibilities under it?

8 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: There was -- if there wasn't
9 a Security Council Resolution that was specific to the
10 situation, which there wasn't until 22 May, we would
11 have to act under the Geneva Conventions and the Hague
12 Protocol in looking after a territory which we had taken
13 over militarily, and that was our clear legal
14 responsibility in the territory where our military
15 happened to be. It was a matter of political
16 arrangement with the Americans what that territory
17 should be.

18 THE CHAIRMAN: And the extent to which the United Kingdom,
19 as the other main coalition partner, was responsible
20 under international law at any rate for the whole of
21 Iraq? We had a share of responsible for the whole as
22 well as a direct responsibility in the south?

23 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Yes, but it is unclear until that
24 responsibility comes out in a particular decision at the
25 international level.

1 I think the document that's worth pointing to at
2 this point is the letter of 8 May, which
3 Ambassador Negroponte at US/UN and I sent to the Security
4 Council describing what we were doing a month after the
5 conflict was actually over.

6 THE CHAIRMAN: This letter, which is in the public domain,
7 can go up on our website, but we notice that it is
8 a letter from the US, the UK and coalition partners.

9 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Yes. I was quite interested in
10 rereading the papers to see that that was actually what
11 we had said, that it went beyond the US and the UK
12 because in 1483 the responsibility came back to the US
13 and the UK.

14 THE CHAIRMAN: Indeed. Well, we will come on to 1483, but
15 there is actually a restrictive paragraph early on,
16 isn't there, declaring other partners not to be
17 occupying powers?

18 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Yes. Anyway, in that letter, we
19 described what we were doing in administering Iraq and
20 what our intentions were, and some of those ideas then
21 fed into 1483. And you can see that quite a large part
22 of the letter is concerned with the searching for and
23 discovery of and destruction of weapons of mass
24 destruction.

25 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. The British Government's

1 objectives in the period leading up to 1483 were
2 essentially to, so far as possible, secure the role of
3 the United Nations in the broad set of arrangements,
4 that vital role that was acknowledged at Hillsborough.
5 Were there more precise negotiating objectives in the
6 run-up to 1483, as it went through successive drafts and
7 discussions?

8 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Yes, and they were -- there were
9 nuances between London and Washington in the setting of
10 the objectives for 1483. First of all, I think it was
11 satisfactory for the United Kingdom that the
12 United States was prepared to go for a UN Resolution
13 authorising the post-conflict situation in Iraq.

14 We could see, rather as was the case in
15 Resolution 1441 the previous autumn, that the
16 United States was setting the bar quite high in terms of
17 what it wanted from the United Nations; in other words,
18 they wanted the situation of the United States leading
19 the coalition with a unilateral decision-making
20 capability for that coalition with the United States
21 very much the largest member of it, with the
22 United Nations endorsing that situation and coming in
23 with its ancillary services to help deal with the
24 territory.

25 When I learned that that was what Washington was

1 looking for, because Ambassador Negroponte and I got
2 down quite early before the end of April to discussing
3 what elements we might advise our capitals should go
4 into such a resolution, I said to him, "This is not
5 negotiable in the Security Council". And we went
6 through a minor version of the same process as 1441,
7 where we had to scale Washington's more unilateral
8 ambitions back down to something that was negotiable
9 within the Security Council.

10 The Security Council -- let me give you the short
11 version of this -- had, as always, a range of opinions,
12 with the Russians in particular being very clear that
13 they would not allow any resolution to pass that
14 appeared to legitimise in any way what had already
15 happened, wanted -- this is the Russians -- wanted
16 a statement of principles to be decided by the Security
17 Council as to what underlay the situation in Iraq with
18 the US and the UK as occupying powers in it and wanted
19 to resist the UN taking over responsibility for what
20 Russia saw as the mess that the US and the UK had
21 created.

22 So you had the US at one end of the spectrum, Russia
23 at the other, and it became almost by this stage
24 a normal Security Council negotiation as to what, in the
25 middle of that, we can achieve in negotiations.

1 THE CHAIRMAN: Thinking back to the post-1441, second
2 resolution attempt, where were the French, as a matter
3 of interest, when it comes to 1483?

4 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: The other members of the Security
5 Council were more constructive than I was expecting at
6 this stage, I think for one, perhaps two, overwhelming
7 reasons. One was that they wanted the United Nations to
8 come back into the picture. They wanted the
9 unilateralism of what they saw as having happened in the
10 invasion to be corrected back to an internationally
11 approved and organised situation for Iraq, with the UN
12 playing its proper part in it.

13 And secondly, they wanted to minimise the overall
14 political -- geopolitical damage that had been done by
15 the invasion of Iraq, and that to my mind was a more
16 constructive approach than might have happened, the
17 reasons for which we can go into, but I had something to
18 play with in the rest of the Security Council because of
19 those attitudes.

20 THE CHAIRMAN: I mean, those two sets of responses were very
21 much echoing United Kingdom Government policy at that
22 point.

23 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Yes. I mean, with a country like
24 France, a fellow permanent member with very similar
25 global interests with the United Kingdom, we often

1 approached matters of peace and security in the same
2 way. On Iraq we were on different sides of the
3 watershed because of the decision to use force, which
4 President Chirac had been very adamant against. But
5 when it came to mending that situation and trying to put
6 the pieces together again, the French were prepared, at
7 least in private -- and occasionally in public -- to be
8 more constructive than their tone of voice before the
9 conflict started.

10 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. It would be helpful to hear a bit
11 about the Secretary General's attitude during the
12 negotiation of 1483. Did it in effect end up where he
13 would have liked it to end up or was it short of,
14 despite that resentment and distancing that you
15 described earlier, where the United Nations as an
16 organisation would like to find itself?

17 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: The Secretary General continued to
18 feel his way and anybody with experience of
19 Secretary General Annan's political thinking and
20 political decision-making would have expected him to do
21 that.

22 The Secretary General is in a sense the servant of
23 the Security Council and of the member states and cannot
24 act, in a situation as tense and as highly political as
25 this, without Security Council authorisation. So he

1 needed to know where members of the Security Council
2 went. But he was also capable of encouraging them to go
3 in certain directions.

4 He did not want to be responsible for the
5 administration of Iraq. He did not want the
6 United Nations to be absent from Iraq and, therefore, he
7 was looking for a role in between those two things that
8 was dignified and proper for the United Nations without
9 biting off more than he, as Secretary General, could
10 chew.

11 So he partly negotiated with us over what might be
12 possible in private and partly watched to see what would
13 happen in the Security Council. I'll give you
14 an illustration. He had appointed a special envoy on
15 7 April in Rafiuddin Ahmed, but the draft of the
16 Security Council Resolution began to talk about
17 a Special Coordinator, which I wanted turned into
18 a Special Representative, which was the proper title for
19 a UN representative in a particular territory, to show
20 that the UN was properly there. And in the end we got
21 that term into the Security Council Resolution and
22 Kofi Annan was very pleased with that, I think.

23 You will see in the wording of 1483, which is
24 tortuous at times, that we got to a description of how
25 Iraq should be run politically and with what political

1 objective in operative paragraph 9 of a kind which
2 I think the Secretary General would have been satisfied
3 with in the circumstances.

4 But he played an active role mainly behind the
5 scenes throughout the whole of this negotiation.

6 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. There is one thing in 1483 we
7 have touched on already and that's the limitation to the
8 United Kingdom and the United States of the role of
9 occupying power, unlike your joint letter a few weeks
10 earlier. How did that come to be? For example, the
11 Australians had a military presence in Iraq during and
12 after the invasion, were coalition partners in the joint
13 letter, no longer have the status of an occupying power.
14 Very explicitly in the preliminaries to 1483. How did
15 that actually come about? Was it a deliberate
16 withdrawal or a deliberate withholding by the two major
17 partners of others, or what?

18 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: I can't remember myself having
19 a discussion with the Australians or any other coalition
20 partner about their receding from the 8 May letter to
21 this preambular paragraph and disappearing from
22 responsibility.

23 I think it must have been settled between capitals.
24 It was much more, in the negotiation I was involved
25 with, a matter of the US and the UK deciding how they

1 would be described as the powers in charge of Iraq, and
2 there were people in Washington and, indeed, I think in
3 London who didn't want any mention of occupation or
4 occupying powers.

5 THE CHAIRMAN: Because of the importation of international
6 law requirements?

7 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Yes, and also the image of an
8 occupation, which was obviously in the context of the
9 Middle East going to be compared with the Israeli
10 occupation of Palestine and, indeed, was by Al Jazeera
11 and the man on the street in the Arab world. And
12 I remember advising London that it was sensible to have
13 a mention of occupying powers because that made it clear
14 under what body of international legislation we would be
15 acting, and without that clarity, we might be confused
16 ourselves and our fellow Security Council members might
17 resist agreeing to a resolution unless there was a clear
18 mention of what the status was of the people in charge
19 of the territory. And London and Washington decided
20 that they would be the two that took the responsibility
21 for that status of our presence in Iraq.

22 THE CHAIRMAN: Without 1483 and without that designation, it
23 would have been questionable, would it, as to how far
24 the coalition could set economic policy or decide on
25 what institutions of civil government to be brought into

1 use?

2 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Actually even with 1483 we were
3 still subject to the terms of the Geneva Conventions,
4 except as amended by 1483. And 1483 goes through
5 a certain amount of detail, but it doesn't give the
6 occupying powers or the authority, as it is called in
7 the resolution, the Coalition Provisional Authority,
8 complete powers to do anything it likes inside Iraq.

9 THE CHAIRMAN: You mentioned Operative Paragraph 9 and,
10 indeed, 8 -- this is all quite detailed but much of it
11 doesn't describe, as it were, an authoritative role. It
12 describes encouragement, influence, that sort of thing.

13 Just before we leave this point, the preamble to
14 1483 notes that other states not being occupying powers
15 may nonetheless work with the Coalition Provisional
16 Authority. I imagine the accent under
17 "provisional" is quite heavy to counterbalance the
18 occupying power flavour.

19 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: The other countries contemplating
20 being members of the coalition wanted to know that if
21 they did so, it was with reasonable Security Council
22 authority for their role, not as responsible powers but
23 as participants.

24 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

25 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: In the Authority, yes.

1 THE CHAIRMAN: So in effect not accepting retrospective
2 responsibility, though the letter of 9 May, was it, may
3 have been thought to confer some of that on them?

4 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Yes, I can't remember the degree to
5 which we negotiated the letter of 8 May with all
6 potential members of the coalition.

7 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

8 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: I think probably to only a very
9 limited extent.

10 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. I think fairly soon we need to get to
11 Baghdad. Just before we do -- and I think we might take
12 a short break in a minute -- others may have questions.
13 Martin?

14 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Sir Jeremy, leaving the UN on the eve
15 of your mission to Iraq, I believe you were present on
16 2 September 2003 at a discussion on Iraq with the
17 Prime Minister. I wonder if you could tell us something
18 of the mood of that meeting and what was discussed, and
19 in particular how it impacted on your own mission?

20 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: I spent the first ten days or so
21 of September briefing myself in London for my role in
22 Baghdad, which -- where I arrived on, I think,
23 15 September, and on 2 September everybody had come back
24 from their summer holidays, including the
25 Prime Minister, and he called a meeting of those who

1 were going to be most responsible for the UK involvement
2 in running Iraq to discuss what was going right and
3 wrong and what was needed from the UK Government to make
4 things go right.

5 The main concerns, I think, that came up in that
6 meeting were first of all security, because security was
7 beginning to go wrong, some way back, and there was the
8 question of how many coalition troops there might be on
9 the ground: were they sufficient, was a larger coalition
10 needed, et cetera? And I think I recall the
11 Prime Minister being interested not in a larger body of
12 external troops being involved in Iraq -- he saw the
13 difficulties in that in supply/resource terms,
14 particularly on the American side -- but rather in
15 getting the police force going, getting a new police
16 force trained and getting civil order restored in Iraq
17 through the rapid creation of a new Iraqi police force.

18 Sir John Sawers was also at that meeting with his
19 experience already on the ground in Iraq. And he and I,
20 I think, tried to warn the Prime Minister that it would
21 take quite a long time to get a police force of the
22 necessary size going, with decent training, from
23 scratch.

24 But he said that was his priority and he wanted us
25 to get on with that and see how quickly we could do it.

1 We said -- we thought it might take a year or so to get
2 a decent police force running. He said try and do it by
3 the end of 2003, if you possibly can. And John and
4 I looked at each other, but decided we had better see
5 whether we could do anything to help that, but we
6 realised it was an extremely ambitious request.

7 The Prime Minister wanted to talk about the
8 political framework, the political process of getting
9 a new government going in Iraq, and I think he said that
10 we should aim to hand over to a new Iraqi government by
11 the summer of 2004 if at all possible, which wasn't
12 quite where the Americans were at that stage and
13 I thought might be too soon.

14 We have skipped to this meeting, Sir Martin, but
15 there is quite a lot that happened before that.

16 THE CHAIRMAN: I think we need to skip back actually --

17 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Let me just finish since I'm
18 answering a question on this meeting, because there was
19 one other focus of the Prime Minister's attention, which
20 was the media operation in Iraq, which he felt was going
21 badly.

22 We were not explaining ourselves well enough and
23 forcefully enough to the Iraqi people, we were not
24 getting our message particularly well out to the rest of
25 the world and he was concerned that we hadn't put enough

1 investment into a sophisticated media operation in
2 Baghdad and internationally, and we were asked to
3 concentrate on that.

4 So there was probably quite a lot else that we
5 discussed. I remember those three areas -- security,
6 the political process and the media -- as being the
7 three priorities that we carried away.

8 THE CHAIRMAN: I would like to go back, before we break --
9 and then we will return to Baghdad after the break -- to
10 the issue of 1483, where the CPA sits in terms of its
11 responsibility to, if any, or accountability to the
12 United Nations Security Council. Right at the end, the
13 Secretary General's special representative has to report
14 to the Council and the paragraph 24 encourages the
15 coalition partners, governments, to inform the Council
16 at regular intervals. It doesn't say anything about the
17 CPA doing anything in that regard, presumably because it
18 is the creature of those two governments.

19 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Yes, in the context of the Security
20 Council, it is the members of the Security Council that
21 report to the Security Council on what they are up to in
22 the matter of peace and security that is the
23 responsibility of the Security Council, or it is for the
24 Security Council to call a non-member of the Security
25 Council from another member state to come and report

1 to it.

2 That word "encourages" would have been a negotiation
3 with the Americans to some extent, because they would
4 not have accepted a Security Council instruction, and so
5 that verb came out like that.

6 There is a touch of fiction in this, in that the
7 Security Council wanted it to appear that the
8 United Nations was assuming the responsibility for the
9 disposition of political forces in Iraq. But they were
10 not assuming responsibility for the administration of
11 Iraq. The people in control of what was going to happen
12 in Iraq were, in everybody's view, without any doubt,
13 the Americans.

14 So 1483 was actually rather a satisfactory
15 resolution from the point of view of the United Nations,
16 but it made it appear that the Special Representative of
17 the Secretary General was going to be at the apex of
18 a relationship which, in truth, on the ground he was
19 not. He was, as I saw it, one of an equal triangle of
20 responsibility, and the UN and the UK were subordinate
21 to the United States in terms of the physical presence
22 on the ground of resources and capability.

23 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. I think after the break we may want to
24 come on to the real, as contrasted with formal, lines of
25 reporting and authority within the CPA itself and the

1 United Kingdom component, but I think that's probably
2 a good moment to break. If we may be back in ten
3 minutes or so.

4 Thank you.

5 (11.09 am)

6 (Short break)

7 (11.19 am)

8 THE CHAIRMAN: On the resumption, I think Baroness Prashar
9 would like to go back to 4 April briefly before we enter
10 into the Baghdad phase, but just before we do, I have
11 got one last question about 1483, which clearly gives
12 equal formal status to the United Kingdom and to the
13 United States, as opposed to the reality of the
14 proportional difference.

15 That was clear both to us and to Washington and both
16 capitals wanted that.

17 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Yes, that was clear.

18 THE CHAIRMAN: It carries with it an assumption of
19 responsibility on the United Kingdom for the entirety of
20 Iraq under occupation, and that was understood?

21 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: The theory of that was understood.

22 THE CHAIRMAN: Right, okay. Well, let's revert to 4 April
23 and the vital role --

24 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Thank you very much indeed.

25 Sir Jeremy, you said that you sent a telex to the UK

1 on 4 April in which you indicated that the approach
2 adopted by the United States was rather top down, and
3 then Hillsborough takes place on 7 and 8 April.

4 Is that a sign of some diplomatic activity and
5 influence on the United States, because after
6 Hillsborough the statement was made of the vital role of
7 the United Nations?

8 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Not a significant one. What I said
9 on 4 April in UKMIS 614 was that the US was too top down
10 for the UN environment. It was going to be essential to
11 have the United States in the lead in terms of troops,
12 resources on the ground and everything else, and we were
13 in the middle of the conflict at that point, but I think
14 my observation was that if the United States tries to
15 run the UN input into that from a position of, "We are
16 in charge, we would like you to do what we are asking at
17 the UN," it wasn't going to work; there would be
18 a reaction. That was what I was warning against.

19 At Hillsborough, amongst the other things that were
20 being discussed, which I was not party to, was this item
21 on the way in which the coalition would describe the
22 involvement of the UN. And, as I understood the way it
23 went, President Bush was being advised by his own team
24 not to give too much away in his description of what
25 part the UN would play, because in practice the US had

1 to be the decision maker and they didn't want their
2 freedom of decision-making to be constrained.

3 The Prime Minister made the point that the UN have
4 capabilities which would be highly useful to the
5 coalition on the ground and, therefore, the UN needed to
6 be encouraged to provide those services without being
7 put in the position of subordination, or at least
8 perceived subordination.

9 We would have liked the UN to be described as
10 playing a leading political role with the US and the UK
11 in administering Iraq as a triumvirate. That was too
12 much for the United States and President Bush came out
13 between his own advisers and the Prime Minister in
14 describing the role that they wanted from the UN as
15 being vital. And do you remember how President Bush
16 described what a vital role would mean? Perhaps it is
17 worth reading into the record because it gives an
18 indication of US thinking. In a press conference
19 afterwards, President Bush was asked by a reporter what
20 the word "vital" meant, and he said:

21 "A vital role as an agent to help people to live
22 freely. That's a vital role, and that means food, that
23 means medicine, that means a place where people can give
24 their contributions, that means suggesting people for
25 the interim Iraqi administration, that means being

1 a party to the progress being made in Iraq."

2 So you can see that President Bush is thinking very
3 much of the practical input of the UN but under the
4 leadership of the US as the controller of the political
5 scenario.

6 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: But the point I wanted to really get
7 at: did the UK exert any influence in shifting their
8 thinking? Did President Bush shift in his thinking from
9 where he was to the point where he made this statement
10 at Hillsborough?

11 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Yes, because without the
12 Prime Minister's input we wouldn't have got the word
13 "vital". I think it was something that President Bush,
14 as it were, gave to the Prime Minister rather than an
15 American recognition that actually the UN would be so
16 useful that we must make sure that they are encouraged
17 to be useful.

18 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Now, we are going to move to
19 Baghdad, but before we do that, I mean, you are in
20 a very unique position at that time because you have an
21 insight into the thinking of the United Nations, you
22 have been negotiating with Ambassador Negroponte in
23 relation to the USA. You have an understanding of where
24 the UK thinking is, but in preparing for your role in
25 Baghdad, were there any outstanding issues that you

1 ironed out before you went? We heard earlier about your
2 meeting with the Prime Minister in September, but were
3 there any issues that were troubling you at the time
4 before you went that you wanted to get clarity on?

5 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Yes, a whole load of issues, but
6 there always are when you take up a new job. And
7 diplomats going to a post are used to going round your
8 own capital in particular and talking to everybody who
9 is involved and seeing what their views are, what's
10 going on, what is happening on the ground, how am
11 I going to be supplied, what am I precisely expected to
12 do, et cetera. So, yes, I did a whole round of
13 devilling at that stage in London.

14 In New York I was announced in mid June as the
15 future Special Envoy for Iraq and I left the UN at the
16 end of July. I had the opportunity to talk to people at
17 the UN about the UN's input. I talked to
18 Sergio Vieira de Mello at one stage when he came back to
19 report to the Security Council in late July. At that
20 open Security Council meeting in late July, members of
21 the Iraqi Governing Council came to New York. I had
22 short conversations with them. Also in late July I went
23 down to Washington to talk to Ambassador Paul Bremer
24 because I would be his partner on the ground and
25 I wanted to reintroduce myself to him because we hadn't

1 worked together since the 1970s.

2 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Were you clear at that stage what
3 your relationship was going to be with Paul Bremer?

4 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: That was part of the discussion with
5 Ambassador Bremer when I went to see him in Washington
6 on 23 July.

7 Sir John Sawers had not been deputy administrator,
8 but the UK representative for UK interests in Iraq.
9 Bremer wanted that to continue with me. His preference
10 was that I should not be a deputy administrator but the
11 representative on the side of the CPA of UK interests.

12 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Were you content with that?

13 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: I said I would discuss it when
14 I went back to London and see what my government wanted
15 me to do, and that was part of my discussions in
16 early September. So that issue was finally decided in
17 London because I was going to do what my government
18 wanted me to do, so long as that was agreeable to the
19 Americans.

20 Actually, the point I'm making is that Bremer did
21 not want me to be his deputy administrator.

22 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Okay. Now, before you went there,
23 there had been an attack on the United Nations and the
24 tragic death of the Special Representative. Did that in
25 any way give you any cause for concern before you went

1 and what were the issues that you thought that
2 particular withdrawal of the United Nations staff meant
3 for you before you got there?

4 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Yes. It changed my approach quite
5 radically. I had begun to imagine what my role would be
6 in circumstances that were clearly very difficult at the
7 start and becoming more difficult because of the loss of
8 control of the security theatre and also from what I had
9 heard about the capacity of the administrative machinery
10 of the CPA.

11 I nevertheless imagined that I would be working in
12 that triangle again: US definitely, in practice, the
13 apex, but the UK and the UN from their separate and
14 independent positions in Baghdad feeding in advice,
15 political comments and suggestions as part of a team
16 that would be working very closely together, drawing on
17 the wisdom of Sergio de Mello from his previous UN
18 postings and on whatever I could bring to the table,
19 having had no experience as an administrator.

20 With the removal of Sergio personally that
21 immediately changed the situation, because Sergio was
22 a powerful instrument, in my view, in his own person.
23 I had lost that. I had lost a real partner. If it was
24 to lead to the withdrawal of the UN, which was not clear
25 really until I actually arrived, altogether in terms of

1 its presence in Baghdad, that was going to change the
2 weighting between the US and the UK because I had
3 conceived of the UN as being part of that weighting. So
4 the answer is yes, for those reasons.

5 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Before you got there, following that
6 meeting that you had with the Prime Minister and the
7 work that you did in talking to colleagues in the UK,
8 what was your understanding of the objectives that were
9 set for you?

10 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: What I was clearly being asked to do
11 was to support the American objective of returning Iraq
12 to the Iraqis in a secure and stable state.

13 So I was to represent the UK interest in that and
14 I was to do what I could to make sure that first of all
15 the political process developed sensibly and smoothly;
16 second, that the UK team in the CPA were well organised,
17 well looked after and working to the best of their
18 capability; and third, that what we were doing in
19 Baghdad fitted in to the UK presence across Iraq, most
20 particularly in the south -- but we can come to
21 describing my relationship with the south in a moment --
22 but also with those governorates, as the Americans
23 called the provinces, which had UK personnel as leading
24 political deputy administrators or actors in them, which
25 was Maysan, Nasiriyah and Kurdistan in effect.

1 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: This was against the background of
2 the time before you got there with increasing
3 deterioration of security issues and so on. The
4 situation was quite complex?

5 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Yes. I didn't know what I was going
6 to find on the ground in practice.

7 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: What did you find when you got
8 there?

9 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: What I was told I would find at one
10 point from the Foreign Office was a dysfunctional
11 administration, an administration which was not up to
12 running Iraq as it should be run at this stage, and the
13 American part of that was also not functioning as we
14 would have wished. To which my reply was, "It is surely
15 an exaggeration to call the American effort
16 dysfunctional. This is the superpower, this is a hugely
17 powerful machine that must be doing things effectively,
18 even if it is not doing everything effectively. So
19 I will need to judge that when I come to it." And then
20 I read some of John Sawyer's reports, his final report at
21 the end of July, and when I came to it on the ground, to
22 jump forward and answer your question, I did indeed find
23 that the coalition's capabilities were not fully up to
24 the business of administering Iraq and was not fully in
25 charge of the whole theatre in Iraq because the military

1 were operating separately from the Coalition Provisional
2 Authority.

3 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: So the military was operating quite
4 separately from the coalition?

5 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: In terms of lines of reporting.

6 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Right.

7 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: The only place at which the apex of
8 administration of Iraq came together between the
9 military pillar and the civilian pillar, which was the
10 CPA, was in the Pentagon. The Deputy Secretary of
11 Defense and the Secretary of Defense were the first
12 points at which Iraq was being administered from one
13 desk.

14 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: So when you got there and you found
15 the dysfunctional CPA, how did you go about determining
16 what you would do and how you would influence and exert
17 UK's influence on the CPA?

18 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: I had addressed this question in
19 London and I think this is relevant, Baroness Prashar --
20 I addressed this in London before I went, when it was
21 agreed that I would not be deputy administrator but UK
22 Special Representative, as Bremer wished. And I said to
23 ministers in London, and I said this to the
24 Prime Minister, "Do not regard me as an administrator in
25 Iraq. I'm here to represent UK interests in Iraq

1 through whatever influence I can bring to bear. But the
2 person who is responsible to London, to the UK, as the
3 country co-responsible under the resolution for the
4 administration of Iraq, is Ambassador Bremer. Is that
5 understood?" And the Prime Minister said that he
6 understood that. I wanted to be clear that I could not
7 be accountable for the administration of Iraq.

8 THE CHAIRMAN: Did Jerry Bremer understand it, that he was
9 responsible to London as a joint coalition partner as
10 well as to Washington?

11 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: I don't think so, no. He didn't act
12 as though he understood that.

13 THE CHAIRMAN: There was nothing in his instructions,
14 I understand.

15 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: No, I think he was being
16 micromanaged himself by the Pentagon and that was almost
17 his sole focus as far as lines of reporting are
18 concerned.

19 THE CHAIRMAN: Forgive me, just to pursue that one more
20 stage, you said a little while back Bremer did not want
21 you as his deputy within the CPA. Was that a reflection
22 of the formality of the thing, that there were two equal
23 coalition partners in formal terms, or was it that he
24 just didn't want somebody in the chain of command that
25 wasn't American?

1 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Both of those things. He didn't
2 want, for instance, to hand over to a non-American as
3 acting administrator when he left the country to return
4 to Washington. He -- he -- he was not, you know,
5 100 per cent that way inclined and zero the other. We
6 talked this through and there were pros and cons for
7 either option, deputy administrator or separate
8 representative of the UK.

9 But I understood that he wanted his senior structure
10 to be American, to rely on a deputy who was American, to
11 report to the Pentagon in an American reporting chain
12 and for the UK to do its own thing on the side of that,
13 but to supply people for the CPA as other coalition
14 partners did but not to our degree, in a way which was
15 supportive of and loyal to the American leadership.

16 THE CHAIRMAN: But leaving open our responsibility as
17 occupying power?

18 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Yes, it did leave that open in terms
19 of the administrative capacities, but remember that
20 there was Basra and MND South East which, in the
21 American mind, was the major British input into the
22 running of Iraq.

23 SIR RODERIC LYNE: You have carefully not said what you
24 personally thought about this, only what Bremer thought
25 and London thought. Did you think that you should have

1 been the deputy administrator and been given a more
2 formal role in this?
3 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: No, I decided that in the end on
4 balance it was better not to be deputy administrator
5 because I did not want to be in a position of being
6 instructed to shut up or whatever by Ambassador Bremer.
7 I wanted an independent voice in the UK interest, which
8 left me having to use that voice as a matter of
9 influence and input and personal management of my day,
10 rather than through any formal position.

11 SIR RODERIC LYNE: So that's in the end what you decided.
12 When you went to see Bremer in July, was it your idea
13 and was it Whitehall's idea that actually you should
14 have a formal part in the structure as a deputy to
15 Bremer? Was that the starting point?

16 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Not really, because I talked this
17 through with John Sawers at some point, perhaps in most
18 detail with John when I was in London in
19 early September, but I checked with him before I went to
20 see Bremer and he had not been deputy administrator and
21 thought that on balance that was probably the right
22 arrangement.

23 There were disadvantages both ways, but the UK had
24 a separate responsibility and needed to be able to put
25 a veto down on the table if it disagreed with the way

1 that the United States was handling things, and you
2 could not do that if you were deputy to an American
3 administrator.

4 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: By we have heard that on the
5 military side there was no difficulty in the senior
6 British officer being a deputy to the American senior
7 military commander. Did this create a disjunction
8 between the civil/military sides of what was going on in
9 Iraq?

10 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: I don't think so. I think the
11 military probably have to have a single chain of
12 command. The political situation was, in structural
13 terms, more complicated than the military situation and,
14 therefore, that did not surprise me that there was
15 a dichotomy.

16 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: But if you were talking about being
17 able to exercise some sort of veto and not being the
18 deputy to Bremer -- in some way that almost puts you in
19 the position of being Ambassador to Iraq -- I mean, or
20 in some way Bremer having an accountability to the
21 British Government through you, but that certainly never
22 happened?

23 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: No, that's what I tried to
24 establish, that Bremer had a direct responsibility to
25 London. But in practice he did not report to London; he

1 relied on me to do that and to tell London what was
2 going on.

3 If London disagreed with something that the
4 United States was doing or wanted something to be done
5 that was not happening, London would talk to Washington.

6 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Perhaps as we go through the story you
7 can just identify to us -- not now, but as with we go
8 through it -- the points at which you actually exercised
9 this power of veto. But let's leave that. I think Usha
10 would like to get back?

11 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Yes. Can I come back to your
12 earlier comment when you said that for Bremer the line
13 of responsibility was sort of, you know, Pentagon and
14 that was the apex. What was the apex in London? Where
15 was the command coming from in London? Was it
16 Number 10, was it the FCO?

17 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: The apex in London was the
18 Prime Minister. The Prime Minister had appointed me and
19 the Prime Minister expected me to work to him, but, of
20 course, in the British system you worked to the system.

21 In practice there was a triangle in the British
22 arrangement, which was the foreign policy adviser to the
23 Prime Minister and Number 10, Nigel Sheinwald, when he
24 was in that position, the Political Director in the
25 Foreign Office, John Sawers in that position at that

1 time, and myself in Baghdad.

2 We would have triangular teleconferences and other
3 means of communication, and if the three of us were
4 clear that this was the way to go, it was my job to get
5 that done in Baghdad, persuade Ambassador Bremer or
6 whatever. It was their job to make sure that they were
7 acting with ministerial authority in London.

8 I came back to London once a month during my six and
9 a half months in Baghdad, and when I came back to
10 London, I would talk to ministers, normally to the
11 Prime Minister amongst other ministers, as well as to
12 officials. So although it sounds like a multiplied
13 arrangement, it is entirely normal to the British system
14 that officials will work on a daily routine basis with
15 their ranking officials and that it is London's job
16 within the system that officials make sure that they have
17 ministerial clearance for instructions that they give
18 overseas.

19 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Did you feel that the lines of
20 communication were effective in terms of what you
21 reported back, action was taken?

22 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Yes, there was understanding and
23 clarity about the lines of reporting. That's not to say
24 that there was understanding and clarity about how we
25 got the job done and what resources were needed, but the

1 communication and the line of command back to the
2 Prime Minister was, to my mind, not a problem.

3 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: So what you are saying is the lines
4 of communications were fine, but they were not
5 necessarily responsive to what was needed and what the
6 situation was like on the ground?

7 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Yes to the latter, but that was
8 primarily because we were having to follow the Americans
9 in almost everything that we did and we could not
10 achieve the filling of gaps where we perceived gaps
11 unless the Americans did most of the heavy lifting in
12 that respect.

13 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Before the break you said that the
14 arrangements were theoretical when they were agreed and,
15 of course, you have given reasons in response to my
16 colleague's questions about why you decided not to be
17 a deputy to Bremer. But how did it actually work on the
18 ground in terms of the cohesiveness of the CPA, in terms
19 of how did you work with the British team and how did
20 you go about actually influencing what the Americans
21 were doing?

22 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: By trial and error. There was
23 a considerable British input into the CPA. I'm talking
24 here about the civilian side of things. I observed the
25 military, but wasn't part of that. If the CPA was

1 roughly 1,200 people, the Brits were about between 90
2 and 100 of those 1,200. Most of those British were
3 working within the CPA under the Administrator. I was
4 off to one side as the UK satellite, if you like, with
5 my own small private office and advisers.

6 My first responsibility -- and I said this to
7 Ambassador Bremer when I first telephoned him on his own
8 appointment, as soon as I knew that I would be coming --
9 was loyalty to him and support for him in getting our
10 joint job done in Iraq.

11 It was the American approach and it was certainly
12 Ambassador Bremer's approach, that the duty of anybody
13 working in Baghdad, including the separate British
14 representative, was (a) loyalty to the United States,
15 and (b) practical support for what they were doing.

16 I tried to provide that on every possible occasion
17 through liaison with London, using whatever materials
18 I had to hand.

19 If it came to disagreement with Bremer or my wishing
20 to suggest that we should think of things in a different
21 way from the way he was thinking, that was a matter of
22 discussion between me and Ambassador Bremer.

23 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: What were the main areas where there
24 were disagreements or differences in approach and
25 objectives?

1 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Well, he had an approach which
2 was -- I think I would call it a driving approach. He
3 had his instructions from his President, he had his
4 seven steps plan, which you know about.

5 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Yes, indeed.

6 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: And he thought that the way to
7 implement that plan was to create momentum behind it and
8 he expected me to be part that of momentum.

9 The second or third day I was in Baghdad,
10 Secretary Colin Powell came on a short visit and he,
11 Bremer and I sat in Bremer's office to talk about the
12 political process and the seven steps, and I was asked
13 for my views by Secretary Powell and I suggested, as
14 I had done to Bremer in Washington in July, that it
15 would be wise to think of options, political options:
16 what if things don't happen as we predict, as often does
17 happen in an unusual situation.

18 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: In other words, not sticking to the
19 steps agreed, but --

20 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Well, we were behind the seven steps
21 plan, but what if the Iraqis don't go along with that
22 bit or that bit of it, are we thinking about alternative
23 routes? And on both occasions in July and on this
24 occasion in September, I was given a very direct and
25 peremptory message from Bremer that I was to stick to

1 the seven steps plan. This was what had been decided,
2 this was the mission, this would be accomplished and
3 I was to support it.

4 So I turned to some other subject with Colin Powell
5 and decided to see how things played out. But these --

6 SIR RODERIC LYNE: So although you were not his deputy he
7 was issuing instructions to you?

8 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Yes, and I was trying to suggest
9 that there was a political discussion to be had. So in
10 a situation like that, you take a step back, you
11 consider what has happened and you decide how you
12 exercise your influence on the next occasion or how you
13 put in your thoughts about the political process and
14 whatever I was concentrating on in the next round of
15 conversation.

16 SIR RODERIC LYNE: But he was not receptive to your advice.
17 You were there as a very senior person, outranking him
18 actually in your own diplomatic career, and you were
19 there to offer him advice. And when you offered him
20 advice, he was telling you that you were to accept the
21 order and that was it, not to raise points of this kind,
22 even in a small conversation with himself and
23 Colin Powell?

24 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: That was the outward and immediate
25 effect, yes, that he didn't want to hear suggestions

1 about how to complete a satisfactory political process
2 that were different from what the President had decided.

3 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Did that take into account the
4 involvement of Iraqis, because he was, you know,
5 pressing ahead? Did he engage effectively with the
6 Iraqi people?

7 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: It didn't take account of two
8 things: One was that, and already in June
9 Ayatollah Al-Sistani had issued a fatwa, a religious
10 decree, against part of the seven steps plan, which was
11 having a constitution before there were elections, which
12 was Ambassador Bremer's clear view of where he wanted to
13 go. So Ambassador Bremer already knew that there was
14 Iraqi resistance to the seven steps plan, and as
15 I understood it at that point, his reaction was to drive
16 harder with the plan that he had.

17 There was also something called the CPA vision for
18 Iraq, which was written down, which I thought didn't
19 amount to a clear enough mission statement actually for
20 the coalition in Iraq, as we might come to later, but
21 which was a vision for Iraq and was publicly available
22 to Iraqis. That made it clear that some flexibility,
23 adaptation, in the coalition's approaches might well be
24 necessary, but that was not the message that I got from
25 Ambassador Bremer in this particular conversation.

1 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Do you think that there was too much
2 emphasis on the sort of sectarian approach, looking for
3 the pan-Iraqi situation, the way the Americans were
4 approaching reconstruction?

5 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Well, it was more than the
6 reconstruction, it was the attempt to establish a new
7 Iraqi Government. So it was highly political. And
8 I thought -- and the UK approach was behind this all the
9 way -- that the Iraqis needed to be both consulted and,
10 indeed, groomed and brought to the point where they
11 could start taking decisions for the administration of
12 Iraq and that they need to be quite closely on board for
13 the political process that we followed.

14 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: What role did you play in ensuring that
15 happened? Because you were obviously operating in
16 a very subtle manner in terms of trying to influence
17 him. Did you actually succeed in changing views?

18 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: If you hit a small hiccup, as I did
19 on my third day with Bremer, that he wasn't going to
20 easily accept political advice, you think of other ways
21 to operate. And one of those ways that I chose was to
22 have my own relationship with members of the Iraqi
23 Governing Council, primarily to persuade them to go
24 along with the American plan.

25 So my first duty was always loyalty to the American

1 plan, but to explore with them their alternative
2 thoughts if they wanted to bring them, and some of them
3 clearly had other ways of approaching these questions,
4 and to try and handle those to see if they could be
5 dealt with without deviating from the American plan, and
6 to make my own judgments on how far the seven steps plan
7 was going to work. And separately, within the CPA
8 itself, I was constantly talking, as were my close
9 advisers, with the American political team, with other
10 parts of the CPA machinery, as to whether we thought
11 what the administrator wanted was going to work in
12 practice, whether we should put forward separate advice.

13 So you do an increasing multiple of things to get
14 through to a good sense approach to the administration
15 of Iraq even if the Administrator isn't quite there yet,
16 and that's the way you operate.

17 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: So within the constraints you were
18 finding room to manoeuvre, to actually develop your own
19 strategies for making sure that you did exert influence,
20 and you were keeping UK informed of all of that?

21 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Yes, I was always pretty frank and
22 open with my reports to London of how I thought things
23 were going, including reporting that conversation with
24 Jerry Bremer.

25 Can I bring another point in here? Coming back to

1 best case scenarios, Chairman, it was very clear to me,
2 even before I got to Baghdad, that the United States had
3 been working on and continued to work on the best case
4 scenario: that they could administer Iraq and turn it
5 back to Iraqis who could administer Iraq, with the
6 lowest possible input of resources and troops and in the
7 most direct way possible. And they didn't insure
8 against things other than the best case scenario, with
9 a higher number of troops or with alternative political
10 plans.

11 Ambassador Bremer was responding to the Pentagon in
12 trying to run a best case scenario approach and that's
13 why he didn't want alternative plans. But when I talked
14 to other members of the American team, when I talked
15 informally to the military, to the intelligence
16 agencies, to other people who were operating, I found
17 a very much more gloomy prognosis of what was going on
18 than I felt or understood Ambassador Bremer was
19 reporting back to the Pentagon.

20 I reported these things back to London. [REDACTED]

21 [REDACTED]

22 [REDACTED]

23 [REDACTED] My telegrams would describe what
24 was going on, and I later discovered that
25 Secretary Powell was reading the UK telegrams from

¹ This sentence was redacted on grounds of national security

1 Baghdad because he wasn't getting enough information
2 from the Pentagon about what was really going on in
3 Baghdad, as opposed to what Ambassador Bremer was
4 reporting.

5 So it was becoming quite a complex picture --

6 THE CHAIRMAN: Can we stop the broadcast for a moment. We
7 need to stay off sensitive areas. Can we just resume
8 then without touching on those things? Thank you. We
9 can deal with those in private.

10 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Just --

11 THE CHAIRMAN: Resuming the broadcast.

12 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: To move on, the intelligence² report
13 which was published in February this year, talks about
14 the CPA being disjointed and ad hoc quality in terms of
15 the whole effort, was that your view when you got to
16 Baghdad?

17 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: I'm sorry, could you repeat that?

18 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: The intelligence³ report which was
19 published in February, describes it as disjointed and
20 ad hoc quality. The whole enterprise was disjointed and
21 of ad hoc quality?

22 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Whose intelligence report was that?

23 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: This is the intelligence⁴ report of
24 the United States, intelligence⁵ report published
25 in February. Let me just quote what it says here.

² This refers to the Report of the US Special Inspector General "Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience"

³ *ibid*

⁴ *ibid*

⁵ *ibid*

1 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Is this an NIC estimate of
2 (inaudible)?

3 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: It says here:
4 "The absence of well defined doctrine on an
5 effectively coordinated strategy caused CPA's approach
6 to reconstruction to have a disjointed and ad hoc
7 quality."

8 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: It is a big question to go into, the
9 whole of the CPA's capability.

10 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: I'm talking about when you were
11 there. Is that how you would describe it?

12 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Yes, I'm happy with that
13 description. The whole American effort between the
14 civilian and the military aspects was compartmentalised,
15 stovepiped is the word that is often used, including
16 amongst Americans. The military and civilian arms were not
17 working smoothly together. There were differences of
18 view within the military. There were differences of
19 view between the Pentagon and the State Department, and
20 these were all being played out as we were trying to
21 administer a country. There were also differences of
22 view from time to time between London and Washington,
23 coming to the records of the conversations between
24 London and Washington.

25 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Can we now move on, because we

1 touched earlier on the relationship between the CPA in
2 Baghdad and Basra. How did that work in practice during
3 your time?

4 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: The south-east in the arrangements
5 for Iraq was regarded both by London and by Washington
6 as very much a British concern to the extent that very
7 little American money was going into MND South East and
8 the Basra area, which led to the British deciding
9 that -- quite early on that they had to bring in British
10 money through DFID, British support for the military, to
11 create almost an independent sub-administration in that
12 part of Iraq.

13 I inherited that situation when I arrived. I went
14 down very early on to see my counterpart in Basra,
15 Sir Hilary Synnott, who was deputy administrator to
16 Bremer and was in the CPA command.

17 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: We heard from him last week, yes.

18 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: So I left him most of the time to
19 get on with his own operation, to report independently
20 to London, to look for resources independently from
21 London and to report to Bremer. But we saw each other's
22 telegrams, we talked when necessary, when we could help
23 each other, and I supported him with Bremer when he
24 wanted that, and I supported him with London less often
25 when he needed that. But on occasions he did need to

1 make an impact on London because he didn't have enough
2 resources.

3 But on the whole, I think you should take my answer
4 to indicate that we worked fairly separately and we
5 didn't have daily contact on what was going on, from my
6 point of view in Basra, from his point of view in the
7 rest of Iraq.

8 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: So in other words you exerted no
9 influence on what happened to CPA South?

10 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: No, I was -- any influence I exerted
11 over what was going on in the south-east would have been
12 done through the CPA system as a whole or in response to
13 a particular question from the south-east or from
14 London.

15 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Okay.

16 THE CHAIRMAN: Can I just interrupt? There was reference
17 a few moments ago by Baroness Prashar to an intelligence
18 report in the public domain. What that in fact was, was
19 a published report by the Special Inspector General for
20 Reconstruction, which was published under Congressional
21 authority. It wasn't, as it were, an intelligence
22 estimate. Thank you.

23 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: My other question really is about
24 de-Ba'athification, because when we saw Sir John Sawers,
25 he said that the coalition went a step further than was

1 necessary to de-Ba'athification, but it would be
2 a mistake to think that de-Ba'athification as a policy
3 was not necessary.

4 Would that be your assessment of the impact of
5 de-Ba'athification?

6 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: The de-Ba'athification decree was
7 issued way before I got there, within four days of
8 Ambassador Bremer arriving. So I met -- when I arrived,
9 met the consequences of that and I wouldn't disagree
10 from what John Sawers told you earlier, that this was on
11 balance an understandable decision that the Shia
12 politicians in particular were strongly against bringing
13 ex-Ba'athists, particularly senior Ba'athists, into the
14 new administration, into the Governing Council or
15 whatever, and that Ambassador Bremer made quite
16 a careful judgment of how far he could go with
17 de-Ba'athification.

18 What did not happen was to find people to run
19 a government who were not Ba'athists, and that decree
20 was issued before a clear route had been found to
21 filling the posts necessary for the minimal government
22 of Iraq. So there was an error not so much in the
23 de-Ba'athification decree or even, if I could add, the
24 decree disbanding the Iraqi army; there was a failure to
25 fill the gaps which those institutions performed in Iraq

1 through any other means, which should have made them
2 think about the wisdom of those two decrees or the
3 timing of them.

4 On de-Ba'athification, when I arrived,
5 Ambassador Bremer was handing over the implementation of
6 that decree to an Iraqi committee under Ahmed Chalabi
7 who was deeply anti-Ba'athist. And in my view,
8 de-Ba'athification in practice was taken too far for the
9 sensible administration of Iraq, including in the
10 professions, in the academic and legal and other
11 professions and in the civil service, when we needed
12 Iraq's middle class to be performing its function if we
13 were to administer it properly. And we all tried to
14 persuade both Ambassador Bremer and Mr Chalabi to
15 allow more Ba'athists back in practice, if they were not
16 senior Ba'athists who had taken responsibility for some
17 of the awful things that happened under Saddam Hussein.

18 And to some extent Ambassador Bremer mitigated the
19 effects of his decree through the implementation of it.

20 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Now, UK were obviously sending some
21 secondees and were these secondees having an impact at
22 operational level, if not at the strategic level?

23 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: The UK's secondees?

24 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Yes.

25 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Yes, they were performing extremely

1 effectively under very trying circumstances.

2 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: How were they interacting within the
3 CPA and being effective? What areas were they
4 concentrating on?

5 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: On the whole any other nationality
6 than American in the CPA was regarded as completely
7 integrated into the CPA process, so that the two younger
8 officers we had in the governance section on the
9 political process, one of them a very good Arabic
10 speaker, the only good Arabic speaker in the government
11 section, Irfan Siddiq, and his colleague Julie Chappell
12 were both very effective younger members of the
13 governance section.

14 Andy Bearpark was a Deputy Administrator or a
15 Director for Operations under Ambassador Bremer, hugely
16 effective, trusted by Bremer, regarded with great
17 respect by Bremer. There were many other Britons
18 working in the CPA who did their job well and got the
19 respect of the Americans for the job that they were
20 doing. If somebody did not fit, as one or two didn't,
21 they were asked to move on, but on the whole that was
22 only a tiny proportion of our 100 or so people operating
23 there.

24 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: You began to touch earlier on the
25 political process and I'm going to hand over to Sir John

1 to take up the questions of the political process.

2 THE CHAIRMAN: Thanks. Yes, I suppose the focus of our,
3 your, influence on Iraqi politics and politicians was
4 the achievement on 14 November 2003 of getting
5 a statement about the transition. Could you give us
6 a little bit of the narrative of how that was
7 accomplished, given the fact earlier of the Sistani
8 fatwa, that any Iraqi constitutions must be drawn up by
9 Iraqis and not by the occupying powers. How did you get
10 from where it started with Bremer's view to the
11 15 November?

12 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Primarily through looking for a
13 plan B. The stalemate was that Ambassador Bremer did
14 not want elections to take place in Iraq without
15 constitutional principles being laid down which would
16 make it clear what those elections were all about.
17 A perfectly reasonable and normal approach.

18 Ayatollah Al-Sistani did not want Iraq's
19 constitution to be written by or influenced by
20 non-Iraqis. So he wanted Iraqis to be elected to draw
21 up the constitution, amongst other things. That was
22 a stalemate and it was some months before
23 Ambassador Bremer decided that the seven-step plan, as
24 he had designed it and as it had been approved in
25 Washington, would not work in the order that he had

1 drawn it up.

2 So we went through a number of discussions amongst
3 ourselves, with the Iraqi Governing Council, as to how
4 we could get round Ayatollah Al-Sistani, which was the
5 way it was expressed in the early stages, and we tried
6 various approaches. When it was clear that Ayatollah
7 Al-Sistani would not back down, and particularly the
8 Shia members, the religious Shia members of the
9 Governing Council would not do anything but support
10 Al-Sistani, we had to find another route round it.

11 And there was a quite well-known meeting in the
12 history of this amongst those who were participating,
13 when I eventually stopped listening to the to-ing and
14 fro-ing between Ambassador Bremer and the Iraqi
15 Governing Council and interjected that when there was
16 a chicken and egg problem, one of the ways to get
17 through it is to design a double circuit of the track --
18 two chickens, two eggs, it became known as, with some
19 humour and disbelief on the American side -- to try and
20 explain that if you have ABAB, then it is a matter of
21 subjective choice as to whether the B comes before the A
22 or not. And, indeed, that actually in the end is what
23 happened, in that we designed a process of drawing up
24 some preliminary constitutional principles through an
25 administrative law leading to a first round of

1 elections, after which there would be the writing of a
2 proper constitution by elected officials, leading to
3 a second round of elections under that constitution.

4 And that was the heart of the 15 November agreement.

5 THE CHAIRMAN: Was the only means of communicating with
6 Ayatollah Sistani through the religious Shia members on
7 the IGC, or were there more indirect links other than
8 through there, available to yourself?

9 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: There was no way I was going to
10 succeed in getting a private conversation with Ayatollah
11 Al-Sistani, who refused even to see the administrator.

12 The channel of communication was either through the
13 Shia members of the Governing Council or through the
14 written word, because Ambassador Bremer did on rare
15 occasions write to Ayatollah Sistani and got a message
16 back through his own acolytes, or through other third
17 parties later in the process when Ambassador Brahmini of
18 the UN became part of the action. He had a Lebanese
19 adviser, Ghassan Salama, who himself went down to see
20 Ayatollah Al-Sistani and became a conduit.

21 Ambassador Bremer also had one other Arab adviser who
22 was a conduit to Al-Sistani.

23 THE CHAIRMAN: As a matter of interest, I don't know the
24 answer to this, with Brahmini's arrival, the Ayatollah
25 would not see him either?

1 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Yes, the Ayatollah did see him. It
2 was a very deliberate move of the Ayatollah not to deal
3 with the occupying authority.

4 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, thank you. There was not only the need
5 to get round the fatwa in the Shia interest, but you had
6 many sets of interests within the IGC: The basic ones
7 Sunni, Kurd, Shia. But how much of your time and energy
8 had to go in trying to understand and then manage those
9 relationships within the Council itself in order to
10 arrive at the conclusion of 15 November?

11 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Well, I understood my primary task
12 in practice as being to help make the political process
13 work. Without that there was no structure for anything
14 else we did and without that we would not get out of
15 Iraq. So I got to know all members of the Governing
16 Council and, with the most senior ones, their immediate
17 advisers and deputies. I would have my own separate
18 conversations with them. I would
19 always attend meetings of the Governing Council and the
20 Administrator. I occasionally chaired meetings of the
21 Governing Council when the Administrator was absent and
22 dealt with the whole political substance of what we were
23 talking about in those ways.

24 I found that I had particular work to do with the
25 Kurdish members of the Governing Council, partly because

1 the Arab Iraq/Kurdistan dichotomy was
2 a vital part of the whole substance, partly because of
3 the British relationship with the Kurdish nation, but
4 I also did work with the senior members of the Governing
5 Council, particularly on the Shia side, who wanted
6 another channel of political discussion than the
7 Administrator, which was viewed with some distaste,
8 I think, by some American members of the CPA and by the
9 Administrator. But I was there with an independent
10 remit and I had my government's authority to do that and
11 they couldn't prevent me from doing it.

12 THE CHAIRMAN: In fact it was a function of your not having
13 become a deputy.

14 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Yes, I think if I had been a deputy
15 I would still have participated, but those conversations
16 helped to ease the members of the Governing Council
17 round Bremer's problems and was, in my view, loyal to
18 the overall mission of the Administrator and helped him
19 achieve both the 15 November agreement and later the
20 Transitional Administrative Law.

21 THE CHAIRMAN: Looking back to your time there, was this
22 actually the most important achievement in making
23 progress under the CPA in your time?

24 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Yes, because the political process
25 that we set through those two organs, the 15 November

1 agreement and the TAL, have lasted to this day as the
2 basis for the political development of Iraq around which
3 security, the economy, the social situation in Iraq, had
4 to circulate. I regard that as a success for the CPA
5 under Ambassador Bremer. It was his achievement.

6 And I should comment here, I think, that through his
7 year as administrator, Ambassador Bremer increasingly
8 came to understand what was necessary to develop the
9 process of returning Iraq to its own sovereignty and to
10 its own people. In a way which Washington did not
11 always understand, to the degree to which I think Bremer
12 found the more he understood that decisions had to be
13 taken in Iraq on the basis of what would work on the
14 ground, the more distance was created between him and
15 Washington.

16 THE CHAIRMAN: It is a not untypical predicament, I think.
17 Thank you. Lawrence? Do you want to pick up some
18 points?

19 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Yes. I think I'm curious about this
20 question of your own role and you have talked a lot
21 about it, but it is interesting.

22 As you have explained, 1483 described the UK and the
23 US as joint occupying authorities. It was a Coalition
24 Provisional Authority, not a United States provisional
25 authority. And you certainly described how within the

1 administration, the two countries were pretty well
2 integrated. But there is this question, hanging over
3 all of this, of leadership and you have talked about
4 loyalty to an American plan. This wasn't a joint
5 British/American plan, it was an American plan. Is that
6 fair?

7 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Yes, I was at the UN when the
8 seven-step plan was drafted and agreed, but -- and I'm
9 sure that Sir John Sawers had an input into that plan,
10 but I didn't see how that happened nor what
11 conversations lay behind it. You are absolutely right
12 that in theory we were co-responsible for Iraq, in
13 practice we were a tenth or less of the practical
14 capacity to do things in Iraq, and the practical
15 normally was more influential than the theoretical in
16 the way things happened.

17 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: You have also described a sort of
18 role that you picked up for yourself, which almost
19 sounds like picking up from where you left off in the
20 UN, except in very different circumstances. That is
21 working closely with the political leaders that you
22 found around you: you may or may not agree with anything
23 that the UK was doing or the Americans were doing, but
24 try to find a negotiated way through.

25 Did you see this as being a particular application

1 of the skills that you brought to Baghdad?

2 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: You tend to use the skills that you
3 have honed over the years rather than trying to look for
4 new ones, because that's the territory you are familiar
5 with. And what we are talking about, Sir Lawrence, is
6 working with a superpower that likes to do things its
7 own way and with the top decisions being taken by
8 a closed circuit of Americans. And working with reality.
9 Those two things.

10 The Brits probably work as well with the Americans
11 as anybody does in an international situation and the
12 Americans were extremely generous to us in terms of
13 integrating us into the system in the CPA. I was in an
14 office within Bremer's area of the Republican Palace.
15 So his office was at one end of the complex, our joint
16 private office, what you might call a third room in old
17 Foreign Office terms, was between us and I was in
18 Saddam's deputy's office at the other end of the private
19 office. So we were in the same complex.

20 We saw a lot of each other's material when we
21 decided to show it to each other, but there was a lot of
22 American material that I never saw.

23 There was, I think, a good spirit in the CPA of
24 international cooperation, but absolutely no question at
25 all that we were working to an American leadership.

1 That American leadership was fissiparous, the leadership
2 of the military was different from the leadership of the
3 civilian team. The leadership of the whole business
4 from the Pentagon in Washington was different from the
5 State Department and not working well with the
6 State Department, which produced the Arabists and the
7 Arab world specialists that occasionally were or were
8 not part of Bremer's team.

9 I had to get my influence going in a system as best
10 as I could by judging what was happening against what
11 the reality on the ground was going to make happen
12 whether we liked it or not. And where the American
13 decisions did not seem to accord with where gravity was
14 taking events on the ground, I would try and use aspects
15 of the situation to get the Americans to adjust their
16 policy, because that backed up the arguments I was
17 making, and I was used to doing that in the Security
18 Council.

19 And that helped because the Americans are and were
20 capable of taking decisions in the American domestic
21 context that were not necessarily going to produce the
22 results that they really wanted on the ground in
23 a country like Iraq, and I was trying to mend the
24 process when I saw that as being likely to happen.

25 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: And you described earlier, in answer

1 to a question from Sir Martin, this meeting with the
2 Prime Minister in early September, where he put a lot of
3 stress on improving the police force.

4 Now, everything we have heard about the Iraqi police
5 force would indicate that that was totally unrealistic,
6 whatever you and John Sawers decided to try to do to put
7 together a plan. How was the unreality of some of the
8 expectations in London fed back? It must have become
9 very apparent as soon as you got to Baghdad that the
10 role that the police force had played, it was
11 a paramilitary force and how hated it was and how
12 difficult it would be to build up anything to police
13 Iraqi society effectively.

14 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: It must have been just as difficult
15 for London as it was for me in Baghdad. I took the
16 approach that if I disagreed with something that was
17 happening on the ground and was trying to change it,
18 that I would not go weeping to London about it and ask
19 them to get Washington to persuade Bremer to do
20 something differently. It was my job to persuade Bremer
21 or we had to go along with the Administrator's
22 decisions.

23 London had a limited capacity anyway to disagree
24 with Washington because Washington was in the lead. We
25 had a relatively poor input into Pentagon

1 decision-making, about which you have heard from other
2 witnesses, and, therefore, there was a sense of
3 frustration in London that we couldn't always persuade
4 the Americans to do what might be our preference,
5 because they were in charge, they were going to do their
6 own thing anyway and we had to try and make it work on
7 the ground. So there was a sense of frustration in both
8 places.

9 Some things were going reasonably well, but the
10 police area was not one of them. And, frankly, in 2009
11 it still isn't one of them. It never came right and we
12 never got Iraqis to create a police force of the
13 strength of Saddam's.

14 The police training exercise was actually run by an
15 extremely competent British former Chief Constable,
16 Douglas Brand, whom the Americans hugely respected, but
17 he had hardly any resources to do it with. He had to
18 invent a training programme, which we eventually did
19 with Jordan which produced a far lower number of
20 recruits going through the system in far too short
21 a training time than was realistic to create a decent
22 police force on the ground.

23 So actually the sense of hurry that we had from our
24 two capitals militated against the production of well
25 trained, well behaving policemen on the ground. So

1 there was a tension there.

2 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: And into that gap -- well, it wasn't
3 a police force, the American, particularly because of
4 the Sunni Triangle, but also the British forces had to
5 go. Did you have any senses of the way that issues of
6 detainees, interrogation and so on were being handled at
7 the time?

8 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Not in detail because there were no
9 British in that particular system. The prison system
10 was run by the American military in -- primarily in the
11 American area. I can't speak for MND South East. They
12 must have had some detention facilities, but I regard
13 that as separate from the question you are asking.
14 I had no input into those arrangements. If
15 Ambassador Bremer had an input into them because they
16 were being run by the US military and he didn't have
17 direct responsibility for them, I was not brought into
18 those discussions.

19 We did have some concerns that too many detainees
20 were being held without being processed through the
21 courts. This was something which Ann Clwyd, for
22 instance, as the Prime Minister's Special Envoy for
23 humanitarian, human rights affairs was concerned with.
24 We would raise those concerns with Bremer and with
25 General Sanchez, the American commander on the ground,

1 to see if more people could be put through the courts so
2 that innocent people were not held for longer than
3 necessary.

4 We only had a limited amount of success in that
5 area, but we didn't have day-to-day sight of what was
6 going on.

7 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: The revelations about Abu Ghraib
8 came after you had left Baghdad, but we heard last week
9 that the military at least were aware that some awful
10 things had been going on there and that this was likely
11 to come out.

12 Were you made aware of this sort of time bomb of
13 sort of imminent media disaster, as well as -- for very
14 good reasons in terms of the fact this was not the way
15 that we were supposed to be behaving?

16 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: As it happened, I was not made aware
17 for two reasons: one, the International Committee of the
18 Red Cross did not send me a copy of their report, even
19 though the UK was co-responsible in Iraq -- they sent it
20 to the Administrator only; and secondly, he did not pass
21 a copy of the report over to me, which perhaps partly
22 answers your earlier question about responsibility for
23 these areas.

24 Because I understood or was told by my own legal
25 adviser that there might be questions about the UK's

1 responsibility for detention facilities in MND South
2 East, I got my legal adviser to purloin a copy of the
3 report from his contacts in the CPA, go through it -- it
4 was actually while I was away on a visit elsewhere --
5 and check what was relevant for British concerns and
6 make sure that those parts were reported back to London
7 and to the Ministry of Defence, which he did.

8 He did not go through the rest of the report or give
9 me any other indication that there were general
10 questions here about the overall administration of Iraq
11 that might arise, and so I missed an opportunity to
12 focus on that.

13 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: And the senior British officers
14 didn't convey this to you either?

15 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: No, they did not.

16 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: So you were not able to give London
17 any warning that this issue was likely to blow up at
18 some time?

19 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: I don't know whether London
20 otherwise got a full copy of the report. I think we
21 sent them the parts of the report that affected British
22 responsibility. You would have to ask other people
23 whether they saw the full report, but when Abu Ghraib --
24 the issue became widely public, that was a surprise and
25 a shock to me.

1 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: And can I just ask you a bit more on
2 the civil/military relationship? You have given an
3 indication that, at least as you started, there was very
4 little prospect of extra American forces being brought
5 in. We have also heard from -- again, from military
6 officers -- our military officers, a sense of surprise
7 at the shift in strategy in November 2003, in the sense
8 as they thought they were getting on top of things, that
10 all of a sudden the United States had gone off in
11 a different direction. And we have also heard there
12 Sir Hilary Synnott, that he felt that they were making
13 progress with the CPA in the south in terms of what he
14 was doing, but, again, with the sudden change in
15 strategy made his work less interesting, shall we say,
16 that it had been before.

17 Did you get a sense of the effectively changing
18 strategy in November as likely to have these sorts of
19 consequences of sort of losing some of the momentum that
20 had been built up?

21 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: That description doesn't sound
22 accurate to me. It wasn't that there was a change of
23 strategy, that there was some turning point in November,
24 the security situation was gradually getting worse. We
25 expected there to be a wide -- a huge wave of incidents

1 during the month of Ramadan, which that year was most
2 of October -- I think September and into the end
3 of October, which didn't happen except in one or two
4 areas.

5 There was -- there were two things around November
6 which you may be referring to. One was a decision by
7 Ambassador Bremer that he wouldn't delegate
8 responsibility to the military and civilian governorate
9 administrators, nor would he give them a -- the amount
10 of money that they were asking for to try and deal with
11 their local situation more effectively; as they knew
12 General Petraeus had been doing in Mosul in the earlier
13 stages. And there is quite a story to this.

14 The CPA had occasional meetings of their regional
15 coordinators and their regional military commanders in
16 Baghdad to look at the whole situation in Iraq.
17 Ambassador Bremer ran those meetings very top down and
18 there was some dissatisfaction from the regional
19 commanders and the regional administrators that they
20 were not being allowed to do the things that they
21 thought would be most effective in their areas, but they
22 didn't get the authority of the Administrator to do
23 their own thing.

24 Major General David Petraeus, as he was then, tended
25 to do his own thing on the ground to the greatest degree

1 possible and showed how an intelligent independent
2 general in his own region could produce an effect in the
3 Mosul region that was positive, whereas others were more
4 forceful in their military approach and less resourceful
5 in finding money to feed into the local community. And
6 there was a sense of dissatisfaction in that whole area.

7 I don't think there was any strategic change
8 in November, but there were adjustments to tactics and
9 there were failures of the Administrator to accept the
10 wise advice of his regional commanders to do things
11 rather differently, which I regarded as a pity. But
12 that's the way I would describe it.

13 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: I was also thinking just of the --
14 which obviously became apparent perhaps after November,
15 that the move to elections the next year and the sense
16 that the CPA's days were numbered and that its ability
17 to carry on with momentum to take the lead in running
18 the country would soon pass, it almost became a lame
19 duck after this -- as 2004 started.

20 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: I think that adjustments were made
21 after the 15 November agreement and at the same time as
22 that agreement, Ambassador Bremer had a decision from
23 Washington as to what the handover time would be with
24 discussion with the United Kingdom -- Jack Straw was
25 present in Washington at that time -- and the end of

1 June 2004 was decided upon. That meant that the lead-up
2 time had to be planned for in a more definite way than
3 had been possible previously, and Ambassador Bremer was
4 very clear in his own mind that there should not be
5 local elections because that would interfere with the
6 process of the national elections he was trying to plan
7 and the agreement on the Transitional Administrative
8 Law.

9 Actually the local administrators had done a lot of
10 good work to get democracy going in the localities,
11 which I and others felt were conducive to the way we
12 wanted Iraq to go. But that was brought to a halt by
13 the change of tactics in designing the lead up to
14 June 2004. Yes, that was true.

15 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: This is the sort of thing I was
16 thinking of, and we have heard from Sir Hilary Synnott
17 about, in a sense, he felt that this meant quite a lot
18 of good work that was underway lost its momentum at that
19 point and he seemed to be confirming that.

20 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Yes, and you have also heard from
21 Sir Hilary about his desperate search for resources,
22 because although he knew what he should be doing he
23 didn't have the instruments to do it.

24 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Did you see part of your role as
25 persuading Bremer to make sure that resources did go to

1 the south?

2 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: I wasn't asked by London to do that
3 because I thought that London was feeding in resources
4 to the south. I asked the occasional question about
5 whether more than 2 per cent of the overall American
6 resources should go into this very important region in
7 the south and a bit of money started going to the south,
8 but not much more than that.

9 In all of this, there was still that separation in
10 the American mind between the British area and the rest
11 of Iraq which was their area.

12 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Doesn't this illustrate the whole
13 problem that the British area was dependent still on
14 American resources because, again, as we heard, we
15 didn't have sufficient resources ourselves to do what
16 was necessary, we hadn't resourced it sufficiently, this
17 had to come from the money that the CPA had to spend,
18 but you yourself were not in a position as sort of the
19 joint administrator to say, "Yes, that's where it should
20 go"? It had to be done in this round about way from
21 Basra to London to Washington and back to Baghdad?

22 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Yes, I wasn't in a position to do
23 that. Ambassador Bremer, if you remember, had been to
24 Congress in September, had got \$18.7 billion out of the
25 Washington system and it was his job to -- actually very

1 little of that was actually disbursed during the
2 coalition period. Only about \$600 million. But he was
3 feeding money into the north, the centre, the
4 north-west, north-east, rather than to the south.

5 Perhaps there are some things we haven't gone into
6 and maybe, Chairman, this will be a matter for private
7 discussion, but I think it is worth bringing out in
8 these public discussions the point that I made to London
9 in my first visit back in October 2003, that the whole
10 effort in Iraq is going to be won or lost in the centre.

11 I saw London as being very concentrated on our
12 particular responsibilities in the south-east. That was
13 what the Wednesday morning meeting of the Chiefs of
14 Staff talked about. That's what the Iraq ad hoc Cabinet
15 Committee talked about. I made the point to ministers
16 that they needed to pay more attention to what was
17 happening in the centre and to remember that, although
18 they had appointed me to represent UK interests in the
19 centre, and although we had 50 per cent of the
20 responsibility, if we put in 2 per cent of the resources
21 to the whole of Iraq, I could not have 50 per cent of
22 the influence on the ground. I was likely to have
23 something closer to 5 per cent of the influence because
24 money means influence. Quantity means influence with
25 the Americans, as much as argument or position of first

1 ally.

2 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: And this was my final question: how
3 much of that do you think was understood both when you
4 sent it back in October and perhaps by the time you left
5 in March?

6 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: I was personally never satisfied
7 that London focused enough on the centre. We had
8 excellent major generals as number 2 to the American
9 military commander in Baghdad. We had good advisers to
10 him and to me, but we did not have the weight or the
11 resources to offer to the Americans for the whole of
12 Iraq to catch their attention when we had disagreements
13 on policy, one of which, if I may take the opportunity
14 to respond to Sir Roderic's earlier question, was the
15 putting down of a veto over the disbanding of the public
16 economy in Iraq under Tom Foley, who was responsible for
17 those economic matters in Baghdad under
18 Ambassador Bremer, when we said that we would not, under
19 our responsibility under 1483, go along with the
20 disbanding of the public sector industries in Iraq
21 because that would create too much unemployment at
22 a difficult period in Iraq. That was the only formal
23 veto that I put down.

24 But on the whole we always had to get our arguments
25 through by constant reiteration, by working different

1 parts of the system, by going to the Iraqis and
2 influencing them rather than anything top down.

3 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Thank you.

4 THE CHAIRMAN: Martin? Roderic?

5 SIR RODERIC LYNE: You have stressed many times the
6 frustration you felt that we weren't putting enough
7 resources in, not enough resources into the south, not
8 enough into police training, not enough into the centre
9 in order to have influence there. Where was the
10 blockage? Why was the British Government not producing
11 enough resources?

12 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: It goes back to more than the
13 British. The most basic error that was made in the
14 whole planning for the post-conflict phase in Iraq was
15 not to set the American military the mission of
16 administering Iraq after the war was over.

17 In my view General Tommy Franks was given the wrong
18 mission: To invade Iraq, get rid of the Saddam regime
19 and hand over to civilian administrators. He should
20 have been given the mission of getting rid of Saddam,
21 pacifying Iraq, making sure that Iraq was a secure
22 military area and then handing over to civilian
23 administrators. So there was an under-resourcing,
24 a misunderstanding of the difficulty of the mission
25 right from the very beginning. London was not in

1 a position to, or did not question that setting of
2 missions.

3 So control of the security situation was lost from
4 the earliest days after 9 April and was never,
5 recovered, and you can't do a political process or an
6 economic process without security.

7 In addition to that, as far as the political
8 process was concerned, no Iraqi leadership was
9 identified in reality and with justification as being
10 the leadership to which we would hand over in the
11 Phase 4 period. So there were two very considerable
12 deficiencies.

13 London was not in my view, although there was a lot
14 of activity, sufficiently consulted on the setting of
15 missions, on the change from ORHA to the CPA, from
16 Garner to Bremer, on the early decrees, and on the
17 setting of resources for the whole task.

18 We were always, by experience in Iraq, from history
19 and in the nature of the British, more pessimistic about
20 what was going to happen than were the Americans and we
21 never, I think, got the Americans to understand that in
22 the post-conflict area they were taking on a more
23 difficult mission than the invasion itself. That lay
24 behind our absences of resources.

25 You then have to add to that the reluctance of any

1 government and every government in this country to spend
2 resources when they don't necessarily see the proof of
3 their being needed. It is in the nature of a democracy
4 always to under-resource and not to pre-empt and not to
5 insure, because the Treasury will always argue against
6 that. It is too expensive.

7 As it happened, Iraq became more expensive because
8 we didn't do those things, because we didn't insure, we
9 carried our own insurance and it was very expensive, but
10 it was in the nature of the British machine not to cover
11 every eventuality because fundamentally it was
12 unaffordable.

13 SIR RODERIC LYNE: So we were in the situation of willing
14 the ends but not the means?

15 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Correct.

16 SIR RODERIC LYNE: In this fundamental failure, as you see
17 it, at the very outset, you say that we were not
18 consulted or not sufficiently consulted. Was that
19 because at the highest levels we were not being
20 assertive enough in putting forward our point of view
21 and demanding to be consulted and this more pessimistic
22 assessment that we had?

23 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: No, it is more complex than that.

24 First of all, in the American view we were a very
25 welcome and a very capable partner, but we were a very

1 low quantity partner. I won't say junior partner, but
2 we were a low quantity partner. Second, the Pentagon
3 were planning for this in the way that they did plan on
4 the assumption that the United States might be the only
5 country executing this plan to invade Iraq and get rid
6 of Saddam Hussein. You will remember that
7 Secretary Rumsfeld said in January or February 2003, "We
8 will go and do this whether or not the Brits are with
9 us". They were planning to do the whole thing if
10 necessary, whether or not they had allies.

11 Thirdly, it is in the American frame of mind, as you
12 have heard from other witnesses, to do things on the
13 basis of American decision-making, American resources,
14 American self-reliance, with other partners being very
15 welcome to add things where they can, but this mainly
16 being an American enterprise.

17 SIR RODERIC LYNE: If I can just interrupt you there, when
18 the British Government took the decision between the
19 different military options that it was presented with to
20 go for the largest, including a division level land
21 force, a strong part of the argumentation as we have
22 heard for that, was that this would give us significant
23 influence over the way that the operation was conducted.

24 So do you think that London failed to appreciate
25 that, despite that decision, we were, as you put it,

1 a low quantity partner? Did they think we were a high
2 quantity partner because of that decision?

3 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: No, they understood that the
4 Americans were in the lead and they would have to rely
5 on good American decision-making and resource allocation
6 to get this thing done well.

7 In British terms it was an enormous expedition,
8 a military expeditionary force to be sent to Iraq to win
9 one part of the country and to hold that part of the
10 country. And if you look at the record of what we did
11 in the south-east, we eventually did it actually very
12 competently up to a certain point in time until our
13 shelf life ran out in Iraq.

14 It was a well executed job that the British did in
15 the south-east, but in doing that job in the south-east,
16 we added very little to what the coalition as a whole
17 was doing in the rest of the Iraq.

18 SIR RODERIC LYNE: So it didn't give you the big influence
19 that we hoped it was going to give us?

20 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: It gave us the influence to make our
21 own decisions in the south-east and to be relied upon by
22 the Americans to do that properly, but it did not give
23 us the weight of voice in Baghdad for the whole
24 administration of Iraq that equated with what the
25 Security Council Resolution said, but I think actually,

1 Sir Roderic, that London understood that.

2 SIR RODERIC LYNE: You said that Ambassador Bremer didn't
3 show you the ICRC report on Abu Ghraib when it was sent
4 to him. And you said separately that there was a lot of
5 American material that you never saw. To what extent
6 did Bremer, sitting across a corridor with your joint
7 staffs in between you, keep you fully briefed on what he
8 was up to?

9 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: He did not keep me fully briefed.
10 He never intended to keep me fully briefed on everything
11 he was up to.

12 The non-Americans in the CPA and quite a few of the
13 Americans did not see anything of the American spending
14 of money and budget allocations. We were not consulted
15 on the budget allocations that Bremer and David Oliver
16 in the early stages and others prepared for the spending
17 of American and Iraq money in Iraq. We did not see
18 anything whatsoever in the oil sector; they kept that
19 very closely American, because they wanted to run the
20 oil sector. There were Australians and Poles and others
21 at quite a senior level who were advising them on some
22 aspects of this, but no non-Americans were taken into
23 the American confidence on the spending of money and the
24 management of the oil sector in Iraq. I think those are
25 two of the clearest examples of how partial the

1 partnership was on the ground with the Americans.

2 SIR RODERIC LYNE: I think this is an important point for
3 the public interest: why were they seeking to have this
4 control of the oil sector?

5 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: I think they felt that they
6 understood the oil sector. They brought in American oil
7 executives to advise them on this and to run that part
8 of the CPA. They knew that management of the oil sector
9 was going to be vital for the supply of finance into the
10 Iraqi system and they wanted to be responsible for it
11 themselves.

12 There might have been a minor angle of thinking that
13 they wanted access to the contracts that might come out
14 of the oil sector and the Iraqi economy at a subsequent
15 period, but the Americans were doing 95 per cent of the
16 work and putting in more than 95 per cent of the money.
17 I wouldn't like to say that they were not justified in
18 taking that approach.

19 SIR RODERIC LYNE: But you would regard that as a minor
20 aspect of their thinking on this?

21 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: I don't think it was a -- certainly
22 if we are going to get into the oil sector, the
23 Americans had no intention to take over and own the oil
24 sector. That was always a canard in public criticism
25 terms of what the invasion was about. It was not about

1 oil. I think they just felt it was such an important
2 area that they would run it themselves.

3 They ran the replacement of the currency with
4 immense competence and efficiency, run by an American
5 with one Brit on board in the team, but primarily as an
6 American exercise and it was wonderfully done.

7 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Can I just turn to a different question?

8 In your contacts with British and American military
9 commanders, did you feel at the time you were there that
10 they would have liked to have had substantially more
11 troops on the ground in order to carry out the task that
12 they were being expected to carry out?

13 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Yes, they were always
14 under-resourced. Ambassador Bremer has spoken in public
15 since his time in the CPA that he himself asked for
16 a larger number of troops in the summer of 2003.

17 Military commanders were always stretched. It was clear
18 to them that the borders were open. They did not have
19 the troops to guard the ammunition dumps which had more
20 than 1 million tonnes of military equipment, explosives,
21 ammunition in them. They were not able to police the
22 streets as a police force, which was otherwise absent
23 from Iraq. They were assuming -- it comes back to my
24 insurance point earlier -- that the Iraqis would do
25 a lot of this themselves, but in this event that was

1 a misplaced assumption and they realised how short of
2 boots on the ground they had to do everything that fell
3 their way.

4 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Although the outgoing chairman of the
5 American Chiefs of Staff had warned the Senate in
6 testimony in February of that year that they were going
7 to need hundreds of thousands of people to deal with the
8 task after the event, but he had been rubbished at the
9 time for saying this, if I remember rightly.

10 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: General Shinseki had said he thought
11 that half a million troops might be necessary for the
12 post-conflict period, and Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz
13 said that this is ridiculous, how can you need more
14 troops for after the conflict than for the conflict.

15 SIR RODERIC LYNE: If you had been asked in September of
16 2003, which of the two was right?

17 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: It was undoubtedly my view all the
18 way through this that more troops should have been
19 allocated from the beginning.

20 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Time is about to run out and we have,
21 I think, benefited enormously from two rounds of
22 testimony from you. I wonder if I can just ask two
23 questions about essentially your overall view.

24 Throughout the whole process, in which you were
25 involved, do you feel that the United Kingdom had

1 a significant impact on the process of policy formation
2 in the United States towards Iraq? I mean, you have
3 talked about one specific episode of vetos, but just
4 looking at it in its broadest sense, did we succeed in
5 influencing it?

6 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Yes, we influenced it in certain
7 detailed ways, but that cannot hide the fact that we
8 were uncomfortable about the low level of planning for
9 the post-conflict period, had worries about
10 under-resourcing and were never able to persuade the
11 Americans, sometimes were not given an opportunity to
12 explain to the Americans why with we thought it should
13 be done differently. And in that very major respect
14 I think our influence was too low, but it was too low
15 for the reason that we were, in resource terms, a minor
16 partner.

17 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Finally, you were there in the period
18 which you have described as the one of catastrophic
19 success, at the time in which the coalition was paying
20 the price for the catastrophic success of winning the
21 war so quickly and was paying the price for the lack of
22 or the failure of planning for the aftermath. And we
23 were essentially making it up, having to make it up as
24 we went along in a very different environment to the one
25 we had expected.

1 Now, you have already drawn a number of important
2 lessons from this and we are on a lessons learned
3 exercise. Are there any other lessons for future
4 policy-making that you would draw from the whole Iraq
5 experience?

6 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: I think there are a number of
7 lessons and I think that the full range of them will
8 probably need another session. But there are two in
9 particular.

10 One is to regard the aftermath as just as important
11 a mission as the military action periods. Secondly, to
12 put security first, because nothing could be done in the
13 political and economic spheres, et cetera, without
14 security. Third, to seek as wide as possible an
15 international input into an international operation of
16 this kind, with the legitimacy that will lead to that
17 and which flows from that. And fourthly, to be much
18 more aware of where the gaps are, where the limitations
19 are going to be and try and address those early in
20 security, political, resource, economic and other terms
21 before you begin.

22 This was clearly, from its history, too rushed an
23 exercise for the size of the task that we found on the
24 ground, a task which some people had been predicting
25 would be as difficult as it was. So to have this degree

1 of mismatch is something that has to be avoided in the
2 future.

3 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Thank you.

4 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Sir Jeremy. I think that probably
5 has given you the opportunity to make any final
6 observation for this session. There may be more to say.

7 So with that, can I say one thing for the record:
8 I think you used the term the "FCO third room". Could
9 you, just for the record, for those who don't know that
10 term, explain what it is?

11 SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: An FCO section was, or is, in the
12 days when I joined the FCO, composed of the head of that
13 section and the deputy head of that section and the
14 third room, as it were the engine room, where the
15 bureaucracy gets done.

16 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

17 Thanks to you and to all of those who have attended
18 throughout this morning, can I close that session. The
19 next session will start at 2 o'clock this afternoon,
20 when we are going to be hearing from
21 Lieutenant General William Rollo and
22 Lieutenant General John Cooper about the military's role
23 in the south of the Iraq. And they both commanded the
24 MNDSE and they also had a senior military role in
25 Baghdad later on.

1 We heard in the course of this morning about the --
2 if I can call it, the United Kingdom triangle --
3 Sir Nigel Sheinwald, Sir John Sawers -- and we shall be
4 hearing from both of those tomorrow afternoon along with
5 Desmond Bowen. So that's a trailer for the afternoon
6 session tomorrow.

7 That includes this morning's session. I would just
8 want to say I interrupted the broadcast briefly this
9 morning because there was a mention of sensitive
10 information, as it is defined in our published
11 protocols. So we had to interrupt very briefly, thank
12 you.

13 (1.00 pm)

14 (The short adjournment)

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