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As you predicted, the aftermath and rebuilding Iraq is proving the most difficult phase. The first point to make is that this is not US/UK forces versus the Iraqi people. But US/UK and Iraqi people versus Saddam's small group of sympathisers plus assorted terrorists. We are trying to rebuild Iraq's prospects. They are trying to destroy them. The security problem is not about ordinary Iraqis. They are the victim. That said, it is our responsibility to sort it out. And this is just the new battleground for the war against terrorism. In essence, as we know, we need to do more, faster. But my basic point is that we need to do this in a way that helps the Iraqis to build the capacity to sort it out themselves.

- (1) On security, Iraq has 37,000 police. We need to double that. Given the numbers of trainers and their facilities, that will take a year. We cannot wait that long. So: if we need to treble or quadruple the trainers and expand the numbers of Iraqi police even beyond that contemplated, we should do it. Some of the Governing Council believe that in certain areas, they should decide how far to take de-Baathification in order to speed up the process. There may be good constraints/reasons why these things should not happen or take time, but we have to be very clear that the priority is to get movement fast. There must also be a top quality intelligence capability given to the Iraqis to act on the threat. This is essential.
- (2) Infrastructure Protection and Rebuilding. We need to speed up the process of letting contracts, though Bechtel is now working hard on it. I have authorised us in the south just to spend the money and recoup later from CPA (centre). The costs of the repair work (as opposed to long-term reconstruction) are not huge but we cannot wait. CPA (centre) should delegate how to spend money to CPA (south). The new man - Synnott - is excellent and can take responsibility.

However, the main problem is sabotage. There is a Facilities Protection Service, 14,000 strong, supposed to guard oil and infrastructure installations. That needs rapid expansion. If necessary, some of the local Sheikhs can be contracted to provide it. But daily sabotage just makes life impossible. The Iraqi Civil Defence Corps is being trained. We need to be clear that the continuation of the FPS and ICDC can do the trick. If not, we need an alternative.

- (3) Media. My obsession. I understand Gary Thatcher is making a big difference. But there are five terrestrial channels to fill; and we need an

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Iraqi satellite service. Apparently, there is a fear that bringing in outside ie US/UK networks would be a problem for the Governing Council. That's a pity, if true. Because the obvious solution is for us, jointly, to task one of the big companies with sorting this out. We need this fast. It is essential to keep building Iraqi consent and understanding.

- (4) UN. This is good since we require financial help and troops. I understand some like the Indians will only come in, with a new UN Resolution. But we need to be careful it doesn't look as if we're saying: we've failed, now we need you; I wouldn't bet on too much help coming forward; and help with eg capacity or police trainers is as vital as troops. Overall, I suspect unless we sort security, help will be hard to find.
- (5) CPA. Bremer is very good. My only query: does he have all the administrative/technical support he needs?
- (6) US/UK Troops. Our army wants more and so we will announce an increase on Monday.

So my basic point is: the problem is not complex to identify: it is security. The best solution is not us or at least us alone but the Iraqis. It is speed in building their capacity - security, intelligence, infrastructure, media - that we need.

Action: we should ask for a detailed plan back on all these points, drawn up by Condi and Nigel, on advice from Bremer, for you and I to action next week.

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