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Differences in the dates at the foot of this document are believed to have resulted from inconsistencies between the authors of different sections. The MOD confirms that this version of the document is complete and correct.



## **UK MILITARY STRATEGIC THINKING ON IRAQ**

**4 SEPTEMBER 2002**

4 Sep 02

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1 of 36

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LEGEND

	Box
<u>ENDSTATE</u>	1
Regime change options.	2
WMD.	3
Minimise unintended consequences.	4
Post conflict.	5
<u>CURRENT SITUATION</u>	
Regime options.	6
<u>PRINCIPLES</u>	
Principles.	7
<u>CREATE CONDITIONS</u>	
Conditions.	8
<u>ENABLERS</u>	
Military enablers.	9
<u>ENDS/WAYS/MEANS</u>	
US Planning	10
UK Commentary on US Plan	11
Potential UK Force Packages	12

4 Sep 02

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
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# CONCEPT DIAGRAM



The diagram above illustrates the process of evolving the UK concept for operations in Iraq. The numbers on the diagram relate to the "Boxes" in the remainder of this document.

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~~DECLASSIFIED~~BOX 1  
ENDSTATEUK

A stable and law abiding Iraq, within present borders, co-operating with the International Community (IC), no longer posing a threat to its neighbours or to international security, and abiding by its international obligations on WMD.

US

Saddam's regime leadership and supporting power base destroyed; WMD capability and infrastructure eliminated; Iraq's territorial integrity intact with sufficient force to defend itself and no ability to threaten its neighbours; and an acceptable provisional/permanent government in place.

PRINCIPAL ASSUMPTION

US planning is based on principal assumption that the Endstate cannot be achieved while the current Iraqi regime remains in power. Consequently, regime change is a necessary step and there is no point in pursuing any strategy that does not achieve this. [see Box 2]

US Objectives

The following US objectives are emerging from **CENTCOM Planning**, these have yet to be endorsed as the US position by the US Administration:

- **US Strategic Objectives.** Operations will support the following US strategic objectives:
  - A stable Iraq, with its territorial integrity intact and a broad-based government that renounces WMD development and use and no longer supports terrorism or threatens its neighbours.
  - Success in Iraq leveraged to convince or compel other countries to cease support to terrorists and to deny them access to WMD.
- **US Military Strategic Objectives.** Operations will accomplish the following strategic military objectives:
  - Destabilize, isolate, and overthrow the Iraqi regime and provide support to a new, broad-based government.
  - Destroy Iraqi WMD capability and infrastructure.
  - Protect allies and supporters from Iraqi threats and attacks.
  - Destroy terrorist networks in Iraq. Gather intelligence on global terrorism, detain terrorist and war criminals, and free individuals unjustly detained under the Iraqi regime.

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### KEY DEDUCTIONS

- Even working alone US has sufficient combat power to destabilise, and overthrow the current Iraqi regime, but it does require a minimum coalition in terms of axes of approach for land/ air operations, bases for mounting operations and providing logistic sustainability. Minimum coalition and capabilities required:
  - – APOD/ SPOD and mounting bases
  - – Overflight, air and SF mounting base
  - – Maritime and AAR air basing
  - – Rear area support, air basing and HQ
  - – overflight for offensive operations and CSAR
  - – Overflight and SF mounting base
  - – Overflight and guarantees of inaction
  - – Free and secure passage of Suez
  - – Cyprus, Diego Garcia basing and SIGA
- US combat power should be sufficient to provide short term strategic protection for allied and supporting states.
- Final destruction of Iraqi WMD capability will not be achieved until whole country is subject to new administration in post conflict phase
- Given fractious nature of Iraqi politics, broad regional concern on nature of new Iraqi government, and poor state of Iraqi infra-structure, delivery of stated post conflict objectives will require lengthy engagement
- Successful post conflict delivery of US support to a new, broad-based government will require co-operation and agreement of regional states on acceptability of the outcome, if its efforts are not to be undermined.

### UK MILITARY/STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

- **To deliver the end state, and provide a "winning concept" the following key issues will need to be resolved, in order to evaluate the campaign design :**
  - **Objectives.** To avoid achieving tactical victory at the cost of strategic failure agreement on Strategic and Military Strategic Objectives across coalition is necessary. On basis of current developments draft UK Strategic and Military Strategic Objectives are at **Box 1A and 1B**
  - **Effect.** Accepting that UK does not wish to (and cannot) deliver the desired end-state alone, but that with acquiescence of key regionals the US can, we need determine the strategic effect the UK is seeking from participation in the campaign:



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- Demonstration of US/ UK solidarity (delivering the Special Relationship)
  - Provide a bridge between Europe and US
  - Add value through sharing the planning burden, and acting as a moderating influence on US planning and action
  - Demonstrate that UK is an active, determined and capable nation by making an operationally significant contribution, in a discrete role that satisfies a clear military objective
- 
- **Partners.** Determine that critical countries will offer the necessary capabilities to enable the campaign.
  - **Legality.** The establishment of an agreed [UK] legal basis for action.
  - **Post Conflict.** Agreement before campaign commences on likely model for Iraqi governance, security structures, and economy, to inform estimates of post conflict engagement.
  - **UN.** In context of pre-conflict consider fate of UNMOVIK and UN observers/ workers in Iraq, and determine likely post conflict role.
  - **CBRN.** Deterrent policy toward Iraqi use of CBRN weapons: against Allied military targets outside Iraq, within Iraq, against 3<sup>rd</sup> party states.
  - **Intelligence.** Determine minimum level of intelligence that will satisfy campaign objectives in following key areas:
    - WMD
    - Regime Centres of Gravity
    - Regime Options and Courses of Action
  - **Information Campaign.**
    - Agree audiences and critical messages
    - Ensure IC matches tempo of overall campaign

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BOX 1A

**POTENTIAL UK STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES**

- Stand alongside US as a junior partner sharing both the strategic and operational risks and burdens, in order to:
  - preserve Atlantic Alliance
  - encourage US to continue to exercise its power via established international bodies and norms
- Remove the threat that any Iraqi regime may pose to the UK, UK interests and regional stability through its failure to comply with international law and agreements on the development and holding of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). This implies:
  - Verifiable destruction of Iraqi WMD capability, composed of:
    - Weapon and delivery systems, and their command and control
    - Directly related feedstocks
    - Infrastructure and equipment
    - Scientific research and development base
  - Establishment of a regime that has the trust of the International Community in fulfilling its international obligations
- Reintegrate a territorially intact Iraq as a law abiding member of the International Community
- Support and where possible enhance regional stability, this implies:
  - Preventing the establishment of a Shi'a dominated Islamic fundamentalist state
  - Ensuring that at the very minimum the impact of any operations against Iraq are neutral in terms of regional stability
- Prevent the Iraqi regime from perpetrating further humanitarian disasters
- Enhance the security of UK's long term economic interests, this implies:
  - Need to secure oil supplies to the world economy
  - Minimize any disruption to oil supply, during and immediately after any operations against Iraq.

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BOX 1B

**POTENTIAL UK MILITARY STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES**

- Provide US Commanders with support necessary for execution of approved campaign plan, focusing first on delivery of critical capabilities
- Assist US forces in creating conditions that will deny the Iraqi's an ability to use their WMD against Allies and supporting nations
  - Subsequently find and destroy Iraqi WMD stocks, delivery systems, C2, research, development and production facilities and infra-structure
- Create conditions for a change in the Iraqi Regime to one that will:
  - Be a law abiding member of the International Community
  - Allow free and open access to remaining Iraqi WMD capabilities, and renounce WMD aspirations
  - Exist within current boundaries of Iraq with a strong central government
  - Respect the human rights and freedoms of all its people
- Create conditions that strengthen regional security and stability, with specific reference to the roles of:
  - Turkey
  - Gulf States
  - Saudi Arabia
  - Jordan
  - Egypt
- Assist US forces in securing Iraqi oil infra-structure and production facilities

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BOX 2  
REGIME CHANGE OPTIONS

CURRENT SITUATION

- There have been a number of conferences and meetings between various Iraqi opposition groups in the UK and US over the last 2 months, some of which have also included contacts with the US administration.
- But no clear picture has yet emerged on how the US plan to effect a regime change (other than the military defeat and subsequent elimination of Saddam Hussein) and what will replace the current Ba'athist administration.

Assessment

- JIC<sup>1</sup> have assessed Iraqi regime cohesion and concluded that only substantial military action will precipitate change within Iraq
- Previous DIS<sup>2</sup> work on removing Saddam remains valid and is forming basis of our current thinking on regime Centres of Gravity:
  - Our current assessment is that Saddam and his immediate circle (Qusay and other nominated Ba'athist regional commanders) form the regime's strategic CofG.
  - However, indications are that regime is recognising potential weaknesses in their C3 infra-structure and are taking measures to decentralise certain key decision-making elements in event of an attack, thus protecting a critical vulnerability of their CofG
- US list 10 Cs of G: Leadership, Internal Security, WMD infrastructure and R&D, Covert missile forces, Republican and Special Republican Guard, Territory, selected Regular Army formations, infrastructure nodes, commercial and diplomatic leverage, supportive elements of civilian population
- Lack of clarity on what type of regime is to follow any action is hampering development of an Information Campaign that will allay fears of Gulf states and Saudi Arabia on potential outcome
- Modern Iraq (post Ottoman rule) has been dominated by Sunni minority (15% of population) who provide most of the military officer Corps and senior officials. Expectation is that this will continue with implications for any aspiration for representative democracy

<sup>1</sup> dated 4 Jul 02 - Iraq: Regime Cohesion

<sup>2</sup> DIS Pol-Mil Memo "Removing Saddam" dated 6 Mar 02

4 Sep 02



- Outcomes we should seek to avoid:
  - Establishment of a revolutionary Islamic government – most likely Shia dominated, aligned with Iran and antithetical to the West
  - Weak military dictatorship that invites coup d'etat to reassert Iraqi nationalism and pan-Arab ideals
  - State with a constitution that enshrines religious or ethnic power balance
- Indications are that US recognise the post conflict policy gap and their newly established inter-agency process will begin to address this key area

**Key Judgements**

- More work is required on strategic Centres of Gravity to ensure campaign is addressing the right objectives
- Current lack of clarity in US on post conflict Iraq means we do not yet have a winning concept
- Agreement on what outcomes we do not want will allow us to progress toward formulation of a winning concept
- Need to address the fears of regional and neighbouring states in development of post conflict model

BOX 3  
THE WMD DIMENSION

SITUATION

- JIC have made an assessment of Iraqi Military Options<sup>3</sup> and are separately addressing possible scenarios in which Iraq may use CBW<sup>4</sup>
- Although Iraq's nuclear capability (essentially a 'dirty' bomb) cannot be dismissed, the main threat, at the moment, is from CB weapons.
- Iraq is experienced in the production and use of chemical weapons and has experimented with BW, and there is every reason to believe they would be used if regime survival is threatened. Availability of weapon stocks and delivery systems will probably restrict use to strategic targets, rather tactical battlefield use.
- Coalition will need to justify the need for military action now – the position of UNMOVIC and the inspection regime continues to complicate this, Saddam continues to prevaricate with UNSG.
- Active public debate on nature of threat and how best to deal with it is ongoing in US and UK

END

The end required is that there is no longer a threat to the region or the wider World from Iraqi WMD; US planning dictates the elimination of all WMD in Iraq

WAYS

- Transparent inspection process that is able to verify no weapons, research or production facilities exist = effective implementation of current policies
- **Neutralise WMD capability and remove will to regenerate the capability, through a regime change**

MEANS

- Pre-Conflict. (operational risk reduction)
  - Need to task intelligence collection means to provide greater detail on level and location of WMD facilities, command and control means and means of delivery **for tactical purposes**. However, we must accept that it is likely that our visibility of WMD may even deteriorate as Saddam prepares for this conflict.
  - Pursue unfettered UNMOVIC inspection regime, wresting initiative from Saddam.
  - Secure **legal basis for targeting** of WMD.
  - JIC assess that Saddam is unlikely to use WMD prior to any attack
  - We need to consider current UK/ US policy on a deterrent response to Iraqi first use of WMD

<sup>3</sup> draft dated 19 Aug 02 "Iraq: Saddam's Diplomatic and Military Options"

<sup>4</sup> draft dated 19 Aug 02 "Iraq: Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons – possible scenarios"

4 Sep 02



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- Conflict. (operational risk reduction)
  - Maximum effort to destroy WMD and/or reduce the effect of WMD weapons use.
  - Provide protection and be prepared to fight in CB environment [see Box 9].
  - Given likely stock levels and speed at which BW agents work these are most likely to be used against key nodes such as APOD/SPOD. CW is unlikely to be used tactically with most likely targets being rear support areas.
- Post Conflict. (delivery of objectives)
  - Secure any remaining threat; audit Iraqi capability for public verification.
  - In slower time, destroy weapons and scientific infrastructure.
  - Monitor successor regime to ensure no resurgence.
  - Removal of Iraqi WMD may cause an imbalance with Iran which will need compensating.

**Key Judgement**

- **We need much better granularity of intelligence**
- **Clarity on what constitutes success for an inspection regime needs to be determined**
- **We need to review UK/ US policies on deterrent response to Iraqi first use of WMD, pre-conflict and in event of conflict.**
- **A satisfactory outcome to the issue of WMD is essential.**
- **Replacement Regime must renounce WMD**

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BOX 4

REGIONAL DIMENSION - MILITARY/STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS


IRAQ: REGIONAL ATTITUDES AND IMPACT OF MILITARY ACTION

Key Judgements

Dated as at 05 August 2002)

- I. No regional State, including Iran and Syria, would give Iraq significant practical support against a US-lead attack.
- II. Turkey would be willing to provide basing for a US-led attack on Iraq. Provided there were no worsening of the security situation in Palestine, Kuwait would provide basing or staging support.
- III. Saudi Arabia would be very unlikely to provide basing. It might approve some over-flights, but possibly only for non-offensive operations. It would distance itself from US-lead military action.
- IV. Arab governments' support would be badly damaged if Israel used a US-led attack on Iraq.  
Their support might also be reduced if any military campaign is prolonged or causes many civilian casualties.
- V. A US-led attack on Iraq would spark large-scale protests across the Arab world. Security forces would probably be able to maintain control, at least initially, - Anti-Western sentiment in the region would not dissipate quickly and could boost popular sympathy for extremist causes, including Al Qaida.

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## INTRODUCTION

- Diagram above shows those countries/ peoples that are integral to any planned action against Iraq
- Their position indicates their net effect on any military campaign, those closest to the centre have the greatest direct effect, and are on the critical path to military success
- The chart overleaf sets out an assessment of the key country conditions that impinge upon a coalition operation against Iraq. Based on recent JIC assessment.

## CHART DEFINITIONS ARE:

	= N/A or Neutral		= No Risk (Essential)		= Medium Risk (Highly Desirable)		= High Risk (Desirable)
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**Sustained Political Support** – policy support to coalition objectives and conops – must be sustained and enduring.

**Sustained Military Support** – offers to participate in operations or to backfill other operations which coalition members are engaged in - must be sustained and enduring.-

**Overflight / Transit** – National consent to air, land or sea transit across territorial spaces.

**Materiel Support** – national support to operations, short of combat. Includes basing, docking, finance and HNS.

**Internal Stability Risk** – degree of risk that there will either be civil unrest or a threat to the current regime or government.

**Public Opinion** – Popular opinion is supportive of Coalition action in Iraq.

**W1 & W2** – Windows 1 and 2.

**Mitigation** – Coalition measure, including military economic and diplomatic to manage out the risks.

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COUNTRY CONDITIONS AND RISKS CHART

4 Sep 02

15 of 36

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16 of 36

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4 Sep 02

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~~DECLASSIFIED~~BOX 5POST CONFLICT TASKS

- US operational military planners are working on detailed plans for post conflict CIMIC and other tasks, however, these are based on very broad assumptions as to nature of the new regime in Iraq.
- Post Conflict Tasks will depend on how regime change actually occurs, and what shape campaign takes to bring about the change. However, there are differences between Iraq and recent experience in Afghanistan and Balkans which mean a different approach is required, however clarity and broad agreement on following is needed before coherent plans can be effectively developed:
  - **Political.** Nature of regime, extent of franchise, land tenure, and relations with other states
  - **Economic.** Ownership and redevelopment of oil resources and development of other economic activity
  - **Security.** Security structures and Security Sector Reform (SSR). Purpose size and nature of Iraqi Armed Forces and internal security forces
- Planning will need to be undertaken with DFID prior to conflict in order to effectively manage NGO response to humanitarian consequences. Saddam may well use mass movement of refugees as an operational tool to slow coalition advance and as part of a strategic attack on coalition CofG (Domestic Public Support).
- Without clear post conflict plans potential scale totality of UK military commitment remains an unknown

Key Judgement

- In the worst case, we need to be prepared for a substantial long-term commitment.
- US planning on post conflict is currently weak and needs much greater definition
- Need regional buy-in to prevent enduring commitment.

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BOX 6  
**IRAQI REGIME COURSES OF ACTION**  
**(The 'What ifs')**

**IRAQ: SADDAM'S DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY OPTIONS**

**Key Judgements**                      **Dated as at 19 August 2002)**

- I. Saddam is likely to pursue continued talks with the UN on the return of weapons inspectors as a means to delay a US attack. He would permit their return if he believed that the threat of large-scale US military action was imminent and that his "concession" would prevent the US from acting decisively.
- II. Saddam will try a mix of charm, bribery and threats with his neighbours. But Iraq's influence is limited.
- III. Such as Saddam would like to seize the initiative before a US attack, his options remain limited. [PRE-JIC]. He is likely to be cautious in using force. He will play for time. But the closer and more credible an attack seemed, the more risks he will be willing to take, perhaps including deniable terrorist attacks.
- IV. Early on in any conflict, Saddam would order attacks on Israel, coalition forces and regional States providing the US with bases.
- V. Saddam would order the use of CBW against coalition forces at some point during a ground war. Once Saddam was convinced that his fate was sealed, he would order the unrestrained use of WMD against coalition forces, supporting regional States and Israel.
- VI. Iraq would probably try to ride out air strikes while conserving its ground forces. Iraq's likely strategy for a ground war would be to make any coalition advance as slow and costly as possible, trying to force the coalition to fight in urban areas.
- VII. There is significant potential for Saddam to miscalculate, either by escalating a crisis at an early stage, or by making concessions too late in the day to be acceptable.



**Most Difficult COA**

- If Saddam were to withdraw to and defend urban areas, this would significantly affect the Coalition action and cohesion. Such a move would mean a series of close battles, with large numbers of casualties on both sides (including Iraqi civilians) and collateral infrastructure damage. Coalition cohesion and public support would be very hard to maintain, as would support from the Region. The plan that the Coalition eventually adopts will need to minimize the possibility of Saddam going for this option, which supports the idea of a 'surprise' attack.
- Also very difficult would be if Saddam decided to 'take to the hills' with his immediate governing team and a significant protection force.

**Most Dangerous COA**

- A WMD attack on Israel would be the most dangerous single COA for the Coalition to deal with. Any plan must include guarantees to Israel that her security will be guarded.

**Key Judgement**

- Saddam's best chance of avoiding regime change will be to prevent the deployment of coalition forces as once committed by presence, the US can only see the operation through to success and his demise will be inevitable.
- Therefore Saddam's best chance is to fracture the will of the Coalition early on, prior to deployment, so speed and agility are needed once the decision to act has been taken.

BOX 7  
PRINCIPLES

KEY STRATEGIC AND MILITARY PRINCIPLES WHICH AFFECT CAMPAIGN DESIGN.

- **Selection and Maintenance of the Aim.** It is vital for public support that the aim is clear and both publicly explainable and defensible.
- **Flexibility.** We need to maintain a choice of options. This is particularly vital as Saddam is so unpredictable
- **Surprise.** The aim is to achieve the correct balance between **maximising strategic certainty** in the minds of Saddam and other relevant players involved in the dynamic **with operational and tactical uncertainty.**

OTHER PRINCIPLES.

- **Deception.** Critical, to keep Saddam off balance.
- **Morale.** There are some indications that the 'average Iraqi conscript' will not fight to the death for Saddam; we need to encourage this by IO and inducements. However, a collapse cannot be assumed as there are authoritative views that some Iraqi conscripts may well put up a determined resistance.
- **Offensive Action.** Once committed, there can be no turning back until the regime is overthrown and WMD is under control.
- **Security.** This is particularly important for surrounding countries; especially Israel and those that will facilitate the Coalition build up.
- **Concentration of Force.** The Coalition will need to identify key areas and fault lines, so that force can be concentrated to shatter cohesion.
- **Co-operation.** Especially with regional allies.
- **Sustainability.** Post Conflict commitment. This needs to be planned and agreed before we embark on military action.

**Key Judgement**

- **How to achieve any form of surprise while portraying the inevitability of Saddam's demise**
- **The need for enduring legitimacy**



BOX 8

**CREATE CONDITIONS**  
**(Those highlighted are a particular priority)**

Prime Ministers Crawford Conditions

**At Crawford PM established 3 conditions for UK involvement**

- **Public opinion domestically and internationally must be prepared.**
- **Giving UNMOVIC a chance to succeed was important.**
- **MEPP – there needs to be discernible progress.**

Timing & Constraints

- Delivering PM's conditions for engagement
- Constraints on timing
  - time to complete overt coalition military preps
    - 1 x Brigade in Kuwait
    - 1 x Brigade in Qatar
    - 1 x MEF (Division size) afloat in Diego Garcia
  - UK maintains no pre-positioned equipment or forces (except those deployed for Op RESINATE)
    - Minimum transit time to Gulf from UK is 3 weeks, once equipment is made ready
    - Transit to E Med is approx 12 days
  - Weather
    - Need to avoid combat in high summer, with optimal campaigning season Oct – Mar
- Turkish Elections: 3 Nov 02. Overt action or preparation on Northern Axis of approach may not be possible until after elections, and new government formed (approx 6-10 Nov 02)
- US political timetable
  - Nov 02 Congressional Mid-term elections
  - Nov 04 Congressional and Presidential Elections
- US planning indicates 2 possible windows:
  - Window 1: Oct 02 – Mar 03
  - Window 2: Oct 03 – Mar 04

4 Sep 02



Condition	Key activities	Achievable in Window 1 (Oct 02 - Mar 03)	Other Periods (to fol)	Achievable in Window 2 (Oct 03 - Mar 04)
Prepare domestic and international public opinion	Establish legal base Develop and conduct IO campaign to undermine and isolate Iraqi regime internationally Identify international audiences and conduct IO campaign			
UN	P5 consensus (especially Russia and China) UNMOVIC inspections given chance to succeed Persuade UN of need for use of force to impose will of International Community			
Discernible progress in MEPP	US/EU engagement in process Relaxation of Israeli occupation of West Bank International Conference on MEPP View from Arab Street View from Arab Leaders			
Prepare UK forces for operations in Gulf and elsewhere	Large Scale Land (3-9 months) Med Scale Land (3-6 months) Med Scale Air (2-6 months) Med Scale Maritime (2-6 months) Key enablers only: Bases: Cyprus/ DG ISR SF AAR Strat Lift			
Promote uncertainty in Saddam's mind	Military deception: operational surges and spikes (eg exercises and deployments) IO to destabilise/ turn supporters			

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Condition	Key activities	Achievable in Window 1 (Oct 02 – Mar 03)	Achievable in Window 2 (Oct 03 – Mar 04)	Other Periods (to fol)
	Disrupt command structures			
	Identify and cultivate potential Sunni dissidents			
	Infrastructure			
	Negotiate overflight rights			
	Maritime MCM surveys and clearance operations			
	Regional support for basing			
Intelligence	Improve intelligence on WMD			
	Improve intelligence on Iraqi capability and weaknesses			
Precursor action to reduce WMD threat				
Prepare internal insurrection				
	Reduce threat of fratricidal fighting			

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**Key Judgement**

- Creating conditions in Window 1 will be at risk, and places emphasis on action and then management of consequences ("Strike then Shape"), Window 2 is more deliberate and allows shaping before action ("Shape then Strike")
- With large amounts of pre-positioned equipment and deployable maritime air, US is less constrained than UK in adopting Window 1 or Window 2.
- Importance of post conflict end state as base for IO campaign so key to creating conditions
- We must not exclude periods outside the 2 windows.

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BOX 9  
UK CAPABILITIES

Force capability requirements will be determined by COA and UK declared level of commitment, but contingency work suggests that UK contribution can be broadly summarised as:

- **Package 1 - In-Place Support.** This package could cover everything from planning teams, ISR support, Lift, Diego Garcia, Cyprus, RESINATE and other forces deployed.
- **Package 2 - Enhanced Support.** Package 1 plus additional Maritime and Air capabilities at up to medium scale of effort.
- **Package 3 - Discrete UK Package.** This package could include selected Enablers plus UK Force Elements with a discrete role in the North, within an integrated US-led campaign.

Key Risks

- Following key risks to a UK deployment have been identified:
- **Concurrency.**
  - **Op FRESCO** poses the only **significant concurrency risk**
  - There are relatively few other instances of exercises or activity that may have to be cancelled depending on timing of any decisions
- **Equipment.**
  - Preparation times for desertisation (or potential winterisation) of vehicles (dependent on the option chosen and the terrain and climate conditions)
  - Industrial capacity to satisfy likely UOR/ preparation requirements is unknown, and will not be resolved until clearance has been given to engage industry
  - UOR requirement has been scrutinised and fewer UOR are seen as showstoppers, however, a large number are still required for forces to achieve full operating capability (FOC) or to reduce potential combat or sustainability risks (see Summary Table)
  - Our ability to address specific shortfalls that have already been noted as "lessons learned" by HCDC and PAC, such as Combat ID



- **NBC**

- **BW.**

- Medical countermeasures are available and picture is improving with increased availability of stocks for Large Scale forecast for late Sep 02, with exception of A week vaccination programme will be required to inoculate personnel (up to Package 3). Detail of programme will require prior consideration by SofS Advisory Group. 90% uptake on vaccination unlikely to be achieved through voluntary system.
    - UK does not have a mature concept or doctrine for handling BW casualties, current management procedures follow principles for naturally occurring communicable diseases with **recovery of personnel to NHS care in UK.**

- **CW**

- Sufficient Combopen are in stock but will require shelf life extension as batches go out of date end of Sep 02
    - COLPRO. There is sufficient for 2 Field Hospitals but training and awareness on use are low. Other COLPRO has been withdrawn from issue and use.

- **Medical.**

- Package 1. Support can be achieved within current resources
      - Package 2. Specialist reserve manpower will be required to man Role 2 & 3 facilities, and equipment to bring deployed hospitals up to modern scales (90 day is current estimate for procurement). SF medical requirement is likely to be significant and impact on demand for reserve manning.
      - Package 3. Minimum requirement will be 4 Role 3 Hospitals (1.5 Regular manning, 2.5 Reserve manned). New equipment will be required to bring hospitals up to modern scales (90 day is current estimate for procurement). Additional hospitals will be needed if force is required to manoeuvre.
    - Consideration will have to be given to the NBC and other risks posed to UK personnel and their dependants (MoD, FCO and EPs) in Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan, Israel and Cyprus. Contingency planning for MoD and FCO personnel is being scrutinised by joint MoD/FCO team.
  - **Reserves**
    - Our ability to call up, train and deploy the necessary reserve forces.



		Package 1	Package 2	Package 3
Northern Axis (via Turkey)	Role	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Incirlik (AAR/ Recce)</li> <li>Cyprus base</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Med Scale Air Strike/ CAS</li> <li>Mar force protection (CVS &amp; MCM gp)</li> <li>Cyprus base</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Med Scale Air Strike/ CAS</li> <li>Mar force protection (CVS &amp; MCM gp)</li> <li>Cyprus base</li> <li>Land: fix Iraqi forces; seize Nthn oilfields and cities (Div(-); post conflict tasking</li> </ul>
	Key UOR (1)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>VC10 comms</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No showstoppers</li> <li>NBC requirement under investigation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fuel/ Water bowzers for land</li> <li>Contingent on need to winterise/ desertise specific equipments</li> </ul>
	Issues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Turkish HNS/ access</li> <li>Overflight Sy/ Is/ Jo</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Turkish HNS/ access</li> <li>Overflight Sy/ Is/ Jo</li> <li>Medical support provided by removing capability from other HR forces</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Turkish HNS/ access - no move before 3 Nov 02</li> <li>Overflight Sy/ Is/ Jo</li> <li>Mobilisation of reserves for NBC/ Medical/ Logs support</li> </ul>
Western Axis (via Jordan)	Role	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>vs WMD</li> <li>Cyprus basing</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Med Scale Air Strike/ CAS</li> <li>vs WMD</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Med Scale Air Strike/ CAS</li> <li>Mar force protection (CVS &amp; MCM gp)</li> <li>Cyprus base</li> <li>Land: Med Scale force to deny Iraq WMD launch</li> </ul>
	Key UOR (1)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>SH/ AT</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>SH/ AT</li> <li>No other showstoppers</li> <li>NBC requirement under investigation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fuel/ Water bowzers for land</li> <li>Contingent on need to desertise specific equipment to reduce risks</li> </ul>
	Issues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Jo HNS/ access</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Jo HNS/ access</li> <li>Overflight Is/ Jo/ Sy</li> <li>Medical support provided by removing capability from other HR forces</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Jo HNS/ access</li> <li>Overflight Is/ Jo/ Sy</li> <li>Mobilisation of reserves for NBC/ Medical/ Logs support</li> </ul>
Southern Axis (via Kuwait)	Role	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mar Force Protection (incl deployed MCM)</li> <li>Mar strike (TLAM)</li> <li>Strike (AAS)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Med scale Mar Force for protection and strike (CVS/ TLAM)</li> <li>Strike/ CAS (Gulf based a/c)</li> <li>Medical support provided by removing capability from other HR forces</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Med scale Mar Force for protection and strike (CVS/ TLAM)</li> <li>Strike/ CAS (Gulf based a/c)</li> <li>Land: UK Armoured formation to be part of US main effort</li> </ul>
	Key UOR (1)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>MCM enhancement</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>MCM enhancement</li> <li>2 x ship fits for Gulf Ops</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Maritime requirement (Package 2)</li> <li>Fuel/ Water bowzers for land</li> <li>Desertisation of CR2 and other vehicles</li> <li>Medical &amp; NBC requirement being planned</li> </ul>
	Issues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Basing of F3 at PSAB</li> <li>Use of Diego Garcia (target clearance)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Basing of F3 at PSAB</li> <li>Use of Diego Garcia (target clearance)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mobilisation of reserves for NBC/ Medical/ Logs support</li> </ul>

(1) Key UOR = Showstoppers without which the capability will not deploy in a warfighting role.

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### UK Packages vs Risks

The table below broadly summarises the areas of risk in the Packages (based on assumption of a land component at Div(-) Scale of Effort from the North). Also included are the key items that will attract visibility, the key events that are common to Packages 2 and 3 will be the negotiation and letting of large contracts for theatre specific equipment (UOR) in significant numbers; the need to call up specialist reserves for training prior to deployment; the letting of charter contracts for strategic lift.

Numbers of UOR action may be initially covered by

PACKAGE/ FUNCTION	1	2	3 (Div-)	3 (Div-) (with FRESCO)
	Risk (H/M/L)	Risk (H/M/L)	Risk (H/M/L)	Risk (H/M/L)
Generate		M		
Prepare		M		
Deploy		M		
Operate		M		
Sustain		M		
Recover				M
Recuperate				
Post Conflict Tasking			M	
Visibility	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Not until committed</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Lift contracts</li> <li>Reserve call up (Medical &amp; specialist)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Theatre specific equipment preps</li> <li>Lift contracts</li> <li>Reserve call up (Medical &amp; specialist)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Theatre specific equipment preps</li> <li>Lift contracts</li> <li>Reserve call up (Medical &amp; specialist)</li> </ul>

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**BOX 10**  
**US PLANNING**

**CURRENT CENTCOM CONCEPT AND PLAN**

**GENERAL CONCEPT**

- Plan seeks to overwhelm the Iraqi regime through a co-ordinated multiplicity of threats applied across a number of lines of operation.
- Offensive ops based (originally) upon two distinct options: 'Generated Start' and 'Running Start.' Both are preceded by shaping operations. Since the briefing to the JCS and POTUS in early Aug, an third option has been produced: the Hybrid.
- Each option uses the same forces, but start combat operations at different force levels based upon the timing of a possible trigger and willingness to accept risk.
- Seven lines of military activity: operational fires, operational manoeuvre, SF ops, unconventional warfare/support to other governments, influence ops, humanitarian assistance, and pol-mil engagement.
- The final phase is post-conflict operations but detailed planning (is now stating to emerge) has not yet been developed.

**SHAPING OPERATIONS**

- At the operational level, shaping operations involve information operations, by coalition SOF and agencies, and a series of activities designated as spikes by the US.
- These spikes are intended to progressively increase the level and tempo of military activity over time, increasing pressure on the regime, creating confusion as to intent, and provoking preparatory movements or responses and the consumption of resources.
- In extremis, their response may be such as to constitute a *casus belli*, triggering US offensive operations. It is assessed that these operations have already begun, manifested through enhanced MIOPS and re-establishment of the Southern NFZ and, to that extent, we are already implicated in their conduct.




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**GENERATED START.** (still on the books but the Hybrid plan is now being developed in great detail and RUNNING START will remain as the option up to such time as the Hybrid plan is fully developed.)

- This option begins with the majority of combat forces in place, assessed as being not before 1 Jan 02.
- Sequential build up followed by simultaneous execution of activities across the seven lines of activity.
- Begins with the overt preparation and posturing of forces and support.
- Initial combat operations are initiated with a 72 hour air campaign. It is envisaged that this will assist in the achievement of tactical surprise.
- Ground forces attack along a two corps front to secure key facilities such as the southern oilfields, and potential APODS and SPODS. Concurrently, the regime will be isolated through operational fires and influence ops.
- Once the force flow is complete, the final phase of offensive operations towards Baghdad and Tikrit to complete the destruction of the regime will occur.




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## RUNNING START.

- May begin with a 'casus belli' or significant Iraqi provocation; alternatively, may be initiated unilaterally by US. First option for launch in early Nov 02, but further options available as forces build up.
- Sequential execution; combat operations initiated with a series of air operations building in duration and utilizing only in-theatre forces at first, building to include US based bombers and fighters as assets become available.
- Ground operations commence with a much smaller ground force than the Generated option to secure limited initial objectives and this may generate strategic surprise.
- Given that ground forces arrive at different intervals, the seizure of objectives is more gradual than in the Generated option. Although the ground manoeuvre plan for the options is similar, the greater degree of risk assumed in the Running Start makes it more dynamic in execution.
- Ex INTERNAL LOOK, a CENTCOM CPX to be held in theatre in Dec 02, will be important for practising the command complexities of the Running Start option. (This ex will now serve as a mission rehearsal, probably for the Hybrid plan).



## HYBRID PLAN


- The hybrid plan was briefed in outline to POTUS at the beginning of August. It represents an amalgam of GENERATED and RUNNING START and once the plan is fully developed it will become the US preferred option. The Hybrid plan continues to be refined and will be briefed to the JCS in the Tank on 28 Sep. Until the completion of

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key 'preparatory actions', Running Start remains the plan that will be activated if required either by US political decision making, or provocation by Saddam Hussein.

- A key difference of the Hybrid plan is the inclusion of a near simultaneous ground attack into Iraq from SE Turkey – the northern option. This offensive will use either US forces or preferably, from a US perspective, UK and coalition forces.
- A number of early enabling actions result in the ability of the US planners to reduce the preparation phase from Presidential decision to launch of the air campaign to 16 days.
- Funding in the order of \$1bn has been made available to enable a number of preparatory tasks to be carried out. These tasks are termed "ambiguous" and could be attributed to OSW/ONW, exercise activity or general force improvement. These include upgrading ramps at potential APODs such as Ali al Salem, pre-positioning equipment and stores in Kuwait and Turkey, and the purchase of additional key infrastructure equipments such as satellite antennas. A significant proportion of these actions are dependent on the State Department achieving the necessary diplomatic clearances. This effort has begun although few projects are actually underway.
- EUCOM has been allocated for preparatory actions and the funds are likely to be used to build tented cities at potential APODs at Incerlik and Diyarbakir.
- 
- The division of planning responsibilities between CENTCOM and EUCOM is slowly being refined with CFLCC concentrating on the CONOPS for the northern option and EUCOM, as a supporting command, facilitating the deployment of forces. CFLCC is planning the deployment of 4th Infantry Division to SE Turkey (CONPLAN COBRA), diverted from its original mission supporting the main effort in the south.
- EUCOM have received a PLANORD (22 Aug) directing them to plan to deliver a divisional size force to SE Turkey, synchronised with the launch of ground operations in the south. Their Joint Planning Group, with 3 UK embedded staff, commences the mission analysis process 4 Sep 02.
- There has been no clearance given for EUCOM to co-ordinate activities with Turkish civil or military authorities. EUCOM wish to start recces and site surveys in early Sep in order to meet planning guidelines; the UK will be invited to participate.
- The timeline for the Hybrid plan is below:



UK Commentary on US Planning

INTRODUCTION

US military planning is proceeding as a discrete activity (UK planning staff embedded within US HQs have now been given access to US planning. Additional staff have been deployed to CENTCOM (2) and EUCOM (3) and a liaison team (5) is now working with CENTAF). US military planners are fully aware of the need to establish a strategic context and for an inter-agency approach and considerable work has been undertaken to address these concerns. Our analysis and judgements are now based on a sound knowledge of the CENTCOM plan and recent military developments to which we are privy, and our assessment of whether to engage or not is (now based on a much surer footing) predicated on this imperfect basis.

Our assessment is based on the military viability and suitability of the US plan (as it is currently constructed) to deliver the UK End State. The key **military** question to be addressed is:

“ Is there a winning military concept and plan?”

We need to develop our military judgement against the following:

Yes    – with conditions  
No     – with reasons



**DECLASSIFIED**CURRENT ASSESSMENT

**Current update on the key factors is as follows:**

Yes. Provided the following conditions are met:

- **Strategic**
  - A legal base is established and broad based international support is achieved through a well orchestrated IO campaign
  - US will deliver P5 consensus on need for action in Iraq
- **Inform**
  - Clear plan for collection of intelligence on WMD and Iraqi regime
- **Command**
  - Appropriate UK representation in C2 structures (COS JFHQ has had detailed discussions with CENTCOM and has received agreement in principle on a proposed structure. He will take forward UK C2 planning in line with developing work for Ex INTERNAL LOOK.)
  - US/UK inter-agency processes are co-ordinated to deliver multiple lines of operation
- **Prepare**
  - Acceptable post conflict administration is prepared (US military planners have now produced much more detailed plans for Phase IV – post conflict – and have identified the military tasks which need to be addressed. How the military tasks are co-ordinated with other aspects of nation building is not yet clear.)
- **Project**
  - UK can utilise US SPOD and APOD facilities, and US will be prepared to do heavy lifting on HNS requirements ( EUCOM have been tasked, as a supporting command, to deliver a divisional sized force from APOD/SPOD to concentration areas in SE Turkey. This offer, and its implications, is being explored by J4 staff. EUCOM staff intend to conduct a reconnaissance of facilities and infrastructure in SE Turkey later this month, once political clearance has been granted.)
- **Protect**
  - Adequate intelligence on operational and tactical level CBW threat is available
  - APOD/ SPOD security is adequately addressed
- **Operate**
  - Plan to fix Iraqi forces in North is developed (being taken forward by CFLCC)
  - US agrees to share key capabilities in UK areas of high risk such as BW detection and countermeasures, medical services, water and fuel provision ( offer to help has been made by CinCCENTCOM to CJO)
  - Iran and Syria are successfully constrained
  - US combat power mitigates UK military risks
  - Contingency plans developed to meet asymmetric threats to coalition and regional states, especially Israel
- **Sustain**
  - Operational level clarification of sustainability concept
- **Recover**

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- UK post conflict tasks will be limited in scope and time

No. The UK should not offer to participate in the US CENTCOM Plan for Iraq for the following reasons:

- **Strategic**
  - Lack of clear intelligence on WMD to support a viable legal basis for military action
  - Discontinuity between UK and US End States
- **Inform**
  - We do not share US's optimistic assessment of Iraqi regime's inherent weakness and liability to fracture
  - We lack intelligence on:
    - Iraqi regime thinking, intentions, and modus operandi
    - Morale and likely reactions of Iraqi people, including armed forces and security apparatus

Operational level intelligence on WMD renders risk to troops of CBW attack too great

- **Project**
  - Overflight and basing rights are not secured
- **Protect**
  - Risks of fighting in contaminated CBW environment
  - Insufficient protection for SPOD/APOD; loss of either would be critical to operation
- **Operate**
  - US military planning does not yet address issues of what we perceive to be Saddam's most dangerous Course of Action which could consist of one or all of the following:
    - Early, or subsequent, use of WMD against Israel, and consequent danger of Israeli nuclear or conventional response
    - Asymmetric attacks on SPOD and APOD, including release of CBW agents
    - Use of conscript forces to deliberately inflate casualties
    - Fall back on "Fortress Baghdad"
- **Sustain**
  - Insufficient access to SPOD and APOD to meet UK logistic needs.
- **Recover**
  - With no clear post conflict strategy UK military commitment is likely to become open ended

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BOX 12

CURRENT UK FORCE PACKAGE OPTIONS

Package 0 – SF (with associated land, air and medical support) Only

Package 1 - In-Place Support. This package could cover everything from planning teams, ISR support, Lift, Diego Garcia, Cyprus and an SF component.

Illustrative Force Package

Maritime

MCC  
2xFFGH  
1xTLAM SSN  
1xLSL  
3xRFA

Air

ACC  
4xJaguar  
6xTornado F3  
8xGR4  
2xVC10  
2xTriStar Mk2  
2xMR2; 2xE3D; 4xC130J;  
1xHS125; 1xC130K

Package 2 - Enhanced Support. Package 1 plus additional Maritime and Air capabilities at up to medium scale of effort and an SF component.

Illustrative Force Package

Maritime

MCC  
CVS Gp  
5xDD/FF  
2xTLAM SSN  
ARG (Coy level Mil Force)  
MCMTG  
RFA Group

Air

ACC  
62xFast Jet  
12xAAR  
3xRecce  
4xAWACS  
2xMPA  
Joint NBC Regiment  
3xGround Based Air Defence  
4x Field Sqn (RAF Regt)  
In theatre transport aircraft as required

17 July 2002



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Package 3 - Discrete UK Package. This package could include selected Enablers plus UK Force Elements with a discrete role in the North, within an integrated US-led campaign.

Illustrative Force Package

Air as for package 2.

Maritime

MCC  
CVS Gp  
5xDD/FF  
2xTLAM SSN  
ARG (Cdo level Mil Force available post Oct 02)  
MCMTG  
RFA Group

Land

1xArmd Div + CS + CSS  
Comprising of:  
1 Div HQ  
2 Square Armd Brigades  
1 Man Sp Bde  
2 Log Bde  
OSG (incl Avn)  
SH package

Lt Bde (Air Assault capable)

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