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SECRETARY OF STATE

MO 6/17/15K

16 January 2003

DG Op Pol

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PS/Minister(AF)	Policy Director
PSO/CDS	ACDS(Ops)
PS/PUS	DCJO (Ops)
Sec/CNS	Head of Sec(Iraq)
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IRAQ: MILITARY PLANNING

1. The Secretary of State is most grateful to CDS and DCJO (Ops) for giving a clear and comprehensive briefing to the Prime Minister on military planning yesterday afternoon. He is also grateful to them and others for dealing so clearly with the questions raised by the Prime Minister in the subsequent discussion.

2. No 10 have now identified the following issues on which the Prime Minister wishes to have further advice:

a. **Targeting.** Like the Secretary of State, the Prime Minister is concerned to ensure that bombing targets are proportionate and minimise civilian casualties. He wishes to have a list of the targets which UK forces might be asked to attack, with a commentary on their military importance and risk of casualties. We will need to provide a list of targets which would be attacked by aircraft operating from Diego Garcia (or other UK airfields) or with other UK support.

b. **Predicting Saddam.** The Prime Minister would like further work to be done systematically to test Saddam's possible responses to military action and how we would counter these. In particular, this work should cover possible pre-emptive use of WMD against allied forces in Kuwait, an attack on Israel, and/or attacks on the Kurds in the KAZ.

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c. **Baghdad.** The Prime Minister has asked for further advice on which coalition forces we expect to reach Baghdad and how quickly. He would also like a full analysis of the risk that Saddam would concentrate on "Fortress Baghdad", how the US plan to deal with this tactic if used, and what they would do if there were inter-communal fighting in the city.

d. **Aftermath.** The Prime Minister agrees with CDS that much greater clarity about the US intentions is required. He would be keen to see the outcome of the Whitehall visit to Washington next week.

3. Work is already in hand on (a) above: Mr Hoon will be holding a meeting next Wednesday. As discussed with CDS and you immediately after yesterday's briefing, Mr Hoon believes that (b) should be taken forward in the context of a comprehensive "red teaming" of the military plan to identify all conceivable risks to its success (for example, in addition to those highlighted by No 10, the risk that Saddam might destroy oil facilities in the south in order to release oil into the Gulf). On (d), we will clearly need to use all our regular contacts with the US, in both CENTCOM and the Pentagon. If appropriate, this is an issue that Mr Hoon could himself raise with Rumsfeld in their next regular phone call next week.

4. I should be grateful if you could coordinate these actions. It would probably be unwieldy to try to cover all No 10's points in a single letter or paper. We should, however, aim to respond to No 10 by the end of the month, including perhaps with a combined paper addressing both (b) and (c). Further action on (a) will follow from Mr Hoon's meeting next week.



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