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IRAQI WMD: EVIDENCE OF POSSESSION

1. You asked about the strength of the evidence showing Saddam's possession of WMD.

2. The starting point is our knowledge of Iraq's past WMD programmes. This demonstrates not only large - scale possession of these weapons, and the readiness to use them, but also Saddam's determination to retain WMD in the face of military defeat in 1991 and the subsequent UN inspections. You will recall that much of his BW programme came to light only in 1995, following Kamil's defection. And as UNSCOM demonstrated in 1999, there has never been a full and convincing account of the destruction of Iraq's capabilities.

The Intelligence Picture

3. Evidence of past possession is not, of course, enough. Indeed, it could itself engender rumour and speculation in Iraq that might be fed back to us as fact. (Some opposition and defector material may be suspect on these grounds.) But our judgement, laid out in HMG's Assessment of Iraq's WMD in September last year draws on a range of well - sourced intelligence. This falls under three main headings:

- **SIGINT** has provided extensive material relating to procurement activities, particularly in the missile and UAV field. Some of this has led to a number of interdictions of missile material. Procurement of dual-use items that could be related to CBW and nuclear programmes has also been noted.
- **Imagery** has also provided useful material in relation to the extensive reconstruction of the Iraq's missile infrastructure, such as the identification of the al Rafah Test Stand and the al Mamoun solid fuel facility. Because many chemical and biological facilities are dual-use, it is difficult for imagery to provide proof of the existence of a CBW programme. For this reason we have not relied on imagery in supporting our case that Iraq has a CBW programme.
- **HUMINT** has provided clear and consistent reporting relating to Iraq's continuing WMD programmes. These come from a variety of sources.
 - SIS have a number of well placed and reliable sources [with high level access in Iraq] and have been able to report on the regime's WMD policy, its plans for use and its extensive concealment efforts. SIS also have a number of sources who report from closer to the programmes. Some of these have provided a consistent picture of Iraq's missile programme (including extension of al Samoud and the existence of al Hussein's). Intelligence on CBW programmes has been less

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complete but indicates continued production of CBW agents after UNSCOM's departure.

- CIA and other foreign intelligence agencies (the mobile BW production laboratories originated from).
- DIS Quadripartite Defector reporting, relating to Iraq's long range missile programme.

4. You are familiar with the main conclusions from intelligence, which are summarised at Annex.

Saddam's Behaviour

5. The picture from past possession and from intelligence is further reinforced by Saddam's current behaviour. He has been given clear opportunities to avoid military action by demonstrating full and active cooperation with UNMOVIC. But he has repeatedly failed to take this route. Leaving aside the intelligence on his concealment tactics, his actions since the adoption of UNSCR 1441 are strongly indicative of deceit. They include:

- failure to volunteer scientists for interview outside Iraq;
- illicit procurement, and subsequent concealment, of Volga engines;
- failure to declare re-constructed facilities (including the rocket motor casting chambers) previously disabled by UNSCOM;

Inspections

6. The failure of UNMOVIC to uncover significant chemical or biological weapons has been disappointing. But it is not wholly unexpected. On 16 October last year, the JIC judged that there was a serious risk that Iraq could prevent inspectors from finding conclusive evidence of WMD before the Spring, unless there was additional guidance to UNMOVIC. The JIC pointed in particular to the importance of interviews free of Iraqi intimidation: you know the limited progress in this area.

Conclusion

7. The JIC view is clear: Iraq possesses chemical and biological weapons, the means to deliver them and the capacity to produce them. The scale of the holdings is hard to quantify: it is undoubtedly much less than in 1991. But the evidence points both to

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Saddam's view that the capability is already militarily significant, and to his determination – left to his own devices – to build it up further.

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