

D/DCDS(C)/05/04/05

25 Mar 03

## OP TELIC PHASE 4 (POST CONFLICT): MILITARY PLANNING GUIDANCE

Reference:

A. Cabinet Office – Iraq: Post Conflict Objectives dated 19 March 2003<sup>1</sup>

### SITUATION

1. Op TELIC continues at high tempo. The outcome of Phase 3 “Decisive Operations” that will have a bearing on Phase 4 are becoming clearer. Non-military factors are also developing very fast and need to be taken into account.
2. The MOD approach to Phase 4 planning remains the integration of top down policy/strategic issues with bottom up operational/tactical realities. This approach has kept us reasonably balanced in a very uncertain environment. With Phase 4 potentially unfolding from now on it is time to take stock and update UK military commanders and staff on an all informed basis. Hence this guidance. I will update it on an Edition basis as necessary.

### HIGH LEVEL POLICY AND INTENT [To be updated after Camp David]

3. US Political/Strategic Intent. [To follow]
4. UK End State. The prime objective is to rid Iraq of its WMD and delivery systems. As rapidly as possible<sup>2</sup>, Iraq should become a stable, law abiding state within its present borders, co-operating with the international community and no longer posing a threat to its neighbours or to international security, removing WMD, and providing effective representative government for all its peoples.
5. UN Involvement. Phase 4 UNSCR timelines will be uncertain for a while. The degree of UN involvement in, or authorisation of, Phase 4 will substantially affect the scale of international contribution in terms of finance, military effort and other

<sup>1</sup> Subject to on going work and yet to be finally endorsed by Ministers.

<sup>2</sup> ‘As rapidly as possible’ is a key part of UK Intent. High tempo should remain an important part of Phase 4.

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resources.

6. **UK Post Conflict Objectives.** Reference A is extant.

7. **UK Ministerial Guidance.** Ministers have recently confirmed (subject to further work including exit strategy and duration) the following guidance for Phase 4 Planning<sup>3</sup>:

a. The maximum size of task to which UK forces contribute in the early days should not exceed our overall military capability<sup>4</sup>. A focus in the South East of Iraq would be reasonable.

b. The UK contribution to such a task in advance of a Security Council Resolution would be limited to the facilitation of humanitarian assistance, a secure environment and the elimination of WMD.

c. We therefore need to agree urgently with the US a realistic authorising Security Council Resolution for post-conflict Iraq.

d. We should urgently plan with the US to help us find military partners to meet ongoing commitments in Iraq and to enable us to draw down and, in due course, design an exit strategy.

e. In broad terms, the MoD will need to draw down its scale of effort to nearer a third of its current commitment by the autumn.

8. **Principles.** In support of the above the Iraq Planning Unit has developed the following Principles to guide UK Phase 4 effort across OGDs:

a. We shall meet our obligations under International Humanitarian Law including the Hague Regulations and Geneva Conventions.

b. We shall seek to minimise the suffering of the Iraqi people and help them to help themselves by supporting their institutions to run the country.

c. We shall need to stress that our presence in Iraq is temporary and is intended to secure compliance with UN resolutions but our commitment to support the people of Iraq is for the long term.

<sup>3</sup> PM/03/023 Iraq: UK Military Contribution to post-conflict Iraq.

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- d. The natural resources of Iraq should be used for the benefit of all the Iraqi people
- e. Our involvement in Phase 4A should as far as possible keep our options open for Phase 4B.
- f. We should seek wider International Community presence in Iraq, including NGOs and IOs, as soon as we can.
- g. Evidence of WMD should be verified by international inspection.

9. **Strategic Lines of Operation**. Phase 4 will be taken forward in a fully integrated approach. Strategic Lines of Operation against which to focus UK effort are currently seen as:

- a. **Disarmament**.<sup>5</sup> Removal of Iraqi WMD programmes and resources.
- b. **Security**. Encompassing stability, internal and external security.
- c. **Humanitarian Effort**. Immediate priorities are likely to be provision of clean water, food, healthcare and shelter.
- d. **Political**. Establishment of initial governance and longer-term reconstruction of political institutions.
- e. **Diplomatic**. Normalisation of international relations for Iraq and UK policies for regional engagement.
- f. **Economic**. Rebuilding of infrastructure; repair and renovation of oil wells and refineries; preventing economic collapse; industrial development.

## **KEY MILITARY STRATEGIC ISSUES**

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<sup>5</sup> The top priority.

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13. **UK Military Strategic Lines Of Operation.** MODUK's Main Effort will be to support the Coalition's Security line of operation. Tasks will develop with events but we should look to contributing Effects within assigned scale of effort in support of the following:

- a. **Combat Operations.** Joint support to dwindling (or recurring) Phase 3 Tasks.
- b. **WMD.** Support to the elimination of WMD and delivery systems (international reverification is a key consideration).
- c. **Secure Environment.** Promoting a secure environment within agreed AOs. This will include employing routine PSO techniques at a local level.
- d. **Strategic Enablers.** Eg ISR and Information Ops.
- e. **Humanitarian plus CIMIC/Civil Affairs.** Within Deployed capabilities, doing the minimum necessary to meet our Occupying Power responsibilities. Occupying Power responsibilities are primarily the provision of public order and safety (while respecting the laws in force in the country) and the administration of the occupied territories.
- f. **Force Protection.** Within JOA, LOCs and to deployed force elements.
- g. **Reconstruction/Security Sector Reform.** The extent to which HMG decides to get involved in rebuilding and SSR is a matter for further policy discussion in London, and depends largely on UNSCR cover (Para 5).

14. **Scale of Effort.** Informed by operational considerations in the JOA, such as levels of consent<sup>9</sup> but also taking account of wider Commitments, we need to draw

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<sup>9</sup> Current UK thinking envisages 3 levels of consent; High, Medium (Patchy) and Low. It assumes Medium (Patchy) Consent turning to High as the basis for Phase 4 planning at this stage but recognises that there will be areas where Low Consent is more likely, possibly for some time.

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down to nearer Medium Scale of effort by Autumn 03. The way forward is currently:

- a. Phase 4 UK Strategy. While our Phase 4 contribution will be governed largely by immediate events in theatre, it is essential that our Phase 4 B/C contribution is set within a wider "Ends" driven strategy, linked to a longer term objective to roll back the spread of WMD, especially in the region. Other regional objectives include MEPP, Iraq/Iran balance, Op VERITAS, Op FINGAL and so on, as well as to wider Defence Commitments within NATO/EU and beyond, are also relevant.
- b. Improved International Support. We need to create the conditions for improved International engagement for Phase 4. An outline strategy has already been developed for this<sup>10</sup>. Implementation will be conditioned by the level of UN involvement (as outlined at para 4). While looking for early support in Phase 4A we should not make premature assumptions that it will be easily forthcoming.
- c. Early Reduction. (May/Jun 03 tbc). We should identify and be prepared to withdraw at a speed (tbc) any capabilities which have Phase 3 utility only, are urgently required elsewhere or need to be withdrawn early to for subsequent Phase 4B roulement.
- d. Staged Draw Down. (Jun-Sep 03 tbc). We should then plan to draw down the balance of Components to the Autumn 03 steady state against clear criteria.
- e. Enduring Steady State. (Sep 03 – Mar 05). Subsequently, we should be prepared to maintain the Steady state until at least Spring 04 and scope out to Spring 05.
- f. Branch Planning. A strategic estimate should be conducted to consider a Large Scale presence continuing through to Mar 04 reducing then to Medium scale until Mar 05.

15. UK C2. We need to identify the optimum C2 structures required to meet our revised position and to dovetail with US thinking. This will need to take account of the rate of draw down of the NCC, the potential utility of HQ ARRC group and how UK relates to CJTF(I).

<sup>10</sup> DG Op Pol/4/5/1/1 Coalition Engagement Strategy for Phase 4 dated 21 Mar 03 which has been agreed by COS and Submitted to Ministers.

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## WAY AHEAD

16. A Task list is at Annex C.

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Annexes:

- A. US Military Tasks for Phase 4.
- B. US Phase 4 Command and Control Structures [To Follow].
- C. Task List.

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ANNEX C TO  
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DATED 25 MAR 03

## TASK LIST

### MOD Military Strategic Tasks

- Maintain UK Military Strategic Estimate/CONOPS and Plan for Phase 4, including a branch plan that assumes no enabling UNSCR for a rolling 3 months. [SPG]
- Develop an engagement strategy with FCO for coalition building in support of UK efforts, within broader US framework in Phase 4. [DG Op Pol]
- Monitor evolving high level C2 structures and make recommendations on potential UK role. [SPG with IPU]
- Maintain currency of Phase 4 Campaign Info Requirements to inform Phase 4 planning. [SPG for CDI]
- Develop UK force (Phase 3/4A) recovery priorities to inform "Managing the Means" issues. [ACDS(Ops) with PJHQ and FLCs]
- Develop UK military engagement in Phase 4B & 4C, and exit strategy, [SPG] including development of UK's defence engagement strategy for North Africa, Near East, Middle East and Far East, in the context of post TELIC environment and continuing Global War On Terrorism. [ACDS(Pol)]

### PJHQ Operational Level Tasks

- Maintain Overview of the Operational Estimate (All Phases).
- Be prepared to transition from Phase 3 to Phase 4A on orders (Assume current in theatre scale of effort).
- Develop Phase 4A/B ConOps, COAs and outline plans in line with above guidance and developing events.
- Be prepared to implement Drawdown to Medium Scale of Effort by Autumn 03.

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- Scope implications of maintaining Large scale Land<sup>1</sup> Component from Autumn 03 to April 04.
- Scope future options Spring 04 to Spring 05.
- Recommend C2 structures to support future operations. Main effort Phase 4A/B.

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<sup>1</sup> Interpret as two brigades with enabling support and C2.