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Foreign &
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Office

London SW1A 2AH

from The Foreign Secretary

17 February 2003

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*cc: MR
JFO
SW*

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Dear David

Iraq: Second Telephone Conversation with Colin Powell, 16 February

**THIS LETTER IS VERY SENSITIVE. IT IS NOT TO BE COPIED.
ITS CONTENTS MUST NOT BE DISCLOSED TO ANY
US INTERLOCUTOR.**

I had a further call on a secure line with Colin Powell at 8.30pm on 16 February. He said that, contrary to the BBC's reporting, Condi's lunchtime interview had been pretty straightforward. He would e-mail me a transcript

Powell had just spoken to Blix. Blix had suggested that there should be a variation of the draft second Resolution we had had in mind. In addition to material breach and serious consequences, it should state that - as at the date of the Resolution - Iraq had not cooperated or complied, and ask that the inspectors advise the Security Council by a date on a list of particulars. This latter list need not be specified in the Resolution, Powell and Blix had agreed, but could include:

- destruction of the Al Samoud missiles;
- push on interviews;
- control of road traffic;
- control of the Syrian pipeline;
- legitimisation of existing NFZ and ? one over the whole of Iraq.

Sir David Manning KCMG

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Blix had proposed a 15 April deadline. Powell had double-checked: "You mean 15 March?" "No", said Blix, "15 April because it will take time to get the Resolution agreed." Powell commented to me that 15 April would be difficult for the US, though it fitted with the Prime Minister's originally suggested deadline.

Powell said there would be a presentational problem for the President if by whatever date set Iraq had complied. He would be unhappy publicly, but almost certainly relieved in private. But, said Powell, to ensure that compliance really was this, the bar (via the Blix list) would have to be set high enough. I agreed.

Powell said that he was now taking a close interest in the targeting Tommy Franks had in mind. He had insisted that as bombing Baghdad would have serious diplomatic consequences, he be fully consulted.

] This could mean big civilian casualties. Powell said he was also getting more involved in day after issues.

I agreed to call him at around 4.00pm Brussels time to update him on the Summit.

I am copying this letter to Sir Jeremy Greenstock (UKMis New York), Sir Christopher Meyer (Washington), Sir Michael Jay and Peter Ricketts.

Your ever

Simon

Pp

JACK STRAW

(Dictated by the Foreign Secretary and signed in his absence by the Private Secretary)

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