

Tuesday, 29 June 2010

1

2 (10.00 am)

3 THE CHAIRMAN: Good morning and welcome to the
4 QE2 Conference Centre for the first day of this phase of
5 the Iraq Inquiry's public hearing. At the Inquiry's
6 launch on 30 July last year, we took on the task of
7 establishing a reliable account of the UK's involvement
8 in Iraq between 2001 and 2009 and to identify lessons
9 for governments facing similar circumstances. In the
10 last 11 months, we have covered a great deal of ground.
11 One of our first priorities was to meet and listen to
12 the families of British citizens and members of the
13 armed forces who died in Iraq. 48 families came to talk
14 to us.

15 We learned much from them. Their sacrifice and
16 concerns remain in our thoughts and inform our approach.

17 Between 24 November last year and 8 March, we heard
18 from more than 80 witnesses in public session. We heard
19 first-hand from senior military personnel and officials
20 involved in providing advice on the policy in Iraq or
21 responsible for its implementation and from senior
22 ministers, including the then Prime Minister Mr Brown
23 and the former Prime Minister, Mr Blair.

24 Our purpose was to establish a broad chronology of
25 what had happened from 2001 to the withdrawal of combat

1 forces in 2009.

2 Those hearings gave us a complementary perspective
3 to the papers which the government has provided. We
4 have received many thousands of documents and that
5 process is continuing.

6 A number of documents were declassified and
7 published on our website to provide relevant context in
8 the earlier hearings. We will continue to take that
9 approach. Accordingly, further documents are being
10 released to support this morning's hearing.

11 As we made clear at the launch, the Inquiry is
12 independent. We have made a deliberate choice to
13 conduct our work in a way which seeks to remain outside
14 party politics. That is why we ended the first round of
15 public hearings before the launch of the general
16 election campaign.

17 In May, the Inquiry held private discussions in
18 France and the United States of America. Details of
19 those visits can be found on our website. We have also
20 held hearings in private with British officials,
21 diplomats and military officers to take evidence on
22 those issues, such as intelligence, which cannot be
23 heard in public.

24 Details about whom we have seen in those hearings
25 will be published in the next week or so.

1 We have also held meetings with less senior service
2 personnel, civil servants and diplomats who have served
3 in Iraq. They, too, have given us very helpful insights
4 into both their achievements and the challenges they
5 faced whilst serving in Iraq between 2003 and 2009.

6 The Inquiry has issued an open invitation to
7 international lawyers to comment on the grounds relied
8 on by the British Government in undertaking military
9 action in Iraq. The Inquiry also continues to receive,
10 and welcomes, submissions from the public on all matters
11 relevant to its terms of reference.

12 These hearings, which begin today, will cover
13 a range of issues. In some cases they will be
14 complementing evidence that we have already heard, in
15 others we will be pursuing issues which have only been
16 touched on in earlier evidence.

17 This morning we will be hearing our first witness
18 from the police. Other areas we will be covering in
19 detail for the first time include military equipment and
20 personnel issues.

21 The Inquiry may hold a further round of public
22 hearings in the autumn. We will take a final decision
23 on that later.

24 As we have said before, we intend to complete our
25 report around the turn of the year. We remain committed

1 to a transparent, open, thorough and fair process and
2 conducting the Inquiry in a cost-effective way. We
3 intend to deliver a reliable and authoritative report
4 about the UK's decision to take military action in Iraq
5 and the events that followed and to identify lessons for
6 the future.

7 MR DOUGLAS BRAND

8 THE CHAIRMAN: Good morning.

9 DOUGLAS BRAND: Good morning.

10 THE CHAIRMAN: This morning we will be hearing from
11 Douglas Brand, the United Kingdom chief police adviser
12 to the Ministry of the Interior based in Baghdad.
13 Mr Brand served from July 2003 until September 2004.

14 This session is the first of a number of sessions
15 where we will focus on the approach taken to police
16 reform in Iraq, including the development of strategy
17 and the resources available. I should also mention that
18 we have today published a number of documents relevant
19 to policing on our website. These include witness
20 statements from UK police advisers based in Iraq and
21 a number of contemporary declassified government
22 documents.

23 Now, we recognise that witnesses are giving evidence
24 based on their recollection of events and we, of course,
25 are checking what we hear against the papers we have

1 access to and which we are still receiving. I remind
2 every witness that they will later be asked to sign a
3 transcript of the evidence to the effect that the
4 evidence given is truthful, fair and accurate.

5 With that, welcome, Mr Brand, I will ask
6 Sir Lawrence to open the questions.

7 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Thank you. You covered the
8 background to your deployment in your very helpful
9 statement, but we would like you to go through it in
10 a bit more detail.

11 At what point did you have contact with the
12 Association of Chief Police Officers or the Home Office
13 to discuss the possibility of you being deployed?

14 DOUGLAS BRAND: That was, I think, only a couple of weeks
15 before going to the Foreign Office for an interview and
16 then being told I had passed the interview and was
17 actually going to be deployed.

18 My involvement prior to that had been to sort of
19 spot the fact that we were likely to be asked for some
20 form of assistance because of the rapid move of the
21 American military into Baghdad and the sort of settling
22 down of the war fighting part, as I call it, and then
23 the obvious need for some form of stabilisation after
24 that and, having looked at the experience of the Balkans
25 and other places, it was clear that if somebody was

1 going to ask a question about policing, it would come to
2 us at ACPO. So I had alerted ACPO to say: be aware
3 that somewhere on somebody's desk in the Foreign Office
4 or in the Ministry of Defence, is a request, or at least
5 an observation, that British police might be required.

6 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: So this was during the fighting that
7 you first became aware that it could become an issue?

8 DOUGLAS BRAND: Yes, my responsibility in ACPO was to look
9 after European affairs and, in that, I have supported
10 the Home Office position in the Police Cooperation
11 Working Group in Brussels. Myself and Paul Kernaghan
12 effectively looked after international issues. He had
13 the full portfolio for international issues and I had
14 European, but I just made a few enquiries to see what
15 was going on, and it was a conversation with an OSCE
16 colleague, who said that, "There is this request, it
17 will be coming. Do you know about it?" The answer
18 clearly was, "No, I don't, but we will get things
19 moving".

20 Q. So just to be clear, you weren't aware of any planning
21 for policing or wider law and order issues for
22 post-invasion Iraq prior to the invasion?

23 DOUGLAS BRAND: No.

24 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: You had no contact with anybody
25 about that?

1 DOUGLAS BRAND: No, and, to be fair, it wasn't in my
2 portfolio, but I think it was the sort of thing one
3 would hear about and I had certainly not heard about
4 that.

5 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: So when it came to your deployment,
6 did you volunteer your services or did you respond to an
7 approach?

8 DOUGLAS BRAND: I made it clear that if there was something
9 going on, I would be interested in it. I then had
10 a request from Paul Kernaghan to see a notice that was
11 going to be published by ACPO, and I responded to that
12 notice and was then invited to the Foreign Office for an
13 interview.

14 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Perhaps you could just describe for
15 us this process of -- from the interview to the actual
16 deployment. What sort of bodies did you discuss your
17 deployment with? What sort of issues were raised with
18 you then?

19 DOUGLAS BRAND: I remember the interview was the day after
20 the Queen's birthday parade in Baghdad, and I also
21 remember thinking it was quite a warm day and I was
22 quite warm and would they think any the less of me
23 because, if I couldn't manage the London heat, what
24 would I do in Baghdad? But there was a sense that the
25 purpose of going was clear in very broad terms and the

1 detail would follow later. I found out on that day that
2 several other police officers were being interviewed as
3 well and, consequently, the decision as to who of us was
4 to be the appointed person wasn't made until the end of
5 that first week, and then, by then, a decision had been
6 made that a second Assistant Chief Constable would be
7 appointed to look after the British interest in Basra
8 and I would go to Baghdad to look after the Baghdad and
9 the rest of Iraq issues.

10 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Which government departments did you
11 see? Were you mainly dealing with the Foreign Office?

12 DOUGLAS BRAND: The Foreign Office almost exclusively. My
13 only contact with the Home Office -- and I suspect there
14 were communications going on that I wasn't aware of
15 between Paul Kernaghan and the Home Office -- but my
16 involvement with the Home Office was a briefing on one
17 day, I think two or three days before I actually
18 deployed.

19 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Were you given much sense of what
20 your role would be in Baghdad?

21 DOUGLAS BRAND: Well, it was -- there were two sort of
22 contradictory messages. One was: you are being inserted
23 at a very senior level because we all know the post --
24 and I'll call it the post-war fighting, for want of
25 a better expression -- but after that happens, now we

1 know, because of our previous experience, that one of
2 the weaknesses is, how do we actually get soldiers off
3 the street and replaced by some form of civilian
4 stabilisation capability in policing or whatever, and
5 that part of my activity was to influence that.

6 But at the same time, there was this slightly
7 bizarre situation of actually being told, "You have got
8 to negotiate your way in and you have to negotiate with
9 the American police supremo", who was a former
10 Commissioner of the New York City Police who, by that
11 time -- and certainly in the UK I had read "Time"
12 articles and others of the his exploits of being the
13 sort of police chief of Baghdad.

14 As I say, there was a rather sort of bizarre
15 contradiction in -- one was a very strategic thing and
16 the other was: get on with this guy or else come back
17 next Tuesday.

18 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Were you surprised that more had not
19 been done to pave the way for you, that there had not
20 been agreement at a higher level about the role that you
21 were going to perform?

22 DOUGLAS BRAND: I can't say I was surprised. I think --
23 I think I recognised that, going back to the early April
24 discovery, we hadn't had any approaches and hadn't
25 formally put any constructive thoughts forward, that it

1 didn't seem that there had been a great deal of thinking
2 beyond actually what was going on and, of course,
3 reported in the general press at the time, was the
4 intention of the American military to be in, do the job
5 and out very quickly. So I wasn't surprised in that
6 sense and I did anticipate that a certain amount would
7 be sort of made up when I got there.

8 But, as I found in other theatres, quite often that
9 is quite a useful way of approaching things, get a broad
10 outline but get there and actually determine what can be
11 done and from there develop the strategy.

12 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: But you were basically told to
13 report to Bernard Kerik when you got to --

14 DOUGLAS BRAND: That's right.

15 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Was he expecting you?

16 DOUGLAS BRAND: He was just a couple of days -- my
17 information was that he was a little concerned that
18 a serving, professional senior police officer was
19 coming -- it was indicated to me that he sort of saw my
20 presence as a bit of a threat to his position, and I had
21 no intention of threatening his position, but that's how
22 it was perceived. But usefully I think some
23 conversations were had ahead of my arrival so that, when
24 I did arrive, he certainly had a job for me to do in
25 terms of developing -- first of all, selecting and then

1 developing the capability of the police chief of
2 Baghdad.

3 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: So you didn't actually have to come
4 back on Tuesday --

5 DOUGLAS BRAND: No.

6 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: -- you were able to negotiate --

7 DOUGLAS BRAND: I was able to stay.

8 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: What line of reporting did you have
9 back to UK at this time?

10 DOUGLAS BRAND: Actually, that wasn't made clear either on
11 my way out, but I anticipated that somebody, probably on
12 the Iraq desk, would want to know what was going on and,
13 once I did arrive and realised the set-up between
14 Administrator Bremer and John Sawers, as he was then,
15 that clearly there was a formal British representation
16 there that I could route any reports through.

17 As it then happened, I sent my reports back and they
18 seemed to be very happy that I do that on a weekly
19 basis. The structure of my reports, after a while,
20 followed a similar fashion each week, so that strategic
21 issues, the involvement that I had had personally and
22 then some of the local flavour, which I felt sometimes
23 was being lost in the distance of transmission, should
24 be incorporated in those reports.

25 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Did you get much feedback from those

1 reports?

2 DOUGLAS BRAND: Very little. I assumed, very much like
3 walking the plank with a blindfold, so long as you don't
4 fall off the edge, everything was okay. There were
5 occasions where specific things had been raised and had
6 come back and in a circuitous way through either the
7 British representative's office or from Paul Kernaghan
8 in ACPO, but generally speaking I assumed my reports
9 were just contributing to the picture, the flavour of
10 what was going on.

11 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: So basically you just got on with
12 the job and told people what you were doing and they
13 seemed quite happy to let you get on with it.

14 DOUGLAS BRAND: Yes.

15 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: What about before you got to
16 Baghdad? Did you have any sense of the overall policies
17 towards security sector reform to be followed in Iraq?

18 DOUGLAS BRAND: There had been a report prepared by a small
19 assessment team, mainly American former police officers
20 from the Department of Justice ICITAP programme, the
21 international crime investigation training and
22 administration programme.

23 They had arrived in May, ostensibly to do the
24 assessment of what was needed. Their assessment was
25 curtailed because of the need to get something done.

1 I remember reading the report then, thinking: well, it
2 is a blueprint for any form of development, high on
3 aspiration but very low on actual, practical capability
4 and, not least, there wasn't a great deal of
5 understanding of the local culture and context; an
6 insistence, for instance, that we must get rid of
7 military ranks in the police. Well, question, why?
8 Until you actually understand the structure and the
9 culture, is that a good thing? Getting rid of an
10 officer entry system. Again, until you actually
11 understand the circumstances, the history, the context,
12 is that the wise thing to do?

13 So I was aware that some work had been done. I was
14 aware that a very ambitious programme had been mapped
15 out in this plan but I was also pretty much aware that
16 it had some significant weaknesses.

17 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Who sort of had overall
18 responsibility for this within the CPA?

19 DOUGLAS BRAND: Well, Bernard Kerik, on the day of my
20 deployment, had actually come out from underneath the
21 umbrella of the senior person responsible for security,
22 a gentleman called Walt Slocombe, who was a very
23 respected American diplomat and administrator, and so,
24 effectively, security, which had been military and
25 police and other security organs, was split and military

1 and security went one way and police and customs and
2 borders came under Bernard Kerik. He then had the title
3 of deputy, which effectively made him the de facto
4 Minister of the Interior within the CPA. So it was to
5 him that my initial reporting and suggestions and ideas
6 went to.

7 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Under international law, the
8 Americans and British, as occupying powers, had
9 obligations to secure public order and safety both
10 before and after the adoption of Resolution 1483. Was
11 this obligation explicitly recognised?

12 DOUGLAS BRAND: I can't say I have ever heard -- I can't say
13 I have ever heard -- let me put it this way: it was
14 certainly not the driver of any of the strategic issues
15 that we were dealing with. There were two components
16 effectively of what was happening. One was an ambitious
17 training programme, which would be recognisable in many
18 countries requiring stabilisation and, in particular, in
19 the case of Bernard Kerik's interest, the establishment
20 of a proper police chief for Baghdad, and then the
21 development of a capability to stabilise Baghdad, using
22 some of the police who had been there before.

23 So that certainly was not articulated in a conscious
24 way, but certainly one could read into a broad training
25 programme and the establishment of a police chief in

1 Baghdad as recognising that as responsibility.

2 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Was this in a sense the strategy
3 that was in place when you arrived in July 2003?

4 DOUGLAS BRAND: Yes, it was. Two things: one is -- and this
5 is -- certainly from looking at other theatres as well,
6 training is not a strategy. It is a means by which to
7 achieve something else, but quite often -- and it is
8 understandable -- the sort of involvement in training,
9 equipping and the parades and all of that sort of gets
10 in the way of, actually, what are we doing the training
11 for? So what was a component or should have been
12 a component of something bigger, but actually it became
13 the dominant activity, not least because, as time went
14 on, it became clear that there was a demand for a huge
15 training operation, something of the like that no sort
16 of developed country had ever taken on, let alone a less
17 developed country.

18 So I had the two things in my mind almost all the
19 time, the fact that this huge focus on training was
20 a means to an end, to achieve something else, but the
21 something else was being eclipsed by a lot of the --

22 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: The sheer effort of the training.
23 You described before the sort of bifurcation between the
24 policing role and the military role. Did that just also
25 make it harder to fit the policing into a wider security

1 sector reform?

2 DOUGLAS BRAND: Yes, it was quite breathtaking actually.

3 The expectation that, on the one hand, the new Iraqi
4 army needed a predominantly, if not exclusively,
5 American training system of some 400 or so individuals
6 and quite a huge budget under a 2-star general to train
7 the first battalion of the new Iraqi army when there was
8 130,000 coalition troops in Iraq, and yet there was
9 nothing for police.

10 There seemed to be this sort of expectation that the
11 police would just sort of rise like a phoenix and just
12 get on with things, like they always do, and there were
13 very few who seemed to recognise -- in fact, sometimes
14 it felt quite lonely, because there was nobody else
15 recognising the fact that you don't have this quantity
16 of trained police to do the policing job that everybody
17 wants them to do and, in order to get them, it is going
18 to take an awful lot longer than the timeframes that
19 were then starting to be talked about, and even if we
20 did train 3,000, as we eventually targeted, every eight
21 weeks, it would be the same as doing basic training for
22 a soldier and then sending them straight to the front
23 line. There would be no transition from-- theoretical
24 into practical.

25 So there were a whole range of things which were

1 missing, and yet it was almost like the king's new
2 clothes, people ignored that. It will just happen and,
3 sadly, that kept on becoming a bit of a mantra of mine
4 to try to remind people, you know, you can't just impose
5 policing without the background, the training, the
6 development, the skill sets, the selection. It just
7 won't work.

8 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: I think there will be some questions
9 soon on taking that further, because obviously it is an
10 important point. Just a final question from me, again
11 just to set the wider scene, was the relationship to
12 criminal justice in general and how did the particular
13 role of policing, which can be seen as a maintaining
14 order matter relate to these questions of a broader
15 criminal justice system?

16 DOUGLAS BRAND: I think one of the lessons that we did learn
17 from the Balkans was that, if you focus solely on the
18 police, the justice system collapses at the next stage,
19 whether it be prosecution or through the court process.

20 So one of the things which I thought was a very good
21 initiative, created on the ground, was to pull together
22 what one would call criminal justice professionals,
23 judges, lawyers, people who were working in different
24 parts of the ministries that had a common interest in
25 justice, so that we could actually get some

1 joined-upness in the approach that we were taking.

2 One of the things that had clearly happened over
3 some time was that judges had become quite lazy in
4 demanding evidence other than confession evidence and
5 that the prosecution process had also become a bit lazy
6 and, therefore, the police saw a successful process of
7 just providing confession evidence and associated with
8 that clearly were allegations of brutality to get it and
9 that then seemed to go through the justice system okay.

10 So one of the things we did very early on was to
11 say, "What can we do about this?" and one was to
12 actually broaden the range of evidence that was going to
13 be available. So one of the initiatives was actually to
14 train judges, prosecutors and police in physical and
15 forensic evidence gathering so that we could have
16 alternatives to the traditional confessional evidence.

17 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Thanks very much.

18 THE CHAIRMAN: Roderic?

19 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Just a short question of detail. We have
20 heard from a number of military witnesses already, but
21 you are the first civilian police officer to appear at
22 the Inquiry and I just wonder if you can explain to us
23 how the function of civil policing, in the situation
24 where you are trying to establish law and order and
25 stabilisation, differs from the function of the

1 military?

2 DOUGLAS BRAND: Well, the function of policing in an ideal
3 situation is to either maintain order by your presence
4 and your interaction with people or to take that into
5 interaction through a process of justice ultimately into
6 a court, ultimately into a prison, if that's required,
7 and the military does not have any background or
8 training other than to deal with the first part, which
9 is keep order, if they had been trained in sort of
10 public order skills.

11 There isn't that connecting thought process and
12 certainly it doesn't drive them to look at the ends of
13 justice, it is usually just to deal with the problem,
14 disperse it or repress it. So the argument for having
15 the development of police very quickly is so that you
16 actually have this connection into the justice system.
17 Otherwise, we tend to undermine what it is that the
18 military is doing, because there is no solution other
19 than a repressive putting down of disorder with no
20 justice follow-up.

21 I think that's the critical difference. If you have
22 a police mentality, you are looking to resolve the issue
23 to keep the peace or, if you cannot do that by your
24 presence and activity, and some of that might be just by
25 talking to people, then you follow a process of justice

1 so that people who disturb the peace, to use a very
2 British approach, are taken before a court system to
3 account for why they have breached the peace.

4 That isn't something that is necessarily a strong
5 part of military training.

6 SIR RODERIC LYNE: So essentially, you are describing two
7 different skill sets?

8 DOUGLAS BRAND: Absolutely.

9 SIR RODERIC LYNE: In the situation that you found when you
10 arrived in Iraq in the middle of 2003, after the
11 conflict but with considerable disorder, what would you
12 have expected, at that stage, the respective roles of
13 the military and the civilian police to be?

14 DOUGLAS BRAND: Well, there was an absence of Iraqi
15 military, so I wouldn't expect to see Iraqi military
16 there at all. They had been disbanded and disappeared.

17 What I would have expected to see, and in
18 a fragmented way did exist, was the occupying force
19 military interacting with the police, who had by that
20 time started to come back to work, supporting them with
21 transportation, guidance in terms of how to organise
22 themselves, if they needed that, communications and, if
23 there were updating of procedures that they were
24 familiar with, to actually impart those.

25 The reason I emphasise "that they were familiar

1 with" is that there were a lot of American military who,
2 as reservists, were police officers in their own right
3 in the United States and so could quite properly give
4 good up-to-date advice on policing.

5 There come, of course, other problems with that
6 because, if you take it into the realm of joint
7 patrolling for confidence-building or whatever, whose
8 lens do you then look through when you are confronted by
9 somebody with a weapon? Are you looking at it through
10 an American military lens, which is still linked to
11 war fighting rules of engagement. What do expect the
12 police to do? Do you expect them to adopt those rules
13 or do they become a witness or do they just take cover
14 or do they do whatever the police did, which might be
15 completely different to that which the military did?

16 The absence of any real, clear direction and
17 strategy meant that, in different parts of Baghdad, and
18 I know in different parts of Iraq, different systems
19 worked according to the influence of the most powerful
20 partner, and that was the military.

21 In Baghdad, one of the things I managed to do
22 through support from General Viggers was to get the
23 members of the 18th MP Brigade, who were military
24 police, and many of them were reservists who were police
25 officers, get them back out of the control of the

1 1st Armoured Division, back under the control of their
2 own colonel, so that they could actually do police work
3 and influence policing around the city, because that
4 wasn't going on before.

5 In some police stations you might find MPs, in
6 others members of the 1st Armoured Division and they are
7 proper soldiers, trained to be soldiers and had really
8 little knowledge or understanding about how policing
9 works, but were placed in police stations to provide
10 some sort of supervision and guidance.

11 So it was a very fragmented situation, and the
12 absence of any clear guidance as to what was going to
13 happen with the development of the Iraqi police meant
14 that, actually, they were always going to be subordinate
15 to the whims of the local military presence.

16 SIR RODERIC LYNE: So the two lenses you described, the
17 military was much the stronger. What was the effect of
18 that on the population and, therefore, on the general
19 level of law and order? How did the population react to
20 this?

21 DOUGLAS BRAND: One of the effects -- and here I perhaps
22 will start a line of observation which will contradict
23 a lot of other observations you have heard about the
24 Iraqi police. One of the situations was that, given the
25 circumstance of attacks on the military, which over time

1 grew rather than reduced, that many people who were
2 responsible for so-called attacks were sort of taken by
3 the military as opposed to the local police and put into
4 the military detention system as potential insurgents or
5 anti-military people, with the consequence that that
6 seemed to take a lot longer in terms of judicial
7 process, if, indeed, a judicial process actually ended
8 there.

9 Whereas the local police, many of whom are some of
10 the most admirable people I have ever met, would often
11 say in a very polite, typically Arab way "It might have
12 been better had we dealt with that, because we can take
13 him to the local court, he will get the most appropriate
14 punishment and he will be dealt with without getting
15 lost in the system of the military detention and without
16 antagonising the local community", who kept on losing
17 people, swept up in road checks or things like this, to
18 the military protection machine that was going on.

19 If I can give one classic illustration, a domestic
20 dispute was resolved on one occasion by one neighbour
21 throwing a hand grenade into the kitchen of another.
22 I happened to be in the police station when the victim
23 and the assailant was brought in. The evidence
24 gathering was crude but effective. Fragments of the
25 hand grenade were taken from the victim, who wasn't

1 badly injured, and compared with others that they found
2 at the scene, but my thought was, had the military heard
3 about this, then, because it was a hand grenade, they
4 would have made an assumption that this must be an
5 insurgent-type activity and taken this person into the
6 military system when, in fact, it was an ongoing
7 domestic dispute which the police were very well aware
8 of and had a long history of and could deal with
9 effectively at the local court level.

10 SIR RODERIC LYNE: In your very useful submission to the
11 Inquiry you note that in the summer of 2003 the military
12 was impatient to stand up local police units because, in
13 their view, the sooner the numbers of police reached
14 sufficient for local control, then the sooner the
15 military could withdraw from the policing operations
16 that they had had to adopt.

17 Now, from what you have just said, that didn't
18 actually happen, the military remained very much in the
19 lead on this. Did that effectively have
20 a counter-productive effect on security?

21 DOUGLAS BRAND: Yes, it did. This was one of a number of
22 what I call false starts. Trying to persuade my
23 military colleagues at 2-star and 3-star level that this
24 was a long-term investment of restructuring the police
25 seemed to work against their sort of short-term mission

1 goals, and I very vividly remember the presentation that
2 was done to the Commanding General which was entitled
3 "30,000 in 30 Days" which I make mention of in my
4 report.

5 To feel rather -- a rather bizarre feeling that
6 people were sort of nodding, "This is a possibility",
7 and I was trying to say "Hang on a second, what are you
8 going to do with these people in 30 days that is going
9 to make them police such that they can be effective
10 enough so that you can withdraw?"

11 We had some very robust arguments in gatherings of
12 many 2-star generals, where, perhaps somewhat
13 flippantly, I had to say, "Okay, in that case then, why
14 don't you give me the military to train? I have read
15 a few war books, I have seen a few war films, it can't
16 be a difficult as that, or is that as ridiculous as what
17 you are suggesting, which is we recruit 30,000 in 30
18 days, call them police, label them police, give them
19 weapons and say 'You are now in the police' but actually
20 have no capability to do the things that policemen
21 should do at all?"

22 Again, as I cover in the report, whether it was ever
23 adopted as formally, I don't know, I wasn't privy to
24 that, but I could certainly see the reports coming into
25 the Ministry of the Interior in terms of the number of

1 people recruited to be so-called police. It just went
2 vertical in July, August, September, October, such that
3 we almost got the numbers that we required for the
4 police of Iraq, that we would establish 70,000 without
5 doing anything at all, just by recruiting being done
6 through the military.

7 I can understand their desire to find a way of
8 saying, "We have got to step back from this", but I did
9 find it rather strange that otherwise well-informed,
10 professional thinkers could imagine that you could just
11 create a police. Thinking about their own countries,
12 thinking about the United Kingdom, it takes a long time
13 to develop that skill. Yet here we were facing people
14 just being gathered together, being called police and
15 pushed out saying, "You get on with it".

16 THE CHAIRMAN: Just as a general reflection on what you have
17 been saying, Mr Brand, a doctrine of police primacy in
18 a situation when military support for the police was
19 still required, would have been impractical as long as
20 the military support had to come from the coalition to
21 an Iraqi police service. So was there any sense at all
22 that the long-term aspiration should be for police
23 primacy once Iraqi security forces had begun to build
24 up?

25 DOUGLAS BRAND: Yes, in fact I actually did get quite a lot

1 of support for a plan -- and this was way into 2004 --
2 because, as with a lot of these things, it is not just
3 coming up with the ideas, but the timing has got to be
4 right to actually engage people.

5 When it was clear that this -- there was
6 a development of a group who were not military, who were
7 not police -- and, forgive me, I do forget the name;
8 they changed the name several times for them -- but as
9 they were starting to develop, there was a sense that
10 there was a real feeling that there was a trained
11 capability that was above the level of police and below
12 the level of military that could actually do this and
13 that the military were spending a lot of time developing
14 that.

15 At that point I said "Okay, great, if we are going
16 to have the concept of police primacy, whatever that
17 means in Iraq, then we could absorb these people". They
18 would need to be trained as police in -- to the ends of
19 justice issue that I mentioned before, but because they
20 had been trained, they could actually deal with the high
21 end issue, we could still have lots of tiers of other
22 policing going on right down to the local policing and
23 there would be police primacy, and gradually I think
24 that was recognised. Certainly the 2-star general who
25 headed both CMATT, the military training, then

1 subsequently CPATT, the police training, said publicly,
2 as he left, "If we were to do this again, we should have
3 done it the other way round, we should have put the
4 police first, trained them up in the way that it sort of
5 started to develop, and leave the military until later",
6 because obviously policing was the sort of primary
7 factor for keeping stability on the streets for so many
8 other things to happen.

9 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much. I'll ask
10 Baroness Prashar to take over the questions.

11 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: We heard you arrived in Baghdad
12 in July 2003 and that was almost three months after the
13 fall of the city and you were the first civilian to be
14 deployed to the country.

15 DOUGLAS BRAND: There were some American civilian police --

16 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: The first UK civilian.

17 DOUGLAS BRAND: Yes.

18 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: How about the city being policed
19 from April to July, before you arrived, can you describe
20 to me how the city was policed?

21 DOUGLAS BRAND: It was primarily military deployments and it
22 was an American military division that was there. They
23 broke down the city into areas of military control and
24 locally they had sought to induce back local police and
25 that had had an -- depending on where you were, that had

1 had reasonable success.

2 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: How did they try to induce them
3 back?

4 DOUGLAS BRAND: Basically broadcasting on radios, telling
5 them that, you know, things were okay and that they
6 wanted the police to come back and do their job, and so,
7 slowly, some police came back, not all by any means and,
8 in fact, even when they were coming back, by the time
9 I had arrived, some of them it was clear we didn't want
10 back, so I didn't allow them to come back into the
11 police. But mainly it was a military presence and then
12 inducing the local police to come back in.

13 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: But what was the state of the police
14 service when you arrived? Because although the Iraqi
15 police service had not been disbanded, the
16 de-Ba'athification order had had some impact. Can you
17 describe to me what was the state of the police service?

18 DOUGLAS BRAND: The de-Ba'athification process had taken out
19 a lot of the senior ranks because many of them were
20 active Ba'athists and, of course, one of the challenges
21 that we had was: who was telling the truth? Who was --
22 if somebody said "That man there is a former Ba'athist,
23 he was the head of this local chapter and he is
24 a brigadier in the police", was he, or was this somebody
25 trying to get his job, and so trying to discredit him?

1 That was probably the biggest challenge throughout the
2 whole time I was there. What was the ground truth? It
3 was very difficult to get information.

4 Even when we actually went through the process of
5 selecting the police chief of Baghdad, he being one of
6 the ones who had come back, under any normal assessment
7 process -- and this is no disrespect to the man
8 himself -- we would not have selected him. The only
9 reason we did was because he was clearly an honest man
10 amongst lots of not so honest people and the different
11 factions that existed within Baghdad had a grudging
12 respect for him. But we knew that he was -- in an ideal
13 world, we would not have selected him. He didn't have
14 any of the sort of broader skill sets that we would
15 require.

16 But the people who were coming back, we would
17 suddenly find that - at one of our liaison meetings,
18 a very grandly dressed gentleman in a white uniform,
19 suddenly turned up and he was the former head of the
20 traffic police who we had been told was one of the sort
21 of senior Ba'athists who had left the country taking his
22 police cars with him, but he suddenly turned up. Rather
23 awkward. What do we do with him and where did he come
24 from and who actually created the circumstance?

25 One of the things that I tried to advise colleagues

1 when they were coming out was, whatever you see, don't
2 assume that's how things are. There is a lot going on
3 underneath that we just don't understand, and a lot of
4 the process of trying to get that information was what
5 absorbed a lot of our time, but as far as getting them
6 back, I know, for instance, that Bernard Kerik had his
7 set of favoured senior officers, but the colonel of the
8 18th MP Brigade also had his set of favourites and they
9 weren't the same set.

10 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Each one was using his own criteria
11 in terms of assessing what they needed?

12 DOUGLAS BRAND: That's right.

13 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: What about the police stations?

14 Because in your statement you make some reference to the
15 state of the police stations.

16 DOUGLAS BRAND: Unless you have actually been there, it is
17 very difficult to describe. This thing that I rather
18 loosely call the catharsis, to be polite, meant that in
19 many cases the police stations were the main target, but
20 public buildings not only had been damaged, it was as if
21 a swarm of locusts had gone through them and taken
22 everything, every nail, every piece of wire, anything
23 that could be moved. So effectively, we had a building
24 of brick with nothing else, floor tiles gone, window
25 frames gone, everything.

1 This was something that I think the Americans did
2 a superb job on, was actually to see this as a really
3 important thing to deal with first, get the identity of
4 the police stations back, but I think even they
5 underestimated just how much repair work needed to be
6 done and those were the ones that were just damaged by
7 the activities of the mobs. There were many that had
8 been destroyed by gunfire and explosives as well. So it
9 was actually a tricky challenge to get the
10 infrastructure up and running in order that we could
11 operate police from police stations.

12 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: But what was your understanding of
13 the police service prior to your deployment? I mean
14 that's what you found, but what was your understanding
15 before you went?

16 DOUGLAS BRAND: I had very little understanding of the
17 structure. I knew that the infrastructure of the police
18 had sort of become militarised after the Gulf War, but I
19 did not have a clear understanding of how the police
20 were structured, where they sat in terms of the security
21 hierarchy. So it was a little bit of a surprise to me
22 when we started to get police back, to realise that
23 actually they were at the bottom of the security pile.
24 There had been no investment in them, the skill sets for
25 doing normal policing were often missing. Some of the

1 fundamentals that we would expect to find in any major
2 city just were not there.

3 Consequently, there was a sudden realisation -- and
4 this goes back to my response to Sir Roderic -- that
5 actually understanding what was required was something
6 that was a sort of discovery as we went along. It was
7 a journey rather than being able to open up a book and
8 say, "This is how it is".

9 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: You had to respond to what you found
10 on the ground really?

11 DOUGLAS BRAND: That's right.

12 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Can you just tell me a little bit --
13 I would like to understand about the status of the Iraqi
14 Police Service under the Saddam regime. How did that
15 fit in with the other criminal justice agencies and was
16 it a national or a local service?

17 DOUGLAS BRAND: It was a -- it was not a national service in
18 the sense that we would understand it, although there
19 were common features. I never did get to find how many
20 different types of policing and different structures
21 there were throughout the 18 governorates, but the
22 police had -- they were very competent locally. In the
23 area of the police station and the particular part of
24 the city, they were effective, because Saddam had built
25 systems where -- there were sort of like street wardens

1 and, if the police needed to know anything, they would
2 go to the street warden and the street warden would know
3 everything because anyone who went into the area had to
4 register with them.

5 Additionally, the police were very poorly paid. The
6 police officers, who had been trained as officers,
7 explained to me that over what -- they separate out the
8 Ba'ath time from the Saddam time. During the Saddam
9 time the police were more and more encouraged to go out
10 and basically be on the streets to take bribes, because
11 Saddam's view was, if they are out there, they are doing
12 their job and it keeps people in their place if the
13 police are constantly seeking to interact with people
14 and the public in this way.

15 It had some fits and starts and I don't recall now
16 the full details. There was a time, late 70s, I think,
17 where one of Saddam's sons was involved in some incident
18 where he was shot and there was a huge criticism of the
19 police because they didn't respond, until they pointed
20 out they didn't have any police cars. So there was a
21 massive purchase of American police cars, and then, of
22 course, over time they weren't serviced, they broke down
23 and so the police just slid back to where it had been
before.

24 We have to recognise that in his particular style
25 this divide and rule was a very predominant way of

1 working, and so the police, being at the bottom of that
2 pile, couldn't protest either. So they just got on with
3 things and kept their heads down, because one didn't
4 come to attention, that was clearly something you didn't
5 do in that regime, because it could cost you your life.

6 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: So they were poorly paid and bribing
7 was an integral part of the policing, but how did they
8 fit in with the other criminal justice agencies, if at
9 all?

10 DOUGLAS BRAND: There were small pockets of what I would
11 call excellence. The juvenile court system was really
12 good. They took personal interest -- when I say "they",
13 the police who ran it in conjunction with what we would
14 call social workers and with the juvenile courts really
15 engaged with the people that they were dealing with.

16 Arguably, the population, the juvenile offending
17 population, was a lot smaller than we would find in
18 other comparable size cities, but nevertheless there was
19 a great sense of purpose and really good engagement
20 between the courts, the social workers and police and
21 there was a -- almost, I guess, a traditional feeling
22 that youth cannot be neglected. We must make sure that
23 the youth doesn't go off the rails.

24 It wasn't by any means a coercive, harsh regime at
25 all. There was quite a broad range of interventions to

1 bring wayward children back in line, but then, at the
2 other end of that scale, I met a number of judges who
3 clearly had abandoned objective principles of judgment
4 in favour of an easier life, and that was very sad,
5 because people had -- they just really had nowhere to go
6 in terms of getting justice.

7 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: So really it was poor policing, no
8 infrastructure, sat in police stations. So it was quite
9 a dire situation.

10 DOUGLAS BRAND: Yes, it was.

11 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Thank you very much.

12 THE CHAIRMAN: Sir Roderic?

13 SIR RODERIC LYNE: I would like to just look at the way that
14 your role was determined and specifically the objectives
15 that you negotiated during your first week, which you
16 have set out -- six objectives -- in your statement.

17 The first four relate to Baghdad, taking full
18 responsibility for the policing of Baghdad, co-ordinate
19 and direct current policing activity being conducted by
20 the CPA in Baghdad, develop an implementation strategy
21 for policing in Baghdad aimed at achieving transition
22 from military primacy to civil police primacy, and then
23 one is an Iraqi chief of police appointed to mentor,
24 coach and train the individual, and then a couple of
25 wider ones relating to Iraq as a whole to advise the CPA

1 director for the Ministry of the Interior on
2 international support for the policing of Iraq and to
3 advise the CPA direct for the Ministry of the Interior
4 on the implementation of a strategy for policing in
5 Iraq. That looks to me, as a layman, like a very tall
6 order. Was this achievable?

7 DOUGLAS BRAND: I think it was -- yes, it was achievable in
8 a much longer time period. I mean, I had sort of agreed
9 I would go there for six months and I think after the
10 first month I realised that I would have to stay another
11 six months to get some of the basics off the ground.

12 What I sought to reflect in here was -- and
13 I actually wrote these for Bernard Kerik's agreement --
14 the last two elements were there to as much remind him
15 of his broader responsibility for the rest of Iraq as it
16 was to give myself a role.

17 So we couldn't just focus on Baghdad, although
18 Baghdad was a very important component.

19 The other thing that was very clear was that his
20 staff -- he and his staff had little understanding of
21 how to draw in the international community to support
22 outside of the United States, and so that second but
23 last one, on -- to advise him on the international
24 support side, was basically to sort of say, "We really
25 need to sort of have a conference, we need to have donor

1 conferences, we need to be able to present the case
2 which would attract people to send police support here".

3 I have to say this was in the context of an
4 extremely ambitious plan that he had, where he was going
5 to recruit -- I think it was 5,700 international police
6 officers, to work in Baghdad and the surrounding area
7 and this had been sort of worked out arithmetically, but
8 with little, I think, understanding of what the
9 international community could sustain in terms of
10 providing support.

11 So it was very much to sort of be able to engage
12 with him in conversations about what was realistic, and
13 as importantly -- and this certainly I know, features in
14 some of the exchanges between Baghdad and the
15 Foreign Office -- is to actually be able to manage the
16 offers of support in a way that is going to be
17 beneficial rather than obstructive to what you are
18 seeking to do in the long-term.

19 So, for instance, some countries had a feeling that
20 they wanted to do something and consequently sent a team
21 of police or a team of advisers, who just sort of turned
22 up and they had a particular skill, which we didn't
23 need, but one didn't want to sort of push them away
24 because, apart from the diplomatic side of things, we
25 didn't have the luxury of having a huge number of people

1 on the ground in any case. But there was a lot of
2 negotiating that had to take place to get them to fit
3 into the broad strategy that I was trying to develop,
4 and also to actually point out to some, "Actually, we do
5 need what you want to offer, but in about six months'
6 time".

7 Particularly, we had an excellent response from the
8 United Arab Emirates to forensic training which was
9 linked to the point I made earlier on about the justice
10 partners determining that forensic and physical evidence
11 gathering was an important part of broader strategy to
12 do away with the reliance on confessional evidence.

13 So that fitted in with the strategy, but we needed
14 to make sure we had the right people. We needed to have
15 the buildings, we needed to have the infrastructure in
16 place so that these individuals could then come and do
17 their work.

18 So sometimes it was about advising him on
19 strategically how we should actually bring in over the
20 next however many years international support that was
21 clearly effective.

22 Then the final point on that list was, as I said to
23 you, to make sure that his eyes were other than in
24 Baghdad and so I made a number of visits around the
25 place; first of all, for people to realise that there

1 was a senior policeman there and, secondly, to be able
2 to report back to him on the conditions. We went to
3 General Petraeus in the north, where he had done
4 a superb job on getting things back up and running, got
5 people involved in training, really set up a good
6 structure, but at that time he didn't have the insurgent
7 problems that were going on down in the south. In the
8 south, the RMPs had done a good job to start with and
9 then we were able to bring in British police to act as
10 advisers, and so that started to help there.

11 In the other areas, we were a little thin, and by
12 this time we had reached a point where he was going to
13 leave in any case. That's when I found myself doing his
14 job as well as my own.

15 SIR RODERIC LYNE: I think you made a number of points there
16 that we will want to come back on. As you tackled this
17 very large, very important agenda, what resources did
18 you have in terms of staff and budget and office and so
19 on?

20 DOUGLAS BRAND: Let me deal with the staff side first.
21 None.

22 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Just you?

23 DOUGLAS BRAND: Just me. Again, reference to
24 General Viggers, who was doing a great job of advising
25 the Commanding General. He loaned me a captain from the

1 British Military Unit, so that I had somebody who could
2 answer my phone and make appointments whilst I was in
3 other meetings.

4 It wasn't until the end of September that I had an
5 administrative assistant, and then, sometime in October,
6 when the Ministry of Defence police contingent came out
7 and I was able to take somebody as a sort of ADC,
8 ad staff officer.

9 It was -- it was quite challenging to be able to
10 effect the sort of expectation that had been made of
11 me -- operate at a 2-star level, engage at the highest
12 level diplomatically and militarily -- when one is
13 answering one's own phone and trying to do all of the
14 administration that supports that type of activity.

15 On the budget side, as I mentioned in my report,
16 I was both rich and poor. There were huge amounts of
17 money, both from the American side and from the Iraqi
18 side that was being directed into different components
19 of the security forces. But certainly, once we had put
20 in the bid for the supplemental budget, the
21 congressional supplemental budget, the realities of that
22 and the difficulties that we would have in spending the
23 money or being able to access the money, which we had
24 not been aware of before, really started to bite home.
25 We were approaching the winter. We wanted to buy winter

1 clothing for the police, because one of the critical
2 things that had been done very early on was to say
3 "Let's get them out of the green uniforms that remind
4 everybody the Iraqi army and the sort of oppression and
5 let's get them in blue uniforms" -- our choice -- "Let's
6 get them in blue uniforms so that everybody can see this
7 is a new group".

8 Well, it was fine when you just had trousers and
9 shirts when it was hot - 40 plus in the summer - but it
10 gets pretty cold in Iraq in the winter. So to try to buy
11 them winter clothing, to be restricted in the way that
12 the congressional supplemental budget is allowed to be
13 used, meant that we couldn't tender before the money had
14 been released. The tendering process because of the
15 quantities we were talking about, took many months. The
16 letting of the contract also took many months. So we had
17 often had policemen wrapped in blankets because we hadn't
18 been able to purchase the equipment for them in the right
19 time or in a timely fashion.

20 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Did you have communications equipment
21 when you arrived there, computers and that sort of
22 thing?

23 DOUGLAS BRAND: The main communication was by cell phone --
24 this is personally -- a cell phone which I think was
25 going sponsored by an American company. We relied on

1 military communications to get out of -- our
2 communication out of Baghdad.

3 Again, full credit to the 18th MP Brigade in
4 Baghdad. They had actually acknowledged communications
5 for the police as a critical focus of standing up,
6 a capability, and they had invested a lot of their local
7 money -- and that was another thing we discovered after
8 time -- that actually, if the funds had been directed
9 into the major subordinate commands, they could spend it
10 without any difficulty. There was no rules for them.
11 So they could buy radios, they could buy radio masts and
12 get the police up and running in a relatively short
13 period of time.

14 We are talking about September/October, we started
15 to have policemen with radios, driving around in police
16 cars, like the police would normally be. But it was in
17 patches and certainly was not existing outside of the
18 rest of -- in the rest of Iraq, except for Basra, where
19 we put some efforts into that down there as well.

20 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Was it the British Government that asked
21 you to go out and play this role? Should the
22 British Government have provided you right from the
23 beginning with the tools you needed to do the job,
24 including staff tools, so that you didn't have to borrow
25 a captain from the army who probably knew nothing about

1 the police and had no previous contact with them?

2 DOUGLAS BRAND: I think the answer to that was simply yes.

3 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Were you asking for it? Were you sending
4 messages back saying "Please send X, Y and Z"?

5 DOUGLAS BRAND: Yes, when I was looking over my reports,
6 I was quite surprised how restrained I had been in the
7 constant repetition of requests for staffing that just
8 seemed to disappear. There wasn't even a response.

9 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Where were you sending these requests to?

10 DOUGLAS BRAND: To the Foreign Office and to Paul Kernaghan,
11 as the ACPO representative. There were some very
12 specific things that I was looking to do. The first
13 thing that became very clear was that I wasn't just
14 going to be given a contingent; I had to justify each
15 person that I wanted to have, and so I had started to
16 identify the critical areas that I felt we needed to
17 work, and not least with the police chief of Baghdad.
18 I felt that he needed an expert or somebody who had
19 expertise in criminal intelligence, so that he could
20 develop his awareness of what was going on and, at the
21 same time, in doing so, recognise that there were some
22 performance things that he could actually look at.

23 When I look back now, having discussions with him
24 in October/November, about performance policing, when we
25 were still trying to refurbish buildings and get people

1 out on the streets was perhaps a little bit ambitious
2 but, having said that, he started to collect information
3 and started to understand the principles. But I could
4 really have done with, then, that individual who could
5 look at the intelligence side of things, look at crime
6 patterns and help him analyse how to deploy his
7 resources based on the demand.

8 That happened eventually. Some of the things that
9 didn't happen, which I think are quite sad, is that,
10 having spent quite some time developing my relationship
11 with Mr Bremer and his team and being able to be
12 reasonably influential, an opportunity arose for us to
13 influence the direction in which the development of the
14 Iraqi Intelligence Service, whatever it was going to be,
15 was going to go, and one of the things that I felt for
16 quite some time was that there seemed to be an awful lot
17 of agencies that had power just to lock people away and
18 not have any accountability, so one of the principles of
19 the democratic process is to have accountability with
20 the authorities.

21 So I argued over a series of meetings with
22 intelligence services from a number of different
23 countries that, if we had a sort of special branch
24 system, like we have in the UK, where the intelligence
25 service does the intelligence work and the arresting and

1 locking-up is done by a police agency, that gives
2 a useful balance, allows people to actually focus on
3 their main area of expertise and doesn't cause the
4 problems of the intelligence people having the power to
5 arrest and detain and do whatever else they need to do to
6 get information.

7 Eventually the Administrator, Ambassador Bremer, was
8 persuaded of that being the better way and made that as
9 a decision. I could not get a special branch manager or
10 somebody retired who had that skill of being able to
11 take the concept into reality, and so we lost the
12 opportunity and that disappeared.

13 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Where did the difficulty lie in getting
14 the resources such as the Special Branch-type person you
15 have just mentioned? Was it because of the system that
16 we have in this country or was it because the people to
17 whom you were sending your requests were not being
18 effective? Was it because we hadn't planned this in
19 advance and it inevitably takes time to jack things up,
20 to find somebody who will go to the Iraq. What were the
21 obstacles that were holding you back?

22 DOUGLAS BRAND: I think there were elements of all three in
23 terms of obstacles. I think one of the things we have
24 to recognise in principle is that British policing is
25 essentially a domestic affair. We don't recruit police

1 people, men and women, to have a mind on
2 expeditionary-type activities in other countries. It is
3 an inward-looking domestic focus and actually we are
4 pretty good at that, but we also seem to have this
5 desire to go elsewhere and we don't have the
6 infrastructure. I have certainly suggested this in
7 other fora; we need to have an infrastructure. If we
8 want to play in that arena, we have to have that
9 infrastructure to be able to respond to it.

10 Australia has certainly taken a lead on that and, to
11 a lesser extent, Canada, where, because they know they
12 are going to be involved in local -- international
13 affairs, they have actually set up a capability within
14 their national police to be able to respond.

15 If we intend to continue getting involved in
16 international police support operations, then we will
17 have to do something similar.

18 At the end of the day here, whilst the
19 Chief Constable can send his or her officers to anywhere
20 in the world to investigate crime from an operational
21 perspective, for non-operational issues -- and this is
22 where my posting fits into that category -- there has to
23 be agreement from the Home Office, there has to be an
24 agreement from the police authority, and there has to be
25 an agreement from the chief executive officer, himself

1 or herself, as well.

2 I was aware that many of my colleagues -- and
3 I understand their position -- would not release their
4 policemen to go abroad for this type of purpose, and
5 I can understand their position there.

6 I can also understand that many of their officers,
7 who do go, do an outstanding job, far above their pay
8 grade and have huge influence, a very positive
9 influence, but we don't yet seem to be able to capture
10 that as an important ingredient of UK PLC's contribution
11 internationally.

12 We have to recognise that, if we haven't got that
13 system in place, then we have to go through a slow,
14 laborious process of trying to find somebody to actually
15 fill a hole, when I need it filled yesterday, we have to
16 advertise it, we have to go through a whole series of
17 processes and eventually, if the person decides, "Well,
18 actually, I don't think I do want to go", we have to
19 start the whole thing again.

20 I'm reminded -- and I know I mentioned this in my
21 report -- of Sir Jeremy Greenstock's observation that in
22 extraordinary situations, the application of ordinary
23 solutions is often going to fail, and that's one of the
24 situations that we faced. I don't think there has been
25 a great deal of change from what I understand; since we

1 made those observations back in the -- seven years or so
2 ago.

3 THE CHAIRMAN: Usha?

4 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Thank you very much. We have heard
5 that the expectations were high and there was a lack of
6 resources. Against that background, how did you
7 determine your priorities and was there really
8 a discussion of the sort of police force that was
9 required for Iraq?

10 DOUGLAS BRAND: Yes, there was and when we started to really
11 focus on the CPA strategy, which was not in existence
12 initially because the CPA was very young, clearly the
13 role of the police and the justice system within that
14 was a major part of it. It did take quite some time to
15 actually -- to sort of pin it down to what was required
16 because everybody had their own opinion.

17 There is the sort of American law enforcement
18 view of the world, there is the British sort of police
19 service view of the world. I had some colleagues from
20 Spain, so consequently there was a Guardia Civil view of
21 the world, and getting these different views to come
22 together and coalesce into some form of a strategy
23 taking into account the context and culture of Iraq was
24 not an easy thing.

25 Additionally, at the time where this was actually

1 happening, it was the time where I had taken
2 responsibility for Bernard Kerik's position and had
3 inherited a newly appointed Iraqi Minister of the
4 Interior, who had to learn the ropes in terms of, first
5 of all, not undoing all the things that we had done in
6 the previous three or four months, which took a while to
7 persuade him, and then to actually work with him on
8 strategically what direction the Ministry of the
9 Interior would take within which police, borders,
10 customs, would operate, so that there wasn't
11 a disconnect between the policy decision and direction
12 and the practical application on the ground.

13 Of course, one of the things we had to take into
14 account was the developing political profile, which
15 I think even the most gifted of us didn't really
16 understand the full ramifications of. So when the
17 minister wanted to create some seven deputy ministers,
18 it was not for any efficiency purpose, it was to make
19 sure that people were held in the right place, had
20 sufficient political influence but not too much to
21 eclipse that of his responsibility, and so, building
22 a system -- and I mentioned in my report -- based
23 loosely on a sort of Home Office type structure -- we
24 had to accommodate these other influences which were not
25 logical, from our perspective, but nevertheless that was

1 the real world for the developing Iraq, so had to be
2 taken into account.

3 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: But in doing that, was there a sort
4 of awareness among those you were dealing with about the
5 dual role of maintaining security and policing an
6 integral part of the criminal justice system, or were
7 there very different perspectives on that as well?

8 DOUGLAS BRAND: I think that there was an intellectual
9 understanding of the need for a police and criminal
10 justice system, but every time they opened the window or
11 looked out of the door, it was heavy security that was
12 the dominant feature and, consequently -- as I say,
13 intellectually, we could have long discussions about how
14 important this was, but the reality was, particularly as
15 the insurgency grew, you know, we would love to spend
16 time developing the justice system but we have got the
17 front door to deal with in terms of insurgency, attacks
18 on not just the coalition forces but, as I mentioned
19 again in my report, the target, the police being the
20 target of a lot of insurgent activity, and so not being
21 able to even sort of think about taking it forward with
22 a developed strategy, when actually they were in
23 survival mode.

24 I have to say that there was a huge amount of
25 distraction for me personally, because anything that had

1 an association with the word "police" ended up with me
2 and so I found myself doing far more
3 operational-oriented work than I thought I would when
4 I first went there.

5 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Were you having to firefight?

6 DOUGLAS BRAND: Yes.

7 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: I mean, you had the trajectorial
8 strategy to deal with the operational issues.

9 DOUGLAS BRAND: That's right.

10 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: I would just like to focus on
11 another issue, because a number of military witnesses
12 have told us that they thought that the Carabinieri
13 style of policing would have been appropriate for Iraq,
14 but Sir Ronnie Flanagan disagreed.

15 Do you have a view on that?

16 DOUGLAS BRAND: I think my -- I can empathise with those who
17 saw the Carabinieri style, or Gendarmerie style, because
18 looking at it from an ordinary policing point of view,
19 it looks that much more effective in terms of the
20 environment in which we were operating. The Italian
21 Carabinieri that I visited, for all intents and purposes
22 were a military outfit. They had their armoured
23 vehicles and machine guns and that sort of thing. So if
24 you were a policeman from London, you'd say "That's
25 clearly what we need for the moment" but then, if you

1 look at it from the strategic development point of
2 view -- and that was what I was trying to do, I was
3 trying to look beyond that, and say: actually, we might
4 need a component of that within an infrastructure that
5 represents policing from basic normal policing at
6 a police station through to more regional specialist
7 development on investigation, right up to the capability
8 to deal with, you know, small insurgencies, where you
9 might need things that looked very much like a military
10 activity but actually are furnished by a Carabinieri
11 style.

12 So the Americans particularly liked the Carabinieri
13 style because it fitted in with their notion of how they
14 would like to be. This is based on conversations with
15 many of my American police colleagues, "We wish we were
16 like that". In fact, you can see that a lot of the
17 developing of their equipment, even though they have
18 a basic law enforcement system, in the larger cities
19 they do have kit that looks a bit like Carabinieri style
20 equipment.

21 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: You said earlier that a lot of
22 people were involved, there were different views, there
23 were discussions, from your point of view, but what was
24 your assessment on the ground as to what kind of style
25 of policing was needed?

1 DOUGLAS BRAND: One of the things and it is interesting
2 how -- and we need to look at our history -- one of the
3 things that a lot of the police officers I spoke to were
4 very complimentary of was the police training that their
5 grandfathers had had from the British in the 1920s,
6 because they knew where they stood, they understood what
7 the policing was about. It was able to deal with every
8 level of policing challenge and, in fact, you know --
9 I make no apologies for it -- I actually used that as
10 a way of getting into the Iraqi communities by finding
11 people whose fathers or grandfathers had been in the
12 British-led police, because there was a point of contact
13 there.

14 But as far as the policing from a professional,
15 modern perspective, I saw that there was space for the
16 continuing existence of this very localised -- very much
17 like we would identify with -- small local area
18 policing. On top of that, national capabilities, which
19 would include the capability to deal with insurgency at
20 a high level, but as importantly -- and something that
21 was neglected -- to deal with the sort of traditional
22 organised crime that we are pretty much familiar with,
23 which, according to Iraqi police colleagues, existed
24 with Saddam's blessing so long as it was done to his way
25 of doing things and his sons got an appropriate

1 remuneration from it.

2 So, for instance, there is still a very strong drug
3 trafficking trade through Iraq. Under Saddam, he
4 controlled it. But just because he has gone doesn't
5 mean to say it has disappeared. Human trafficking
6 through the area there is rife and so the development of
7 the police capability had to accommodate those things as
8 well, but when you are dealing with upfront insurgency,
9 it is very difficult to talk about the subtleties of
10 developed policing with people who are having to suffer
11 the consequences of this attack on an almost daily
12 basis.

13 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: The picture I'm getting is there was
14 no recognised central control, there was no capacity for
15 strategic thinking, you were having to deal with
16 operational matters and actually firefight, so there was
17 no capacity.

18 DOUGLAS BRAND: A lot of the time, yes.

19 THE CHAIRMAN: I think we will take a break now for ten
20 minutes and then return. Thank you.

21 (11.25 am)

22 (Short break)

23 (11.35 am)

24 THE CHAIRMAN: Let's restart. I would like to ask one or
25 two questions about resources and support. You have

1 covered that very fully in your extremely helpful
2 statement. We have touched on it already this morning
3 but just to be clear about, first of all, the financial
4 streams that were flowing. You have spoken about the
5 major congressional funding, but also the difficulties
6 attached to actually using it. There was local money.
7 Was there also UK streamed money?

8 DOUGLAS BRAND: I'm sure there was, but I didn't -- I wasn't
9 in receipt of it myself. As far as the sort of
10 financial challenges that I had, the -- finding somebody
11 to authorise things was actually quite difficult. On
12 one occasion I travelled with the minister to Egypt
13 because Egypt had offered support and then he wanted to
14 go to the UAE because they had also offered support and
15 trying to find somebody to authorise that was actually
16 quite difficult.

17 THE CHAIRMAN: Someone in-country or back in the UK?

18 DOUGLAS BRAND: Clearly it was back in the UK. It wasn't
19 going to be done in-country. That was made very clear.

20 THE CHAIRMAN: Was there a direct connection from you to the
21 FCO for that sort of domestic business?

22 DOUGLAS BRAND: It became established as a result of that
23 particular request, because it was, I think it was just
24 something that people hadn't thought of. I was going to
25 Iraq and why would I be in Egypt?

1 THE CHAIRMAN: Did you have the same problem of having to
2 establish a connection in terms of getting personnel
3 support as well?

4 DOUGLAS BRAND: Yes, I definitely got the impression that,
5 once I had been deployed, that was it, that the
6 undertaking had been accomplished and I would get on
7 with it. I don't think that -- I don't know what the
8 Foreign Office's experience of deploying chief officers
9 had been before. I suspect there hadn't been too many,
10 but there didn't seem to be an understanding of how one
11 operates and the sort of support that one would need and
12 I got the impression that they thought it might be
13 provided on the ground.

14 But it became very clear that the situation on the
15 ground was quite dire in terms of every department not
16 having sufficient people to do the job properly.

17 THE CHAIRMAN: Could you look for support in theatre to the
18 senior British representative, be it the military or on
19 the civil side?

20 DOUGLAS BRAND: On occasions that I needed to communicate or
21 I needed to get advice on structuring things, I would
22 certainly go to Sir Jeremy Greenstock's staff, but in
23 terms of actually getting help from them, sort of
24 seconded help, no, they were pretty busy themselves.

25 THE CHAIRMAN: Would it be right to start to draw a lesson

1 that there needs to be a much stronger theatre to home
2 connection in terms of any police deployment?

3 DOUGLAS BRAND: Absolutely. I think that the best example
4 I can give -- and I got to know his office very well --
5 but General Viggers had effectively a non-operational
6 2-star role in the traditional sense. He wasn't a major
7 subordinate commander which would attract a different
8 type of support, but he nevertheless had a political
9 adviser, he had a military adviser, he had a secretary,
10 he had a Chief of Staff. Very small, compact but
11 functioning, a capably functioning support team, which
12 allowed him to do the sorts of support activities that
13 he had to undertake in supporting the Commanding
14 General.

15 THE CHAIRMAN: You have touched already this morning on the
16 difficulties you encountered simply in moving around,
17 thinking of the need for close protection from armoured
18 vehicles and all the rest of it. Who actually had or
19 should have had responsibility for your personal
20 security and the means to enable to you function on the
21 ground? Was this the FCO?

22 DOUGLAS BRAND: Yes, it was the FCO and, in fact, my first
23 conversation with the Chief of Staff, General Viggers,
24 Chief of Staff, was he asked me, "Sir, where is your
25 protection?" and I basically said, "What protection?"

1 He said, "Okay. Well, we will get on with that", and it
2 took, I think, three weeks to get an assessment and
3 eventually get an assigned a protection team. I had to
4 sort of make do and mend in between times.

5 THE CHAIRMAN: Was the protection team you got a British
6 military one or was it in -- ultimately FCO-provided?

7 DOUGLAS BRAND: It was a FCO-provided commercial company --

8 THE CHAIRMAN: Right.

9 DOUGLAS BRAND: -- who did a very good job, did a very good
10 job, but -- and things like -- you know, I carried
11 a personal weapon, but that had to be sent out from the
12 MoD. It wasn't available on-site. So there were the
13 small things which -- you know, you could actually do
14 a pilot's checklist of things to sort of do in the
15 future.

16 THE CHAIRMAN: Do we in effect have that from the experience
17 you had in Iraq in 2003 and 2004?

18 DOUGLAS BRAND: I'm not sure we do. I think we have
19 elements of it and I think -- I mentioned yesterday --
20 I mentioned probably the cross-Whitehall task force that
21 we had afterwards, in which a number of these things
22 were identified, but I'm not sure what was subsequently
23 picked up as an action.

24 THE CHAIRMAN: We have had since then, of course, much
25 experience in Afghanistan, where presumably similar but

1 not by any means identical issues would have arisen.

2 DOUGLAS BRAND: Certainly my short time in Afghanistan,
3 I recognised a lot of the things that we had in Iraq and
4 I think there are some fundamentals going back to the
5 job of developing the police.

6 Certainly, when I did the visit to Afghanistan, the
7 police were being trained and equipped in exactly the
8 same way as we had hoped would happen in Iraq, but
9 nobody was asking the question, "What happens to them
10 when they leave the training school?"

11 It wasn't too difficult to find out that they had
12 divested all the new kit, they had been put on to
13 some -- one of the local police commanders'
14 cash-engendering schemes and, you know, things don't
15 actually develop very well, and one of the weaknesses in
16 the whole police training strategy was that everybody
17 ignored the field training component, which was
18 a transition from theory to practice, which is probably
19 the most demanding and would actually distract an awful
20 lot of police from their normal work.

21 THE CHAIRMAN: We would like to come on to the training
22 issue in a bit more detail in just a moment. I really
23 wanted to get as much as we can from your own personal
24 experience and the last point I wanted to ask was how
25 much you could look to your own home force,

1 South Yorkshire, for any kind of support, both in
2 theatre and on return or against the prospect of return?

3 DOUGLAS BRAND: For the reasons I mentioned earlier on, it
4 is actually quite difficult for a domestic police force
5 to sort of supply you with the things that you need.
6 I actually took a South Yorkshire Police piece of body
7 armour with me, because one of the things that I decided
8 very early on was that -- not least because of my
9 physical size -- I needed to send out a message that the
10 police were here, because with thousands of military
11 people it is actually quite difficult to recognise where
12 the sort of entry points for the transition to civil
13 order is going to come from. So I made a point of
14 always being dressed in a police uniform with police
15 badges and would have my South Yorkshire Police body
16 armour with me, which sort of, in the heat,
17 disintegrated over months, but that was another thing.
18 It wasn't designed for that type of activity.

19 But there was little that my force could do in terms
20 of supporting me. What it could have done is it could
21 have been a little bit more engaged back home, whilst
22 I was abroad, in making sure or reassuring -- the sort
23 of reassurance that families need, for instance, which
24 was -- I think I would be kind in saying it was limited,
25 but it was not part of the support that was provided.

1 I make mention -- my Chief Constable pointed out to
2 the Police Authority, "Here is one of three of my
3 Assistant Chief Constables operating at deputy
4 Chief Constable level. He is the only person who is not
5 substantive. Will you make him substantive?" He fought
6 hard for that. That was in order to achieve the
7 objective of being able to operate at a 2-star level.
8 So there was a purpose in doing that.

9 But I think that it is difficult for ACPO to
10 legislate, because of the very local nature of policing,
11 but certainly I know my family would have appreciated
12 the occasional telephone call to say "How are you
13 doing?" and that -- you know, that was one of the things
14 that they fed back to me.

15 THE CHAIRMAN: We would like to take ten minutes or so at
16 the end of this session for your general reflections and
17 that might go to the wider issue of the attitude of
18 British police forces and police authorities towards
19 overseas deployments. But I wanted to get your own
20 personal experience. So thank you for that.

21 You mentioned training, and perhaps we could turn to
22 that. Sir Martin?

23 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: I would like to look at the process of
24 training. You mentioned in your statement that the
25 initial strategy was one of recruit, train, equip at

1 basic level. If I could start with recruit, first of
2 all, where did the police recruits come from?

3 DOUGLAS BRAND: The initial cadre of recruits we took from
4 the police officers training school that had existed
5 just prior to the war. They were the first year
6 students -- sorry, no, I think they were the second year
7 students, and we had planned to have them as the first
8 cadre and then the first year students as the second,
9 which would then give us several benefits.

10 One would be people who were motivated to be
11 policemen in the first place. Secondly, people who had
12 gone through some form of training process before our
13 basic training, so we wanted to sort of capitalise on
14 what we had there. So we were able to draw on the
15 records of the Iraqi police to identify them, bring them
16 in, vet them and get them ready to really go across to
17 Jordan.

18 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: What was the vetting process?

19 DOUGLAS BRAND: That was done by the military, and I have no
20 idea how they do that, but certainly one of the things
21 that I wanted to do was to involve civilian police in
22 the recruiting process because, again, I didn't want it
23 to be exclusively seen through a military lens.

24 This is where we come up against another problem,
25 which either we can explore now or later, about how one

1 gets the skill sets that you require from -- certainly
2 from other countries, because the American police
3 officers who came through the State Department's
4 contractor DynCorp, for the most part were patrolmen
5 and first line supervisors, but amongst them were
6 people -- there were three female officers who had
7 recruiting experience, and so, as soon as I found that,
8 "Great, I'm going to have those in my recruiting team",
9 only to find a few weeks later that they had disappeared
10 and DynCorp company had offered more money for those who
11 would be prepared to do effectively armed security
12 guards on some of the buildings and these three ladies
13 had gone off to do that.

14 So I actually couldn't control, and I had a bit of
15 a discussion with the in-country manager and his bottom
16 line was "They are my people. I do with them what
17 I will. You get what I give you". Okay, that was the
18 situation. But it did have a knock-on effect because
19 I just couldn't have a police aspect to this recruiting
20 process.

21 But after, what we decided was, having got those two
22 cadres of already existing trainee policemen through,
23 that would have given us some breathing space to sort
24 out the recruiting process for those who had not gone
25 through that recruiting path.

1 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: What percentage in the end were the
2 people who had not gone through?

3 DOUGLAS BRAND: Certainly on the first course, the first 500
4 were all second year police trainees from the former
5 Iraqi academy. I don't remember the proportion from
6 there on. The training responsibility was reallocated
7 on the arrival of the new American director in the
8 Ministry of Interior, the CPA Ministry of the Interior.
9 So I had lost track of that.

10 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: You mentioned Jordan. Can you tell us
11 something about where the training took place and the
12 phases of training?

13 DOUGLAS BRAND: Yes, I mean, the training -- I mean it
14 sounds very grand. It is actually a very, very basic
15 course. It is eight weeks, half of which is to deal
16 with vehicles and shooting and things of that nature.
17 But it was developed from the Kosovo model and, in fact,
18 the head of the Kosovo training school was brought in by
19 the State Department's international law enforcement
20 agency to set up the training centre in Jordan. I had
21 gone in September, I think it was, early September, with
22 Ambassador McManaway, to negotiate with Jordan because
23 the King of Jordan had said that he wanted to help and,
24 after some initial difficulties in finding an
25 appropriate site, we eventually found a site that was

1 capable of being developed. The Americans very swiftly
2 moved in another one of their contractors and took over
3 the responsibility of developing the site, according to
4 standards that we actually wanted in terms of
5 accommodation and classrooms and that sort of thing, and
6 then the American part that was back in Baghdad took
7 over responsibility for developing the response or the
8 reaction to this training. So my involvement was up to
9 getting the first cadre across to Jordan and
10 responsibilities were shifted.

11 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: What equipment were the recruits given?
12 Were there problems with equipment?

13 DOUGLAS BRAND: They were given basic but serviceable
14 equipment, uniforms, bed rolls, things of that nature,
15 so that they could function, and also they were
16 equipped, once they were satisfactorily trained and
17 shipped back to Iraq, given extra equipment so that they
18 could actually go and do their job as policemen.

19 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: When they returned to Iraq, was
20 training followed up or --

21 DOUGLAS BRAND: No, that's the one area I identify as the
22 biggest weakness, which was highlighted right at the
23 beginning. You know, you can't just train people for
24 eight weeks in a foreign country, bring them back, put
25 them out on the streets and expect them to behave like

1 police, and this is the area that I had intended we
2 should have the majority of the international support,
3 either being in charge of a group of local mentors,
4 local field training officers, who were experienced
5 police officers or actually doing it themselves.

6 The closest we got to that was to put police
7 advisers into the major subordinate command areas as
8 advisers and part of that advice activity was to link in
9 with whatever was happening in terms of development of
10 police, and to make their presence known and fit in with
11 what the development was, knowing that, as the training
12 strategy was developing and the broader strategy was
13 developing, they would have some sort of reach back to
14 a policy, a set of ideas, as to which way we were going.

15 But time was clearly running out, because one of the
16 critical changes in terms of everybody's outlook -- and
17 I'm sure this has been covered by other witnesses -- was
18 the decision in November that the handover is going to
19 take place in June, at the end of June, and all the
20 focus was on "Let's get this over to the Iraqis", and so
21 our longer-term intentions were almost squashed from
22 there on.

23 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Time is really what I want to talk
24 about now. The initial estimate of numbers required was
25 between 68,000 and 70,000 and in your statement you say

1 that, despite professional advice that it would take
2 about five years to produce such numbers, there was, as
3 you put it, considerable pressure on these timelines, so
4 they were reduced down to 18 months. Can you tell us
5 what was causing that pressure?

6 DOUGLAS BRAND: I think there were several things. One, the
7 expeditionary nature of the military view is always very
8 short-term. You know, "We have got a mission to do,
9 let's get the mission done and get back". So talking
10 about five years to senior military people, it doesn't
11 register as part of a way of operating because that's
12 not their skill set. They don't go into that sort of
13 long-term campaign plan.

14 Additionally -- and this was suggested to me
15 strongly by American colleagues -- if we could get this
16 training done in time for the 2004 presidential
17 election, it would be able to demonstrate some outcomes.

18 You know, even though a lot of it was almost
19 impossible, we actually did it. The bits that were
20 missing were important, but the part that we started out
21 to do, actually got achieved, but it did have its
22 downsides, and the downsides I have already touched on.

23 You know, we didn't have a proper foundation.
24 Consequently, when police went back to their police
25 station areas, there wasn't an infrastructure for them

1 to develop, so they would find them sort of the bottom
2 line and they would fit within that and then the
3 potential for developing them into specialisms or
4 develop their skills as patrol officers would be
5 limited.

6 So consequences all the way along the line would
7 start to feature because of the inability to invest
8 right at the beginning in a long-term plan.

9 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Thank you very much. I'll come back to
10 that later.

11 THE CHAIRMAN: Right, Usha?

12 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Can we move on to talk about the
13 Ministry of the Interior and the effort made to build
14 its capacity? We have been looking at training, but it
15 is really looking top down on what was happening to the
16 Ministry of the Interior.

17 What approach was being taken to reform the Ministry
18 and what had been the effect of the de-Ba'athification?

19 DOUGLAS BRAND: Generally speaking, the initial response to
20 the setting up of the first Minister of the Interior, it
21 was very much a political appointment, very much geared
22 to the interests of the then lead person, Ayad Allawi.

23 The difficulty actually was to find -- where was his
24 bottom line? What background did he have? What
25 experience did he have? Did he really understand the

1 role of a Minister of Interior?

2 As you are probably aware, the sort of culture there
3 is a culture of patronage, and so, therefore, if you can
4 give jobs to people and if you can distribute largesse
5 appropriately, then that makes you a good person,
6 well-respected. So there was that side of the
7 challenge.

8 There was another side of the challenge, which was
9 the emerging political tensions within the Governing
10 Council and competing for different positions within the
11 ministries. Then, in between that, was this senior
12 British policeman saying, "Actually, in the UK this is
13 how the Home Office works and you might want to draw
14 some lessons from this".

15 So it was -- it wasn't a surprise that it actually
16 took quite a time -- and I mention in my report -- many
17 late nights on his kitchen table literally, trying to
18 draw lines which made appropriate connections, which had
19 nothing to do with the efficiency of the ministry but
20 more to do with accommodating a range of other
21 considerations, not least of which the political
22 pressures. All of that had an effect on what was going
23 to fall out of that in terms of policies for the
24 developing of the police, the borders, the customs, and
25 the fire service was in that as well.

1 So I give that as a sort of preamble to say strategy
2 but not quite as we understand it. A strategy that was
3 having to accommodate a whole range of things which
4 I anticipated, over time, the minister would start to
5 realise -- when he got more and more into his
6 responsibilities, he would start to realise "No, I can't
7 have that" and actually I had several plan Bs and Cs
8 ready to slot in when it was appropriate, but he had to
9 recognise that for himself because he was understandably
10 quite resistant to me, a foreigner, saying "This is how
11 you should run your country from the ministerial
12 perspective".

13 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: So your role was one of trying to
14 influence and to help to set the direction but not
15 directly manage?

16 DOUGLAS BRAND: Not directly manage him. That was -- I had
17 to sort of call a time-out on one occasion and invoke
18 Ambassador Bremer's intervention just to sort of get him
19 refocused. That was to do with dismantling all the
20 things that we had put into place over the previous
21 three or four months, but once we had got over that,
22 then we had very good, very positive working
23 relationship. I had tremendous help from one of the
24 British support, Andrew Rathmell, who went on to write
25 some very good accounts of the different challenges that

1 we found in the development of the capability of the
2 ministry and, over time, I sensed that we were actually
3 going to win this particular one.

4 Then, of course, the minister got changed. So we
5 started off with another minister and then another
6 minister came along. So each time they had to be
7 reintroduced to what had been before, what our
8 aspirations were, with, of course, their significant
9 input, and where we thought we could help, and all the
10 time we were getting closer and closer to the end
11 of June where it was going to be their responsibility.

12 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: The Jones Report, which was made to
13 the congress in 2007, described the Ministry of the
14 Interior as a ministry in name only. Now, were these
15 conditions of the state of affairs being said as early
16 as 2003/2004, do you think?

17 DOUGLAS BRAND: Yes, they were. The ministry building --
18 and if you ever get a chance to see a picture of it, it
19 looks as austere on the outside as it is on the
20 inside -- had been subject to the catharsis initially.
21 It had been refurbished, rebuilt. It had been attacked
22 several times significantly by car bombs. So just
23 accessing the building was quite a challenge, but then,
24 on the interior of the building, very much as
25 I understand -- or as it has been explained to me exist

1 in some parts the United Nations, the different floors
2 represent different interests.

3 So, you know, I could go and see the minister and
4 then come down two floors and I would be in a completely
5 different environment because there was a completely
6 different set of rules and agendas for a deputy minister
7 who came from the opposition party, and I certainly
8 didn't enjoy the sort of warmth and bonhomie that I had
9 had with the minister. Then I would go another floor
10 down and meet the police minister and things were back
11 on track again.

12 So I think that's not an unreasonable description
13 because the affiliations -- the affiliations were with
14 people. There was no organisational or personal
15 recollection of public service providing a service, and
16 so, even though the thing was called the Ministry of the
17 Interior, people looked at the individual and said,
18 "Okay, what can he do for me, and what can they do for
19 me?"

20 I guess, even today, it is still is developing that
21 sense of identity, as part of the institute of state to
22 provide service and protection to its people rather than
23 have individuals who one subscribes to or not according
24 to political or other influences.

25 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: But what priority was afforded to

1 the institutional reforms in terms of the ministry --
2 capacity building versus the training of the new
3 recruits? Were we putting too much emphasis on training
4 and not enough on capacity building?

5 DOUGLAS BRAND: Well, I think the answer to that is yes,
6 I did have for a short period of time a colleague from
7 the Home Office who had been a senior person and it was
8 my intention that he would go into the ministry and
9 start to help develop how the ministry should operate.
10 But after a couple of weeks, he decided it wasn't
11 actually for him and came back. So --

12 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: He wasn't replaced?

13 DOUGLAS BRAND: He wasn't replaced. So basically the
14 minister had me and one or two junior officers who had
15 skills in particular areas, that was it. If we had had
16 the exclusive job of just developing him, even though
17 that would have been challenging, it could have achieved
18 something. But all the time there were the other
19 demands as well, and I think this -- the paucity of
20 support became acute and I can remember on one occasion
21 standing in front of one of the American ambassadors and
22 having just a laugh because, in the space of 30 seconds,
23 four huge demands had come in, one involving the
24 assassination of one of the members of the Council,
25 something else was going on in Karbala, and each one

1 came in like a Whitehall farce, and I just said, "Okay,
2 which one do you want me to deal with first and how much
3 time do you want me to spend on these?" It was as silly
4 as that, almost. I think that's when we started to
5 really recognise that there just wasn't the
6 sustainability for what we were seeking to do.

7 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Did you have any links with the
8 Ministry of Justice?

9 DOUGLAS BRAND: Yes, I did, and they were led initially by
10 a very capable American lawyer and he had some very
11 capable individuals who were also -- sorry, he was
12 a judge and he had some very capable lawyers who had
13 been in other Peace support operations, so had a sense of
14 the sort of things that needed to be done. But even
15 they, I think, were surprised at just how broken the
16 system was.

17 Of course what we sought to try to do was apply
18 justice now and also develop a capability for the
19 future, and the apply justice now involved lots of sort
20 of national and international challenges, which nobody
21 had considered, but needed something to be done.

22 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: As if you didn't have enough to do,
23 but one of the other objectives was to mentor the chief
24 of police. How did you cope with that?

25 DOUGLAS BRAND: He was a very nice man and, in that

1 wonderful Arab way, he would never confront an issue
2 directly, but on one occasion I was asked by my
3 interpreter, who was one of his staff, "The chief wants
4 to know, do you ever take lunch?" and I said, "Sure,
5 does he want to go out to lunch?" not thinking that what
6 he meant was, "Do you stop in the middle of the day and
7 then do you have a sleep in the afternoon?" and so
8 I said, "Well, what does he want to do?" He said, "Can
9 we just have lunch once a week?" and I sort of looked
10 back and thought of the times I had dragged him out at
11 midnight to go and visit his police stations, "This is
12 about your leadership and your influence. You have got
13 to be out there", at all times of the day and night, and
14 I suddenly felt quite guilty that I wasn't even giving
15 him lunch.

16 But the chief understood his limitations and his
17 first operational demand was the Canal Hotel bombing
18 and after he had had the -- I won't call it trauma; it
19 would be trauma for us, it wasn't for them, I think they
20 had got used to it by then, but the whole area was
21 covered by United States military with bayonets fixed,
22 and eventually negotiating with them that these were the
23 local police whose job it was to investigate something
24 like this and literally taking the police chief by the
25 hand and walking him round and explaining the basics of

1 how you would deal with a bomb scene, and I said to him,
2 "You know, bring a couple of your guys with you, because
3 I don't want just you to know this, bring somebody else
4 so they can hear the same thing, just in case, for some
5 reason, you are not here".

6 So we did a sort of training session at the scene
7 and got it how I wanted it to be and got his people
8 there and got a command post set up. But he had not
9 done any of this before. None of his staff had ever
10 experienced this before. So it was starting from
11 a pretty low level of competence.

12 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: How about the selection of key
13 personnel, you know, the new chief of police and other
14 key personnel, how did you select them? How confident
15 were you of their ability? How were they vetted?

16 DOUGLAS BRAND: Most of the selecting was done by
17 a combination of who had turned up, who had come back.
18 We worked on the premise that, if anybody came back
19 voluntarily, they probably didn't have too much to hide,
20 then checking with the police chief and, after a while,
21 I had started to recognise the system: you go with the
22 police chief to the local Sheikh and you say, "We have
23 these people and what do you think?" and if the local
24 Sheikh blesses it, then it is okay. Because he will be
25 responsible if the person doesn't perform.

1 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: That was a kind of indirect vetting.

2 DOUGLAS BRAND: Indirect vetting, yes, but quite effective,
3 and that really was the only system.

4 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Thank you very much.

5 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Martin?

6 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: If I could return to training, we have
7 discussed the basic training for the recruits. Who was
8 carrying out this training in Baghdad? What was the
9 structure?

10 DOUGLAS BRAND: We had two lots of training going on. One
11 was a three-week course called the transition
12 integration programme, which was effectively aimed at
13 existing police officers. The focus was on human
14 rights, rule of law, and an introduction to the
15 democratic process. That was being run by the
16 United States military. The second form of training was
17 the recruit training that we did initially in Jordan and
18 then established a training centre in Baghdad.

19 What we did in Baghdad was to effectively recognise
20 that we were not going to get international police
21 officers to come to Baghdad in any large numbers. We
22 had a group of very dedicated, very capable
23 Ministry of Defence police. In fact, the head of the
24 Baghdad academy was a chief inspector from the Ministry
25 of Defence police. But we were not going to attract

1 trainers in the traditional sense as we had done in
2 Jordan. So we trained in Jordan military trainers who
3 were trained by police to do police training, if that
4 makes sense. So we got people from the major
5 subordinate commands -- generally speaking, those who
6 had a police background who were reservists -- took them
7 to Jordan, trained by police trainers in how to train
8 policemen and then put them back to the training centre
9 in Baghdad.

10 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Was there any viable alternative to
11 giving the military the lead?

12 DOUGLAS BRAND: No, not at that stage. Baghdad was
13 considered to be just not safe enough to put civilian
14 police in and the military was the only alternative. It
15 was taking too long to develop Iraqi police trainers,
16 which was an initiative that had taken off in a number
17 of different areas. So in order to meet this demand of
18 35,000 in 18 months, that's the way we did it.

19 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: It was essentially a security problem?

20 DOUGLAS BRAND: Yes.

21 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: You mention in your statement that
22 there were a number of areas where the military had
23 little experience to offer police recruits. You
24 mentioned, for example, specialist investigation,
25 forensics and also organised crime. How were these

1 training needs met?

2 DOUGLAS BRAND: They were not. It was part of the
3 longer-term strategy. Certainly during my time there,
4 they were not addressed. We had an operational
5 capability in Baghdad, which was represented by the
6 Serious Crime Squad and another team of officers who had
7 been trained in the United States in sort of SWAT-type
8 interventions, but the development of the others was a
9 much longer-term plan that it was clear to me was not
10 going to get off the ground, certainly in the time that I
was there.

11 I sought to try to sort of firm up the potential
12 middle level of leadership by recruiting 400 or 500
13 competent Iraqi officers at the rank of major to
14 colonel, so that we could hothouse them in and out of
15 Iraq so that they would form -- effectively, they
16 would form the nucleus of the new Iraqi police
17 leadership. There would be enough of them to make
18 a critical mass and we could address their needs over
19 a slightly longer period of time, but still within the
20 sort of -- I think at that point we had about seven
21 months left before handover.

22 The Commanding General thought it was a good idea as
23 well, but in using the fragmentary order process to
24 communicate this, basically we got no response from the
25 major subordinate commands. So that didn't get off the

1 ground either. I think a lot of the -- one often
2 reflects "Could I have done anything differently?" and
3 of course, with the wisdom of hindsight, you think,
4 "Yes, I should have attacked this more, I should have
5 engaged more here", but the reality was it was just
6 impossible to be that visible around a country the size
7 of Iraq, with the transportation difficulties, to make
8 that influence.

9 So I could have easily used several hundred
10 competent policemen to get out and actually keep on
11 reinforcing the message and probably that would have
12 made a difference, but we didn't have them.

13 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: In terms of the move to transition from
14 training to being in the field, was there a sense that
15 the military were keen to have the police on the streets
16 as soon as possible because of the security situation?

17 DOUGLAS BRAND: Yes. Yes. I think that they recognised
18 that, whilst the police were not going to have the broad
19 competence that the military saw that they had, having
20 police out there was going to be a distraction, it would
21 take the focus off of the coalition military because
22 there would be an Iraqi authority there and, as
23 I mentioned in my report, unfortunately that Iraqi
24 authority became the target of a number of the insurgent
25 activities so that it really almost worked against the

1 principle because, in providing the Iraqi police as
2 a simple, easy, soft target, we actually exacerbated the
3 situation.

4 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: What advice were you able to give, or
5 what advice did you give, on how to balance the
6 short-term needs with the longer-term objective of
7 building up a competent police force?

8 DOUGLAS BRAND: Well, one -- certainly one of my consistent
9 themes was that, if we don't invest now and get it right
10 now, the consequences down the road will be -- will not
11 be worth considering. We will not get the competence
12 that everybody seems to want but are not prepared to put
13 the investment into -- and to just refer back briefly to
14 the point I made earlier on, I sensed that there really
15 wasn't an understanding that you have to invest -- if
16 you want to develop a professional body of police, it
17 requires time, it requires expertise, it requires
18 training and all of these things are -- they are not
19 exclusive. They are a complete package. You can't just
20 do a train and equip for recruits and say "Okay, we are
21 done", and step back, because you create high
22 expectation, which then falls down, and people go back,
23 not to where they were before, but they say "This is
24 worse than it was under Saddam. We cannot even expect
25 anything from these people".

1 So it is understanding that policing, as a broad but
2 not exclusive part of the justice system, is critical to
3 get right in order that all the other things can
4 actually follow on effectively, whether it be the
5 development of the justice system, reconstruction or
6 anything of that nature.

7 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: To whom did you put these points?

8 DOUGLAS BRAND: To anybody who would listen, without
9 sounding flippant. These points were made regularly to
10 the 2-stars, to Ambassador Bremer, to the Commanding
11 General. Don't get me wrong, they did understand that,
12 but I think they were facing, at their level, the same
13 sort of challenges that I was facing at my level. They
14 had huge demands, and even though the American military
15 is a phenomenal thing to see when it is actually
16 underway, the demands that were being placed on them
17 made that -- meant that they couldn't do all of the
18 things that were being asked of them either.

19 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Thank you.

20 THE CHAIRMAN: Just one question going back a little to
21 the -- you were describing that to set up a training
22 capability, you had to take military people, some of
23 them with a police background, admittedly, as
24 reservists, get them trained as trainers of policemen.
25 Did this have some consequential effect in terms of

1 ethos and outlook in terms of being more militarily
2 biased?

3 DOUGLAS BRAND: I'm convinced it would and what we also had
4 to at -- and I don't think I was being unrealistic or
5 being naive. If you look around the rest the
6 Middle East, most of the policing is of a military
7 nature, certainly the visible policing. There is much
8 else that goes on that is recognisable as investigative
9 policing or things of that nature.

10 So it wasn't as if it was completely flying in the
11 face of a sort of trend that existed elsewhere. What
12 I was mainly concerned about was that -- it was the sort
13 of policing brain, if you like, or the eyes that needed
14 to go with these trainers so that they weren't just
15 seeing things through a military lens, and one of the
16 differences between, for instance, the British
17 Royal Military Police and their counterparts in the
18 United States, is that fundamentally, in the
19 United States, they are trained as infantrymen with
20 a police component bolted on and it is only when they
21 specialise in investigation that their activities become
22 more recognisable. Fundamentally, they are infantry
23 people. Unlike our MPs, who are proper policemen in
24 a military uniform and that makes a difference to how
25 they see the world.

1 So it wasn't -- it wasn't a completely obstructive
2 situation to put ourselves in, but what I wanted to do
3 was -- and one the reasons -- and he was very effective,
4 one of the reasons I wanted the Ministry of Defence
5 chief inspector to head the training schools was so that
6 there was always this presence of police thinking,
7 whether it be in an informal sense or informal
8 direction, that would actually affect the way that these
9 Iraqi policemen were being trained by military people.

10 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Lawrence, do you want to pick up
11 on something?

12 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Yes, I would like to ask you
13 a couple of questions in a second about the
14 organisational structures. But just to finish off on
15 the training set-up, as it were. You have alluded
16 a certain amount to the Jordanian centre and how it was
17 established. What impact do you think this centre
18 actually had? Do you think it was a success?

19 DOUGLAS BRAND: Yes, I do. A relative success, in as much
20 as we were able to start the process of getting large
21 numbers of people of arguably the right calibre, as
22 opposed to the ones that had been inherited, into
23 training mode, trained by internationals, subject to
24 a training environment where they weren't distracted by
25 what was going on at home because they were in somebody

1 else's country, supervised by the Jordanians, so that,
2 you know, there wasn't much downtime, and then placed
3 back ready to start a career in policing.

4 So from that perspective and certainly in the
5 numbers that we had -- and I've met since a number of
6 the people who were involved in the training there --
7 and we had a wide variety, a very rich variety of
8 international police trainers.

9 Where it fell down, if it fell down at all, was in
10 the follow-up, in the development in the policing
11 environment, and clearly also where we were seeking to
12 develop specialisms and competence in investigation and
13 things of that nature.

14 So for what it was, what it sought to achieve, it
15 was successful. It just didn't have the follow-on
16 components that would have been better for its success.

17 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: How did you work with the Jordanians
18 on setting this up and this question of supervision?

19 DOUGLAS BRAND: Basically, we developed a Memorandum of
20 Understanding with the Jordanians, who were very happy
21 to do what it was that was being asked of them from me.
22 As always, there is -- at the sort of practical level,
23 you iron out a few difficulties, but we always had in our
24 back pocket the fact that the King of Jordan said this
25 will happen. So we always knew that that's actually

1 what would happen and we had good support from the
2 contractors from the American side who actually did the
3 infrastructure of the site, and some good influence
4 initially from the former head -- or the then current
5 head of the Kosovo training school.

6 So setting up the infrastructure, even though it was
7 a little bit spartan on the first course, there was no
8 stepping away from setting up something that was going
9 to be effective and, in fact, still existing today and
10 is still training people from another Arab country to do
11 similar sorts of things.

12 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: You described your involvement in
13 the project. Were you able to sort of keep a close eye
14 on what was going on?

15 DOUGLAS BRAND: No. For two reasons. One, I was mainly in
16 Iraq and, secondly, a decision made by the new American
17 director was that this was not to be part of my
18 responsibility.

19 I'm sure he had his own reasons for determining
20 that, but it went to an American person and then
21 subsequently the establishment of the CPATT
22 military-driven structure took the train/equip even
23 further away.

24 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: I want to come on to that in a
25 second, what you said relevant to that. Just a couple

1 of final questions on Jordan and the training
2 facilities.

3 Obviously, for security reasons, one can understand
4 why this was in Jordan. But you have given one
5 indication of some possible difficulties that could
6 cause, which would have been easy access for you and
7 others to what was going on there. Were there any other
8 difficulties that arose from the fact that this was not
9 in Iraq?

10 DOUGLAS BRAND: Politically, the Governing Council were not
11 that happy that this was being done in Iraq -- sorry,
12 being done in Jordan. For a variety of reasons, they
13 were concerned about Jordanian influence over their
14 recruits. I think, personally, unfounded concerns.

15 But behind it was this belief -- and this is one of
16 the reasons why we accelerated the work to take place in
17 Baghdad at the same time -- if our country is not safe
18 enough to train its police, and we have to send them
19 outside, what hope is there for us?

20 So one of the really major shifts of emphasis in
21 building the training capability in Baghdad, apart from
22 helping in terms of the development, the numbers of
23 police, was also a political fillip to the Governing
24 Council to say, "Yes, we are doing it here. Not quite
25 the way we would like to do it, but we are going to do

1 it here, and it represents training Iraq people in
2 Iraq", and that was an important element at that time.

3 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: So in a sense, if the police
4 couldn't sort out their own security, it was hard to
5 have confidence in the future.

6 You mentioned training facilities in Baghdad. What
7 about the facility in As Zubayr near Basra? What role
8 did that play?

9 DOUGLAS BRAND: As I indicated in my report, with the
10 establishing of the second chief officer to go down
11 there, I made an early decision, rightly or wrongly,
12 that I wasn't going to trespass in his area, apart from
13 the fact that I had enough to get on with in Baghdad and
14 the rest of Iraq, but also there was a slightly
15 different set-up.

16 First of all, the British military had established
17 itself very well in terms of influence within the police
18 activity, police station visits, basic training and that
19 sort thing. The training centre there was also
20 supported by some trainers from Denmark, and so they had
21 a slightly different remit initially and it was clear
22 that that part of the country had also suffered from
23 neglect, and so I was very happy for them to develop
24 a capability there which either was going to be just for
25 Basra or actually could become a regional centre

1 depending on what other practical things we could do in
2 terms of expansion and things of that nature.

3 But the one thing really that affected them was my
4 decision to ask them to focus solely on the transition,
5 integration programme, rather than doing recruit
6 training. They wanted to do recruit training and train
7 the trainers and my judgment was it was the wrong time.
8 We needed to get a focus on the recruit training in
9 Baghdad and Jordan, but we needed the training centre
10 down there to continue the process of bringing on the
11 already existing police.

12 We sort of sorted that one out with some discussion
13 and -- but it was indicative of lots of the areas in
14 Iraq wanting to do their own thing, which is
15 understandable in the absence of any sort of strong,
16 clear direction from the centre.

17 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Did that work? Was it integrated
18 with the rest of the training system?

19 DOUGLAS BRAND: Yes, it was. Again, it was sort of going in
20 that direction, and this is indicative of what I was
21 saying earlier on about countries wanting to do things
22 but it not necessarily fitting in with the timing that
23 was being determined at the centre. We had some
24 excellent trainers from Denmark and they had responded
25 very, very quickly but their remit was to do management

1 training and train the trainers which, at the time,
2 wasn't actually what, first of all, was the priority
3 and, second, we didn't actually have that number of
4 people who could be trained in those skills, and so, you
5 know, all credit to Denmark for stepping up very quickly
6 and providing a very professional team and, as time went
7 on, we negotiated back through the Danish government to
8 sort of adjust their terms of reference so that they
9 could actually be used for these other courses as well.

10 But eventually, the focus was very much on the
11 training centre there dealing with already trained --
12 sorry, already serving police officers, just to bring
13 them up to speed on the human rights, rule of law and
14 democratic process training, rather than do recruit
15 training.

16 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Can I just now go back to -- I think
17 you have alluded to, but important in terms of
18 organisations and reporting lines. First, the sort of
19 rather abrupt departure of Bernard Kerik in 2003. How
20 did that affect your role in the CPA?

21 DOUGLAS BRAND: I was actually on leave when he left and he
22 called me to say he wanted me to go to Brussels to brief
23 the Core group on what was going on. They were going to
24 get a briefing from the military -- on the military side
25 of things and we wanted to balance that with the

1 civilian police and I had said "Okay", but I was coming
2 back because I had got my first meeting with all the
3 police chiefs in Iraq and he said, "Well, don't worry,
4 I'll manage that. You go and brief the people in
5 Brussels". That was on, I think, 3 September. So when
6 I called him to see how it had gone, that was when he
7 announced that he was leaving that day.

8 So I wasn't sure what had happened to my gathering
9 of all the police chiefs, but it was clear that he was
10 leaving. So within a couple of days, I got back and
11 there was an empty office -- actually, there wasn't an
12 empty office, there was somebody else in there whom
13 I had not met before, who had come from Washington and
14 we had a discussion about what he thought he was there
15 to do and it was pretty clear that his view of sort of
16 holding the gap wasn't quite what was needed.

17 So basically he vacated, did a different job in the
18 main office and I sat in Bernard Kerik's chair and
19 started going to his morning meetings that he would have
20 gone to with Bremer and sort of got, almost by osmosis,
21 absorbed into the Bremer process. I was then invited to
22 meetings and eventually performed the role for a couple
23 of months until we had the Madrid donors' conference
24 where I met the new American who was going to take over
25 Kerik's position. So I sat there, I think for about two

1 months, which -- during which time we put together the
2 bid for the Madrid conference and also put together the
3 supplemental bid as well. So it was a busy time and, of
4 course, what got neglected was the police part, because
5 there were a few other things going on in the ministry
6 as well.

7 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: But this was a temporary thing and
8 then you went back?

9 DOUGLAS BRAND: Yes.

10 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: You indicated before loss of the
11 training function, that you didn't seem to be too happy
12 about.

13 DOUGLAS BRAND: It wasn't so much I wasn't happy about it.
14 I just couldn't understand the logic and the new
15 American person wasn't able to explain it either.

16 So we just -- we continued as best we could.

17 I mean, I still had the responsibility for the
18 development strategically around the rest of the
19 country, the Baghdad responsibilities, co-ordination of
20 donor support, but I sensed that there was -- this
21 wasn't his own original thinking, there were those on
22 the American side who would like the tidiness of just it
23 being an American-led thing in Jordan.

24 So that's how it sort of spun out, but things --
25 I mean, basically we were too busy anyway to get too

1 wrapped up in the process, but I just had the
2 conversation with him saying "I don't understand it, but
3 you are the guy who is in charge, so we will get on with
4 it".

5 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Just a final question. You
6 mentioned the coalition police's existing training team
7 which was created in March 2004. Again, how did that
8 affect your lines of reporting?

9 DOUGLAS BRAND: Actually, it was quite a shock to both
10 myself and the American director because, overnight, the
11 Secretary of Defence in the United States had basically
12 taken away all responsibility for policing, including
13 the training, equipping and recruiting, and given it to
14 the military, and that included a budget that was
15 \$950 million. We had had no indication of this and
16 neither he nor I actually knew where it left us. So we
17 went to see Ambassador Bremer to say, "Can you give us
18 some direction as to what our responsibilities will be?"
19 and I don't think he was too clear either on what the
20 impact of this was.

21 The military were very clear that it was just theirs
22 and this would tidy things up in the way that I think
23 many of them had wished it had been because one of the
24 things that became apparent -- I mean, they do some
25 magnificent things, but partnership isn't one of them.

1 So in the eyes of the generals who had done the report
2 which subsequently led to this -- and it is
3 understandable, because it is only the military who has
4 the capability and, if the international community can't
5 provide the police to do it, then who else is going to
6 do it?

7 So in that sense I could understand it, but it was
8 a little bit -- it was rather draconian in terms of its
9 mood, and the consequences, as I mentioned in my
10 report -- one was that, whilst they could do the volume
11 stuff, they still didn't have the skill sets for basic
12 training, and then the one thing they didn't have, which
13 was just so essential, and which the military training
14 side had, is that policy advice back in Washington on
15 policing. They had none. So they were making it up, in
16 that sense, from theatre, rather than back at the policy
17 headquarters.

18 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: There was a British brigadier,
19 Brigadier MacKay, who was head of CPATT. Is that right?

20 DOUGLAS BRAND: Yes.

21 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: How did you work it out with him?

22 DOUGLAS BRAND: I thought we understood where our separations
23 were. He took -- with my blessing -- some of the
24 trainers, the American trainers, to sort of equip his
25 set-up. I'm not sure we saw eye to eye on -- in fact,

1 I know we didn't see eye to eye on a number of the
2 connections between the train and equip and the part
3 that relied on advice to the minister on the direction
4 of the strategic policing plan.

5 From my perspective, the demarcation there got very
6 blurred, and so it wasn't -- the distinction from CPATT
7 being solely train and equip and deliver to the front
8 line, so to speak, wasn't the only thing that they got
9 themselves involved in. So the minister was getting two
10 lines of advice, which wasn't very effective.

11 THE CHAIRMAN: Time is starting to press on us rather hard
12 now but, Roderic?

13 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Just one question about the period after
14 28 June. You remained for another couple of months in
15 Iraq after the transition to the Iraqi interim
16 government of Iraqi sovereignty and at the same time the
17 Multi-National Security Transition Command was set up
18 under the leadership of General Petraeus in Iraq, known
19 as MNSTC-I. How did the appearance of these two
20 organisations, as it were, affect the role you played
21 and where did you relate to the two of them and get your
22 instructions from?

23 DOUGLAS BRAND: Right, the first thing to say was that I was
24 on the books of Iraq, but I was actually back here.
25 I had taken some leave. I came back, all ready to go

1 back out again and, after a short conversation, it was
2 clear I wasn't going back. I was going to be held in
3 the Foreign Office to support other aspects from this
4 end. My replacement had been identified.

5 SIR RODERIC LYNE: When did you physically leave?

6 DOUGLAS BRAND: I physically left at the end of June and
7 didn't return.

8 SIR RODERIC LYNE: So perhaps this question is rather
9 irrelevant to you and we should ask others? Right,
10 let's move on then.

11 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Martin?

12 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: At a strategic level, what influence do
13 you feel the United Kingdom had on the American approach
14 to the security aspect?

15 DOUGLAS BRAND: I think our presence certainly was felt and
16 there are many very capable people who made that
17 presence felt. Sometimes the presence was felt by way
18 of irritation, others because we had had experiences
19 that our American colleagues hadn't had in other
20 theatres in other environments. But also, there was the
21 ability to engage even when perhaps sometimes our
22 opinion wasn't sought, to find ways of actually
23 discussing things with people and not necessarily doing
24 it directly, but rather asymmetrically, finding
25 individuals who were clearly sort of putting together

1 sort of policy papers and saying "Have you thought about
2 this and have you considered these sorts of things?"
3 knowing full well that that would eventually get taken
4 into their discussion, which I'm sure are techniques you
5 are very familiar with. So our presence, I think,
6 given the size of us there, as a sort of UK PLC, was
7 pretty big.

8 On the policing side, the presence of British police
9 there has quite an interesting effect because our
10 American colleagues love the concept of the British
11 bobby, and so I played that to extreme ends, but in some
12 of the activities that we undertook, and bearing in mind
13 there was a sort of handful of us, we led the Baghdad
14 training centre, we were solely responsible for this --
15 what I have called the -- sort of like a Crimestoppers'
16 line.

17 If you can imagine that -- and I know observations
18 have been made before about the different routes for
19 intelligence, but one of the ones that was deemed to be
20 useful and consistent with the way that policing in
21 a democratic society works is you give people access to
22 call the police and say "Did you know this is happening
23 down the street?" Because we had British policemen in
24 there, there was a huge uptake of people calling in,
25 telling us about weapons and missiles and all sorts of

1 things like that and then it was so successful that one
2 of the last things that Mr Kerik did before he left was
3 to announce, "It was so successful we are now handing it
4 over to the Iraqis", and all the calls stopped.

5 So we had to reinstitute, because we understood
6 after a while that it was the British police being at
7 the other end, even though they were speaking to Iraqis,
8 the fact that people knew there were British police at
9 the other end of the phone made for the calls to happen,
10 and that was a really successful part of our small
11 contribution.

12 The third part -- and one that I particularly had
13 a personal sort of pleasure in establishing, though the
14 circumstances were far from pleasurable, is managing to
15 penetrate the American military's understanding of how
16 police operate such that they would change the way they
17 operated in order to accommodate the police.

18 This came about because I was getting regular
19 reports and actually visiting the scenes of where there
20 had been a clash between the American military and the
21 Iraqi police. This was usually because the Iraqi
22 police, as they were building their confidence, were
23 sort of engaging out on the streets, in vehicles,
24 driving around, perhaps not as responsibly as we might
25 want, and coming into contact with usually American

1 checkpoints, then being suspected, because people would
2 see weapons, of being on the wrong side of the law and
3 were being shot at and -- in order to stop them doing
4 whatever it was they were doing.

5 Only afterwards was the discovery made that they
6 were policemen doing the police's job. This got to
7 a really bad stage, and so, with the help of
8 General Viggers, I managed to get the American commander
9 in Baghdad to set up a sort of joint co-ordination
10 centre, where eventually we actually had a small office
11 built on the back of their planning unit, staffed by
12 Iraqis with British police. The effect was almost an
13 immediate drop-off of these incidents of fratricide or
14 blue-on-blue types of engagements.

15 So that was a huge achievement, because up until
16 that point the American military just didn't understand
17 why it was necessary, and so that was a very useful way
18 of getting across our message, and it was very British.
19 I'm not sure it could have been quite pulled off the
20 same way by someone else, but I would say that,
21 wouldn't I?

22 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Finally for the record, how many UK
23 personnel were there, aside from yourself, and what was
24 their function?

25 DOUGLAS BRAND: There were a small number of customs

1 officers, who did a very good job in setting up the
2 infrastructure within the Ministry of the Interior.
3 I had a detective chief inspector from Dorset police who
4 was my intelligence expert. I should say also I had two
5 excellent deputies, one who is now, I think, the
6 commissioner of New South Wales police and the other
7 from the RCMP, who were first-class senior police
8 officers.

9 The members of the MoD police, I have already
10 mentioned, in charge of the Baghdad training centre and
11 I think six or eight -- because they were rotating --
12 other MoD policemen. Then we had -- a few more MoD
13 police joined us and became trainers down in the Baghdad
14 training centre, so -- certainly less than 20, I think
15 probably closer to 15 or 16 -- and a contribution from
16 Spain, from Estonia and one or two other European
17 countries as well.

18 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Thank you.

19 THE CHAIRMAN: We have got just a very few minutes left.
20 What I would like to do, if I may, is invite your
21 reflections over that time and particularly looking at
22 what you have seen as your key achievements in that year
23 and a half, year and a bit, what you see as the
24 prospects for the Iraqi police service.

25 You might want to say a little more about the UK's

1 capacity, as it is or could be made to be, to contribute
2 to international policing missions. Over to you.

3 DOUGLAS BRAND: Thank you. I think fundamentally, the
4 lesson was identified in the Balkans but, as I mentioned
5 in my report, it seems to be the one that is most
6 resistant to being learned, and that is that if you
7 intend to have a military intervention anywhere, there
8 will come a time where that military presence and
9 predominance needs to shift towards a more
10 civilian-oriented authority. Whether that's police in
11 the way that we understand it or any other variation
12 that's less than military isn't really important, the
13 fact that that shift is taking place is the important
14 thing.

15 So if we fail to recognise the importance of that
16 transition, then none of the things that we have
17 aspirations for, whether they be in strategic plans or
18 discussions about policing or the justice system, none
19 of it will happen, because it needs that investment and
20 that consciousness that it is an important part of
21 a solution.

22 So my first observation is that stabilisation -- it
23 is essential that there is a military component to it
24 and the military are very good at that, but at some
25 stage, and arguably, I would say, at the planning stage,

1 there needs to be an involvement of all the other actors
2 who are going to have a responsibility further down the
3 line to make sure that these things happen.

4 It is often the case that the military plan is the
5 plan and, if you are lucky enough to have a contribution
6 to it, it is still the military plan that has got
7 a bolt-on aspect. My view -- and I have expressed this
8 elsewhere -- is that, as soon as there is an interest
9 from a government perspective of being involved in an
10 event, that's the time where the other actors need to be
11 engaged and it will make a little bit of difference then
12 as to how we progress.

13 The second point is that the UK is going to have to
14 make up its mind what it wants to do in terms of the
15 introduction of police. It is clear, whenever we do
16 deploy, we do very well. Other people seek us out. We
17 seem to have an infinite capacity within our junior
18 officers for them to really grow and do some remarkable
19 things that they would never get the opportunity to do
20 in the domestic environment, and yet we still don't seem
21 to acknowledge or understand that.

22 If our -- if our UK police remains a domestic
23 focused police, then that's fine, but we can't expect it
24 then to turn around and do the sort of expeditionary
25 type things.

1 So on the issue of policing, I think one of the
2 solutions is that -- and this is borne out of
3 experience, not just in Iraq but Afghanistan, Darfur and
4 other places -- if we can put a small number of senior
5 or specialist police officers into the highest level we
6 can get them to influence -- influence being the
7 emphasis -- then we will actually be able to achieve
8 quite a lot.

9 It will need the support that I have already
10 illustrated, but nevertheless it can actually be done
11 with small numbers. We haven't got a capacity in this
12 country to send huge numbers of patrol cops or first
13 line supervisors, but what we do have are critical
14 skills and specialisms and we have senior officers who
15 can make a difference if they are put in the right
16 place.

17 My experience in Darfur was to put no more than five
18 or six senior officers into police headquarters around
19 the African Union Police in Darfur and make
20 a difference, hold them to account, introduce new
21 systems, be there as an irritant or as an encourager or
22 a combination of both.

23 So I think that the future for us, as far as the
24 police contribution is concerned, if we stay the same,
25 ostensibly a domestically focused organisation -- then

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