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The fourth page is missing from this document as is the last page(s) of Annex C. The Government has been unable to provide the Inquiry with a complete version of the document.

**VISIT REPORT - IPU SECURITY SECTOR REFORM TEAM VISIT TO
BAGHDAD 4 - 7 JULY**

HIGHLIGHTS

- CPA reorganisation removes requirement for UK SSR deputy to Amb Slocombe.
- UK SSR appointees making good progress.
- Suitable post and role identified for UK ACPO representative.
- Significant further UK police support is required to fulfil both training and executive functions. Initial request for 100 police officers to assist with training and mentoring.
- Police contributors conference likely to be held in Europe within next 4 weeks.
- Plans for implementation of first elements of New Iraqi Army (NIA) well advanced.
- More support likely to be required for borders/immigration development.
- Further clarification of way ahead for Basra River Service (BRS) and New Iraqi Navy (NIN).
- Posts within planning pillar of CMATT identified for RN and RAF personnel.
- No formal DDR process in evidence although plans for majority of ex military personnel well developed. Concern expressed by Slocombe over need to identify way ahead for existent militia style units.

BACKGROUND

1. An IPU led SSR team comprising representatives from MOD, JACIG (DDR and Arms Control), UKMCC and ACPO visited Baghdad at the invitation of Ambassador Slocombe to discuss general progress on SSR issues. Attendance by a rep from the Defence Advisory Team was cancelled at the last minute due to the change in CPA intentions for SSR. Visit was most timely as a change within the CPA structure had resulted in Slocombe losing his overall responsibility for SSR and as a consequence a fracturing of the holistic approach formerly adopted. It was obvious from discussions throughout the visit that much work had been achieved in the various pillars of SSR although there was little evidence of a cohesive strategy resulting in a somewhat confused picture. This should not necessarily be a cause for current alarm, although the overall linkages to governance issues will need to be closely monitored. Rather, it reflects the fluid nature of organisational structures within the CPA; the speed of change, both internally, and in response to external circumstance; and the dynamic created by the interaction of senior personalities.
2. Calls were made on Amb John Sawers (UK Special Representative), General Viggers (UK Senior British Military Adviser), General Eaton (Commanding General CMATT), Ambassador Slocombe (now re-titled Director National Security and Defence), Ambassador Kerik (Director Interior) and Capt Dugan USN (NAVCENT LO). Additionally separate briefs were received from UK personnel working in the Justice, Borders, Immigration and Customs areas.

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CPA MACHINERY

3. Much progress is being made by the various ministry teams which is not always visible back in the UK. There remain, however, many areas where better co-ordination and the publication of an overall campaign plan would allow progress and success to be more accurately measured. The current security situation is the dominant theme and is recognised by all as the highest priority. There is a tendency to blur the line between 'security' and 'security sector reform'. The challenge is to link the measures taken for immediate security into the reform of the security sector. (Initial plans to allow 5 years to build the police force have been cut to a maximum of 2 years, while in the military sector focus has been successfully concentrated on the establishment of the first elements of the New Iraqi Army).

4. Signs of building a more cohesive CPA structure more focussed on achieving the desired end state were noted with the introduction of a steering group (see Annex A) chaired by Director Operations (Andy Bearpark) and the creation of "tiger teams" to focus on specific problem areas. Additionally the move of a military element from CJTF7 planning personnel into the CPA Strategic Planning Group is a positive and welcome move – it is understood that this team will have responsibility for developing the CPA plan/strategy. There appears to have been little progress on the overall information/communications strategy work undertaken by the UK team with the plan at best stalling and starting to founder – **there is an urgent need to identify a Director for this critical area and although currently a US lead UK may wish to consider providing a suitable nominee.**

5. The move of the Interior Ministry (police, Customs, Borders, immigration and blue light services) from under the auspices of the Director for Security Affairs (Slocombe) has removed the single point focus for SSR. Despite this there is an acknowledgement by all SSR actors of the need to reform all the interlocking elements of the security sector in Iraq in a cohesive manner. Moreover, the four key UK placements (Riley, Tesh, Brand and) in the SSR pillars should, once settled in, be able to exert effective pressure to create a holistic approach and develop linkages between different SSR elements.

DISCUSSIONS

6. A detailed breakdown of discussions for individual SSR pillars can be found at the Annexes. A brief overview is contained in the paragraphs below.

Ambassador Slocombe

7.

Slocombe's focus remains the standing up of the New Iraqi Army (NIA) although attention within the next 2 weeks will turn to MOD reform. He is very keen for the UK MOD 2 Star deputy (John Tesh) to join him as soon as possible – subject to availability it is intended to conduct an initial scoping visit within the next 2 weeks.

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8. Plans for the New Iraqi Army are well advanced and training for an initial Officer cadre will commence on 15 July with stipend payments for former military personnel commencing on the same date. Future development plans for all Iraqi armed forces will be conducted under the auspices of Gen Eaton (Commanding General Coalition Military Advisory Training Team - CMATT), this will include the Navy and Air Force.

9. As mentioned above the post for a UK deputy responsible for SSR is no longer required (agreed with John Sawers) although Slocombe still recognises the need for close co-operation between the various SSR pillars. It is possible that the newly established CPA steering group could take on a co-ordination role when problems are identified. To maintain a holistic overview it will be important for UK to closely monitor activity and developments. This will be achieved by the various UK senior posts within the pillars making weekly reports back to the IPU on progress and developments. Slocombe was very happy with the level of UK support provided to him and was now concerned that more US support was needed to match that of the UK. His own personal exit strategy appears to have him departing in mid November.

10. Long term planning for the military sector is developing but Slocombe acknowledges that there is still much to do and nothing is yet committed to paper. He acknowledged that some form of DDR process was required for the various militia groups (Peshmerga etc) but that thinking was poorly developed in this area. He requested military support to his outer office at the military SO2 level and although not specifically a DDR advisor role it is viewed as a possible foothold from which to build UK advice and influence. The JACIG representative on the team undertook to investigate provision from within JACIG resources.

11. Slocombe stated that he had no wish for his CPA organisation to become the new MOD but that the MOD would be stood up from the beginning as an Iraqi institution. He was very clear on his intention to avoid creating a military structure that was de-facto the prop to the new Government and was conscious that his area must not build a heavy reliance on the military into the structure. Plans for MOD reform are still developing but there is thought of some form of international conference to generate support and it is recognised that early Iraqi buy-in is essential. Slocombe expressed an interest in sending suitable Iraqi civilians on overseas training courses and this may again be an area where UK may wish to contribute.

Ambassador Kerik

12. Kerik is obviously delighted that he has achieved a shift in responsibility for his Ministry to allow him to report directly to Ambassador Bremer. His responsibilities cover Police, Fire, Customs, Border Control, Immigration, Passports, Citizenship and Disaster Relief. To achieve all this his team currently consists of 12 people with a small (5-6) number of short term consultants completing assessments. Although Kerik has a clear vision on his aspirations for a police force there currently appears to be a lack of strategic direction for the whole of Iraq with his focus firmly on Baghdad. That said it is understood that guidance has been given to the regions but they have largely been left to fend for themselves. It is expected that this will change as the international policing effort is established. Kerik offered much praise for the efforts and progress made in the Basrah area by UK forces. Additionally a

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military personnel feel cared for, wanted and valued by higher authority. He is also very aware of the need for the military to develop in concert with the other SSR pillars and with the full engagement of the evolving Iraqi authority.

Signed on CHoTs

T M LOWE
Capt RN
MOD LO IPU
SSR Lead and Co-ord

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THE CPA PROCESS

1. POLICY DEFINITION


- Amb Bremer, with advisors, defines the policy
- Policy dissemination within CPA/CJTF 7

2. IMPLEMENTATION

- Steering group takes policy and ensures implementation
- Ministry teams deliver, within area of competence, with Iraqis
- Project teams co-ordinate issues that involve combined action between ministries

3. EVALUATION

- Audit teams evaluate plans and progress to ensure that CPA and CJTF 7 produce joined up results
- Audit teams identify key emerging issues that require Project Teams/Steering Group engagement



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Annex B to IPU
Trip Report
Dated 9 July 03

POLICING

Background

1. A total of 34 Police Stations have now been reactivated within Baghdad out of a total of 60. The police assessment revealed that the existing police infrastructure and organisation did not work and a series of initial goals were established:

- a. First requirement is to de-militarise the police force.
- b. Change the mindset and attitude of the Iraqi people towards the police.
- c. A total force of 65-70,000 is required of which approximately 17-19,000 will be in Baghdad.
- d. Initial training will focus on patrol concepts and basic human rights policy and education.

2. A guidelines and framework document has been published (a copy is still awaited) although the future policy for final structure and laydown of the police force has still to be determined. Kerik viewed this as a high level political decision although Slocombe felt it was within the powers of the CPA to determine.

Development Plans

3. Initial plans aimed to get the police force fully established within 2-5 years but this has now been amended by Bremer to complete in 2 years. Costs are significant but preliminary budget work has been completed and an interim budget established. It has been realised that the current security situation would hinder progress given the short time scale and the intention is to identify a suitable training location abroad where Iraqi police can be trained in a benign environment. It is hoped that this will open within the next 4-6 weeks and it is expected to be at an old US base in Hungary – final confirmation is expected 10 July.

Training/International Support

4. Aim is to train 5-6,00 police officers per course with courses lasting approximately 9-12 weeks. It is hoped that course length can eventually be reduced to 9 weeks to meet the required time lines – current competency of Iraqi police assessed as 10% of US/European equivalent. It is intended that training and resources will largely be provided by US and European police contributors and a specific request for 100 UK Police Officers in a mentoring/tutoring role for the next 18 months operating in Iraq was raised by Kerik. The split of expertise was stated as 25 executive level advisers and 75 instructors (probably requiring executive authority). The need for an Arabic presence in the training teams is fully recognised and it is hoped that Jordan will provide a significant contribution.

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5. A requirement for a total international policing effort of approximately 7,000 people has been identified of which 10% will be US. Kerik is aware of the difficulties of raising such a force but is determined that the problems experienced in Kosovo will not be repeated. His current intention is to approach OSCE for support and assistance in raising the force. It is likely that DCC Brand (UK ACPO representative on Kerik's staff) will be given responsibility for developing plans to secure contributions from donor countries. Police personnel will be expected to contribute in 5 main areas:

- a. Training staff in Hungary.
- b. Provide leadership and tutoring during the transitional phase in Iraq.
- c. Providing executive level mentoring.
- d. Field Training Officers (FTO) throughout Iraq (may have executive powers).
- e. Contributing to a train the trainer programme.

6. Based on initial discussions it is assessed that DCC Brand will require some bespoke UK support to achieve his role and aims. Although final confirmation will be provided as plans for his employment develop the following posts have been tentatively identified:

- a. Admin support person with police experience (will hopefully be provided by CPA).
- b. Training advisor with police training experience (definitely required).
- c. Additional police officer (level and exact requirement to be determined).

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DDR AND ARMS CONTROL REPORT

Introduction

1. The aim of the DDR and arms control element of the visit was to establish progress so far, identify what further support is required by the CPA (particularly in manpower) and put forward the UK view on key issues, where appropriate.

Disarmament, Demobilisation and Integration

2. The key point brought out by Walt Slocombe was that for the old Iraqi Army, disarmament and demobilisation has largely been achieved. Most major equipment types, such as armour and artillery had either been destroyed or captured. Soldiers simply melted away at various stages of the war, taking with them their small arms and light weapons (SALW). Reintegration, and the consequent requirement for stipends and new employment, is an issue affecting mainly officers and professional soldiers, as most conscripts have simply returned to their pre-war lives. John Sawyers pointed out that the same is not true of the Pesh Merga in the north and the Badr Corps in the south. The full DDR process is likely to be required here for those groups, but any political agreement for this is some way off. Therefore it is recommended that DFID (CHAD) continue to monitor advancement on the political process for Iraq, but avoid launching any DDR initiatives until the time is right.

Small Arms and Light Weapons

3. The SALW situation is confused. There is an acceptance that, in the short and medium term at least, Iraq will be awash with SALW. They are both in the hands of the population and held by interest groups in unknown hides. Currently, amnesties are ineffective and wholesale confiscation is proving counter-productive. Only a visible improvement in the security situation and clear movement in the Iraqi political process are likely to change this.

4. Additionally, there is a shortage of SALW to support SSR programmes. Currently, CMATT options to solve this are as follows (in order of preference):

- Access MEK stocks of SALW for up to a year. Politically, this may prove impossible.
- Access surplus US stocks of M16A1.
- Purchase stocks of surplus central/eastern European AKs.
- Re-start local manufacture of AKs.

5. The latter 3 are undesirable as they add to the problem. Two other options may be available:

- Access stocks currently under control of coalition troops. Numbers are unknown and there may not be enough but SBMRI has been asked to