

1 Tuesday, 24 November 2009

2 (10.00 am)

3 Chairman's Opening Statement

4 THE CHAIRMAN: Good morning ladies and gentlemen and welcome
5 to the Iraq Inquiry's first day of public hearings. For
6 those of you who don't know me, I'm Sir John Chilcot,
7 Chairman of the Inquiry, and I'm joined by my
8 colleagues, Sir Lawrence Freedman on my right,
9 Sir Martin Gilbert at the end there, and
10 Sir Roderic Lyne at the end on my right, and
11 Baroness Usha Prashar.

12 Next to me is Margaret Aldred, who is the Secretary
13 to the Inquiry. I propose that we should sit in silence
14 for a few moments out of respect for all those from the
15 United Kingdom, and its allies, and people in Iraq, who
16 lost their lives in this period.

17 Thank you. The Iraq Inquiry was set up to identify
18 the lessons that should be learned from the UK's
19 involvement in Iraq to help future governments who may
20 face similar situations. To do this, we need to
21 establish what happened. We are piecing this together
22 from the evidence we are collecting from documents, or
23 from those who have first-hand experience. We will then
24 need to evaluate what went well and what didn't and,
25 crucially, why.

1 My colleagues and I come to this task with open
2 minds. We are apolitical, we are independent of any
3 political party, and we want to examine and rely on the
4 evidence. We will approach our task in a way that is
5 thorough, rigorous, fair and frank.

6 We are committed to openness and we are determined
7 to conduct as much of our proceedings as possible in
8 public, and I welcome those members of the public who
9 join us here today. Thank you for taking the time and
10 making the effort to travel here this morning, and
11 I also welcome the media presence here in the centre.

12 For those not physically able to be here, I'm
13 pleased that the Inquiry proceedings are available for
14 broadcast and are being streamed on the Internet. These
15 public hearings are the activity which will attract the
16 most publicity. They do form only one part of our work
17 and it is important to emphasise that.

18 Over the past months, we have requested and received
19 mountains of written material from government
20 departments involved in Iraq during 2001 and 2009. We
21 have spent many hours already combing through these
22 official records and will continue to do this in the
23 months ahead. We are confident that we will have, and
24 do have, access to all the material we need, but we
25 don't want to and are not just hearing from official

1 representatives. We value hearing a broad spectrum of
2 views from a wide range of people and organisations. We
3 want to know what people across Britain think are the
4 important questions. We want to get a range of
5 challenging perspectives on the issues we are
6 considering and we have already made a start on this by
7 holding five meetings, so far, with the families of
8 those who were killed or are missing in Iraq, and we are
9 all very grateful to those who came to talk with us.

10 We have held preliminary meetings with Iraq veterans
11 and there will be more. We have held, so far, two
12 seminars with a range of experts, and hope to have
13 further seminars early next year. We have also asked
14 anyone who has information, or who wants to make points
15 relevant to our terms of reference, to contact us, and
16 we thank all those who have already been in touch,
17 a considerable number.

18 But the next phase begins today. We have called as
19 witnesses those with first-hand experience of the
20 development and implementation of the United Kingdom
21 Government policy in Iraq. Our first round of public
22 hearings begins today and runs until
23 early February 2010. We will then take a break from
24 public hearings, returning to our analysis of the
25 written material and the witness testimony we will have

1 received by then. We will hold some private hearings in
2 that period, take evidence on matters, which, if
3 disclosed in public, will cause genuine harm to the
4 public interest, or where there are other genuine
5 reasons why a witness would have difficulty in being
6 frank in public.

7 Circumstances in which we will hold private hearings
8 are set out in the protocols which are published on
9 the Inquiry's website. Then, in the middle of 2010,
10 there will be a further round of public hearings. We
11 expect to invite back some previous witnesses and,
12 where relevant, call new ones.

13 What I would like to stress now is that people
14 shouldn't jump to conclusions if they don't hear
15 everything or everyone they expect in the first round
16 of hearings, there will, in fact, be more to follow.

17 Once we have collected all the evidence we need, we
18 will be in a position to draw conclusions and make our
19 recommendations and we plan to report by the end of
20 2010.

21 It is not in our, or, I judge, in the country's
22 interest to delay the process. Our objective, however,
23 is to produce a thorough analysis that makes a genuine
24 contribution to improving public governance and
25 decision-taking. If that takes a bit longer than the

1 beginning of 2011, I hope that people will bear with us.

2 That's for next year. For now, it might be useful
3 to set out what we aim to cover in this initial phase of
4 public hearings and how we plan to conduct our business.

5 We want to establish a clear understanding of the
6 various core elements of the United Kingdom's
7 involvement in Iraq and how things developed over time.
8 We will start by hearing from senior officials and
9 military officers who had a key role in developing
10 advice for Ministers and/or implementing government
11 policy. We want them to take us through the main
12 decisions and tasks. That will help to give us a clear
13 understanding of the various strands of British policy
14 development and implementation since 2001. We need to
15 learn the reasons why particular policies and courses of
16 action were adopted and what consideration was given to
17 alternative approaches.

18 Once we have heard that initial evidence, we will
19 begin to take evidence from Ministers and other
20 officials about issues which run throughout the period
21 we have been asked to consider; 2001 to 2009. In some
22 cases, we will be able, on the basis of the evidence we
23 have heard from officials earlier in the session, to get
24 into considerable detail. In other cases, we may need
25 to return to a number of issues at later stages, and it

1 will be during those hearings in the New Year, and not
2 before, that we will begin to hear about the legal basis
3 for military action.

4 In all our questions we will be drawing on the vast
5 number of documents we have already seen and read, and
6 that will give us a good sense of the main events of the
7 hearing and the issues and preoccupations. Witness
8 evidence will build on our previous knowledge. It will
9 help to develop our lines of inquiry and these, I must
10 stress, are still developing.

11 We remain, as we have been from the outset,
12 open-minded, but what we are committed to, and what I
13 believe the British general public should expect from
14 us, is a guarantee to be thorough, to be impartial, to
15 be objective and fair.

16 So perhaps this is an appropriate moment to set out
17 our expectations of how these proceedings will run from
18 now.

19 The Iraq Inquiry Committee members will ask
20 questions, witnesses will respond for themselves. We
21 expect them always to give evidence that is truthful,
22 fair and accurate. We do not intend to ask questions
23 today that will involve evidence that might harm
24 national security or other important public interests,
25 as described in the protocols we have published, if they

1 were to be made public. In the extremely unlikely event
2 that evidence moved towards such matters sensitive to
3 national security, I would intervene to halt the
4 proceedings. Such matters can, and, where necessary,
5 will, be pursued in private hearings at another time.

6 As I have said before, we are not a court of law,
7 nor are we an inquest, or, indeed, a statutory inquiry
8 and our processes reflect that. No one is on trial
9 here. We cannot determine guilt or innocence, only
10 a court can do that.

11 But I make a commitment here that, once we get to
12 our final report, we will not shy away from making
13 criticisms either of institutions or processes or
14 individuals where they are truly warranted.

15 Finally, as I said earlier, all of us are pleased
16 these are public sessions. We welcome those of you who
17 join us today and will do so over the coming months.
18 There are, however, serious matters that we have to
19 examine. We want to get to the heart of what happened
20 and don't wish to be distracted in that task by any
21 disturbance. So we have set out on our website, and to
22 all here today, the kind of restraint and behaviour we
23 expect from those present in this room. They are no
24 different from those expected of the public when they
25 attend Parliament, for example, before Select Committee

1 hearings.

2 Just as there, though, if anyone, later on, were
3 moved to fail to meet them, they would have to leave.

4 As to today's proceedings, as I have set out,
5 the first five weeks aim to establish the main features
6 of United Kingdom involvement in Iraq over the period.
7 We have invited to give evidence both senior officials
8 and military personnel, who, by the post they occupied,
9 had a unique perspective on United Kingdom Government
10 decision-making and the implementation of those
11 policies. Today, we start in 2001.

12 Before us are Sir Peter Ricketts, who, in 2001, was
13 the Director General Political in the Foreign and
14 Commonwealth Office; Sir William Patey, who was head of
15 the Foreign Office's Middle East Department; and
16 Simon Webb, who was Policy Director in the Ministry of
17 Defence.

18 The objectives for today are these: we start to
19 build a picture and set a context. It is important we
20 understand the recent history in all its complexity, and
21 it is difficult to understand events in the years that
22 follow without understanding this earlier period. Two
23 sessions will cover the state of UK policy on Iraq in
24 2001 and the evolution of policy in the course of that
25 year.

1 We will examine Iraq policy reviews, initiated by
2 the United Kingdom and by the US Government in 2001,
3 including a sanctions regime and the No Fly Zones. We
4 will see Sir John Sawers for the Number 10 perspective
5 on these at a later date.

6 At this morning's session, we are going to examine
7 broad lines of policy with those involved from the
8 Foreign Office, Cabinet Office and the
9 Ministry of Defence. I expect this will last up to
10 about three hours.

11 In the afternoon, we are going to focus more closely
12 on the No Fly Zones and on sanctions. I estimate each
13 of these sessions may last from between two to three
14 hours at most.

15 I would like, before closing, just to recall that
16 the Inquiry has access to thousands of government
17 papers, including the most highly classified, for the
18 period we are considering. A developing picture is of
19 the policy debates and of the decision-making process in
20 that period.

21 The evidence sessions are an important element in
22 informing our thinking and in complementing the
23 documentary evidence. It is important that witnesses
24 are, and feel able to be, open and frank in evidence
25 while respecting national security.

1 I must remind witnesses, as I will on each occasion,
2 that they will later be asked to sign a transcript of
3 their evidence to the effect that the evidence they have
4 given is truthful, fair and accurate.

5 What I will start by doing, if I may, is to invite
6 each of our witnesses in turn to describe who they are,
7 and then I will, if I may, turn to Sir Peter Ricketts
8 for a brief introduction for a few minutes to this area
9 of policy at this time.

10 SIR PETER RICKETTS, SIR WILLIAM PATEY and MR SIMON WEBB

11 SIR PETER RICKETTS: Thank you very much indeed,
12 Mr Chairman. Maybe, as the first official witness,
13 I can just repeat the undertaking that the
14 Prime Minister gave in the House of Commons when he set
15 up the Inquiry, that the government pledged the
16 fullest cooperation with the Inquiry, and I know all the
17 departments concerned will continue to give you
18 the fullest cooperation throughout the Inquiry.

19 In 2001, I was Chairman of the Joint Intelligence
20 Committee for the first nine months of the year, and
21 I moved into the Political Director position at the
22 Foreign Office a few days before 9/11 in September 2001
23 and was then in that position through to July 2003. I'm
24 now the Permanent Secretary in the FCO.

25 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. I wonder, Sir William, as to

1 whether if you could just describe very briefly your
2 responsibilities at that time, and then I will turn back
3 to Sir Peter to bring us into the subject.

4 SIR WILLIAM PATEY: Thank you. I'm Sir William Patey. I'm
5 currently ambassador to Saudi Arabia. In 2001, I was
6 the head of the Middle East Department, which is the
7 department responsible for policy towards Iraq, amongst
8 other things, including Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf,
9 and I was probably leading on policy in respect of
10 development of the policy on Iraq during that period.
11 I left the department in March 2002 to go off to be
12 ambassador to Sudan.

13 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much. Mr Webb.

14 MR SIMON WEBB: My name is Simon Webb, I'm currently
15 undertaking in the Cabinet Office a study of the lessons
16 of crisis management over the last 15 to 20 years, and
17 I'm also on secondment part-time to the
18 Football Association to help with government support for
19 the World Cup in 2018. "England united, the world
20 invited", but in that era, I was, at the start of 2001,
21 the Director General for Operational Policy in the
22 Ministry of Defence, advising on the political and
23 military dimensions of current operations. That ran
24 through until about September. In July, I was promoted
25 to become Policy Director of the Ministry of Defence,

1 which deals with the wider issues about the overall
2 balance between the armed forces and the structure and
3 budget and so on.

4 I probably ought to say that I was promoted during this
5 period -- on the recommendations in a competitive
6 process, of a panel which included two members of the
7 Inquiry, Baroness Prashar and Lawrence Freedman.

8 I think, for transparency, it is for me to say that
9 rather than anyone else.

10 THE CHAIRMAN: Coming back to you, Sir Peter, would you like
11 to give us a few minutes to lead us into this time
12 period?

13 SIR PETER RICKETTS: Certainly, Mr Chairman. Thank you very
14 much.

15 Let me try to set the scene in terms of
16 policy-making as at the beginning of 2001. That's
17 a point in a continuum, of course, because Iraq had been
18 a major foreign and defence policy issue for the UK
19 throughout the 1990s ever since the Gulf War, but, as
20 2001 dawned, we had the arrival of a new administration
21 in Washington and Whitehall was busy reviewing policy
22 towards Iraq in preparation for discussions with that
23 new administration.

24 I think the simple summary of our view at that time
25 was that we had been pursuing a policy of containment,

1 containment, most important, of Saddam Hussein's
2 ambitions to redevelop weapons of mass destruction but
3 also containment of the threat which Iraq had posed to
4 the region, but, by 2001, that containment policy was
5 failing and the rate of failure was accelerating.

6 There were three standards, I would say, to the
7 containment policy. One was sanctions, of which perhaps
8 the most effective was an arms embargo, but there were
9 also sanctions on Iraqi oil exports and revenues from
10 them, handled through this complex machinery of the Oil
11 For Food programme the UN ran.

12 The second strand was an incentive strand.
13 Resolution 1284 of the Security Council passed in 1999,
14 had offered the Iraqis a deal, the incentive of
15 suspension of sanctions 120 days after the Iraqis had
16 accepted to return the weapons inspectors to Iraq.

17 The third strand was a deterrent strand; it was the
18 No Fly Zones in the north and in the south.

19 Now, our review at the beginning of 2001 has
20 suggested that each of those strands of policy were in
21 trouble. The sanctions strand was subject to increasing
22 smuggling of oil through a new pipeline in Syria and
23 then leakages of oil round the region, of abuse of the
24 Oil For Food programme providing substantial revenues to
25 Saddam Hussein and the regime, and, as I say, the arms

1 embargo perhaps the most effective part of it, but also
2 with problems.

3 The incentive strand had not been implemented
4 because Saddam Hussein had not accepted the return of
5 the weapons inspectors to Iraq, so that was on hold, and
6 the No Fly Zone strand was thought to be risky, for
7 reasons which we will come on to explore, but also very
8 unpopular.

9 We were very aware, in 2001, that international
10 support for this structure of sanctions and deterrence
11 was eroding, both in the region and in the
12 Security Council.

13 The net effect of that was that Saddam Hussein in
14 Iraq was feeling pretty comfortable. He had
15 substantial illegal revenues from which he could pursue
16 patronage inside Iraq and continue the efforts to
17 procure materials for his weapons of mass destruction
18 programme. He was busy restoring his standing in the
19 Arab world by very visible support for the Palestinian
20 Intifada, which was another major issue that was
21 happening at that time.

22 There were no inspectors in the country to inspect
23 his weapons programme and the US/UK sanctions policy was
24 pretty unpopular. He was able to put the blame for the
25 suffering of the Iraqi people on the west. So our

1 review of the policy -- and I will now come to the end
2 of this introduction -- was really designed to try to
3 regain the initiative, to put the effort more
4 effectively on controlling the ambitions for weapons of
5 mass destruction, to lift controls over civilian goods
6 going into Iraq, to tighten up border controls, and to
7 clamp down on smuggling.

8 Those ideas of a reformed sanctions package were ones
9 that we discussed in the early weeks of new
10 administration with Colin Powell and others coming into
11 power in Washington, and we found that their thinking
12 was very much along the same lines. Colin Powell was
13 also very conscious of the need to rebuild international
14 support for an effective, more focused sanctions regime
15 in Iraq.

16 One immediate difference that we discovered with the
17 incoming administration was that they were much less
18 keen on getting weapons inspectors into Iraq, but apart
19 from that, we saw considerable similarity of approach.
20 We were conscious that there were other voices in
21 Washington as well, some of whom were talking about
22 regime change, and I certainly remember reading in the
23 summer of 2000 Condi Rice's article in Foreign Affairs
24 on the national interest, which was a Republican Party
25 manifesto before the party came into office, where she

1 said that "nothing will change until Saddam has gone, so
2 the US must mobilise whatever resources it can,
3 including support from his opposition to remove him."

4 So that line of thinking about regime change was
5 already there from before the new US administration
6 arrived, but our early exchanges with the new
7 administration suggested our thinking was on very much
8 the same lines.

9 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Is it fair from that description
10 to say that United Kingdom policy had, for quite a long
11 time, been settled and stable, but the elements of it
12 were breaking down in the judgment of United Kingdom
13 Government?

14 By contrast, the United States and the new
15 administration coming in was essentially possessing
16 a provisional undeveloped policy towards Iraq, the new
17 administration, and when both the United Kingdom and
18 United States began to review their policy, they did so
19 from different starting points, albeit perhaps with
20 a shared analysis.

21 SIR PETER RICKETTS: I think our policy had certainly rested
22 on containment throughout the 1990s with different
23 emphasis on different strands of that policy
24 throughout that period, and we had been very much on the
25 same lines as the Clinton administration. We had

1 certainly read, as I say, suggestions that the
2 Republican Party coming into office would come in with
3 a different approach to Iraq, but, in fact, the early
4 exchanges we had with the administration -- and this was
5 largely with Secretary Powell and the State Department,
6 who were leading on the policy at that time -- suggested
7 that, actually the policy was not that different, that
8 the Americans, too, recognised that containment was the
9 right policy at that point. They were worried that it
10 was not being pursued effectively and they wanted to
11 regain the initiative by focusing more clearly on arms
12 control rather than the elaborate control of civilian
13 goods going into Iraq, and I think we were encouraged by
14 those early exchanges.

15 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. I don't want to go too soon in
16 these sessions into sanctions in detail, but I would be
17 grateful if one of you could say a word about the oil
18 embargo in particular, as to whether, by 2001, it was
19 being seen as having handed Saddam something of a weapon
20 in his own hand to use in terms of corruption, influence
21 over neighbours for trading concessions and the rest of
22 it. Was that particular element a positive for Saddam
23 and a negative for the other?

24 SIR WILLIAM PATEY: I think that was one of the problems --
25 one of the reasons why we were coming to the conclusion

1 that the current policy was failing in the sense that in
2 an attempt to address the humanitarian concerns that the
3 sanctions were hitting ordinary Iraqis. Saddam had been
4 very good at manipulating this and preserving advantage
5 for his own regime, but the Oil For Food had given him
6 money which he was able to use to influence neighbours.

7 So, yes, there was a sense that that was one element
8 of why the policy was seen to be failing. Saddam was
9 sitting comfortably and the sense that, on the present
10 course, he would eventually escape from the constraints,
11 from the continued policy.

12 The policy was designed to prevent him from
13 developing his weapons of mass destruction, designed to
14 get rid of whatever weapons of mass destruction he had
15 and prevent him from threatening his neighbours. Those
16 policy aims looked increasingly vulnerable, and I think
17 the money that inevitably came to his regime in our
18 desire to provide the Iraqi Government with the
19 wherewithal to supply their people with the humanitarian
20 needs, it did give him an opportunity to exploit that.

21 THE CHAIRMAN: I imagine this is more for Mr Webb, but
22 I would be grateful if you could say just something
23 about the arms embargo component of the policy, as it
24 then stood, of containment. There was a naval embargo,
25 as I understand it, but also a wider embargo on arms or

1 material that could be used for arms development.

2 MR SIMON WEBB: Yes, the arms embargo had been in place
3 throughout the 1990s and was an essential plank of the
4 policy on Iraq, and the UK played a role along with
5 a multinational force in the maritime dimension of that.
6 We had a frigate or destroyer permanently on station in
7 the Gulf which had powers to intercept inbound ships for
8 arms and also to help policing the oil embargo with
9 outbound ships from Iraq.

10 The general impression we had, I think, by the start
11 of 2001 was that the arms embargo was, in general,
12 holding up well -- I just keep looking at my notes
13 because I want to try and be accurate about this -- and
14 that the majority of -- almost all members of the
15 United Nations were abiding by it, which was preventing
16 the Iraqis from acquiring major new weapons systems,
17 surface-to-air missiles and that kind of thing, but
18 there was some leakage still of parts and components
19 which allowed them to be a bit more effective.

20 For example, they appeared to be flying their
21 aircraft a bit more regularly than we had previously
22 expected, and that kind of thing. And, of course --
23 I expect you want to get on separately to the question
24 of weapons of mass destruction, but that, of course, was
25 also a part of the arms picture.

1 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much.

2 So we have a situation where both governments, the
3 United Kingdom and the United States, are reviewing
4 their policy against a background of -- in the
5 Washington case of a change of administration, but in
6 both cases a growing lack of confidence in the
7 components of the containment policy.

8 Were the assessments of the threat posed by the
9 regime pretty much the same in Washington and London at
10 the beginning of 2001?

11 SIR PETER RICKETTS: I think they were, Mr Chairman.

12 THE CHAIRMAN: So the objectives that each government had in
13 initiating the review did stem pretty much from that
14 common assessment as well as the background.

15 How widely was that assessment shared outside of the
16 London and Washington axis, in other European capitals,
17 for example, in the wider world?

18 SIR PETER RICKETTS: I think it is fair to say that there
19 had been a declining recognition of the threat from
20 Saddam Hussein, both in the region and more widely in
21 the Security Council, and that's why the No Fly Zones
22 for example, were not popular, indeed increasingly
23 unpopular. The French had been part of the No Fly Zones
24 until the mid-1990s, but by then, by 2001, were publicly
25 critical of them and were not supporting them.

1 Regional countries were increasingly coming to see
2 Iraq, I think, subject to Sir William, as a commercial
3 opportunity through oil exports and trade, and less and
4 less concerned about Iraq as a threat to the region. So
5 I think the sense of the threat that Iraq posed was
6 probably sharpest in London and Washington, and less so
7 elsewhere.

8 SIR WILLIAM PATEY: That is certainly true, and part of the
9 narrative through 2001 is an attempt to get P5 unity
10 back on to Iraq and increasingly other countries not
11 sharing -- not sharing the threat. I think the passage
12 of 1284, Security Council Resolution 1284, was the high
13 point of P5 unity. Everything since then was an effort
14 to regain that, which we never achieved.

15 THE CHAIRMAN: So it is fair to say, is it, that one of the
16 objectives of having a policy review, at least from the
17 London perspective, was to rebuild more of a consensus,
18 both in the P5, the Security Council and more widely as
19 well as, as it were, to deal with the inherent breakdown
20 of elements of the containment policy.

21 SIR PETER RICKETTS: Yes, absolutely, it was explicitly so,
22 and to focus international attention back on what we
23 continued to see as the primary concern, which was
24 Saddam Hussein's continuing efforts to acquire material
25 and expertise in his weapons of mass destruction

1 programme.

2 We felt that that was much more likely to be a place
3 where we could find consensus, for example, in the P5,
4 than the wider sanctions, which was too easy to portray
5 as somehow the west denying civilian goods to the
6 suffering Iraqi people.

7 MR SIMON WEBB: Can I just put a point about homogeneity of
8 view really, in the sense that I think -- well, I
9 wouldn't want to leave you with the impression that
10 there wasn't a variety of opinions in some areas. For
11 example, in Kuwait they were still very exercised about
12 the risk from Iraq, and I remember, when the
13 Defence Select Committee went and visited them, this came
14 through in their report.

15 Similarly, Washington, having spent quite a lot of
16 time in the embassy there, at the start of any
17 administration, you will find a variety of different
18 views, and one of the issues about handling Washington
19 in any period is that you are going to find people were
20 debating issues out in the early months. That's quite
21 normal and natural, so to say there is a universal
22 Washington view on day one is probably not quite how it
23 was.

24 SIR WILLIAM PATEY: In the region, if I may add there, the
25 message we were getting from the region was, "We need P5

1 unity". That was a message from the Kuwaitis and the
2 Saudis and others, that their willingness to do things
3 and support things was increased if we could achieve
4 unity in the P5.

5 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

6 I would like to ask one question about process with
7 the British policy review. It clearly had a number of
8 objectives. Was there a clear sense, right from the
9 beginning of the review process, what these objectives
10 were to deal with the breakdown of the existing
11 containment policy, or elements of it, to promote
12 greater international support not least in the P5
13 itself, and also to reassure regional neighbours of Iraq
14 of, at any rate, British policy towards their interests?

15 Was this a shared set of assumptions and objectives?

16 SIR PETER RICKETTS: Yes, I think so. The review was
17 coordinated by the Cabinet Office and it was Whitehall
18 in its classic consensus building mode, where the
19 departments came with different perspectives and
20 different interests, but the papers that were going
21 through the Cabinet Office, for example, for the
22 Prime Minister's first visit to the new administration
23 in late February 2001, I think, reflected an
24 interdepartmental view.

25 It continued the lines of policy objectives which

1 had run through British policy since the Gulf War, of
2 containment on the basis of WMD and avoiding it being
3 a threat to the region. That I think was settled policy
4 across Whitehall departments.

5 THE CHAIRMAN: Given the coherence of the British review
6 process and given the facts of life that the new
7 administration was taking office in Washington, in
8 a sense forming its policy from a different set of
9 starting points in a way, was it possible coherently to
10 link the two processes as they went along?

11 I think it is not contestable that the power in a
12 new American administration will tend to shift around
13 until it settles down. If it does, your interlocutors
14 from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, but clearly
15 with the State Department, there were other interests,
16 DOD, and others. How did that interaction work in the
17 process of this review?

18 SIR PETER RICKETTS: My experience of Washington is there
19 tends to be one dominant force on policy at any
20 particular time, and for Iraq, through to 9/11, the
21 dominant player was the State Department.

22 Colin Powell was leading policy, and that was very
23 apparent when the Prime Minister went to Camp David in
24 late February and, indeed, Powell left that Camp David
25 meeting for a trip to the region which began to set out

1 this smarter sanctions policy that the Americans were
2 developing in parallel with us.

3 At that time, I think it is fair to say that the
4 Pentagon and others may not have been fully aligned with
5 that, but Powell was in the lead, and Powell had the
6 President's authority.

7 I think we can talk later about what happened after
8 9/11, but I think you can see there the change and the
9 change of dominant force in Washington was very clear at
10 that point, up until then we felt that, dealing with the
11 State Department, we were dealing with the people who
12 were leading the policy-forming in Washington.

13 SIR WILLIAM PATEY: I went to Washington during this period,
14 and we certainly had the sense that the State Department
15 were being given a chance to see if they could make this
16 policy work. That was how I looked back at it; that
17 they were being given a chance to see if they could make
18 containment work. Could they do what we had set out to
19 do, was contain Saddam by narrowing and deepening the
20 sanctions, and that for at least until 9/11,
21 Colin Powell was the main player on that and the
22 State Department were intent on trying to make that
23 work.

24 THE CHAIRMAN: I would like just to introduce the term
25 "regime change", really to know how early that began to

1 loom in American, or, indeed, for that matter, joint
2 thinking as a possible objective or a possible outturn
3 for the process of review. It wasn't of itself an
4 objective of containment, as I understand that policy.

5 SIR PETER RICKETTS: No, and I have quoted, Mr Chairman,
6 Condoleezza Rice in her pre-administration article in
7 foreign affairs, which I think was in the minds of many
8 of us. It was in a section of her article entitled
9 "Rogue States", and so the concept of rogue states and
10 of regime change was there in the public rhetoric of the
11 incoming Republican administration, and we were
12 conscious of that, but I don't think any of us felt that
13 there was an operational consequence of that in the
14 early days.

15 I think, as William puts it well, the
16 State Department was given the chance to show whether
17 containment would work. We did hear voices around
18 Washington talking about possibly looking at arming
19 Iraqi opposition groups and so on, but it didn't feel,
20 to us, operational at that point; we were conscious it
21 was a strand in their thinking, but was not being played
22 through into policy.

23 SIR WILLIAM PATEY: I made a note that, in fact, on
24 22 February 2001, there was a policy board which our
25 policy should be to keep a long way from the regime end

1 of the spectrum. So in February 2001, we were aware of
2 these drum beats from Washington and internally we
3 discussed it. Our policy was to stay away from that end
4 of the spectrum, but in the course of the year, we were
5 obviously aware of the dichotomy and I think, later on,
6 you may want to talk about the Contract with the Iraqi
7 People, which was our way in the Foreign Office of
8 trying to signal that we didn't think Saddam was a good
9 thing and it would be great if he went, but we didn't
10 have an explicit policy for trying get rid of him.

11 MR SIMON WEBB: Perhaps I should fill in the defence part of
12 this. I haven't mentioned this so far because we are
13 going to spend some time this afternoon on the no-fly
14 zones, but that was a current military operation which
15 had been in place for a number of years to patrol over
16 northern Iraq and southern Iraq in a coalition with the
17 United States.

18 So obviously, while we had a current live military
19 operation and, as I will explain this afternoon, it was
20 getting more difficult in some ways with an increasing
21 risk to patrolling aircraft and new techniques that the
22 Iraqis had developed, we had to have closer links with
23 the Pentagon about it both at an operational level and
24 at a political level.

25 To answer your question about how did we coordinate,

1 actually we went on a first visit round Washington
2 in March as I recall, with the Foreign Office in the
3 lead and myself and other people as a team. We went
4 round and talked to the Department of Defence and others
5 about the position, and I then went back on subsequent
6 visits at their request.

7 The point I would like to make is that those
8 discussions did raise questions about the operation of
9 the No Fly Zone. People would indeed -- you know,
10 sensible strategists would ask questions about why we
11 were doing this patrolling under attack, and the
12 strategic progress we were making was limited. So the
13 zones were only justified by the protection of
14 minorities of the Kurds in the north and the Shias in
15 the south for humanitarian reasons, but there were
16 questions which people would quizzically have asked
17 about all that. So we talked about all that.

18 I think the important point was to say that -- the
19 question of regime overthrow was, I recall, mentioned
20 but it was quite clear that there was no proposition
21 being put in our direction on that, and, indeed, we got
22 propositions -- and we can talk about the detail of
23 those -- on the No Fly Zones, but we did not get the
24 proposition about regime change.

25 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

1 We are still in 2001, 9/11 is still a way ahead.
2 Was there a narrowing of focus of the review, either in
3 London or in Washington, because there seems to be, from
4 reading, a mounting determination to achieve, if at all
5 possible, a new Security Council Resolution and then to
6 focus on a review of the goods lists that were
7 authorised.

8 What I don't know is how much that displaced review
9 of other aspects, such as those that Mr Webb has just
10 been talking about, the NFZs. Was there a growing
11 concentration?

12 SIR PETER RICKETTS: I think that went on in parallel and
13 I think the MoD continued intensive discussions with the
14 Pentagon on that NFZ operation, which was an ongoing
15 operation.

16 We fairly quickly moved our thinking on from
17 generalities about the need to focus the sanctions
18 regime into a specific proposal for a new resolution,
19 which then became the goods review list resolution and
20 which then took us a good year to push through the
21 Security Council to, finally, adoption in May 2002, but
22 that went along with efforts to tighten up the border
23 controls, to talk to Syrians and others about clamping
24 down on the smuggling. So it was part of a package of
25 making the sanctions regime more effective.

1 THE CHAIRMAN: We are beginning to talk, aren't we, about
2 smart sanctions, the attempt to achieve international
3 agreement on them. Can we go forward at a slightly
4 faster pace just on that?

5 That effort went through the months of the spring
6 into the early summer, but then ground to a halt.
7 I would really like to hear from you, perhaps all of
8 you, about the consequence of that grinding to a halt,
9 but, first, just how did we get there and what happened
10 in the Security Council? We shall be talking to
11 Sir Jeremy Greenstock later, but I would like to hear it
12 from the London end.

13 SIR WILLIAM PATEY: I think, by March, we had reached
14 agreement with the Americans on a sort of structure and
15 framework for narrowing and deepening the sanctions, the
16 essence of which was to try to produce a system where
17 everything was allowed that wasn't controlled.

18 We had got ourselves into a position where
19 everything that could conceivably be of dual use was
20 subject to holds, and we had our own small number of
21 holds, but the Americans adopted quite a liberal policy
22 on hold. I think at one stage we even had eggs on hold
23 because they could be incubated for weapons of mass
24 destruction.

25 So there was a proposal to get away from this

1 nonsense and to allow everything that wasn't controlled.
2 So we got to a system where we would define a controlled
3 goods list, which would be based on internationally
4 acceptable lists already of dual-use equipment. We had
5 a discussion of the Wassenaar list. There were already
6 lists available. So that was getting a controlled goods
7 list, but at the same time toughening up on the
8 implementation of the remaining sanctions.

9 So to try and prevent Saddam from smuggling oil,
10 there was to be a concerted effort to increase border
11 monitoring, perhaps, or to bring illegal pipelines under
12 the UN control system. So there was a sense in which we
13 would narrow the scope of the sanctions but make their
14 implementation more effective. So this was the essence
15 the smarter sanctions and the controlled goods list,
16 which we throughout that year tried to get.

17 You had certain deadlines, and we decided that it
18 was better to try and deal with this in the Oil For Food
19 rollover resolution, which had to be reviewed every six
20 months, rather than go for a new resolution which would
21 have allowed the Russians in particular, and possibly
22 others, to reopen the essential deal which was in 1284
23 which remained part of the bedrock of the policy, which
24 was that, in return for Iraq allowing inspectors in and
25 fulfilling its obligations on WMD, we would lift

1 sanctions.

2 That was the essential deal in 1284 and that was
3 still there. So this was an attempt to deal with
4 sanctions until Saddam accepted that deal.

5 So you had that -- so every rollover, we tried to
6 get agreement, and we missed the first -- in June, we
7 weren't able to get the Russians engaged on the
8 controlled goods list, but, later on, we discovered they
9 were never going to agree to it. It became a commercial
10 issue for them, an internal political issue, but we
11 didn't know that at the time, so we engaged
12 realistically on this list. We didn't meet the June
13 rollover, we were -- we thought we would get it done in
14 another month, so we would give ourselves one more
15 rollover. We got a commitment that we would discuss
16 a controlled goods list and we rolled that over
17 until July and then we didn't get it in July.

18 So we had a five-month rollover into November and in
19 the middle of that we had 9/11, which changed the game
20 a bit.

21 THE CHAIRMAN: It is of course a counterfactual question,
22 but had we been successful in securing a revised goods
23 list, had that worked, would that have satisfied both
24 our policy objectives in finding a new and workable
25 regime towards Iraq, towards Saddam, and would it have

1 satisfied the Americans as well, or was it simply a part
2 for -- a medium for a much larger set of objectives?

3 SIR WILLIAM PATEY: You are asking me to conjecture, and
4 I will. It certainly satisfied us, because it would
5 have restored Security Council unity. It would have
6 brought this policy of containment. It would have been
7 arguable even against the hawks in Washington.
8 Colin Powell and the State Department people who
9 supported containment would have had a credible
10 argument.

11 I remember conversations with my French and Russian
12 colleagues saying, "You know if you don't agree to this,
13 where this is going", and each time I remember they
14 always agreed three months too late.

15 SIR PETER RICKETTS: I think it certainly would have been
16 a major step forward, but it would only have really
17 changed the course of events if it had so increased the
18 pressure on Saddam Hussein that he had been prepared to
19 think again about the 1284 deal, and the 1284 deal,
20 getting the weapons inspectors back into Iraq, would
21 really have changed the game, I think, and if a tighter
22 sanctions regime had put enough pressure on Saddam to
23 bring him to the 1284 table, then I think we would have
24 been getting somewhere.

25 THE CHAIRMAN: That would have extended, perhaps

1 indefinitely, for the life of, broadly speaking
2 a containment strategy.

3 SIR PETER RICKETTS: It would have reinvigorated the
4 containment strategy and would have given us inspectors
5 back on the ground in Iraq. It would never have stopped
6 some leakage round the edges of the sanctions policy,
7 nor would it necessarily have stopped some revenues
8 finding their way into Saddam Hussein's pockets -- that
9 is the nature of sanctions regime -- but it would have
10 made it much more effective.

11 SIR WILLIAM PATEY: I think it would have given more light.
12 I think that ultimately we would still have been left
13 with Saddam Hussein there, whose objectives hadn't
14 really changed much.

15 THE CHAIRMAN: I would like to move back from conjecture to
16 what actually happened, but, Mr Webb, if you would like
17 to come in first.

18 MR SIMON WEBB: I would just like to say that the way we
19 looked at the sanctions regime and the controlled goods
20 list issue was, from a defence point of view, we were
21 very keen to see a very effective regime in that arena
22 and, if you like, to see reductions in other parts of
23 the sanctions process in order to get it.

24 It is worth remembering at this stage that we were
25 starting to get a feel for the problems of wider

1 proliferation, which you will be, I know, taking up
2 later in the week, but even by that stage -- because, at
3 that stage, there was a very small number of people, as
4 the Butler Report brought out, who knew about it, but we
5 knew by that stage about concerns about Libya, we were
6 getting increasingly concerned about Iran and we knew
7 that the supply chain from AQ Khan and so on was getting
8 around. So that was all starting to come through in
9 2001 and was greatly increasing the level of anxiety
10 amongst defence people about the risks of nuclear
11 proliferation, particularly across the Middle East.

12 So you were starting to see Iraq in one sense from
13 our limited knowledge and also the role of
14 United Nations in that broader context. I would just
15 like to say that we were keen on the controlled
16 sanctions regime in these sorts of regions, but there
17 was starting to be a bit of a wider context to it.

18 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

19 What happened in reality was it wasn't possible to
20 achieve that degree of acceptance in the United Nations'
21 Security Council. Didn't that have an effect in terms
22 of the United States' objectives? There was a one-month
23 rollover, and if that failed, we were looking to the end
24 of 2001 -- we, the United Kingdom, were -- but it must
25 have had some effect on the dynamics of the

1 United States administration about where to send their
2 review.

3 SIR PETER RICKETTS: Yes, I think it probably did. I don't
4 think it helped Colin Powell's position in Washington,
5 frankly, that he had tried for the first six months of
6 the administration and, by July, had not been able to
7 give this containment policy a refresh through the
8 sanctions resolution. I don't think it led to an
9 immediate shift in American policy because I remember, as
10 9/11 happened, we and the Americans were still working
11 on further pushes with the Russians to see whether we
12 could get a goods review list resolution through in the
13 autumn, but I think it didn't help the cause of the
14 State Department that the flagship of this strengthened
15 containment policy had not succeeded by July.

16 THE CHAIRMAN: I think at that sort of mid-point in 2001,
17 with the first policy attempt, as it were, having been
18 stalled, I would like to turn to Sir Roderic Lyne.

19 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Thank you. I wonder if you would just go
20 back a little bit on the question of the extent and the
21 period before September 2001 when the British and
22 American Governments really shared the same view?

23 Sir Peter, you said that their thinking was very
24 much on the same lines, although the Americans were less
25 keen on weapons inspectors. You have noted that there

1 were those in Washington, voices in Washington, that
2 were in a favour of regime change.

3 Was there, in fact, a substantive difference --
4 I mean, regime change had been part of American policy
5 since the 1990s; a substantive difference between the
6 British and the American Governments over regime change
7 in this period.

8 SIR PETER RICKETTS: I don't know if there was a substantive
9 difference, because I did not feel that regime change
10 was, in any operational sense, US policy at that point,
11 it was part of the rhetorical backdrop of the incoming
12 Republican administration. What we had, actually, in
13 the operational world, was US and UK working side by
14 side in the Security Council to get the goods review
15 list resolution through to strengthen the containment
16 policy. So I didn't feel it was operational US policy
17 at that point.

18

19 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Sir William said that it was an article
20 of faith -- not the word you used -- to keep a long way
21 from regime change within HMG at this time.

22 Was that the universal view within the
23 British Government or were there elements of our policy
24 or people in the decision-making positions who actually
25 saw regime change as perhaps part of our policy towards

1 Iraq? Was it completely excluded or not?

2 SIR WILLIAM PATEY: At that early stage, I didn't come
3 across anyone suggesting regime change within the
4 government. I think, later on, there were people saying
5 we should have entirely excluded it, that there was no
6 legal basis for it.

7 At that time, as Peter says, we were aware of the
8 voices because they had been -- in the lead-up to the
9 election of President Bush, there were many of the
10 incoming administration who had been very clear on this,
11 but even within the American system there was no plan.
12 Indeed, you had disputes over how you would -- if, on
13 a theoretical basis, you could produce this, how you
14 would do it. There were supporters of Chalabi and
15 people who had discounted Chalabi, so there was no --
16 through this period, we didn't have discussions, that
17 I was aware of, with the Americans, and the Americans
18 didn't put this as a proposition.

19 We were aware of the background noise. The first
20 five months of the new administration, it was
21 essentially left to Colin Powell and the
22 State Department to drive this policy.

23 SIR PETER RICKETTS: I was certainly never aware of anyone
24 in the British Government at that point promoting or
25 supporting active measures to achieve regime change.

1 What we did have was advice to Ministers, which I think
2 they accepted, that we could set out this Contract for
3 Iraq, which was a declaration of what the world would
4 look like for Iraqi people post-Saddam Hussein. The
5 consequence rather than a policy to achieve it.

6 That, I think was accepted and, indeed, we drafted
7 contracts, but this was all against the assumption that
8 it would not be our policy that we were seeking the
9 removal of Saddam Hussein.

10 SIR RODERIC LYNE: By what process was the review of our
11 policy in this period conducted? Were there meetings
12 held at senior ministerial level, meetings of
13 Cabinet Committees, meetings of senior officials at
14 which all of the options were reviewed and thrashed out
15 and we decided that this was the right thing to do?

16 SIR WILLIAM PATEY: It was essentially driven by the
17 Cabinet Office, so all the departments were represented
18 at the official level. I attended lots of
19 Cabinet Office meetings. The Cabinet Office put up the
20 joint advice to groups of Ministers.

21 So I don't recall -- I don't recall personally
22 a ministerial group looking at this, but it was
23 certainly interdepartmental with advice, written advice,
24 going to Ministers.

25 SIR PETER RICKETTS: I remember several rounds of

1 Cabinet Office process leading up to the papers for the
2 Prime Minister in advance of key events in the course of
3 2001. I have mentioned one, which was the February
4 visit to Camp David for the first meeting with the new
5 President, and, subsequently, through that period there
6 were several further rounds of that classic
7 Cabinet Office-led process.

8 MR SIMON WEBB: We had done a review of the No Fly Zones at
9 the turn of the year, as one normally does with a new
10 US administration inbound, and we contributed the
11 results of that into this review from about February
12 onwards and then were part of the collective discussion.
13 So, yes, it was a classic bit of cross-departmental
14 process.

15 SIR RODERIC LYNE: So it was essentially a common view in
16 Whitehall that the policy of containment that you said
17 at the outset, Sir Peter, was our policy at the time was
18 one that needed strengthening and needed improving
19 because it wasn't working terribly well in all its
20 aspects, but it was a policy that was, in Whitehall's
21 view, sustainable over the long-term and could be
22 enforced?

23 SIR PETER RICKETTS: It was not sustainable on its present
24 course, but, as strengthened, we thought it was the
25 right policy.

1 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Did you feel that that view was shared by
2 the dominant force in American policy-making at the
3 time?

4 SIR PETER RICKETTS: Yes, as I said, Colin Powell explicitly
5 did support the approach of a strengthened, narrowed,
6 focused sanctions regime.

7 SIR RODERIC LYNE: When Mr Webb went to talk to his opposite
8 numbers in the Pentagon, did you get the same sense that
9 this was American policy?

10 MR SIMON WEBB: I did. I did. Yes. It was -- I suppose
11 the truthful answer is that, when I went across in March
12 to talk about the No Fly Zones -- for the first time
13 there were No Fly Zones -- the issue of overthrowing
14 came up and I wrote in my notes about "the dog that didn't
15 bark". I said it "grizzled", but it didn't bark.

16 So we didn't have a sense of anything going on, and
17 that reflects the fact that -- whatever discussions
18 might have been going on in Washington, this is
19 a serious, disciplined administration. We were
20 talking -- these were senior people in the
21 administration and they don't, as it were, you know --
22 they -- they stick to, when talking on official
23 business, to their coalition partners, they give you
24 a straight reading of what the position of the
25 administration is at the time, never mind what they

1 might have said themselves or discussed in the past. So
2 you do have that sense of them having concluded that
3 they were not going to put this issue on the agenda
4 first.

5 SIR WILLIAM PATEY: I did get a sense in the months that it
6 was more difficult to persuade them. There was
7 a heightened degree of scepticism, the intellectual case
8 for containment and sustainability as a policy. It got
9 tougher and tougher to argue with bits of the
10 American -- even the State Department, that it was
11 viable. So I did notice an increased scepticism, but it
12 hadn't tipped over into anything more direct at that
13 stage.

14 SIR RODERIC LYNE: So you and the Americans at this time
15 wanted to make containment work, but then you have
16 paragraphs which Sir Peter, I think, referred to, which
17 was that the regional countries, the countries most
18 vulnerable to threat from Iraq, were becoming less and
19 less concerned about the threat from Iraq; the threat
20 was felt most sharply in London and Washington rather
21 than countries next door and directly beside Iraq.

22 Why was that? Why did they feel less threatened
23 than we?

24 SIR WILLIAM PATEY: I think you can't take all the regional
25 countries as one. As I think Simon rightly said, the

1 concern was greater in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia than it
2 was in Syria and Turkey, and Jordan had a rather special
3 relationship with Iraq, a dependency relationship, it
4 was very worried about its economy and being cut off.
5 So there were a complex set of relationships.

6 I think I would describe the region as, if they had
7 had faith in the policy, they would have supported it
8 more, but if it was going to fail, they didn't want to
9 be on the wrong side of Saddam. So you know, I would --
10 I would say they were hedging their bets, it is not that
11 they were unaware of the threat. Indeed, when we talked
12 about southern No Fly Zones, it was quite clear for the
13 Kuwaitis and the Saudis, that was an important aspect of
14 their security. So it was a mixed picture. They were
15 unhappy within the Arab world.

16 I think, as Sir Peter said, it was against the
17 backdrop of a Palestinian Intifada, of daily photographs
18 of hospitals, Iraqi children, you know, Saddam would
19 have very good propaganda efforts. So they were feeling
20 uncomfortable. So I think -- I wouldn't sort of
21 characterise it as they were perfectly comfortable with
22 Saddam re-emerging as the strong man in the region; they
23 had a complex set of attributes depending on the
24 efficacy of the policy.

25 SIR RODERIC LYNE: But they were not so worried about him

1 that they were really enthusiastic to make containment
2 work. They were actually helping it to break down.

3 SIR PETER RICKETTS: One of the strands of this complex was,
4 of course, they had commercial interests, many of the
5 regional countries, in an eroding and porous sanctions
6 regime. They were getting oil, they were getting trade,
7 there were commercial interests in play as well as one
8 of the elements of this mix. So it was not
9 a straightforward picture. I think the way it has been
10 described is right.

11 SIR RODERIC LYNE: If they felt there was an imminent
12 threat, presumably that would have overridden their
13 commercial interests?

14 SIR PETER RICKETTS: If they thought there was a threat of
15 him re-invading a neighbouring country, absolutely, and
16 that's why, for Kuwait -- and Simon is quite right to
17 say that Kuwait's position in this is perhaps rather
18 different from most other neighbours -- the continuation
19 of the southern No Fly Zone and the deterrent effect
20 that that created, and it was very important to those
21 closest to them.

22 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Just taking the story forward, in the
23 first half of the year, building up to July, we tried to
24 develop this policy of improved containment, of smart
25 sanctions, and let us remember what Mr Webb said, which

1 was that the arms embargo part of the policy was
2 working, you thought, quite well, that there wasn't
3 major leakage on that. The leakage was much more on the
4 area of sanctions and there was vulnerability about
5 No Fly Zones.

6 Why, then, were we not able to get the so-called
7 smart sanctions resolution through the Security Council
8 in July 2001? What was the cause of that?

9 SIR WILLIAM PATEY: I think the Russians took a very cold,
10 commercial view of this. They were doing okay on
11 smuggling and sanctions and developing their
12 relationship with Iraq. So I think they were quite
13 explicit with us at one point. I think the Russian
14 foreign minister had run out of arguments and said,
15 "Yes, I accept all of that, but actually we have got
16 a lot of commercial interests at stake and it is very
17 difficult domestically". The Russians had \$8 billion of
18 debt owed to them by the Iraqis, which they were hopeful
19 of getting repaid, and they were doing quite well on --
20 contracts were being given, even for non-military
21 grounds, because they were being given on political
22 grounds, so the Russians were being given lots of
23 contracts. So the system at the time quite suited them.
24 It took a long time to flush that out.

25 In the end, it was -- with retrospect, it was

1 virtually impossible to change the Russian view, and
2 I imagine you were involved in it at the time, trying to
3 change the view. I'd imagine you probably know more
4 about the Russian view than I do at the time.

5 SIR RODERIC LYNE: I should just note as a footnote that
6 I was ambassador in Moscow at the time.

7 Do you think that, after the initial failure to get
8 this through the Security Council, there would have been
9 a chance of changing the Russian view further down the
10 road? As Sir Peter said, 9/11 changed this, but after
11 we had failed to get it through the first time, did we
12 think that we needed a new policy or did we think that
13 we should bang on with trying to get the Russians to
14 change their mind. You had already persuaded the
15 French, I think, to change their view and most of the
16 Chinese.

17 SIR WILLIAM PATEY: I think we persisted because the policy
18 containment was the least worst option, we thought at
19 the time. We persisted and we began to look at ways of
20 bringing the Russians on board by removing some of the
21 objections that had come from the neighbours of Iraq,
22 who didn't like the prospects for border controls,
23 didn't like the tightening aspects of it, and I think
24 in November we looked at the possibility of removing
25 those aspects from the resolution to get broader

1 consensus in favour of it.

2 We looked at the prospect of doing a deal with the
3 Russians on their debt to allow Iraq to pay off their
4 debt to increase. We looked at various ways to sweeten
5 the deal for the Russians.

6 So we actually -- although 9/11 intervened, we were
7 still pursuing this in November and we did another
8 rollover to May and we were still trying to get Russian
9 agreement on the goods review list, but the Russians
10 wouldn't even agree to the definition of what
11 constituted military equipment, even though in the
12 Wassenaar agreement we had a perfectly good
13 internationally-recognised agreement. So we hadn't
14 given up.

15 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Did the Americans share that view?

16 SIR WILLIAM PATEY: I think it became more and more
17 difficult, because the Americans, post-9/11, were less
18 inclined to go along with anything.

19 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Pre-9/11, after the smart sanctions, had
20 this undermined Colin Powell's position?

21 SIR WILLIAM PATEY: I think pre-9/11 we were -- the Russian
22 refusal in July?

23 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Yes.

24 SIR WILLIAM PATEY: We hadn't been up at that point. In
25 July --

1 SIR RODERIC LYNE: But the Americans, were they beginning to
2 give up on the policy at that point or not?

3 SIR WILLIAM PATEY: It is not clear that they had given up.
4 They had certainly said that they would work -- they
5 would have a five-month rollover to November and we
6 would continue to work on the Russians on the goods
7 review list.

8 SIR RODERIC LYNE: You said this was the least worst option
9 in your view. What were the other options, the worst
10 options?

11 SIR WILLIAM PATEY: The other options were the sanctions
12 regime would collapse completely. Saddam would
13 re-emerge and be free to develop his weapons of mass
14 destruction or we would be going down a path of military
15 action.

16 SIR RODERIC LYNE: How far would he have re-emerged just
17 because one plank of containment had failed? I mean, we
18 had troops deployed, the British and the Americans, in
19 some of the neighbouring countries as a deterrent, we
20 had a naval embargo, we had an arms embargo. Would the
21 failure of the sanctions have completely undermined
22 containment?

23 SIR PETER RICKETTS: It would have provided revenue streams
24 that would have allowed him to go out and increasingly
25 buy material for his weapons of mass destruction

1 programme, short-circuiting border controls and arms
2 embargos. We will come on to talk about the JIC
3 assessments, but I was chairman of the JIC at that time
4 and I remember our estimates of the revenue that the
5 regime was making through smuggling and abuse of OFF
6 were rising all the time, and by shortly before 9/11, we
7 estimated that they were probably making about
8 \$3 billion.

9 If we had had further erosion which, as I said at
10 the beginning, we felt was an accelerating erosion of
11 the sanctions regime, the revenues the regime would have
12 had their hands on would have grown and grown, and
13 I think, at that point, if you have money, you can
14 usually find ways of getting what you want.

15 SIR WILLIAM PATEY: That was certainly our assessment. If
16 Saddam had full control of all revenues, as Saddam had
17 full control of the revenues from his oil, he would very
18 rapidly be able to influence the region, build up his
19 capabilities and emerge reasonably quickly to the sort
20 of threat he was prior to 1991.

21 MR SIMON WEBB: It is perhaps worth saying there weren't
22 actually that many ground force groups in the region at
23 this time. What we were doing was to use the no-fly
24 zones in a way to do -- it had a side benefit of risk
25 reduction. Because we were flying over southern Iraq

1 most of the time, we knew what the military situation
2 was on the ground, and that gave us some time, if there
3 had started to be a build-up of another repeated attack
4 on Kuwait, which had indeed -- they had moved towards
5 that at least once during 1990 already -- it would have
6 given us the opportunity to interdict any ground force
7 movements which were the start of an attack on Kuwait
8 and some time to reinforce, but those two things
9 together actually allowed us to be in the rather
10 comfortable position of having a not very expensive
11 military operation -- 30 million a year I think was the
12 figure used at the time on the air side. It allowed us
13 to manage without big ground force deployments, which,
14 for all sorts of reasons, not least the pressure on the
15 armed forces busy in the Balkans and so on, and costs
16 and, of course, the regional countries not being very
17 comfortable about large deployments of our troops all
18 the time.

19 So to that extent, there were, as William was
20 suggesting, quite substantial stakes here. If we had
21 had breakdown, we would have to think about reinforcing,
22 I think our assessment was that the troops we had on the
23 ground couldn't hold a renewed Iraqi attack.

24 SIR RODERIC LYNE: We will come back this afternoon in more
25 detail to the question of No Fly Zones. It is obviously

1 important for the reasons you give. But while we are in
2 this very beginning stage of our hearings, trying to set
3 the whole of the scene to describe the problem, if you
4 like, that the British Government believed it was facing
5 in 2001, I would like to go back a bit to the question
6 of the assessment of the threat, and in particular,
7 Sir Peter, you were Chairman of the JIC until September,
8 when you moved to become Political Director in the
9 Foreign Office.

10 I'm obviously not going to ask you in open session
11 to go into any details of sensitive intelligence, but
12 can you tell us in broad terms, first of all, where Iraq
13 and the question of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction
14 stood in the priorities of the JIC in 2001? Perhaps if
15 we pause on that one.

16 SIR PETER RICKETTS: In both 2000 and 2001, Iraq was a major
17 feature of the JIC agenda, but by no means the dominant
18 one. In 2000, it was probably the Balkans that we spent
19 most time on. By 2001, we were spending a great deal of
20 time on Sierra Leone, where there had also been military
21 operations, as well as the Balkans continuing, as well
22 as Afghanistan and other places, but in each year it was
23 a significant part of JIC's time, essentially.

24 SIR RODERIC LYNE: So it was important that it wasn't seen
25 as the sort of biggest problem that we had to think

1 about at the time.

2 SIR PETER RICKETTS: Yes, it was important, but it was by no
3 means the only major issue the JIC was focusing on.

4 SIR RODERIC LYNE: How did the JIC see the threat that was
5 posed by Iraq? The Iraqi military machine had obviously
6 degraded in the course of the 1990s, containment had
7 been followed for a number of years. Was this a high
8 threat, a medium threat or a low threat to international
9 peace and security?

10 SIR PETER RICKETTS: We certainly continued to see Iraq's
11 pursuit of weapons of mass destruction as a continuing
12 threat, for some of the reasons that Simon referred to,
13 and the JIC's work on this has been extensively reviewed
14 in the Butler Inquiry and so is on public record, but
15 a reader of JIC papers during my time as Chairman,
16 I think would have come away with a clear impression
17 that Iraq retained the intention to acquire a WMD
18 capability, that they were still trying to go around
19 procuring equipment and material for it, and that they
20 were at work to ensure that they had at least a breakout
21 capability of manufacturing CW and BW. That absolutely
22 was a cause for concern and something which it monitored
23 pretty closely.

24 Of course, their missiles as well, just to add the
25 fourth component of that, that we saw continuing work on

1 missiles which went beyond the permitted 150-kilometre
2 range for Iraq missiles. So it was among the threats of
3 ballistic missile and WMD development that the JIC
4 monitor around the world.

5 MR SIMON WEBB: I've just done the military end of the JIC
6 assessment, and I joined the JIC later in this piece.
7 The things that we took from it were, under
8 Saddam Hussein, there had been human rights abuses,
9 which included the use of military force against
10 civilians, and that the international monitoring process
11 of enforcement had constrained it but hadn't actually
12 prevented that.

13 I think we haven't mentioned the north yet. In the
14 north, Iraqi forces remained poised to retake the
15 territory, if they could. They had had a look at trying
16 to do that in 1996 and were only restrained from it by
17 the No Fly Zone.

18 In the south -- well, I have already been over the
19 situation there, but there was a sense, I think, of
20 Saddam gaining in confidence. He was taking positions,
21 I think, on the Palestinian issue which would ingratiate
22 himself with more Arab opinion. So there were those
23 things happening --

24 SIR PETER RICKETTS: I can develop on the JIC, if you like.
25 The weapons of mass destruction aspect of it was one

1 part of our work. We also spent a lot of time reviewing
2 the sanctions issue and the question of erosion and
3 leakage from sanctions, which I have talked about, and
4 we also had certainly one paper during my time on the
5 implications of the No Fly Zones for Iraqi persecution
6 of the civilian population. I can go into each of those a
7 little bit more, if you would like.

8 SIR RODERIC LYNE: I think we are going to take a break in
9 minute and then probably we'll want to come back to this
10 question after the break, I think collectively, but just
11 to follow through this line before we do so, again, in
12 very broad terms, you have described the problem of
13 weapons of mass destruction that the JIC was looking at,
14 did you see this as something that was essentially in
15 a static condition, the Iraqi weapons of mass
16 destruction programme, or did you see this as a growing
17 threat or possibly even a diminishing threat in the year
18 2001?

19 SIR PETER RICKETTS: In the year 2001 we saw an acceleration
20 of work on missile programme and I think our reports
21 were specific that there was an acceleration there.

22 We saw increased Iraqi efforts to procure material
23 for their nuclear programme, we saw continuing interest in CW
24 research and development and I think we suspected that
25 the increased availability of money from the increasing

1 revenues diverted from smuggling and OFF were allowing
2 that acceleration of work, certainly in the missiles and
3 the nuclear area.

4 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. I wonder, before we have a short
5 break, if my colleagues would like to follow up what has
6 happened so far?

7 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Could I ask a question? Could
8 I just go back, Sir Peter? When you were talking about
9 the view of the USA in the early days, you said that
10 they were on the same lines as ours, but the USA was
11 less keen on inspectors.

12 Why was that the case, given what you have just said
13 about the growing threat?

14 SIR PETER RICKETTS: There was a concern in American circles
15 that if we had the weapons inspectors back in Iraq,
16 somehow Saddam Hussein would be able to pull the wool
17 over their eyes and we would have the inspectors
18 reporting that all was fine, whereas all was not fine.
19 So they feared that they would be manipulated by the
20 Saddam regime to producing an answer that was
21 misleading.

22 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: That was the view held by the USA
23 but not the UK?

24 SIR PETER RICKETTS: I have been rightly prompted by Simon
25 to remind all of us that the USA are not homogenous.

1 There were a whole different range of views. But
2 I think there was a dominant feeling in the US that
3 a weapons inspection regime was risky, that it would
4 have to be really good and really professional if it was
5 going to get to the heart of what was going on in these
6 very secret Iraqi programmes.

7 We, I think, probably had more confidence that the
8 UNMOVIC weapons inspection that had been developed in
9 Resolution 1284 was professional under Mr Blix, and if
10 we could get the UNMOVIC inspectors into the country
11 with assistance from our experts, that would be better
12 than not having them in, but it was an area where we
13 probably disagreed with many on the American side.

14 SIR WILLIAM PATEY: The implementation of 1284, which would
15 have got UNMOVIC into the country, on the ground
16 inspecting, we certainly believed that would be the best
17 way to deal with the weapons of mass destruction and we
18 had confidence in Hans Blix, but there was a high degree
19 of scepticism in different American circles, and I think
20 at one stage Colin Powell said the last thing we want is
21 a Potemkin UNMOVIC. So there was a degree of scepticism
22 because of the experience that they had had with UNSCOM,
23 because they had watched how UNSCOM had been manipulated
24 and obstructed by Saddam.

25 So it wasn't an entirely unreasonable position on

1 their part, having had the experience of UNSCOM, that
2 this UNMOVIC might go the same way, but it wasn't shared
3 by us.

4 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Could I ask another clarification?

5 You talked earlier about a Contract with the Iraqi
6 People, what it would look like after Saddam, but you
7 said that, although it was in the public domain what the
8 US said Condoleezza Rice was saying about regime change,
9 was it any -- what were the assumptions? How would you
10 achieve Iraq without Saddam? I mean, were they
11 considerate of how you would get there.

12 SIR PETER RICKETTS: On the American side?

13 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Both. USA anyway.

14 SIR PETER RICKETTS: Because, as I said, we quite clearly
15 distanced ourselves in Whitehall from talk of regime
16 change, and I think in all the initial advice I saw
17 going to Ministers in 2001 it was clear that was not
18 something we thought there would be any legal base for.

19

20 On the American side, in the early months, when
21 people talked about regime change, they weren't so much
22 talking about military invasion, they were tending to
23 talk about arming the Iraqi opposition parties or
24 fomenting difficulty, fomenting uprisings and arming
25 opposition groups.

1 SIR WILLIAM PATEY: It was a dilemma for us. It was our way
2 of saying, "We are not going to do anything to deliver
3 regime change, but actually our point of view is it
4 would be very good for Iraq." So it was a way of
5 signalling to the Iraqi people that because we don't
6 have a policy of regime change, it doesn't mean to say
7 we're happy with Saddam Hussein, and there is a life
8 after Saddam with Iraq being reintegrated into the
9 international community.

10 The attempt of the Contract with Iraq was to set out
11 what the international community would do if Iraq became
12 fully compliant with all the requirements of the
13 international community. So it set out investment in
14 Iraq and normalisation of relations, but it also left
15 open that we think these things are probably impossible
16 so long as Saddam is in place and we -- there was
17 a phrase in there supporting -- if there was to be
18 a change, supporting that, but without any -- there was
19 no action points to fulfil the contract.

20 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: What was the status of the Contract
21 with the Iraqi People?

22 SIR WILLIAM PATEY: The contract was never issued. It was
23 an internal document. We sort of proposed it as part of
24 reconfiguring of sanctions, of saying to the
25 Americans -- trying to help those within the US

1 administration who wanted containment to deal with
2 a dilemma of not signalling that you were okay with
3 Saddam. So the contract was designed as sort of part of
4 a public presentation of a relaunched -- smarter
5 sanctions, if you like, but it never went anywhere.

6 SIR PETER RICKETTS: I think if we had got the goods review
7 list resolution through in the summer of 2001, it would
8 then have been accompanied with some sort of Contract
9 for the Iraqi People.

10 SIR WILLIAM PATEY: It would have remained an internal
11 discussion document.

12 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Just another question that was made
13 before about why the Americans didn't want inspectors
14 back, or weren't so keen.

15 You have referred to the deal inherent in
16 Resolution 1284, which was, as I recall, December 1999,
17 and which offered the end of sanctions, in effect, if
18 inspectors went back in and the inspections were deemed
19 satisfactory.

20 So if you didn't have the inspectors back in, in
21 a way there was no way out of the regime that had been
22 established in terms of sanctions and containment and so
23 on.

24 SIR PETER RICKETTS: Yes, I mean, Resolution 1284 offered
25 a two-stage approach, as I remember. First of all,

1 suspension of sanctions after 120 days, provided Saddam
2 was cooperating with the inspectors, and then ultimately
3 lift of sanctions, but that was some way down the line,
4 and that still seemed to us, in 2001, a good package,
5 the best way of leading the
6 international community out of sanctions and isolation
7 towards reintegration of a reformed Iraq in the
8 international community.

9 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: But the difficulty presumably for
10 a new American administration would be that it would be
11 a reformed Iraq with Saddam Hussein still at its head.
12 In a sense, it raised a tension between whether the aim
13 of sanctions was to disarm Iraq or to contain Iraq,
14 because, for the reasons that you have given, once
15 the sanctions were lifted, there might be all sorts of
16 ways by which -- not necessarily weapons of mass
17 destruction, but it would have come back into being
18 a regional power with Saddam Hussein there.

19 So, first, is that a reasonable assessment of
20 American concerns?

21 SIR PETER RICKETTS: Yes, and I'm sure there were vigorous
22 debates and differences of view around Washington on
23 that point, but the operational conclusion, at least for
24 the period of 2001, was the one that we've talked about,
25 that Colin Powell was given the opportunity to show

1 a strengthened containment policy and they -- the
2 Americans preferred the sanctions end of that to the
3 weapons inspectors, sanctions suspension, sanctions lift
4 path. That's where they put the emphasis of their
5 policy.

6 Of course, the other person who was reasonably
7 comfortable under the sanctions regime was
8 Saddam Hussein, because it wasn't actually doing him any
9 harm at all. So I mean, there are many dilemmas in
10 international policy when it comes to sanctions and that
11 I'm sure was being eagerly debated around Washington
12 tables in early 2001.

13 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Just one final point, if I may, just
14 following on from that, we haven't heard much about the
15 views of the Iraqi Government during this period.
16 Presumably, we were getting them through the
17 United Nations and elsewhere.

18 I mean, it is fair to say that the view of the
19 Iraqis was first that sanctions should go before the
20 inspectors went back in, but as they didn't believe
21 sanctions would be removed anyway, because of the views
22 of the American administration, there weren't really
23 that many incentives in the system, as you have
24 described it, for the Iraqis to change their policies as
25 things were at the time.

1 SIR PETER RICKETTS: William knows better than me, but, yes,
2 we had not succeeded in increasing the pressure
3 sufficiently on Saddam to interest him in the 1284
4 package. He was watching his revenues grow from
5 smuggling, he was doing quite well in blaming the west
6 for the sufferings of the Iraqi people, he was posturing
7 on the Palestinians and the Intifada, and, although his
8 relationship with the Arab world was complex, on the
9 Arab street there was probably quite a lot of support
10 for the Iraqi position on the Palestinian issue.

11 So Saddam did not feel under great international
12 pressure, and that was, going right back to the
13 beginning, one of the reasons why we were keen to review
14 policy and shift into a different gear on smarter
15 sanctions at the beginning of the year, because we
16 didn't feel that they were having traction on Saddam.

17 SIR WILLIAM PATEY: We did get some Iraqi views mainly from
18 the Russians, but at one stage the Russians proposed
19 that a revision of 1284, which basically said, "You lift
20 sanctions and then the inspectors go in", but that was
21 never acceptable to the Americans.

22 There was a difference between us and the Americans
23 because we -- the French and the Russians tried to
24 incentivise the Iraqis by removing -- there were some
25 ambiguities in 1284. Nobody had spelt out exactly what

1 post-suspension looked like and there was a debate
2 amongst the P4 on whether we would elaborate those,
3 elaborate on those and clarify, and the Americans were
4 against that. The Russians and the French were for it.

5 We were ready to do it as part of a broader package
6 of smarter sanctions and 1284, so we were ready to
7 elaborate what post-suspension was in order to try and
8 incentivise Iraq to accept them.

9 THE CHAIRMAN: I think this is probably the right moment for
10 the Committee and the witnesses to take a short break.
11 We will return promptly in ten minutes.

12 Can I ask that if any members of the public or
13 others in the room do need to leave, that they return
14 before the session recommences in ten minutes from now.
15 You will need to hand your pass in to security and
16 return through the security screen, but please bear in
17 mind there cannot be any readmission to the rest of the
18 morning's proceedings after we have recommenced the
19 hearing in ten minutes.

20 The committee will now leave through that door, and
21 the witnesses. We will be back in ten minutes.

22 (11.33 am)

23 (Short break)

24 (11.50 am)

25 THE CHAIRMAN: Right, let's restart. I will turn to

1 Sir Roderic Lyne to pursue, Roderic, the questions you
2 had on the JIC and other things.

3 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Sir Peter, we were discussing the JIC's
4 view of Iraq in the period before 9/11. What I would
5 like to know at this stage is, what was the JIC being
6 asked to do on Iraq? What questions were you getting
7 from the people who tasked the JIC, from either
8 Whitehall departments or from Ministers, the
9 Prime Minister's office. What questions were they
10 asking you to explore on Iraq?

11 SIR PETER RICKETTS: Three sets of issues in the course of
12 my time in the chair, which was a year.

13 One was to track the erosion of the sanctions regime
14 and to report on diversions, smuggling, illegal
15 revenues, opportunities that gave the regime, which we
16 did in three or four papers through the year.

17 One quite specifically on the effectiveness of the
18 No Fly Zones in reducing Iraqi capacity to persecute its
19 own civilian population, and then the third we have
20 already talked about, assessing Saddam's intentions and
21 success or otherwise of acquiring WMD material.

22 Those were the three areas that we were asked to
23 study and which we did report on.

24 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Were they asking you the sorts of
25 questions that suggested that they saw Iraq as a serious

1 threat, perhaps a -- in some dimensions growing? You
2 talked earlier about attempts to break out from the
3 restrictions on their nuclear programme, for example,
4 that they were really worried about this and they wanted
5 the JIC to look at this.

6 SIR PETER RICKETTS: I don't remember specific requests from
7 Ministers on those lines. The WMD work was part of our
8 worldwide review of WMD programmes, which the Committee
9 did on a regular continuing basis. The work on
10 sanctions, as I remember it, was specifically
11 commissioned by the FCO and was intended to keep track
12 with the development of policy.

13 So, for example, in the middle of the year 2001, we
14 were asked for a paper on the effect of a smarter
15 sanctions resolution on Saddam Hussein and whether we
16 thought that that would successfully increase the
17 pressure on him to the point where he was interested in
18 the 1284 deal.

19 So I remember that as a specific request to us,
20 I remember the NFZ effectiveness issue. I don't recall
21 other specific requirements laid on us by officials,
22 senior officials or Ministers.

23 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Now, at this time, neither the
24 United Kingdom, nor the United States had embassies in
25 Baghdad. Therefore, we weren't getting a sort of normal

1 stream of diplomatic reporting on the situation inside
2 the country.

3 How much did this mean that the JIC was being asked
4 to provide the government, provide Ministers, with an
5 assessment of what was going on in Iraq, of how firmly
6 Saddam Hussein was in control, of what tensions existed
7 between different groups within Iraq, paint the picture
8 of the inside of Iraq for the decision-makers?

9 SIR PETER RICKETTS: We did not, as far as I recall in my
10 period, try to write a paper in detail on the internal
11 dynamics of the regime in Iraq. We were concerned with
12 the more operational issues, as I have talked about,
13 sanctions and No Fly Zones and weapons of mass
14 destruction, and I don't believe we wrote in that period
15 a paper on the internal regime, economic, social or
16 political aspects of Iraq.

17 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Sir William, you were the head of the
18 department. How much did you know about what was going
19 on inside Iraq in 2001?

20 SIR WILLIAM PATEY: We had to rely on officers who would go
21 into northern Iraq. We had officers -- I had an officer
22 based in Ankara who covered northern Iraq and made
23 regular visits into the Kurdish area. So we had
24 a reasonable insight into what was going on in northern
25 Iraq and we would talk to the Kurds about what was going

1 on in other parts of Iraq. We talked to the opposition.
2 We were -- didn't have a -- we had a less good picture
3 than we would have had if we had had some people on the
4 ground, but we put it together with -- we talked to
5 people who did go to Iraq, there were people who went to
6 Iraq, George Galloway and a few MPs went to Iraq, others
7 went to Iraq. We talked to the opposition, but, if you
8 are asking me, did I know as much about what was going
9 on inside Iraq as I knew what was going on inside Iran,
10 probably the answer was no.

11 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Did you feel that Saddam Hussein was
12 firmly in control?

13 SIR WILLIAM PATEY: Yes. That was our assessment, that he
14 wasn't under any threat. He was ruthless, he had a long
15 history of eliminating anyone who appeared a threat to
16 him. So our assessment was that he was secure and
17 comfortable.

18 SIR RODERIC LYNE: So if someone had come to you, maybe
19 an exiled group and said, actually, there would be
20 a chance of toppling Saddam through an internal uprising
21 or set of uprisings, how would you have responded to
22 that?

23 SIR WILLIAM PATEY: We were fairly sceptical. There were
24 people who came from time to time suggesting that they
25 could mount coups. We had a fairly jaundiced view of

1 the capabilities of the external opposition and the
2 extent to which there was an internal opposition. We
3 were pretty sceptical about its ability to do anything.
4 Attempts -- previous attempts in the late 1990s from
5 Kurdistan had met with brutal repression, so our
6 assessment was that the chances of Saddam being
7 overthrown internally were limited.

8 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Did you think he was strong enough, or
9 could become strong enough, perhaps, with the lifting of
10 sanctions, to be in a position again in which he could
11 within a year or two threaten neighbouring countries?

12 SIR WILLIAM PATEY: I think that was our assessment, that,
13 free of sanctions, Saddam would -- we would be back to
14 a pre-1991 position, with Saddam having -- maybe even
15 stronger regionally, because, having survived an attack
16 and having survived 10 years/12 years of sanctions, he
17 might even be stronger.

18 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Yet, in those 10 or 12 years his economy
19 had fallen apart and his military machinery had been
20 degraded and from time to time attacked, so was he
21 really in that strong a position?

22 SIR WILLIAM PATEY: I don't think he was an immediate threat
23 at that time.

24 SIR RODERIC LYNE: What do you mean by "immediate"?

25 SIR WILLIAM PATEY: Well, if sanctions suddenly stopped

1 tomorrow, he wouldn't have had a fully-functioning
2 capable army.

3 SIR RODERIC LYNE: How long would it have taken him to
4 become threatening again?

5 SIR WILLIAM PATEY: Within a few years.

6 SIR RODERIC LYNE: You were confident that, despite the lack
7 of the conventional reporting that you would have had
8 from an embassy, we had a good understanding of what was
9 going on inside Iraq?

10 SIR WILLIAM PATEY: The French had embassies there, and the
11 Russians, and we did talk to our partners with embassies
12 there. So I don't think anyone was seriously
13 questioning, our assessment was based on our discussions
14 with allies.

15 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Sir Peter, did Ministers show an interest
16 in what the JIC was telling them about Iraq in the
17 course of 2001 before 9/11?

18 SIR PETER RICKETTS: Yes.

19 SIR RODERIC LYNE: You had feedback on some of your reports?

20 SIR PETER RICKETTS: Certainly. We had feedback. Indeed,
21 the report I referred to about the effectiveness of the
22 No Fly Zones and their impact on Iraqi persecution
23 figured, as I remember it, in a ministerial discussion
24 of the No Fly Zones in the middle of 2001.

25 The weapons of mass destruction material was always

1 read with close interest, including in Number 10, and we
2 got regular requests to keep our focus on that and to
3 monitor it closely.

4 SIR RODERIC LYNE: So your understanding at official level
5 of what was going on there essentially was shared by
6 Ministers, you didn't have an argument or a debate or
7 you didn't feel that they were disconnected from this
8 picture, that they had their eyes elsewhere?

9 SIR PETER RICKETTS: No, not at all. I would see from time
10 to time that JIC papers that were fed in were then
11 followed up by requests, for example, from Number 10 for
12 further policy work to be done, for example, on the
13 Syrian pipeline which was becoming a increasing concern
14 in terms of diversion of Iraqi oil and circumvention of
15 the sanctions regime.

16 Our JIC paper on that led to a Number 10 request to
17 policy departments to put up advice on what we should do
18 about it.

19 SIR RODERIC LYNE: How did you get this feedback? Did you
20 discuss the intelligence directly with the
21 Prime Minister, or the Foreign Secretary or the
22 Defence Secretary?

23 SIR PETER RICKETTS: I tended to be at ministerial meetings
24 when they took place on Iraq. I had feedback, more
25 often John Sawers than from the Prime Minister directly,

1 and from senior officials in the FCO who, indeed, were
2 on the JIC.

3 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Were there frequent ministerial meetings
4 on Iraq?

5 SIR PETER RICKETTS: I can't remember frequent meetings,
6 I can remember a number of meetings in the period that
7 I was JIC chairman.

8 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Do any particularly stick in your mind as
9 having reviewed policy in a fundamental way?

10 SIR PETER RICKETTS: I particularly remember a discussion of
11 the No Fly Zones on the basis of our NFZ paper in the
12 JIC. That, I think, was at the heart of the period of
13 discussion about the operation of No Fly Zones.

14 I don't recall being at a general discussion of
15 Iraqi policy in -- for example, in terms of the
16 development of the smarter sanctions policy, no.

17 SIR RODERIC LYNE: In such meetings, was there much
18 discussion at ministerial level about how our policy
19 meshed with the new administration in Washington?

20 SIR PETER RICKETTS: Not at meetings that I was at.

21 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Were you aware of any ministerial
22 discussion about this?

23 SIR WILLIAM PATEY: I did not attend any ministerial
24 discussions about this at this time other than with the
25 Foreign Secretary.

1 SIR RODERIC LYNE: So you attended meetings with the
2 Foreign Secretary on this subject. Were there a number
3 of those meetings in the course of 2001?

4 SIR WILLIAM PATEY: I honestly don't know. Two or three,
5 I think.

6 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Yes, thank you. Can I just move past
7 9/11 and then perhaps pass the ball on to my colleagues?
8 What effect did 9/11 have on the JIC's view on Iraq,
9 the tasking of the JIC, the amount that the JIC was
10 asked to report on Iraq? Did 9/11 put Iraq up your
11 priority list and bring it into a sharper focus,
12 Sir Peter.

13 SIR PETER RICKETTS: I just need to make a footnote here
14 that I moved out of the chairmanship of the JIC a week
15 before 9/11 and I therefore became a policy consumer of
16 the JIC product more or less as 9/11 happened.
17 Can I just say one word about --

18 THE CHAIRMAN: Could I just interject? We shall be taking
19 evidence from John Scarlett, who followed immediately
20 after you when 9/11 happened.

21 SIR PETER RICKETTS: John I think would be a better witness
22 on the effect on the JIC, but as we enter the 9/11 point
23 in this discussion, can I just recall for the Inquiry
24 the depth and breadth of the effect it had on policy
25 thinking?

1 THE CHAIRMAN: Could I just call a short pause on that?

2 I think there are one or two things we would like to
3 establish before 9/11 happens, before we come back to
4 what you want to say. Sir Lawrence, would you like to
5 begin?

6 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: I just want to -- really almost sort
7 of summing up where we had got to, the position that we
8 were in on the eve of 9/11.

9 I suppose my question is whether we really had
10 a tenable, sustainable policy if -- it is an unfair
11 question maybe, but if 9/11 hadn't happened, do you
12 think the policy that we had developed as of this point
13 could have been sustained?

14 SIR PETER RICKETTS: Counterfactuals are always interesting
15 questions, aren't they? I'm pretty sure we would have
16 stuck to our guns on the policy that we had. Indeed,
17 you can see that, even after 9/11, the effect was not
18 immediate on our policy. We continued to push for
19 a goods review list resolution and to urge the Americans
20 to push that on the Russians.

21 I think, if 9/11 hadn't happened, we would have
22 reminded convinced that a strengthened sanctions regime,
23 tightened, narrowed, was the right way to go, and we
24 would have continued to push to get weapons inspectors
25 back into Iraq.

1 It is a theme throughout western -- I mean, British
2 policy, from early in the 1990s, all the way through to
3 2003 to want to see inspectors back in.

4 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: If we just go through what we have
5 already heard this morning, we have heard from the
6 Russians who, more than we realised, had no particular
7 interest in changing the nature of the sanctions regime,
8 they were doing quite well from it.

9 The French were distancing themselves from British
10 and American policy. Colin Powell was the dominant
11 voice possibly in American policy, but there were other
12 voices pointing in completely the opposite direction.

13 In the Arab world, in a sense, Iraq was almost
14 yesterday's issue because of the Intifada and all of the
15 concerns that that was raising, and Iraq's regime was
16 managing perfectly nicely with the situation as it was,
17 because it controlled the smuggling and the rationing.

18 So whereas it may have been British policy, were we
19 sort of short of allies on this? Were we really in the
20 position to push forward with our particular policy at
21 that time?

22 SIR PETER RICKETTS: I think we sensed a bit more momentum
23 behind the policy on the eve of 9/11 than you are
24 suggesting there, Sir Lawrence. We had got quite close
25 to a resolution in July. Indeed, we got a resolution

1 which I think looked forward to a more detailed
2 resolution to come in November, if I remember rightly.
3 So we had got a growing majority on the Security Council
4 to see that the current sanctions regime was not working
5 and that it should be replaced by something better,
6 including lifting civilian holds and freeing up civilian
7 trade into Iraq.

8 The French were certainly on board for that, and,
9 yes, we had a continuing Russian problem, but we were
10 used to dealing with Russian problems in the
11 Security Council and we had a degree of confidence that
12 with time and with our, you know, adjustments to the
13 resolution to take account of some of their concerns,
14 that we could have got there. I think that's where we
15 felt we were on the eve of 9/11.

16 SIR WILLIAM PATEY: I think in July the French were possibly
17 closer. I wouldn't characterise them as distancing
18 themselves. I think, post-9/11, what they were prepared
19 to agree to in November, had they agreed to it in July,
20 we would have been better off. I used to tell my French
21 colleagues, "You are always agreeing with things five
22 months too late".

23 So I would see them, in July, as coming on board,
24 and we hadn't given up on the Russians, because the
25 Russians were running out of arguments, other than the

1 blatant one, that "It is in our commercial interests to
2 see this continuation of the sanctions regime".

3 It is hard to say, but we would have still felt it
4 was a viable policy and still the best option amongst
5 the others that might be canvassed.

6 THE CHAIRMAN: I can recall a quote, maybe it wasn't quite
7 from this time, but I think it was from Tariq Aziz,
8 which described smart sanctions as "the kick of a dying
9 mule".

10 You wouldn't accept this as a characterisation of
11 where this policy was going?

12 SIR PETER RICKETTS: I'd rarely accept anything Tariq Aziz
13 said, as far as I recall.

14 MR SIMON WEBB: Can I reinforce the point Peter was making
15 about the importance of inspectors? In the stocktake
16 I referred to which went into policy debate, we looked
17 at how effective had been the attempt in 1998 to keep,
18 if you like, the WMD lid on by bombing -- there was
19 a short bombing campaign at that point after the
20 inspectors were thrown out, and we concluded it was not
21 effective and we were not able to offer any assurance
22 that you would have been able to deal with the WMD
23 problem solely by air power.

24 Therefore, that reinforced, quite explicitly --
25 I must have a look at my notes -- the point that you

1 needed to get the inspectors back in. So we were
2 strongly behind the Foreign Office position on all that.

3 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, I think we have dealt with 2001
4 from its beginnings, the new American administration,
5 and, through the spring and summer, the events in the
6 United Nations and elsewhere, and then we have to come
7 to 9/11.

8 I suppose the first question I should like to put to
9 our witnesses is, how far did the event itself -- we
10 shall come on, I'm sure, to the United States -- but how
11 far did it change the United Kingdom's assessment about
12 the security environment threat that could arise from
13 Iraq as well as from other sources, and did that itself
14 inject a requirement to review policy by reason of
15 a change of the assessment of the threat?

16 SIR PETER RICKETTS: What it did, first and foremost, and
17 obviously, is push counter-terrorism right to the top of
18 the agenda, and that was true from the moment it
19 happened, but it also was the starkest indication we had
20 had that this new breed of terrorists were intent on
21 mass casualties, that they were innovative in finding
22 unconventional ways of achieving that, that they didn't
23 mind at all dying in the process and that this was all
24 a new dimension, really, of the terrorist threat.

25 One thing it did immediately do is redouble our

1 concern about the possibility of terrorists acquiring
2 weapons of mass destruction, because, if you put together
3 unconventional means, willingness to die, intent to
4 create mass casualties, weapons of mass destruction
5 would be a very good weapon for such terrorists, and
6 that concern, which had been around and which the
7 Prime Minister had articulated earlier, I think was made
8 worse by the discovery by the coalition forces
9 in Afghanistan that AQ was interested in experimenting
10 with CW or BW in Afghanistan, and so --

11 THE CHAIRMAN: I think -- sorry -- some indication, too, of
12 an interest in, if not work on, radiological.

13 SIR PETER RICKETTS: Indeed. All of which threw into
14 greater relief concerns about WMD proliferation, not
15 just Iraq, but more widely. Simon has already referred
16 to the AQ Khan network, but then, when you came to WMD
17 and Iraq, I think it gives the whole issue greater
18 political salience and prominence.

19 Not to say that we had any evidence that Iraq was
20 directly linked in any way to the 9/11 attack, we didn't
21 have any such evidence, but it did throw into greater
22 relief the threat from Iraqi WMD without any inspector
23 control over it, and I think that's probably the way in
24 which 9/11 impacted Iraq policy in the first place.

25 It didn't change, as we have said, the thrust of our

1 general policy. I mean, we were still, after 9/11,
2 working for a GRL resolution, for containment, for
3 getting the weapons inspectors back in, but it added an
4 edge to that work on WMD.

5 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

6 SIR PETER RICKETTS: I accept that.

7 THE CHAIRMAN: You stated -- and we know from reading --
8 that the United Kingdom did not itself assess that there
9 was a direct threat from Iraq and its potential, in WMD
10 terms, in terms of linkage with Al-Qaeda or other
11 terrorist movements.

12 Was the same true in the United States?

13 SIR PETER RICKETTS: We heard --

14 THE CHAIRMAN: I don't know if you can help.

15 SIR PETER RICKETTS: We heard people in Washington
16 suggesting that there might be some link between
17 Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden, undocumented, and
18 I don't think we ever saw any evidence of it.
19 Certainly, at that early stage, they didn't produce
20 evidence, but the tone of voice was more, "If there
21 turns out to be a link between Saddam Hussein and
22 Osama bin Laden, then you know, that's going to have
23 major implications for Iraq and Saddam Hussein".

24 We began to get that sort of tone of voice early on.

25 THE CHAIRMAN: You say a "tone of voice", but what was the

1 nature of the change in US attitude towards policy, the
2 way it was developing its policy from the impact of
3 9/11, both, as it were, politically, militarily, but
4 also emotionally?

5 SIR PETER RICKETTS: I think I have seen the phrase in
6 official papers that US policy hardened after 9/11 and
7 that, I think, captured some of it.

8 Counter-terrorism became absolutely the dominant
9 issue, the War on Terror, but, immediately, the
10 operational implication of that was Afghanistan, and the
11 US, with support from others, went into coalition
12 operations in Afghanistan straight away, and it was not
13 until some months later, probably late November, that
14 one began to hear talk of a phase 2 of the War on Terror
15 from Washington, not always specifically looking at
16 Iraq, but a sense that Afghanistan would not necessarily
17 be the only phase of the war on terror. So it certainly
18 gave the US immediately much greater focus on
19 counter-terrorism.

20 I think in terms of interdepartmental politics in
21 Washington, it made the Pentagon the dominant instrument
22 of American policy, particularly when they moved into
23 coalition operations in Afghanistan.

24 THE CHAIRMAN: Thereby importing an additional set of policy
25 options into American thinking, but not into our own,

1 insofar as we might have to follow them?

2 SIR PETER RICKETTS: I think that's fair. It changed the
3 weighting of policy players in Washington immediately,
4 I think, in favour of the Pentagon, but that did not
5 reflect an immediate change in UK policy.

6 SIR WILLIAM PATEY: There wasn't an immediate change in
7 American policy in some ways, but the tone changed.
8 I made a note here that the US was ready to support
9 a new resolution in November, but its intrinsic worth
10 had fallen since 9/11. So there was a sort of -- for
11 the time being, they were going to go along with our
12 attempts to get agreement, but, of course, it came at
13 a time in order to get agreement, we were going to have
14 to make more concessions to get P5, and the willingness
15 to make any concessions had fallen away when -- with the
16 Pentagon coming to the fore in policy-making.

17 THE CHAIRMAN: So although there may have been a degree of
18 sympathy with the United States by reason of the effects
19 of 9/11, in political terms in the P5 in the
20 Security Council it actually went the other way, because
21 of the internal effect in Washington of giving more
22 power, more influence to, if you like, the Pentagon
23 component of policy-making.

24 SIR PETER RICKETTS: That is true, if you look narrowly at
25 the Iraq issue. If you look more generally, those early

1 weeks after 9/11, there was a tremendous surge of
2 worldwide support for the Americans. I mean the
3 invocation of Article 5 in NATO, the passage of
4 a unanimous Security Council Resolution on the day after
5 9/11, I think. Everybody was prepared to support the US
6 in their immediate counter-terrorist policies.

7 Over the months, when that was translated into
8 thinking about Iraq policy, yes, I think that probably
9 did move things away from any prospect of consensus
10 immediately.

11 THE CHAIRMAN: I wonder, Mr Webb, your own perspective on
12 this with the, as it were, rise of the Pentagon in
13 relative terms, immediately following 9/11 and
14 afterwards, did that change our bilateral relationship
15 on the military side?

16 MR SIMON WEBB: Perhaps I can talk about what I saw as the
17 sort of shift of thinking and come back to the
18 relationships.

19 On the shift of thinking, the striking shift was
20 this: previously, terrorism had been seen as something
21 where, if you like, you would experience an incident,
22 you would deal with them on a reactive basis. The huge
23 shift after 9/11 was that both the scale of the
24 casualties that had been inflicted and all these people
25 who had given up their own lives meant a shift in

1 thinking to say, "We can't afford to wait for these
2 kinds of threats to materialise upon us; we must be
3 ready to engage the potential threats wherever they
4 emerge".

5 So it shifted from something which is, in a way,
6 often part of the American feeling that, "We are a big
7 country who have everything within our boundaries and we
8 will wait for things to happen", into a much more
9 proactive sense that they needed to deal with security
10 threats before they arrived.

11 We, ourselves, did a new chapter of the Strategic
12 Defence Review -- in fact, I oversaw the production of
13 the White Paper -- and we acknowledged some of that.
14 You will find British Ministers saying, "We need to deal
15 with threats before they arrive, rather than just
16 waiting for them to come here", and, of course, you
17 know, domestically we were now running an air defence
18 operation on an ongoing basis against hijacked airliners
19 and you needed to -- that gave you a sense of it being
20 preferential to engage these issues before they arrived
21 with you. A general change of thinking.

22 It didn't -- I mean, we were immensely busy, all of
23 us, at this period. It is perhaps worth mentioning, as
24 we were just doing in late August and early September,
25 we had an operation running in Macedonia, in fact my

1 discussions with Washington were mostly about Macedonia
2 in all this, where -- people forget all this, but we did
3 a 60-day deployment of a NATO coalition led by the UK,
4 which the Americans had interests in.

5 We then went on to Afghanistan, which for any
6 defence department was a substantial deployment and the
7 Americans went in first and then we were arranging the
8 international security assistance force in the Kabul
9 area and we led the coalition on that. So we were very
10 busy on that, and I think there was a sense in which
11 Iraq was there but it was second on the agenda for
12 a while.

13 That was reinforced by the fact that actually the
14 penetrations in the No Fly Zones dropped off quite
15 suddenly after 9/11. The Iraqi aircraft ceased to come
16 through into the No Fly Zones as often as they had done
17 before, and you had a sense that Saddam was being
18 careful for a while. That reversed later on, but all
19 these things combined to -- I don't think -- I did not
20 have a sense of anybody saying, "Oh, great! Now we are
21 in charge", feeling. It was more, "These issues have
22 come to us. We are a defence department. We are going
23 into Afghanistan. We are very busy with that, so we
24 will lead because it is time for us to do the military
25 operations which are necessary".

1 THE CHAIRMAN: You have talked already this morning about
2 regime change and its sort of contextual position even
3 before the election of President George W Bush.

4 Did that come more obviously to the fore, and, if
5 so, how quickly, following 9/11, whether in political
6 discourse or, indeed, in military consideration of what
7 might need to be done.

8 SIR PETER RICKETTS: I think in the immediate post-9/11
9 period from Washington it was more in the tone of voice
10 that I have described, that, if we find that there were
11 links between Iraq and the terrorists either who carried
12 out 9/11 or the Osama bin Laden group, then that puts
13 Iraq very much on our agenda.

14 I think it was only later, in the autumn, after the
15 initial surge of work in the Afghanistan operation that
16 we began to hear the phrase I have used, phase 2.
17 Phase 2 was not clearly defined at all, what it meant.
18 Did it mean military action, did it mean other kinds of
19 action, did it herald a completely different US policy
20 towards Iraq? But it was clear from the late autumn,
21 I suppose, from late November, that Iraq was being
22 considered in a different light in the light of the 9/11
23 attack.

24 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: I just wanted to go back to this
25 whole question of why did Iraq become an area to pursue,

1 because there was the question of containment being
2 pursued? You said yourself that there was a very
3 tenuous link, if any -- no documentary evidence of links
4 with Al-Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden.

5 So why did it become so important to pursue the
6 policy of regime change or the removal of Saddam?

7 I just want to explore that a little bit. Can you just
8 reflect on that?

9 SIR PETER RICKETTS: You are asking me really to explain US
10 policy here, because it was not British policy at that
11 point. British policy remained the very familiar one
12 of, "Let's go back to the idea of getting the weapons
13 inspectors in", and that was very much the flavour from
14 London.

15 I think for many in Washington, the new urgency of
16 weapons of mass destruction, the risk that weapons of
17 mass destruction might fall into the hands of
18 terrorists, with incalculable consequences, the fact
19 that Iraq, in our view at that time, probably did still
20 have some weapons of mass destruction, had been prepared
21 to use them against its own population and against Iran
22 at earlier stages, meant that Iraq and their WMD
23 programme was a real cause for concern in Washington.

24 That didn't translate immediately into any concrete
25 policy to what to do about it, but it made their

1 tolerance of uncontrolled, unsafeguarded weapons of mass
2 destruction capacity in Iraq, made that tolerance less.

3 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: But we heard from you earlier that,
4 post-9/11, there was sympathy for the USA and you nearly
5 got these smart sanctions, and I still don't understand
6 why it was so urgent to pursue Iraq.

7 SIR PETER RICKETTS: Well, I think we have said that was not
8 the first priority after 9/11. The first priority was
9 to go after Al-Qaeda, the presumed people responsible
10 for the attack. That led on to a large US military
11 operation in Afghanistan, the overthrow of the Taliban
12 regime, the arrival of an international force which we
13 first led in Afghanistan and a cranking up of US
14 counter-terrorism policy across the world; in the UN, in
15 many other fora. That was the first response.

16 Later, towards the end of the year, people did begin
17 to look at Iraq, for the reasons that I have described,
18 because of the fact of weapons of mass destruction and
19 continuing programmes there, as part of what they called
20 phase 2.

21 So by the time you came to the State of the Union
22 address at the beginning of 2002, you had President Bush
23 talking about an axis of evil, of which Iraq was one
24 part. I think Iran and North Korea were the other
25 parts. So there wasn't an exclusive focus on Iraq in

1 American policy at that time, but it was one of the Axis
2 of Evil countries, as the President put it, that they
3 were worrying about. Perhaps Simon can explain --

4 MR SIMON WEBB: Yes, I think it was read in that way and, as
5 you mentioned yourself, Chairman, there are obviously
6 indications discovered in Afghanistan of interest of
7 Osama bin Laden in some sort of improvised nuclear
8 device, and the thing he was short of was expertise and
9 fissile material to try to do that kind of thing.

10 So you would -- that made you look at all the
11 countries where you might have a WMD problem, of which
12 Iraq was one, he had obviously overstated -- that was
13 overstated because we didn't quite know what was going
14 on there, but also the other countries that were
15 mentioned.

16 The other point I think was something like this,
17 that the only instrument you had to deal with this
18 problem of proliferation was the United Nations
19 non-proliferation regime. You didn't have any other
20 real instruments for trying to tackle it. So restoring
21 that, in the way that Peter has described, in Iraq
22 became a policy priority; because, unless the UN could
23 show itself effective in Iraq, where, for ten years, we
24 had been talking about disarmament, and yet they had
25 thrown the inspectors out and we had apparently done

1 nothing about it, unless you could make the UN effective
2 over Iraq, then how were you to -- what were you to say
3 to Libya, and particularly their neighbours in Iran,
4 about -- to try to persuade them not to go down the same
5 course?

6 So these things tended to merge together a bit in
7 that way, I think, at that stage.

8 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

9 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: So what you are saying is that
10 because the United Nations was seen to be ineffective,
11 therefore disarmament and use of inspectors was seen to
12 be ineffective, and therefore the alternative was the
13 removal of Saddam.

14 MR SIMON WEBB: No, no, I am saying that what we wanted to
15 do is get the inspectors back in again. I mean, the
16 inspectors had been out since 1998 and, as we discussed
17 earlier, we had now had a new inspection regime under
18 1284. We wanted to get that regime working again in Iraq,
19 which was why we came back to it.

20 The questions started to come up, "Well, if you
21 can't get that to work, what next?"

22 SIR WILLIAM PATEY: I think one of the clear trends
23 post-9/11 was the willingness to accept the risks
24 intrinsic in a containment policy had declined in the
25 United States.

1 THE CHAIRMAN: I would like thank you for registering that.
2 It is a very fundamental point in the sequence, isn't
3 it?

4 But going back just briefly to Afghanistan, the
5 first reaction by the United States and then by the
6 international community was itself a military success of
7 some speed. That not only disclosed further information
8 about the links between Al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime
9 which was hosting it -- or was it the other way round --
10 but it also must have given some degree of confidence
11 both in the direction of effort and the capacity of both
12 the United States itself and its military, but also more
13 widely, including the United Kingdom.

14 So did Afghanistan, that enterprise, shift
15 assumptions, confidence levels, in the coalition,
16 between the United States and the United Kingdom?

17 MR SIMON WEBB: It didn't feel quite like that. It just
18 felt busy, rather than -- I suppose we were pleased that
19 the operations that we had done that year in Macedonia
20 and in Kabul had worked well, and I suppose you could
21 say we were in practice and had been ever since Kosovo,
22 but I don't think we felt kind of more than that.

23 THE CHAIRMAN: Does "we" include Ministers as well as
24 officials, or was there a sense that, you know, we had
25 been able to pull something off here? I'm talking about

1 politicians in office both in London and in Washington.
2 Was that not an encouragement to consider a wider range
3 of options or a different set of likelihoods attaching
4 to different options?

5 SIR PETER RICKETTS: I don't think British Ministers ever
6 underestimated the scale of the challenge of a military
7 operation in Iraq, a hypothetical military operation in
8 Iraq, in late 2001.

9 I mean, I think it is hard for us to speak about the
10 view in Washington. It may have been that there were
11 some in Washington who felt that the Afghanistan mission
12 had gone extremely well, relatively few US casualties,
13 and, you know, that therefore other military operations
14 would be the same. I don't recall that as a feeling
15 around in London at the time.

16 SIR WILLIAM PATEY: I was certainly not aware, right up
17 to March 2002, when I left, of any increased appetite by
18 UK Ministers for military action in Iraq.

19 THE CHAIRMAN: Okay. There is a lot more to say and we
20 shall be discussing WMD issues tomorrow. What I would
21 like to do now, I think, is to ask my colleagues, in the
22 light of the evidence we have been taking throughout
23 this morning, for points that have arisen out of it that
24 we would like to take up with you in the last few
25 minutes or half hour.

1 Sir Martin, would you like to?

2 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Yes. I would like to get a stronger
3 sense of how the Americans were reacting to the idea of
4 the return of the inspectors, how they really understood
5 our sense of the containment policy could be effective.

6 SIR WILLIAM PATEY: I mean, my sense was that the Americans
7 didn't hold great store by the inspection regime and,
8 therefore, there was always a debate as to just how much
9 effort were they prepared to put into getting 1284
10 implemented. I think we were almost more enthusiastic
11 about getting inspectors, had greater faith that the
12 inspection regime would ultimately deliver the answers
13 on WMD and lead to a different situation in Iraq.

14 I think the Americans were more sceptical about it,
15 and, therefore, it came back to this issue of how -- how
16 far down the road did you go to explain post-suspension
17 arrangements in order to incentivise the Iraqis?

18 They were much more focused on making the
19 containment policy work, keeping Iraq -- keeping
20 a regime which limited Iraq's ability to spend its oil
21 revenue, which maintained tight controls on its ability
22 to acquire weapons or anything that could contribute to
23 it. That was much more their focus, and, indeed,
24 smarter sanctions.

25 So my own impression is that they were less sanguine

1 about the impact. We certainly had discussions with
2 them about, "Why don't you think Hans Blix -- he is
3 a serious player, he has learned the lessons of UNSCOM",
4 but we had to have these debates with them because they
5 didn't take it as a given.

6 THE CHAIRMAN: Did you want to comment on that, Usha?

7 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: I wanted to move to a different area
8 because this morning, Sir Peter, when you were talking
9 about the Whitehall machinery, you said it was a classic
10 Whitehall operation of policy being coordinated across
11 government departments and the Cabinet Office was
12 leading on that.

13 Was there any change after 9/11, or did that policy
14 machinery continue?

15 SIR PETER RICKETTS: No, I don't think there was. I don't
16 think there was.

17 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: What happened?

18 SIR PETER RICKETTS: I think the focus of policy debate
19 shifted to counter-terrorism, where there was a huge
20 priority for work right across the board in
21 counter-terrorist cooperation with many different
22 countries, including work in the UN and then
23 Afghanistan, but, no, the Whitehall coordination
24 mechanism worked through that.

25 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: It continued to work post-9/11?

1 SIR PETER RICKETTS: Yes.

2 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Okay. My second question really is
3 about, could the UK and the US have done something
4 different to achieve the objectives of containment over
5 this period? Could they have done something different?

6 SIR PETER RICKETTS: I mean, I think we were interrupted, as
7 it were, by 9/11, because, as we were saying earlier,
8 I think we had built some momentum behind a policy that
9 would shift towards tighter, narrower, more effective
10 sanctions freeing up the civilian goods, getting away
11 from the sense that the west was responsible for the
12 humanitarian crisis in the Iraq, and over time, you
13 know, I think that could have succeeded in putting
14 containment on to a more sustainable footing.

15 If there were things we could have done
16 differently -- I mean, perhaps we could have anticipated
17 that the Russians would have seen these huge commercial
18 difficulties in going down that path and perhaps have
19 got on to that and tackled that earlier, but, looking
20 back, I think we first of all achieved the initial
21 objective, which was to work well with the incoming US
22 administration, and out of that mass of different voices
23 in Washington in January 2001 come down on a policy
24 throughout the rest of that year until September, which
25 was basically the policy we had been advocating.

1 With more time, we might have been able to get the
2 GRL resolution and, therefore, get the sanctions policy
3 on to a better footing.

4 SIR WILLIAM PATEY: We did look at different options.

5 I remember writing a paper that went all the way from,
6 you know, hard containment, current policy which didn't
7 seem like hard containment, to soft containment, to
8 lifting of sanctions, to -- I have to say, it even had
9 at the end of it a regime change option. It said go all
10 out for regime change, which we dismissed at the time as
11 having no basis in law, but we did look at the various
12 options and our policy review conclusion was, given the
13 international circumstances, because, you know, it
14 wasn't just up to Britain, it was what was feasible,
15 given the Russian position, given the French position,
16 given the regional position, and given the American
17 position. So we did look at the other options.

18 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: When you looked at the other
19 options, was it something within the FCO, was that paper
20 considered by Number 10?

21 SIR WILLIAM PATEY: It was an FCO paper. I don't recall us
22 going to the -- within the FCO, the extremes were
23 knocked out. So within -- I think within the
24 Cabinet Office machinery we were really talking hard
25 containment and current policy soft containment. So the

1 lift sanctions and see what happens option, we knocked
2 out. So there was an internal FCO.

3 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: That was your paper which wasn't
4 fully considered at Number 10?

5 SIR WILLIAM PATEY: We didn't put it up beyond the
6 department.

7 MR SIMON WEBB: Could I try and answer Sir Martin's point?
8 Can I just do that very quickly? Which is really to say
9 something like this, that, if you like -- and this was
10 a trend which came through particularly after the axis
11 of evil speech at the end of January by
12 President Bush -- was, previously, we had tolerated
13 a situation in which this containment was sort of
14 jogging along and not doing very well, and I have talked
15 earlier about the issues about on WMD.

16 I think it got, as Peter described, a further run
17 after, because, you know, that seemed to be the best way
18 to try to deal with the WMD problem in the new context
19 after 9/11. But inexorably, the military departments do
20 do this. They start asking themselves, "If that doesn't
21 work" -- and the question I think became, "Are we
22 prepared to tolerate the containment policy or even the
23 inspectors not working?", and that, I think, is the
24 shift, and once you start to say that, you start to say,
25 "Well, what might one then do?"

1 It is not a plan, it is not -- it is certainly not
2 anywhere near a decision, but it is a question that has
3 to come up about how you move your policy forward in
4 this new context where you have a feeling you can't wait
5 for threats to come to you.

6 SIR PETER RICKETTS: Can I just put on the record, as it
7 were, a quotation from a document of mine of March 2002,
8 which I think has now sort of circulated as a result of
9 the Butler Inquiry?

10 I said:

11 "The truth is that what has changed is not the pace
12 of Saddam Hussein's work in the weapons of mass
13 destruction programme, but our tolerance of them
14 post-9/11."

15 That's what I said in a note to Jack Straw in
16 March 2002 and I think the "our" in that sentence is as
17 much America as -- perhaps more America than the UK.

18 MR SIMON WEBB: I said "The real anxiety is WMD, of which
19 Iraq is the first example", or something like that.

20 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Sir Roderic?

21 SIR RODERIC LYNE: I would just like to follow up on this.

22 This is a very interesting series of points that you
23 have made, about the way that policy evolved in the
24 period autumn 2001, after 9/11, into the early months of
25 2002.

1 Sir William Patey talks about a paper put up within
2 the FCO about options, but you say that paper didn't go
3 beyond the FCO, although you referred to the
4 Cabinet Office looking at a narrower range of options.
5 Mr Webb has talked about the Ministry of Defence asking
6 itself the question, "What do we do if this doesn't
7 work?"

8 MR SIMON WEBB: I was talking more about the Americans.

9 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Sir Peter Ricketts is noting that the
10 tolerance of Saddam has changed as a result of 9/11.
11 Now, at what point, if at all, did the people at the
12 top, the very top, the Ministers, sit down with their
13 experts, people like yourselves, the chiefs of staff,
14 the intelligence chiefs, and say, "We are in a different
15 situation. The American approach has clearly changed.
16 If you have any doubt about that, the Axis of Evil
17 speech by President Bush made that pretty clear, but we
18 are still committed to a policy of containment. It is
19 a policy that, by our own assessment, isn't now working
20 properly, it is not functioning well, and our closest
21 allies are now on a different tack".

22 Was there -- did our policy just drift from one line
23 eventually into another or was there a point at which
24 Cabinet Ministers sat down and looked at the strategy.
25 They reviewed the problem we were facing, the extent of

1 the threat, they reviewed the strategy that we were
2 following and, above all, most importantly, they were
3 presented with a series of options to discuss and debate
4 so that they could then take a decision about where we
5 go from here? Did that happen at any point?

6 SIR PETER RICKETTS: You are now moving the focus forward
7 well into 2002, if we are talking in the period beyond
8 the "axis of evil" speech, and I think the policy
9 process that I remember in that period was another of
10 these classic interdepartmental processes, coordinated
11 by the Cabinet Office in late February/early March 2002,
12 to prepare the Prime Minister for his important
13 discussions with President Bush at Crawford
14 in March 2002, and that would seem to be an important
15 moment to take stock of policy, and there certainly was
16 a Whitehall-wide process to stocktake, review policy
17 options and put advice to Ministers at that point.

18 THE CHAIRMAN: I don't want to halt you on this but we will
19 have, in later sessions, the opportunity to go in more
20 detail into that period of early 2002 and the run-up to
21 the February meeting. But, Roderic, did you want to
22 pursue this--

23 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Just one short rider to that. In the
24 classic Whitehall manner, as you have put, did this
25 classically include Ministers sitting down to look at

1 these options before the Prime Minister went to
2 Crawford?

3 SIR PETER RICKETTS: I was not present at such a meeting,
4 but then I probably wouldn't have been in the position
5 that I held, so I can't answer that.

6 SIR RODERIC LYNE: But you would have been aware of it as
7 the political director at the FCO and Sir William would
8 have been aware of it as the head of the department.

9 SIR PETER RICKETTS: I would need to research further that
10 point. My researches have not extended at this point --

11 THE CHAIRMAN: In fairness, we did ask didn't ask you to
12 look at 2002 for this session.

13 MR SIMON WEBB: I distinctly remember in that period us from
14 Defence offering Mr Hoon a view, which he then put to
15 his colleagues, certainly before Crawford. So I'm
16 sure -- we weren't talking --

17 SIR PETER RICKETTS: Okay, we will come back to this at a
18 later stage.

19 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Sir Lawrence?

20 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Sir William Patey mentioned the
21 paper which discussed regime change, only to dismiss it
22 as having no basis in law. Can we just clarify,
23 therefore, what people had in mind during 2001 when they
24 were talking about regime change? What sort of series
25 of events did they assume that this would entail?

1 SIR WILLIAM PATEY: Well, we never got into that in 2001.
2 This was a paper I commissioned from my staff, to say,
3 "Come on, let's think of the whole range of options out
4 here. Let's go from -- nothing is off the table. I
5 know this is the policy we have been pursuing for the
6 last ten years, but nothing is off the table." And it
7 was very much an internal paper. I would have to go and
8 research again to see where it went to, but it wasn't
9 circulated, but it did -- because I came across it
10 again -- it did look at lift, give up and see what
11 happens, deal with the consequences and -- so it didn't
12 go into any how you would achieve regime change.
13 Obviously, regime change -- we are talking about a paper
14 that had two pages and seven or eight --

15 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Accepting that, but it is a more
16 general question: when this phrase was used, which I
17 think was mentioned before -- it had been used by the
18 Americans since 1998 or indeed before that, with the
19 Iraq Liberation Act. Hadn't it, by and large, been
20 about supporting, say, the INC or other exiled groups?
21 It wasn't necessarily about a full-scale military
22 invasion, which is how it has now come to be seen.

23 SIR PETER RICKETTS: Correct. In that pre-9/11 period --
24 I think our understanding, when Americans in Washington
25 talked about regime change, they were thinking about

1 fomenting uprisings or arming the external opposition
2 forces, and we treated all that with great scepticism in
3 Whitehall.

4 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: What sort of response did you get
5 when you told them so?

6 SIR PETER RICKETTS: It never became an operational policy.
7 The operational policy was the one that we were pursuing
8 with the State Department, and there were expressions of
9 opinion, that perhaps that would be a great thing to do,
10 but it never concretised into operational policy.

11 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: So after 9/11 -- and you mentioned
12 these discussions of stage 2. Afghanistan was stage 1.
13 That had a very clear and obvious purpose and was widely
14 supported. But then, late November, you start getting
15 the discussions, "Well, what do we do next?" And at
16 this point quite quickly Iraq is raised publicly,
17 including a (inaudible) by the President.

18 So at that stage, presumably, you did have to start
19 thinking about what regime change might now mean. Did
20 you have those discussions still in 2001 -- at the end
21 of 2001?

22 SIR PETER RICKETTS: I don't recall discussions like that at
23 the end of 2001. No, I don't think that they began to
24 -plan for the contingency: what if US policy began to
25 develop in the direction of military invasion of Iraq.

1 I don't recall any such discussion in 2001.

2 SIR WILLIAM PATEY: And we were never asked as a department
3 to provide advice on regime change or how it might look,
4 nor did we.

5 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: But in December 2001, when the
6 President was making statements which indicated that
7 Iraq was coming into his sights, so you are saying that
8 Ministers didn't ask you -- and I also recall Jack Straw
9 responding to some of these statements. But you weren't
10 asked then for any assessment of where this might be
11 going?

12 SIR PETER RICKETTS: I don't believe so, no. We certainly
13 never put up any advice on that, as far as I recall.

14 MR SIMON WEBB: I don't think there were any substantive
15 discussions until after weapons of mass destruction.

16 SIR WILLIAM PATEY: It was still background noise, I think.
17 The background noise was louder but it was still
18 background noise.

19 MR SIMON WEBB: I think there is a point to make here also
20 that the focus didn't shift to regime change; the focus
21 shifted to weapons of mass destruction problems, of
22 which in the case of Iraq -- in order to deal with the
23 weapons of mass destruction problem in Iraq, you would
24 probably end up having to push Saddam Hussein out of
25 power. That was the sequence of events, if you couldn't

1 do it by inspection.

2 So it wasn't hopping straight to regime change. In
3 fact I don't think we ever thought there was really
4 a legal basis for a regime change as such in that
5 period. It was all about an objective -- the objective
6 was about the WMD after 9/11.

7 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Do you think this ambiguity about
8 policy can have led to confusion, because was it about
9 disarming Saddam Hussein -- and that was it about WMD --
10 or was it about regime change? The way you were going
11 to get there. It seems to me to be a deliberate policy
12 of ambiguity.

13 SIR PETER RICKETTS: No, I don't think that's true. It is
14 for the Americans to describe their own policy. Our
15 policy I don't think was ambiguous. I think we were
16 still along the same old track of trying to get weapons
17 inspectors back into the country, and indeed in the
18 first months of 2002 we got a tip-up of interest again
19 in the GRL resolution. We found that the
20 State Department were more interested, and the Russians
21 were beginning to sniff around as well, a revival of the
22 goods review list mechanism.

23 So we still had our focus on weapons inspector route
24 and sanctions-type means, and if we heard these voices
25 about regime change, they weren't really impinging on

1 the Whitehall policy debate at that point.

2 THE CHAIRMAN: Laurie?

3 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: I'm curious about this because we
4 now know that the President was actively discussing this
5 in December internally. The military planners were
6 starting to think about what it might mean. This was
7 the period when the US did start to think this through.

8 So you are saying there was no indication
9 penetrating into Whitehall that the US debate had
10 suddenly taken this rather sharp turn?

11 SIR PETER RICKETTS: I don't remember a sharp turn, no.

12 What I remember of late 2001 was huge work going on on
13 Afghanistan, the UK deeply engaged in putting together
14 a coalition to go in as ISAF to Kabul, us continuing to
15 pursue weapons inspections and there being a range of
16 different views in Washington. Of course we were
17 hearing people talking about regime change. I've said
18 we were hearing people saying, "If we find any evidence
19 of Saddam Hussein connected to UBL, my goodness, that's
20 going to have a major impact on our policy". But I don't
21 remember a clear turning a corner on American policy, as
22 you describe, in late 2001.

23 SIR WILLIAM PATEY: In pursuit of this policy, we were
24 saying to the French and the Russians and others, "If we
25 can't make this sanctions regime work, if we can't make

1 this containment policy work and deliver on WMD, then
2 the noises from Washington will lead us in a different
3 direction." We were saying that but we weren't --

4 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: So you picked up something?

5 SIR WILLIAM PATEY: No. We picked up the signs but we
6 weren't -- we could see that as pressure on us to
7 deliver on our policy.

8 SIR PETER RICKETTS: Maybe the question, just to finish
9 that, for all of us in interpreting our transatlantic
10 friends is: when does debate about options, when does
11 disagreement, when do a dozen competing ideas become
12 policy. And I don't recall by the end of 2001 that we
13 were at all clear that this was becoming policy.

14 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Just one question just to wrap this
15 up, that gives it a broader context, and it goes back to
16 the stage 2 debate. As you will be aware, well aware,
17 after 9/11 there were major issues about the "war on
18 terror": what it would mean, what it would require, was
19 this going to be essentially about intelligence and
20 police work, picking up non-state actors, or was there,
21 as was the strong view in the States, really about the
22 state sponsors of terrorism, which is why "war" might
23 then seem a more appropriate word.

24 Were you having those sort of broader debates about
25 what this long-term policy might mean? If you declared

1 war on terrorism, where was this going to take you and,
2 if so, was Iraq part of that discussion?

3 SIR PETER RICKETTS: I don't remember "War on Terrorism"
4 ever being our phrase. Indeed, I remember British
5 Ministers being fairly -- you know, not very impressed
6 with it as a phrase. Yes, of course, we had endless
7 debates and discussions and decisions about what our
8 counter-terrorist policy should be, and that ranged from
9 intelligence sharing, from building up capacity of
10 countries around the world to deal with terrorists,
11 improving border control regimes, and many, many
12 different policies that came together into a broad
13 counter-terrorism policy.

14 I don't remember us sitting down and having debates
15 about whether, you know, we should be thinking about
16 military action against state sponsors of terrorism.
17 No, I don't recall such discussions.

18 THE CHAIRMAN: We have covered a lot of ground this morning
19 and I'm going to ask my colleagues if they have got any
20 last questions before the conclusion of this session,
21 and then I will, if I may, ask our witnesses whether
22 there are any final points that they would like to make.
23 So, just to go round the table ...

24 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Just one point that continues to puzzle
25 me, which is the paradox between our assessment of

1 Saddam Hussein's aspirations to develop weapons of mass
2 destruction, which you described earlier and which the
3 JIC had quite a lot of information that it reported on.
4 As I understand it, broadly speaking, the assessment
5 that Saddam was trying to do this, that he had certain
6 capabilities, which he was trying to develop further,
7 was not disputed by other countries, by other members,
8 permanent members of the Security Council, broadly
9 shared by countries in the region. So there wasn't
10 a major difference of opinion -- correct me if I am
11 wrong -- between us and France, or Germany, or Russia,
12 on this basic assumption.

13 But at the same time the United Kingdom and the
14 United States, working off this database, saw Iraq
15 clearly as a major threat that had to be contained or
16 more serious, and all of these other countries came to
17 a very different conclusion.

18 Now, why did they look at the same information but
19 not regard it as threatening, whereas we did?

20 SIR PETER RICKETTS: Well, first of all, I don't think there
21 was any disagreement, as you say, that Iraq had had
22 weapons of mass destruction. After all, they had used
23 them. IAEA inspectors had found and largely dismantled
24 a nuclear programme after the Gulf War. So the fact
25 that the country had capabilities and had shown they

1 were willing to use them was not disputed. There may
2 have been difference of assessment, I don't know, as to
3 whether they were actively seeking to reconstitute their
4 WMD capabilities. There we had intelligence information
5 suggesting that they did, which I'm sure could be
6 exposed to you in more detail in private sessions.
7 I don't know to what extent that was shared as
8 an assessment with other countries.

9 But, for example, the French certainly were
10 concerned about Iraq's WMD, and one policy line that the
11 French were always in agreement with us on was getting
12 the inspectors into Iraq. So the disagreement with the
13 French was really about how to go about it. The French
14 had serious doubts about the NFZs. They had serious
15 doubts about the sanctions regime, but they wanted to
16 see the inspectors back in Iraq. So there was
17 a difference of how to achieve your objective.

18 The Russians -- honestly, I don't know exactly what
19 was driving them. I think their commercial interests
20 were probably pretty prominent in their view. And
21 regional countries -- I mean, I guess they thought that
22 Iraqi weapons of mass destruction were not something
23 that they could do anything about and they were rather
24 looking to the western countries to deal with that
25 problem. They saw probably as not something that they

1 had the capacity to deal with. So there was a bit of
2 handing off that problem to the US, UK and others.

3 SIR RODERIC LYNE: But they didn't think it was so menacing
4 to them that they needed to assist in the process of
5 dealing with it? They were actually undermining that
6 process.

7 SIR PETER RICKETTS: Well, they were living with Iraq as
8 a large and potentially powerful neighbour. They were
9 profiting commercially. They were doing their best to
10 avoid antagonising Iraq and they were hoping that the
11 West would do enough to keep Iraq deterred.

12 SIR WILLIAM PATEY: I think it is a reflection of the
13 differing levels of tolerance and the different levels
14 of economic and commercial engagement, and when the
15 economic cost of doing what was required went up, the
16 level of tolerance seemed to go up as well. So I think
17 that's what we were dealing with.

18 SIR RODERIC LYNE: But with the exception of Kuwait, were
19 the countries in the region banging on doors in London
20 and Washington saying, "We are very worried about
21 Saddam Hussein; please will you do something about him."

22 SIR WILLIAM PATEY: I can't say my door was being knocked on
23 very regularly, no.

24 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Thank you.

25 MR SIMON WEBB: One point just to make is that the

1 intelligence about the wider proliferation issues, which
2 we were talking about and you will get on to, was not on
3 the whole shared -- it was extremely sensitive and it
4 was very much held within the UK and probably people
5 within the US, if you like, but it was not widely
6 available to other allies.

7 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Sir Peter, Sir William, Mr Webb,
8 final remarks from this morning's session from
9 yourselves?

10 SIR PETER RICKETTS: Not from me, thank you, no.

11 THE CHAIRMAN: Right.

12 Well, we have covered 2001 in policy terms. We
13 arrived at 9/11 and the immediate aftermath, although
14 there is much more to say in 2002 and onwards. This
15 afternoon we want to go in more detail into the No Fly
16 Zones and also the sanctions components of the UK's 2001
17 policy and the policy before.

18 There will be a slight change of cast, I think.
19 Sir Peter, I think, you will give way and we have
20 Sir Michael Wood joining us.

21 What I would like to say to those present: thank you
22 for sitting so patiently through quite a long morning
23 with a lot of detail. We are going to resume at 2 pm.
24 I hope, if you are coming back, which I hope you will,
25 you will come back by 2 o'clock. On going out, please,

1 as in the break, hand in your passes to the security
2 people and collect them again on coming back.

3 Sad to say, unlike the opera, those who don't get in
4 before we restart at 2 pm don't get in until the next
5 break.

6 Thank you all very much and thank you to our
7 witnesses.

8 (12.55 pm)

9