


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UK MILITARY STRATEGIC THINKING ON IRAQ

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LEGEND

|   | Box          |
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BOX 1  
ENDSTATE

UK

A stable and law abiding Iraq, within present borders, co-operating with the IC, no longer posing a threat to its neighbours or to international security, and abiding by its international obligations on WMD.

US

Saddam's regime leadership and supporting power base destroyed; WMD capability and infrastructure eliminated; Iraq's territorial integrity intact with sufficient force to defend itself and no ability to threaten its neighbours; and an acceptable provisional/permanent government in place.

KEY POINT

The Endstate cannot be achieved while the current Iraqi regime remains in power. Consequently, regime change is a necessary step and there is no point in pursuing any strategy that does not achieve this. [see Box 2]

MILITARY/STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

- Force Size. US military planning is based on a commitment to change the current regime by force. They are aware of the dangers of failure and, so are planning for worst case, and are prepared to commit the required forces.
- Tempo. US planning includes the ability to escalate rapidly to reflect changes on the ground. This requires strategic agility. UK is currently not well balanced in this regard, as only limited forces are pre-deployed, and no equipment is pre-deployed or made ready for operations in the Gulf environment. [see Box 9]
- Post Conflict. Need to acknowledge that there will be an extended post conflict phase with an associated commitment, manpower and finance bill. Depending on how the regime change is achieved, and the form of the replacement, there is a spectrum of commitment where the worst case is a long period with a large bill. This is a weakness of current US planning which stops at the "day after".
- Intelligence. A much more detailed level of intelligence is required, on WMD, the composition and methods of the current Iraqi regime, and where the fracture lines within the regime exist. This has implications for the tasking of collection assets and the timing of any action.
- WMD. If regime survival were at stake, Saddam would almost certainly use WMD, so there would be no deterrent equation as in 1991. Early

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neutralisation and, if that fails, preparedness to fight in an NBC environment, is required [see Box 9].

- Time. Time is critical – both as to the 'windows of opportunity' (balancing US/Allied domestic issues) and in terms of duration. Gaining support from Iraq's neighbours will require a period of preparation. Retaining public support at home and maintaining regional support will require action that achieves a rapid effect with minimum damage to non-military areas. This will constrain military options.
- Legal. Any overriding legal considerations need to be addressed early as a precursor to campaign design.

**Key Judgements.**

- Regime change is a necessary step to achieve the endstate.
- If UK military force is to be deployed alongside US forces there is a need to match US planning aspirations in terms of tempo and utility.
- Establishing and maintaining support from the International Community, and regional support from neighbours, will be the Coalition CoG.
- Consideration needs to be given to the UK commitment to the 'Post Conflict' phase.

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BOX 2  
REGIME CHANGE OPTIONS

CURRENT SITUATION

1. The Kurds (who are mainly Sunni) are 20% of the population, Shia make up 60% and the Sunni Arabs less than 15% of the population, yet the Sunni Arabs dominate the State institutions, security organisations and the Officer Corps. Consequently modern Iraq is potentially unstable, and is currently held together by the strong security apparatus of the Ba'ath Party. It will require considerable effort to break the structure supporting Saddam's regime: the current regime has survived for 25 years encompassing 2 catastrophic wars (vs Iran (78-88) and Gulf War '91), and at least 3 major internal insurrections. However, once the regime's security apparatus is broken, the Regime will shatter due to its minority appeal.
2. Critical Institutions of Power.
  - Saddam himself. US assess Saddam to be the CoG. He is focus of the State and completely closed to normal diplomatic persuasion. Although inherently unpredictable, he remains more predictable whilst he is unsure of the precise intentions of the Coalition.
  - Special Security Organisation (SSO). Around 2,000 strong, this at the top of the tree, headed by Qusai, Saddam's second son. It controls the rest.
  - SRG. Around 8,000 strong, based in Baghdad. Best equipped - T72, BMP 1/2, 2S3. Responsible for WMD concealment.
  - RGFC. 75,000 men, the principal warfighting organisation. Leads on Internal Security, defence of the regime and would lead offensive action. Regular Army. 400,000 men. There has been no additions or improvement to weapon systems since 1991.
3. Opposition Groups.
  - Sunni. Not organised.
  - Kurds. KDP and PUK not united. Militarily weak.  
2/3 of Iraqi army stands on border. Turkish sensitivity.
  - Shia. Clan groups with little co-ordination and unable to mobilise any support in the Sunni heartland. The Iranian backed groups (SCIRI, Badr Corps and Dawa Party) are more capable, but depend upon Iranian support.
  - INC. ineffectual.

There is little evidence of co-operation between the opposition groups. The Shias, Kurds and INC gave their best effort in the insurgency of 1991 and 1994/95 and were slaughtered. Kurds and Shias will require significant inducements to rise, especially if political hopes/aspirations seem unlikely to be fulfilled. They will also need to be confident that the US is resolute and that the US force posture is credible.

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4. ENDS.

Chosen ends have a significant bearing on post conflict tasks and requirements. US planning has yet to focus on either of these aspects and there is considerable disagreement on how these can be achieved [see Box 5]

REMOVAL

- Saddam and key advisers (including sons)
- Saddam and his wider security and governing regime
- The entire Ba'thist regime

REPLACEMENT POSSIBILITIES

- Sunni strongman
- International Presence coupled with a bridging process leading eventually to a broad based coalition
- Federated state, following extended international presence and reshaping of political scene.

WAYS

- Saddam Hussein's prime focus is on regime survival or popular change will not be allowed to deliver any of the ends sought
- Regime removal or replacement can therefore only be delivered by:
  - An internal coup – highly unlikely unless the regime is mortally wounded
  - A popular insurrection backed by external forces
  - External force that enables popular change

MEANS

To deliver change, a number of graduated military tasks fall out as enablers to any of the above methods of change:

- Undermine regime/induce climate of collapse/foster internal dissent.
- Encourage Kurdish/Shia insurgency (money/protection/training/equipment/planning).
- Coerce/persuade potentially dissident Sunni officers to plot against Saddam.
- 
- Selected surgical targeting of regime infrastructure, based on currently unavailable accurate intelligence.
- Wider air campaign to destroy regime cohesion and military capability.
- Ground forces to destroy Saddam and his regime (US aim) and control/influence the outcomes.

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- Support to new regime, supported (and ideally led) by neighbouring countries.

**Key Judgements**

- Removal and replacement options cannot be directly correlated.
- No obvious replacement regime. At the very least, we must be clear on what we do not want.
- It will be difficult to apply force with sufficient precision to ensure a predetermined outcome. So, need reserves and ground forces with the agility to respond to developing events.
- Further evidence that there is a need for clarity on what the regime should be.

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BOX 3

THE WMD DIMENSIONINTRODUCTION

- Although Iraq's nuclear capability (essentially a 'dirty' bomb) cannot be dismissed, the main threat, at the moment, is from CB weapons.
- Coalition will need to justify the need for action now – the position of UNMOVIC and the inspection regime complicates this, with potential for Saddam to continue to prevaricate.

END

The end required is that there is no longer a threat to the region or the wider World from Iraqi WMD; US planning dictates the elimination of all WMD in Iraq

WAYS

- Change regime to one that renounces WMD – this does not fit with US planning, and therefore we are left with a single option:
- Neutralise WMD capability and remove will to regenerate the capability, through a regime change

MEANS

- Pre-Conflict. (operational risk reduction)
  - Need to task intelligence collection means to provide greater detail on level and location of WMD facilities, command and control means and means of delivery **for tactical purposes**. However, we must accept that it is likely that our visibility of WMD may even deteriorate as Saddam prepares for this conflict.
  - Pursue unfettered UNMOVIC inspection regime, wresting initiative from Saddam.
- Conflict. (operational risk reduction)
  - Maximum effort to destroy WMD and/or reduce the effect of WMD weapons use.
  - Provide protection and be prepared to fight in CB environment [see Box 9].
- Post Conflict. (delivery of objectives)
  - Secure any remaining threat; audit Iraqi capability for public verification.
  - In slower time, destroy weapons and scientific infrastructure.
  - Monitor successor regime to ensure no resurgence.

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**Key Judgement**

- We need much better granularity of intelligence.
- A satisfactory outcome to the issue of WMD is essential.
- Replacement Regime must renounce WMD to prevent destruction of facilities with continuing verification

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


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BOX 4

**REGIONAL DIMENSION - MILITARY/STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS**

(Critical early actions in bold)

**INTRODUCTION**

- Diagram above shows those countries/ peoples that are integral to any planned action against Iraq
- Their position indicates their net effect on any military campaign, those closest to the centre have the greatest direct effect, and are on the critical path to military success
- The chart overleaf sets out an assessment of the key country conditions that impinge upon a coalition operation against Iraq. It analyses the main risks against both windows and points to ways in which these may be mitigated.

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COUNTRY CONDITIONS AND RISKS CHART

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PRIORITY ONE COUNTRIES

- Kuwait. Kuwait is a critical ally for basing purposes. The Coalition must be prepared to provide:
  - **Support to sustain regime.**
- Saudi Arabia and Gulf Instability. The support of other Arab states in the Gulf region is, at best, fragile. Of particular concern is the  
So, we will need to plan to:
  - Support Saudi Arabian regime.
  - **Base elsewhere**. US planning is focusing on extensive use of maritime air power, and use of Saudi airspace, but is not assuming unrestricted use of Saudi airbases. However, larger UK air packages are likely to require Saudi bases, and Saudi basing decisions will restrict UK options and alternatives will need to be found.
  - **Protect critical coalition infrastructure - including energy resources.**
  - Conduct NEOs.
- Turkey/Kurds. Support from Kurdish opposition groups will be a key factor in overthrowing Saddam. At the same time, Turkey, a critical ally in the Coalition and credible jumping off point, is adamantly opposed to further Kurdish autonomy. This will call for a delicate political balance that will require the following military support:
  - **Credible political carrots to ensure Turkish support need identifying.**
  - **Enhanced military aid to Turkey.**
  - **Establishment of effective military links to Kurdish guerrilla groups.**
- Israel. Saddam may choose to provoke Israel into military action in order to garner Arab support against the Coalition. The Coalition needs to be prepared to:
  - **Enhance the Israeli defensive (particularly air) shield.**
  - Pre-empt Israeli reactions by early committal of other coalition forces.
  - Be prepared to use ground forces to dominate western region of Iraq to prevent WMD capable missile systems being deployed to areas in range of Israel. UAVs will greatly assist in this task.

PRIORITY TWO COUNTRIES

[Common issue will be MEPP]

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- Iran. May take the opportunity to disrupt Coalition SLOCs and/or seize land in the border region. So, we need to be prepared to:
  - **Protect SLOCs.**
  - Deter land seizure by political action.
- Jordan. Jordan is a particularly key in providing a buffer between Israel and more militant Arab states, so we need to plan to:
  - Provide support to the Hashemite regime.
  - Ensure provision of oil to Jordan, if the Iraqi flow is halted.
  - Not prejudice stability of country by our actions
- Syria. We will need to prevent Syria drifting into covert active support for Saddam
  - Remain engaged with Syria to ensure overflight access for Med based assets is not denied
  - Prevent Saddam using Syria
- Afghanistan. It is unlikely that the Coalition (even the USA) could sustain use of key enabling capabilities (C4/ ISR/ SF) in Afghanistan at the same time as taking action against Iraq. This raises wider (than Afghanistan) problems of concurrency, especially for UK. So we will need to
  - **Examine force levels and possibly reduce elsewhere.**
  - **Consider taking on Afghanistan as UK ME to free up US resources**

**Key Judgement**

**Minimise footprint and duration of operation, commensurate with assets to manage unintended consequences.**

- **Progress on MEPP**
- **Confirm UK operational priorities**

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## BOX 5

POST CONFLICT TASKS

- This will depend on how regime change actually occurs, and what shape campaign takes to bring about the change. However, key differences between Iraq and recent experience in Afghanistan and Balkans are:
  - Iraq is naturally wealthy with significant oil reserves and potential revenue, therefore reconstruction should be self sufficient, with cash from OFF escrow account providing significant pump priming as compared to Afghanistan or Balkans. Iraq has a sound agricultural base ("fertile crescent")
  - Educated and able technical, industrial, and managerial population exists
  - Although ethnic suppression has occurred there is limited regional inter-ethnic mixing as compared to Afghanistan and Balkans
  - International intervention is not in tandem with ongoing, and in the case of Afghanistan prolonged, civil war.
  - Iraq is a balance to the regime power (Iran) and either needs to retain significant military capability or international guarantees.
- Current US planning has not considered the wider issues related to post conflict tasks and is a key weakness in the forward strategy
- Russia is likely to be suspicious of western motives with respect to oil resources and will need diplomatic efforts to allay fears.
- Iran - next candidate of axis of evil?

Likely Military Tasks

- Immediate (0 - 6 months)
  - Provide external and internal security, law and order to prevent any potential for inter-ethnic violence, or opportunity for organised crime
  - Detention and processing of key regime figures (Nuremberg model?)
  - Confine and disarm elements of armed forces likely to rebel (Special Republican Guard, Republican Guard)
  - Confine and monitor remaining elements of Iraqi Armed Forces
  - Secure and account for WMD capability (materiel and intellectual)
  - Enable humanitarian relief
  - Assist in restoration of key infra-structure elements
  - Secure oilfields and oil distribution/ refining infrastructure
  - Negotiate and secure alternative lines of communication (LoC) through Syria/ Turkey/ Jordan
- Scope of tasks likely to demand large numbers of ground troops, comprehensive C2 and air mobility (circa 200,000+)

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- Medium Term (6 months – 2+ years)
  - Continue to provide both external and internal security, law and order to prevent any potential for inter-ethnic violence, or opportunity for organised crime, but commence transfer of requirement to new Iraqi security structures
  - Detention and processing of key regime figures
  - Develop SSR model, with DDR aimed at reducing size and scope of internal security forces
  - Support SSR with training and equipment
  - Begin transfer security of oilfields and production facilities to Iraqi Forces
  - Provide international security guarantees
- Scope of tasks likely to continue to demand large scale forces
- Long Term (2 –10 years)
  - Support SSR through training and presence on ground to effect gradual resumption of full responsibility for internal and external security by new regime.
  - Detention of key regime figures
  - Exercises to underpin international security guarantees.

**Key Judgement**

- In the worst case, we need to be prepared for a substantial long-term commitment.
- US planning on post conflict is currently weak and needs much greater definition
- Need regional buy-in to prevent enduring commitment.

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BOX 6  
**IRAQI REGIME COURSES OF ACTION**  
**(The 'What ifs')**

Assumption. Iraq will be on her own, with no state coalition partners (but will have support of the *Arab Street* and possibly 'volunteers' from elsewhere).

*[We will need to consider the implications should this assumption be flawed]*

### **SADDAM'S STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES**

Saddam's overall strategic objective is to remain in power – (regime survival = personal survival).

### **SADDAM'S OPTIONS**

#### **Prior to Operation**

During this period Saddam remains unsure of the Coalition's intentions and consequently avoids handing us a *causus belli*. Therefore he is unlikely to take any significant military action. However, he will try to **prevent the Coalition deploying** as once they have his demise is almost certain. Possible actions include:

- Accelerate WMD development and weaponisation.
- NFZ actions to 'wrong foot' the Coalition.
- Admit inspectors, then obstruct/expel them – hostage risk.
- Stop oil production.
- Handover power (whilst actually retaining it in a 'behind the scenes' role).

#### **Phase 1 (Position and Posture the Force)**

Saddam is convinced that the Coalition is determined to overthrow his regime. His reaction will be unpredictable, ranging from benign/conciliatory, in the hope influencing international public opinion to undermine Coalition action, to military aggression at the other end of the scale. Possible actions include:

| ACTION  | RISK              | ANTIDOTE  |
|---|-------------------|---|
| Pre-emptive attack (maybe on Israel or a spoiling operation on potential APODs and SPODs) – possibly WMD. | [to be completed] | Deter and Protect<br>Prep diplomatic –<br>causus belli<br>(immediate) |
| Mining SPODs or approaches.   |                   | ISTAR protect and be<br>prep to clear                                 |
| Pre-emptive attack on Kuwait.   |                   | Deter and Protect<br>Prep diplomatic –<br>causus belli<br>(immediate) |

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| ACTION   | RISK | ANTIDOTE   |
|--|------|--|
| Asymmetric - Terrorism.  |      | Int and security – legislation                                 |
| Asymmetric - Hostages  |      | Minimise exposure IO and diplomatic, ISTAR, legal and military |
| Dispersal of Army and/or Air Force to 'neutral' Arab country.  |      | ISTAR - Diplomatic   |
| Reoccupy the KAZ   |      | ISTAR – deter – disrupt (air/                                  |
| If Saddam becomes convinced that coalition efforts are focused on the KAZ, he may choose to either mount a conventional pre-emptive attack to deter Kurdish support and grab hostages, or use unconventional covert means to subvert Kurds |      | ISTAR – deter – disrupt (air/ and protect                      |

## Phase 2 (Attack) and 3 (Regime Destruction)

This is the conflict phase. Saddam now goes into full regime (and personal) survival mode, with no holes barred. Possible actions include:

| ACTION  | RISK | ANTIDOTE   |
|---|------|--|
| IADS mobilisation.  |      | ISTAR and neutralise/destroy                                   |
| Conventional fixed defensive lines. Mobilise population; create 'nation in arms.'   |      | IO campaign  |
| Hold urban areas, forcing us to use siege/urban warfare.  |      | IO campaign and military action                                |
| Fall back on "fortress Baghdad" to provoke large scale casualties in order to deny coalition moral imperative and force a compromise solution |      | IO campaign and pol/mil action                                 |
| Asymmetric - Guerrilla warfare in open country.   |      | ISTAR, IO campaign and pol/mil action                          |
| Asymmetric - Human shields.   |      | Minimise exposure IO and diplomatic, ISTAR, legal and military |
| Asymmetric - Environmental actions as a weapon.   |      | IO Campaign, deter, legal, ISTAR, protect and disaster relief  |
| Asymmetric - WMD use.   |      | Intelligence, IO, deter, legal, security and protect           |

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**Most Difficult COA**

- If Saddam were to withdraw to and defend urban areas, this would significantly affect the Coalition action and cohesion. Such a move would mean a series of close battles, with large numbers of casualties on both sides (including Iraqi civilians) and collateral infrastructure damage. Coalition cohesion and public support would be very hard to maintain, as would support from the Region. The plan that the Coalition eventually adopts will need to minimize the possibility of Saddam going for this option, which supports the idea of a 'surprise' attack.
- Also very difficult would be if Saddam decided to 'take to the hills' with his immediate governing team and a significant protection force.

**Most Dangerous COA**

- A WMD attack on Israel would be the most dangerous COA for the Coalition to deal with. Any plan must include guarantees to Israel that her security will be guarded (:

**Key Judgement**

Saddam's best chance of avoiding regime change will be to prevent the deployment of coalition forces as once committed by presence, the US can only see the operation through to success and his demise will be inevitable. Therefore Saddam's best chance to fracture the will of the Coalition is early on, prior to deployment, so speed and agility are needed once the decision to act has been taken.

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BOX 7  
PRINCIPLESKEY STRATEGIC AND MILITARY PRINCIPLES WHICH AFFECT  
CAMPAIGN DESIGN.

- **Selection and Maintenance of the Aim.** It is vital for public support that the aim is clear and both publicly explainable and defensible.
- **Flexibility.** We need to maintain a choice of options. This is particularly vital as Saddam is so unpredictable
- **Surprise.** The aim is to achieve the correct balance between **maximising strategic certainty** in the minds of Saddam and other relevant players involved in the dynamic **with operational and tactical uncertainty.**

OTHER PRINCIPLES.

- **Deception.** Critical, to keep Saddam off balance.
- **Morale.** There are indications that the 'average Iraqi conscript' will not fight to the death for Saddam. We need to encourage this by IO and inducements.
- **Offensive Action.** Once committed, there can be no turning back until the regime is overthrown and WMD is under control.
- **Security.** This is particularly important for surrounding countries; especially Israel and those that will facilitate the Coalition build up.
- **Concentration of Force.** The Coalition will need to identify key areas and fault lines, so that force can be concentrated to shatter cohesion.
- **Co-operation.** Especially with regional allies.
- **Sustainability.** Post Conflict commitment. This needs to be planned and agreed before we embark on military action.

**Key Judgement**

- How to achieve any form of surprise while portraying the inevitability of Saddam's demise
- The need for enduring legitimacy

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BOX 8

**CREATE CONDITIONS****(Those highlighted are a particular priority)**Prime Ministers Crawford Conditions**At Crawford PM established 3 conditions for UK involvement**

- **Public opinion domestically and internationally must be prepared.**
- **Giving UNMOVIC a chance to succeed was important.**
- **MEPP – there needs to be discernible progress.**

Timing & Constraints

- Delivering PM's conditions for engagement
- Constraints on timing
  - time to complete overt coalition military preps
  - - 1 x Brigade in Kuwait
    - 1 x Brigade in Qatar
    - 1 x MEF (Division size) afloat in Diego Garcia
  - UK maintains no pre-positioned equipment or forces (except those deployed for Op RESINATE)
    - Minimum transit time to Gulf from UK is 3 weeks, once equipment is made ready
- Weather
  - Need to avoid combat in high summer, with optimal campaigning season Oct – Mar
- US political timetable
  - Nov 02 Congressional Mid-term elections
  - Nov 04 Congressional and Presidential Elections
- US planning indicates 2 possible windows:
  - Window 1: Oct 02 – Mar 03
  - Window 2: Oct 03 – Mar 04

However, we **should not exclude periods outside these**, especially if a *causus belli* emerges unexpectedly

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| Condition  | Key activities  | Achievable in Window 1 (Oct 02 - Mar 03) | Other Periods (to fol) | Achievable in Window 2 (Oct 03 - Mar 04) |
|--|---|--|------------------------|--|
| Prepare domestic and international public opinion      | Establish legal base  |  |                        |  |
|  | Develop and conduct IO campaign to undermine and isolate Iraqi regime internationally |  |                        |  |
|  | Identify international audiences and conduct IO campaign                              |  |                        |  |
| UN   | P5 consensus (especially Russia and China)  |  |                        |  |
|  | UNMOVIC inspections given chance to succeed   |  |                        |  |
|  | Persuade UN of need for use of force to impose will of International Community        |  |                        |  |
| Discernible progress in MEPP                           | US/ EU engagement in process  |  |                        |  |
|  | Relaxation of Israeli occupation of West Bank   |  |                        |  |
|  | International Conference on MEPP  |  |                        |  |
|  | View from Arab Street   |  |                        |  |
|  | View from Arab Leaders  |  |                        |  |
| Prepare UK forces for operations in Gulf and elsewhere | Large Scale Land (6-9 months)   |  |                        |  |
|  | Med Scale Land (3-6 months)   |  |                        |  |
|  | Med Scale Air (3-6 months)  |  |                        |  |
|  | Med Scale Maritime (3-6 months)   |  |                        |  |
|  | Key enablers only:<br>Bases: Cyprus/ DG<br>ISR<br>SF<br>AAR<br>Strat Lift             |  |                        |  |
| Promote uncertainty in Saddam's mind                   | Military deception: operational surges and spikes (eg exercises and deployments)      |  |                        |  |
|  | IO to destabilise/ turn supporters  |  |                        |  |

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**Key Judgement**

- Creating conditions in Window 1 will be at risk, and places emphasis on action and then management of consequences ("Strike then Shape"), Window 2 is more deliberate and allows shaping before action ("Shape then Strike")
- With large amounts of pre-positioned equipment and deployable maritime air, US is less constrained than UK in adopting Window 1 or Window 2.
- Importance of post conflict end state as base for IO campaign so key to creating conditions
- We must not exclude periods outside the 2 windows.

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BOX 9  
UK CAPABILITIES

Force capability requirements will be determined by COA and UK declared level of commitment, but contingency work suggests that UK contribution can be broadly summarised as:

- Package One – Enablers Only. This package would cover everything from planning teams, ISR support, lift, Diego Garcia, Cyprus issues and so on. It would stop short of capabilities operating into or over Iraq (Less Op RESINATE).
- Package Two – Enablers plus UK in a Supporting Role. This package could include selected Enablers plus UK Force Elements embedded in a supporting role within US tactical command structures, directly or indirectly engaged in operations against Iraq.
- Package Three – Enablers plus UK 'Distinct Role' either with or away from the US main effort. This package could include selected Enablers plus UK Force Elements with a distinctive higher profile role than Package Two on one of the principal Operational Lines within whatever US Op Plan develops. Such a package may also be appropriate for a UK deployment through Turkey.

**[Against these packages the following shaping factors will influence UK decision making: To be developed once PJHQ input received]**

| FACTOR                    | PACKAGE ONE | PACKAGE TWO | PACKAGE THREE | REMARKS |
|---------------------------|-------------|-------------|---------------|---------|
| US CONOPS                 |             |             |               |         |
| DESIRED CAPABILITY EFFECT |             |             |               |         |
| CONCURRENCY               |             |             |               |         |
| ENDURANCE                 |             |             |               |         |
| AVAILABILITY              |             |             |               |         |
| READINESS                 |             |             |               |         |
| SUSTAINABILITY            |             |             |               |         |
| FUNDING                   |             |             |               |         |
| OVERALL ASSESSMENT        |             |             |               |         |

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Other key factors are:

- Command.
  - Scale of command will depend on level of engagement, but at a minimum it is likely to need:
    - NCC/JFC co-located with CINCCENTCOM
    - Critical capabilities: Strategic comms (equipment, bandwidth and people)
- Inform.
  - Strategic intelligence demand will be high.
    - retasking of UK national strategic intelligence gathering assets (SIGA)
  - UK capabilities: PR9, Nimrod R, SF, HUMINT, maritime SIGINT platforms
- Prepare. Following are maximum likely UK contributions.
  - with **3 months** warning of offensive operations the UK could deploy a **Medium Scale** Joint Force to the Gulf (10 major warships including a carrier, an armoured Brigade, about 60 fast jets and associated support including transport aircraft). Cost of generating forces to the required level of readiness, including essential UORs, would be some **£500M - £800M**, with money allocated now. The land package would consist of a Brigade size force, however, generating the force and deploying it in this timescale implies significant risk. There will be a requirement to mobilise reserves for both Medical, Logistic and NBC support.
  - **6 months** preparation time would allow us to deploy a Large Scale land warfighting force (Div(-)[2 square armoured brigades, OSG, and a rear ops brigade]), combined with medium scale maritime and air forces comparable to those available for the 3-month option. Cost of generating forces to the required level of readiness, including essential UORs, would be some **£800M - £1.1Bn**. Although these forces can be generated they would deploy at risk at this scale of effort, as we are at the bare minimum time for preparation of vehicles and people.
  - with **9 months** warning the recommended force package would remain as for six months, but inherent risks would be significantly reduced; the large scale land force package in particular becomes more credible, capable and sustainable. Cost of generating the required level of readiness would be of the order of **£900M - £1.2Bn**.
- Reserve Forces
  - For Large Scale up to 8000 reserves (500 RN, 6000 Army, 1500 RAF) will be required with mobilisation commencing 5 months prior to operations starting.
  - At Medium Scale the reserve requirement is driven by the composition of the force. Specialist reserves, such as medical, NBC troops, and logistics, will be required, and other reserve forces would be required to backfill forces used to make ready the force.

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- Project. (UK)
  - 21 days is minimum for sea transit times from UK South Coast ports to Bahrain or other Gulf destinations (36 days if via Cape of Good Hope). To Turkey this would be 15 days and avoid the risk of transit through Suez. However it would also involve using an extended (1000km) land Loc through difficult country with a poor infrastructure.
  - Large Scale deployment using only UK military sealift and airlift resources would take approximately 500 days.
  - Using additional commercial charter timescale can be reduced to around 81 days.
  - Assume unimpeded movement through Suez, simplified 7 day Dipclear
  - Figures do not include a margin for sustainment, which would need to begin shortly after any force arrives in theatre, or recovery.
  - Air estimates are based on a marked reduction in current usage of AT for up to 3 months before any air deployment is started in order to enable recovery of the ATF in terms of aircraft maintenance and crew training following Op VERITAS activities.
  - UK bases in Cyprus and Diego Garcia are available
- Protect. Threat indicates additional requirements for force protection:
  - NBC
    - UK possesses sufficient stocks of IPE for Large Scale deployment UOR action (in 3 months or less) can address a number of shortfalls, but main shortfall is in BW:
      - Can support fixed locations for BW using current outfits, months lead time to manufacture additional equipment
      - Limited medical countermeasures to BW attack / (only), with adequate stocks to support Medium Scale deployments only
    - Decontamination of equipment is undertaken by Reserves, necessitating call out
  - GBAD (SRBM threat)
  - SLOC (including Suez)
- Sustain. (UK)
  - Sustainment beyond initial SDR assumptions have not been factored into calculations to date
  - Prolonged post conflict deployment will provide significant burden on defence resources
- Operate.
  - Force packages will be determined by COA [see Box 13/14]
- Key Risks
  - Following key risks to a UK deployment have been identified:
    - Preparation times for desertisation of vehicles

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- Industrial capacity to satisfy likely UOR/ preparation requirements is unknown, and will not be resolved until clearance has been given to engage industry
- BW medical countermeasures are restricted to Medium Scale force package
- Medical.
  - Army Medical Services cannot support a large scale deployment. We will require support from another nation to provide the required medical services at this level of commitment.
  - Medium Scale (Brigade) can be supported but at penalty to the NHS.
  - Establishing and sustaining political consensus

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
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MEANS

CONDITIONS



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
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WAYS

MEANS

CONDITIONS



1. Identify potentially dissident Army officers. Persuade them to lead move against Saddam -
2. Infiltrate Saddam's inner security circle to identify his location and movements.
3. Remove Saddam and his immediate team.
4. IO campaign to exploit regime weakness and fault lines.
5. Destroy key regime infrastructure by surgical air strikes and/or
6. Re-enforce NFZs.
7. Destroy IADS by surgical air strikes and/or
8. Conduct wider air campaign to weaken regime and neutralise Iraqi air force.
9. Conduct strategic coup de main seizure of key regime power centres.
10. Conduct conventional attack to neutralise Army.

1. Obtain detailed information on potentially dissident Sunni Army officers. Then, co-ordinated infiltration by
2. Identify the key security individuals
3. Track the location and movements of Saddam and his immediate team. Then, air strikes and to remove. Needs basing for aircraft and
4. Identify fault lines and weaknesses.
5. Intensive intelligence gathering effort to identify institutions and facilities that uphold the regime. Then, air strikes and to remove. Needs basing for aircraft and
6. Basing for aircraft. More aircraft to re-establish control, then enhanced tempo of regular patrolling.
7. Increased CSAR effort. Build international justification and support.
8. Intensive intelligence gathering effort to identify key IADS nodes. Air strikes and to destroy.
9. Needs basing for aircraft and
10. Intelligence to identify targets. Sufficient aircraft in theatre, including carrier based. Basing rights. Intelligence to identify targets. Air assault forces with support aircraft to permit landings deep into Iraq. Deception to maintain and shock effect. Resupply. Large reserve, immediately available. Basing rights.
11. Maintenance of SLOCs, especially Suez. Time to build up conventional force, up to two corps. Basing north and south. Reserves.

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BOX 12

ILLUSTRATIVE APPROACHES - MILITARY STRANDSCONSTANTS

- These actions will be required as precursors to shape the conditions, whichever option is eventually chosen.
- Actions:
  - Re-enforce NFZs.
  - Pursue UN (especially UNMOVIC) options vigorously.
  - Conduct IO campaign to exploit regime weaknesses and fault lines.
  - 
  - 
  - Increase intelligence collection to improve the  
granularity of the intelligence on WMD-related installations, individuals,  
means of delivery and command and control.
  - 
  - *Create a climate of uncertainty. Deceive Saddam by building up and  
building down force levels in Kuwait and the Gulf. Conduct short notice  
exercises.*
  - Prepare to support new (post conflict) regime, politically, militarily and  
economically.

Note:

- Requirement is to minimise the Coalition military footprint, to be more acceptable in the Region.
- Aim is to keep Saddam off balance, whilst we improve our intelligence for possible future operations.
- There is a possibility that Saddam may over react, thus giving a *casus belli* and requiring early action.

However:

- These measures are unlikely to cause the downfall of Saddam by themselves.
- The Coalition will have little control of the outcomes ie What happens to WMD? How will Iran react?

Judgement. Whichever course of action is eventually adopted, these measures are required, **Very low military risk with Very low return.**

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OPTION A. AIR AND SF PRECISION STRIKE

- This option could be described as the 'Afghanistan' or 'Kosovo' model. Although the situation and conditions are distinctly different (and more difficult) than either Kosovo or Afghanistan, the option is included because it has gained high level enthusiastic backing in Washington (although this may now be waning). Essentially the aim is to generate a 'knock out' blow of key installations and facilities that will shatter the regime and cause its downfall.
- Whilst unlikely to be chosen as a discrete option, its elements will form part of the other 2 options.
- Actions:
  - Destroy IADS by precision air strikes
  - Destroy WMD delivery means by precision air strikes
  - Destroy CB production facilities by precision air strikes
  - Remove or isolate key individuals in the WMD C2 system.
  - Destroy WMD communications system.
  - Provide air support and leadership advice for dissident (Kurdish and Shia) uprising.

Pros:

- Minimises exposure of Coalition Forces.
- Neutralises WMD (especially CB) threat.

Cons:

- Assumes precise targeting information, which may be an unrealistic assumption.
- Gives inadequate control over the successor regime.
- Successor regime needs to be identified in advance and ready to move quickly.
- Insufficient evidence of US resolve may fail to trigger uprising.

**Judgement.** Unsure at this point if it will ever be possible to have adequate granularity of targeting detail. Even if it is, Coalition will have little control over successor regime. **Low military risk for low return.**



**OPTION B. STRATEGIC 'COUP DE MAIN'**

- This option would only be undertaken after Saddam's regime had been 'squeezed' by all means at the Coalition's disposal ie political, diplomatic, legal, economic, to set the conditions. **It has huge military risk and the decision may be made to discount it as an option.**
- Actions:
  - Actions in Option A.
  - Use air assault forces to:
    - Seize key regime power centres (mainly in Baghdad).
    - Seize NBC weapons, sites and command and control nodes.
    - Neutralise Special Republican Guard.

Pros:

- Plays to US military strengths.
- Abbreviates 'build up'.
- Surprise.
- Sets conditions to achieve endstate most quickly.

Cons:

- High risk if we misjudge Iraqi cohesion and resolve. Success could never be guaranteed, so need to be prepared to move rapidly to Option C.
- Increased likelihood of significant Allied casualties.
- Narrows military coalition.

**Judgement.** Militarily, a high risk strategy. Politically attractive. Needs strategic surprise – deceive as to time frame/readiness, yet must signal resolve sufficient to corrode Iraqi cohesion. **High military risk for high return.**



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## OPTION C. SEIGE

- This option would involve Coalition forces seizing one or more pieces of territory (probably in the north and south) and, in effect, laying siege to the regime. Saddam would be extremely unlikely (and ill-advised) to attack and the theory is that public support for his overthrow would grow as the better conditions in the Coalition enclaves became obvious.

Pros:

- Basing problems are eased since Coalition will be much less dependent on surrounding Arab countries.
- If the plan works there will be minimum combat.

Cons:

- Does not achieve the required rapid victory. Consequently, support from neighbouring countries will be difficult. In the worst case the ME could disintegrate into war.
- Initiative could pass to Saddam, who may be able to publicly present counter-moves (eg an attack on Israel) as justified, given the provocation of the Coalition.

**Judgement.** This idea has received some support in the Press and from academics. If it worked it could achieve the endstate with little fighting, but the political risks are high. **Low military risk for potentially high return.**

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**OPTION D CONVENTIONAL 'HEAVY PUNCH'**

- This option is essentially the re-run of the Gulf War, and provides reserve/insurance for other options.
- Actions:
  - Amass sufficient force north and south to guarantee favourable force ratios. (Iraqi forces are at 50% of 1991 strength, but no update or improvement to equipment has occurred, so it is assessed that they are well below 50% in overall capability.)

Pros:

- Presents Iraq with inevitability of military defeat.
- Least risk of significant Allied casualties.
- Facilitates more ambitious endstate.

Cons:

- Maximum strain on Coalition and offensive to 'Arab Street'.
- High risk for other Arab regimes.
- Vulnerable LOC.
- Presents target array for WMD.
- Time consuming/predictable – risks handing initiative to Saddam.

Judgement. The safer military option. Medium military risk for high return.

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