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To: MENAD - All Staff  
From: MENAD  
Subject: FW: LEAD: OO NYMIS/FCOLN 214: IRAQ: 5 FEBRUARY SECURITY COUNCIL LUNCH  
Sent: 06 February 2003 04:00:00 GMT

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From: Swift Incoming Telegrams (Machine 1)  
Sent: Thursday, February 06, 2003 4:00:00 AM  
To: MENAD  
Subject: LEAD: OO NYMIS/FCOLN 214: IRAQ: 5 FEBRUARY SECURITY COUNCIL LUNCH  
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INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS VIENNA,

SUBJECT: IRAQ: 5 FEBRUARY SECURITY COUNCIL LUNCH

#### SUMMARY

1. Annan tries to focus Council Ministers on points of agreement. Blix and El Baradei say that they will use Powell's points with the Iraqis. Villepin expands, volubly, on his idea of strengthened inspections. Fischer supports. Counter arguments from the UK and Spain. Others, including Russia and China, preserve their options. Powell has the last word.

#### DETAIL

2. Following the Open Council meeting, Ministers repaired to lunch to exchange views in private. Annan said he was glad to note one major point of unanimity, that Iraq must now move fast to cooperate pro-actively and not wait for the inspection process to evolve. The Blix/El Baradei visit to Baghdad could be used to tell Iraq that the Council unanimously insisted on much improved cooperation. Annan assumed that the time would come soon, under the 1441 process, when the Security Council had to take a decision. What the Inspectors reported on 14 February would be important. They were doing a professional job. The time could also come - no-one could doubt this - when the Council would have to take some tough decisions.

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3. Ivanov asked whether Blix would use the Powell material in Baghdad. Blix said that he would study the Powell text carefully. He was grateful for all the information. If there were things hidden in Iraq, the Inspectors would try to get to them. He said it was reassuring for the inspection teams that the Council wanted to stay united, because without unity the Inspectors were weaker. It was good to have the message reinforced that Iraq must cooperate actively. This could not be a game of catch-as-catch-can. Cooperation had to be spontaneous. UNMOVIC could do a lot with more resources and improved equipment. But Iraq was a big country. What really counted was active cooperation on the South African model.

4. El Baradei echoed most of this, while acknowledging that the UNMOVIC files were the key ones. He would study the new material and face the Iraqis up to it. He believed that the Inspectors had to make full use of 1441. There were plenty of things to be clarified by the Iraqis - there could be no disagreement on that. Iraqi cooperation must improve in a dramatic way.

5. Powell said that the US would give all their material to the Inspectors. He had really worked hard on this presentation, refining the material carefully with the CIA. He asked whether Villepin could explain his idea of reinforced inspections.

6. Villepin began calmly but developed into a rant. He believed that there was space between fully active cooperation and war for other options. This was a widely shared thought. The Middle East was complex. A broader strategy was needed. Force had to be the very last resort, and then only with the legitimacy of the UN. To win the peace after the war, the involvement of the UN was essential. The inspection regime under 1441 allowed the Council this further possibility. Only if they met a deadlock would we need to come back to 1441. We could not afford to go to a bloody, long, expensive war on the basis of impatience. Other States would draw the conclusion that you needed nuclear weapons to avoid attack: compare North Korea. Such crises had to be solved by the international community collectively.

7. So the answer, Villepin went on, was to use 1441 fully. Reinforce the Inspectors. If after time it did not work, then force could be considered. The problems of the world had to be solved through collective responsibility, or they would only grow bigger. If the route he had set out proved unsuccessful, then France would assume its responsibilities with the rest.

8. Fischer took up the details of Villepin's proposal: higher numbers, new equipment, a harder approach to interviews. All this was on the table for discussion now. He liked the idea of a Permanent High Commissioner for Iraq disarmament.

9. Palacio said she was worried that the message to Saddam was becoming blurred. The Council had already tried every possible way. Now we were asking for a change of will from Saddam. It was this message that had to be strengthened, not the inspections. Otherwise, as a citizen of Europe, she would not understand the approach.

10. You said that you did not believe that more inspectors and more equipment would solve anything. If Blix/El Baradei wanted

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more, we would try to help. But the absence of compliance had not been related by anyone to the number of inspectors. Rather, as Blix had said, it was catch-as-catch-can. Did we have to watch the score while Iraq and the Inspectors played this game against each other? This was fruitless. The fundamental point - Powell's presentation had been powerful on this - was that Iraq was not complying. If there was cooperation, there was no need for greater numbers. If there was no cooperation, higher numbers could not help. The Inspectors needed not just physical, but intellectual evidence. Yet Iraqi scientists had been terrorised into silence. A thousand inspectors could not change that. So the Villepin proposal was a chimaera, a false message. And it would lead to a split in the Council. We should stick to the key: Iraqi cooperation.

11. Ivanov was discursive. He started with terrorism, with a reference to working with Pakistan on the Afghanistan problem, which was just as dangerous as Iraq. The first Russia-Pakistan bilateral summit for thirty years was now about to take place. They would try together for a solution. As for Iraq's WMD, Russia had studied the Inspectors' report. There were substantial complaints. But they had to continue, and Russia would help them. They were addressing Baghdad on a daily basis. He hoped the U2 problem would be solved soon. Putin had asked him to set out a list of the current problems and to work with the Iraqis to solve them. Baghdad could hardly change overnight to become democratic in its nature. Pressure would be needed. But the opportunities for a political settlement were far from being exhausted.

12. Kasuri reacted with a long explanation of Pakistan's effort against Al-Qaida, getting in a broadside on Pakistan/India confrontation for good measure. Pakistan had got into the Afghan mess partly because of the Soviet invasion. They were now left on their own but were trying to deal with it actively. As for Iraq, military action would be very difficult for Pakistan and the Islamic world. Villepin was right about the wider consequences. Global poverty was an element here. Action against Iraq would provide an incentive for further violent reactions from the breeding grounds for terrorism.

13. Tang sympathised with the calls for more time. The Inspectors would have to follow up the new information and report back. A combination was needed of both pressure on Iraq and strengthened inspections. Outstanding problems should be solved by discussion and negotiation. But Iraq did have to produce more practical cooperation. He emphasised the importance of Council unity.

14. Fischer tried to sum up as Council President. There was agreement that the Council should send out the message that a very serious point had been reached. This was a major crisis with widespread consequences. War would be very damaging. 1441 had to be implemented fully. Inspections must continue: there was no contradiction between that and the presence of sharp instruments. The message to Baghdad had to be that they now had to deliver.

15. Powell did not allow this to stand. He said that he had listened to the arguments for a peaceful solution. The Council had so far been denied that. Blix and El-Baradei had to continue: their visit to Baghdad was important and they had made

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some progress so far. Then we would have to see how far they had reached. The US was not fixated on war. As a soldier, he knew about the destructiveness of war. But he would not accept the premise that the world could not accept the risks. He hoped it would not come to war. But war could even produce good results. If it came to that point, the US would be happy to act with a coalition of the willing under the authority of the UN, in the full understanding of the risk of unintended consequences and of the overall situation in the Middle East. Too much time had already gone by.

16. Ivanov lightened the final moment by producing for Annan a model of a bear on a trapeze between two pillars, Peace and War. The bear was balanced by five ping-pong balls, one for each Permanent Member of the Council. If any one ball was removed, the bear would fall off. Everyone laughed. But Ivanov also managed to offend Annan by representing him as a bear, and the Non-Permanent Ten by excluding them from the balance.

#### GREENSTOCK

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IRAQ/KUWAIT		13
MENAD	0	
RESIDENT CLERK		0
CONSULAR D	0	
PROTOCOL D//PALACE		0
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ADDITIONAL 1

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ATT GEN//C ADAMS		1
BANKE	0	
BT11	0	
BT12	0	
CAOFF1	0	
CAOFF2	0	
DFID1	0	
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