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D/DCDS(C)/05/04/05

13 Jun 02

PSO/CDS

Sec/CNS

MA1/CGS

PSO/CAS

MA/VCDS

PS/PUS

PS/CDI

PS/Policy Director

SPS/DG Op Pol**SUPPORTING PAPER FOR COS STRATEGIC THINK TANK ON IRAQ - 18 JUN**

Reference:

A. Agenda for COS Meeting to be held on Tue 18 Jun at 0930.

1. Further to Reference, this note and the Enclosures will prepare attendees for the meeting. The enclosed paper is part of ongoing work developed by a cross Whitehall group that has met on a regular basis to exchange ideas and information, and undertake UK contingency thinking. The purpose of this work has been to develop UK thinking in advance of any detailed consultations with the US.

2. The legend/paper has been constructed so that it supports the ideas captured within the enclosed slide; hence COS need to refer to the slide whilst reading the legend/paper. At the meeting next Tue DCDS(C) will open with a short overview. Brig Jim Dutton (SPG Leader) will follow covering the subject matter to draw out the major issues to inform the subsequent discussion.

3. Questions on the attached paper should be addressed to the SPG point of contact, (DOMA AD(ME)) on Ext

{Original signed}


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Enclosures:

1. Powerpoint Slide - A Concept?
2. Legend.

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A CONCEPT?



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Regime change options.

WMD.

Minimise unintended consequences.

Post conflict.

CURRENT SITUATION

Regime options.

PRINCIPLES

Principles.

CREATE CONDITIONS

Conditions.

ENABLERS

Military enablers.

ENDS/WAYS/MEANS

WMD

Regime Change

ILLUSTRATIVE APPROACHES - MILITARY STRANDS

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SECRET UK/US EYES - NO FURTHER DISSEMINATION

BOX 1
ENDSTATE

UK

A stable and law abiding Iraq, within present borders, co-operating with the IC, no longer posing a threat to its neighbours or to international security, and abiding by its international obligations on WMD.

US

'..... maintenance of Iraq as a viable nation state, disavowing the use of WMD but capable of defending its borders and contributing to the counter balance of Iran.¹ US is determined to achieve a more representative, non-tyrannical, government.

KEY POINT

The Endstate cannot be achieved while the current Iraqi regime remains in power. Consequently, regime change is a necessary step and there is no point in pursuing any strategy that does not achieve this. [see Box 3]

MILITARY/STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

- Force Size. Once it is obvious that the US is committed to regime change, she will have to prevail, so need to plan for worst case and to be prepared to execute it if required.
- Tempo. Need to be able to escalate rapidly, which will require strategic agility.
- Post Conflict. Need to acknowledge that there will be a post conflict phase with an associated commitment, manpower and finance bill. Depending on how the regime change is achieved, and the form of the replacement, there is a spectrum of commitment where the worst case is a long period with a large bill.
- Intelligence. A much more detailed level of intelligence is required. This has implications for the tasking of collection assets and the timing of any action.
- WMD. If regime survival were at stake, Saddam would almost certainly use WMD, so there would be no deterrent equation as in 1991. Early neutralisation and, if that fails, preparedness to fight in an NBC environment, is required.

¹ Adapted from US CENTCOM OPLAN 1003.
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- Time. Time is critical – both as to the 'window of opportunity' (balancing US/Allied domestic issues) and in terms of duration. Gaining support from Iraq's neighbours will require a period of preparation. Retaining public support at home and maintaining regional support will require action that achieves a rapid effect with minimum damage to non-military areas. This will constrain military options.
- Legal. Any overriding legal considerations need to be addressed early as a precursor to campaign design.

Key Judgements.

- **Regime change is a necessary step to achieve the endstate.**
- **Establishing and maintaining support from the International Community, and regional support from neighbours, will be the Coalition CoG.**

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REGIME CHANGE OPTIONSCURRENT SITUATION

1. The Kurds (who are mainly Sunni) are 20% of the population, Shia make up 60% and the Sunni Arabs less than 15% of the population, yet the Sunni Arabs dominate the State institutions, security organisations and the Officer Corps. Consequently Iraq is potentially fundamentally unstable, and is currently held together by the strong security apparatus. It will require considerable force to break that security structure, but once achieved, the Regime will shatter due to its minority appeal.
2. Critical Institutions of Power.
 - Saddam himself. US assess Saddam to be the CoG. He is focus of the State and completely closed to normal diplomatic persuasion. Although inherently unpredictable, he remains more predictable whilst he is unsure of the precise intentions of the Coalition.
 - Special Security Organisation (SSO). Around 2,000 strong, this at the top of the tree, headed by Qusai, Saddam's second son. It controls the rest.
 - SRG. Around 8,000 strong, based in Baghdad. Best equipped - T72, BMP 1/2, 2S3. Responsible for WMD concealment.
 - RGFC. 75,000 men, the principal warfighting organisation. Leads on Internal Security, defence of the regime and would lead offensive action.
 - Regular Army. 400,000 men. There has been no additions or improvement to weapon systems since 1991.
3. Opposition Groups.
 - Sunni. Not organised.
 - Kurds. KDP and PUK not united. Militarily weak.
2/3 of Iraqi army stands on 'border'. Turkish sensitivity.
 - Shia. Clan groups with little co-ordination and unable to mobilise any support in the Sunni heartland. The Iranian backed groups (SCIRI, Badr Corps and Dawa Party) are more capable, but depend upon Iranian support.
 - INC. ineffectual.

There is little evidence of co-operation between the opposition groups. The Shias, Kurds and INC gave their best effort in the insurgency of 1991 and 1994/95 and were slaughtered. Kurds and Shias will require significant inducements to rise, especially if political hopes/aspirations seem unlikely to be fulfilled. They will also need to be confident that the US is resolute and that the US force posture is credible.

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4. Ends and Means.

Chosen ends and means have a significant bearing on post conflict tasks and requirements [see Box 5]

REMOVAL

- Saddam and key advisers (including sons)
- Saddam and his wider security and governing regime
- The entire Ba'thist regime

REPLACEMENT POSSIBILITIES

- Sunni strongman
- International Presence coupled with a bridging process leading eventually to a broad based coalition
- Federated state

WAYS

A number of graduated military tasks fall out:

- Undermine regime/induce climate of collapse/foster internal dissent.
- Encourage Kurdish/Shia insurgency (money/protection/training/equipment/planning).
- Coerce/persuade potentially dissident Sunni officers to plot against Saddam.
- Re-enforcement of NFZs.
- Selected surgical targeting of regime infrastructure.
- Wider air campaign.
- Ground forces to destroy Sunni hegemony (US aim) and control/influence the outcomes.
- Support to new regime, supported (and ideally led) by neighbouring countries.

Key Judgements

- Removal and replacement options cannot be directly correlated.
- Possibilities for a replacement regime are very difficult to assess. At the very least, we must be clear on what we do not want.
- It will be difficult to apply force with sufficient precision to ensure a predetermined outcome. So, need reserves and ground forces with the agility to respond to developing events.

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BOX 3
THE WMD DIMENSION

INTRODUCTION

- Although Iraq's nuclear capability (essentially a 'dirty' bomb) cannot be dismissed, the main threat, at the moment, is from CB weapons.
- Coalition will need to justify the need for action now – the position of UNMOVIC and the inspection regime complicates this, with potential for Saddam to continue to prevaricate.
- If the Indo/Pak conflict were to go nuclear, what would be the effect on the Iraq situation? (Assess both in regional terms and the effect on international opinion.)

END

The end required is that there is no longer a threat to the region or the wider World from Iraqi WMD.

WAYS

- Change regime to one that renounces WMD, or
- Completely destroy WMD capability and remove will to regenerate the capability, which implies regime change

MEANS

- Pre-Conflict.
 - Need to task intelligence collection means to provide greater detail on level and location of WMD facilities, command and control means and means of delivery.
 - Pursue unfettered UNMOVIC inspection regime, wresting initiative from Saddam.
- Conflict.
 - Maximum effort to destroy WMD and/or reduce the effect of WMD weapons use.
 - Provide protection and be prepared to fight in CB environment.
- Post Conflict.
 - Secure any remaining threat; audit Iraqi capability for public verification.
 - In slower time, destroy weapons and scientific infrastructure.
 - Monitor successor regime to ensure no resurgence.

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Key Judgement

- We need much better granularity of intelligence.
- A satisfactory outcome to the issue of WMD is essential.


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BOX 4

REGIONAL DIMENSION - MILITARY/STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

(Critical early actions in bold)



PRIORITY ONE COUNTRIES

- Iran. May take the opportunity to disrupt Coalition SLOCs and/or seize land in the border region. So, we need to be prepared to:
 - **Protect SLOCs.**
 - Deter land seizure by political action.
- Turkey/Kurds. Support from Kurdish opposition groups will be a key factor in overthrowing Saddam. At the same time, Turkey, a critical ally in the Coalition, is adamantly opposed to further Kurdish autonomy. This will call for a delicate political balance that will require the following military support:
 - **Enhanced military aid to Turkey.**
 - **Establishment of effective military links to Kurdish guerrilla groups.**
- Kuwait. Kuwait is a critical ally for basing purposes. The Coalition must be prepared to provide:
 - **Support to sustain regime.**

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PRIORITY TWO COUNTRIES

- Saudi Arabia and Gulf Instability. The support of other Arab states in the Gulf region is, at best, fragile. Of particular concern is the
So, we will need to plan to:
 - Support Saudi Arabian regime.
 - **Base elsewhere.**
 - **Protect critical coalition infrastructure - including energy resources.**
 - Conduct NEOs.
- Jordan. Jordan is a particularly key Western ally, so we need to plan to:
 - Provide support to the Hashemite regime.
 - Ensure provision of oil to Jordan, if the Iraqi flow is halted.
- Syria. We will need to prevent Syria drifting into covert active support for Saddam
 - Remain engaged with Syria to ensure overflight access for Med based assets is not denied.
 - Prevent Saddam using Syria
- Afghanistan. It is unlikely that the Coalition (even the USA) could sustain use of key enabling capabilities (C4/ ISR/ SF) in Afghanistan at the same time as taking action against Iraq. This raises wider (than Afghanistan) problems of concurrency, especially for UK. So we will need to
 - **Examine forces levels and possibly reduce elsewhere.**
- Israel. Saddam may choose to provoke Israel into military action in order to garner Arab support against the Coalition. The Coalition needs to be prepared to:
 - **Enhance the Israeli defensive (particularly air) shield.**
 - Pre-empt Israeli reactions by early committal of other coalition forces.
 - Be prepared to use ground forces to dominate western region of Iraq to prevent WMD capable missile systems being deployed to areas in range of Israel.

Key Judgement

Minimise footprint and duration of operation, commensurate with assets to manage unintended consequences.

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BOX 5
POST CONFLICT TASKS

- This will depend on how regime change occurs, and what the shape campaign takes to bring about the change. However, key differences between Iraq and recent experience in Afghanistan and Balkans are:
 - Iraq is naturally wealthy with significant oil reserves and potential revenue, therefore reconstruction should be self sufficient, with cash from OFF escrow account providing significant pump priming as compared to Afghanistan or Balkans
 - Iraq has a sound agricultural base ("fertile crescent")
 - Educated and able technical, industrial, and managerial population exists
 - Although ethnic suppression has occurred there is limited regional inter-ethnic mixing as compared to Afghanistan and Balkans
 - International intervention is not in tandem with ongoing, and in the case of Afghanistan prolonged, civil war.

Likely Military Tasks

- Immediate (0 – 6 months)
 - Provide external and internal security, law and order to prevent any potential for inter-ethnic violence, or opportunity for organised crime
 - Detention and processing of key regime figures (Nuremberg model?)
 - Confine and disarm elements of armed forces likely to rebel (Special Republican Guard, Republican Guard)
 - Confine and monitor remaining elements of Iraqi Armed Forces
 - Secure and account for WMD capability (materiel and intellectual)
 - Enable humanitarian relief
 - Assist in restoration of key infra-structure elements
 - Secure oilfields and oil distribution/ refining infrastructure
 - Negotiate and secure alternative lines of communication (LoC) through Syria/ Turkey/ Jordan
- Scope of tasks likely to demand large numbers of ground troops, comprehensive C2 and air mobility (circa 200,000+)
- Medium Term (6 months – 2+ years)
 - Continue to provide both external and internal security, law and order to prevent any potential for inter-ethnic violence, or opportunity for organised crime, but commence transfer of requirement to new Iraqi security structures
 - Detention and processing of key regime figures

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- Develop SSR model, with DDR aimed at reducing size and scope of internal security forces
- Support SSR with training and equipment
- Begin transfer security of oilfields and production facilities to Iraqi Forces
- Provide international security guarantees
- Scope of tasks likely to continue to demand large scale forces
- Long Term (2 -10 years)
 - Support SSR through training and presence on ground to effect gradual resumption of full responsibility for internal and external security by new regime.
 - Detention of key regime figures
 - Exercises to underpin international security guarantees.

Key Judgement

- In the worst case, we need to be prepared for a substantial long-term commitment.

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BOX 6

IRAQI REGIME MILITARY COURSES OF ACTION
(The 'What ifs')

Assumption. Iraq will be on her own, with no state coalition partners (but will have support of the *Arab Street* and possibly 'volunteers' from elsewhere).

Phase 1 (Pol and Mil)

This is the period during which Saddam remains unsure of the Coalition's intentions and consequently avoids handing us a *casus belli*. Therefore he is unlikely to take any significant military action. Possible actions include:

- Accelerate WMD development and weaponisation.
- NFZ actions to 'wrong foot' the Coalition.
- Admit inspectors, then obstruct/expel them.
- Stop oil production.
- Handover power (whilst actually retaining it in a 'behind the scenes' role).

Phase 2

This phase begins when Saddam is convinced that the Coalition is determined to overthrow his regime. His reaction will be unpredictable, ranging from benign/conciliatory, in the hope influencing international public opinion to undermine Coalition action, to military aggression at the other end of the scale. Possible actions include:

- Pre-emptive attack (maybe on Israel or a spoiling operation on potential APODs and SPODs) - possibly WMD.
- Mining SPODs or approaches.
- Pre-emptive attack on Kuwait.
- Asymmetric:
 - Terrorism.
- Dispersal of Army and/or Air Force to 'neutral' Arab country.

Phase 3

This is the conflict phase. Saddam now goes into full regime (and personal) survival mode, with no holds barred. Possible actions include:

- IADS mobilisation.
- Conventional fixed defensive lines. Mobilise population; create 'nation in arms.'
- Hold urban areas, forcing us to use siege/urban warfare.
- Asymmetric:

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- Guerrilla warfare in open country.
- Human shields.
- Environmental actions as a weapon.
- WMD use.

Most Difficult COA

If Saddam were to withdraw to and defend urban areas, this would significantly affect the Coalition action and cohesion. Such a move would mean a series of close battles, with large numbers of casualties on both sides (including Iraqi civilians) and collateral infrastructure damage. Coalition cohesion and public support would be very hard to maintain, as would support from the Region. The plan that the Coalition eventually adopts will need to minimize the possibility of Saddam going for this option, which supports the idea of a 'surprise' attack.

Most Dangerous COA

A WMD attack on Israel would be the most dangerous COA for the Coalition to deal with. Any plan must include guarantees to Israel that her security will be guarded /

Key Judgement

Saddam's best chance is to fracture the will of the Coalition in Phase 2, so speed and agility are needed once the decision to act has been taken.

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BOX 7
PRINCIPLESKEY STRATEGIC AND MILITARY PRINCIPLES WHICH AFFECT CAMPAIGN DESIGN.

- **Selection and Maintenance of the Aim.** It is vital for public support that the aim is clear and both publicly explainable and defensible.
- **Flexibility.** We need to maintain a choice of options. This is particularly vital as Saddam is so unpredictable
- **Surprise.** The aim is to **maximise strategic uncertainty** in Saddam's mind.

OTHER PRINCIPLES.

- **Deception.** Critical, to keep Saddam off balance.
- **Morale.** There are indications that the 'average Iraqi conscript' will not fight to the death for Saddam. We need to encourage this by IO and inducements.
- **Offensive Action.** Once committed, there can be no turning back until the regime is overthrown and WMD is under control.
- **Security.** This is particularly important for surrounding countries; especially Israel and those that will facilitate the Coalition build up.
- **Concentration of Force.** The Coalition will need to identify key areas and fault lines, so that force can be concentrated to shatter cohesion.
- **Co-operation.** Especially with regional allies.
- **Sustainability.** Post Conflict commitment. This needs to be planned and agreed before we embark on military action.

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BOX 8

CREATE CONDITIONS

(Those highlighted are a particular priority)

POL

- Obtain/retain sufficient public support.
- Establish a legal basis.
- Achieve progress on MEPP to secure Arab nation acquiescence.
- Assemble and sustain political coalition.
- Isolate Iraq:
 - Russia
 - China

MIL

- (UK) Review force levels and key capabilities worldwide.
- Review NFZ posture; re-enforce zones rigorously.
- Promote uncertainty in Saddam's mind to keep him guessing and on edge:
 - Exploit regime fault lines by IO and
 - Wide use of IO to destabilise Saddam's supporters.
 - Use of UNMOVIC.
 - Other UN moves.
 - Military/strategic deception. eg reschedule exercises.
- Create military coalition, particularly to provide adequate LOCs, overflight rights, APOD, SPOD, bases and Assembly Areas.

ME

- Kuwait - total support.
- Turkey - total support.
- Egypt - total support.
- Saudi flank.
- Bahrain.
- Qatar.
- Oman.
- Jordan.

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Europe

- UK.
 - France.
 - Germany.
 - Italy.
-
- Improve information on WMD – what, where, how much, how developed and weaponised etc. Location of delivery means and command and control systems.
 - Precursor action to neutralise WMD.
-
- Necessary military actions to prevent interference.

Key Judgement

- Aim is to keep Saddam off balance whilst carrying out the necessary preparatory activities prior to the main action.

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BOX 9
UK ENABLERS

Force capability requirements will be determined by COA and UK declared level of commitment, but contingency work suggests:

- Command.
 - Provision of NCC/JFC co-located with CINCCENTCOM
 - Critical capabilities: Strategic comms (equipment, bandwidth and people)
- Inform.
 - Strategic intelligence demand will be high.
 - retasking of UK national strategic intelligence gathering assets (SIGA)
 - UK capabilities: PR9, Nimrod R, SF, HUMINT, maritime SIGINT platforms
- Prepare. (UK)
 - with **3 months** warning of offensive operations the UK could deploy a **Medium Scale** Joint Force to the Gulf (10 major warships including a carrier, an armoured Brigade, about 60 fast jets and associated support including transport aircraft). Cost of generating forces to the required level of readiness, including essential UORs, would be some **£500M - £800M**.
 - **6 months** preparation time would allow us to deploy a Large Scale land warfighting force (Div(-)[2 square armoured brigades, OSG, and a rear ops brigade], combined with medium scale maritime and air forces comparable to those available for the 3-month option. Cost of generating forces to the required level of readiness, including essential UORs, would be some **£800M - £1.1Bn**.
 - with **9 months** warning the recommended force package would remain as for six months, but inherent risks would be significantly reduced; the large scale land for package in particular becomes more credible, capable and sustainable. Cost of generating the required level of readiness would be of the order of **£900M - £1.2Bn**.
- Project. (UK)
 - 21 days is minimum for sea transit times from UK South Coast ports to Bahrain or other Gulf destinations (36 days if via Cape of Good Hope).
 - Large Scale deployment using only UK military sealift and airlift resources would take approximately 500 days.
 - Using additional commercial charter timescale can be reduced to around 81 day.
 - Assume unimpeded movement through Suez, simplified 7 day Dipclear
 - Figures do not include a margin for sustainment, which would need to begin shortly after any force arrives in theatre, or recovery.
 - Air estimates are based on a marked reduction in current usage of AT for up to 3 months before any air deployment is started in order to enable

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recovery of the ATF in terms of aircraft maintenance and crew training following Op VERITAS activities.

- Protect. Threat indicates additional requirements for force protection.
 - NBC
 - GBAD (SRBM threat)
 - SLOC (including Suez)
- Sustain. (UK)
 - Sustainment beyond initial SDR assumptions have not been factored into calculations to date
 - Prolonged post conflict deployment will provide significant burden on defence resources
- Operate.
 - Force packages will be determined by COA


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


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BOX 12ILLUSTRATIVE APPROACHES - MILITARY STRANDSCONSTANTS

- These actions will be required as precursors to shape the conditions, whichever option is eventually chosen.
- Actions:
 - Re-enforce NFZs.
 - Pursue UN (especially UNMOVIC) options vigorously.
 - Conduct IO campaign to exploit regime weaknesses and fault lines.
 -
 - Increase intelligence collection (technical and human) to improve the granularity of the intelligence on WMD-related installations, individuals, means of delivery and command and control.
 -
 - Create a climate of uncertainty. Deceive Saddam by building up and building down force levels in Kuwait and the Gulf. Conduct short notice exercises.
 - Prepare to support new (post conflict) regime, politically, militarily and economically.

Note:

- Requirement is to minimise the Coalition military footprint, to be more acceptable in the Region.
- Aim is to keep Saddam off balance, whilst we improve our intelligence for possible future operations.
- There is a possibility that Saddam may over react, thus giving a *casus belli*.

However:

- These measures are unlikely to cause the downfall of Saddam by themselves.
- The Coalition will have little control of the outcomes ie What happens to WMD? How will Iran react?

Judgement. These measures are required, whichever course of action is eventually adopted. Although not impossible, it is unlikely that Saddam can be unseated by this means alone. It also leaves WMD uncontrolled, so will not satisfy the endstate. **Very low military risk.**

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OPTION A. AIR AND SF PRECISION STRIKE

- This option could be described as the 'Afghanistan' or 'Kosovo' model. Although the situation and conditions are distinctly different (and more difficult) than either Kosovo or Afghanistan, the option is included because it has gained high level enthusiastic backing in Washington (although this may now be waning). Essentially the aim is to generate a 'knock out' blow of key installations and facilities that will shatter the regime and cause its downfall.
- Whilst unlikely to be chosen as a discrete option, its elements will form part of the other 2 options.
- Actions:
 - Destroy IADS by precision air strikes
 - Destroy WMD delivery means by precision air strikes
 - Destroy CB production facilities by precision air strikes
 - Remove or isolate key individuals in the WMD C2 system.
 - Destroy WMD communications system.
 - Provide air support and leadership advice for dissident (Kurdish and Shia) uprising.

Pros:

- Minimises exposure of Coalition Forces.
- Neutralises WMD (especially CB) threat.

Cons:

- Assumes precise targeting information, which may be an unrealistic assumption.
- Gives inadequate control over the successor regime.
- Successor regime needs to be identified in advance and ready to move quickly.
- Insufficient evidence of US resolve may fail to trigger uprising.

Judgement. Unsure at this point if it will ever be possible to have adequate granularity of targeting detail. Even if it is, Coalition will have little control over successor regime. **Low military risk for low return.**

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OPTION B. STRATEGIC 'COUP DE MAIN'

- This option would only be undertaken after Saddam's regime had been 'squeezed' by all means at the Coalition's disposal ie political, diplomatic, legal, economic, to set the conditions.
- Actions:
 - Actions in Option A.
 - Use air assault forces to:
 - Seize key regime power centres (mainly in Baghdad).
 - Seize NBC weapons, sites and command and control nodes.
 - Neutralise Special Republican Guard.

Pros:

- Plays to US military strengths.
- Abbreviates 'build up'.
- Surprise.
- Sets conditions to achieve endstate most quickly.

Cons:

- High risk if we misjudge Iraqi cohesion and resolve. Success could never be guaranteed, so need to be prepared to move rapidly to Option C.
- Increased likelihood of significant Allied casualties.
- Narrows military coalition.

Judgement. Militarily, a high risk strategy. Politically attractive. Needs strategic surprise – deceive as to time frame/readiness, yet must signal resolve sufficient to corrode Iraqi cohesion. **High military risk for high return.**

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OPTION C. CONVENTIONAL 'HEAVY PUNCH'

- This option is essentially the re-run of the Gulf War, and provides reserve/insurance for other options.
- Actions:
 - Amass sufficient force north and south to guarantee favourable force ratios. (Iraqi forces are at 50% of 1991 strength; but no update or improvement to equipment has occurred, so it is assessed that they are well below 50% in overall capability.)

Pros:

- Presents Iraq with inevitability of military defeat.
- Least risk of significant Allied casualties.
- Facilitates more ambitious endstate.

Cons:

- Maximum strain on Coalition and offensive to 'Arab Street'.
- High risk for other Arab regimes.
- Vulnerable LOC.
- Presents target array for WMD.
- Time consuming/predictable - risks handing initiative to Saddam.

Judgement. The safer military option. **Medium military risk for high return.**

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