

1 (4.30 pm)

2 MS CAROLYN MILLER

3 SIR JOHN CHILCOT: Good afternoon and welcome.

4 MS CAROLYN MILLER: Thanks very much. Good afternoon.

5 SIR JOHN CHILCOT: In this session, we are hearing from  
6 Carolyn Miller. You were director for Europe, Middle  
7 East and the Americas in DFID, between 2001 and 2004,  
8 I think.

9 Now, I say two things before every session. We  
10 recognise that the witness gives evidence based on  
11 recollection of events and we, of course, check what we  
12 hear against the papers to which we have access and  
13 which we are still receiving.

14 I remind each witness they will later be asked to  
15 sign a transcript of the evidence given to the effect  
16 that that evidence is truthful, fair and accurate.

17 With those preliminaries, over to you  
18 Baroness Prashar.

19 BARONESS PRASHAR: Thank you very much indeed.

20 Did you have responsibility for Iraq at the start of  
21 your posting in 2001?

22 MS CAROLYN MILLER: No, I didn't. When I joined DFID -- and  
23 I joined from outside -- the Middle East was not in my  
24 realm of responsibility. When we looked at the division  
25 between the three Directorates, the Middle East made

1 more sense to come in with the other country portfolios  
2 I had. So the Middle East moved in early in 2002. It  
3 was actually quite an important part then of my  
4 portfolio, the Middle East as a whole.

5 BARONESS PRASHAR: Of course. How many people within DFID  
6 worked on Iraq in 2001 to 2002, or the time when you  
7 took responsibility?

8 MS CAROLYN MILLER: I can't remember the exact numbers, but  
9 the Middle East team was a small team. Within that,  
10 there would have been nobody exclusively covering Iraq.  
11 They would have been covering Iraq alongside all the  
12 other countries. The Palestinian territories were the  
13 biggest factor in our workload there, with also Jordan,  
14 Egypt.

15 BARONESS PRASHAR: From your point of view, were there  
16 enough people to do the work you expected to do for  
17 Iraq?

18 MS CAROLYN MILLER: At the beginning, yes. Iraq, whilst we  
19 were aware that things could happen in future, was  
20 a quite small part of our workload and I would say the  
21 largest was the Palestinian territories.

22 BARONESS PRASHAR: As the work increased, did you get an  
23 increase in personnel?

24 MS CAROLYN MILLER: As we moved on, by the end, we had huge  
25 numbers working on Iraq, so yes, numbers increased.

1 BARONESS PRASHAR: How much money did you have between 2001  
2 and 2002 to deliver what you were expected to deliver?

3 MS CAROLYN MILLER: At the very beginning, as I remember it,  
4 Iraq was just a programme where we gave some money to  
5 the UN, the Red Cross and some of the local NGOs. That  
6 was a reasonably small programme and I think that was  
7 appropriate at that point in time.

8 BARONESS PRASHAR: At the time.

9 MS CAROLYN MILLER: Gradually, as things moved on, we gave  
10 money for humanitarian preparedness and then for  
11 response, and then, in 2002, the figures increased in  
12 sort of leaps and bounds as we went on.

13 BARONESS PRASHAR: Can you remember the timing when  
14 resources increased? Was it late 2002, early 2002?

15 MS CAROLYN MILLER: Resources increased only for  
16 preparedness, I believe, in late 2002 and then for  
17 response building up to the conflict and then after that  
18 for reconstruction.

19 BARONESS PRASHAR: Uh-huh. Just looking at the engagement  
20 of DFID across Whitehall, the former Permanent Secretary  
21 of DFID told us that the first time that DFID was  
22 engaged in Whitehall discussions was when the ad hoc  
23 group on Iraq was established. That was, I think, in  
24 December 2002.

25 MS CAROLYN MILLER: Yes. Those are the first ones

1 I remember being involved in.

2 BARONESS PRASHAR: Is that when you started engaging across  
3 Whitehall?

4 MS CAROLYN MILLER: Yes.

5 BARONESS PRASHAR: Can you tell me something of your  
6 experience of engagement?

7 MS CAROLYN MILLER: In the job that I had, I was engaging  
8 quite strongly across Whitehall anyway. So I was  
9 already engaging with my counterpart in the Middle East  
10 in the Foreign Office where Iraq may have come into some  
11 discussions, but not specifically. So my sort of upping  
12 of involvement was that Iraq group. I think I was  
13 involved in that very early on. We took our  
14 humanitarian concerns to that, I believe.

15 BARONESS PRASHAR: Did you attend the ad hoc group or was it  
16 attended by Nicola Brewer, who was the Director General?

17 MS CAROLYN MILLER: We changed around, but I certainly went  
18 to a number of those meetings.

19 BARONESS PRASHAR: Your attendance was purely to discuss  
20 humanitarian issues or were you engaged on some of the  
21 broader issues? Were they drawing on your external  
22 experience, having been in the NGO sector?

23 MS CAROLYN MILLER: That probably would have come into the  
24 humanitarian side, but I never felt constrained in  
25 contributing to discussions that DFID had a point of

1 view on. Inevitably, the humanitarian role was  
2 paramount in where people were seeking DFID's views, but  
3 there would -- I am sure I entered into discussions or  
4 made some point in other areas.

5 BARONESS PRASHAR: Can you recall who were the principal  
6 Whitehall counterparts on Iraq that you worked with at  
7 Whitehall?

8 MS CAROLYN MILLER: Very closely with Edward Chaplin in the  
9 Foreign Office, Ian Lee in the Ministry of Defence and  
10 some other people in the Ministry of Defence as well,  
11 Jim Drummond in Cabinet Office. There were people in  
12 the Treasury occasionally, Stephen Pickford, people like  
13 that.

14 BARONESS PRASHAR: How did you find that relationship? Did  
15 it work effectively?

16 MS CAROLYN MILLER: Very.

17 BARONESS PRASHAR: At your level, it was working?

18 MS CAROLYN MILLER: At my level, very honestly, it was very  
19 easy to work across Whitehall. We had similar concerns,  
20 similar aims to make this work. People went out of  
21 their way to be helpful to us. Obviously, we were aware  
22 of difficulties in coordination, but really it was  
23 actually quite a positive experience of trying to move  
24 things forward.

25 BARONESS PRASHAR: What was the level of interaction with

1 the MoD?

2 MS CAROLYN MILLER: It probably -- there was less of it at  
3 the beginning of my involvement across Whitehall.

4 I didn't think that was necessarily a problem. There  
5 was less we necessarily had to discuss -- I am sure you  
6 want to ask me about visits to the US, but by the time  
7 we were doing that, which was November, I was clearly  
8 working closely with the MoD, because they were part of  
9 it, around, certainly, at the beginning of 2003, I was  
10 regularly attending Ministry of Defence meetings, as  
11 were others, and, you know, I would be in dialogue with  
12 them at these meetings. I don't remember too many  
13 separate meetings up until things really vamped up in  
14 January, February, March.

15 BARONESS PRASHAR: Thank you.

16 SIR JOHN CHILCOT: Right. Over to Sir Roderic Lyne.

17 SIR RODERIC LYNE: When did you become aware that our  
18 military were engaged in joint planning with their  
19 American counterparts for possible military action  
20 against Iraq?

21 MS CAROLYN MILLER: I think an assumption was made  
22 reasonably early on. Now, when was I actually aware of  
23 it? I couldn't actually say, but it must have been well  
24 before we went on that first Washington visit, which was  
25 in November, and generally it was sort of out there in

1 the public that there were discussions going on, but  
2 I genuinely can't remember exactly when I was aware.

3 SIR RODERIC LYNE: We know from the "Hard Lessons" report  
4 published in the United States that the National  
5 Security Council had set up a group by August 2002 to  
6 start looking at post-war planning.

7 MS CAROLYN MILLER: Uh-huh.

8 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Now, you and your colleagues didn't go to  
9 Washington until November --

10 MS CAROLYN MILLER: Uh-huh.

11 SIR RODERIC LYNE: -- the first of your Whitehall trips with  
12 Edward Chaplin.

13 MS CAROLYN MILLER: Uh-huh.

14 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Were you aware, before you went to  
15 Washington, that the Americans were engaged in post-war  
16 planning?

17 MS CAROLYN MILLER: Certainly before we got there, because  
18 we would all have deliberated beforehand and I was  
19 definitely expecting that those would be part of the  
20 discussions. Exactly when I was aware of that before  
21 then, I couldn't actually say, but yes, we were aware  
22 that there was a humanitarian part to the discussion and  
23 a post-war part to the discussion.

24 SIR RODERIC LYNE: When you got to Washington --

25 MS CAROLYN MILLER: Uh-huh.

1 SIR RODERIC LYNE: -- what did you find out? Did the  
2 Americans lay their plans out in front of you?

3 MS CAROLYN MILLER: In terms of post-war planning, there was  
4 a meeting that we went to before the main meeting with  
5 the State Department when I saw the "Future of Iraq"  
6 document.

7 SIR RODERIC LYNE: That was by the State Department, which we  
8 have seen.

9 MS CAROLYN MILLER: That was the State Department document.  
10 That was the most detailed thing I had seen up until  
11 that point. I had not seen anything -- I did not see  
12 anything from USAID. I had a separate meeting with  
13 USAID when I was on that trip, but they were quite open  
14 verbally with their planning, but they didn't show me  
15 anything written that they were doing.

16 SIR RODERIC LYNE: What did you think of the American plans  
17 that you saw on that trip?

18 MS CAROLYN MILLER: To be honest, and given that these were  
19 supposed to be the better ones, I thought they were  
20 reasonably top level or too top level for that stage.

21 SIR RODERIC LYNE: "Top level" meaning?

22 MS CAROLYN MILLER: Slightly simplistic.

23 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Simplistic?

24 MS CAROLYN MILLER: Yes. I think I was concerned about the  
25 advice, where they were getting the advice from.

1 I didn't feel necessarily that it was as considered  
2 enough as might have been produced in the UK maybe.

3 SIR RODERIC LYNE: How much of a dialogue did you have about  
4 these plans? Did you challenge them, point out  
5 deficiencies?

6 MS CAROLYN MILLER: It was a short meeting.

7 SIR RODERIC LYNE: A short meeting.

8 MS CAROLYN MILLER: No. I can't remember how long we were  
9 there, it was more than outlining it. So no, at that  
10 stage, I don't remember challenging anything.

11 SIR RODERIC LYNE: What attitude were you conveying about  
12 the British Government's willingness, and particularly  
13 the department that you represented, to be a partner in  
14 planning for the aftermath of a conflict in Iraq?

15 MS CAROLYN MILLER: My main inputs in that meeting were on  
16 the humanitarian side. The Foreign Office led the  
17 reconstruction side of those discussions. So I don't  
18 remember being specifically asked or specifically  
19 contributing on the reconstruction side, but certainly  
20 had a lot of discussions on the humanitarian side.

21 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Were you under instructions from your  
22 Secretary of State over the attitude you should take in  
23 this meeting?

24 MS CAROLYN MILLER: No, I don't believe I was at all. The  
25 division of responsibilities meant that DFID, at that

1 point, was concentrating only on the humanitarian side  
2 anyway. So for me to comment on -- in a short meeting,  
3 on the future of Iraq, I wouldn't necessarily have seen  
4 as my role and I am not even sure that the  
5 Foreign Office commented during that meeting.

6 Obviously, we considered it cross-government afterwards.

7 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Was this a division of labour that made  
8 sense? I mean, do the Foreign Office know about  
9 reconstruction? It sounds more like development than  
10 foreign policy.

11 MS CAROLYN MILLER: When you look at -- you have seen the  
12 "Future of Iraq". It is quite top level. It is more of  
13 the kind of principles, but I really don't recall very  
14 detailed discussion on it anyway. I think if there had  
15 been, the Foreign Office might have been questioning  
16 some of the things in it. So it was presented, as  
17 I remember it, as a "for information" and "This is where  
18 we have got to".

19 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Now, you and Edward Chaplin went back in  
20 January --

21 MS CAROLYN MILLER: Yes.

22 SIR RODERIC LYNE: -- by which time things had moved on in  
23 terms of American planning and I think these were called  
24 the "Day After" talks.

25 MS CAROLYN MILLER: Yes.

1 SIR RODERIC LYNE: The Australians, by now, I believe, were  
2 there as well.

3 MS CAROLYN MILLER: Right.

4 SIR RODERIC LYNE: What were your impressions of that  
5 meeting? What did you report back to your chain of  
6 command in DFID about this?

7 MS CAROLYN MILLER: I was concerned by that meeting.

8 I could very clearly see divisions between different  
9 parts of the US Government and I do clearly remember  
10 reporting back that there was quite a contrast between  
11 what I felt was quite a joined-up approach from the  
12 British Government and the kind of certain level of  
13 disarray amongst the US Government.

14 So there were, I believe, some slight contradictions  
15 in the meeting. It was quite clear that different parts  
16 of the government were not working together and they  
17 were borne out or in part informed by separate  
18 discussions I was having with USAID.

19 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Did you feel that the Americans were  
20 being frank and open with us about the state of their  
21 planning?

22 MS CAROLYN MILLER: I mean, they were doing the planning.  
23 I think it was more a question of our judgment on how  
24 good their plans were. I don't remember them sharing  
25 much more than we already knew. So in that sense, they

1           didn't give us much more information about their  
2           planning.

3   SIR RODERIC LYNE: Your judgment, as you say, was that you  
4           were concerned about this.

5   MS CAROLYN MILLER: Yes.

6   SIR RODERIC LYNE: Were they, at this stage, embodying  
7           something that was in our planning insofar as we had  
8           planning, which was a prominent role for the UN in  
9           dealing with the aftermath of the campaign?

10 MS CAROLYN MILLER: They were not denying it, is the way  
11           I would put it. Obviously this is something we would  
12           have to seek cross-Whitehall, and they were not saying  
13           no, so we were given to hope there might still be room  
14           for persuasion.

15           Separately, certainly State -- and USAID were keen  
16           to have some role for the UN, although I think it was  
17           pretty clear we were looking for a more substantive role  
18           for the UN than they would be, and they would be looking  
19           for the UN to deliver some things rather than a more  
20           overall role.

21   SIR RODERIC LYNE: So in the light of that visit, what  
22           planning assumptions was DFID able to make about its  
23           role in the aftermath?

24   MS CAROLYN MILLER: I think it still left us with a range of  
25           scenarios to plan for. It didn't necessarily make

1 anything clearer, because we weren't coming away saying  
2 "The UN route is hopeless. It is never going to work".  
3 So that was still one scenario to plan for. Anything  
4 still could have happened militarily. So we still did  
5 have the different options of how it would go to plan  
6 for. I think we were quite clear that moving forward on  
7 reconstruction would be difficult. So we were aware  
8 that wasn't going to be easy.

9 So I'm not sure how much further forward it took us.  
10 It sort of reinforced our concerns.

11 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Time, by now, was obviously getting a bit  
12 short.

13 MS CAROLYN MILLER: Uh-huh.

14 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Against this range of scenarios, what  
15 sort of plans were you then able to make?

16 MS CAROLYN MILLER: We were still keen to ensure that  
17 preparedness was happening wherever possible. That  
18 would be through the UN and NGOs. We were still able to  
19 consider what parts of the UN we might need to fund in  
20 the event of them being able to respond. We were still  
21 looking at options that would be our support to the  
22 military, to the UK military, and looking at what DFID  
23 could do to deploy itself individually. So it is  
24 a combination and, depending on the scenario, it would  
25 be different combinations of all of those things.

1 SIR RODERIC LYNE: But from what you say, the UN had  
2 a central part in this and part of your planning was how  
3 you would feed into the UN. Then the action starts in  
4 March.

5 MS CAROLYN MILLER: Uh-huh.

6 SIR RODERIC LYNE: By the time it starts, the Americans have  
7 still not assigned a role to the UN.

8 MS CAROLYN MILLER: Yes.

9 SIR RODERIC LYNE: It then becomes increasingly clear that  
10 they don't plan to do so --

11 MS CAROLYN MILLER: Uh-huh.

12 SIR RODERIC LYNE: -- at all and, of course, we have not got  
13 a second Security Council Resolution. So the UN itself  
14 is inhibited.

15 MS CAROLYN MILLER: Uh-huh.

16 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Is that something that we should have  
17 picked up sooner?

18 MS CAROLYN MILLER: In hindsight, we were probably overly  
19 hopeful that the UN would have a slightly more prominent  
20 role. We did all believe that it was necessary, and  
21 that was not just DFID. That was across the  
22 Foreign Office as well. It would have been a much  
23 easier outcome for all of us to work with. I believe  
24 that we had taken into account that there might be other  
25 ways we would have to do it, but we were not -- I think

1 the greater constraint was that delay before we were  
2 sure what the outcome was going to be and whether  
3 anything -- what we were going to be allowed to do  
4 legally or not rather than the planning for it.

5 I think, if you are doing good emergency planning --  
6 and this is still an emergency even if we are looking  
7 towards reconstruction -- you need to be fleet of foot  
8 and you need to be flexible. I think we had considered  
9 in our mind all of the options. I think the unfortunate  
10 part was that delay before we knew what was legally  
11 possible and how we could move, but similarly, the chaos  
12 on the ground was another factor that inhibited us  
13 moving forward.

14 SIR RODERIC LYNE: But Whitehall's planning was based around  
15 the assumption that the UN would play a major role in  
16 the aftermath, and, as you say, we had hoped we would  
17 persuade the Americans of this point of view.

18 MS CAROLYN MILLER: Yes.

19 SIR RODERIC LYNE: When we were not able to persuade the  
20 Americans of this, or indeed the UN, that presumably  
21 left a very, very big hole -- and I don't just mean in  
22 DFID's plan, I mean Whitehall's plan -- in Whitehall's  
23 plan of what to do after the campaign.

24 MS CAROLYN MILLER: It meant a change of strategy, but we  
25 had already looked at seconding to ORHA, the CPA and

1 things like that, so it meant we had to sort of regear,  
2 I think. So I don't think anyone thought we would  
3 absolutely definitely get it, so that was the only thing  
4 to plan for, but yes, the major hope was that that would  
5 be the way forward.

6 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Thank you.

7 SIR JOHN CHILCOT: Right. Over to Sir Martin Gilbert.

8 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: You will be aware that several  
9 witnesses told us that they believe that your Secretary  
10 of State restricted DFID staff engaging in planning in  
11 Iraq due to her disagreement with the government's  
12 policy.

13 MS CAROLYN MILLER: Uh-huh.

14 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Were you ever instructed by her to not  
15 engage in planning across Whitehall?

16 MS CAROLYN MILLER: No, no, I was never instructed not to  
17 engage across Whitehall. I did check before I joined  
18 groups, you know, I put in submissions saying, "I think  
19 it is important that we go to this group" and sometimes  
20 there were "but only to do this or whatever", but  
21 I didn't feel there was anything constrained. I think  
22 there was a general instruction at one point -- and  
23 I don't think it even came from the Secretary of  
24 State -- that we couldn't be talking to NGOs, but then  
25 that was lifted.

1           There were concerns that the Secretary of State had,  
2           but in terms of engagement across Whitehall, she would  
3           have been concerned to know what I was doing across  
4           Whitehall, but really, the fact that, you know, I was at  
5           one of the early ad hoc group on Iraq meetings and, you  
6           know, I was frequently talking to those other  
7           departments with her knowledge and reporting back on the  
8           general state of affairs I think actually no, there was  
9           no active, "No, you can't engage across Whitehall".

10   SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Of course, the ban on engaging on  
11           external planning with NGOs was a Cabinet Office ban.

12   MS CAROLYN MILLER: Exactly.

13   SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Sir Suma Chakrabarti has told us that  
14           this was lifted in October 2002.

15   MS CAROLYN MILLER: That's right.

16   SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Can you tell us what instructions you  
17           had from the Secretary of State with regard to engaging  
18           external partners after the ban was lifted?

19   MS CAROLYN MILLER: As I remember it, she was quite happy  
20           for to us do things reasonably low key. I think the  
21           difficulty in the Secretary of State's mind was to doing  
22           anything too external and too obvious so that it  
23           appeared that we were accepting the inevitable, but to  
24           do things just by low-key visits and discussions and  
25           things like that went on. We did it --

1 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Low key --

2 MS CAROLYN MILLER: -- and reported back.

3 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Low key was sufficient for the tasks  
4 you felt were needed?

5 MS CAROLYN MILLER: One of my team went to talk to all of  
6 the UN agencies at a reasonably high level, came back,  
7 reported to me. That was reported to the Secretary of  
8 State. That's not too low-key, but we did not publicise  
9 it then to the NGOs, for instance. So maybe "low-key"  
10 is the wrong phrase, but it would be part of the normal  
11 business that we were doing. So we were able to talk to  
12 people and, in talking to the NGOs, I believe that we  
13 were not supposed to mention scenarios or whatever, but  
14 I don't think we would have wanted to anyway.

15 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Thank you very much.

16 SIR JOHN CHILCOT: Back to Sir Roderic Lyne.

17 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Early in 2003, it was decided that our  
18 military would go in through the south rather than the  
19 north.

20 MS CAROLYN MILLER: Uh-huh.

21 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Then a decision was taken that we would  
22 take civil responsibility for four provinces of Iraq in  
23 the south.

24 MS CAROLYN MILLER: Uh-huh.

25 SIR RODERIC LYNE: To what extent was DFID consulted or

1 brought into the debate over the decision to take that  
2 responsibility?

3 MS CAROLYN MILLER: My recollection is that we were asked to  
4 play a role in that after the decision had been made.  
5 I may not -- this is quite a while ago, so I wouldn't be  
6 totally sure on that.

7 SIR RODERIC LYNE: It was something that I understand was  
8 discussed at a meeting between your Secretary of State  
9 and the Secretary of State for Defence and the  
10 Foreign Secretary --

11 MS CAROLYN MILLER: Uh-huh.

12 SIR RODERIC LYNE: -- in February 2003. Do you have any  
13 recollection of the meeting or briefing for it or  
14 decisions taken by it? I appreciate it is seven years  
15 ago.

16 MS CAROLYN MILLER: I remember that we had discussions on  
17 whether helping in the areas that were to be sort of  
18 more controlled by the British was the right thing to do  
19 or not, and that we had come to the conclusion that that  
20 was a reasonable way forward. I can't remember much  
21 more than that, unless you jog my memory with something  
22 else.

23 SIR RODERIC LYNE: The implication is that this would have  
24 had major resource implications for DFID, because you  
25 would be playing quite a big part in the whole process

1 of reconstruction and so on.

2 MS CAROLYN MILLER: Uh-huh.

3 SIR RODERIC LYNE: There was also the notion that came out  
4 at this time that the United Kingdom would try to prove  
5 that we could play an exemplary role, a phrase that has  
6 cropped up in many of our discussions here.

7 MS CAROLYN MILLER: Uh-huh.

8 SIR RODERIC LYNE: What is not absolutely clear is where  
9 that concept came from, whether it came out of DFID or  
10 was, as it were, imposed on you and others from on high,  
11 possibly from the Prime Minister, and whether you were  
12 able to allocate the resources necessary to achieve  
13 that. Can you comment on those two issues?

14 MS CAROLYN MILLER: I genuinely haven't -- I know this  
15 exemplary thing and I remember it being used.  
16 I certainly think, when the Secretary of State was using  
17 it, she just wanted to do a good humanitarian job and  
18 that is where she was coming from on it.

19 SIR RODERIC LYNE: You say "humanitarian". Do you restrict  
20 it to humanitarian?

21 MS CAROLYN MILLER: Not necessarily.

22 SIR RODERIC LYNE: I mean, at this point, we are talking  
23 about something much wider than humanitarian.

24 MS CAROLYN MILLER: Not necessarily. Yes, yes, she probably  
25 wanted to do a good job more widely than that.

1           I think that the resource implications of this  
2           exemplary role were not necessarily factored in or  
3           different people may have had a different opinion of  
4           what an exemplary role meant. So if one person --  
5   SIR RODERIC LYNE: I mean, to jog your memory on that point,  
6           after discussing this with the Prime Minister I think  
7           she went back to the department and then wrote a letter  
8           saying, "If I am going to do this, I am going to need  
9           more money, because I can't take money off other  
10          programmes that are geared to the Millenium goals and  
11          poverty". So some conditionality came in, but you  
12          don't, yourself, have a personal recollection of that?

13   MS CAROLYN MILLER: I certainly remember requests for money.  
14          That's very clear in my mind, because to put a lot of  
15          money in would have affected our programmes and that was  
16          the Secretary of State's concern. I saw that as part of  
17          whatever effort we did anyway, but -- so yes, I didn't  
18          necessarily link that to the exemplary part. I linked  
19          that to doing whatever we needed to do.

20                 I think the concept of exemplary was just one of  
21                 these things that came up and faded away. I think we,  
22                 as officials, were just looking at what we needed to do,  
23                 as DFID, to do a good job in Iraq.

24   SIR RODERIC LYNE: It didn't fade away terribly fast. We  
25          have had witnesses talking about it being very much in

1 people's minds in 2005 even, that this was what they  
2 were supposed to be achieving.

3 Sally Keeble, in her evidence, told us that she felt  
4 that the issue of whether or not DFID should be  
5 concentrating on one sector should have been sorted out  
6 much earlier than it was.

7 MS CAROLYN MILLER: Uh-huh.

8 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Presumably because that meant you would  
9 have to adjust your plans from an Iraq-wide scenario or  
10 a humanitarian scenario in the different scenario of  
11 UK Inc. being in charge of four provinces of somebody  
12 else's country with all that that implied.

13 Do you think -- would you agree with Sally Keeble's  
14 comment?

15 MS CAROLYN MILLER: I believe that we in DFID didn't want to  
16 totally restrict our work to sort of one group of areas,  
17 and that we felt there was a need to support people who  
18 were working at national level -- and that could have  
19 been the UN or whoever else -- whilst at the same time  
20 making a more concerted effort.

21 In the end, that's what we moved on to do and there  
22 was input into both. I think it was probably difficult  
23 to decide earlier than we did, because we were still  
24 getting in that bit about the second resolution and the  
25 legality bit. So I would actually link the delay, not

1 to a decision on whether we did it or not, but delay on  
2 what we were permitted to do or not.

3 SIR RODERIC LYNE: I think my colleagues will come on to the  
4 second resolution in a moment. Thank you.

5 MS CAROLYN MILLER: Okay.

6 SIR JOHN CHILCOT: Sir Martin Gilbert?

7 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: I would like to look at the question of  
8 division of responsibility between the departments.

9 With the creation of the Iraq Planning Unit in  
10 February 2003, which was FCO-led but of which DFID was  
11 an integral part, can you tell us what agreement was  
12 secured, and how it was secured, on the division of  
13 responsibility for the aftermath between the different  
14 government departments within the IPU?

15 MS CAROLYN MILLER: Certainly I don't remember any  
16 difficulties in the negotiation and certainly the people  
17 that we had there were looking at a range of areas and  
18 certainly not just humanitarian. In some ways, there  
19 was some collaborative working. I don't remember there  
20 being any issues on how it was divided up.

21 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: With regard to security sector reform,  
22 did DFID have a view on that?

23 MS CAROLYN MILLER: DFID, before the conflict, had  
24 highlighted security sector reform as something that was  
25 very important and it is something you find across

1 a number of DFID programmes as being sort of an area of  
2 expertise, but clearly it is also something that other  
3 government departments are interested in. So that to me  
4 would be something you would be looking for, some kind  
5 of collaborative effort.

6 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: In terms of the necessary professional  
7 expertise was this something DFID felt it could  
8 contribute, security sector reform?

9 MS CAROLYN MILLER: DFID has people that can contribute. It  
10 has done it in a number of countries, or had at that  
11 point in time. I am no longer in DFID. I'm sure it's  
12 still got it.

13 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Paul Boateng told us with regard to the  
14 question of security sector reform that DFID had the  
15 expertise and considerable funding, but suspected there  
16 was, as he put it, a degree of resistance on the part of  
17 DFID to getting involved.

18 Was that your understanding and was this a conscious  
19 decision?

20 MS CAROLYN MILLER: I remember no reluctance to getting  
21 involved in security sector reform at all. I  
22 do remember that it was highlighted as an important area  
23 for us to potentially contribute to. Again it is  
24 possible that there were delays in DFID being able to  
25 move forward. Things moved forward more slowly than

1 would have been ideal. So it may be that that was  
2 linked to a general -- post the invasion you are waiting  
3 for the legal view and then things move forward from  
4 there. So there was that element, plus it was fairly  
5 chaotic on the ground.

6 So in my mind I would say it was probably more  
7 related to those two things rather than any deliberate  
8 unwillingness to get involved.

9 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: If I could look just briefly at the  
10 military/DFID relationship, Geoff Hoon told us in his  
11 evidence:

12 "We became very heavily involved in reconstruction,  
13 frankly, to an extent that eventually I judged was not  
14 appropriate, because we were expecting that soldiers  
15 would be replaced doing some of these basic  
16 administrative jobs by civilians, and indeed we had been  
17 promised by both the Foreign Office and by DFID that  
18 that that would happen."

19 Do you think there was a confusion with regard to  
20 the expected level of contribution by DFID and the FCO  
21 in terms of civilian personnel?

22 MS CAROLYN MILLER: I think there could have been. I don't  
23 remember construction being such a big issue, but I  
24 think -- I am not sure that it was ever laid out totally  
25 clearly on exactly what numbers anybody was expecting at

1 any point in time. So there could have been confusion  
2 in there.

3 My responsibility for Iraq kind of diminished over  
4 time and certainly it became a separate area, separate  
5 division, but the point at which I was involved I don't  
6 remember any agreement whatsoever on numbers. I think  
7 we were gradually increasing our numbers over time.

8 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: So this was not something that the Iraq  
9 Planning Unit was -- where you made a specific input in  
10 terms of numbers or potential numbers?

11 MS CAROLYN MILLER: I don't remember any commitment to  
12 precise numbers.

13 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Thank you very much.

14 SIR JOHN CHILCOT: Right. Over to Sir Lawrence Freedman.  
15 Lawrence.

16 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: UNSCR 1483.

17 MS CAROLYN MILLER: Uh-huh.

18 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: This established the UK as a joint  
19 occupying power along with the US.

20 Did you have any involvement in the negotiations for  
21 1483?

22 MS CAROLYN MILLER: No, I didn't. I just followed it very  
23 closely, because it was very important to us being able  
24 to move on to another stage.

25 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Did you have any concerns about how

1           it was developing?

2   MS CAROLYN MILLER:  Yes.  Obviously I was following, and  
3           more senior people in DFID were involved in their inputs  
4           into the negotiations.  So I was totally aware of all of  
5           that happening, and obviously we wanted something as  
6           strong as possible to give as clear a mandate as  
7           possible to future reconstruction work.

8   SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:  But you were not making any of the  
9           inputs yourself?

10  MS CAROLYN MILLER:  No, I wasn't.

11  SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:  What did you understand at the time  
12           to be the arguments for the UK being named as a joint  
13           occupying power?

14  MS CAROLYN MILLER:  Again all of the -- I mean, obviously  
15           what DFID were seeking in particular was to have the UN  
16           in there, but what was being sought was enough of  
17           a mandate for us to be comfortable in doing the next  
18           things that were necessary to aid Iraq's recovery.

19  SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:  So in general what was your  
20           understanding of the implications for the UK government  
21           as a whole, DFID in particular, of this role being  
22           assigned to the UK?

23  MS CAROLYN MILLER:  I suspect there were different views  
24           within DFID on that, but I personally was looking for  
25           anything that gave us enough legitimacy to move forward

1 and get on with the work.

2 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: So in what way then were you able  
3 to -- I mean, up to this point were you not able really  
4 to get involved?

5 MS CAROLYN MILLER: We could still second people in. We had  
6 people seconded in, and I think, as I mentioned before,  
7 that wasn't the only constraint. I mean, you know, the  
8 aftermath planning, as we have agreed, was not that  
9 great, and it was actually very difficult to contribute  
10 anything anyway, but that would have given a greater  
11 impetus.

12 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: But before we understand DFID was  
13 concerned about the legality of sending staff to engage  
14 in ORHA, for example, without resolution. So once it  
15 was passed did it remove the obstacles?

16 MS CAROLYN MILLER: It removed that obstacle. I think  
17 people were still concerned. I know people were still  
18 concerned about the ability of ORHA to then move forward  
19 anyway.

20 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: How did the UK adjust its planning  
21 and resource commitments in preparation then for being  
22 an occupying power once 1483 was passed?

23 MS CAROLYN MILLER: To me it was an incremental process.  
24 There were things that could be done immediately. Then  
25 other plans were put in place. So gradually the number

1 of staff was increased, partly as secondees in and then  
2 partly to Basra. It was an incremental process of  
3 finding the people. Obviously there were people we knew  
4 we could call on. We didn't suddenly start doing it  
5 then. People had been identified before, but it was  
6 difficult to find enough people.

7 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Leaving aside the difficulty of  
8 actually finding the people, prior to 1483 were you  
9 aware that the Foreign Office and MoD also had concerns  
10 about the legality of the position without the UN  
11 resolution?

12 MS CAROLYN MILLER: Yes. So, I mean, a lot of these things  
13 were shared across Whitehall.

14 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Given the difficulties you have  
15 mentioned, do you think there were sufficient numbers of  
16 staff with appropriate skills fast enough in 2003 to  
17 meet the responsibilities of being a joint occupying  
18 power?

19 MS CAROLYN MILLER: Obviously not. That is fairly obvious.  
20 The DFID emergency unit has a whole range of people that  
21 it can always call on, and I think the advantage of  
22 those people is they have been used to dealing with  
23 these situations before. They know how to build  
24 capacity, but there probably had never been anything  
25 quite like this, and there were other things going on in

1 the world at the same time where a number of people were  
2 already occupied.

3 So in an ideal scenario you would have a lot of  
4 people prepared and ready to go, but even, you know,  
5 things have moved on since then and new systems have  
6 been put in place, but when something happens, you know,  
7 those people aren't available or whatever, but yes,  
8 ideally we would have had more people ready to go.

9 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: So just cumulatively all these  
10 factors slowed up the ability to get people in?

11 MS CAROLYN MILLER: Yes.

12 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Can I just go back to the one of the  
13 things you said before, which is your awareness of what  
14 was going on with 1483 and the negotiations, because you  
15 indicated that you were sighted on the negotiations, on  
16 the correspondence about the negotiations, because Clare  
17 Short seemed to suggest to us that she was not and that  
18 things had gone quiet as they moved to closure on the  
19 negotiations, but you didn't feel --

20 MS CAROLYN MILLER: There may have been points where  
21 suddenly something went quiet. I think one thing  
22 I would say, that within DFID the sort of way we all  
23 worked together from Secretary of State,  
24 Permanent Secretary, Director General, myself and my  
25 team, it was a very full on role. We were keeping each

1 other informed very closely at all points in time. So  
2 that's what I meant by I knew exactly what was happening  
3 at the stage where we knew what was happening. There  
4 may have been a day or so when we didn't know what was  
5 happening next, but I certainly seem to remember reading  
6 a lot of updates on how the resolution was going.

7 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: I mean, just in terms of listening  
8 to what you are saying and other evidence we have heard  
9 you are giving this a sense of being reasonably well  
10 plugged into the Whitehall machine, decent relations  
11 with your colleagues in MoD and FCO, Cabinet Office and  
12 so on.

13 MS CAROLYN MILLER: Uh-huh.

14 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Yet we also have this sense of at  
15 the higher level at least a more sort of tense and  
16 difficult relationship.

17 So I suppose the question is, one, were you aware of  
18 that more difficult and tense relationship say at  
19 Cabinet level and, secondly, were you able at an  
20 official level in a way to insulate yourself from that?

21 MS CAROLYN MILLER  
22 Yes and yes is the answer. Obviously we wouldn't be  
23 doing our jobs properly if we weren't aware of what was  
24 happening above us. We are there to sort of support  
25 those people above us, but there are ways that you can  
work, because we were being given a mandate to make this

1 work, across to sort of help ameliorate some of those  
2 things or to make suggestions that would help them  
3 resolve some of those difficulties.

4 I mean, I do genuinely feel that at my level and  
5 probably a level above me as well it worked quite well.  
6 Sometimes we had to push to get information, but  
7 generally it wasn't much of a struggle.

8 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: So you didn't feel your position  
9 was -- you didn't feel personally torn in a way between  
10 your colleagues in other ministries and your Secretary  
11 of State?

12 MS CAROLYN MILLER: No, because at the end of the day the  
13 Secretary of State was very committed to a solution at  
14 the end of the day. So I think our interpretation of  
15 how that solution had to be got, which was by working  
16 quite closely with those people -- we were -- I was  
17 given a mandate to work across.

18 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Okay. Thanks very much.

19 SIR JOHN CHILCOT: Can we move through the difficult spring  
20 and summer months of 2003 and on to September? In  
21 September that year DFID created a new position of  
22 Director Iraq.

23 MS CAROLYN MILLER: Yes.

24 SIR JOHN CHILCOT: Can you just tell us something about the  
25 rationale behind the creation of the post? Was it

1 focus, workload?

2 MS CAROLYN MILLER: It made total sense to me and, in fact,  
3 it happened a little bit before that. What happened  
4 immediately after the conflict started almost is that we  
5 brought in two very senior people to work with me or  
6 under me to look at the humanitarian side and the  
7 reconstruction side. So it was already taken to a much  
8 higher level, and before September one of those people  
9 started as an acting Director. This was something that  
10 happened across Whitehall.

11 If you look -- I mean, I was supposed to be covering  
12 all of these other areas. I was probably January to  
13 April full-time on Iraq. I made other arrangement for  
14 the rest of my division. It had become a lot more  
15 political. There were even more meetings to do. So it  
16 made total sense to take it out. I was very happy to go  
17 back to the rest of my job.

18 SIR JOHN CHILCOT: I was just coming on to ask you when  
19 Jim Drummond took over as the Director Iraq proper, but  
20 you said there was in effect an acting Director before  
21 --

22 MS CAROLYN MILLER: Yes. Chris Austin.

23 SIR JOHN CHILCOT: Who was that?

24 MS CAROLYN MILLER: Chris Austin worked as the sort of head  
25 of the reconstruction part in DFID and then there was

1           someone else doing humanitarian. He was acting Director  
2           from about June or July.

3   SIR JOHN CHILCOT: His chain of command at that point would  
4           not have been to you but to Suma Chakrabarti or  
5           whomever.

6   MR KIMMELMAN: To Nicola Brewer.

7   SIR JOHN CHILCOT: Nicola Brewer.

8   MS CAROLYN MILLER: And then through to Suma Chakrabarti.

9           I continued to cover the Middle East, so I kept an  
10          eye on what was happening in Iraq, but I was not  
11          involved.

12   SIR JOHN CHILCOT: So you are completely free of Iraq  
13          responsibilities from September but in effect have --

14   MS CAROLYN MILLER: From July really, from June/July.

15   SIR JOHN CHILCOT: In effect from July.

16   MS CAROLYN MILLER: Even in the period a little bit before  
17          that I could perhaps do a little bit more of my old job  
18          because I had two very senior people covering it.

19   SIR JOHN CHILCOT: So in effect rather than a sudden change  
20          in the machinery at DFID there was a gradual evolution.

21   MS CAROLYN MILLER: Yes, a very smooth hand-over, and at  
22          which time the Iraq teams were building up enormously  
23          and kind of took over a very large space in DFID.

24   SIR JOHN CHILCOT: Can you say something about how  
25          priorities shifted over that period, April, or indeed a

1 bit later, through to September? They grew but --

2 MS CAROLYN MILLER: They shifted from the humanitarian side

3 through to reconstruction --

4 SIR JOHN CHILCOT: Yes.

5 MS CAROLYN MILLER: -- and within reconstruction much more

6 emphasis over time on capacity building, as would be

7 a little bit more of a normal DFID programme, but in

8 abnormal circumstances.

9 SIR JOHN CHILCOT: With the absence of a really major

10 humanitarian problem, which had been one of DFID's great

11 concerns before the invasion, did that reduce the sense

12 that direct engagement by the United Nations on

13 a significant scale was essential?

14 MS CAROLYN MILLER: To my mind no, because the UN do a major

15 job in rebuilding, and in many ways at the beginning of

16 a very intense humanitarian situation you have the

17 Red Cross and people like that as well. So no, I didn't

18 see that major difference.

19 SIR JOHN CHILCOT: So could you give us your sense -- I am

20 looking now at I suppose, say, April/May 2003 --

21 MS CAROLYN MILLER: Uh-huh.

22 SIR JOHN CHILCOT: -- how, on the one hand, the UN and its

23 agencies viewed the Iraq task, and also the growing

24 realisation presumably in London that the US and the CPA

25 were not going to have major engagement by the UN at any

1 price. So how did those two views look to you at that  
2 time?

3 MS CAROLYN MILLER: It just meant a gradual adjustment. The  
4 UN obviously were in for a short while, and that meant  
5 there were some things that could be done with the UN,  
6 but very much more we moved to a model of direct action  
7 secondments, but particularly advisers to build up  
8 ministries.

9 I think we firmly believed that, you know, some of  
10 the planning and the ministries and things were  
11 reasonably strong in Iraq, and that we would be able to  
12 help build things back. On hindsight clearly that was  
13 another thing that was wrong. There was security and  
14 there were all kinds of other decisions that were made  
15 that made that less possible. So it moved more into  
16 a building up the local structure.

17 SIR JOHN CHILCOT: Yes. That was a forced adjustment, not  
18 necessarily a willed one, but that was how the world  
19 was. That's what you did.

20 MS CAROLYN MILLER: Yes. We would have done some of that  
21 anyway. I think it is about proportions in your  
22 portfolio of work.

23 SIR JOHN CHILCOT: Right. I would like to close with some  
24 questions about the DFID/military relationship and in  
25 particular I suppose on the ground and in the

1 south-east.

2 Can I first start with a quote from Clare Short's  
3 evidence to us?

4 MS CAROLYN MILLER: Uh-huh.

5 SIR JOHN CHILCOT: It is this:

6 "On the ground in Sierra Leone, East Timor, Bosnia  
7 and so on we had always had good relationships with the  
8 military, because we are 'can doers' and so are they.  
9 We all want to get on with it and make things work. Of  
10 course in this case" -- she means the Iraq case -- "it  
11 was totally different because we had been frozen out."

12 She goes on to say:

13 "I think that affected my relationship with Boyce",  
14 the then Chief of Defence Staff. "I had had good  
15 relations with Guthrie before him when we worked on  
16 Pakistan together, but he", Boyce no doubt, "had been  
17 told to have nothing to do with me obviously."

18 Did that at the top level, if you like, that  
19 analysis chime with what you were experiencing in the  
20 actual playing out on the ground of DFID's contribution  
21 with the military?

22 MS CAROLYN MILLER: I find in all my dealings with the  
23 military that their kind of number one focus was  
24 actually on the humanitarian situation and there were  
25 people who were very concerned. People came into DFID

1 and sort of said, "Look, how do we plan for these  
2 different scenarios? What do we need to do about key  
3 positioning and things like that?"

4 Obviously there were personality things that got in  
5 the way at a top level. I think it was the legitimacy  
6 thing that really got in the way of constructive  
7 relationship between the military and other parts of  
8 Whitehall.

9 SIR JOHN CHILCOT: Even after 1483 was passed?

10 MS CAROLYN MILLER: Then it should have diminished. Then it  
11 should have diminished.

12 SIR JOHN CHILCOT: Yes. I don't know whether this is  
13 a useful picture of Iraq post-invasion, but you can view  
14 it as seeing three actors of very different orders of  
15 magnitude of relevance for us: the great giant of the  
16 United States military and a very much smaller civilian  
17 component of the US; then ourselves with proportionately  
18 for us a very big military presence but very small  
19 compared to the Americans; and then the civilian  
20 component of the UK contribution, very much smaller  
21 again.

22 MS CAROLYN MILLER: Uh-huh.

23 SIR JOHN CHILCOT: Is that a fair picture to start with?

24 MS CAROLYN MILLER: Yes, that seems fair.

25 SIR JOHN CHILCOT: So how then against that background was

1           it possible to maximise the civil contribution to  
2           reconstruction and stabilisation?

3           What I would like to do is to quote from some  
4           observations that Andy Bearpark gave us with a lot of  
5           experience, of course. You will know him I am sure.

6   MS CAROLYN MILLER: Yes.

7   SIR JOHN CHILCOT: He said a propos the south-east and the  
8           civil/military combination in our area of  
9           responsibility:

10           "Whatever your limited civilian resources, it must  
11           match exactly into where you insert it into the military  
12           machine. If you can afford only one person, that person  
13           has to be the equivalent of the commanding general. If  
14           you can afford three people, you can place them two  
15           ranks down, and if you can only afford one junior  
16           person, that person must be on the personal staff of the  
17           commanding general."

18           Were you aware until the responsibility passed from  
19           you about any choices that DFID had in where to insert  
20           itself into the MND South East British military  
21           machinery?

22   MS CAROLYN MILLER: No, I wasn't. My assumption that I made  
23           was we were trying to find the best people to do the  
24           right things. That would have then determined where  
25           they fitted in, but it may be that I was not party to

1 all of those decisions.

2 SIR JOHN CHILCOT: Would DFID have had the choice, if it  
3 chose to exercise it, to put in more, perhaps much more,  
4 senior people in order to scale themselves up to the  
5 level of military commanders in the South East?

6 MS CAROLYN MILLER: I would have hoped that we were looking  
7 for the most senior people we could find, but one of the  
8 things that we were trying to do, as I remember it, was  
9 look for particular skills in the areas that we thought  
10 needed building up. So you are looking often for  
11 technical people as opposed to the Andy Bearpark  
12 figures.

13 SIR JOHN CHILCOT: Yes. There are two contrasting views  
14 here, aren't there? One is look for the best and most  
15 appropriate skills. The other is to learn how to work  
16 the machine in practice when you are frankly on a tiny  
17 scale compared to the military scale. Two views of how  
18 to do it.

19 MS CAROLYN MILLER: I would do a combination of both. You  
20 know, if we were doing all this again now, that would be  
21 clearly -- the world has moved on since then. So, I  
22 mean, I would hope that in a similar kind of scenario  
23 you would be looking to do both.

24 SIR JOHN CHILCOT: Thank you. That's a helpful offering of  
25 a lesson I think.

1           I think we are coming to the conclusion of this  
2 session. I would just like to ask my colleagues if they  
3 have any final questions and then give you the  
4 opportunity to offer us final reflections, if you wish.

5           Right. Over to you. Looking back on that  
6 experience, quite short for you, but nonetheless  
7 absolutely vital.

8 MS CAROLYN MILLER

It was. It was quite a life-changing experience.

9           I would say that, looking back on it, because obviously  
10 I am still connected in this area, that a lot of lessons  
11 were learned. I can see changes that have been made as  
12 a result of it. So I would sort of look on that  
13 positively.

14           In fact, I was a panel member on an exercise in  
15 Shrivenham, where you have got people from all the  
16 government departments planning conflict scenarios and  
17 how they would work together on them. So I think that  
18 has changed.

19           My other thought is that what sort of got left out  
20 of all of this or what was so different about it was  
21 normally DFID's role is in sort of looking at the  
22 British contribution compared to the international  
23 contribution and that international coordination, and  
24 this didn't happen because of all kinds of reasons, but  
25 that would be the case in another scenario quite likely.

1           So I think that we probably need to remember that  
2           because the UN were so limited and a lot of other  
3           countries didn't go in in the same way, it was quite  
4           a different scenario to the normal one that you would  
5           expect. Therefore it was quite an unusual role for DFID  
6           to play.

7   SIR JOHN CHILCOT: So some lessons perhaps about process of  
8           relationships to be learned, but not taking the example  
9           of Iraq as transferable in any way -- good way?

10   MS CAROLYN MILLER: Yes, definitely aspects of it. Closely  
11           government working, although I don't think -- you know,  
12           I think cross-government working is still pretty good.  
13           This was a very particular case which -- and in another  
14           scenario you would be asking about how it fitted in with  
15           everyone else's planning.

16   SIR JOHN CHILCOT: Well, thank you very much.

17   MS CAROLYN MILLER: Okay. Thank you.

18   SIR JOHN CHILCOT: We are grateful to our witness this  
19           afternoon, to Carolyn Miller. With that we will close  
20           this session of evidence.

21           We will return on Friday morning at 10 o'clock, when  
22           we shall hear from Paul Kernaghan, the International  
23           Policing Portfolio Lead for the Association of Chief  
24           Police Officers of England, Wales and Northern Ireland  
25           for all the period 2001-2008.

1                   That ends this afternoon. Thank you.

2   (5.25 pm)

3                                   (Hearing concluded)

4   --ooOoo--

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

