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Differences in the dates at the foot of this document are believed to have resulted from inconsistencies between the authors of different sections. The MOD confirms that this version of the document is complete and correct, and that it totals 52 pages.

## **UK MILITARY STRATEGIC THINKING ON IRAQ**

**6 NOVEMBER 2002**

26 Sep 02

1 of 56

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
	Box
ENDSTATE	1
Regime posture options	2
WMD	3
Minimise Unwanted Consequences	4
Post Resolution (Aftermath)	5
<u>CURRENT SITUATION</u>	
Regime options.	6
<u>PRINCIPLES</u>	
Principles.	7
<u>CREATE CONDITIONS</u>	
Conditions.	8
<u>ENABLERS</u>	
Capabilities	9
<u>ENDS/WAYS/MEANS</u>	
US Planning	10
UK Options	11
UN/ Coalition	12

26 Sep 02

DECLASSIFIED

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# CONCEPT DIAGRAM



The diagram above illustrates the process of evolving the UK concept for operations in Iraq. The numbers on the diagram relate to the "Boxes" in the remainder of this document.

30 Sep 02

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BOX 1

ENDSTATE

UK

As rapidly as possible, we would like Iraq to become a stable, united and law abiding state, within its present borders, co-operating with the international community, no longer posing a threat to its neighbours or to international security, abiding by all its international obligations and providing effective government for its own people.<sup>1</sup>

US

***[Saddam's regime leadership and supporting power base destroyed];*** WMD capability and infrastructure eliminated; Iraq's territorial integrity intact with sufficient force to defend itself and no ability to threaten its neighbours; and an acceptable provisional/permanent government in place.

PRINCIPAL ASSUMPTION

US **military** planning is based on principal assumption that the Endstate associated with WMD cannot be achieved while the current Iraqi regime remains in power. **[see Box 2]**

Comment

Potentially significant difference between UK End States (which is in harmony with UN route) and US End State with respect to Regime Change noted in earlier estimates remains.

If Regime is reformed, this should imply acceptance of all extant UNSCR, and address:

- WMD threat (basis for policy of containment and economic sanctions)
- Extant threat to Kuwait, and wider threat to regional security (US legal base for NFZ)
- Extant threat of further regime inflicted humanitarian disaster (UK basis for NFZ)

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<sup>1</sup> 10 Downing Street's note of 22 Oct 02

30 Sep 02



Current draft UNSCR does address these issues, and UK dossier described the nature of all Iraq's current behaviour on these 3 issues, but emphasis in public preparation remains focussed on WMD.

**US OBJECTIVES AS DEVELOPED BY CENTCOM**

US objectives developed by **CENTCOM** have yet to be endorsed as the US position by the US Administration, but **have not changed in the last month:**

- **US Strategic Objectives.** Operations will support the following US strategic objectives:
  - A stable Iraq, with its territorial integrity intact and a broad-based government that renounces WMD development and use and no longer supports terrorism or threatens its neighbours.
  - Success in Iraq leveraged to convince or compel other countries to cease support to terrorists and to deny them access to WMD.
  - Support international efforts to set conditions for long term stability in Iraq and the region.
- **US Military Strategic Objectives.** Operations will accomplish the following strategic military objectives:
  - Destabilize, isolate, and overthrow the Iraqi regime and provide support to a new, broad-based government.
  - Destroy Iraqi WMD capability and infrastructure.
  - Protect allies and supporters from Iraqi threats and attacks.
  - Destroy terrorist networks in Iraq. Gather intelligence on global terrorism, detain terrorist and war criminals, and free individuals unjustly detained under the Iraqi regime

Draft objectives for the North remain under consideration in **Pentagon** by JS:

- *Fix Iraqi forces in the north and isolate Tikrit from reinforcement by forces located in the North*
- *Control key terrain in the North*
- *Deter/ prevent Iraqi attack on Kurds*
- *Provide ability to exploit success of early regime change*
- *Facilitate coalition participation*
- *Facilitate civil military and humanitarian operations in the North*
- *Maintain territorial integrity of northern Iraq*

6 Nov 02

5 of 56

**KEY DEDUCTIONS**

- Even working alone US has sufficient combat power to destabilise, and overthrow the current Iraqi regime, but it does require a minimum coalition in terms of axes of approach for land/ air operations, bases for mounting operations and providing logistic sustainability. Minimum coalition and capabilities required:
  - – APOD/ SPOD and mounting bases
  - – APOD/ SPOD and mounting bases
  - – Maritime and AAR air basing
  - – Rear area support, air basing and HQ
  - – Air basing (principally for U2)
  - – Overflight for offensive operations and CSAR
  - – Overflight and SF mounting base
  - – Overflight and guarantees of inaction
  - – Free and secure passage of Suez
  - – UK, Cyprus, Diego Garcia basing and SIGA
- US combat power should be sufficient to provide short term strategic protection for allied and supporting states.
- Final destruction of Iraqi WMD capability will not be achieved until significant change in behaviour of Iraqi regime
- Given fractious nature of Iraqi politics, broad regional concern on nature of new Iraqi government, and poor state of Iraqi infra-structure, delivery of stated post conflict objectives will require lengthy engagement
- Successful post conflict delivery of US support to a new, broad-based government will require co-operation and agreement of regional states on acceptability of the outcome, if its efforts are not to be undermined.

6 Nov 02

6 of 56



**UK MILITARY/STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS**

- There are 3 broad Courses of Action (COA) to deliver the End State:
  - **COA 1. Diplomatic & Coercion.** UN resolution. UNMOVIC inspections. Current HMG ME. Create and sustain IC resolution
  - **COA 2. Diplomatic/Force.** UN resolution. Continuation of COA 1 but UNMOVIC Inspection process fails at some point. IC resorts to use of force with UN authorisation.
  - **COA 3. Force.** Early failure of UN route. No or inadequate resolution. US led coalition resorts to use of force without UN mandate.
- To deliver the end state, and provide a "winning concept" that encompasses all 3 COA the following key issues will need resolution:
  - **Objectives.** To avoid achieving tactical victory at the cost of strategic failure, agreement on Strategic and Military Strategic Objectives across coalition is necessary. The Prime Minister's Strategic Objectives for the UK are set out in **Box 1A**, with current draft UK Mil Strategic objectives at **Box 1B**.
  - **Effect.** Determine the strategic effects the UK can deliver or contribute to in each COA.
  - **Partners.** For each potential phase of campaign partners will be different, major phases (see Box 7) are:
    - Level of engagement will be different depending on COA and outcome.
    - Before engaging NATO we will need clarity from US on their intended strategy for coalition management.
  - **Legality.** The establishment of an agreed legal basis for action.
  - **CBRN.** Determine **deterrent policy** toward Iraqi use of CBRN weapons: against Allied military targets outside Iraq, within Iraq, or against 3<sup>rd</sup> party states.
  - **Intelligence.** Determine minimum level of intelligence that will satisfy campaign objectives in following key areas:
    - WMD
    - Regime Centres of Gravity
    - Regime Options and Courses of Action

6 Nov 02

BOX 1B

**POTENTIAL UK MILITARY STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES**

- Be prepared to support diplomatic and UNMOVIC/IAEA action in case of Iraqi resistance to the implementation of UNSCRs
- Assist the Coalition in creating conditions that will deny the Iraqi's an ability to use their WMD against Allies and supporting nations
- Subsequently find and destroy Iraqi WMD stocks, delivery systems, C2, research, development and production facilities and infra-structure
- Create conditions that promote a change in the behaviour of the Iraqi Regime such that it will:
  - Be a law abiding member of the International Community
  - Allow free and open access to remaining Iraqi WMD capabilities, and renounce WMD aspirations
  - Exist within current boundaries of Iraq with a strong central government
  - Respect the human rights and freedoms of all its people
- Create conditions that strengthen regional security and stability, with specific reference to the roles of:
  - Turkey
  - Gulf States
  - Saudi Arabia
  - Jordan
  - Egypt
- In event of conflict be prepared to:
  - Ensure that Israel's security is not threatened by Iraqi action.
  - Assist the Coalition in securing Iraqi oil infra-structure and production facilities
  - Minimise damage to Iraqi infra-structure
  - Ensure Iraqi sovereignty in the aftermath.
  - Assist in humanitarian and SSR operations/activity during the aftermath.

6 Nov 02

8 of 56



BOX 2

CHANGE IN REGIME POSTURE OR BEHAVIOUR

CURRENT SITUATION

- UK diplomatic and political pressure aimed at:
  - Achieving significant change in behaviour and posture of current regime with respect to WMD, and other UNSCRs, **to prevent conflict**, however,
  - If regime fails to change its behaviour voluntarily then it will be **compelled to change its posture** through the application of force, should regime change result this will be an unsought, but added benefit.
- 
- Coercive campaign will require careful orchestration: Saddam will need to be convinced we are serious, but equally that compliance will reap its rewards, and he is not in a zero sum game.

Assessment

- Assessment remains that Saddam and his immediate circle (Qusay and other senior Ba'athists) form the regime's strategic CofG, with **regime survival** as their singular aim.
- JIC<sup>3</sup> have assessed Iraqi regime cohesion and concluded that only substantial military action will precipitate regime change within Iraq, and there are currently no contrary signals.
- Effectiveness of limited pressure over last 10 years in effecting change is not promising:
  - Economic sanctions, intrusive (and belittling) coalition presence in the air, significant air operations (Desert Fox) have not had a lasting effect.
  - Future of regime has not been seriously threatened since 91.

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<sup>2</sup> JIC(02)228 dated 11 Oct 02 – Iraq: The Return of UN Weapons inspectors

<sup>3</sup> JIC(02)140 dated 4 Jul 02 – Iraq: Regime Cohesion  
6 Nov 02

- Need to convince Saddam that his regime will not survive unless he is willing to compromise on WMD, and other UNSCR, will require:
  - **Options for use of force** that have sufficient capability, are credible, an delivery of a clear message of intent
  - **Greater clarity on what type of regime could follow**, to demonstrate coalition is seriously considering most damaging outcome.
- Lack of clarity on what type of regime is to follow action continues to hamper development of Information Campaign, weakens potential resolve of Gulf states and Saudi Arabia, and undermines current phase of campaign. It offers Saddam opportunities to divide developing coalition, and weaken coercive message.
- We should have clarity on outcomes we should **seek to avoid**:
  - Establishment of a revolutionary Islamic government – most likely Shi'a dominated, aligned with Iran and antithetical to the West<sup>4</sup>
  - Weak leadership that invites coup d'etat to reassert Iraqi nationalism and pan-Arab ideals or leads to widespread breakdown of law and order
  - State with a constitution that enshrines religious or ethnic power balance

#### US Planning

- US recognise a post conflict policy gap and are working within following broad framework with following objective:
  - Demonstrate that the US is prepared to play a sustained role in the reconstruction of a post-Saddam Iraq with contributions from and participation by the International Community that:
    - Rapidly starts the country's reconstruction
    - Preserves but reforms the current Iraqi bureaucracy
    - Reforms the Iraqi military and security institutions
- They have three broad phases
  - Remove current regime

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<sup>4</sup> JIC judge this an unlikely outcome.

dated 23 Oct 02 Iraq: The Kurds and Shia.

- Dismantle regime apparatus used to exert control
- Reform governance of Iraq

**Key Judgements**

- **Coercive strategy must offer carrots as well as sticks, if we are to achieve a change in current regimes behaviour without conflict**
- **To deliver a change in Iraqi regime behaviour requires continued credible threat of force**
- **Agreement on what outcomes we do not want will allow us to progress toward formulation of a winning concept**
- **"Aftermath" we need to address the fears of Iraqis, and the regional and neighbouring states in development of post crisis solution.**

6 Nov 02

11 of 56



BOX 3

THE WMD DIMENSION

SITUATION

- JIC have made an assessment of Iraqi Military Options<sup>5</sup> and have separately addressed possible scenarios in which Iraq may use CBW<sup>6</sup>
- Iraq's nuclear capability (essentially a 'dirty' bomb) cannot be dismissed, the main threat, at the moment, is from CB weapons.
- Iraq is experienced in the production and use of chemical weapons and has experimented with BW. Availability of weapon stocks and delivery systems will probably restrict use to strategic targets, rather tactical battlefield use.

ENDS

The end required is that there is no longer a threat to the region or the wider World from Iraqi WMD; US planning dictates the elimination of all WMD in Iraq

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- Transparent inspection process that is able to verify no weapons, research or production facilities exist = effective Implementation of current policies<sup>7</sup>
- Neutralise WMD capability and remove will to regenerate the capability, through a regime change

MEANS

- Pre-Conflict. (operational risk reduction)
- Pursue unfettered UNMOVIC inspection regime, wresting initiative from Saddam.

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<sup>5</sup>.                   dated 2 Sep 02 "Iraq: Saddam's Diplomatic and Military Options"

<sup>6</sup>                   dated 9 Sep 02 "Iraq: Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons"

<sup>7</sup>.                   dated 11 Oct 02 "Iraq: The Return of UN Weapons Inspectors". JIC assess that Iraqi regime believe they can conceal sufficient WMD knowledge and resources to regenerate their programme.

6 Nov 02



- Provide UNMOVIC with knowledge in WMD R & D and expert Means to task intelligence collection
- means to provide greater detail on level and location of WMD facilities, command and control means and means of delivery **for tactical purposes**. However, we must accept that it is likely that our visibility of WMD may even deteriorate as Saddam prepares for a potential conflict.
- Secure **legal basis for targeting** of WMD.
- JIC assess that **Saddam is unlikely to use WMD prior to any attack**
- We need to consider current UK/ US policy on a deterrent response to Iraqi first use of WMD

Conflict. (operational risk reduction)

- Reduce operational freedom of movement of Iraqi WMD
- Maximum effort to destroy WMD and/or reduce the effect of WMD weapons use.
- Provide protection and be prepared to fight in CB environment [see Box 9].
- Given likely stock levels and speed at which BW agents work these are most likely to be used against key nodes such as APOD/SPOD. CW is unlikely to be used tactically with most likely targets being rear support areas.

Post Conflict. (delivery of objectives)

- Secure any remaining threat; audit Iraqi capability for public verification.
- In slower time, destroy weapons and scientific infrastructure.
- Monitor successor regime to ensure no resurgence.
- Removal of Iraqi WMD may cause an imbalance with Iran which will need compensating.

6 Nov 02

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**Key Judgement**

- We need much better granularity of intelligence
- Clarity on what constitutes success for an inspection regime needs to be determined, and how long we would wish to see inspections continue if initial (120 days) do not find anything
- We need to review UK/ US policies on deterrent response to Iraqi first use of WMD, pre-conflict and in event of conflict.
- A satisfactory outcome to the issue of WMD is essential.
- Iraqi Regime must renounce WMD

6 Nov 02

14 of 56

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BOX 4

REGIONAL DIMENSION – MILITARY/STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

IRAQ: REGIONAL ATTITUDES AND IMPACT OF MILITARY ACTION

Introduction

- Adoption of UN track by US has caused a significant shift in regional attitudes

Northern Option


- The northern option is only viable if Turkey can be delivered, the lack of clarity in US as to whether this is achievable within the current planning timelines continues
- Following are key:
  - Turkish willingness to allow operations to proceed unhindered, and intent towards Northern Iraq and Kurds is key.
  - Kurdish intent (principally KDP and PUK, though other factions have potential to disrupt/ distract from Main Effort)

6 Nov 02

15 of 56

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## INTRODUCTION

- Diagram above shows those countries/ peoples that are integral to any planned action against Iraq
- Their position indicates their net effect on any military campaign, those closest to the centre have the greatest direct effect, and are on the critical path to military success
- The chart overleaf sets out an assessment of the key country conditions that impinge upon a coalition operation against Iraq. Based on recent JIC assessment.

## CHART DEFINITIONS ARE:

	= N/A or Neutral		= No Risk (Essential)		= Medium Risk (Highly Desirable)		= High Risk (Desirable)
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**Sustained Political Support** – policy support to coalition objectives and conops – must be sustained and enduring.

**Sustained Military Support** – offers to participate in operations or to backfill other operations which coalition members are engaged in - must be sustained and enduring.

**Overflight / Transit** – National consent to air, land or sea transit across territorial spaces.

**Materiel Support** – national support to operations, short of combat. Includes basing, docking, finance and HNS.

**Internal Stability Risk** – degree of risk that there will either be civil unrest or a threat to the current regime or government.

**Public Opinion** – Popular opinion is supportive of Coalition action in Iraq.

**W1 & W2** – Windows 1 and 2. Windows retained to show discrimination over time.

**Mitigation** – Coalition measure, including military economic and diplomatic to manage out the risks.

6 Nov 02



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COUNTRY CONDITIONS AND RISKS CHART

6 Nov 02

17 of 56

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6 Nov 02

18 of 56

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**BOX 5**

**AFTERMATH - RESOLUTION PHASE**

**INTRODUCTION**

- The lasting impression of Coalition legitimacy and success will not be set by military success in conflict - it will be determined by the nature of the Iraqi nation that emerges afterwards.
- This phase has potential to prove most protracted and costly phase of all
- Planning must be flexible to accommodate wide range of start states and possible outcomes ranging from fast and bloodless coup, a rapid and anarchic collapse, or a damaged and ungoverned state on the verge of disintegration.
- Operations in Iraq may have a negative impact on the UK's policy objectives for International Terrorism, as poor handling of a Post-Conflict Iraq has the potential to increase greatly anti-western feeling in the region; fuelling the very international tensions we have sought to diffuse and arming the forces of extremism.

**SCENARIOS**

- There are three broad scenarios we may face in Iraq:
  - Coercion succeeds in securing the removal of an Iraq WMD threat.
  - Military action takes place with UN authorisation and support.
  - Military action takes place without UN authorisation and support.
- First scenario Resolution Phase activity may simply be limited to an appraisal of the need for further coercive effort and an examination of Defence Diplomacy means for further Iraqi rehabilitation.
- Second and third scenarios provide the greatest challenge for military forces.

**ASSUMPTIONS**


- A major military role in the resolution phase is only required if by military action or consequence of diplomatic activity the current Iraqi regime changes or collapses.
- The US will retain the military lead and the senior UK military commander will report to a US superior officer.
- There will remain a residual threat to deployed forces from non-compliant elements regardless of the position achieved on termination of offensive operations.

6 Nov 02



### END STATE

- Box 1 describes the UK and US end-states and both outline a situation that cannot be resolved by offensive operations alone. It is the efforts undertaken in the Resolution Phase of conflict that will eventually achieve these strategic end-states. Diplomatic, economic and military lines of activity will co-operate to achieve the end-state.
- The strands of policy supporting the end-state can be presented as functional areas or 'pillars', each composed of a range of lines of operation for different ministries, agencies and NGOs. The diagram below illustrates these pillars for Resolution Phase Iraq<sup>8</sup>.



### UK CROSS -GOVERNMENT POLICY DEVELOPMENT

- The pillars only serve a purpose if they form the basis for interaction and co-operation between OGDs. The MOD can define some Lines of Operation in isolation, but early consultation is necessary for coherence.
- Action is in hand by Cabinet Office to develop UK thinking
- From a MoD perspective, ideally OGDs should be invited to agree the policy pillars and outline their Lines of Operation within them, noting where they may seek assistance from, or interaction with, the military.

### IRAQI GOVERNANCE AND REFORM

- The US lead in military operations places them in the lead for Resolution Phase operations. Much of the policy is, therefore, likely to be set according to US aims and principles. The key to effective involvement that does not compromise UK principles is an early assessment of areas of potential difference. Governance and reform may be critical areas.

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<sup>8</sup> These terms are broadly in line with US doctrinal areas for post-conflict resolution tasks and should allow coherent planning.

6 Nov 02



- There is no firm US interagency view on the role of the UN in a transitional government and the development of a permanent solution. It is probable that the UK policy will accept: an initial brief period of Coalition-run, largely military government; followed by an interim government run by either a UN international appointee or a UN approved Iraqi; leading to self government.
- A balance must be struck between the competing demands for reform and removal of Ba'athist influence and the need for effective administration. This dilemma shapes some clear information requirements as follows:
  - A detailed structural analysis of the current regime, its instruments of state power and its administration.
  - An informed UK-US judgement on the degree to which reform will be required immediately, for effective operation, and eventually, to secure the end-state.
  - A rolling assessment of the effectiveness of state institutions as a result of coalition action, linked to a mechanism for moderating or accelerating operations to set conditions for successful post-conflict efforts. **Throughout, military offensive action must be balanced against the longer-term objectives – the opportunity for counter-productive destruction is high.**
- **Early engagement at the policy level will be required to formulate a working consensus in the areas that allows coherent military planning to proceed. In particular the role of the UN in any transitional arrangements will need to be agreed.**

#### ACTORS' COURSES OF ACTION (COA)

- There are six principal actors that will set the conditions under which Resolution Phase operations are conducted:
  - The Iraqi Regime – Saddam and the Ba'ath Party.
  - The Iraqi Armed Forces – SRG, RGFC, Regular forces.
  - The Iraqi peoples – Sunni, Shia and Kurdish.
  - Regional Powers – Turkey, Iran, Israel, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
  - Coalition Forces.
  - The UN and the International Community.
- Each of these actors have Courses of Action (CoA) open to them prior to, and within, the Resolution Phase which would affect the operation. The impact of Coalition actions is accepted but the other actors merit further study. Each actor

6 Nov 02

has sub-groups with significantly different influences and intents. A very detailed set of policies and plans is needed to guide operational planners.


### Conclusions

- Key SIRs for Offensive and Resolution Phase Operations will be the developing intent of each group.
- It may be necessary to conduct Offensive operations and Resolution Phase activity concurrently.
- Strategic pre-emption means are needed to ensure that the actors conform with our intent. In case these fail, contingency plans must be made. The plans will involve both military and non-military means. Early thinking on political/diplomatic agreements with ethnic groups to limit the risk of secession and internal conflict will be essential.
- Any replacement Iraqi Regime could be categorised simply as compliant or non-compliant. Only a compliant government would be dealt with in a different manner to the existing Regime.
- Policies for the Iraqi Armed Forces must be agreed before offensive operations start.
- Info Ops will have a crucial shaping role throughout and it must be geared to support Resolution Phase Operations, in addition to Offensive operations, from the outset.

### MILITARY SUPPORT TO POLICY PILLARS

- Military Lines of Operation. Within the policy pillars there will be a series of tasks which may require military involvement. This may range from leadership, through support to other agencies, to an interim role until others are geared for the task. The diagram below illustrates the generic lines of operation which encompass the main military tasks and links them to the policy pillars, showing the predominant (but not all encompassing) role in the Security Sector and highlighting potential supporting roles elsewhere.





- Military End-state. A possible military end-state is:
  - **An accountable Iraqi security structure capable of assuming self-defence and internal security responsibilities in accordance with international law.**

### LEGALITY

- The legality of military action and subsequent occupation without an authorising UNSCR would need close consideration by the Attorney General.
- The possible requirement to use Police Powers will need further examination.

### IMPLICATIONS FOR MILITARY PLANNING

### LEVEL OF COMMITMENT

- The impact of any enduring commitment on other operations would be significant. A recommendation on the size of force the UK is prepared to commit must be

6 Nov 02



prepared, at least for the key six months following any operation. In parallel diplomatic efforts must seek partners to share, and eventually take on, the burden.

### **OPERATIONAL PLANNING AND TRANSITION**

- Planning for Resolution Phase operations must be complete before the start of Offensive operations. Any UK land force HQ must have the capacity to conduct Offensive and Resolution Phase operations concurrently.
- Warfighting forces must be able to contribute to Resolution Phase objectives until formal transition to Resolution Phase can be declared. Therefore clarity on post Resolution Phase and likely UK contribution will be needed before operations commence.

### **KEY JUDGEMENTS**

- **Views on Policy Pillars and potential support expected of military forces will be sought from OGD using current Cabinet Office machinery.**
- **The development of a jointly acceptable approach to Iraqi Governance and reform in the Resolution Phase should be pursued with the US. Agreement on the role of the UN is essential.**
- **A structural analysis of the Iraqi system and the need for reform is required. Current FCO and DFID papers reveal key gaps in our knowledge (eg structure and efficiency of Iraqi police)**
- **A detailed analysis of the CoA of key actors is required. Military and non-military pre-emption capabilities and contingency plans must be prepared.**
- **The UK's intent to commit forces beyond Offensive operations needs to be clarified to allow operational planning for the Resolution Phase, and to allow balancing of the wider Commitments picture.**
- **Once principal coalition partners have agreed on key issues, this will need to include agreement on Coalition Management processes, early diplomatic activity to seek burden-sharing partners should be undertaken.**
- **Work to define force structure options must run concurrently with ongoing operational planning in order to ensure the UK is adequately prepared to conduct Resolution Phase operations.**

### **WAY FORWARD**

- **A full and detailed strategic estimate for this phase is being conducted. The next iteration of Box 5 will present an Executive Summary of its deductions.**

6 Nov 02

BOX 6

**IRAQI REGIME COURSES OF ACTION**  
**(The 'What ifs')**

**IRAQ: SADDAM'S DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY OPTIONS**

**INTRODUCTION**

- US planning continues to assess Iraqi most likely COA as defence in depth. However, Iraqis may be seeking to strike at coalition C of G (national will) by seeking to reduce tempo of coalition attack and increasing the casualty bill.

**ASSESSMENTS**

- JIC continue to assess that Saddam will permit return of inspectors in order to prevent the US from acting decisively.
- Saddam will continue to try a mix of charm, bribery and threats with his neighbours. But Iraq's influence is limited.
- He is likely to be cautious in using force. He will play for time. But the closer and more credible an attack seemed [and if he can see no other way out], the more risks he will be willing to take, perhaps including deniable terrorist attacks.
- Early on in any conflict, Saddam would order attacks on Israel, coalition forces and regional States providing the US with bases.
- Saddam would order the use of CBW against coalition forces at some point during a ground war. Once Saddam was convinced that his fate was sealed, he would order the unrestrained use of WMD against coalition forces, supporting regional States and Israel.
- Iraq would probably try to ride out air strikes while conserving its ground forces. Iraq's likely strategy for a ground war would be to make any coalition advance as slow and costly as possible, trying to force the coalition to fight in urban areas.
- **There remains significant potential for Saddam to miscalculate.**

6 Nov 02

25 of 56



**Most Difficult COA**

- If Saddam were to withdraw to and defend urban areas, this would significantly affect Coalition action and cohesion. [Box 6A addresses "Fortress Baghdad"]
- Once hostilities have commenced Saddam may look to distract coalition forces by a deliberate and sustained attack in the North, using all methods available to him (including CBW). The mass movement of refugees, and the humanitarian disaster this would create would be used to distract Coalition Forces.
- Recent DFID papers indicate that in event of conflict the loss of Oil for Food (OFF) is likely to cause large migration of refugees in the North, South and West (there are already 300,000 Iraqis in Jordan (total pop 5.3m) of the country.

**Most Dangerous COA**

- A WMD attack on Israel would be the most dangerous single COA for the Coalition to deal with. Any plan must include guarantees to Israel that her security will be guarded.

**Key Judgement**

- Saddam's best chance of avoiding regime change will be to prevent the deployment of coalition forces as once committed by presence, the US can only see the operation through to success and his demise will be inevitable.
- Therefore Saddam's best chance is to fracture the will of the Coalition early on, prior to deployment, so speed and agility are needed once the decision to act has been taken.

6 Nov 02

26 of 56



**BOX 6A**

**FORTRESS BAGHDAD**

**LIKELY IRAQI COAs**

- Defence in Depth. Saddam Hussein (SH) may establish a series of concentric rings around Baghdad, the outer ring being the least politically reliable (ie Regular Army (RA) on the country borders) with Republican Guard Forces Command (RGFC) divisions within 80-100 km of the city and Special Security Organisation/ Special republican Guard (SSO/ SRG) forces in it. Most likely.
- Fortress Baghdad. SH may withdraw 4 of the 6 RGFC divisions into Baghdad and establish a coherent defensive position. Most dangerous.

**COALITION RESPONSE**

- Coalition cannot engage in drawn out urban conflict. Loss of tempo, rising casualties and humanitarian effects would undermine coalition will to continue and rapidly alienate regional supporters.

**DOCTRINAL TOOLS**

- OPERATIONAL
  - Shape the Battlespace. Attack the enemy's will through an Information Operations (IO) campaign stressing the inevitability of defeat, but tailored to each type of audience (RA, RGFC SRG etc) and providing a viable way out.
    - Attack Iraqi Cohesion. Redesign operational plan to prevent the enemy from carrying out his most dangerous COA.
  - Protect Coalition Will and Cohesion.
    - Maintain the moral and legal high ground by minimising civilian casualties, collateral damage, and own casualties.

**POSSIBLE UK APPROACH**

- Try to avoid Fighting in Built Up Areas (FIBUA), but accept that FIBUA is likely during offensive operations and possibly during resolution phase.
- Best option is to avoid conflict in entire towns and cities and to target only those KPs required – otherwise guard to prevent enemy sorties and

6 Nov 02

bypass.

- Dislocate RA and RGFC using IO and PSYOPS and ultimately by denying routes into the city.
- Attempt decapitation of Regime (kill SH and sons).
- Isolate SSO, SRG and any elements of RGFC still loyal and attempt to subvert through aggressive IO and PSYOPS.
- Dominate remainder of the country and implement resolution phase.
- When ready conduct operations to complete the defeat of the surviving loyal elements, through combined PSYOPS, precision fires and ultimately ground assaults on selected and isolated sections.
- Ensure throughout that a massive humanitarian aid effort is available to provide life support to non-combatants.


6 Nov 02

28 of 56

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BOX 7

PRINCIPLES



CONFLICT CYCLE

- Conflict "cycle" can be depicted as in figure above; as noted in BDD it is more a continuum than a cycle with movement in either direction aimed at achieving successful conflict resolution
- Current action against Iraq is **Conflict Prevention**. Sanctions and NFZ are being pursued as containment and peace enforcement strategies. Adoption of a new UNSCR is aimed at adding additional pressure by achieving broad based agreement on need for action.
- **Force on Mind**. Although at all points of the conflict cycle influence is targeted against decision makers, and their will to fight, in Conflict Prevention it is the key instrument of military power:
  - We are at the point in this crisis in which constant coercive pressure is needed to keep up forward momentum.
- Overt Force Generation and Force Preparation activities are key elements in maintaining current coercive pressure

6 Nov 02

DECLASSIFIED



- Unity of Message. A clear and unified declaration of intent by a wide and solid coalition as possible will deliver the most powerful message of international intent to Saddam Hussein

**Key Judgement**

- We are executing a strategic Force on Mind campaign
- Information Campaign is fundamental to delivering message to Saddam
- Force generation and preparation are strategic elements of campaign in application of pressure we are seeking to place these in an appropriate framework to determine their effect and timing.

6 Nov 02

30 of 56

DECLASSIFIED

BOX 8

CREATE CONDITIONS

UNSCR

- Negotiation on UNSCR continues. UNSCR provides key context for COA 1 and COA 2, with failure resulting in COA 3
- With adoption of UN track we cease to hold initiative over timing unless UN route is rejected as part of COA 3.
- Having embarked on UN route failure to achieve a resolution is likely to have short term (and potentially medium term) impact on regional support, and numbers of nations coming forward to join coalition.

UNMOVIC

- As well as creating conditions in Iraq further effort will need to be expended on creating right conditions **within** UNMOVIC for successful inspections
- FCO assessment is that UNMOVIC is at **serious weakness** due to:
  - Too few suitably qualified and experienced technical staff
  - Number of inspectors that are planned to be on the ground at any one time (80) will not prevent Iraqis from second guessing them
  - Poor intelligence and no clear means, or process for delivering accurate or timely intelligence.

Timing & Constraints

- Turkish Elections. Complete. Government has 40 days in which to form, but given size of majority, administration is likely to form sooner rather than later. Overt action or preparation on Northern Axis of approach may not be possible until after new government formed
- US political timetable
  - 5 Nov 02 Congressional Mid-term elections
  - Nov 04 Congressional and Presidential Elections
- Weather
  - If possible need to avoid combat in high summer, with optimal campaigning season Oct – late Mar, however, following UN route we will need to identify what can be undertaken in summer [see Box 9]

6 Nov 02

31 of 56

DECLASSIFIED



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SECRET UK/US EYES – NO FURTHER DISSEMINATION

Condition	Key Activities	Achievable in Window 1 (Oct 02 – Mar 03)	Other Periods (to fall)	Achievable in Window 2 (Oct 03 – Mar 04)
Prepare domestic and international public opinion	Establish legal base Develop and conduct IO campaign to undermine and isolate Iraqi regime internationally Identify international audiences and conduct IO campaign			
UN	P5 consensus (especially Russia and China) UNMOVIC inspections given chance to succeed Persuade UN of need for use of force to impose will of International Community			
Discernible progress in MEPP	US/ EU engagement in process Relaxation of Israeli occupation of West Bank International Conference on MEPP View from Arab Street View from Arab Leaders			
Prepare UK forces for operations in Gulf and elsewhere	Package 0 Package 1 Package 2 Package 3			
Promote uncertainty in Saddam's mind	Military deception: operational surges and spikes (eg exercises and deployments) by UK forces IO to destabilise/ turn supporters Disrupt command structures Identify and cultivate potential Sunni dissidents			
Prepare region to accept forces	Infrastructure Negotiate overflight rights Maritime MCM surveys and clearance operations Regional support for basing			
Intelligence	Improve intelligence on WMD Improve intelligence on Iraqi capability and weaknesses			

6 Nov 02

32 of 56

SECRET UK/US EYES – NO FURTHER DISSEMINATION

DECLASSIFIED



Condition	Key activities	Achievable in Window 1 (Oct 02 – Mar 03)	Other Periods (to fol)	Achievable in Window 2 (Oct 03 – Mar 04)
Precursor action to reduce WMD threat				
Prepare internal insurrection	Reduce threat of fratricidal fighting			

Key Judgement

- Creating conditions in Window 1 will be at risk, and places emphasis on action and then management of consequences (“Strike then Shape”), Window 2 is more deliberate and allows shaping before action (“Shape then Strike”)
- With large amounts of pre-positioned equipment and deployable maritime air, US is less constrained than UK in adopting Window 1 or Window 2.
- Importance of post conflict end state as base for IO campaign so key to creating conditions
- We must not exclude periods outside the 2 windows.

BOX 9

**UK CAPABILITIES**

UK capability has been grouped in 6 incremental force packages:

- Package 0 - SF Only
- Package 1 - In-Place Support and Key Enablers.
- Package 2 - Enhanced Support. Maritime and Air capabilities at up to medium scale of effort.
- Package 3 - Enhanced Support and UK land Package.
- Package 4 - Aftermath. Forces required post resolution of crisis
- Package 5 - UK home base requirements

Package 4 and 5 have yet to be determined.

**Key Risks**

- Following key risks to a UK deployment have been identified:
- **Concurrency.**
  - **Op FRESCO** poses the only **significant concurrency risk**
  - There are relatively few other instances of exercises or activity that may have to be cancelled depending on timing of any decisions
- **Environment.** With adoption of UN track timing of operation may now shift to point of failure of UN process and action may be required in "hot months". Following initial assessment has been made of UK ability to operate:
  - Environmental constraints on operations will apply throughout the year. However, the key summer constraint is temperature.
  - Temperatures are likely to peak across the region in Jul / Aug to at least 40degC, and in places to 50deg C.
  - These temperatures will have an effect on personnel and equipment that will be equal on Iraqi and acclimatised coalition forces. Non-acclimatised forces, less than 2 weeks in theatre (BCRs particularly), will have significant difficulties with coping with the conditions. Risk increases exponentially as temperature rises due to cumulative factors that can only be partially mitigated.

6 Nov 02



- The Force's ability to continue to operate cannot be definitively measured in advance. It will be subject to continuous estimate and hourly risk management.
- General constraints that will apply across all operations include:
  - Increased time for acclimatisation
  - Reduced op tempo
  - Increased effect on equipment
  - Increased logistic support (water etc)
  - Faster force degradation
- Collectively these aspects will tailor operations in the following way:
  - Greater dependency upon night for WF
  - A requirement for shorter endurance operations
  - Longer pauses between phases for regeneration/recovery or more forces
  - Operations in NBC conditions, forcing the requirement for personnel to wear IPE, will make WF extremely difficult from May – Oct.
- **All components will be able to continue operations throughout 365 days but with increasing risk (against endurance and tempo) as the temperature climbs monthly and daily. WF from Jul & Aug will be at Extremely High Risk, Jun & Sep at Very High Risk and May & Oct at High Risk. It is feasible that, at some point, this risk may become unacceptable.**

**Equipment.**

- **UOR** . COS are being briefed separately on UOR progress.
- **NBC**
- **Threat:** CBRN agents can be delivered in 4 ways:
  - Through deliberate use of CBRN weapons by Iraq against coalition.
  - Through covert, or ambiguous use of CBRN substances by Iraq, or sympathetic groups.
  - As a product of collateral damage caused by Allied attacks on CBRN and related facilities.

6 Nov 02



- As an toxic environmental hazard resulting from deliberate release of industrial or other substances; or the mismanagement of facilities.
- **Risks:** Initial assessment of CBRN Risk<sup>9</sup> being undertaken. Following risks are identified:
  - There is a slight risk that Iraqi capability could go beyond the 'known' threat agents in JIC-based CBRN threat assessments. Principal concerns are ✓ Mitigation strategies are being developed.
  - That the capability for asymmetric delivery, by Iraq unattributably, by proxies (such as Kurdish or Sh'ite displaced persons) or by sympathisers is assessed as limited, although it could be an attractive option.
  - The greatest CBRN risk to the **success of the operation** is in the early stages of the operation - centered on attacking coalition and host nation resolve, vulnerabilities at obvious key staging areas and choke points, although JIC assesses that early use is unlikely since it would only build support for US led action
  - The greatest **risk of UK casualties** lies in the closing stages of the operation in Iraq, when troops are most likely to encounter a wide range of threats from BW, CW and, toxic industrial materiel. [SGD should comment on whether UK deployed and home-base medical structures could cope].
  - That the psychological impact (reaching up to higher pol/mil levels) from real CBRN events or even false alarms might exceed military impact.
  - Use of CBRN, or suspected use that turns out to be a false alarm, will adversely affect operational tempo.
  - Attrition of Iraq's CBRN **delivery systems and command & control** will be beneficial, but difficult; however attrition of complete CBRN weapons should be avoided due to the risk of causing unintended releases.
  - Fighting in an urban environment would afford Iraq with the best opportunity to employ its CW capability.
  - There is a risk that the UK might continue to sustain casualties once hostilities cease due to residual CBRN contamination and that our

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<sup>9</sup> D/DJW/402/13 and D/CBW Pol/12/6 dated Oct 02.

6 Nov 02

immediate operational capability for any follow-on mission could be at risk for a period, due to delays in expatriation of CBRN contaminated material.

- **Risk Mitigation:** The CBRN risk mitigation is focused in 5 areas:
  - Mitigating risk taken on the strategic intelligence assessments by making limited provision for non-core CBRN threats and for novel delivery, including back to the home base.
  - A high tempo operational campaign and early attrition of CBRN bulk delivery systems
  - Wide area force protection capability improvements (based on UORs), in particular of the ground component operating in a toxic environment.
  - Comprehensive training, education, and technical/science support mainly at the higher operational and strategic pol/mil levels, in conjunction with OGDs and our main ally, to prepare ourselves for CBRN events whether real or false alarms.
  - A current medical estimate that makes a notional 100-bed Field Hospital available as a UK capability for BW casualties. Burden sharing with the US is being staffed.
- **Defence Concept:** Employ all 4 pillars of defence NBC policy, comprehensive force protection from frontline to rear, cater for all hazards from classic threat agents to environmental hazards, which may merge, including post-conflict. Enhance CBRN Recce/Survey with specialist NBC/EH teams with 'duty of care' a priority.
- **BW.**
- **Limited coverage from BW detectors** will require tight prioritisation and management during all phases.
- Picture improving on medical countermeasures, with stocks of anthrax and smallpox vaccines for Large Scale now available. A period of weeks is required for full protection against Anthrax, although reasonable protection is afforded after a period of weeks; would aim to include units in the programme as soon as they are identified. Voluntary programme unlikely to achieve 100% uptake but likely to rise from current levels (78% among Army, 46% overall). Stocks of antibiotics unlikely to be a problem. **Stocks of very limited. For Ricin and Aflatoxin currently there is no medical counter measure.**
- Overarching policy for the evacuation of contagious and BW casualties has been developed but detailed concept and doctrine is not mature.

6 Nov 02



Current management procedures follow principles for naturally occurring communicable diseases with **recovery of personnel to NHS care in UK** once diagnosed, with appropriate isolation.

- **CW**

- Sufficient Combopen are in stock but will require shelf life extension as batches go out of date end of Sep 02
- COLPRO. Current assessment indicates that there should be sufficient COLPRO for 2 Field Hospitals but training and awareness on use are low. Other COLPRO has been withdrawn from issue and use.

- **Medical.**

- Package 1. Support can be achieved within current resources
- Package 2. Specialist reserve manpower will be required to man Role 2 & 3 facilities, and equipment to bring deployed hospitals up to modern scales (90 day is current estimate for procurement). SF medical requirement is likely to be significant and impact on demand for reserve manning.
- Package 3. Minimum requirement will be 4 Role 3 Hospitals (1.5 Regular manning, 2.5 Reserve manned). New equipment will be required to bring hospitals up to modern scales (90 day is current estimate for procurement). Additional hospitals will be needed if force is required to manoeuvre.
- Consideration will have to be given to the NBC and other risks posed to UK personnel and their dependants (MoD, FCO and EPs) in Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan, Israel and Cyprus. Contingency planning for MoD and FCO personnel is being scrutinised by joint MoD/FCO team.

- **Reserves**

- Land with largest requirement for reservists is looking for ways of pro-actively managing reservist risk. Planning assumption timelines in a number of cases can be reduced as individuals or units are at higher state of training than baseline assumed in assumptions.
- Key risk is number of reservists likely to appeal against call-up and consequent delays in forming units/ training key personnel. Planning assumes in some cases 50% excess in call up to cover potential "no shows". Risk can be mitigated as soon as covert restrictions are lifted and individuals/ units can report likely intentions

6 Nov 02



- Reserve call up is part of strategic Force on Mind campaign
- **OGD Demand for Military Support**
  - Work is ongoing to assess MoD requirements for home based force generation, preparation, deployment and protection requirements
    - 5,500 personnel were stood by for logistic support tasks, key point guarding (military and civil), guarding of internment camps, and medical support during Op GRANBY.
    - Changes in MoD/ OGD structures and practice since GRANBY imply a significant (downwards) change in both required outputs and numbers is likely.
- Once MoD baseline requirement is established OGD requests for potential MACA tasks will be processed as required.

**Aftermath**

- The nature of a campaign will dictate the CBRN hazards at the cessation of hostilities. In addition to the presence of residual agents, it is likely that personnel remaining in theatre could be at risk from Toxic Industrial Chemicals (TIC) and will need ongoing protection. Prior Iraqi use of CB weapons could mean significant work to be done to make the environment safe for the indigenous population and to decontaminate equipment. Long term impact on the regeneration of operational CBRN capability.

6 Nov 02

BOX 10

US PLANNING

CURRENT CENTCOM CONCEPT AND PLAN

GENERAL CONCEPT

- Plan seeks to overwhelm the Iraqi regime through a co-ordinated multiplicity of threats applied across a number of lines of operation.
- Offensive ops based (originally) upon two distinct options: 'Generated Start' and 'Running Start.' Both are preceded by shaping operations. Since the briefing to the JCS and POTUS in early Aug, an third option has been developed: the Hybrid, which is now referred to as "the plan."
- Each option uses the same forces, but start combat operations at different force levels based upon the timing of a possible trigger and willingness to accept risk.
- **Seven lines of military activity: operational fires, operational manoeuvre, SF ops, unconventional warfare/support to other governments, influence ops, humanitarian assistance, and pol-mil engagement.**
- The final phase is post-conflict operations and has been planned in detail at the military level (CENTCOM), and has been turned over to the interagency process in Washington for the integration of other governmental agencies and non-governmental agencies (NGOs).
- CENTCOM has forwarded through the Joint Staff a list of the countries from whom they require beddown and overflight permissions. Kuwait, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Egypt have been deemed essential or critical to the overall deployment of forces. No formal requests have been made to any of these countries at this point.

SHAPING OPERATIONS

- At the operational level, shaping operations involve information operations, by coalition forces, SOF and agencies, and a series of activities designated as spikes by the US.
- These spikes are intended to progressively increase the level and tempo of military activity over time, increasing pressure on the regime, creating confusion as to intent, and provoking preparatory movements or responses and the consumption of resources.
- In extremis, their response may be such as to constitute a *casus belli*, triggering US offensive operations. It is assessed that these operations


6 Nov 02



have already begun, manifested through enhanced MIOPS and re-establishment of the Southern NFZ and, to that extent, we are already implicated in their conduct.



GENERATED START. (Still on the books but the Hybrid plan is now being developed in great detail and RUNNING START will remain as the option up to such time as the Hybrid plan is fully developed.)






- This option begins with the majority of combat forces in place, assessed as being not before 1 Jan 02.
- Sequential build up followed by simultaneous execution of activities across the seven lines of activity.
- Begins with the overt preparation and posturing of forces and support.
- Initial combat operations are initiated with a 72 hour air campaign. It is envisaged that this will assist in the achievement of tactical surprise.
- Ground forces attack along a two corps front to secure key facilities such as the southern oilfields, and potential APODS and SPODS. Concurrently, the regime will be isolated through operational fires and influence ops.
- Once the force flow is complete, the final phase of offensive operations towards Baghdad and Tikrit to complete the destruction of the regime will occur.

#### RUNNING START.

- May begin with a 'casus belli' or significant Iraqi provocation; alternatively, may be initiated unilaterally by US. First option for launch in early Nov 02, but further options available as forces build up.



6 Nov 02




- Sequential execution; combat operations initiated with a series of air operations building in duration and utilizing only in-theatre forces at first, building to include US based bombers and fighters as assets become available.
- Ground operations commence with a much smaller ground force than the Generated option to secure limited initial objectives and this may generate strategic surprise.
- Given that ground forces arrive at different intervals, the seizure of objectives is more gradual than in the Generated option. Although the ground manoeuvre plan for the options is similar, the greater degree of risk assumed in the Running Start makes it more dynamic in execution.
- Ex INTERNAL LOOK, a CENTCOM CPX to be held in theatre in Dec 02, will be important for practising the command complexities of the Running Start option. This ex will now serve as a mission rehearsal, probably for the Hybrid plan) PJHQ continue to plan to participate in this exercise and an appropriate training package has been developed. Ministerial approval to participate in the exercise has been granted. A PJHQ "Warrior Train-up" period has already begun. Joint training for the roughly 261 augmentees required for the Ex commenced on 28 Oct. The JFHQ has initiated the train-up of the Stand-by Joint Force HQs (19 Mech Bde) whilst they are deployed.
- **HYBRID PLAN**
- The Hybrid plan was briefed in outline to POTUS at the beginning of August. It represents an amalgam of GENERATED and RUNNING START and once the plan is fully developed it will become the US preferred option. The Hybrid plan continues to be refined and will be briefed to the Sec Def on 31 Oct. Until the completion of key 'preparatory actions', Running Start remains the more likely plan that will be activated if required either by US political decision making, or provocation by Saddam Hussein.
- The Hybrid plan includes sequential ground attack into Iraq from SE Turkey to coincide with the main effort attack of V Corps forces in the south – henceforth termed the Northern Option. This offensive will be built upon the 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Div of the US Army and may include UK Package 3 forces pending political decision. The exact C2 procedures and the likelihood of delivering a 3 star (Corps) Hqs for this force has yet to be determined and will likely be based upon what level of UK forces are employed in the north. A number of early enabling actions result in the ability of the US planners to reduce the preparation phase from Presidential decision to launch of the air campaign to 16 days.
- Funding in the order of \$1bn has been made available to enable a number of preparatory tasks to be carried out. These tasks are termed

6 Nov 02



"ambiguous" and could be attributed to OSW/ONW, exercise activity or general force improvement. These include upgrading ramps at potential APODs such as Ali al Salem, pre-positioning equipment and stores in Kuwait and Turkey, and the purchase of additional key infrastructure



equipments such as satellite antennas. The majority of these tasks have been completed and the remainder have commenced now that fiscal year 03 funding has been received. The anticipated completion date for the remaining tasks is Mar 03. EUCOM has been allocated \$150m for preparatory actions and the funds are likely to be used to build tented cities at potential APODs at Incirlik and Diyarbakir. Given delays attributed to the Turkish general elections and similar fiscal year 03 funding difficulties, EUCOM has made little headway in accomplishing their preparatory tasks.

- The division of planning responsibilities between CENTCOM and EUCOM is slowly being refined with CFLCC concentrating on the CONOPS for the northern option and EUCOM, as a supporting command, facilitating the deployment of forces. CFLCC's primary plan is for the deployment of 4th

6 Nov 02



Infantry Division to SE Turkey (CONPLAN COBRA) and 3 ACR is now fully committed to the south. This overall concept has been briefed to and approved by the President. EUCOM received a PLANORD (22 Aug) directing them to plan to deliver a divisional size force to SE Turkey, synchronised with the launch of ground operations in the south. Their Joint Planning Group, with 3 UK embedded staff, commenced the mission analysis process on 4 Sep 02. Detailed planning cannot proceed until the PDSS has occurred, which is remains an open requirement pending the outcome of the Turkish general elections.

- **However, there still has been no clearance given for EUCOM to co-ordinate essential tactical level activities with Turkish civil or military authorities.**

Once approval is granted, the UK has already been invited to participate and Ministerial agreement in principle has been given.

#### The Northern Option

- **US and UK planning for a Northern option have validated that a Div size force is required to achieve the effects required by CENTCOM and CFLCC.**
- PJHQ (OA) have wargamed the north and concluded that a Div force of two Bdes could accomplish all the tasks up to the interdiction of the LoC between Tikrit and Baghdad, but would be incapable of participating in operations around Baghdad given its current force structure. **Feedback from the second CENTCOM TPFDD conference indicated that EUCOM is much further behind in detailed planning in the North than in the south. The third TPFDD will convene at Scott AFB on 04 Nov 02 to take this work forward.** EUCOM remains confident of their ability to deliver the LoC from the SPOD to Iraqi border
- Planning has acknowledged UK shortfalls in several areas such as HETs, fuel and water bowsers and other support requirements. As yet no assets have been allocated to meet these shortfalls.
- However detailed **EUCOM planning is still constrained by their inability to** and conduct detailed reconnaissance. Likewise, once the force package for the North is confirmed, EUCOM will be required to determine their degree of support to the Div and CENTCOM CFLCC as they advance South.
- C2 structure for the North is leaning toward the establishment of a 2\* JTF HQ under the command of the EUCOM J4, Maj Gen Rasmussen for LoC support and the 2\* ODC (Office of Defence Cooperation) in Ankara as the "anchor" for pol-mil engagement with the Turkish government. This COA

6 Nov 02

also takes account of a 3\* from EUCOM (likely to be the COS, LtGen Sylvester) who will deploy forward, when required.

- **Planning for Ex INTERNAL LOOK will focus on three vignettes:**
- **Vignette #1 - G day (Initiation of the Ground Campaign)**
- **Vignette #2 - G +124 (The Transition to Post-hostilities)**
- **Vignette #3 - Review of procedures for "Fortress Baghdad" scenario.**

8 Nov 02



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BOX 11

UK Commentary on US Planning

INTRODUCTION

This assessment continues to be based on the military viability and suitability of the US plan (as it is currently constructed) to deliver the UK End State. The key **military** question to be addressed is:

**“ Is the UK military contribution part of a winning strategic concept and plan?”**

We need to develop our military judgement against the following:

Yes – with conditions

No – with reasons

CURRENT ASSESSMENT

Current update on the key factors is as follows:

**Yes. Provided the following conditions are met:**

Strategic

- Need to conclude UNSCR in order to bring UK public and international diplomatic opinion behind need for action.
- Inform
  - Continued refinement of assessments of Iraqi intent.
  - Accurate assessments of likely success in delivering key states for the coalition (especially Turkey)
- Command
  - Appropriate UK representation in C2 structures (COS JFHQ has had detailed discussions with CENTCOM and has received agreement in principle on a proposed structure. He will take forward UK C2 planning in line with developing work for Ex INTERNAL LOOK.)
  - US/UK inter-agency processes are co-ordinated to deliver multiple lines of operation
- Prepare

6 Nov 02

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- UK force package preparations can become overt in sufficient time to permit deployment at acceptable risk
- Forward recces and negotiations are permitted to go forward in time.
- Project
  - UK can utilise US SPOD and APOD facilities, and US will be prepared to do heavy lifting on HNS requirements ( EUCOM have been tasked, as a supporting command, to deliver a divisional sized force from APOD/SPOD to concentration areas in SE Turkey. This offer, and its implications, is being explored by J4 staff.
- Protect
  - Adequate intelligence on operational and tactical level CBW threat is available
  - Security of UK home base and overseas bases is adequate
  - APOD/ SPOD security is adequately addressed
- Operate
  - Plan to fix Iraqi forces in North is developed (being taken forward by CFLCC)
  - US agrees to share key capabilities in UK areas of high risk such as BW detection and countermeasures, medical services, water and fuel provision ( offer to help has been made by CinCCENTCOM to CJO)
  - Iran and Syria are successfully constrained
  - US combat power mitigates UK military risks
  - Contingency plans developed to meet asymmetric threats to coalition and regional states, especially Israel
- Sustain
  - Operational level clarification of sustainability concept is obtained.
- Recover
  - UK post conflict tasks will be limited in scope and time

6 Nov 02

48 of 56



**No. The UK should not offer to participate in the US CENTCOM Plan for Iraq for the following reasons:**

- Strategic
  - Discontinuity between UK and US End States opens up potential for strategic differences of approach and violate first principle of war.
- Inform
  - We do not share US's optimistic assessment of Iraqi regime's inherent weakness and liability to fracture
  - We lack intelligence on:
    - Iraqi regime thinking, intentions, and modus operandi
    - Morale and likely reactions of Iraqi people, including armed forces and security apparatus
    - Operational level intelligence on WMD renders risk to troops of CBW attack too great
- Project
  - Overflight and basing rights are not secured
  - Turkey is an uncertain partner and cannot be guaranteed to deliver necessary support, in sufficient time.
- Protect
  - Risks of fighting in contaminated CBW environment
  - Insufficient protection for SPOD/APOD; loss of either would be critical to operation
  - Ability to defend Israel and guarantee Israeli non-intervention
- Operate
  - US military planning does not yet address issues of what we perceive to be Saddam's most dangerous Course of Action which could consist of one or all of the following:
    - Early, or subsequent, use of WMD against Israel, and consequent danger of Israeli nuclear or conventional response

6 Nov 02

- Asymmetric attacks on SPOD and APOD, including release of CBW agents
- Use of conscript forces to deliberately inflate casualties
- Fall back on "Fortress Baghdad"
- Attack Kurds in north and cause mass migration into SE Turkey
- Is northern option fundamental? To us, strategically, yes but to CENTCOM, operationally, no.
- Sustain
  - UK logistic requirements cannot be satisfied from own resources and how shortfalls to be made up is as yet unclear (though promises of US support have been made).
  - Insufficient access to SPOD and APOD to meet UK logistic needs.
  - UK Sea, Air and Land forces may be split exacerbating logistic support difficulties
- Recover
  - With no clear post conflict strategy UK military commitment is likely to become open ended

6 Nov 02

50 of 56



BOX 12

UN ROUTE

Negotiations are ongoing at the UN about the detail of, and procedure for, the return of weapons inspectors to Iraq. The timelines that emerge will have a potentially significant impact on military planning, due mainly to the difficulties in conducting operations beyond March 2003. On the assumption that a new SCR is achieved by early Nov at the very latest, Blix believes that inspectors will be allowed in on 15 Nov. He sets out the following timelines:

- 2 months to prepare before inspections start Mid Jan 03
- 2 months to work and then submit baseline report to UN Mid Mar 03
- 120 days to assess compliance and submit a final report on compliance Mid Jul 03

This timetable must be assumed as the best case.

If these timelines run their course, and **if Saddam co-operates fully** throughout, then this could delay operations until winter 03/04. This is very probably Saddam's intention as he sees this as likely to:

- Create divisions between US/UK and the international community.
- Give Iraq scope to procrastinate prior to and following the entry of inspectors.
- Lead to the weakening of internal opposition and bolster regime morale.
- Allow Iraq to work on exploiting Palestine and other issues.

UK/US will pressure the UN Security Council to pass clearly defined and early resolutions to allow the inspection programme to begin as soon as possible. Within that programme, the UN should be seeking early indications of Iraqi compliance, perhaps by seizing the initiative and testing the most difficult and controversial areas first.

Issues that will need to be resolved are:

- Will Blix criteria satisfy US if their intelligence sources indicate to the contrary?
- 

6 Nov 02

- What level of consent/ compliance will Saddam demonstrate:
- High consent – no restrictions full and open exchange; no attempt to move or hide material, or other evidence
- Patchy consent – either through bureaucratic inefficiency, individual hostility towards foreign intrusion; or pre-determined malice inspectors may encounter local difficulties. What level of failing will amount to a *causus belli*.
- Low consent – Iraqi regime admit inspectors and adopt a posture of obstruction and delay.

#### KEY DEDUCTIONS

- The UN route may not be compatible with the US endstate which focuses primarily on regime change, but compatible with that of the UK which focuses more on the elimination of Iraqi WMD; this is a potential fault line in the UK/US relationship, which Saddam may try to exploit.
- In parallel to the UN route, the US is likely to continue action unilaterally, either on current timelines or to accept some small delay. The UK would have the choice of following the US or the UN route.
- The need to continue planning a preparation for military action remains extant

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