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
CDI 2/25

22 Jul 02

PSO/CDS

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DCDS(C)
Policy Director
DG Op Pol



IRAQI CAPABILITIES

1. I held a debriefing meeting today with members of the team accompanying CDI to Washington last week for discussions on the intelligence background to planning on Iraq. CDI himself will be available to provide his personal impressions on his return to the office on 25 July.

2. As mentioned in my minute of 18 July, the US is no better off than we are about actionable intelligence on WMD. Sites formerly used for the production of WMD are known but there is little intelligence on whether they currently in use or on possible new locations. The whereabouts of potential storage sites is a top priority but no significant success was reported to the team. Likewise, potential launch sites for Iraq's remaining SCUD-type missiles are urgently being sought but, the team was told, with very limited hope of finding them. It is likely that some CW agents have been weaponised, with aerosol sprays, conventional bombs artillery shells and perhaps UAVs as the chosen delivery means. While a CW attack on attacking forces, whether in Iraq or Kuwait, is probable, it is unlikely to be launched before the onset of hostilities. The US also indicated that they believe that a CW/BW attack on Israel cannot be ruled out as a gesture of last resort.

3. The team confirmed that the US (J3) seem very concerned about the risk of asymmetric terrorist attack after the initiation of hostilities because of the number of official Iraqi offices overseas (Embassies, Trade Missions and the like) which could provide cover. The presence of a senior AQ operative in Baghdad and the discovery of WMD facilities in Northern Iraq also probably contributed to their concern. This risk was considered by a CIG recently and the Security Service expressed doubts about the ability of the Iraqi Foreign Intelligence Service to operate effectively overseas. We will, however, ask them to review this judgement in the light of US concerns.

4. The team also reported that the US considered that Saddam 'will fight and die in Baghdad or perhaps Tikrit'. This is more a judgement on the part of the US that Saddam would not seek to flee Iraq rather than an expectation of last ditch fighting, street to street since it would be a clear sign that Saddam's regime is doomed if he flees either of these locations. The US is, however, reportedly preparing to fight in an urban environment against internal security forces.

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