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To: ;
From: Amanda Tanfield
Subject: FW: LEAD: OO NYMIS/FCOLN 366: NOSEC: IRAQ: FOREIGN
SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH UN
Sent: 07 March 2003 08:44:20 GMT

Please register on 13/1

-----Original Message-----

From: MENAD
Sent: 07 March 2003 03:05
To: MENAD - All Staff
Subject: FW: LEAD: OO NYMIS/FCOLN 366: NOSEC: IRAQ: FOREIGN SECRETARY'S MEETING
WITH UN

From: Swift Incoming Telegrams (Machine 1)
Sent: Friday, March 07, 2003 3:04:54 AM
To: MENAD
Subject: LEAD: OO NYMIS/FCOLN 366: NOSEC: IRAQ: FOREIGN SECRETARY'S
MEETING WITH UN

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MY 4 IPTS (NOT TO ALL)

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SUBJECT: NOSEC: IRAQ: FOREIGN SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH UN
SECRETARY-GENERAL, NEW YORK, 6 MARCH

SUMMARY

1. The Foreign Secretary sets out our thinking on revising the
draft second Resolution. Annan approves.

DETAIL

2. The Foreign Secretary said that the US default setting was to

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take military action. He said that, two days ago, he had had a good discussion with Igor Ivanov who acknowledged that we had got Iraq to this position only because of 1441 backed by a credible military threat. Although we could not allow military considerations to dictate policy, military build-up was a fact which could not be maintained for ever. The Foreign Secretary said that the more he had looked into the Iraq dossier the more convinced he had become of the need for action. Reading the clusters document made his hair stand on end.

3. The Foreign Secretary said that a number of countries found our draft second Resolution too stark. Now we were looking at language to set a deadline in 10 days to two weeks, after which there would have to be a positive decision to find Iraq in full, active and complete cooperation. This was Iraq's last chance. But, as the Prime Minister had told Ivanov yesterday, this was about disarmament. If Saddam did what we demanded, he could stay. Some American commentators had not helped - switching the focus from disarmament to regime change to liberation to the Al Qaida link and back to disarmament. If Saddam went down this route, we would still need a permanent and toughened inspection regime, possibly picking up some earlier ideas for an all-Iraq NFZ.

4. Annan said that what we were proposing sounded similar to Canadian ideas. The Foreign Secretary pointed out that we had a shortened timetable. Prendergast said that we were reversing the veto: if there were no positive finding, then there would be war. What did we think the Russian and French attitude would be? The Foreign Secretary said that Ivanov had not poured cold water. Peter Ricketts said that it had to be this way round if there were to be a clear deadline.

5. The Foreign Secretary said that we had thought about adding an exile provision but had concluded that it would muddy the Resolution. But we were telling our Arab friends that we had got exile language. We also thought that there had to be something in the Resolution about post-conflict: if there were a conflict then the UN had a role in humanitarian aid and reconstruction, and only the UN could give legal authority for any post-Saddam government. Annan agreed: without it there would be an illegitimate occupation. Annan said that our timetable would take us very close to the end of the month (implying - rather like Canada's).

6. Annan said that he was disturbed by the American line that everyone had to vote for this or else the UN would be irrelevant. The US knew that it needed the UN on a range of issues. As Annan had said publicly, the UN was bigger than Iraq. The Foreign Secretary said that if we failed the cohesion of the Security Council would be weakened. China might be able to withstand that but Russia, France and the UK could not.

7. Prendergast said that if we gave Saddam impunity, we would have a big public problem: how could we ignore the ICC? The Foreign Secretary replied that the ICC was not retrospective. And he had the sense that if the choice was between war or immunity, people would breathe a sigh of relief if Saddam chose immunity. Annan said that he did not see him choosing exile. The Foreign Secretary said that it was important to give something to Prince Saud and Co - the Arabs were very keen. Annan finished by saying that he was seeing the Arab delegation this evening.

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MAIN 13

IRAQ/KUWAIT 13

MENAD 0

RESIDENT CLERK 0

CONSULAR D 0

PROTOCOL D//PALACE 0

ADDITIONAL 1

IRAQ/KUWAIT 0

(IRA) 0

ATT GEN//C ADAMS 1

BANKE 0

BTI1 0

BTI2 0

CAOFF1 0

CAOFF2 0

DFID1 0

DFID2 0

ECGD 0

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[DAVIES]

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