

Thursday, 3 December 2009

(9.00 am)

THE CHAIRMAN: Good morning. Welcome to everybody. We have had a day's break in the hearings and it is probably worth reminding everyone what this stage of the public hearings is for.

The officials and military officers appearing before us are being asked to give an account of the way in which policy on Iraq was developed and implemented, outlining the main decisions and tasks that were faced. This will help to give us a clear understanding of the various strands of British policy development and implementation since 2001 right up to 2009.

In the New Year we will begin to take evidence from Ministers. It will be then that we will be hearing about the legal basis for military action among a number of crucial questions, but we will take the opportunity this morning to hear about your involvement in that issue.

The objectives for today are to look at how the United Kingdom's participation in the invasion of Iraq was planned, what options were considered, when the key decisions were taken and how this was linked to the wider diplomatic process.

We will also begin to explore how the United Kingdom

1 planned for after the invasion and what assumptions were
2 made about what the United Kingdom's military role in this
3 might be.

4 The session will cover up to the eve of the invasion
5 and what the United Kingdom thought would happen
6 afterwards. We will see a number of military officers
7 directly involved in the planning, tomorrow, for their
8 perspective on these issues, and next week, we will hear
9 about the invasion itself from two of the commanders who
10 led UK forces in the field, Air Chief Marshall
11 Sir Brian Burridge and Lieutenant General Robin Brims.

12 For many, these questions are at the centre of the
13 issues facing the Inquiry. There will be a good number
14 of further sessions with military officers, and others,
15 where specific questions around equipment and the
16 preparation of the forces sent to Iraq throughout the
17 campaign will be examined in detail, but today's session
18 is about building a clear picture of the military
19 planning process, how and when decisions were made and
20 the timescales for preparation.

21 I remind all witnesses that they will later be asked
22 to sign a transcript of their evidence to the effect
23 that the evidence they have given is truthful, fair and
24 accurate.

25 I wonder if I can invite you, Lord Boyce, and

1 Sir Kevin, to describe your role at the time of
2 2001-2003.

3 LORD MICHAEL BOYCE and SIR KEVIN TEBBIT

4 LORD BOYCE: I was the Chief of Defence Staff, the professional
5 head of the armed forces.

6 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: I was the Permanent Secretary of the
7 department responsible for policy advice, financing
8 and general management of the department.

9 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. I will turn now to the
10 questioning. Sir Roderic?

11 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Lord Boyce, good morning. I wonder if
12 I could start in late 2001 in the period after 9/11?
13 That was a time when we went into Afghanistan with the
14 United States and other coalition partners. We had
15 military personnel attached to the US Central Command,
16 CentCom in Tampa in Florida.

17 As far as Iraq was concerned, the policy of
18 containment was clearly beginning to creak, it was under
19 pressure after 9/11. It had become very unpopular in
20 the United States. People in the United States were
21 beginning to talk about doing Iraq next after
22 Afghanistan, and, of course, the No Fly Zones over Iraq,
23 north and south, which we were participating in
24 patrolling, with American aircraft and British aircraft
25 flying side by side, had become increasingly

1 problematic.

2 Now, at what point in this period after 9/11 did the
3 Ministry of Defence start thinking about the
4 contingency -- it was no more than that -- of full-scale
5 military action against Iraq and discussing it
6 informally with your counterparts in the United States?

7 So, Lord Boyce, I wonder if you would like to take
8 that first?

9 LORD BOYCE: In the latter part of 2001, we had also heard
10 the rumour that there was talk about this from the United States
11 side, there was talk about Iraq and an effort to try to
12 tie in somehow or other with Iraq those who had been involved
13 in Al-Qaeda in the 9/11 bombings.

14 We absolutely did not want to get involved in such
15 conversations. It was made very clear to the people who
16 were there - my people, either in Tampa or in any other post - in
their
17 conversations to tell the Americans that we were not
18 interested in discussing Iraq, and absolutely no
19 contingency planning went on in 2001 so far as Iraq was
20 concerned.

21 Hardly surprising, because from about October
22 onwards, we were heavily involved in the war in
23 Afghanistan, and in the late November/December really
24 going at full speed trying to generate the
25 international security assistance force, which was

1 absorbing any sort of capacity we had, almost, just to
2 get that underway. So even if we wanted to start
3 contingency planning, we wouldn't have had the capacity
4 to do so. But there was no contingency planning or
5 thinking about Iraq, so far as the MoD was concerned, in
6 2001.

7 SIR RODERIC LYNE: If we carry that forward into the first
8 four months of 2002, and particularly after
9 President Bush's Axis of Evil speech, was this cloud
10 beginning to appear on the horizon? Were you beginning
11 to have to think about it a bit more then?

12 LORD BOYCE: Yes, and, of course, Afghanistan itself was
13 settling down, if I can use that expression, in terms of
14 getting the ISAF mobilised and in place.

15 I suppose in the sort of spring, around sort
16 of April time, as one was hearing more and more from the
17 Americans about their thinking about Iraq, we were
18 starting thinking about: what happens if they ask us
19 what, if anything, we can do about Iraq? So I guess,
20 with a very, very small group, there was something going
21 on about what our capability was should we be asked
22 to contribute from low scale, from sort of forces which were
23 already in theatre, up to something on a larger scale
24 and that started really around about April 2002.

25 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Yes, Sir David Manning told us the other

1 day that in early March there was in the Cabinet Office
2 an options paper that was presented to the
3 Prime Minister that looked at either the option of
4 continuing with containment in some stronger form or the
5 possibility of effecting regime change, it looked at
6 three possible ways in which regime change could have
7 been effected. That then was followed by his own visit
8 to Washington then the Prime Minister's important
9 meeting with President Bush at Crawford.

10 Could you both perhaps tell us how the MoD
11 contributed to the options paper and the Prime
12 Minister's briefing for Crawford, what it wanted the
13 Prime Minister to establish from President Bush at
14 Crawford with regard to Iraq and the military planning
15 that you said -- "planning" may be too strong a word --
16 was beginning to happen in a very small group at that
17 time.

18 LORD BOYCE: Well, I don't know obviously, I haven't looked at
19 this. I don't recall the words "regime change"
20 appearing at that time at all, and, certainly, so far as
21 I was concerned, the process which we believed to be
22 absolutely fundamental was that things should be done
23 through the United Nations and not some sort of separate
24 coalition effort.

25 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Sir Kevin?

1 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: Thank you. I think it is fair to say, as
2 Lord Boyce has mentioned, there was no such thing at that stage as
3 military planning in the MoD as such. It was clear that
4 the State of the Union address, the Axis of Evil speech,
5 meant that we needed to consider the possibility that
6 the United States might look at the option of military
7 action.

8 Of course, one appreciated this from one's own
9 visits to Washington, and I was there in December 2001,
10 and if one listened to people like Richard Perle, it was
11 quite clear that there were officials in the
12 United States from the neo-conservative, crudely
13 described, wing, who were pushing for this, not just
14 against Iraq, but against other countries too,
15 the option of using military force.

16 Therefore, in the papers that were prepared for the
17 Prime Minister's visit, we needed to consider this
18 question. I think the line taken in the briefing was
19 that we should not rule out the possibility that the UK
20 may be asked to participate in military action if that
21 was the only way of stemming the tide of WMD and
22 proliferation and that appropriate options existed at
23 the time.

24 I think the considerations that were put then by
25 officials in the various papers, - as I recall it,

1 there were contributions from the Foreign Office, from
2 the Ministry of Defence and the Cabinet Office and
3 these were policy papers rather than military planning
4 documents -.

5 I think the principles that were set out in those
6 papers were very similar to the ones which persisted
7 throughout the next year. That is to say that, were the
8 UK to consider joining something of that kind, military
9 action, it would need to be only after we had exhausted
10 the UN arms' control route, only when public opinion was
behind it and understood

12 the difficulties and dangers, only when there was
13 a broad coalition of international support for the
14 action, and only when there was clarity as to what would
15 happen afterwards.

16 Those principles were pretty well set out in the
17 documents which the Prime Minister would have seen
18 before he went to Crawford.

19 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Did the process of briefing the Prime
20 Minister for Crawford in meetings that the
21 Defence Secretary would have had with the Prime
22 Minister, with other Ministers, before Crawford, in
23 briefing the Prime Minister before Crawford -- was the
24 Ministry of Defence wanting the Prime Minister to
25 extract anything specific in terms of Iraq and the

1 possible military angle from President Bush at Crawford?

2 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: I think that would be going too far.

3 I think we were simply part of a process of underlining

4 what we saw at the time as being a serious need for

5 disarmament that, as it were, the containment track had

6 indeed broken down. We knew the Americans were looking

7 at other options and it was therefore important for us

8 to help the Prime Minister to inform his thinking, but

9 there were no recommendations.

10 SIR RODERIC LYNE: So if the Americans were looking at other

11 options, we felt that they were well enough informed

12 about that and plugged into that process since it was

13 quite likely to involve us?

14 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: No, that would be going too far, I think,

15 at that stage, in terms of the official briefings.

16 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Did we want to be better informed about

17 it?

18 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: I think one always wants to be better

19 informed, but these were background papers and these

20 were, of course, not the only issues that were being

21 prepared and discussed. There was a whole raft of

22 issues, but I don't think one should underestimate the

23 concern that existed in, as it were, the Pol/Mil

24 community about proliferation, about the difficulties of

25 containing Saddam Hussein, about his own role in that,

1 in terms of the threat to his people, the threat to the
2 region, and, more widely, in terms of aspirations that
3 he had. That was a concern. But there were no
4 recommendations. I'm describing background material.

5 THE CHAIRMAN: Sir Kevin, just before coming to the
6 questions, you used the term Pol/Mil, and for the
7 benefit of the wider audience, can you just explain what
8 that is?

9 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: It is that area trying to balance
10 political considerations and military considerations.

11 THE CHAIRMAN: Who are they, the Pol/Mil?

12 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: I think you have already taken testimony
13 actually from Simon Webb, who was the Policy Director of
14 the MoD and would therefore be regarded as the Pol/Mil
15 specialist in the Ministry of Defence.

16 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Can I just clarify in terms of this
17 preparation for Crawford and the Ministry of Defence
18 contribution to that preparation, were you involved in
19 that?

20 LORD BOYCE: No.

21 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: When we were saying that we
22 shouldn't rule out the possibility of being engaged in
23 military action, had you been consulted on that, not
24 ruling out a possibility?

25 LORD BOYCE: We had started thinking of what our capability

1 would be. I was not involved in the briefing of the
2 Prime Minister just before going to Crawford.

3 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: When the Prime Minister came back
4 from Crawford, was this the point that a planning cell
5 was established to take these questions of capabilities
6 and options a little further?

7 LORD BOYCE: Yes, we started ramping up our sort of thinking
8 on the whole subject of what we could provide. We were
9 asked, as I said, from a relatively small-sized
10 contribution, forces in theatre, leading up to
11 a larger-scale sort of contribution. That thinking
12 started in May, but, again, it was constrained to a very
13 small group of people and it was very much in London in
14 the MoD, it didn't actually go outside into any of the
15 outposts, if you like, in the MoD.

16 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: What sort of people were involved in
17 this, were these Pol/Mil people?

18 LORD BOYCE: I can't remember who they were, but there would
19 have been a mixture of people, like, for example, from
20 the Policy Directors' area, but they would have been
21 primarily, though, from the Deputy Chief of Defence
22 Staff (Commitments) area, in other words, people
23 who look after the high level strategic planning for the
24 armed forces, which is largely a military staff.

25 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: You have indicated some of the

1 options going from the rather low level to a much higher
2 level. We had some indications of these from
3 Sir David Manning, but perhaps you could amplify a bit
4 on what these options were?

5 LORD BOYCE: The lower levels were based on what we had in
6 theatre, really, which was largely special forces and
7 some naval forces through a middle-sized option, if you
8 like, which would be a contribution of something of the
9 order of brigade strength up to what is technically
10 known as a large-scale operation, which is
11 a divisional-sized contribution.

12 One of the reasons for looking at that is to see how
13 quickly one can react if someone was asked to do it.
14 Clearly, generating forces in theatre doesn't
15 take long - you are talking about days. Generating
16 something of the order of a divisional-sized
17 contribution, clearly would take a matter of months. So
18 it was getting a feel for how quickly we could do
19 something if we were asked.

20 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: What sort of criteria were developed
21 to assess against which of these different options could
22 be judged?

23 LORD BOYCE: I think it was, it was all part of the
24 process, you know, about what would the Americans be
25 looking for in terms of a size of contribution, whether

1 we could actually fill areas in which they had
2 shortages - not shortages, but where they would benefit
3 from having our contribution.

4 It was obviously a function of threat assessment as
5 well, how difficult a task it might be if we were
6 involved doing those sort of planning functions.

7 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: We just heard that you weren't
8 directly discussing these questions with the Americans
9 at that time.

10 LORD BOYCE: We weren't, although we had people in Tampa at
11 this time, they were there on the Afghanistan ticket
12 rather than the Iraq ticket, and on this the Americans were
13 keeping outsiders very clear, because, of course, in Tampa, they
14 had quite a large number of British people involved in
15 the Afghanistan operation. They were keeping it very tight
16 to themselves. Whatever planning they were doing about
17 Iraq was not being exposed to us.

18 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Where did our ideas about what the
19 Americans might need come from then? Were these just
20 supposition?

21 LORD BOYCE: We were exploring a range of options, so we had
22 something ready to answer with when and if we were
23 asked.

24 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: What in terms of -- given the
25 strength of American armed forces, were we aware of any

1 obvious gaps that they had in their capability? Was
2 there a sense that they really would need us in this
3 militarily?

4 LORD BOYCE: I think that probably, in the first instance,
5 the scope of our thinking was probably, if the Americans want
6 to ask US and, indeed, other potential allies, to get
7 the effect of having multiple flags on the scene rather
8 than just having their own, of course, if the Americans
9 wished to do this on their own, they had more than
10 enough capability and there is no particular area, other
11 than possibly some intelligence reports, where we would
12 be able to offer something which they did not have.

13 The US size, both in terms of their make-up and
14 quality and quantity, was something where they wouldn't
15 have a gap that we would make a big difference on, other
16 than the fact of actually being bound in. What actually
17 happened on the day is a different matter, by the way,
18 but this was in the planning process.

19 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Yes, we are talking about the
20 planning process, and multiple flags basically means we
21 are there to provide political solidarity.

22 LORD BOYCE: Absolutely.

23 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: I think it might be helpful if I made
24 a general broad point here, because it should not be
25 assumed that we were looking for the military option at

1 this early stage. I think it is very important to make
2 clear the difference between military planning and
3 political planning.

4 For military men to provide an option, a very long
5 planning process is required. Therefore, it is natural
6 for the armed forces to want to understand what might be
7 required of them as early as possible because of the
8 difficulties of physically generating any option.

9 As you go through this Inquiry, you will find that
10 political debates can change situations very rapidly and
11 it is a deliberative process, a diplomatic process.
12 A force generation process is a completely different
13 thing, and, therefore, for colleagues like the Chief of
14 Defence Staff here it would have been necessary to start
15 thinking about the possibility of military options, even if one
16 did not hope or even expect to need to use them, because
17 if one could not begin to start thinking of capability
18 options, they would not be there should the politicians
19 decide to avail themselves of them at a much later date.

20 I think that general point is worth making
21 because it is important not to feel that there was
22 a military pressure building in the UK for things to happen. That
23 was never the case.

24 At this early stage, and I think we are still
25 talking about April 2002, we did not know whether the

1 Americans were going to go for a military option and, if
2 so, which one. So this was very, very preliminary
3 ground clearing, and even at that stage, I think the
4 idea perhaps that there would be an internal uprising or
5 an uprising instigated by exiles from Iraq, and that
6 that might have been one of the obvious options, was
7 very much in the Americans' minds as well.

8 So this was a very open-planning, ground-clearing,
9 thinking stage.

10 THE CHAIRMAN: We have been having throughout these hearings
11 a bit of trouble in the microphones and we have got live
12 transcription going on. It would be a kindness if both
13 of you could try to speak a little louder and a little
14 slower. I would be grateful, thank you.

15 They are not only directional, but they are very
16 distance sensitive. One needs to be at the right point.
17 You will hear an echo if you are too close.

18 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Thanks very much. At what point
19 then, during, say, the April to June period, did
20 these -- the sense that maybe this was more than just
21 thinking about possible contingencies, but might be for
22 real, start to influence the planning?

23 LORD BOYCE: I guess it was in late June or July that the
24 Americans -- well, in discussions that I had with
25 General Franks and General Myers they agreed we should

1 actually come into their planning cell itself in Tampa, so we
2 started getting better access to what it is and what sort
3 of plans that they were developing, which would enable
4 us to start shaping our potential contribution, again
5 based on three options, to fit in with their overall
6 plan.

7 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: But before that, you didn't really
8 have any clear sense of the sort of planning that they
9 might do. Sir Kevin, you were going backwards and
10 forwards to Washington presumably at this time. Did you
11 have any discussions with your counterparts in the
12 Pentagon about this?

13 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: Not, I think, with the Pentagon at that
14 point. I think some work was done in the
15 Ministry of Defence in that closed planning group to
16 indicate to the Defence Secretary what sort of options
17 broadly might be possible.

18 Those were very much against the background of the
19 Strategic Defence Review and the sort of options that we
20 said British armed forces should be able to manage
21 should they be required to act, in terms of how long it
22 would take to generate a large-scale operation, how long
23 it would take to generate a medium-scale operation and
24 what could be done with forces in place.

25 Those three options were the natural ones that would

1 flow from the Strategic Defence Review. I think
2 late May would have been the time when the Defence Secretary
first heard of that sort of preliminary exercise.

4 At the same time, of course, we had
5 just had another UN Security Council Resolution, so
6 these were very much twin tracks.

7 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: On the question of force generation,
8 which you have indicated is one reason why you need to
9 get this planning started quite early on, thinking about
10 it early on, did you get a sense from the Americans,
11 even, say, by May, as to when they were thinking an
12 operation might take place? Because presumably, given
13 the long lead times you have talked about, we would have
14 needed to start getting things moving.

15 LORD BOYCE: Obviously, our contribution would be very
16 dependent on lead times for the reasons you have just
17 mentioned, but I don't think -- I suppose it was in
18 September that they first indicated that the end of the
19 year, or January, might have been the time we would do
20 something, and that, of course, would have constrained
21 us from producing a large-scale contribution, because we
22 couldn't have generated it in time.

23 SIR RODERIC LYNE: As you rightly emphasise, planning for
24 all sorts of contingencies and eventualities is
25 something which defence staffs have to do all the way

1 round the world, it is a core part of their functions,
2 but at this point, where you did have people now
3 established working with the Americans in CentCom on
4 this issue, obviously planning was moving into
5 a slightly different phase.

6 Sir Christopher Meyer told us the other day that in
7 this period he had heard from a member of the
8 administration that we were apparently planning to send
9 more or less what we did eventually send. That is to
10 say word had come up to Washington that we were planning
11 to send a divisional-sized force. That was the
12 assumptions that the Americans were beginning to make.

13 But this was at a time when our political leaders
14 hadn't actually taken a decision to do such. Where did
15 this American assumption come from?

16 LORD BOYCE: There was a huge reluctance by the Americans
17 throughout the period of July through to March 17th,
18 2003, to accept that we were not going to commit our forces unless
19 they agreed to by a United Nations resolution unless we were fully
20 agreed to go through the United Nations process, and, in
21 the latter weeks, through Parliament as well. No matter
22 how many times you said to senior American officers, and
23 indeed to Mr Rumsfeld, that we were not committing our
24 forces until we had been through the proper UN process,
25 and, as I say, in the latter days, had been through

1 Parliament as well, there was a complete reluctance to
2 believe that.

3 It was a case of, "We know you say that, but
4 actually, come the day, you will be there", was the
5 attitude.

6 SIR RODERIC LYNE: But you said we were looking at a number
7 of different options, different sized packages. Why
8 were they, right from this early stage, assuming we were
9 going to go for the largest one?

10 LORD BOYCE: You would have to ask them that.

11 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: That wasn't my impression, I have to say.
12 I think we were very conscious -- I'm speaking now
13 of May/June period into July -- I think we did sort out
14 the basis of discussions with the American military
15 during June and I think the initial sort of contingent
16 planning began at the end of June/early July.

17 However, I think there was a very strong degree of
18 caution on the UK side, because it was clear to us that,
19 even at that stage, if one began discussions with the
20 United States on the military track, albeit without
21 commitment, it becomes increasingly difficult to keep
22 options open absolutely completely, and I think we made
23 it clear to them that our participation in those
24 discussions was purely to inform British Government
25 thinking, but there was a dilemma.

1 On the one hand, if one is drawn into discussion of
2 timescales and details, we might give misleading signals
3 of support for military action which was not present at
4 that stage.

5 On the other hand, if we continued to stand aside,
6 it might be too late for us to influence events or meet
7 the political requirement which might be placed on us.
8 That was the dilemma to which we were exposed, and that
9 was why the movement to talk to the Americans was very
10 carefully managed, just to avoid giving the sort of
11 impression you are talking about.

12 I personally was not aware that that was the
13 American impression at that stage.

14 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Although, Sir Christopher Meyer reported
15 this back to London, that didn't reach you?

16 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: I wasn't aware of it, no.

17 SIR RODERIC LYNE: No. Obviously your people in these
18 discussions were in a very difficult situation for
19 precisely the reason you give, because you can't have
20 a meaningful discussion with your American military
21 opposite number without the contingency, without the
22 Americans wanting to know precisely what kind of a force
23 contribution we might be making and, indeed, as you get
24 further into it and you start looking at the map, where
25 it is going to come from. Are we going to be part of

1 what became known as the northern option or the southern
2 option or whatever?

3 Now, in order, as you say, Sir Kevin, to make sure
4 that we are not left out of the possibility of
5 influencing this, we have to have something to say at
6 that point. What we say, for the reasons that
7 Lord Boyce gave, was always heavily caveated right up to
8 the very last moment. So I think your representatives
9 must have been in really a very difficult situation.

10 Where did the idea begin to arise, which it
11 obviously did in this period, in the summer of 2002,
12 that the British were going to lead on the northern
13 option, or take the northern option, which means the
14 part of the plan that at that time said "Come down from
15 Turkey"?

16 LORD BOYCE: That was a fairly early part of the planning
17 process, that we'd come from Turkey. We weren't going
18 to lead it, by the way, we'd have been part of the
19 American force, probably the American Fourth
20 Infantry Division, and we'd have come down there with
21 them. We wouldn't be leading a military operation, and
22 it remained on the table --

23 SIR RODERIC LYNE: We never talked about leading it?

24 LORD BOYCE: No, and it would remain on the table right
25 until January 2003.

1 THE CHAIRMAN: Sorry, Lord Boyce, once again, I am afraid
2 the mic is playing up a bit. A bit further back
3 perhaps? Thank you.

4 LORD BOYCE: So the favourite option, if you like, was that
5 we would actually go through Turkey with the
6 Fourth Division, and so we started planning on that
7 basis in May and -- I guess it was September/October,
8 starting that line of planning, but it is important to
9 realise that when we talked to them about outline
10 planning, high level planning, I was not allowed to
11 speak, for example, to the Chief of Defence Logistics --
12 I was prevented from doing that by the Secretary of
13 State for Defence, because of the concern about it
14 becoming public knowledge that we were planning for
15 a military contribution which might have derailed one thought
16 it might have stopped or be completely unhelpful in the
17 activity going on in the United Nations to secure what
18 subsequently turned out to be UN Security Council
19 Resolution 1441.

20 SIR RODERIC LYNE: The northern option, was this something
21 that was attractive to us? Was it actually our
22 preference to do it, or was it something that the
23 Americans very much wanted us to do?

24 LORD BOYCE: I think it was probably a bit of both really.
25 I think that, provided Turkey agreed, it would have been

1 a sensible way of deploying our armoured division to
2 work alongside the Fourth Infantry Division.

3 SIR RODERIC LYNE: If I can take us now through into June
4 and July, as Sir David Manning has told us, by this
5 time, things began to become a bit more specific. The
6 Prime Minister was aware now that we had this discussion
7 going on in Florida between our military representatives
8 and the Americans, and Sir David told us that he asked
9 for advice from the Ministry of Defence on what the
10 options might be.

11 Can you tell us how that advice was put together,
12 what the rationale was for the packages that were
13 proposed to Number 10 in July of 2002, and then
14 subsequently developed, so that, by early September, it
15 had become a fairly concrete set of proposals, options?

16 LORD BOYCE: As I say, first of all, they couldn't be
17 concrete, they could only be high level, because the
18 planning team was still very small team located in
19 the Ministry of Defence. We weren't consulting with
20 important organisations such as the Defence Logistics
21 Organisation.

22 Why is that important? Because if you are doing an
23 armed operation, you are going to have to take up ships
24 from trade to get your forces out there, you're going to
25 have a huge amount of logistic planning and to start

1 buying in equipment, which the armed forces didn't have
2 because they weren't funded to have ourselves the right
3 level of preparation. So all you can be doing is high
4 level planning and saying, "This is what we could do, if
5 and when we get the opportunity, when we get the
6 go-ahead to start bringing in, if you like, the
7 Defence Logistics Organisation".

8 SIR RODERIC LYNE: At this point, where Number 10 was asking
9 the Ministry of Defence for formal advice on what we
10 might be able to do if we had to take part in a military
11 action against Iraq, did you have reservations about the
12 sort of direction that our policy was beginning to take
13 towards a possible conflict with Iraq? What risks did
14 you see in the advice that you were being asked to give
15 on this?

16 LORD BOYCE: Military risks? Obviously yes in terms of
17 Iraq's capability, are you meaning? Military
18 capability?

19 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Military risks, risks for our security
20 position, reservations about whether this was the right
21 way of dealing with the threat posed by Saddam Hussein.

22 LORD BOYCE: I think that our position remained, certainly
23 right through until March 2003, that the right way of
24 doing it was going to be the United Nations.

25 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Did that mean continuing with

1 containment?

2 LORD BOYCE: Containment, also getting Saddam Hussein to

3 agree to do what 1441 had asked him.

4 SIR RODERIC LYNE: What was the rationale behind the idea of

5 perhaps going for a large contingent as opposed to the

6 package 2, which was essentially air and maritime, the

7 large contingent involving divisional-sized land forces?

8 LORD BOYCE: We felt that the advantage of that in

9 particular would be that we would have more influence on

10 the American plan. If we were producing something of a

11 large-scale size as opposed to a small-scale or just

12 medium-scale.

13 SIR RODERIC LYNE: So by and large, if we were going to go

14 in, you were in favour of going in with a larger

15 package?

16 LORD BOYCE: To do it properly, yes.

17 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Sir Kevin, do you want to comment on

18 this?

19 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: Back in the politico-military world, if

20 I can call it that, in terms of policy, at that stage,

21 I think in early July, we were equally concerned that

22 the military planning track should not be regarded as

23 pulling forward before we had established the right

24 policy framework with the United States, bearing in mind

25 the points I mentioned at the beginning, the conditions

1 which would need to be met were military action to be
2 taken. We knew by then that the United States had
3 intensified slightly its military planning activity,
4 moving from vague options to looking more seriously at
5 these things.

6 I certainly felt at that stage that there was
7 a danger of being pulled into military planning while
8 there was still something of a policy vacuum in terms of
9 our perception of what the United States was actually
10 doing. This was a very difficult period to quite
11 understand what was going on in Washington, given the
12 various pressures that existed and which had been
13 described very well by people before me, including
14 Sir David Manning.

15 But it was not clear at that point that the
16 United States itself had a clear rationale that they had
17 clearly explained their own public opinion, let alone
18 our own, what the threats and the risks were, what the
19 legal basis for any action would be and what the end
20 state might be in terms of what would happen if military
21 action took place in terms of successor government, in
22 terms of relations with the Arab world at a time of
23 tension in Middle Eastern affairs.

24 So I personally was very concerned that there should
25 be full engagement with the policy machine in the

1 United States, if we were to be going further, as it
2 were, on the military net.

3 That, I think, was a general feeling in London, too,
4 and I'm only saying this really to restate the point
5 that one should not, because you are asking about the
6 military planning dimension, get that out of the context
7 of the wider policy picture. I think at that point
8 certainly I and a lot of other officials were concerned
9 to deepen our engagement with the United States to
10 ensure that those conditions which I mentioned at the
11 outset were indeed seriously being pursued and that we
12 would continue to push the United States on those,
13 above all, the UN arms control track, but also broader
14 planning issues rather than simply be invited to engage
15 in more detailed military planning, albeit as
16 a contingent activity.

17 SIR RODERIC LYNE: So in this period -- and as you say,
18 speaking very much from a political military point of
19 view, would you concede that the United States
20 administration was heading more and more in the
21 direction of seriously considering military action
22 against Iraq, and, in considering doing so, to change
23 the regime, which was their policy, not ours?

24 Did you have concerns about this strategic direction
25 in which we were being taken? Did you feel that we were

1 laying down our own position, our own conditions for
2 participation, strongly enough in this period?

3 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: I think that that was indeed the case.

4 Remember, things were being planned very much in
5 compartments at that stage, we are talking about July,
6 and it was not entirely evident what was going on
7 elsewhere. I think everybody involved did do everything
8 they could to ensure that those conditions that I talked
9 about were indeed being pursued, but the environment in
10 Washington at that stage was quite difficult to
11 influence.

12 I should say one of the factors which made it
13 harder -- and I had been in Washington at the first Gulf
14 War, in 1991, as the politico-military
15 counsellor in the British embassy at that
16 point; the big difference between then and 2002 was
17 that the military planning track had moved to being
18 essentially a dialogue between the Office of the
19 Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld himself, and the
20 CENTCOM planners in Tampa, not the Washington military
21 establishment. The joint Chiefs of Staff had much less
22 of a role in the US planning process and,
23 indeed, the Inter-Agency role was much less than had been
24 the case in the first Gulf War.

25 The system which we had got used to earlier of very

1 well-structured discussions between State Department,
2 National Security Council, the Defense Department, the
3 Intelligence Agencies that had happened in 1990, was not
4 there again in 2002.

5 So the concerns I think one had were more about how
6 one actually kept in touch properly with a comprehensive
7 planning process in Washington and encouraged that
8 forward than any concerns about the UK side.

9 LORD BOYCE: Just to reinforce that point, the
10 dysfunctionality of Washington was that the lack of
11 communication between the State, the Pentagon and the
12 White House was actually helped by ourselves, where we
13 had quite a joined up effort certainly the military side.
14 At my Chiefs of Staff meetings I had very senior
15 representatives from the Foreign Office, the agencies
16 and, in fact, from Number 10.

17 I also found myself briefing my American counterpart
18 on what was going on in the State, rather than him
19 actually finding out directly. That was the only way,
20 actually, he found out what was going on. Indeed, to
21 pick up the other point that Sir Kevin made, he
22 correctly says Rumsfeld attempted to deal directly with
23 Tampa, with General Franks. So I was very often keeping
24 General Myers informed on what was going on in the
25 defence sector, his own defence organisation, because he

1 wasn't getting it from Rumsfeld.

2 SIR RODERIC LYNE: We put our chips on the table by

3 signalling, albeit in a heavily caveated form, that he

4 might be willing to take part with the Americans in

5 action and starting to plan in a very preliminary way

6 with them, but what you are saying effectively was that

7 we didn't actually have much traction despite, having

8 put the chips on the table, with the people who were

9 leading their defence effort?

10 LORD BOYCE: We certainly had traction with General Franks

11 at the military planning, and our advisers, you know,

12 the British officers on General Franks's staff, were

13 very much engaged in looking at various options about,

14 "Should we go to Iraq, how we should actually do that?"

15 SIR RODERIC LYNE: You had a good dialogue with Franks.

16 What about Donald Rumsfeld?

17 LORD BOYCE: If you were talking to Franks, you were talking

18 to Rumsfeld anyway, indirectly. But we weren't

19 engaging that much you'd have to ask Mr Hoon how often he spoke

20 to Mr Rumsfeld. Certainly I spoke to him from time to

21 time, but not very much, but it was more of that my

22 interaction was largely with Franks, but he was on the

23 phone to Rumsfeld about five times a day, so one would

24 imagine Rumsfeld was hearing our view through Franks.

25 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: Can I just add here, I did get the

1 impression by September that these concerns of ours were
2 indeed getting through in Washington. There were
3 various conversations, I recall. One was Myers, I think
4 telling CDS that the UN route was indeed the one that
5 the United States was now prepared to put forward and
6 pursue more actively.

7 The Secretary of State, Geoff Hoon, I'm sure will
8 talk for himself, but he continually emphasised to
9 Rumsfeld the importance of pursuing the UN route and
10 that disarmament was the UK objective, not regime
11 change. We talked about changing the behaviour of the
12 regime, which, by implication, may well have meant that
13 Saddam Hussein couldn't stay in those circumstances, but
14 it was in order to secure disarmament.

15 I think Condi Rice, said to us that US
16 policy had been transformed by being persuaded to go
17 down the UN route. One took these things with a certain
18 pinch of salt, but I think there was quite a lot of
19 evidence to suggest that we were having an impact in
20 terms of the advice and the concerns we were expressing,
21 in parallel with the military planning.

22 This also included, for example, the decision by
23 the Americans to involve as many nations as possible in
24 their efforts to persuade them, as it were, to take the
25 multilateral route in their policy ,which was fundamental to British

1 thinking, rather than any unilateral approach. So
2 I think we were getting through. The concerns we
3 expressed in July were beginning to have an impact, but
4 this was still a difficult structure in Washington to
5 penetrate.

6 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Let's now take things forward to
7 September, as you have done. By early September, the
8 Ministry of Defence has worked up some quite detailed
9 advice for Ministers on what their options are, packages
10 1, 2 and 3, set out in quite a lot of detail.

11 Now, the Prime Minister goes to Camp David for
12 another meeting with President Bush on 7 September and
13 that's obviously a very important meeting. It is
14 a meeting which, as we have been told, the Prime
15 Minister -- well, President Bush very much at the Prime
16 Minister's wishes, albeit obviously persuaded by his own
17 people, decides that he is going to go down the UN
18 route, going to go to the United Nations, support the
19 idea of the UN Resolution or Resolutions, but at the
20 same time it is very clear to us by then that he is
21 under a lot of pressure from other people in Washington,
22 including Vice-President Cheney, who, slightly to our
23 surprise, pops up at Camp David, not to do that at all.

24 So we can see that the timetable for action is
25 shortening, the pace is quickening, but at this stage,

1 you are still in the political vacuum that Sir Kevin
2 referred to. You have presented options to the Prime
3 Minister, but you have not had any clear instruction as
4 to what we are going to do.

5 Where did that leave you? What direction at that
6 stage were Ministers leaning towards? Did it allow you
7 with this shortening timetable and your long lead
8 timings, if you were going to deploy a large contingency
9 sea force, to get on with the work that you needed to be
10 doing at this stage?

11 LORD BOYCE: It was very frustrating, and I was not allowed
12 to do that. Having refined our theoretical strategic
13 planning one couldn't take the next step, which is how
14 to start to implement it and start doing the necessary
15 purchasing, or bringing things forward or getting people
16 in the right sort of place.

17 This was all very much, as I said earlier on, in
18 order not to give any signals -- to make any signals
19 that we were doing overt military planning while the UN
20 negotiations were going on leading up to the resolution
21 which happened in November.

22 So my advice was that the longer that I'm held back
23 from actually allowing, for example, the defence logistic
24 organisation to start doing the sort of things they
25 needed to do, long lead items, and the whole time, every

1 day I was held back from doing that was another day
2 later on which we could actually deploy.

3 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Were you getting indications, at this
4 stage, that the Prime Minister and the Defence Secretary
5 favoured one of the three options?

6 LORD BOYCE: I think that by that time we were planning, if
7 you like, for the most difficult option, we were looking
8 now probably at the large-scale option.

9 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Rather than the package 2? Because at
10 some stage they had favoured package 2.

11 LORD BOYCE: I think that package 2 would have disappeared
12 as being as a favoured option in about September,
13 because the large-scale option was obviously more
14 difficult to prepare, so our focus was on that.

15 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: I think I would only add that, at that
16 stage in September, it was not entirely clear when the
17 Americans were hoping or intending or planning to
18 consider military action. As CDS said, we were seeking
19 very much the arms control route in the next
20 Security Council Resolution, but I think the point was
21 that until about then, if the Americans were going to
22 try to go early, we couldn't have gone with
23 a large-scale option. By "early", I mean, by the end of
24 2002. It just wasn't physically possible for the UK.

25 However, it was clear that US planning assumptions

1 were moving around and that may well have opened up
2 again the large-scale option which CDS is talking about.
3 These were discussed in the UK, as he says, by the
4 Prime Minister and by the Defence Secretary. It was
5 indeed decided that we would not expose the full
6 large-scale option to the United States at that point
7 because of concerns about the UN process, but also because,
8 actually, lack of clarity at that point, and which
9 persisted, as to whether the Turks would actually
10 provide the necessary facilities for the northern option
11 which was the one mainly under consideration.

12 There were also considerations of the fire strike.
13 Remember, back in those days Operation Fresco, as it was
14 called, was still a preoccupation for the
15 Ministry of Defence, and quite significant numbers of
16 people had to be held back against the possibility of
17 being used for fire duties. CDS is perhaps underplaying
18 the extent of the planning difficulties he faced in
19 generating forces, if they were required, given the
20 other pressures on him.

21 I think some very contingent urgent operational
22 requirement work was authorised by the Defence Secretary
23 at that time under CDS's pressure, because, if he
24 needed the option, he had to do work, but those were
25 very much ones which could be done invisibly, as it

1 were, and not in a way that would disrupt
2 diplomatic activity. A very limited amount of
3 preparation.

4 SIR RODERIC LYNE: I recall CDS at the time pointed out
5 publicly that it wasn't very easy for him to deploy
6 19,000 troops on firefighting duties if they were going
7 to be fielded for other purposes. That obviously was
8 a huge complication for you.

9 If there was this possibility that the Americans
10 would go early and simply sooner than we would be able
11 to deploy a sufficient-sized land force as part of that
12 contribution, did they actually need us at all?

13 LORD BOYCE: As I said before, if they had chosen to go on
14 their own, they could have done so. They had the
15 capability and the numbers to do so, and at the early
16 planning time, yes, they could have done it without us,
17 but I think they very much wanted to have us there as an
18 ally, as another flag; and, knowing the quality of our
19 people, we could actually make a serious contribution,
20 but if they had decided to go on their own, of course
21 they could have done so.

22 SIR RODERIC LYNE: From our point of view, if it wasn't
23 essential for us to deploy a land force of a size that
24 really stretched our capabilities after the strategic
25 defence review and with fire strikes to deal with, and

1 we had the option of making a substantial contribution
2 through aircraft and warships, why were we so keen to
3 send a division out there?

4 LORD BOYCE: I think it was only by having something of that
5 particular size that we thought we would have
6 a reasonable influence on how the Americans were going
7 to conduct the campaign.

8 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Did we succeed in having that influence?

9 LORD BOYCE: I think we probably did to an extent.

10 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Sir Lawrence?

11 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Can I just follow this through a bit
12 in terms of --

13 LORD BOYCE: Can I just add, one of the reasons I think
14 that, if I may, sorry to interrupt you know, you asked us
15 about "Did we have any influence?", I think, you know,
16 if the Americans were minded to go, at one time, by the
17 end of the year, but they wanted us on board.
18 Therefore, our protestations that we wanted to go down
19 the UN route first and foremost, actually, if you like,
20 did influence their behaviour. So I think we did have
21 an impact.

22 Whereas, if we were offering a very small
23 contribution, they probably would have just rolled past
24 it and it wouldn't have had as much bearing.

25 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Do you want to come in on this?

1 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: I would only make the point I have been
2 making throughout, really, so I apologise if it is the
3 same old gramophone record, but this was not a narrow
4 military issue, this was the major political issue
5 facing the international community, and British policy,
6 the Prime Minister's policy, was that he was satisfied
7 that the disarmament of Saddam Hussein was the most
8 important single thing to do at that point and that it
9 should be done by the international community as
10 a whole, that it should be done through arms control and
11 disarmament, and only if that became impossible should
12 it be done by the military force, that a build-up of
13 military force might actually be necessary to convince
14 Saddam Hussein that we were serious, so there was
15 a deterrent effect as well as a force threat in doing
16 what we were doing, that we were very insistent on wide
17 coalition participation. We were not talking about just
18 the UK going with the United States. Remember, the
19 actual planning that was authorised contingently
20 in June, included the Australians as well, authorised by
21 the United States, I mean, and other countries joined in
22 various ways as the process gathered momentum in the
23 period that you are going to come to.

24 So this was very much a view, I think, that the
25 Prime Minister and government had, that this was a vital

1 problem for international security that should be dealt
2 with by the international community as a whole and,
3 therefore, that Britain should have a full part in it
4 and that also informed the idea of a large-scale ground
5 force component.

6 Now, when you mentioned, Sir Roderic, the Strategic
7 Defence Review, you almost implied it was a limitation.
8 Actually, that was the general conceptual framework
9 which would involve a large-scale deployment of the kind
10 that we finally did indeed send.

11 The problem was, I think, that because of other
12 commitments, we did not have the full readiness levels
13 in September, say, to be able to easily generate that,
14 and this was the big challenge that the Chief of Defence
15 Staff faced. But the broader context was the one I was
16 trying to put across. This was not a narrow activity, therefore it
was
18 very valid for us to seek to make a significant
19 contribution because it was a contribution, as it were,
20 to international stability ...

21 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Can we just try to pinpoint this
22 influence and going back to the things that we have
23 heard, possibly our peak influence was in the summer of
24 2002, encouraging President Bush to move to the
25 Security Council to set in motion the negotiations which

1 led to Resolution 1441. But at that stage, we hadn't
2 announced -- or made it clear or did anything overt
3 about having this very large force. So at this moment
4 of peak influence, that was not the critical factor the
5 size of our force. Is that fair?

6 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: I recall that the Parliamentary debate on
7 the issues surrounding Iraq took place on 25 September.
8 This was when, I think, British public
9 opinion, Parliamentary opinion, was beginning to be
10 engaged and, remember, the dossier was published, the
11 infamous dossier, on 24 September.

12 So I think by that stage, there was a much more
13 general sense of these large-scale contributions.

15 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: I am not sure that is actually true,
16 is it, that a decision had been made on the size of the
17 force --

18 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: I'm not suggesting a decision had been
19 made. I'm suggesting that these were the planning
20 issues that were being considered.

21 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: By that time, by the end
22 of September, the President made his commitment, and
23 then, is it not the case, as we move into October, that
24 it actually, for the reasons that Lord Boyce has given,
25 becomes more difficult to take a decision to commit to

1 a large-scale force, precisely because we are into these
2 negotiations in the Security Council and the
3 Prime Minister does not want it to appear that we are
4 directing military discussions. Is that fair?

5 LORD BOYCE: Yes.

6 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: I'm sorry, I should correct myself. I'm
7 not sure if I gave the wrong impression. I was talking
8 about within the UK, why we should consider
9 a large-scale contribution. I wasn't talking about
10 publicly announcing one. That was a different point.

11 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: So we are talking about within
12 government there is a discussion going on about this,
13 but there is no decision reached in September or October
14 that this is necessarily the way that we should go.

15 What were the other reasons? Was it only because of
16 the political perceptions -- the political signals that
17 the government didn't want to give, the problems of the
18 firemen's strike and stretch? Were there other reasons
19 why there might have been reluctance to do more than
20 option 2, than package 2?

21 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: Well, I think, the first reason in
22 addition to what we have said, was the lack of clarity
23 of the overall plans still at that point. I think the
24 Chiefs of Staff were very assiduous throughout this
25 period of always asking whether, in the discussions with

1 the United States, contingent discussions, I repeat, the
2 US had "a winning concept".

3 I think that was a consideration which the Chiefs of
4 Staff kept in mind throughout the period. So one point
5 was that unless and until the Chiefs of Staff were
6 satisfied there was a winning concept -- and remember,
7 we were talking about aftermath or the day after as well
8 as the actual operation itself -- then obviously there
9 was a reservation.

10 There was also a reservation because we did not
11 have, at that stage, clarity -- in fact, we never got
12 it -- as to the Turkish attitude to a plan involving us
13 in the north.

14 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: I want to come on to that in
15 a moment. What about cost? Is that a factor or did you
16 believe that you would have the money to do whatever was
17 necessary?

18 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: This is one of my crosses as
19 Permanent Secretary. I should say two things very
20 quickly. There was never any suggestion throughout the
21 operation, planning or conducting it, that the Treasury
22 was withholding the necessary funding to achieve the
23 mission.

24 The problem was a different one, which was
25 withholding the necessary funding to actually fund the

1 MOD as a whole in the normal budgetary planning process.
2 So there were two very separate issues, but at no stage
3 did the Treasury deny or withhold funding for this
4 particular operation. The problem was a more basic one
5 about the defence budget as a whole.

6 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: So you were allowed to do the
7 operation, but you had to find the money from your own
8 resources?

9 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: Not at all, the money was provided as
10 additional to the defence budget. It was just the
11 defence budget itself was too small, but, you know,
12 I find it difficult to be saying this, but at no stage
13 did the Chancellor of the Exchequer withhold the
14 resources necessary to carry out the operation.

15 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: I'm sure that will be fully
16 reported.

17 Can you say something a bit more about this question
18 of influence as a factor in British military planning?
19 Because, is it assumed that if we had just gone for the
20 package 2, which would have not been a trivial thing,
21 which would have been quite a substantial commitment by
22 the UK, that that would not have brought influence?

23 After all, the Australians didn't provide that much,
24 but they seem to have got a certain amount of influence
25 and kudos with the Americans from what they did. We're

1 a different sort of power to the Australians, but is
2 there a direct relationship between the size of force
3 and the amount of influence?

4 LORD BOYCE: I am not sure the Australians did have any
5 influence. They certainly got a lot of kudos from the
6 Americans and they were very grateful for their
7 contribution. I don't think they were as heavily
8 involved in the planning process as we were.

9 Also -- although you might say the final outcome
10 didn't indicate it -- we had quite a lot of influence
11 with regards to what was called Phase 4, all the
12 aftermath planning as well, as a result of the size of
13 our contribution.

14 Another aspect of our contribution, of course, is
15 that, having something on a large-scale size would allow
16 us, as it actually happened, to take over a region of
17 the country rather than being integrated with the
18 American force in the aftermath process, which is how we
19 finished up with southeastern Iraq.

20 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: But at the moment -- I want to come
21 on to that in a second -- we are still looking at the
22 north.

23 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: Can I just add there, if I may,
24 Sir Lawrence, I think we learned in 1990, again with
25 Desert Storm, that unless and until one had, as it were,

1 to use the crude term, boots on the ground, one did not
2 have serious influence on American planning.

3 In 1990, we learned that, once we committed
4 ourselves to a ground force contribution, the planning
5 process opened completely to us and we were able to
6 influence it, and that experience, I think, still
7 influenced the way we thought in the run-up to this
8 operation, that unless and until we had ground force
9 commitments, we did not have the inside track on
10 planning or influence on the day after or the general
11 conduct of affairs, including, of course, holding the
12 Americans to a multilateral track and holding them to
13 exhausting the arms control route and trying to deal
14 with this through disarmament.

15 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Is it fair to say that throughout
16 this period -- we are now well into 2002, coming to the
17 end of it -- that Downing Street was reluctant to
18 authorise the full planning for the large package?

19 LORD BOYCE: The authorisation for the full package came
20 once the United Nations Security Council had been passed
21 in November, mid November. Once that process had
22 finished and culminated in the successful achievement of
23 that resolution, then we
24 were able to go totally overt and get on with starting
25 implementing the planning.

1 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: That was going overt on the planning
2 even just in terms of choosing between particular
3 options. My understanding from the documents would be
4 that Downing Street's view was that you should certainly
5 plan and keep the large-scale option in place, talk
6 about it, but that there was no particular decision in
7 favour of that as opposed to option 2.

8 Is that fair? Sir Kevin is nodding.

9 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: I think that's correct.

10 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Thank you. Can I just ask again
11 a process question? When did the Chiefs of Staff start
12 to discuss this? Because you indicated to start with,
13 it was a very tightly held cell. When was this issue
14 discussed with the full Chiefs of Staff for the first
15 time?

16 LORD BOYCE: Going into Iraq?

17 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Yes.

18 LORD BOYCE: Right from the very start. The individual
19 Chiefs of Staff were engaged in this, but only a very
20 small team outside the actual Chiefs of Staff
21 themselves.

22 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Was this discussed at the Chiefs of
23 Staff Committee?

24 LORD BOYCE: I can't remember when it was on the agenda of
25 the Chiefs of Staff's Committee. It would probably have

1 been in May/June.

2 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: I have had a privilege of looking at
3 all the documents on the Falklands. So I have read
4 Chiefs of Staff's Committee meetings before, and one
5 becomes aware of different services having different
6 views on the nature of military operations and the role
7 that they would like to play in them.

8 Were the chiefs of one mind on this potential
9 operation or were there different emphases amongst the
10 chiefs?

11 LORD BOYCE: I don't think anyone was, for example,
12 suggesting we should only have an air contribution or
13 only have a naval contribution. It was seen as being
14 a contribution of land, air and maritime.

15 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: With the large army option, the
16 option 3, the divisional option, what was the view of
17 the army of this? Were they reluctant to be taking on
18 yet another commitment or were they nervous about being
19 left out what may be the most important military
20 campaign of the period?

21 LORD BOYCE: I don't recall there being any reluctance from
22 the Chief of General Staff notwithstanding the problems
23 we had with the other two services, by the way, in
24 delivering the fire-fighting requirement. There were,
25 of course, sailors and airmen also involved, but I don't

1 recall the Chief General Staff being reluctant to get on
2 and plan for his contribution to the large-scale effort.

3 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Because it had been the opposite, he
4 was indeed quite enthusiastic?

5 LORD BOYCE: No, I think it was just a professional
6 judgment. This was an option which he could deliver.

7 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: As Permanent Secretary, I attended Chiefs
8 of Staff meetings. At no stage, frankly, did I feel
9 that there was an effort, as it were, by the military
10 establishment to drive the agenda. The only issue was,
11 as CDS said, that if politicians wanted certain options,
12 you had to have enough time to prepare for them,
13 otherwise they wouldn't be there. That was the only
14 pressure. There was never an ambition on the military
15 side to actually do more than was appropriate to support
16 a possible operation. Whether that was the case in the
17 United States, I can't say.

18 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: So this leads us in, I think, to the
19 question of the north option, as it were, and its
20 viability. The idea of coming through Turkey seems to
21 have been around from quite early on in the process.

22 Where did the idea come from? Was it a suggestion
23 by the Americans or was it coming from us looking at the
24 map and thinking, "This is where we would like to go
25 from"?

1 LORD BOYCE: It was, to a certain extent, American-driven,
2 but there is a NATO plan to go through Turkey, a dormant
3 plan, if you like, so I think there was something
4 already in being which could be dusted off and reshaped
5 to deal with this particular operation. So, as I said,
6 the thing was already there from what existed already
7 in NATO planning.

8 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Could you give us just some
9 indication of how thinking on the northern option then
10 developed from quite an early stage in the spring
11 through the year? What was the American view of the
12 northern option? Because in the end, of course --

13 LORD BOYCE: The American view, held right until March 20,
14 was that they wanted the country taken, and it was from the north
but
15 we were in total doubt about whether or not Turkey was
16 going to provide permission to do this, right through
17 until, finally, I recommended to the Secretary of State
18 that we should stop trying to get through Turkey, which
19 was about, actually, the end of the year, in December.
20 In fact, we were sailing some ships not knowing whether
21 they'd turn left or turn right when they got into the
22 Mediterranean.

23 We kept on hoping that Turkey would allow this
24 option to be allowed to happen, and as far as the Americans
25 are concerned, as you know, the Fourth Infantry Division

1 was held poised on Turkey right until after the war
2 actually started - which led, in fact, to the
3 contribution on March 20 being significantly more by the
4 UK than America ever envisaged. In fact, crucial to the
5 start of the war on 20 March. Because the
6 Fourth Infantry Division had not been allowed to go
7 through Turkey and then had to be redeployed to come
8 through the south, which took some weeks.

9 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: The alternative to the northern
10 option was the southern option, which was the one we
11 eventually took. Why were we not just looking at that
12 during the course of 2002? Was this seriously weighed
13 as an alternative?

14 LORD BOYCE: We were focused on our contribution which was through the
15 north. There was, of course, a southern component of
16 the battle plan, and, of course, we actually executed
17 part of that ourselves in terms of our amphibious
18 assault on the Al Faw peninsula. That was in the early
19 part. So there was always going to be something
20 happening in the south. It wasn't just going to be
21 exclusively something done from the north.

22 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: What were the reasons why the
23 military advice appeared to be to stressing the north
24 rather than the south, because this was clearly an
25 option? Sir Kevin?

1 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: Are you talking about the UK forces or
2 the coalition?

3 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: No, from the UK forces.

4 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: I don't think there was a particular
5 UK dimension to that, unless -- I mean, it was the case
6 obviously that this was a very sensitive area in
7 relation to the Kurds and the Turks and the notion of
8 fixing, as it were, Saddam's forces moving north and
9 preventing a humanitarian disaster, which would have
10 happened if Saddam Hussein had moved his troops into the
11 Kurdish area again. That was something which the UK had
12 particular concerns about. I can't recall it informing
13 as it were, military planning directly, but it was
14 something which, at the political level, we recognised
15 very actively.

16 The second point, I think, was that we had been
17 flying the northern No Fly Zone. Now, we have not talked
18 about the problems of the No Fly Zones, although there
19 was a strong military dimension, but in the build-up to
20 these issues, - the loss of containment, if you will, - there was an
increased
21 threat of being shot down, as we flew over the
22 No Fly Zones, as Saddam Hussein got more clever in the
23 way he disposed his anti-aircraft capabilities,
24 so we had an interest there; and, of course, one
25 was very alive to the fact that the northern oil fields

1 were very vulnerable.

2 Now, of course, there have been some people who have
3 argued that oil was at the bottom of it all. That was
4 completely untrue, but it was very clear in planning
5 that it was important to secure the oil fields both in
6 the north and in the south, very early on, to prevent
7 Saddam Hussein firing them and causing an environmental
8 and a humanitarian disaster, but also to preserve the
9 resources necessary for rebuilding Iraq afterwards.

10 So there were very strong reasons for a force to, as
11 it were, fix the north, and strong reasons, therefore,
12 for the UK to regard that as an appropriate role for us
13 to help with.

14 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Go through those sort of same issues
15 with the south. Clearly, the southern No Fly Zone had
16 been more difficult than the northern No Fly Zone, far
17 more anti-aircraft activity and politically more
18 controversial. So part of what you were saying, just to
19 clarify, is that we were more comfortable operating in
20 the north than in the south?

21 LORD BOYCE: I think that's correct and it's also true that we
22 felt we would be more compatible with the
23 Fourth Infantry Division than with the other American
24 divisions. So the mix would be better with that
25 commitment as well.

1 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Clearly there were oil fields in the
2 south as well as the north. So that factor wouldn't
3 have been so appropriate.

4 Were there other reasons, more negative, why we were
5 concerned about going through the south?

6 LORD BOYCE: I think we were concerned about the fact it is
7 a relatively small area in which to actually insert,
8 and, of course it obviously, it depends hugely on the
9 host nation support. The same for Turkey too, for
10 that matter, which, of course -- Kuwait would only gain
11 when the time came, but Kuwait is a relatively small
12 state in which to insert a couple of divisions of armour
13 and infantry.

14 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: What were the differences in force
15 generation terms? You said, looking at the documents
16 from the end of -- late 2002, there is a sort of concern
17 that it is going to take us much longer to get to the
18 south. Was that the view -- do you have a recollection
19 of that view?

20 LORD BOYCE: The force we would have to deploy in the same
21 way; in other words, by sea, but it would obviously be
22 quicker to go through the eastern Mediterranean than all
23 the way round through the Gulf.

24 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Just to conclude, with the -- let me
25 clarify again on the discussions with the Americans on

1 these different options.

2 The Americans presumably were aware of the potential
3 problems -- they were real problems, they didn't seem to
4 be able to make up their mind. So were we concerned
5 that we had to develop another option? When did we
6 start looking at the south as an alternative?

7 LORD BOYCE: I guess the latter part of 2002. Certainly we
8 were developing a southern option and talking over
9 threats, you know, "If we can't get Turkey, what shall
10 we do instead?", and that process was starting
11 in December, at least in December 2002.

12 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Which was quite late in the day as
13 things turned out.

14 LORD BOYCE: Yes.

15 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: I mean, I think the issue of, "Could we
16 go in through Turkey or not?", was going backwards and
17 forwards for some time. There was lack of clarity for
18 quite a long while, mainly because the Turks had had an
19 election and it wasn't at all clear how the new
20 Turkish Government would behave and their Parliamentary
21 processes were just coming into place.

22 So I think during December, as I recall it, the
23 Chiefs of Staff began looking at, more actively, the
24 southern option, but it wasn't until early January that
25 it was absolutely blocked off for us, because I remember

1 visiting Ankara with the Secretary of State for Defence,
2 with Geoff Hoon to make one final effort to clarify what
3 was going on, because, of course, it was vital for the
4 United States as well. They needed rights there, and
5 even if we were not going to put land forces there, we
6 needed overflight rights for aircraft and supplies in
7 any case. So there was a coalition requirement as well.

8 But I think during the course of late November
9 into December, it became increasingly difficult to rely
10 on the northern option, and, by the end of December,
11 I think CDS said he'd decided that he needed to plan for
12 the other option.

13 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Thank you.

14 THE CHAIRMAN: I think we are heading towards a break, but,
15 before I do, can I ask my other colleagues if they would
16 like to ask a question.

17 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Could I ask a question? Thank you,
18 Chairman.

19 Sir Kevin, you said earlier that you were trying to
20 deepen your engagement to influence the United States,
21 but they were difficult to influence because the States
22 were rather dysfunctional in terms of laying down your
23 conditions and so on. But during that process of your
24 political engagement on policy matters, did you realise
25 that the USA had taken the conditions laid down,

1 something that was desirable but not essential, and that
2 they had taken our commitment for granted? Because we
3 heard from Sir Christopher Meyer that they were hearing
4 the "yes", but not the "buts". Was that your
5 understanding when you were engaging with them?

6 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: Two things, if I may. I think the first
7 reason certainly for me going in to see them in July was
8 to be absolutely clear whether they were determined
9 to proceed on a military track. It was not clear at
10 that point.

11 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: It wasn't inevitable?

12 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: "Inevitable" is the wrong word, but until
13 then, I don't think we were absolutely clear what the
14 Americans intended to do and how serious they were about
15 planning for a military operation. That was one of the
16 reasons for going, to try to satisfy my own mind.
17 I think at that stage there were others going in there,
18 too, for the same purpose.

19 The second was, again one has to understand that
20 there were different groups at work in Washington, with
21 different views. I think if you were to talk to the
22 State Department, as I did, to Armitage, he would have
23 said, "Your conditions are absolutely right. Thank
24 goodness you have brought them forward. We will help
25 work with them. You have our full support. Thank you

1 for helping us". I think that was the view of the
2 State Department right through.

3 I think to the neo-conservatives, who had a great
4 deal of idealism on their side, they felt that this was
5 not necessary. They felt that there was
6 already authority through UN Security Council
7 Resolution 687 for military action should Saddam fail to
8 comply. They believed he was not complying. They
9 believed that he would continue to deceive the arms
10 control inspectors whatever we did with the new
11 resolution and that this was not necessary, and that
12 actually Iraq would fall quite easily because they were
13 listening very carefully to the exiles, to Mr Chalabi,
14 to Allawi, who, in their judgment, were indicating that
15 so long as Saddam Hussein were removed then a flowering
16 of democracy would occur in Iraq and the exiles would
17 return and be able to take over government without undue
18 difficulty.

19 They had a deep faith in the natural democratic
20 nature of man, which perhaps proved to be a little
21 over-optimistic.

22 Then there was a third group, perhaps, who felt that
23 the military act was quite straightforward and one
24 shouldn't agonise too much over it, and that US vital
25 interests were so deeply engaged, that was the

1 overriding consideration.

2 I would just reinforce what people
3 have said earlier in this Inquiry, that the effect of
4 9/11 was absolutely massive on the American people,
5 absolutely fundamental. It was worse than Pearl Harbour
6 in a way, and they felt that never again would they
7 watch a dictator build up a military capability with
8 weapons of mass destruction and be able to choose the
9 timing and the nature of an attack. This was the
10 pre-emption philosophy, and the American thinking at
11 that stage was that this was such an overriding concern
12 they were not prepared to sit back and allow it to
13 happen. They would take action beforehand.

14 That stream of thinking was very, very strong, so we
15 were competing with three rather different views:
16 a rather simplistic military approach, on the one hand;
17 a deeply ingrained view about the need for pre-emption
18 and the fact that things had been allowed to go on for
19 too long already, and that one needed to act militarily;
20 and the third one was very much in line with our own
21 views about the importance of exhausting the arms
22 control track, achieving disarmament through
23 negotiation, multilateral approaches, and a very clear
24 view about the effort that would be required after the
25 invasion to rebuild Iraq. So, in July, one was right in

1 the middle of these issues, and I think the British view
2 was that we had the opportunity to shape thinking in
3 Washington in a positive, multilateral direction, and
4 that we felt that we were making some progress but not
5 complete progress.

6 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: But my understanding is that we were
7 sceptical about the role the dissidents would play, we
8 were more concerned about the aftermath, and against the
9 background, we were sceptical about the approach and
10 that they would be trying to influence and lay
11 conditions.

12 Do you think we concentrated too much on influencing
13 and not negotiating hard on the conditions?

14 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: I think that's very difficult to answer.
15 I think you have heard from others and it could only be
16 a personal view. I think you have to also -- one also
17 has to build into the mix the view that certainly,
18 I think, the Prime Minister felt that, you know, this
19 was the right thing to do. It wasn't simply a question
20 of -- certainly there wasn't a question of poodling to
21 the Americans, but that the importance of disarmament
22 was paramount, and if it meant one had to take military
23 action, then so be it, albeit with the conditions which
24 we imposed.

25 It is very easy to say, with the benefit of

1 hindsight, "Well, perhaps we should have pushed harder".
2 I certainly didn't have the impression that we weren't
3 pushing hard. We all were pushing as hard as we could
4 all the way through.

5 LORD BOYCE: I think, if I may, Chairman, there are two
6 particular questions I have left hanging. I want to
7 re-emphasise the efforts we made to try and tell the
8 Americans that we were not committed until the
9 UN process had been completed, and then, later on
10 in March, until the Parliamentary process had gone, and
11 we must remember that, in context in which we were
12 operating, we had behind us, if you like, an alliance in
13 Afghanistan, and the fact that we were working with
14 American forces in Kosovo and as far back as the first war
15 in Iraq in the early 1990s; and, as I said earlier on,
16 when we said, "We will go through the planning, but we
17 are not committed until we are committed", the shutters
18 came down. They just did not believe it, because they
19 did not want to and it wasn't really until about March that
20 Rumsfeld finally got it, and Myers got it, and he had
21 that outburst saying, "If you don't want to come, we
22 will do it on our own", if you recall, and indeed,
23 having got it, that's when they realised the truth and they'd
24 only got the Parliamentary aspect of it, you know,
25 would Parliament approve or not, with Myers was sitting on

1 a phone, with me at the other end of it, waiting for the
2 outcome of the vote in Parliament on, whenever it was,
3 17 March. So that's one important point.

4 The other point on influence and aftermath, I had
5 numerous numbers of meetings with very senior people
6 in the Pentagon, meaningful people, where we were trying
7 to stress the importance of actually getting the right
8 sort of planning in to Phase 4 for the aftermath, and
9 where, by the way, they had discarded the
10 State Department's advice, and indeed people, in the
11 early part of 2003, and I could not get across to them
12 the fact that this would not be seen that the
13 coalition would not be seen as a liberation force where
14 flowers would be stuck at the end of rifles and
15 that they would be welcomed and it would all be lovely.

16 When I said, "This is not going to happen. There
17 may be six hours of euphoria, but not much after that",
18 this was absolutely not accepted, and I think, as far as
19 the Pentagon was concerned, both the civilians in the
20 Pentagon and the uniforms, they just thought that Iraq
21 would be fine on the day, that, having knocked
22 Saddam Hussein down, that the place suddenly the
23 following day would be a lovely democracy and everybody
24 would be happy. It was one of the reasons why they were so
25 terribly under-resourced in boots on the ground after

1 the victory was achieved.

2 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

3 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: I have a question arising from that.

4 As a result of the UK's expected contribution, from the
5 United States' perspective, and their knowledge of our
6 planning, despite the conditions, was there a point in
7 time before 17 March at which they could not in fact go
8 it alone?

9 LORD BOYCE: Yes. Well, yes on the day of 20 March.

10 Because of the Turkish situation, the Fourth Infantry
11 Division was held up in the north, and, on 20 March,
12 when we finally went to war, by that time our air effort
13 was totally integrated with that of the American forces.

14 So to have suddenly withdrawn, at that stage, would
15 have absolutely definitely required a major reshaping of
16 the air battle plan which was not trivial. I mean, it
17 would have been a very huge task and would have taken
18 many days.

19 When we went into Iraq, on 20 March, we had a third
20 of the armoured power of the invasion force, without
21 which the Americans could not have invaded on 20 March,
22 in my opinion, not if they had taken seriously, which
23 they did the theoretical threat that the Iraqi divisions
24 posed.

25 So, yes, they could have gone on their own, but it

1 would have taken some time before the Fourth Infantry
2 Division came down. They would have had to delayed some
3 days, if not weeks, before they had been ready to go on
4 their own. They could not have gone on 20 March, is my
5 very firm view.

6 THE CHAIRMAN: I think that's a good moment to break. We
7 will break for about ten minutes. So I ask those in the
8 room, if you do go out, please come back in ten minutes,
9 because then we will have to shut the door and that will
10 be it for the rest of the morning?

11 Thank you very much.

12 (10.30 am)

13 (Short break)

14 (10.49 am)

15 THE CHAIRMAN: Can I begin with an apology both to our
16 witnesses and those in the room. The microphone
17 problems, we hope they have been somewhat mitigated, but
18 we will just have to do our best and struggle on, I am
19 afraid. Thank you for your indulgence.

20 Resuming the questioning, then, Sir Roderic?

21 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Lord Boyce, I would like to take us up
22 now to the situation, essentially the outbreak of the
23 military campaign, on 20 March 2003.

24 We had ended up deploying a very large force,
25 stretching ourselves, as we noted earlier, quite close

1 to our limits and we had had to assemble, equip and
2 deploy this force in a much shorter timescale than the
3 Chiefs of Staff would have wished or had originally said
4 was the minimum necessary period. So that was quite an
5 achievement.

6 We had also had to make a late change of plan, from
7 planning to come in from the north to the southern
8 option, which we have discussed at some length, and as
9 a result of this, it was all a bit of a rush.

10 For example, I understand that Seventh Brigade
11 didn't reach full operating capability until 19 March,
12 the day before things actually started to happen.

13 What were the consequences for us of having to act
14 in this rush? Were, for example, the command and
15 control arrangements fully in place? Had they been
16 fully coordinated with the American commanders? Were
17 our own commanders entirely clear on their role, on what
18 they were being asked to do? Had there been time for
19 our forces to train properly? Had there been time for
20 them to acclimatise? Were they fully equipped?

21 We have had, as you know, I'm sure, a number of
22 meetings with families of people who died in the
23 conflict and some of them have expressed very strong
24 concerns about equipment; for example, about body
25 armour. Did our units have sufficient ammunition? Did

1 they have the right boots? Had they, in general, been
2 given what in MoD parlance I think is called, UORs, the
3 urgent operational requirements? Had they been given
4 the modifications that they required to operate in
5 desert conditions?

6 LORD BOYCE: First of all, in terms of preparation and
7 readiness in the sort of command and control sense, it
8 is important to realise that a couple of events happened
9 in 2001, which significantly helped towards people's
10 readiness. We had, I think, an exercise called
11 "Exercise Saif Sareea", which was an exercise conducted
12 in Oman early on in 2001 before September, which had
13 given excellent battle training to a large force, which
14 actually was a desert operation in Oman a desert
15 exercise in Oman, which involved air and naval units as
16 well.

17 Secondly, in December of 2002, we had in 2002,
18 taken part in an exercise which was called "Internal
19 Look" in Qatar. It was a full-scale sort of
20 Command Headquarters rehearsal, if you like, where the
21 Prime Minister said that he was happy for us to go along
22 and take part in that exercise - again without saying
23 that we would finally be committed to actually taking
24 part in an operation in due course - but, by having
25 actually done that exercise, working alongside the

1 Americans, we had our command and control sorted out and
2 rehearsed as late as December.

3 The other aspect which you mentioned about, "What
4 effect did the late change in plan have, as regards to
5 our preparedness?", one of the conditions - perhaps too
6 strong a word, but one of the conditions about our
7 shifting from north to south was that the Americans
8 pulled out all the stops to help us in the logistics
9 sense, and in a number of other ways as well, which
10 would have been difficult for us to drive up to speed,
11 to get up to the full capability that we would have
12 liked on our own.

13 So part of the deal, if you like, of coming south
14 was that the Americans gave us a lot of support that
15 otherwise we would have had to do ourselves. So I felt
16 pretty confident in terms of our battle readiness in the
17 command and control sense, and also, to a large
18 extent because the lessons that came out Saif Sareea were
19 enormously helpful in giving us an understanding of what
20 we should actually be ready for, in terms of a desert
21 campaign, tied together with the lessons we had learned
22 from the first Iraq war back in the 1990s.

23 Insofar as the preparedness of the forces, the
24 British forces, were concerned with the invasion, first
25 of all, so far as the Air Force were concerned, they had

1 been involved in No Fly Zone operations and had been
2 doing a lot of operational work for years. So I was
3 pretty confident about them.

4 The amphibious force was in place as early
5 as January and reached operational capability
6 in February, and I was pretty confident about that,
7 because they were taking on the south-east corner of the
8 campaign, if you like, on the Al Faw peninsula.

9 So far as the armoured division was concerned, you
10 are right, they didn't reach full operational capability
11 until March, but, as I say, because of Saif Sareea,
12 because of the lessons we had learned from that, because
13 of what we had done in Internal Look, when they actually
14 did achieve that full operational capability in March,
15 I was pretty confident that they were actually ready, in
16 terms of understanding what they had to do, the job that
17 lay ahead of them.

18 In terms of equipment, you are absolutely right that
19 the late stage at which I was finally given authority to
20 start mobilising the Logistics Organisation to get the
21 equipment delivered that we needed left us with some
22 very short timelines, but the force readiness those units which
23 were going to the front of the front line on 20 March,
24 I am confident were properly equipped.

25 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Right down to the sort of details

1 I mentioned --

2 LORD BOYCE: Yes --

3 SIR RODERIC LYNE: -- like body armour, boots and so on?

4 LORD BOYCE: -- I'm not familiar with the detail of things

5 such as body armour. The unfortunate thing about going

6 to war is that some people are going to get killed.

7 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Had they also had time to train in the

8 right conditions?

9 LORD BOYCE: As I have mentioned, they had had Saif Sareea

10 anyway, and so there was --

11 SIR RODERIC LYNE: But not necessarily the people who were

12 actually there would have taken part in those

13 operations.

14 LORD BOYCE: I don't know what the numbers were of who had

15 done Saif Sareea, who were actually deployed in Kuwait

16 in 2003.

17 SIR RODERIC LYNE: If I can put it another way, if, in ideal

18 conditions, you were preparing for an operation like

19 this, would you have deployed the land force sooner to

20 give it more time to train on the ground or to

21 acclimatise or to make sure that it had all the right

22 equipment in the right places?

23 LORD BOYCE: My advice was that they had had sufficient time

24 to make themselves ready.

25 SIR RODERIC LYNE: And the equipment was in the right

1 places?

2 LORD BOYCE: Yes.

3 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Sir Kevin, do you want to comment on
4 this?

5 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: Perhaps I could. In addition to what CDS
6 has said -- and I keep referring to him as "CDS" because
7 we spent quite an intensive time together in 2002 and
8 2003 -- the process of generating operational
9 requirements was one which attracted the highest level
10 of attention in the Ministry of Defence, by which I mean
11 we put in place a system of tracking the progress of
12 these 250 different programmes weekly, and this was
13 overseen by the Minister for Defence Procurement,
14 Lord Bach, and he personally would chase this through
15 with these weekly reports, in conjunction with the
16 Vice-Chief of Defence Staff. So we did put in place
17 a rigorous system to ensure that these orders
18 to industry came through.

19 It was indeed a very complex and complicated process
20 because it was a question of getting them from industry,
21 getting them into the UK end, as it were, modifying some
22 in the UK, sometimes having to send them out to theatre,
23 training the necessary forces and managing a very
24 complex supply chain.

25 So as far as those 250 urgent operational

1 requirements were concerned, they were actually
2 basically all completed in time. Some of them were for
3 follow-on forces which did not need actually to be fitted
4 and fully trained on day one. A proportion of them
5 were, as it were, for the later stages, the so-called
6 day after activities, which helped in a sense in
7 timescales.

8 Turning to individual items, I have to say the
9 press almost treated it like a sport, trying to find
10 reasons for criticism; but enhanced combat body armour
11 was an issue, and just to give you an illustration, for
12 example, in the weekly urgent operational requirement
13 update on 28 February we knew that 25,000 had been
14 delivered, with deliveries rising to 14,000 a week,
15 basically we then had something like a target of 33,000.

16 The problem of things like enhanced combat body
17 armour was that, ultimately, these were judgments made
18 by the commanders in the field as to what they needed in
19 order to have full operational capability.

20 They had the role, because only they could finally
21 judge, as to whether what actually got through to their
22 forces on the ground was sufficient for them to claim
23 that they had that capability. It was a bottom-up set
24 of decision-making which enabled the military commanders
25 in the end to say they were ready.

1 So on the one hand, there was a very serious
2 top-down approach, and it was necessary, because not
3 everything that was said to be there was there. So we
4 had to keep chasing this through. At the other end, at
5 the field commander level, there was a judgment as to
6 what he needed to actually get his troops fully in
7 position.

8 I recall the biggest difficulty we had with these
9 issues was actually our NBC protection, nuclear,
10 biological and chemical protection. We found
11 some of the equipment was outdated, with expiry dates
12 and that sort of thing, and we had to put a lot of work
13 in making sure we got that into place sufficiently.

14 So I mean, I wouldn't want to give the impression
15 that this was not a very intensive process. It was
16 indeed, and at the end of the day there was a colour
17 coding system, red, amber, green and until all the force
18 commanders on the ground felt that they were green, they
19 did not have full operational capability and would not
20 be in a position to signal they were ready to start.
21 They all did signal that they were ready.

22 SIR RODERIC LYNE: So you are saying it was for the
23 commanders in the field to decide what they needed.
24 They said that they were ready.

25 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: Yes, priorities were allocated according

1 to the requirements in theatre.

2 SIR RODERIC LYNE: When they were debriefed after they
3 completed their tours of duty, were they still saying
4 that they had had the right equipment at the right time
5 in the right places?

6 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: The impression I had was that, overall,
7 that was the case. That doesn't mean to say there
8 weren't individual cases where people said they hadn't.

9 I think the biggest problem we had was with the
10 tracking systems to actually ensure we knew exactly what
11 was where, when; and that consignments that were sent
12 actually arrived in time to be fielded properly. That
13 system was not fully effective.

14 The speed and the volumes involved were massive.
15 I think the best way of expressing it is that we got the
16 same amount of equipment into the same theatre as we had
17 in Desert Storm in 1990 in half the time. So this was
18 a massive effort and I can't say that everything was
19 absolutely perfect. It obviously wasn't. But my sense
20 was -- and I have read some reports since then -- that
21 selectively you will find complaints and problems, but
22 overall the force was properly equipped.

23 SIR RODERIC LYNE: So selectively or individually some
24 complaints and problems. Overall, properly equipped.
25 Some problems with the tracking systems.

1 Now, did the problems with the tracking systems
2 mean, for example, that there were types of equipment
3 that we knew we had in theatre but we couldn't find or
4 that were not in the same place as the personnel who
5 needed them? Did that happen at all?

6 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: I think it must have happened on
7 occasions, yes. The volumes were extremely high. As
8 I say, the amount of equipment that went through was
9 absolutely enormous in a relatively short space of time.
10 That doesn't mean to say that the troops were not
11 properly equipped to deliver their missions.

12 SIR RODERIC LYNE: This obviously was an extremely large
13 operation conducted at much shorter notice than you
14 wished, so one would not have expected it, perhaps, to
15 be as good as the picture which you have just given us,
16 which is a picture in which, overall, you say it worked
17 extremely well.

18 As you know, one of the main objectives of this
19 Inquiry is to see what lessons need to be learnt from
20 Iraq. Did you draw the conclusion from this, both of
21 you, that our systems had worked in the way that they
22 were intended to work without any significant problems?

23 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: No, because there already had been
24 extensive public hearings about logistics issues arising
25 from the operation in the House of Commons Defence

1 Committee, in the Public Accounts Committee. So it is
2 a matter of public record which perhaps we needn't go
3 over in detail here.

4 SIR RODERIC LYNE: We have read it, but I think it is useful
5 to embrace it in the record of this. We are being asked
6 to look right across the board at the eight-year period.

7 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: My point is only that I haven't refreshed
8 my memory in complete detail on all of those issues,
9 but, of course, lessons were learned and our asset
10 tracking system was not up to the task of coping with
11 the volume and the variety and the speed in an ideal
12 world.

13 As I say, that is not the same as saying that the
14 military commanders did not have all they needed to have
15 full operational capability. You will, I know, be
16 taking evidence from the military commanders. So it
17 will be up to them to give their own views. I think
18 another calculation, of course, is: how long do you hold
19 troops in order to ensure that they are absolutely ready
20 for an operation? It is a combination of a number of
21 factors which I'm not professionally equipped to judge.
22 All I would say is that, as the weather gets hotter, as
23 people trained get stale and need to be retrained, there
24 are other factors that come into play, as well as the
25 equipment issues. So it is a matter of judging an

1 all-round readiness state for armed forces, but, as

2 I say, I'm not a professional expert.

3 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Lord Boyce, looking at another of the
4 areas in which maybe we need to learn some lessons, did
5 you feel, as Chief of Defence Staff, that you had the
6 right form of two-way communication with the political
7 leadership in this country, with the
8 Secretary of State for Defence, and, above all, with the
9 Prime Minister?

10 Did you feel throughout this period that you were
11 fully and appropriately consulted by the Prime Minister,
12 that he was open to your advice and listening to it,
13 that you were given a clear definition of what our
14 political leaders were asking the forces under your
15 command to do and that you were given clear decisions
16 when you needed them?

17 LORD BOYCE: Yes, I was very happy about that. I saw the
18 Defence Secretary, not only daily, but more often than
19 daily, certainly as the tension was building up, and,
20 likewise, the Prime Minister I saw frequently and we
21 always had a totally open conversation.

22 My job was to present him with what the military
23 capability was, what was within our capacity to do. He
24 always listened very carefully, as did the Secretary of
25 State, and I always felt that he took on board what

1 advice I was giving him. I never felt that I was being
2 excluded from any particular consultations, as far as
3 the military end of the operation as far as the military aspect
4 of the whole issue was.

5 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Within these frank conversations, were
6 there times when you had to express serious reservations
7 or warnings to the Prime Minister about the course we
8 were heading down?

9 LORD BOYCE: I would certainly, on a number of occasions,
10 have expressed views about, for example, the holding up
11 decisions to get reserves mobilised, the decision to go
12 overt or to start allowing the preparations to be made,
13 and whatever other problems as I saw them, as they came
14 up, you know, which we would then go about solving.

15 I certainly never had any hesitation in making those
16 known, and, indeed, was taken aside from time to time to
17 say, "Can't we make it more of a half-full rather than
18 a half-empty assessment?", but my view was what I had to
19 do was provide as realistic an appraisal as possible,
20 which was what I was being asked to do and I never felt
21 I was being shut out from doing that.

22 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Lord Butler's report --

23 LORD BOYCE: Not by the Ministry anyway.

24 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Lord Butler's report took issue with the
25 style of what was called "sofa government", I think,

1 which meant that formal processes of decision-making
2 were not always being used in this period.

3 Did that bother you, or did you think the Whitehall
4 decision-making was working well?

5 LORD BOYCE: That was not my problem. I had the ear of the
6 Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and the
7 Defence Secretary, whether it was on the sofa or whether
8 it was in the Cabinet room, and I never had a problem
9 with my communication line. Whether it was a correct
10 way to do things or not is a matter for somebody else.
11 As far as getting my point across was concerned, I was
12 achieving that.

13 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Sir Kevin, did you feel that the
14 coordination of policy in Whitehall in this period
15 2002-2003 leading up to this very important decision
16 worked as well as it should have done from your long
17 experience of public service in different departments?

18 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: Thank you. I thought that within the
19 Ministry of Defence it worked extremely well. I was
20 concerned that the so-called UK inter - agency process
21 should work better. I certainly discussed this with
22 Sir David Manning in September and discussed the
23 machinery that might be brought into play to manage, as
24 it were, the wider aspects of UK planning and we --
25 I recall discussing it with him and the outcome of that

1 was, indeed -- he probably was going to do it anyway --
2 a Committee structure where there would be an inner
3 group, as it were, of Ministers, as well as the Cabinet.
4 There would be what we called the DOPC, the Overseas
5 Policy Committee, at official level, meeting regularly,
6 bringing in the various departmental interests,
7 Foreign Office, Development, Home Office, to some
8 extent, the Cabinet Office, as well as ourselves and the
9 intelligence agencies, and also a smaller group dealing
10 essentially with the more delicate intelligence
11 dimension which was running.

12 These seemed to me to be working pretty well, but
13 I was concerned to make sure that they were in place.
14 I think it was quite difficult for us to ensure that
15 other government departments were as aware as they
16 needed to be about their possible role, particularly in
17 the day after arrangements and that was my main concern.

18 Of course, that concern did continue. The
19 Foreign Office finally did go into the lead and created
20 an Iraq Planning Unit, a policy unit, which helped
21 matters considerably, but I think there was always
22 a certain concern to get all the departmental interests
23 fully behind the policy, including the way in which aid
24 was to be used.

25 LORD BOYCE: Can I just add to that, that in addition something

1 I said earlier on, but I think it is actually quite
2 important; and that is, in terms of transparency, about
3 what the military were thinking, is that at my Chiefs of
4 Staff Committee - which, as, again, the situation built
5 up was meeting more and more often - sitting at my
6 table, in addition, obviously, to the Chiefs of Staff,
7 were very senior representatives of the Foreign Office,
8 Number 10, Sir David himself would come along, and also
9 the intelligence agencies and DFID and the Home Office
10 where appropriate.

11 So the transparency of what the military were doing
12 was being heard at first hand by representatives of
13 those different departments, so they could actually take
14 back to their departments exactly what we were doing,
15 and, of course, they would input into my meeting
16 whatever their thinking was at the time, whether it was
17 the Foreign Office or the agencies or whatever the case
18 may be.

19 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: I was going to add that point because it
20 was a very important way of making sure people
21 understood the tempo of planning.

22 I think the only other thing I would say about these
23 issues is that I think by Christmas -- the end of
24 2002- when it is becoming clear that the
25 northern option wasn't going to work and we might take

1 a much bigger role in the south, and, therefore, the
2 stakes for the UK would be greater, at that stage it
3 wasn't entirely clear whether we were going to achieve
4 all of our conditions. Things had moved by that stage
5 to, you know, the issue of the second UN Security
6 Council Resolution.

7 I certainly discussed these issues very fully with
8 the Secretary of State for Defence as to whether this
9 was indeed the right point to take broader stock of
10 where we were going and make absolutely certain that the
11 government was satisfied with the course. Not to say
12 that I wasn't, it is just that I felt it was quite
13 important for Ministers to be absolutely clear that
14 planning had moved on very rapidly in the United States
15 at that stage and we needed to be clear what the
16 prospects might be.

17 I believe there was a discussion with Ministers in
18 the middle of January, which I think was very important
19 in that context.

20 SIR RODERIC LYNE: I know that both that and the aftermath
21 planning are issues which Sir Lawrence Freedman would
22 like to discuss in a little more detail in a minute, but
23 can I just ask, perhaps, a couple of final questions?

24 Lord Boyce, you said at the outset that all the way
25 through, our policy was geared to going through the

1 United Nations and it was geared, of course, to the
2 disarmament of Iraq, and that was right up to March of
3 2003. But in the end, we were in a situation in which
4 we went into this conflict without the approval of
5 a second United Nations Security Council Resolution, the
6 situation Sir Jeremy Greenstock described as being of
7 questionable legitimacy, albeit he made the distinction
8 with legality.

9 That certainly wasn't the scenario that you had
10 envisaged right along this track, as you described. Did
11 you have concerns at that point about the situation,
12 that you found yourself in, as Chief of the Defence
13 Staff and that our forces were being put into? At what
14 point along this track did you feel that we had passed
15 a point of no return?

16 LORD BOYCE: Obviously, the propriety and/or the legality of
17 what we were about to do was obviously a concern of
18 mine, not least of it, since, somewhat against my better
19 instincts, we had signed up to the ICC. I always made
20 it perfectly clear to the Prime Minister face-to-face,
21 and, indeed, to the Cabinet, that if we were invited to
22 go into Iraq, we had to have a good legal basis for
23 doing so, which obviously a second resolution would have
24 completely nailed.

25 When did I think that we were committed? I think

1 I don't know, I can't remember when it was - about the
2 11th or so of March, when it became clear that we were
3 not going to achieve a second resolution, because
4 I think it was one of the countries, maybe France, who
5 said, "Whatever is put on the table, we're going to say
6 no to". I felt that that was at a time we were actually
7 going to be committed to military action.

8 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Had we not already, long before then, got
9 ourselves so hooked on to an American policy that we
10 couldn't have unhooked ourselves?

11 LORD BOYCE: I was absolutely prepared to unhook ourselves.
12 As I said to you earlier on, up until 17 March and the
13 decision taken, you know, the debate in Parliament,
14 which was to say whether or not we should get engaged.
15 I was perfectly prepared to give an order saying, "We
16 will not go further. We will stop where we are".

17 SIR RODERIC LYNE: So you could have had your forces
18 deployed out there but you would have said, "They are
19 not going to cross the start line".

20 LORD BOYCE: Absolutely.

21 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Would that not have been very
22 humiliating?

23 LORD BOYCE: We are a democracy. If Parliament said we were
24 not to engage, we would not engage.

25 SIR RODERIC LYNE: What would it have done for our relations

1 with the United States, including our very important
2 military relationship with the United States?

3 LORD BOYCE: Pure speculation.

4 SIR RODERIC LYNE: It must have been a matter of your
5 calculations, surely?

6 LORD BOYCE: As I said earlier on, we kept on saying to the
7 Americans all the way through that there were provisos
8 about our commitment, and, towards the end, one of those
9 provisos was that Mr Blair was going to put this to
10 a full Parliament.

11 They understood absolutely that if Parliament had
12 said no, we would not be going, and what contingency
13 planning they were doing, if that were to happen, I have
14 absolutely no idea.

15 SIR RODERIC LYNE: What would your view on that be,
16 Sir Kevin?

17 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: Sorry, on?

18 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Did we have the option of pulling out
19 in March, late March, 17 March? What would have been
20 the consequences for this country, for the matters you
21 put talked about earlier, our relationship with the
22 United States, our standing in the world, if we had at
23 that point said, "We are deployed, but we are not going
24 to cross the start line"?

25 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: I think it would have depended on the

1 circumstances in which we decided we couldn't go
2 forward, and I think those circumstances were not
3 absolutely clear right until the last minute. I think
4 we made it very clear how important we regarded the UN
5 framework.

6 I put it that way because it wasn't necessarily
7 a second Security Council Resolution in all
8 circumstances. We wanted one if we could
9 possibly get one, and if we couldn't get one, the
10 reasons for failure had to have been clearly
11 unreasonable behaviour by other members of the
12 Security Council rather than a lack of general support,
13 but I think -- I think it was, you know, very clear
14 by January, that sort of time, that we had to recognise
15 that, if we were not to go to war, then there could be,
16 in certain circumstances, serious damage to the
17 bilateral relationship, not just because of the
18 bilateral relationship, but because of the multilateral
19 approach to solving international problems as opposed to
20 unilateral approaches, and that did seem an important
21 consideration., but these were views which I'm sure all
22 the individuals may have held, and they may have held
23 different ones. But the decision was to go forward, for,
24 reasons which were very clear to the
25 government and they did proceed.

1 But right up until the end, as CDS said, we were
2 making it clear to the Americans how important the
3 UN framework was and how absolutely vital the Houses of
4 Parliament vote was and the Parliamentary position was,
5 and that these were indeed vital steps for us to go
6 through before we could join, finally, the operation.

7 So in fact, it was not agreed until right at the
8 end, even though there would be serious consequences of
9 not proceeding.

10 SIR RODERIC LYNE: You said earlier that the Prime Minister
11 felt that it was the right thing to do and he said that
12 many times himself in public.

13 Do you feel that the relationship with the
14 United States was of such overriding importance from
15 a politico-military point of view that we more or less
16 had to stick with the United States, right or wrong,
17 through this exercise?

18 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: I don't think that would be a fair way of
19 putting it. I think that the question was how we could
20 influence events and play our role in international
21 management and the aftermath of this particular event,
22 and I think there was a judgment there, as to whether it
23 was better to actually continue to do that side by side
24 with the United States or whether to watch them go on by
25 themselves and face the consequences internationally of

1 that happening.

2 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Now, with the luxury of hindsight,
3 looking back on it, do you feel that that was the
4 correct judgment, that the benefits of going along with
5 the United States outweighed the drawbacks?

6 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: I wouldn't put it in that narrow context,
7 I think it was much more a question of the importance of
8 the issue itself and the overall question of
9 proliferation. This was the absolutely vital issue at
10 the centre of it all.

11 I might say -- I was looking at my own notes and
12 found that I had gone to Washington in November and
13 couldn't see very much about Iraq there. In fact,
14 I recall now that I went there for another proliferation
15 reason which was very, very engaging, very important,
16 very vital. I can't talk about it here, but the point
17 is that these questions of weapons of mass destruction
18 and proliferation were right at the top of the
19 international agenda. So that was the overriding
20 concern that was involved here.

21 Working very closely with the United States, that is
22 my background. I mean, I have spent much of my career
23 doing so. So clearly I was the sort of person to talk
24 about the importance of these things. But in terms of
25 the final decisions, I don't think they were absolutely

1 decisive. I think the decisions were taken because the
2 Prime Minister believed this was the right thing to do
3 in terms of his own interests and his own influence on
4 events.

5 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Thank you.

6 THE CHAIRMAN: Just before we move on to Sir Lawrence's
7 lines of questioning, turning to the legal issue, you
8 asked for, and got, a certificate from the
9 Attorney General that it was lawful to go forward. It
10 is in the nature of legal opinions that is they tend to
11 be complex, they tend to be caveated, there tend to be
12 arguments, but you needed a black and white certificate,
13 you asked for it, and you got it. That was it?

14 LORD BOYCE: Yes, and that wasn't new it was something which
15 I had told the Prime Minister that I would need at the
16 end of the day, long before March. This is back
17 in January when we started to commit our forces out
18 there, and, as you say, I received that assurance this was an
19 important issue particularly because of the speculation in
20 the press about the legality or otherwise and, as far as
21 I was concerned particularly for, my constituency, in other words,
22 soldier, sailors and airmen and their families had to be
23 told that what they were doing was legal. So it formed
24 the first line of my Operational Directive which
25 I signed on 20 March, and it was important for me just

my

1 to have a one-liner, because that was what was required,
2 as far as I was concerned, from the government Law
3 Officer, which, as you say, I received.

4 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Sir Lawrence?

5 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Just following on that question
6 quickly, Sir Kevin, what was your view on the importance
7 of the legal side? Lord Boyce has indicated that this
8 was not a sudden last-minute issue. When did it enter
9 your thinking as being important?

10 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: I recall writing to the Cabinet Secretary
11 in early March saying that, at that stage, it wasn't
12 possible to be precise about exactly what scenario might
13 arise, because, at that stage, we didn't know how the
14 second UN Security Council Resolution would go, you
15 know, whether it would fail to get the votes necessary,
16 whether it would be vetoed but would otherwise have
17 succeeded, whether there would be no vote, whether we
18 would get a successful second vote.

19 It wasn't clear at that point, when I wrote, what
20 the outcome would be, but I felt that things were coming
21 to a head sufficiently for me to register the
22 point, as CDS has sort of made, that we would need
23 a ministerial meeting which had the essential engagement
24 of the Attorney General -- I think I described that as
25 being crucial -- through which CDS received his legal

1 and constitutional authority.

2 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: What was the Cabinet Secretary's

3 response?

4 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: I assume he was going to do it anyway,

5 but, anyway, it happened.

6 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Can I go back a bit into the

7 decision-making? You mentioned, Sir Kevin, that there

8 were meetings in mid-January, where these issues were

9 thrashed out. The Secretary of State for Defence

10 announced to Parliament on 20 January that we were

11 sending land forces. So when, before that, was the

12 actual decision taken to send land forces before Mr Hoon

13 announced it?

14 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: I think -- I'm trying to recall back from

15 my reading of the papers. I think we were looking at

16 early January in terms of -- I think the policy

17 objectives the government had were set out to Parliament

18 on 7 January, which made it clear that the prime

19 objective was to rid Iraq of weapons of mass

20 destruction, according to the Security Council

21 Resolutions, and that 1441 gave Iraq a final opportunity

22 to comply and that military action may be necessary to

23 enforce compliance if that did not occur. So I think

24 that was the main sort of public signal.

25 I think at that stage we had still not finally

1 decided on precisely how that military involvement of
2 our own would take place and I think the announcement of
3 the actual package came out on 20 January.

4 LORD BOYCE: I think, to help a bit, I think it was back
5 in November that the Americans made a formal request for
6 our Option 3, our large-scale contribution.

7 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: At that stage, as we have discussed,
8 we were still thinking about going through Turkey, so --

9 LORD BOYCE: Oh, yes.

10 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: And we have now decided that, if we
11 are going to contribute, it will be through the south.
12 Just to refresh memories, it does seem that there was
13 a meeting on 15 January to make decisions on which
14 options we were going to actually follow. Would that
15 sort of seem right to you?

16 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: That seems right, as I say, for the
17 announcement to be made on the 20th.

18 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: So this was really quite a momentous
19 decision. Can you just give me some indication of the
20 sort of preparations that and briefings that would take
21 place so that the Prime Minister and other Ministers
22 were ready to make that decision?

23 LORD BOYCE: We had already started exposing the fact that
24 we may not be able to go through Turkey and our
25 alternative option was a southern option, and that

1 particular decision was made on 8 January, with the US
2 saying, "Take the southern option rather than the
3 northern one." But it wasn't a sort of cold shock for
4 everybody on 8 January. The Prime Minister, the Cabinet
5 and clearly the Secretary of State for Defence had, as
6 I say, been exposed to the planning we were doing --
7 provisional planning -- contingency planning we were
8 doing, should we have to go south.

9 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: So, when you met with Ministers on
10 15 January -- and again I have in mind, because I have
11 seen the papers, the comparable decisions with the
12 Falklands. There were quite extensive options papers
13 and a discussion of the operational risks, the things
14 that could go wrong. Were Ministers given a paper or
15 a briefing of that sort?

16 LORD BOYCE: That's a continuous process really. Certainly
17 as far as the defence ministers were concerned, they
18 were aware of what our plans were and what the pluses and
19 where might be the pinch points on any plan and what we
20 were doing to ensure those were mitigated as far as
21 possible.

22 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Sir Kevin?

23 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: Yes. I think there was detailed
24 submissions going at that stage from the Chiefs of Staff
25 to the Secretary of State and from the Secretary of

1 State to the Prime Minister, and that would fit in with
2 that timeframe, and I think ministers would have
3 discussed this during the 16th and the 17th. I haven't
4 got the precise details but that would be consistent
5 with the advice that was going forward.

6 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: How would you have described to
7 ministers the risks that our forces might be taking,
8 given that they have recently discovered, ministers,
9 that, instead of going through the north, we are going
10 through the south: this is a different sort of
11 operation, different types of Iraqi forces that might be
12 faced; the north is an area where the Kurds are
13 semi-autonomous, the south is not, an area still more
14 under regime control; there have been concerns about
15 chemical and biological war fare.

16 So how were these risks described to ministers at
17 this period? How serious were they shown to be?

18 LORD BOYCE: Well, it would have been done in the normal
19 sort of way. You would have done threat assessments,
20 worked out what the potential opposition forces might
21 be, their dispositions, what our capability was matched
22 against that. Some of the risk, if you like, was
23 mitigated by the fact that we were going to be operating
24 in our own area, looking after the southeast of the
25 country while the American forces drove for Baghdad. So

1 we had a very clearly defined objective in terms of an
2 area of operations.

3 There were additional problems like, for example,
4 the importance of making a very fast entry to secure the
5 oil fields, to ensure that they were not sabotaged,
6 creating some environmental problem or otherwise. That
7 was certainly one of our main thrusts, if you like, in
8 the very early days, which were different than we had in
9 the north.

10 It is a normal part of the planning process: doing
11 threat assessments, working out what the potential
12 dangers might be and then mitigating accordingly.

13 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: But ministers, presumably, would
14 have liked some sense of potential casualties, for
15 example. What numbers were we putting at risk? Were
16 they told this sort of thing?

17 LORD BOYCE: Part of the briefing process would have
18 included casualty assessments, yes.

19 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Can you recall what it was?

20 LORD BOYCE: I don't now remember what the numbers were.

21 All I know is they were a lot less; what actually
22 happened at the end of the day was significantly less
23 than what we actually thought might have happened,
24 particularly since part of our casualty assessment
25 process was that we thought, in fact we were completely

1 convinced, that we would meet at some time or other
2 chemical and biological warfare, and indeed, as you will
3 have seen from the reaction of our force on the ground
4 in Kuwait, on 20 March, when the Iraqis fired missiles
5 at us in response to the initial bombing, the first
6 reaction of everybody was to don their special
7 protective equipment; and we had various lines on the
8 map in Iraq at points where we thought that we almost
9 would certainly meet some sort of chemical or biological
10 resistance. And one of the reasons why our casualty
11 assessments were significantly lower at the end of the
12 day, of course, was we never actually met any chemical
13 or biological weapons in reality.

14 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: I think I'm being a little reticent on
15 this because I'm never quite clear how public public
16 hearings are, and one is discussing details which I
17 suspect have never been revealed publicly before.

18 THE CHAIRMAN: Can I set your mind at rest? We have the
19 opportunity of private hearings if there are matters --

20 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: I don't think there is anything
21 particularly; I'm just trying to phrase this in general
22 terms. I think, as far as casualties are concerned, the
23 assessment was that they would not be any higher than we
24 faced in the Gulf war 12 years earlier. So the figures
25 were relatively, I might say, modest. In the event,

1 they were even lower than that. The uncertainty was
2 indeed the possible use of chemical/biological weapons
3 against us. I think the original assessment was that
4 Saddam was unlikely -- but we couldn't rule it out
5 militarily -- unlikely to use them early because that
6 would weaken his image, as it were, internationally, but
7 he might use them, and we expected him to use them, as
8 a matter of last resort, which, of course, informed the
9 nature of military planning. It was one of the reasons
10 for speed and to get to places very rapidly, which might
11 be the sources of these types of things.

12 I think on other aspects there was full briefing
13 provided to ministers as to whether there was indeed
14 a winning concept now, and I think that judgment was
15 that there was indeed a winning concept, subject still
16 to questions of clarifying the legal base, to questions
17 of how, after the initial event, things would be
18 managed, and, of course, it was still contingent on the
19 political decision. I need to reinforce that point.
20 I know it has been made before.

21 But I think the advice that went to ministers was
22 that, you know, although time was short and we couldn't
23 be sure what the timeframe would be -- and of course we
24 were still at that stage politically seeking a longer
25 timeframe in terms of the UN process. But though time

1 was short, it was an acceptable period for us to be able
2 to engage in military action; and I seem to recall the Prime
Minister
3 himself asking questions at that stage about minimising
4 risks to civilians and how that could be managed in
5 terms of targeting, and in terms of a number of other
6 points.

7 There was concern at that stage whether there
8 would be intensive fighting within Baghdad, for example,
9 and whether "fortress Baghdad" was going to be an issue
10 or not. So these things were considered very carefully
11 at the time, and, as I say, I don't feel entirely
12 comfortable about going through all of the details. But
13 what Saddam would do, predicting Saddam, was an issue
14 which was considered very carefully at that stage. As
15 I said, I think it came out, as I have suggested, that
16 there would be a high risk he would use weapons of mass
17 destruction but not in the initial phase.

18 And I think we still were looking for more clarity
19 about US intentions after the event at that stage. But
20 with those sorts of caveats, we got the authorisation,
21 as it were, to go forward on planning, still subject to
22 a final political decision -- and to announce that.

23 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Just a final question on that: we
24 heard last week that intelligence had been received,
25 just a few days before the final decision, that if

1 chemical weapons did exist, they didn't appear to have
2 been assembled or ready for use. Did that percolate
3 through to you?

4 LORD BOYCE: As far as the military planning was concerned,
5 we were operating on the basis that we could encounter
6 chemical and biological weapons.

7 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: I heard that and I rushed back to look at
8 my notes to see whether I had any evidence of it and I
9 don't see anything there.

10 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Can we move to the question of
11 aftermath planning? You have both stressed the
12 importance of this quite a bit. We have heard quite
13 a lot about concerns about American aftermath planning.
14 I would be interested to know a bit more about our own.
15 What did we expect to be doing? And I would like to
16 take this back a bit into 2002, before we go right up
17 to March. We had a lot of experience of various
18 operations, where we had found out that, once you went
19 into a particular country that had suffered humanitarian
20 distress of some sort or another, it was quite difficult
21 to get out. Was that a concern of ours in thinking
22 about this operation as well?

23 LORD BOYCE: Certainly, and I think it is probably fair to
24 say we spent as many hours working on our Phase 4, on
25 aftermath planning, as we did actually on the actual

1 main battle plan of winning the war, and one of our
2 great concerns was to ensure that we retained as far as
3 possible infrastructure and also such things as the
4 Iraqi army. And indeed, you know, part of the battle
5 plan was that we got messages - if I can be as vague as
6 this - messages to Iraqi formations that if they did
7 certain things and looked the other direction, we would
8 walk past them, because I saw - and we saw - the
9 importance of actually maintaining the Iraqi army as
10 being the infrastructure to maintain sensible good order
11 once the country had been defeated and indeed also
12 keeping professionals, such as people who subsequently
13 we have not been able to use who were Ba'athists, given
14 the fact that everybody had to be a Ba'athist to be
15 a professional; you had to be a card carrying member.
16 And also not trashing the joint, if I can use that
17 expression. In other words, our entry into Basra was
18 very carefully calibrated to ensure that the
19 infrastructure was left as far as possible and it was
20 planned in a very sensible and orderly way, rather than
21 just running through and making it a pile of rubble.

22 So a huge amount of effort went into trying to see
23 how we could actually make sure that in the aftermath of
24 the actual campaign having had the victory, actually having
25 defeated Iraq, whether we could actually then move

1 reasonably seamlessly into a situation to allow a society to
2 re-establish itself using the infrastructure of the society
3 itself to re-establish itself.

4 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: But in terms of the troop numbers
5 that were involved, what were our assumptions about the
6 sort of force levels that would be required --

7 LORD BOYCE: I think, as far as our own area of operation
8 was concerned, we felt that probably we were about okay,
9 but I was always extremely concerned about the anorexic
10 nature of the American contribution, and not just
11 because the Fourth Infantry Division was taking a while
12 to get there, but because it was Rumsfeld's view of and of that the
13 Americans, certainly at that particular stage that they, were very
14 much, "We are here to do the war fighting, not the
15 peacekeeping." And combine that with the obsession that
16 Mr Rumsfeld had with network-centric warfare and
17 therefore to prove that you could minimise the number of
18 your troops, in particular, because you had clever
19 methods of conducting warfare, other than using boots on
20 the ground, meant that, in my view anyway, we were
21 desperately under-resourced in terms of boots on the
22 ground so far as those forces going towards Baghdad were
23 concerned.

24 So, once the battle had been won, we didn't have the
25 boots on the ground to consolidate. I think that we

1 were in a less parlous condition in the south-east of
2 the country, in our area of operations around Basra.
3 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: But we were planning to slim down
4 our own forces as well; we were not expecting to
5 maintain the same force levels with which we had gone
6 in.
7 LORD BOYCE: Ultimately, no, but the initial expectation was
8 that we would be there for a while, without defining
9 exactly what it was. But we certainly weren't
10 expecting, the day after achieving success, to start
11 drawing down our numbers; we were expecting to be there
12 for a considerable period of time.
13 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: When did you expect to be drawing
14 down your numbers?
15 LORD BOYCE: My own personal view: I thought we would be
16 there for three or four years at least, and said so at
17 the time.
18 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: But the planning was not that?
19 LORD BOYCE: The theoretical planning against the defence
20 planning assumptions is you don't do this sort of
21 operation for an extended period longer than about
22 six months. But it never seemed to me very likely that
23 we would be out there in six months.
24 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: But the assumption was that we would
25 go down to about 8,000 thousand troops.

1 LORD BOYCE: Brigade level.

2 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Brigade level.

3 LORD BOYCE: Medium-scale.

4 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: But although that assumption was

5 there, you were doubtful that it would be realised?

6 LORD BOYCE: For the job that we would have to do in the

7 Basra area, it might have been that a brigade size might

8 have been sufficient, as conditions pertained in the

9 middle of 2003. What happened after that, I'm afraid I

10 cant' comment; I wasn't there.

11 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Sir Kevin, do you want to comment on

12 this?

13 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: Just a few points to reinforce that.

14 Firstly, when I talk about an acceptable political

15 policy framework, what happened afterwards was central

16 to that. So that was always upfront in the planning

17 papers and the recommendations we sent to ministers.

18 The governance framework after the invasion, or the

19 liberation, whichever phrase you wish to use, was

20 absolutely crucial, and of course we saw the UN as

21 playing a central role in that, and a lot of the

22 discussions between us and the United States in the next

23 three months, from the beginning of year, as it were, up

24 until the start of operations, was about the importance

25 that we attached to instituting a UN framework at the

1 earliest possible opportunity.

2 The second point, I think: within the UK
3 we couldn't start planning really until we knew what our
4 area of operations might be, and that wasn't clear
5 until January. Remember, we were still, until then,
6 planning to be in northern Iraq/southeastern Turkey.
7 So, until one had an idea of where we would
8 be, we couldn't do detailed planning.

9 The third thing I would say is in terms of UK
10 plans; I think, not just us -- I mean, it is very
11 difficult to unlock the two because we were very
12 concerned to be part of the total plan for Iraq, not
13 just looking after our UK sector, because the success of
14 the policy was, obviously, the success of Iraq and the
15 Middle East.

16 I think, in terms of the wider plan, there was
17 a general expectation that we would have a massive
18 humanitarian problem on our hands from displaced people
19 and that sort of thing and that the governance issues
20 would not be quite as huge as indeed they became. So
21 I think both we and DFID -- and I know Clare Short was
22 writing a lot about this -- were very worried about
23 humanitarian disaster and we were trying to put all our
24 effort into how that might be handled and managed. But
25 we were having even greater difficulty in

1 coming to agreement with the United States and
2 understanding ourselves the details of the governance
3 arrangements which would come into place immediately
4 afterwards. I don't know how far you want me to go into
5 all of that but that was a major area of discussion
6 between us and the United States.

7 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: I would like to spend a little time
8 on that, yes.

9 LORD BOYCE: Can I, if I may, just quickly, Sir Lawrence,
10 say something else about our own drawdown. A factor regarding
11 the number of people we would keep in theatre, a very
12 serious factor, was the contribution of other allies in
13 the aftermath of the actual victory, and of course that
14 is actually what happened. So a number of allies
15 started contributing reasonably serious numbers of
16 people to operate in our sector, which would have
17 allowed us to draw our own people down as they came in.

18 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: How much were questions of just
19 rotation of forces also a factor in our drawdown? We
20 didn't have an awful lot to spare.

21 LORD BOYCE: As I say, we had help in that our situation was
22 alleviated by the fact that other countries were
23 producing up to brigade-size, if I recall correctly,
24 formations, which allowed us to get a focus on things
25 like rotation and indeed drawing down our overall

1 divisional size strength.

2 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Just a final bit on our own

3 planning: how good was the interagency coordination on

4 this question? Were you happy with the relationships

5 with DFID, for example?

6 LORD BOYCE: No, not particularly. I thought that DFID were

7 particularly uncooperative, particularly as led by

8 Clare Short.

9 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Would you like to elaborate?

10 LORD BOYCE: Well, you had people on the ground who were

11 excellent operators for DFID, who were told to sit in

12 a tent and not do anything because that's the

13 instruction they had received and I actually met

14 them.

15 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: How did you address this in problem

16 within Government?

17 LORD BOYCE: Well, I passed it up my command chain, if you

18 like, and I expressed my concerns to the

19 Defence Secretary. But that's about all I could do.

20 Indeed, a lot of the activity that went on on the ground

21 was done by members of the division without the support

22 of the DFID that they might have actually hoped for.

23 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Sir Kevin, would you like to --

24 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: I think we got there in the end but it

25 was hard pounding. I think the problems DFID faced

1 were, firstly, that they felt that a second
2 UN Security Council Resolution was absolutely essential
3 before they could agree to do anything, and therefore
4 that the UN framework they required was absolute, and
5 that meant, of course, that it was only late in the day
6 that we were able to get them fully engaged.

7 I think the second thing was that their focus on
8 poverty relief, rather than backing a strategic
9 objective of the British Government, meant that they
10 were not sure at first that the Iraqi people were quite
11 poor enough to deserve major DFID aid. I remember
12 saying at one stage to them, "If you wait a bit, they
13 certainly will be, if you don't come forward."

14 The amounts of money which they were envisaging
15 allocating to our area, if you like -- I call it that
16 once we had an area of operations, the four southern
17 provinces -- I thought was very small. That, eventually,
18 was increased, but I think it did take a meeting chaired
19 by the Prime Minister to finally hammer out the terms of
20 proper support. This was in the immediate phase, after
21 the military operations, where essentially it is our
22 armed forces that would have to administer the direct
23 humanitarian assistance.

24 That, as I say, was hammered out, I recall,
25 in March, not until quite close to the invasion, by

1 the Prime Minister personally presiding over a meeting.
2 If you want me to look at my notes, I might be able to
3 tell you what the outcome was, but it was basically
4 satisfactory and DFID came on board. But it was very
5 late in the day.

6 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: So not only were the Americans
7 having trouble coming to a common view on this, we were
8 also having trouble coming to a common view.

9 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: The American issues were of a completely
10 different order. The American issues were -- firstly,
11 planning in the United States for this moved through
12 three different phases. There was a lot of work done by
13 the US State Department during 2002 of a broadly
14 conceptual nature, and it sort of stayed there as
15 conceptual planning, academic work really, on the nature
16 of Iraqi society, and it never really, as far as I could
17 see, amounted to anything real.

18
19 Then the National Security Council appeared to be
20 put in overall control of formulating the Phase 4 work.

21 Then it seemed to be taken away from them and went
22 straight down to the military planning track, and
23 Donald Rumsfeld secured control of it, and basically,
24 I think, with the support of the Vice-President,
25 insisted on doing it very much as a military controlled

1 activity, through the creation of ORHA, the
2 Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance,
3 under a retired general, who had been involved in Iraq
4 before., and that meant that it was quite difficult to
5 chase it round.

6 The second problem was, as I say, that there were
7 strong feelings in the United States that you didn't
8 need to do too much, and so we were engaged with the
9 Americans in some detail on precisely what was required
10 by way of aftermath planning, and I recall that we set
11 out a number of issues to them on areas of disagreement,
12 where we wanted to achieve resolution, centring
13 basically on the role of the UN, which we saw as vital
14 in the immediate aftermath period.

15 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: We have talked about our feeling
16 that we could look after our sector in the south, as it
17 were, but it is still part of a larger country. So at
18 what point did these concerns about American planning,
19 or the lack of it, translate into an operational risk
20 for British forces? At what point do you start to worry
21 that, if this isn't sorted out, there really could be
22 quite serious trouble after the war?

23 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: The first thing I would say about
24 that is that nobody, I think, expected, including the
25 Iraqis themselves, frankly, the level of violence and

1 internecine strife which finally emerged
2 I think everybody, totally, was surprised at
3 what happened eventually. I don't think anybody was
4 prepared for that. I think there were
5 obvious concerns that these were, to some extent, risks,
6 but the scale of violence that finally emerged, I think,
7 surprised everybody.

8 I think we were certainly aware that we would be
9 required to be responsible for an area which, on the one
10 hand, should be relatively calm because it was a Shia
11 area and the Shia, after all, you know, had been
12 persecuted by Saddam and therefore we had reason to
13 suppose, or to hope, that we would not have insuperable
14 problems. I think, as I said, at the same time we were
15 conscious that we needed to be part of the total
16 management arrangements of Iraq, not just, as it were,
17 confined to our specific area, not least because we
18 wouldn't have the resources to do it all ourselves. As
19 CDS has said, we would need allies and other resources
20 too.

21 I have mentioned the role of the UN, which we
22 thought was vital, vital because that would bring in the
23 UN agencies quickly, vital because we would need the UN
24 weapons inspectors back in to complete their work,
25 because it again would bring major resources, because it

1 would confer additional legitimacy in the eyes of
2 international opinion, including the Arab world, and it
3 would also provide a framework for the exit strategy
4 much more easily than were there not to be a UN
5 framework. So that was a major issue that we were
6 expecting.

7 I think one of the consequences of the way in which
8 the United States finally decided to go about things,
9 with ORHA then being succeeded rapidly by a sort of
10 viceroy, Bremer, is that decisions were taken on certain issues -
11 de ba'athification and on the removal of senior military
12 officers right down the military chain to quite low levels, - in a
way that
13 was not consistent with British thinking. We
14 felt that, in doing that, a huge problem was being
15 created.

16 There were also problems, when it came to
17 it, about how much of the Iraqi administration would be there
18 to resume activity and how they would be funded.
19 We found a problem eventually
20 between what was going on in Baghdad and what we could
21 do in the southern area. But I'm moving ahead.

22 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: You are moving ahead, which is all
23 relevant and important and we will be exploring more in
24 the coming days. Can I just ask you one final question,
25 though, about this, but also for Lord Boyce as well.

1 When we have heard descriptions already of people's
2 views about what went wrong, the inability to impose law
3 and order quickly and the inability to secure arms dumps
4 have been mentioned. This is basically put down just to
5 a lack of troops, so that in some ways one of the
6 problems that could have been foreseen, and indeed was
7 foreseen, was that the small forces that, as Lord Boyce
8 as mentioned, Donald Rumsfeld was very keen to show that
9 he could take Iraq with, were never going to be
10 sufficient to cope with potential instability
11 afterwards.

12 LORD BOYCE: That is so, and it was certainly pointed out in
13 discussions with the Americans but, as I say, their
14 attitude of mind was that the coalition forces would be
15 seen as a liberation force and that the day after the
16 victory everybody would be very happily moving to
17 a quiet and well ordered society, a democratic society,
18 and that the coalition forces would be seen as great
19 heroes.

20 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: Yes. As I say, we expected there to be
21 a vetting policy. We were pressing for a vetting policy
22 which didn't remove as much of the Iraqi armed forces
23 and the Iraqi authorities as was eventually the case.
24 We expected them to do a certain amount of
25 self-policing, for example, and self-management. That

1 proved to be unattainable but I think we never made
2 a secret of the fact that we also knew the US armed forces
3 had been asking for more troops and that they did not
4 get agreement to provide them.

5 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: It is a truism of war that the
6 unintended consequences can be as important, if not more
7 so, than the intended. Were you warning that there was
8 a risk?

9 LORD BOYCE: Yes, and I think that that was
10 also accepted by a number of American generals, who
11 frequently said they wanted more troops on the ground
12 and Mr Rumsfeld said no, as I understand it.

13 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: Yes. I'm not sure how much directly we
14 tried to insist that the Americans should have more
15 troops. I think that would have been very difficult for
16 us to advance as a UK position. We certainly encouraged
17 them to have a maximum coalition effort, and that
18 perhaps is the way round it. But I recall, for example,
19 that we pressed our views about managing
20 Phase 4, as it was called, on the Americans several
21 times. I remember, when Geoff Hoon went to Washington
22 in the middle of February, he went with a brief which
23 emphasised the importance we attached to a mandate from
24 the UN to justify continued occupation, to putting in
25 place a transitional administration which got the Iraqis

1 involved as early as possible, to a vetting policy of
2 former people that didn't completely remove the
3 structures, as well as things like oil and national
4 governance and economic policy, security sector reform
5 and humanitarian relief.

6 So we were going through these issues in
7 considerable detail with the administration beforehand
8 and emphasising our views.

9 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: But this perhaps was an area where
10 our influence just wasn't sufficient?

11 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: We thought we made quite a lot of
12 progress actually and we thought we made a lot of
13 progress over involving the UN. We never quite got them
14 to a point where they would accept immediate UN
15 authority, but I think we did get the Americans to
16 a point where they would accept involvement and
17 engagement with UN organisations very early on. Sadly,
18 the bombing of the UN office pretty quickly on in 2003
19 was a serious blow to all that, but I think we did shift
20 the American position on engagement with the UN quite
21 considerably. As you know, there was quite a lot of
22 anti-UN feeling still in Washington at that time.

23 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Thank you very much.

24 THE CHAIRMAN: We have only a minute or two to go. Are
25 there any final questions from my colleagues?

1 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Could I ask one brief question, if
2 I may? Sir David Manning told us that the US military
3 saw peacekeeping and policing as not their
4 responsibility. Were you aware of that?

5 LORD BOYCE: Yes.

6 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: At what stage did you become aware
7 of that?

8 LORD BOYCE: I was always aware of it. It was very much an
9 attitude, "We are war fighters, we are not
10 peacekeepers." Obviously, that has changed some time
11 down the track after 2003. But certainly, leading up to
12 that, they saw their job as actually winning the war.
13 So, combined with the feeling that they would be seen as
14 liberators and that everybody would be very happy in
15 Iraq - the Iraqis would be happy to see them there - was
16 the fact that they didn't see a role of peacekeeping
17 afterwards.

18 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: But did you make the Prime Minister
19 and the ministers aware of that?

20 LORD BOYCE: Yes.

21 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: And what was done, because you were
22 talking earlier about the winning concept, and the
23 winning concept, was it about the removal of Saddam or
24 was it about the end state?

25 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: The winning concept was a combination of

1 things but it included, as I said before, a satisfactory
2 end state -- that was absolutely vital -- which included
3 disarmament, which why I have mentioned bringing the UN
4 early into that.

5 You recall that, even before we got there, there was
6 talk of our regarding our area of operations as an
7 exemplar. Now, this may sound rather arrogant but at
8 the time the UK felt that if we could get there and use
9 our skills, which at that stage were well ahead of the
10 Americans -- they caught up subsequently very rapidly,
11 two or three years later, but in 2003 we were the people
12 who were best at converting war fighters into
13 peacekeepers on the same day and doing stabilisation
14 activities and working with the local population, and we
15 did have a genuine feeling in the UK that if we could do
16 a good show, as it were, in our four southern provinces,
17 that would help, as it were, with the way in which the
18 Americans approached the rest of it. That may seem
19 rather wishful thinking but at the time that was
20 certainly part of our concept, and we had reason to
21 believe we did have a chance there because, of course,
22 as I say, with the Shia area we were facing slightly
23 different levels of opposition than was the case in
24 Baghdad, and indeed, when I visited myself in the middle
25 of 2003, with the then Chief of Defence Staff, we could

1 drive through the centre of Basra in unprotected
2 vehicles with the people two inches away from us.

3 So there were reasons to suppose and to expect that
4 we could help in that context as well.

5 THE CHAIRMAN: Martin?

6 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: I have a governmental structural
7 question with regard to aftermath planning which perhaps
8 can help us in our lessons learned.

9 You mentioned that the Prime Minister had to preside
10 over a meeting to get DFID on board. This seems rather
11 a drastic spur to cooperation. I wondered what you
12 could say from the MoD perspective about the structural
13 system with regard to other departments concerned and
14 interdepartmental planning.

15 SIR KEVIN TEBBIT: Well, the so-called comprehensive concept
16 did exist in Whitehall, the idea that we needed to have
17 integrated planning to bring all the instruments of
18 government to bear on the issue, and I think that was
19 definitely there and we certainly had transparency, but
20 I think these things are actually very difficult to
21 achieve and we are still groping, both nationally and
22 internationally, with those concepts. One is dealing
23 with very different cultures across departments. You
24 can't simply create a committee and then achieve
25 everything you are seeking to do.

1 I always felt that we could not quite get other
2 departments to share the urgency that we felt in the
3 Ministry of Defence in terms of their own planning with
4 us, and I think this is still a problem that the
5 international community is confronted by, actually. It
6 has not gone away, it is still there.

7 THE CHAIRMAN: I think that brings us to the close of this
8 morning's session. Tomorrow, Friday morning, the
9 Committee will be hearing from Lieutenant General Sir
10 Anthony Pigott, who was Deputy Chief of Defence Staff
11 for Commitments at that time, and from Major General
12 David Wilson, who was the United Kingdom's senior
13 military attache to Central Command in the US in 2002.
14 These hearings will help us further develop the picture
15 of the military planning we have been hearing about
16 today and the British perspective on the US planning.

17 Tomorrow afternoon we are going to hear from
18 Dominic Asquith, who served as both the head of Iraq
19 policy in the Foreign Office and then as the
20 United Kingdom's ambassador in Baghdad between 2004 and
21 2007.

22 So, with that, I thank our witnesses for your
23 evidence this morning, Lord Boyce and Sir Kevin, and to
24 those of you who have attended throughout this morning's
25 proceedings.

1 The next hearing will start at 10 o'clock tomorrow
2 morning, and with that I close this session.

3 Thank you.

4 (12.05 pm)

5 (The Inquiry adjourned until 10.00 am the following day)

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I N D E X

LORD MICHAEL BOYCE and SIR KEVIN 3
TEBBIT

FINAL