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CABINET OFFICE

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Julian Miller

Chief of the Assessments Staff

HE Sir Jeremy Greenstock KCMG
UK Permanent Representative to UN
UKMIS, New York

26 February 2003

Dear Jeremy,

IRAQ: WMD BRIEF

1. You and John Scarlett spoke last night about points from intelligence that you might use in tomorrow's Security Council discussion.
2. I attach a note, agreed with the Agencies, that you could draw on.

In setting out the story of Iraq's response to 1441, we have suggested that you emphasise that our account is based on knowledge, not supposition. Again, our preference is not to labour the intelligence background. But if you felt it would be important to say more, you could say explain that our picture of Iraq's policy does draw on intelligence.

3. Copies go to David Manning (No 10), C, Francis Richards (GCHQ), William Ehrman (FCO), Simon Webb (MOD) and to David Omand, John Scarlett, Desmond Bowen and Jane Binstead (Cabinet Office).

*Yours sincerely,
Julian Miller*

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IRAQI WMD BRIEF FOR USE IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL

HMG'S ASSESSMENT OF IRAQ'S WMD

- HMG published an Assessment of Iraq's WMD in September 2002. The Assessment made a number of judgements on Iraq's WMD programmes:
 - Iraqi planning to reconstitute some of its programmes began in 1995. WMD programmes were then given a further boost in 1998 with the withdrawal of UNSCOM/LAEA inspectors;
 - Iraq has a useable chemical and biological weapons capability, which includes recent production of chemical and biological agents, and military plans to use them. After UN inspectors left in 1998, Iraq continued to produce chemical and biological agents;
 - Iraq has tried covertly to acquire technology and materials that could be used in the production of nuclear weapons;
 - Iraq possesses up to 20 al Hussein missiles with a range of 650km, is developing longer-range ballistic missiles, and is extending the ranges of al Samoud and Ababil-100 (Fatah) systems beyond the UN permitted range of 150km. UNMOVIC have now proscribed one of these missiles, and is investigating another.
- Faced with renewed UN inspections, Iraq was adopting a policy of concealment, including of sensitive equipment and papers. Subsequent events have borne this out.
- The Assessment also highlighted the rocket motor casting chambers, which UNMOVIC have now proscribed, and the al Rafah engine test stand, which UNMOVIC agree has a capability far in excess of what is needed for permitted missiles systems.

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CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF IRAQ'S CAPABILITIES

- Iraq's CBW production capability is designed to survive a military strike, and to evade UN inspections.
- Iraq is capable of producing the chemical agents mustard gas, tabun, sarin, cyclosarin and VX.
- Iraq is capable of producing biological agents, including anthrax, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin and ricin. Indeed, work on anthrax carried on late in to 2002.
- Iraq has a range of delivery means available, including aircraft, UAVs, artillery and missiles.

RESPONSE TO 1441

Saddam's behaviour since the middle of last year has been very instructive. We have been watching closely as the story unfolds. What follows is not supposition. It is what we know.

Pre Resolution and Inspections

- By mid-2002 Saddam recognised that he might soon face the return of the inspectors with strengthened powers.
- Implementation of the regime's concealment policy was in full swing:
 - By 20 November 2002 all production work on banned weapons at Military Industrial Commission sites had been stopped and evidence of prohibited activity was being cleaned up;
 - Prior to November documentation was being falsified and compromising information removed from computer hard drives;
 - In August individual scientists and officials were made personally responsible for the items on which they were working, holding them in their homes and the homes of friends and relatives.

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- Proscribed materials were concealed, including at innocuous sites such as hospitals. The regime had already begun to prepare for this in April 2002 when Saddam's son, Qusai, issued instructions for the concealment of chemical warfare agents. Some materials, such as missiles, have been and remain on trucks that are continually on the move.

Resolution passed.....inspections begin

- By the end of December Saddam was confident that this concealment strategy would work at least until the Spring when military operations might become more difficult - the aim was to buy time.
- This was reflected by Iraq's approach to the Declaration called for under 1441.
- After 1441 was adopted Saddam's advisers considered whether to declare some of their weapons, in the hope that this would see off the pressure. They decided it was too risky. Having lied for so long they risked losing what remaining support they had by such a confession. They decided to pad the Declaration out so that it would take inspectors time to assess it and cross-reference it with previous documents and inspectors - buy more time.
- Throughout the period of inspections, Iraq's security and intelligence agencies have been monitoring UNMOVIC/IAEA and plans are available to obstruct them if they are close to uncovering WMD. Iraq's agencies are continually adjusting their tactics to counter any changes in the inspector's modus operandi.

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- For instance, following the discovery of nuclear-related documentation at a scientist's home on 16 January the Iraqis gave orders to remove hidden items from scientists' homes.
- In January inspectors arrived at a hospital at al-Kut in search of hidden weapons. They were confronted by an orchestrated crowd, whose aim was to prevent a full inspection of the area.
- Many proscribed materials are now being moved daily in order to avoid detection.
- Nevertheless, Iraq is particularly concerned about interviews, because if carried out as mandated, interviews would expose Iraq's WMD programmes. Iraq therefore continues to ensure that inspectors are not able to interview who they want, when they want and free from any Iraqi monitoring.
- The main planks of this policy are intimidation and monitoring.
 - In early December Saddam issued formal instructions that the scientists were to be threatened with serious consequences for themselves and their families if they revealed any sensitive information to UNMOVIC. They were ordered not to agree to any interviews outside Iraq. They have been coached in the answers to give. Some have been removed from their homes and places of work and detained to prevent them being interviewed by inspectors.
 - Every measure is being taken to ensure that interviews are monitored, and to convince scientists that this is the case.
 - Scientists have been reminded that any rooms where interviews are held will be bugged.

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- Most recently scientists have been told to ask for tape recordings to be made of the interviews. The tapes are then taken from them by the Iraqi Monitoring Directorate when they leave the room.
- Only a limited number of interviews have been carried out to date, and one of the interviewees was a person assigned to the NMD.

The future

- Iraq will continue ostensible co-operation with the UN and seek to retain support in the UNSC to avert a war while continuing an active policy of concealment to avoid loss of WMD capability.
- And as part of that, and despite current protestations, we know that Saddam is likely to agree to the destruction of all al-Samoud 2 missiles as demanded by UNMOVIC.

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