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IRAQ: 29 JANUARY SECURITY COUNCIL DISCUSSION  
From: UKMIS NEW YORK

TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 167  
OF 300337Z JANUARY 03  
INFO IMMEDIATE CABINET OFFICE, EU POSTS, GULF POSTS  
INFO IMMEDIATE MIDDLE EAST POSTS, SECURITY COUNCIL POSTS  
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PART ONE OF TWO

## SUMMARY

1. Second Council discussion of Blix and El-Baradei reports a replay of earlier positions. I say Iraq is in material breach and hammer home that the Council cannot simply tread water and will have to take tough decisions soon. Blix says that chemical warheads contained no chemical or bacteriological traces. New Iraqi letter (by fax to MED, UND, NPD).

## DETAIL

2. The Security Council met on 29 January to further consider the Blix and El-Baradei reports. Almost every delegation welcomed Powell's intention to provide evidence on 5 February (most seeing it feeding into the inspections process).

3. Blix kicked off with answers to outstanding questions. Casting chambers at Al-Mamoun appeared to be chambers earlier destroyed and now repaired. They had a potential capacity for engines over 150 km and so were being further analysed. The Iraqis said the new missile test stand at Al-Rafah was designed to test two missiles at once. UNMOVIC continued to analyse it as it could potentially test missiles over 150kms. One of the chemical warheads UNMOVIC had found had contained liquid - this had been analysed and had no relation to any proscribed chemical or bacteriological substance.

4. Wehbe (Syria) said Iraq had accepted 1441 before the deadline; submitted their declaration before the deadline; facilitated the establishment of inspections; opened all facilities; and submitted a list of scientists. The day before, Iraq had expressed its readiness to redouble efforts and deal positively on the outstanding issues. Inspections should be given more time. All inspection regimes experienced hick-ups.

5. Lavrov (Russia) said inspections were proceeding normally. Baghdad was cooperating on access. But Blix wanted more proactive cooperation. Russia agreed. Iraq should implement the ten-point statement. Blix had said the 7 December declaration gave new information on missiles and biotechnology so it was wrong to describe it as containing nothing new. The inspections had not turned up any evidence of a resumption of Iraq's WMD programme. There was no confirmation of allegations Iraq had tried to buy aluminium tubes or uranium. The recent find of papers in a private house had not yielded what some had thought. There was no grounds for using force. Lavrov welcomed that Powell would come to the Council on 5 February. His information should be given to the inspectors and checked by them.

6. Arias (Spain) said Iraq's co-operation was incomplete and passive. Blix's report was a catalogue of 20 obstructions and omissions. The situation was grave. A little more time should be given - a last chance to the last chance. But this would serve no

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purpose if Iraq did not respond to the long list of pending issues. Peace was possible, but only if Saddam fulfilled his obligations urgently.

7. Pleuger (Germany) said that once they reached full strength, never before would inspections have been so robust and enjoyed such Council support. No hard evidence had been found of WMD while El-Baradei had said he could provide credible assurances of no nuclear programme within a few months. This indicated inspections were being successful, as did the findings of warheads, documents, and access to all sites. Blix had noted many open questions - it was for Iraq to clarify these and provide more active co-operation including on private interviews. The presence of inspectors would keep enough pressure on Iraq to suppress any WMD activities. Powell's welcome intention to provide the evidence would help support the inspectors. We should give them a realistic opportunity.

8. Aguilar-Zinser (Mexico) said inspections had proved useful and should continue. Blix and El-Baradei should propose additional measures that could help them complete their tasks. Iraq must give co-operation so broad that it made it possible to verify, destroy, and dismantle all WMD and related programmes. Valdis (Chile) said Iraq's substantive co-operation was riddled with insufficiencies. But this did not mean that inspections should be discarded. The inspectors had not been moved to call a meeting of the Council (under OP11, 1441) and so seemed prepared to give the process more time. Tafrov (Bulgaria) said inspections should continue. But there was not much time, and, if Iraq did not address pending issues, the Council would have to reflect on steps to compel it. Traore (Guinea) urged Iraq to seize its last opportunity. Because there were many pending questions, inspections should continue, but he could not give a view on their duration. Belinga-Eboutou (Cameroon) regretted Iraq's passive co-operation - insufficient to allow the discovery, except by chance, of CBW. We should give the inspectors the time they seemed to need. Gaspar-Martins (Angola) said Iraq should co-operate. With time, inspections could be a powerful tool in peaceful disarmament. The absence of a "smoking gun" reinforced this. War should only take place if there was an outright refusal of Iraq to co-operate or a discovery of WMD that Iraq refused to hand over.

9. Wang (China) said there were three "shoulds". First, inspections should continue. Iraq was doing its utmost to complete its "homework". We could not ignore that, overall, Iraqi co-operation was rather good and the 10 point statement showed Iraq was willing to continue co-operating. Second, Iraq should be more co-operative, including implementing the 10 point statement and clarifying questions. Third, the Security Council should contribute to a peaceful solution. As long as there was one ray of hope we should not give up on peace.

10. I said we regarded the Iraqi declaration as neither accurate, full, nor complete. We had also heard on 27 January that the inspectors had serious outstanding questions. We wanted the inspections to push Iraq hard and soon on these unexplained areas. The Council was focussing on co-operation - the crux of where we stood. In asking for more time, as many had done, we had to be realistic. Time would not achieve anything without the co-operation we expected. Blix himself had said that Iraq appeared not to have come to a genuine acceptance - not even today - of the disarmament required of it. There had been access - but to what? Yes the doors the inspectors had knocked upon had been opened, but Iraq had given no access to its illegal WMD.

programmes. There was a huge difference. OP4 of 1441 was quite clear about what was required to avoid a further material breach above the breach Iraq had already committed. Iraq had both allowed omissions in the declaration and failed to co-operate. The inescapable conclusion was Iraq was in material breach of 1441. We had to give active consideration to these issues - we were meeting today, the following week, and in further weeks. We were sure others shared our frustration that Iraq was not taking this final opportunity. The time was fast approaching where the Council would have to take its responsibilities to safeguard international peace and security. It was still not too late - but Iraq had to co-operate now. If it did not, there was no way the inspectors would be able to fulfil their mandate.

11. I said we could not reopen 1441. 1441 did not ask whether Iraq would ever co-operate - the question was whether Iraq realised the game was up. How many instances of non-co-operation did people need after 12 years, 600 weeks on? Even in the view of the inspectors the partial passive co-operation they had received had been offset by hidden documents; incomplete lists; failure to agree to air reconnaissance; private interviews being obstructed; and inspectors being harassed and accused of being spies. What if Iraq had also ordered scientists not to talk to UNMOVIC? What if they had been told that if they helped inspectors they would be killed? What if the list of names had been deliberately withheld with scientists dispersed and replaced with intelligence officials? What if documents had also been dispersed? How could more time under the standard operating procedures of well led and professional inspections resolve such a planned resistance to UN inspections if these turned out to be the actualities? The Council had to realise that it was up against a serious decision under a tight timescale. More time would not help. There was only one answer - we had to stay together in insisting that the non-compliance had to stop or the Council would no longer be in charge of this process through inspections. We wanted to consult further; we wanted to hear the inspectors come back and report; and then it might well be time to make a decision on where we took this

12. Akram (Pakistan) said that neither Blix nor El-Baradei had drawn final conclusions, nor wanted to. The possibilities of inspections had not been exhausted. We should give more time during which Iraq should co-operate as required by UNMOVIC/IAEA. There were other important issues: ameliorating the suffering of the Iraqi people; ensuring sovereignty and territorial integrity; and ensuring economic security. This issue had political and emotive undertones in Pakistan and the region - we had to proceed with utmost caution.

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PART TWO OF TWO

13. Negroponte (USUN) associated himself with Arias and my statements and repeated arguments I had deployed on 27 January about the deterrent effect of inspections - this was not the purpose of 1441, nor could the non-existence of WMD be assured if Iraq was not co-operating. He then asked: when UNMOVIC would come to conclusions on Al-Fatah/Al-Samoud; whether UNMOVIC could give more details of its evidence on anthrax; and whether IAEA had considered the entire procurement chain for aluminium tubes.

14. La Sabliere (France) said inspections had been considerably strengthened and were just coming to full capacity. They had already yielded results. All sites were now open and their presence hindered Iraq from developing proscribed programmes. Some sites suspected of suspicious activities had been inspected but no significant discoveries had been made and no traces of proscribed substances found. On the nuclear side analysis showed aluminium tubes were unlikely to be for enrichment. Iraq had provided a new document in the biological area. In the chemical area Iraq had established a committee of enquiry and would hopefully obtain evidence in other areas with the same goodwill. No doubt significant questions remained unresolved. And inspections would be all the more effective if Iraq fully co-operated, putting into effect the 10 point statement. Iraq should understand that a marked lack of co-operation or any other serious failing would expose it to the machinery in 1441. We needed time for inspections to work with no artificial timetable to undermine them. He welcomed the US intention to share evidence with the Security Council and make this available to Blix and El-Baradei as provided under 1441. La Sabliere asked whether the 16 chemical warheads had a propulsion method and were still operational; whether the 150km limit had been systematically broken for Al-Samoud and Al-Fatah missiles; whether inspectors had any conclusions on the bacteriological document; and when UNMOVIC could draw definitive conclusions on sampling.

15. Lavrov (Russia) said I had asked colleagues to take careful note of 1441. But 1441 was not about preparing for war, it was about ensuring Iraq had no WMD and, to that end, giving inspectors the strongest mandate. He asked Blix whether the latest Iraqi letter (received over lunch on 29 January - by fax to MED, UND, NPD) was a serious attempt to react to UNMOVIC's concerns.

16. Blix said that, on anthrax, the new Iraqi document had also expressed an interest in UNMOVIC's evidence. UNSCOM had found that Iraq had had the capacity to produce 25,000 litres of anthrax - 3 times the amount Iraq had declared. But it was for Iraq to provide evidence proving its version of events. Blix said the Al-Samoud had flown over 150kms 13 times out of 40. He was likely to come up with conclusions on missiles before 14 February and might well meet with outside experts. At least one of the 16 empty chemical warheads had propulsion. Iraq continued to insist that some amendment meant the warheads would not work. On sampling, UNMOVIC had a biolab and would have a chemical lab on 5

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February. There were no samples containing WMD so far, but some were outstanding (comment: FranMis told us today they were very concerned about this - their experts said that traces of VX would exist years after its production). In answer to a further question from Lavrov, Blix said he did not think the Iraqi claim that UNSCOM's 3500 names included lower level staff (like technicians and drivers) was correct. In addition, Iraq had clearly not provided any names for after 1991. In answer to a further question from me on whether UNMOVIC would be interviewing those at the top of Iraq's WMD activity, Blix said they were asking for interviews with 3 or 4 star generals, not 5 star though their discussions involved some at the very top.

17. El-Baradei made an at times confused intervention ("as we go forward we continue to go backwards"). He said that IAEA needed more from Iraq on interviews, aerial surveillance; and technical meetings to resolve issues like aluminium tubes. He explained how IAEA were in a different position from UNMOVIC (more comfortable starting point and the fact that nuclear activity left traces so they did not rely so heavily on Iraqi co-operation). On aluminium tubes he said IAEA had learnt from one member state that different types of tubes had been procured, including some with a higher tolerance than those IAEA had tested in Jordan. It might be that these could be more easily adapted to a centrifuge. On uranium, IAEA had very little information and needed more from member states (comment: can we provide it?).

18. After the briefing I had a quick bilateral word with Negroponte. He said he was going to Washington on 30 January and would see Powell in the margins. He would ask whether Powell wanted to see me on 3 February to discuss tactics. I also said he should underline the need for Powell's presentation to be as convincing as possible.

#### COMMENT

19. The Council risks going around in circles until there is more definitive guidance from political leaders. Most delegations were constrained to reading from pre-prepared texts from capitals. My increased flexibility allowed me to comment on the nature of the debate and hammer home that the Council cannot hope simply to tread-water.

Desk Officer for Iraq: ( ) and on  
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