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**UK MILITARY STRATEGIC THINKING ON IRAQ**

**30 SEPTEMBER 2002**

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
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## CONCEPT DIAGRAM



The diagram above illustrates the process of evolving the UK concept for operations in Iraq. The numbers on the diagram relate to the "Boxes" in the remainder of this document.

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BOX 1ENDSTATEUK

A stable and law abiding Iraq, within present borders, co-operating with the International Community (IC), no longer posing a threat to its neighbours or to international security, and abiding by its international obligations on WMD.

US

*[Saddam's regime leadership and supporting power base destroyed];* WMD capability and infrastructure eliminated; Iraq's territorial integrity intact with sufficient force to defend itself and no ability to threaten its neighbours; and an acceptable provisional/permanent government in place.

PRINCIPAL ASSUMPTION

US **military** planning is based on principal assumption that the Endstate associated with WMD cannot be achieved while the current Iraqi regime remains in power. **[see Box 2]**

Comment

The adoption of the UN track by the US Administration introduces doubt as to the pursuit of the End State upon which CENTCOM and Pentagon planners are currently working. US planners have noted UK's emphasis on WMD, and implicitly acknowledge that if Saddam accepts inspectors the regime has de facto changed its behaviour. Potential divergence between UK and US End States highlighted by recent public statements on both sides of Atlantic; UK and US need not have exactly same End State, but they must at least be complementary, and compatible in terms of legal basis for action.

If Regime is reformed, this should imply acceptance of all extant UNSCR, and address:

- WMD threat (basis for policy of containment and economic sanctions)
- Extant threat to Kuwait, and wider threat to regional security (US legal base for NFZ)
- Extant threat of further regime inflicted humanitarian disaster (UK basis for NFZ)

UK dossier addresses all 3 issues, but emphasis in public preparation is WMD.

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## US OBJECTIVES AS DEVELOPED BY CENTCOM

The following US objectives are emerging from **CENTCOM Planning**, these have yet to be endorsed as the US position by the US Administration:

- **US Strategic Objectives.** Operations will support the following US strategic objectives:
  - A stable Iraq, with its territorial integrity intact and a broad-based government that renounces WMD development and use and no longer supports terrorism or threatens its neighbours.
  - Success in Iraq leveraged to convince or compel other countries to cease support to terrorists and to deny them access to WMD.
  - Support international efforts to set conditions for long term stability in Iraq and the region.
- **US Military Strategic Objectives.** Operations will accomplish the following strategic military objectives:
  - Destabilize, isolate, and overthrow the Iraqi regime and provide support to a new, broad-based government.
  - Destroy Iraqi WMD capability and infrastructure.
  - Protect allies and supporters from Iraqi threats and attacks.
  - Destroy terrorist networks in Iraq. Gather intelligence on global terrorism, detain terrorist and war criminals, and free individuals unjustly detained under the Iraqi regime

Draft objectives for the North currently under consideration in **Pentagon** by JS:

- *Fix Iraqi forces in the north and isolate Tikrit from reinforcement by forces located in the North*
- *Control key terrain in the North*
- *Deter/ prevent Iraqi attack on Kurds*
- *Provide ability to exploit success of early regime change*
- *Facilitate coalition participation*
- *Facilitate civil military and humanitarian operations in the North*
- *Maintain territorial integrity of northern Iraq*

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## KEY DEDUCTIONS

- Even working alone US has sufficient combat power to destabilise, and overthrow the current Iraqi regime, but it does require a minimum coalition in terms of axes of approach for land/ air operations, bases for mounting operations and providing logistic sustainability. Minimum coalition and capabilities required:
  - – APOD/ SPOD and mounting bases
  - – APOD/ SPOD and mounting bases
  - – Maritime and AAR air basing
  - – Rear area support, air basing and HQ
  - – Overflight for offensive operations and CSAR
  - – Overflight and SF mounting base
  - – Overflight and guarantees of inaction
  - – Free and secure passage of Suez
  - – UK, Cyprus, Diego Garcia basing and SIGA
- US combat power should be sufficient to provide short term strategic protection for allied and supporting states.
- Final destruction of Iraqi WMD capability will not be achieved until significant change in behaviour of Iraqi regime
- Given fractious nature of Iraqi politics, broad regional concern on nature of new Iraqi government, and poor state of Iraqi infra-structure, delivery of stated post conflict objectives will require lengthy engagement
- Successful post conflict delivery of US support to a new, broad-based government will require co-operation and agreement of regional states on acceptability of the outcome, if its efforts are not to be undermined.

## UK MILITARY/STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

- **To deliver the end state, and provide a “winning concept” the following key issues will need to be resolved, in order to evaluate the campaign design :**
  - **Objectives.** To avoid achieving tactical victory at the cost of strategic failure agreement on Strategic and Military Strategic Objectives across coalition is necessary. Cabinet Office have opened cross government debate on UK Strategic Objectives (see **Box 1A**), current draft UK Mil Strat objectives are at **Box 1B**
  - **Effect.** Determine the strategic effects the UK can deliver or contribute to.

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- **Partners.** Determine that critical countries will offer the necessary capabilities to enable the campaign.
- **Legality.** The establishment of an agreed [UK] legal basis for action.
- **Crisis Resolution**
  - **Diplomatic Route (UN).** Develop likely UK Military posture if inspection regime is accepted and works. Consider future of humanitarian efforts (No Fly Zones)
  - **Military Route.** Agree before campaign commences on likely model of Iraqi governance, security structures, and economy, to inform estimates of post conflict engagement.
- **CBRN.** Determine **deterrent policy** toward Iraqi use of CBRN weapons: against Allied military targets outside Iraq, within Iraq, or against 3<sup>rd</sup> party states.
- **Intelligence.** Determine minimum level of intelligence that will satisfy campaign objectives in following key areas:
  - WMD
  - Regime Centres of Gravity
  - Regime Options and Courses of Action
- **Information Campaign. [see Box 1C]**
  - Agree audiences and critical messages
  - Ensure IC matches tempo of overall campaign

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Box 1A

**Cabinet Discussion Paper – Iraq: Campaign Objectives**

- First draft paper circulated 27 Sep 02
- Paper focuses on immediate objectives that are related to destruction of Iraqi WMD and ballistic missile capabilities, in accordance with UNSCR
  - Includes reference to return of Kuwaiti property and renunciation of terrorism
- Includes a re-statement of current UK end-state
- Specific immediate objectives:
  - Achieve tough new UNSCR
  - Return inspectors
  - Enable inspectors to complete their work
  - Institute long term monitoring regime
  - Maintain international solidarity in UN
  - Continue to make military plans and preparations in support of diplomatic and UNMOVIC/ IAEA action.

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BOX 1B

**POTENTIAL UK MILITARY STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES**

- Be prepared to support diplomatic and IAEA action case of Iraqi resistance to the implementation of UNSCRs
- Assist US forces in creating conditions that will deny the Iraqi's an ability to use their WMD against Allies and supporting nations
- Subsequently find and destroy Iraqi WMD stocks, delivery systems, C2, research, development and production facilities and infra-structure
- Create conditions that promote a change in the behaviour of the Iraqi Regime such that it will:
  - Be a law abiding member of the International Community
  - Allow free and open access to remaining Iraqi WMD capabilities, and renounce WMD aspirations
  - Exist within current boundaries of Iraq with a strong central government
  - Respect the human rights and freedoms of all its people
- Create conditions that strengthen regional security and stability, with specific reference to the roles of:
  - Turkey
  - Gulf States
  - Saudi Arabia
  - Jordan
  - Egypt
- In event of conflict be prepared to:
  - Ensure that Israel's security is not threatened by Iraqi action.
  - Assist US forces in securing Iraqi oil infra-structure and production facilities
  - Ensure Iraqi sovereignty post conflict
  - Minimise damage to Iraqi infra-structure.

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## INFORMATION CAMPAIGN

### INTRODUCTION

- Information strategy – linked to and dependent on HMG's wider strategic policy framework and the articulation of policy objectives. Will develop as wider policy develops. Currently two policy issues critical:
  - Justification/legal basis
  - Vision of future Iraq - 'the aftermath'
- The key to whether force has to be applied (and if so for how long and with what intensity) is dependent on the resolve of the regime in Baghdad.
- Four interdependent 'front's'
  - Home                      A current priority. Solid home front a precondition.
  - International            International bodies key to delivery.
  - Regional                }
  - Iraqi                      } Where the Military IO focus lies, analysed below

### OBJECTIVES AND THEMES

- Wider Information Campaign Objectives:
  - Identify build and maintain a Coalition – a consensus for action
  - Demonstrate Coalition resolve to affect political change in Iraq
  - Demonstrate that political change will result in long term benefits for all
  - Isolate the Iraqi regime, and weaken their resolve to retain WMD.
- Conditioning themes:
  - Firmness of US/UK resolve            (We will see this through)
  - Status quo unacceptable            (Threatens us all)
  - Change in Iraqi behaviour will bring a better future to the Iraqi people, and the region            (We all benefit)
  - Iraqi propaganda effort            (The regime tells lies).
  - It is the regime not the Iraqi people that is our target

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THE REGIONAL FRONT

- Objectives:
  - To build and maintain Coalition support for potential military action against Iraq
  - To isolate, undermine and weaken the cohesion of the Iraqi regime.
- Audience/Target:
  - Leadership/elite's      Main emphasis
  - Street      Have realistic expectations.
- Key Themes:
  - We are serious and will see this through
  - Iraq will remain intact and strong
  - The Iraqi people will be freed from tyranny and given a better future
  - Your economic and trade prospects will be protected/improve
  - Saddam is a bad Muslim. He does not represent authentic Islamic or Arab identity
  - A more stable and prosperous region will lead to a much reduced US/Western military presence (US hegemony)
  - We are committed to the MEPP.

THE IRAQI FRONT

- Objectives:
  - To diminish military and security forces confidence in the ability of the regime to maintain power
  - To degrade the regimes confidence in its ability to retain control
  - To create distrust and disaffection against the regime.
- Audience/Target:
  - Sunni officer Corps      (Will need to believe threat to remove Saddam is credible. Appeal to their self interest and assuage fear of change)
  - Saddam's decision making capability (technical attack).

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- Key Themes:
  - Change is inevitable with or without your consent/assistance
  - You can have a place in a future [post Saddam] Iraq - dependent on how you now react
  - Iraq can make a contribution to regional security
  - The world wants a prosperous united Iraq with which to trade. We are prepared to help Iraq establish this position
  - Iraq's failures/hardships are not due to foreign sanctions but regime mismanagement
  - Internal peace and preservation of current borders are essential.

## PROCESS

- Whitehall Machinery for co-ordination and direction. COBR(R) (Manning Group) and the Cabinet Office Ad hoc Group on Iraq will develop the wider policy. In parallel a Cabinet Office Information Strategy Group (ISG) will consider the information aspects. In MOD the Information Campaign Co-ordination Group (ICCG) should co-ordinate and direct the MOD aspects of the information Campaign.

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BOX 2

## CHANGE IN REGIME POSTURE OR BEHAVIOUR

### CURRENT SITUATION

- Adoption of UN track by US and UK policy makers, and subsequent statements by UK Ministers highlights twin track approach to achieving End State
  - Achieve significant change in behaviour and posture of current regime with respect to WMD, and other UNSCRs, **to prevent conflict**
  - If regime fails to change its behaviour voluntarily then it will be **compelled to change its posture** through the application of force, should regime change result this will be an unsought, but added benefit.

### Assessment

- Our current assessment is that Saddam and his immediate circle (Qusay and other nominated Ba'athist regional commanders) form the regime's strategic CofG, with **regime survival** as their singular aim.
- JIC<sup>1</sup> have assessed Iraqi regime cohesion and concluded that only substantial military action will precipitate regime change within Iraq.
- Effectiveness of limited pressure over last 10 years in effecting change is not promising:
  - Economic sanctions, intrusive (and belittling) coalition presence in the air, significant air operations (Desert Fox) have not had a lasting effect.
  - Future of regime has not been seriously threatened since 91.
- Need to convince Saddam that his regime will not survive unless he is willing to compromise on WMD, and other UNSCR, will require:
  - **Options for use of force** that have sufficient capability, are credible, an delivery of a clear message of intent
  - **Greater clarity on what type of regime could follow**, to demonstrate coalition is seriously considering most damaging outcome.
- Lack of clarity on what type of regime is to follow action hampers development of Information Campaign, weakens potential resolve of Gulf states and Saudi Arabia, and undermines current phase of campaign. It

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<sup>1</sup> dated 4 Jul 02 – Iraq: Regime Cohesion  
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offers Saddam opportunities to divide developing coalition, and weaken coercive message.

- We should have clarity on outcomes we should **seek to avoid**:
  - Establishment of a revolutionary Islamic government – most likely Shi'a dominated, aligned with Iran and antithetical to the West
  - Weak leadership that invites coup d'etat to reassert Iraqi nationalism and pan-Arab ideals
  - State with a constitution that enshrines religious or ethnic power balance

## US Planning

- US recognise a post conflict policy gap and are working within following broad framework with following objective:
  - Demonstrate that the US is prepared to play a sustained role in the reconstruction of a post-Saddam Iraq with contributions from and participation by the International Community that:
    - Rapidly starts the country's reconstruction
    - Preserves but reforms the current Iraqi bureaucracy
    - Reforms the Iraqi military and security institutions
- They have three broad phases
  - Remove current regime
  - Dismantle regime apparatus used to exert control
  - Reform governance of Iraq

## Key Judgements

- More work is required on strategic Centres of Gravity to ensure campaign is addressing the right mil/strat objectives
- To deliver a change in Iraqi regime behaviour requires threat of force, which if required can be translated into action.
- Agreement on what outcomes we do not want will allow us to progress toward formulation of a winning concept
- "Aftermath" we need to address the fears of Iraqis, and the regional and neighbouring states in development of post crisis solutions



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BOX 3

### THE WMD DIMENSION

#### SITUATION

- JIC have made an assessment of Iraqi Military Options<sup>2</sup> and have separately addressed possible scenarios in which Iraq may use CBW<sup>3</sup>
- Iraq's nuclear capability (essentially a 'dirty' bomb) cannot be dismissed, the main threat, at the moment, is from CB weapons.
- Iraq is experienced in the production and use of chemical weapons and has experimented with BW, and there is every reason to believe they would be used if regime survival is threatened. Availability of weapon stocks and delivery systems will probably restrict use to strategic targets, rather tactical battlefield use.
- Publication of UK and US evidence, has widened active public debate on nature of threat and how best to deal with it.

#### ENDS

The end required is that there is no longer a threat to the region or the wider World from Iraqi WMD; US planning dictates the elimination of all WMD in Iraq

#### WAYS

- Transparent inspection process that is able to verify no weapons, research or production facilities exist = effective implementation of current policies
- Neutralise WMD capability and remove will to regenerate the capability, through a regime change

#### MEANS

- Pre-Conflict. (operational risk reduction)
- Need to task intelligence collection means to provide greater detail on level and location of WMD facilities, command and control means and means of delivery **for tactical purposes**. However, we must accept that it is likely that our visibility of WMD may even deteriorate as Saddam prepares for a potential conflict.

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<sup>2</sup> dated 2 Sep 02 "Iraq: Saddam's Diplomatic and Military Options"

<sup>3</sup> dated 9 Sep 02 "Iraq: Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons"

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- Pursue unfettered UNMOVIC inspection regime, wresting initiative from Saddam.
- Secure **legal basis for targeting** of WMD.
- JIC assess that **Saddam is unlikely to use WMD prior to any attack**
- We need to consider current UK/ US policy on a deterrent response to Iraqi first use of WMD

## Conflict. (operational risk reduction)

- Maximum effort to destroy WMD and/or reduce the effect of WMD weapons use.
- Provide protection and be prepared to fight in CB environment [see Box 9].
- Given likely stock levels and speed at which BW agents work these are most likely to be used against key nodes such as APOD/SPOD. CW is unlikely to be used tactically with most likely targets being rear support areas.

## Post Conflict. (delivery of objectives)

- Secure any remaining threat; audit Iraqi capability for public verification.
- In slower time, destroy weapons and scientific infrastructure.
- Monitor successor regime to ensure no resurgence.
- Removal of Iraqi WMD may cause an imbalance with Iran which will need compensating.

### Key Judgement

- **We need much better granularity of intelligence**
- **Clarity on what constitutes success for an inspection regime needs to be determined**
- **We need to review UK/ US policies on deterrent response to Iraqi first use of WMD, pre-conflict and in event of conflict.**
- **A satisfactory outcome to the issue of WMD is essential.**
- **Iraqi Regime must renounce WMD**

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**DECLASSIFIED**BOX 4**REGIONAL DIMENSION – MILITARY/STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS****IRAQ: REGIONAL ATTITUDES AND IMPACT OF MILITARY ACTION**Introduction

- Since last JIC assessment<sup>4</sup> adoption of UN track by US has caused a significant shift in regional attitudes
- Reporting from theatre indicates Saudi Arabia is less hostile and has apparently offered basing, and a removal of the current restrictions imposed on NFZ
- Other states are also modifying their approach with an emphasis on approving the UN route

Northern Option

- The northern option is only viable if Turkey can be delivered, there is a lack of clarity in US as to whether this is achievable within the current planning timelines
- Following are key:
  - Turkish willingness to:
    - Allow operations to proceed unhindered
    - Provide APOD/ SPOD and LoC
    - Provide reliable rear area force protection
  - Turkish intent towards:
    - Northern Iraq
    - Kurds
  - Kurdish intent (principally KDP and PUK, though other factions have potential to disrupt/ distract from Main Effort)


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<sup>4</sup> dated 5 Aug 02 "Iraq: Regional Attitudes"

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### INTRODUCTION

- Diagram above shows those countries/ peoples that are integral to any planned action against Iraq
- Their position indicates their net effect on any military campaign, those closest to the centre have the greatest direct effect, and are on the critical path to military success
- The chart overleaf sets out an assessment of the key country conditions that impinge upon a coalition operation against Iraq. Based on recent JIC assessment.

### CHART DEFINITIONS ARE:

	= N/A or Neutral		= No Risk (Essential)	HD	= Medium Risk (Highly Desirable)		= High Risk (Desirable)
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**Sustained Political Support** – policy support to coalition objectives and conops – must be sustained and enduring.

**Sustained Military Support** – offers to participate in operations or to backfill other operations which coalition members are engaged in - must be sustained and enduring. - **Overflight /**

**Transit** – National consent to air, land or sea transit across territorial spaces.

**Materiel Support** – national support to operations, short of combat. Includes basing, docking, finance and HNS.

**Internal Stability Risk** – degree of risk that there will either be civil unrest or a threat to the current regime or government.

**Public Opinion** – Popular opinion is supportive of Coalition action in Iraq.

**W1 & W2** – Windows 1 and 2.

**Mitigation** – Coalition measure, including military economic and diplomatic to manage out the risks.

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COUNTRY CONDITIONS AND RISKS CHART

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BOX 5

## AFTERMATH - RESOLUTION PHASE

### Possible Outcomes

- There are two possible means of resolving the current crisis: diplomatically, or is these methods fail through the application of force to compel the Iraqi regime to change its behaviour.
- Each route will result in different outcomes and demands on military resources.

## CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT TASKS

### Post Diplomatic Solution

- Following the diplomatic route we will have to be satisfied that:
  - that Iraq no longer possesses the capability or intent to use or develop WMD
  - that Kuwait is no longer threatened by Iraq
  - that the regime will not attack its own people and create further humanitarian crises on the scale of those previously witnessed.
- A satisfactory resolution of these issues will allow a reappraisal of the continuance of the No Fly and No Drive Zones, and the trade sanctions currently in place.
- A review of how Defence Diplomacy can be used to give Iraq democratically accountable armed forces as agents of change.

### Post Conflict

## STRATEGIC SITUATION

- Assumptions
  - Major consequence management role is only likely to follow regime change, however such change may have been initiated:
    - Iraqi territorial integrity must be maintained.
    - Early buy-in by regional players essential.

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- Situation

- Iraq though suffering from economic sanctions has great natural wealth, adequate water resources (with an antiquated urban distribution network) and an agricultural sector that is capable of producing food though in need of reform.
- Security structures are bound to the current leadership through ties of kinship and patronage at senior levels, and economic advantage and fear at the bottom.
- Iraq has a sophisticated though choking bureaucracy.
- Iraqi infrastructure is poorly maintained by the current regime with damage from the war of 1991 still not repaired, and water supplies becoming contaminated in major urban centres.
- Population has been ethnically mixed by current regime by internal displacement to weaken opposition; however though mixed ethnic, cultural, and religious divides persist with old scores remaining unsettled.
- Indebtedness to Russia. Other regional debts may also exist.

## CONTEXT

- Campaign Plan. See attached schematic to place post-conflict tasks in context against political and military lines of operation.
- US Policy. US policy is at variance with the UK in two key areas:
  - Objectives. For the US regime change is a stated objective and post war (sic) strategy is viewed as a matter of liberation. As the contextual schematic shows, in most cases any military action is likely to bring about this objective, limiting the difficulties presented by the UK's less ambitious aim. Should a political agreement on WMD be reached, however, US objectives are only partially satisfied and the potential for military action remains. The UK stance in such an eventuality will need further examination.
  - Administration.
    - US plans envisage a period of military authority exercised through a military governor. This would be followed by a gradual transition to civil authority and finally Iraqi self-rule.

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- Allied to this is an extensive programme to dismantle and remove elements of the Iraqi regime closely related to Ba'athist rule.
- The UK will need to assess whether it can comfortably support the US intent to provide military stewardship rather than rapidly establishing an Iraqi transitional authority at the earliest opportunity.
- The US desire to remove the influence of the previous regime may also run counter to the need for basic administration and governance, further increasing the reliance on external authority. This may prove counter productive.

## CHALLENGES

- Law and order and effective administration.
- Ethnic/factional conflict.
- Humanitarian welfare.
- Regional agendas and interference.
- Remnant forces.
- Infrastructure shortfalls.

## KEY DRIVERS

- Rather than exploring potential scenarios it may be more useful to set out the drivers that are likely to determine the extent and nature of engagement required, the levels of risk and the degree to which burdens can be shared with other nations, international bodies and NGOs:
  - Relationship with new leadership.
  - Level of consent.
  - Level of international support/perceived legitimacy.
  - Speed of collapse/defeat.
  - Extent of damage to infrastructure.
  - Compliance/extent of defeat of Iraqi security forces.
  - Requirement to remove elements of security apparatus to allow good governance.

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## MILITARY TASKS

### Pre-conflict:

- Establish FCO/DfID/MOD framework plan. Confirm in-country liaison arrangements.
- Explore US intent and acceptable scale of consequence management commitment.
  - Develop agreed responsibilities for elements of consequence management.
  - Account for post conflict needs in targeting process.
- Identify coalition sp to phase 4 and any potential burden sharing.
- Identify Regional attitudes to conflict and any possible reactions to outcomes.
- Immediate (0-6 months):
  - Establish presence:
    - Capital and key regional nodes.
    - In country APODs/SPODs/LOCs.
    - Seize and cordon WMD and regime infrastructure
    - Protect key nodal points and economic infrastructure (oilfield security may be important to ensure financial underpinning of new regime – may be key to Russian support).
  - Create C2 links to new regime.
  - Support civil/political efforts to enable effective control by civilian ministries.
  - Iraqi Military:
    - Confine military forces to barracks.
    - Track down/capture leaders.
    - Disarm key loyalist elements.
    - Support to possible International Criminal Court action.
  - Facilitate delivery of aid by preventing criminal interference.

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- Info Ops in support of post-conflict role.
- Develop internal intelligence network.
- Establish CIMIC links.
- Reconstruction tasks.
- Hold warfighting reserve for contingencies/deterrence.
- Medium Term (6 months – 2 years):
  - Continue the earlier tasks as required plus:
  - Establish full regional presence (if required). Can be by proxy using Iraqi forces loyal to new regime.
  - Development of baseline Iraqi security capability.
  - Transfer stable areas to Iraqi control.
  - Develop SSR plan including DDR.
- Long Term (2 – 10 years):
  - Regional presence.

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
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## Context for Consequence Management

Initially Military line of operation supports Diplomatic line of operation by demonstrating international resolution and providing coercive effect. Eventually a point is reached at which it becomes apparent that either this approach will secure the desired agreement to surrender Iraqi WMD capability (diplomatic success) or military action is required to remove the capability (diplomatic failure). Diplomatic success envisages a situation in which the current Regime buckles under international pressure and voluntarily accepts removal of its WMD capability. In this instance activity to complete the achievement of the endstate will be almost entirely diplomatic and economic, with military means remaining in the deterrent role to ensure continued compliance. There may be a need to review those military activities already underway such as Op RESINATE. In the event of diplomatic failure, military action will be required to achieve the endstate. At any point from start of operations to total defeat the Iraqi Regime may choose to surrender or seek some compromise. Despite this, given the explicit US aim of regime change, it is difficult to foresee a circumstance in which conflict would not lead to the removal of Saddam Hussein. An alternative outcome is the failure of the Iraqi regime under stress but without direct military action. In this case, subject to the call for assistance from the new regime, or a concern over the status of WMD assets, forces could deploy into Iraq to conduct an assisted or semi-compliant operation to remove WMD assets. Likely tasks in this case would mirror those conducted following the success of direct military action.



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\* International pressure might inhibit US desires for Regime Change if Iraq surrendered or sought settlement shortly after commencement of operations. This is deemed unlikely but it remains a possibility.



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BOX 6

**IRAQI REGIME COURSES OF ACTION****(The 'What ifs')****IRAQ: SADDAM'S DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY OPTIONS****INTRODUCTION**

- Some of the following judgements have been drawn from recent JIC assessments, with an updated MoD/ DIS view given Iraqi moves following US Presidents speech to UNGA.

**ASSESSMENTS**

- With growing realisation that US threats are not empty Saddam has opened serious negotiation with UN. This is more than likely in an effort to split International Community by using delay and distraction and put any potential US attack on hold. JIC assess that he would permit return of inspectors in order to prevent the US from acting decisively.
- Saddam will continue to try a mix of charm, bribery and threats with his neighbours. But Iraq's influence is limited.
- He is likely to be cautious in using force. He will play for time. But the closer and more credible an attack seemed [and if he can see no other way out], the more risks he will be willing to take, perhaps including deniable terrorist attacks.
- Early on in any conflict, Saddam would order attacks on Israel, coalition forces and regional States providing the US with bases.
- Saddam would order the use of CBW against coalition forces at some point during a ground war. Once Saddam was convinced that his fate was sealed, he would order the unrestrained use of WMD against coalition forces, supporting regional States and Israel.
- Iraq would probably try to ride out air strikes while conserving its ground forces. Iraq's likely strategy for a ground war would be to make any coalition advance as slow and costly as possible, trying to force the coalition to fight in urban areas.
- **There remains significant potential for Saddam to miscalculate.**

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## Most Difficult COA

- If Saddam were to withdraw to and defend urban areas, this would significantly affect Coalition action and cohesion. If the coalition responds by attempting to take each area it is likely to involve a series of close battles, with large numbers of casualties on both sides (including Iraqi civilians) and collateral infrastructure damage. Coalition cohesion and public support would be very hard to maintain, as would support from the Region. The plan that the Coalition eventually adopts will need to minimize the possibility of Saddam going for this option or ameliorate its effect. This supports the idea of a 'surprise' attack.
- Once hostilities have commenced Saddam may look to distract coalition forces by a deliberate and sustained attack in the North, using all methods available to him (including CBW). The mass movement of refugees, and the humanitarian disaster this would create would be used to distract Coalition Forces. Saddam's aim would be to increase the friction encountered by Coalition Forces, and if they are not already operating in the North to force them to open a second front.

## Most Dangerous COA

- A WMD attack on Israel would be the most dangerous single COA for the Coalition to deal with. Any plan must include guarantees to Israel that her security will be guarded.

## Key Judgement

- Saddam's best chance of avoiding regime change will be to prevent the deployment of coalition forces as once committed by presence, the US can only see the operation through to success and his demise will be inevitable.
- Therefore Saddam's best chance is to fracture the will of the Coalition early on, prior to deployment, so speed and agility are needed once the decision to act has been taken.

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
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BOX 7

PRINCIPLESCONFLICT CYCLE

- Conflict "cycle" can be depicted as in figure above; as noted in BDD it is more a continuum than a cycle with movement in either direction aimed at achieving successful conflict resolution
- Current action against Iraq is **Conflict Prevention**. Sanctions and NFZ are being pursued as containment and peace enforcement strategies. Adoption of a new UNSCR is aimed at adding additional pressure by achieving broad based agreement on need for action.
- **Force on Mind**. Although at all points of the conflict cycle influence is targeted against decision makers, and their will to fight, in Conflict Prevention it is the key instrument of military power:
  - We are at the point in this crisis in which constant coercive pressure is needed to keep up forward momentum.
  - Overt Force Generation and Force Preparation activities are key elements in maintaining current coercive pressure

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- Unity of Message. A clear and unified declaration of intent by a wide and solid coalition as possible will deliver the most powerful message of international intent to Saddam Hussein

## Key Judgement

- We are executing a strategic Force on Mind campaign
- Information Campaign is fundamental to delivering message to Saddam
- Force generation and preparation are strategic elements of campaign in application of pressure

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BOX 8

## CREATE CONDITIONS

(Those highlighted are a particular priority)

### Prime Ministers Crawford Conditions

- At Crawford PM established 3 conditions for UK involvement
  - Public opinion domestically and internationally must be prepared.
  - Giving UNMOVIC a chance to succeed was important.
  - MEPP – there needs to be discernible progress.

### Timing & Constraints

- Delivering PM's conditions for engagement
- Constraints on timing
  - time to complete overt coalition military preps
    - 1 x Brigade in Kuwait
    - 1 x Brigade in Qatar
    - 1 x MEF (Division size) afloat in Diego Garcia
  - UK maintains no pre-positioned equipment or forces (except those deployed for Op RESINATE)
    - Minimum transit time to Gulf from UK is 3 weeks, once equipment is made ready
    - Transit to E Med is approx 12 days
  - Weather
    - Need to avoid combat in high summer, with optimal campaigning season Oct – late Mar
- Turkish Elections: 3 Nov 02. Overt action or preparation on Northern Axis of approach may not be possible until after elections, and new government formed (approx 6-10 Nov 02)
- US political timetable
  - Nov 02 Congressional Mid-term elections
  - Nov 04 Congressional and Presidential Elections
- US planning indicates windows may be broadening with edges blurred:
  - Window 1: Oct 02 – Mar 03
  - Window 2: Oct 03 – Mar 04

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Condition	Key activities	Achievable in Window 1 (Oct 02 - Mar 03)	Other Periods (to fol)	Achievable in Window 2 (Oct 03 - Mar 04)
Prepare domestic and international public opinion	Establish legal base			
	Develop and conduct IO campaign to undermine and isolate Iraqi regime internationally			
	Identify international audiences and conduct IO campaign			
UN	P5 consensus (especially Russia and China)			
	UNMOVIC inspections given chance to succeed			
	Persuade UN of need for use of force to impose will of International Community			
Discernible progress in MEPP	US/ EU engagement in process			
	Relaxation of Israeli occupation of West Bank			
	International Conference on MEPP			
	View from Arab Street			
Prepare UK forces for operations in Gulf and elsewhere	View from Arab Leaders			
	Package 0			
	Package 1			
	Package 2			
Promote uncertainty in Saddam's mind	Package 3			
	Military deception: operational surges and spikes (eg exercises and deployments) by UK forces			
	IO to destabilise/ turn supporters			
	Disrupt command structures			
Prepare region to accept forces	Identify and cultivate potential Sunni dissidents			
	Infrastructure			
	Negotiate overflight rights			
	Maritime MCM surveys and clearance operations			
Intelligence	Regional support for basing			
	Improve intelligence on WMD			
	Improve intelligence on Iraqi capability and weaknesses			
Precursor action to reduce WMD threat				

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Condition	Key activities	Achievable in Window 1 (Oct 02 - Mar 03)	Other Periods (to fol)	Achievable in Window 2 (Oct 03 - Mar 04)
Prepare internal Insurrection				
	Reduce threat of fratricidal fighting			

## Key Judgement

- Creating conditions in Window 1 will be at risk, and places emphasis on action and then management of consequences ("Strike then Shape"), Window 2 is more deliberate and allows shaping before action ("Shape then Strike")
- With large amounts of pre-positioned equipment and deployable maritime air, US is less constrained than UK in adopting Window 1 or Window 2.
- Importance of post conflict end state as base for IO campaign so key to creating conditions
- We must not exclude periods outside the 2 windows.

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### UK CAPABILITIES

UK capability has been grouped in 6 incremental force packages:

- Package 0 - SF Only
- Package 1 - In-Place Support and Key Enablers.
- Package 2 - Enhanced Support. Maritime and Air capabilities at up to medium scale of effort.
- Package 3 - Enhanced Support and UK land Package.
- Package 4 - Aftermath. Forces required post resolution of crisis
- Package 5 - UK home base requirements

Package 4 and 5 have yet to be determined with Package 4 awaiting US planning efforts which are due to complete in late Oct.

### Key Risks

- Following key risks to a UK deployment have been identified:
- **Concurrency.**
  - **Op FRESCO** poses the only **significant concurrency risk**
  - There are relatively few other instances of exercises or activity that may have to be cancelled depending on timing of any decisions
- **Equipment.**
  - Package 2. Assessment of priority UORs within Package 2 is ongoing. Majority of UORs are for Air Package with a number of very high priority equipment modifications required.
  - Package 3. ECBA, provision of logistic support vehicles and preparation times for desertisation of vehicles (dependent on the option chosen and the terrain and climate conditions) are key UOR for medium scale land package.
  - Industrial capacity to satisfy likely UOR/ preparation requirements remains unknown, however work now in hand on business cases should begin to resolve or highlight key issues
  - We will not be able to address specific shortfalls that have already been noted as "lessons learned" by HCDC and PAC, such as

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Combat ID, and a presentation strategy will be required to deal with these issues as they arise in the media.

- **NBC**
- **Threat:** (in rough priority) comes from BW, CW, Toxic Materials, which including Radiological hazards— delivered by 'conventional' means (hopefully, mass chemical delivery systems can be attrited early), then asymmetric delivery incl rear areas and LoC, then chance encounter with any such substances.
- **Defence Concept:** Employ all 4 pillars of defence NBC policy, comprehensive force protection from frontline to rear, cater for all hazards from classic threat agents to environmental hazards, which may merge, including post-conflict. Enhance CBRN Recce/Survey with specialist NBC/EH teams with 'duty of care' a priority.
- **BW.**
- Limited coverage from BW detectors will require tight prioritisation and management during all phases.
  - Medical countermeasures are available and picture is improving with increased availability of stocks for Large Scale forecast for late Sep 02, with exception of                      A period of      weeks is required for full protection against Anthrax, although reasonable protection is afforded after a period of      weeks. A vaccination programme will be required to inoculate personnel (up to Package 3). Voluntary programme unlikely to achieve 100% uptake. For Ricin and Aflatoxin currently there is no medical counter measure.
  - Overarching policy for the evacuation of contagious and BW casualties has been developed but a detail concept and doctrine is not mature. Current management procedures follow principles for naturally occurring communicable diseases with **recovery of personnel to NHS care in UK.**
- **CW**
- Sufficient Combopen are in stock but will require shelf life extension as batches go out of date end of Sep 02
- COLPRO. There is sufficient for 2 Field Hospitals but training and awareness on use are low. Other COLPRO has been withdrawn from issue and use.
- **Medical.**
- Package 1. Support can be achieved within current resources

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- Package 2. Specialist reserve manpower will be required to man Role 2 & 3 facilities, and equipment to bring deployed hospitals up to modern scales (90 day is current estimate for procurement). SF medical requirement is likely to be significant and impact on demand for reserve manning.
- Package 3. Minimum requirement will be 4 Role 3 Hospitals (1.5 Regular manning, 2.5 Reserve manning). New equipment will be required to bring hospitals up to modern scales (90 day is current estimate for procurement). Additional hospitals will be needed if force is required to manoeuvre.
- Consideration will have to be given to the NBC and other risks posed to UK personnel and their dependants (MoD, FCO and EPs) in Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan, Israel and Cyprus. Contingency planning for MoD and FCO personnel is being scrutinised by joint MoD/FCO team.
- **Reserves**
  - Land with largest requirement for reservists is looking ways of pro-actively managing reservist risk. Planning assumption timelines in a number of cases can be reduced as individuals or units are at higher state of training than baseline assumed in assumptions.
  - Key risk is number of reservist likely to appeal against call-up and consequent delays in forming units/ training key personnel. Planning assumes in some cases 50% excess in call up to cover potential "no shows". Risk can be mitigated as soon as covert restrictions are lifted and individuals/ units can report likely intentions.
  - Reserve call up is part of strategic Force on Mind campaign
- **OGD Demand for Military Support**
  - Work is ongoing to assess MoD requirements for home based force generation, preparation, deployment and protection requirements
    - 5,500 personnel were stood by for, logistic support tasks, key point guarding (military and civil), guarding of internment camps, and medical support during Op GRANBY.
    - Changes in MoD/ OGD structures and practice since GRANBY imply a significant (downwards) change in both required outputs and numbers is likely.
  - Once MoD baseline requirement is established OGD requests for potential MACA tasks will be processed as required.

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BOX 10

US PLANNINGCURRENT CENTCOM CONCEPT AND PLANGENERAL CONCEPT

- Plan seeks to overwhelm the Iraqi regime through a co-ordinated multiplicity of threats applied across a number of lines of operation.
- Offensive ops based (originally) upon two distinct options: 'Generated Start' and 'Running Start.' Both are preceded by shaping operations. Since the briefing to the JCS and POTUS in early Aug, a third option has been developed: the Hybrid, which is now referred to as "the plan."
- Each option uses the same forces, but start combat operations at different force levels based upon the timing of a possible trigger and willingness to accept risk.
- **Seven lines of military activity: operational fires, operational manoeuvre, SF ops, unconventional warfare/support to other governments, influence ops, humanitarian assistance, and pol-mil engagement.**
- The final phase is post-conflict operations and has been planned in detail at the military level (CENTCOM), has recently started the interagency process in Washington.

SHAPING OPERATIONS

- At the operational level, shaping operations involve information operations, by coalition forces, SOF and agencies, and a series of activities designated as spikes by the US.
- These spikes are intended to progressively increase the level and tempo of military activity over time, increasing pressure on the regime, creating confusion as to intent, and provoking preparatory movements or responses and the consumption of resources.
- In extremis, their response may be such as to constitute a *casus belli*, triggering US offensive operations. It is assessed that these operations have already begun, manifested through enhanced MIOPS and re-establishment of the Southern NFZ and, to that extent, we are already implicated in their conduct.

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
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## Concept of Operations



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# ‘GENERATED START’

Running Start

Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3	Phase 4	New Regim & No WMD
30 days	45 days	90 days	duration ?	
<u>Preparation</u>	<u>Attack Regime</u>	<u>Complete Regime Destruction</u>	<u>Post Hostilities</u>	
Initial Forces Complete	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Linker Operations</li> <li>AN</li> <li>AN</li> <li>AN</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>AN</li> <li>AN</li> <li>AN</li> </ul>		
N Day EXORD	C Day DEPLOYMENT	D Day HOSTILITIES START	G Day GROUND OFFENSIVE BEGINS	

**Info Ops Campaign**

‘Spikes’ / de-sensitise

Afghanistan/ SF Dir Camp

DESERT STORM Build-up

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


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- This option begins with the majority of combat forces in place, assessed as being not before 1 Jan 02.
- Sequential build up followed by simultaneous execution of activities across the seven lines of activity.
- Begins with the overt preparation and posturing of forces and support.
- Initial combat operations are initiated with a 72 hour air campaign. It is envisaged that this will assist in the achievement of tactical surprise.
- Ground forces attack along a two corps front to secure key facilities such as the southern oilfields, and potential APODS and SPODS. Concurrently, the regime will be isolated through operational fires and influence ops.
- Once the force flow is complete, the final phase of offensive operations towards Baghdad and Tikrit to complete the destruction of the regime will occur.

## RUNNING START.

- May begin with a 'casus belli' or significant Iraqi provocation; alternatively, may be initiated unilaterally by US. First option for launch in early Nov 02, but further options available as forces build up.



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- Sequential execution; combat operations initiated with a series of air operations building in duration and utilizing only in-theatre forces at first, building to include US based bombers and fighters as assets become available.
- Ground operations commence with a much smaller ground force than the Generated option to secure limited initial objectives and this may generate strategic surprise.
- Given that ground forces arrive at different intervals, the seizure of objectives is more gradual than in the Generated option. Although the ground manoeuvre plan for the options is similar, the greater degree of risk assumed in the Running Start makes it more dynamic in execution.
- Ex INTERNAL LOOK, a CENTCOM CPX to be held in theatre in Dec 02, will be important for practising the command complexities of the Running Start option. This ex will now serve as a mission rehearsal, probably for the Hybrid plan) PJHQ continue to plan to participate in this exercise and an appropriate training package is being developed. A decision on whether the UK will continue to participate in the exercise will be required by 11 Oct just prior to the Final Planning Conference.

**HYBRID PLAN**

- The Hybrid plan was briefed in outline to POTUS at the beginning of August. It represents an amalgam of GENERATED and RUNNING START and once the plan is fully developed it will become the US preferred option. The Hybrid plan continues to be refined and will be submitted to the JCS on 14 Oct. Until the completion of key 'preparatory actions', Running Start remains the plan that will be activated if required either by US political decision making, or provocation by Saddam Hussein.
- A key difference of the Hybrid plan is the inclusion of a near simultaneous ground attack into Iraq from SE Turkey – the northern option. This offensive will use either US forces or preferably, from a US perspective, UK and coalition forces.
- A number of early enabling actions result in the ability of the US planners to reduce the preparation phase from Presidential decision to launch of the air campaign to 16 days.
- Funding in the order of \$1bn has been made available to enable a number of preparatory tasks to be carried out. These tasks are termed "ambiguous" and could be attributed to OSW/ONW, exercise activity or general force improvement. These include upgrading ramps at potential APODs such as Ali al Salem, pre-positioning equipment and stores in Kuwait and Turkey, and the purchase of additional key infrastructure equipments such as satellite antennas. A significant proportion of these actions are dependent on the State Department achieving the necessary

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
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diplomatic clearances. This effort has begun although few projects are actually underway.

- EUCOM has been allocated \$150m for preparatory actions and the funds are likely to be used to build tented cities at potential APODs at Incerlik and Diyarbakir.



- The division of planning responsibilities between CENTCOM and EUCOM is slowly being refined with CFLCC concentrating on the CONOPS for the northern option and EUCOM, as a supporting command, facilitating the deployment of forces. In the absence of UK commitment, CFLCC is planning the deployment of 4th Infantry Division to SE Turkey (CONPLAN COBRA), diverted from its original mission supporting the main effort in the south.
- EUCOM received a PLANORD (22 Aug) directing them to plan to deliver a divisional size force to SE Turkey, synchronised with the launch of ground operations in the south. Their Joint Planning Group, with 3 UK embedded staff, commenced the mission analysis process on 4 Sep 02. Detailed planning cannot proceed until the PDSS has occurred, which is scheduled for early Oct 02.

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- There has been no clearance given for EUCOM to co-ordinate activities with Turkish civil or military authorities. EUCOM wish to start reccees and site surveys as soon as possible in order to meet planning guidelines; the UK has been invited to participate and Ministerial agreement in principle has been given.

The Northern Option

- US and UK planning for a Northern option have validated that a Div size force is required to achieve the effects required by CENTCOM and CFLCC. However, post the CENTCOM conference in Kuwait, it remains obvious that these tasks still require more clarification.
  - PJHQ (OA) have wargamed the north and concluded that a Div force of two Bdes could accomplish all the tasks up to the interdiction of the LoC between Tikrit and Baghdad, but would be incapable of participating in operations around Baghdad given its current force structure. More work is required with SBLA and CFLCC to reconfirm CFLCC and CENTCOM expectations for the North.
- Feedback from the CENTCOM TPFDD conference indicates that EUCOM is much further behind in detailed planning for the North than CENTCOM planning for the South.
  - EUCOM remains confident of their ability to deliver the LoC from the SPOD to Iraqi border
  - Planning has acknowledged UK shortfalls in several areas such as HETs, fuel and water bowsers and other support requirements.
  - However detailed EUCOM planning is still constrained by their inability to and conduct detailed reconnaissance. Likewise, once the force package for the North is confirmed, EUCOM will be required to determine their degree of support to the Div and CENTCOM CFLCC as they advance South.
  - C2 structure for the North is leaning toward the establishment of a 2\* JTF HQ under the command of the EUCOM J4, Maj Gen Rasmussen for LoC support and the 2\* ODC (Office of Defence Cooperation) in Ankara as the "anchor" for pol-mil engagement with the Turkish government. This COA also takes account of a 3\* from EUCOM (likely to be the COS, LtGen Sylvester) who will deploy forward, when required.
- Planning for Ex INTERNAL LOOK remains south centric and scenarios to exercise the northern option are still to be developed. This can be rectified by the Final Planning Conference in mid Oct.

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BOX 11

## UK Commentary on US Planning

### INTRODUCTION

US military planning is proceeding as a discrete activity (UK planning staff embedded within US HQs have now been given access to US planning. Additional staff have been deployed to CENTCOM (2) and EUCOM (3) and a liaison team (5) is now working with CENTAF). US military planners are fully aware of the need to establish a strategic context and for an inter-agency approach and considerable work has been undertaken to address these concerns. Our analysis and judgements are now based on a sound knowledge of the CENTCOM plan and recent military developments to which we are privy, and our assessment of whether to engage or not is (now based on a much surer footing) predicated on this imperfect basis.

Our assessment is based on the military viability and suitability of the US plan (as it is currently constructed) to deliver the UK End State. The key **military** question to be addressed is:

**“ Is the UK military contribution part of a winning strategic concept and plan?”**

We need to develop our military judgement against the following:

Yes – with conditions

No – with reasons

### CURRENT ASSESSMENT

Current update on the key factors is as follows:

**Yes. Provided the following conditions are met:**

- **Strategic**
  - With UK dossier release, Parliamentary debate, and US/ UK diplomatic activity a successful UNSCR can be steered through the Security Council
  - UNSCR brings UK public and international diplomatic opinion behind need for action.
- **Inform**
  - Continued refinement of assessments of Iraqi intent.

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- Accurate assessments of likely success in delivering key states for the coalition (especially Turkey)
- Command
  - Appropriate UK representation in C2 structures (COS JFHQ has had detailed discussions with CENTCOM and has received agreement in principle on a proposed structure. He will take forward UK C2 planning in line with developing work for Ex INTERNAL LOOK.)
  - US/UK inter-agency processes are co-ordinated to deliver multiple lines of operation
- Prepare
  - UK force package preparations can become overt in sufficient time to permit deployment at acceptable risk
  - Forward recces and negotiations are permitted to go forward in time.
- Project
  - UK can utilise US SPOD and APOD facilities, and US will be prepared to do heavy lifting on HNS requirements ( EUCOM have been tasked, as a supporting command, to deliver a divisional sized force from APOD/SPOD to concentration areas in SE Turkey. This offer, and its implications, is being explored by J4 staff.
- Protect
  - Adequate intelligence on operational and tactical level CBW threat is available
  - Security of UK home base and overseas bases is adequate
  - APOD/ SPOD security is adequately addressed
- Operate
  - Plan to fix Iraqi forces in North is developed (being taken forward by CFLCC)
  - US agrees to share key capabilities in UK areas of high risk such as BW detection and countermeasures, medical services, water and fuel provision ( offer to help has been made by CinCCENTCOM to CJO)
  - Iran and Syria are successfully constrained

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- US combat power mitigates UK military risks
- Contingency plans developed to meet asymmetric threats to coalition and regional states, especially Israel
- Sustain
  - Operational level clarification of sustainability concept is obtained.
- Recover
  - UK post conflict tasks will be limited in scope and time

**No. The UK should not offer to participate in the US CENTCOM Plan for Iraq for the following reasons:**

- Strategic
  - Discontinuity between UK and US End States opens up potential for strategic differences of approach and violate first principle of war.
- Inform
  - We do not share US's optimistic assessment of Iraqi regime's inherent weakness and liability to fracture
  - We lack intelligence on:
    - Iraqi regime thinking, intentions, and modus operandi
    - Morale and likely reactions of Iraqi people, including armed forces and security apparatus
    - Operational level intelligence on WMD renders risk to troops of CBW attack too great
- Project
  - Overflight and basing rights are not secured
  - Turkey is an uncertain partner and cannot be guaranteed to deliver necessary support, in sufficient time.
- Protect
  - Risks of fighting in contaminated CBW environment
  - Insufficient protection for SPOD/APOD; loss of either would be critical to operation

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- Ability to defend Israel and guarantee Israeli non-intervention
- Operate
  - US military planning does not yet address issues of what we perceive to be Saddam's most dangerous Course of Action which could consist of one or all of the following:
    - Early, or subsequent, use of WMD against Israel, and consequent danger of Israeli nuclear or conventional response
    - Asymmetric attacks on SPOD and APOD, including release of CBW agents
    - Use of conscript forces to deliberately inflate casualties
    - Fall back on "Fortress Baghdad"
    - Attack Kurds in north and cause mass migration into SE Turkey
  - Is northern option fundamental? To us, strategically, yes but to CENTCOM, operationally, no.
- Sustain
  - UK logistic requirements cannot be satisfied from own resources and how shortfalls to be made up is as yet unclear (though promises of US support have been made).
  - Insufficient access to SPOD and APOD to meet UK logistic needs.
  - UK Sea, Air and Land forces may be split exacerbating logistic support difficulties
- Recover
  - With no clear post conflict strategy UK military commitment is likely to become open ended

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BOX 12

UN ROUTE

Negotiations are ongoing at the UN about the detail of, and procedure for, the return of weapons inspectors to Iraq. The timelines that emerge will have a potentially significant impact on military planning, due mainly to the difficulties in conducting operations beyond March 2003. On the assumption that a new SCR is achieved by early Oct at the very latest, Blix believes that inspectors will be allowed in on 15 Oct. He sets out the following timelines:

- 2 months to prepare before inspections start Mid Dec 02
- 2 months to work and then submit baseline report to UN Mid Feb 03
- 120 days to assess compliance and submit a final report on compliance Mid Jun 03

This timetable must be assumed as the best case.

If these timelines run their course, and **if Saddam co-operates fully** throughout, then this could delay operations until winter 03/04. This is very probably Saddam's intention as he sees this as likely to:

- Create divisions between US/UK and the international community.
- Give Iraq scope to procrastinate prior to and following the entry of inspectors.
- Lead to the weakening of internal opposition and bolster regime morale.
- Allow Iraq to work on exploiting Palestine and other issues.

UK/US will pressure the UN Security Council to pass clearly defined and early resolutions to allow the inspection programme to begin as soon as possible. Within that programme, the UN should be seeking early indications of Iraqi compliance, perhaps by seizing the initiative and testing the most difficult and controversial areas first.

Issues that will need to be resolved are:

- Will Blix criteria satisfy US if their intelligence sources indicate to the contrary?

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- What level of consent/ compliance will Saddam demonstrate:
- High consent – no restrictions full and open exchange; no attempt to move or hide material, or other evidence
- Patchy consent – either through bureaucratic inefficiency, individual hostility towards foreign intrusion; or pre-determined malice inspectors may encounter local difficulties. What level of failing will amount to a *causus belli*.
- Low consent – Iraqi regime admit inspectors and adopt a posture of obstruction and delay.

#### **KEY DEDUCTIONS**

- The UN route may not be compatible with the US endstate which focuses primarily on regime change, but compatible with that of the UK which focuses more on the elimination of Iraqi WMD; this is a potential fault line in the UK/US relationship, which Saddam may try to exploit.
- In parallel to the UN route, the US is likely to continue action unilaterally, either on current timelines or to accept some small delay. The UK would have the choice of following the US or the UN route.
- The need to continue planning a preparation for military action remains extant

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