

DCts(Ops)(081-04)

Jun 04

Cabinet Office for Matthew Rycroft
Cabinet Office for Sir Nigel Sheinwald
Cabinet Office for Desmond Bowen
HD/FCO IPU

Copies to:

APS2/SofS
PSO/CDS
MA/VCDS
MA1/DCDS(C)
PS/Pol Dir
Iraq CCT Leader

MA/CJO
MA/SBMR(I)
GOC MND(SE)
MA/ACDS(Pol)
SPS/DG Op Pol
SPS/DGISP

DJt Cts-Mil
Iraq Director
FCOIPU-SSR1
CC Hampshire Constabulary

HOW BEST TO PROGRESS THE IRAQIISATION OF THE SECURITY SECTOR

BACKGROUND

1. The headline observations of the team looking at Iraqiisation of the Security Sector were contained in my report of 25 May 04¹. Initial response of the Cabinet Office to that report was to direct a follow-up piece focused on:
 - a. How to develop an Iraqiisation strategy.
 - b. How to influence work in support of that strategy.
 - c. Determining tangible UK assistance in both the short and medium term.
 - d. A summary of short term actions to put to the Prime Minister.
2. To meet this remit I have ordered this report in the following way:
 - a. The first section (paragraph 3) outlines the component elements of an Iraqiisation Strategy.
 - b. The second section (paragraph 4) outlines how we might influence such a strategy.
 - c. The third section (paragraphs 5 - 7) gives a summary of resources that the UK might commit, or consider committing, in the short and medium term. It draws on a comprehensive review of the current state of Security Sector Reform (SSR) at Annex A.
 - d. The fourth section (paragraph 8) derives from the first three, and is a summary of actions the PM may consider pursuing in the short term.

¹ DCts(Ops)(073-04) dated 25 May 04.

A STRATEGY FOR IRAQIISATION

3. Thus far the majority of the effort expended on Iraqiisation of Security has been on a wide range of initiatives, most relating to SSR, which have developed piecemeal, and without reference to an overarching strategy. Such a strategy is needed in order to bring coherence to all activity. The strategy should include the following key elements:

- a. Vision. A clearly articulated vision of the eventual constitutional, legal and judicial framework which will operate in a future, democratic Iraq. This might be captured in a simple endstate: 'A secure and stable Iraq maintained by credible, self-confident and capable security structures under Iraqi governance'.
- b. Security Sector Architecture. Derived from that vision should be an outline of the security sector architecture, defining the range, purpose, size, capability and geographic distribution of each element of the Iraqi security sector. Agreement on this architecture will involve some key policy decisions. For example:
 - (1) Iraqi Police Service (IPS). There needs to be agreement on the principle of Police Primacy (or not) in Internal Security (IS) issues. Will the Police Service be controlled nationally or regionally? Will it be trained in Public Order and Counter Terrorist skills? Will it have a special weapons and tactics capability; if so how much and under whose control? Will it have an EOD capability?
 - (2) Iraqi Civil Defence Corps (ICDC). Is the ICDC a temporary or a permanent creation? What is its longer term destiny: a general reserve for the Army or a third force for IS duty? Or will it be subject to a DDR programme when the conditions for its existence pass?
 - (3) Iraqi Army. What is the role of the Iraqi Army in IS? What legal instrument should activate its involvement in IS? Is the Iraqi National Task Force a specialist IS formation within the Iraqi Army? If so, who tasks it, where is it based, what skills does it have, and what is its C2 relationship to the IPS.
 - (4) Infrastructure Police. Does it make sense for the Infrastructure Police to be controlled by the wide range of Essential Service Ministries? Should they be brought under centralised control?
 - (5) Contractors. The current Iraqi Security Sector is awash with contractorised capability. Are these short term expedients or do they form part of the longer-term vision?

Note; these issues are examples only, not exhaustive.

- c. Policy Framework. This architecture should inform a policy framework for a range of issues relating to each element of the Security Sector. Key policy issues would be such things as priority for recruitment, training and equipment; pay, pensions, redundancy and terms of service. The need to resolve quickly a policy regarding police redundancy has already been identified as key to the future effectiveness of the IPS.

d. Transitional Plans. A series of transition plans are required to get us from where we are now to where we want to be. The key transition plans are:

- (1) Capacity Building. Capacity building plans for the elements of the Security Sector are well advanced but they need greater refinement to reflect the need for capability rather than just quantity. The status of and requirements for capacity building are covered in greater detail below.
- (2) Interim Operational C2. Agreement between the Coalition and the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) on how the interim operational C2 is to function is now a matter of urgency.
- (3) Militias. There are assessed to be 52 militias ranging in size from twelve to 31,000. They have represented useful short-term expedients, and some may need to feature as part of the longer term accepted Security Architecture. A policy for militias is starting to emerge.
- (4) Legal/Emergency Powers. Even in western democratic states it is accepted that certain special Legal/Emergency powers need to exist in order to deal with extreme IS situations. Such powers inevitably constrain the rights of the individual in pursuit of the common good. Such powers may cover such issues as preventative detention.
- (5) Finance. The assumption of Sovereign authority by the IIG, the advent of new Iraqi ministries and the demise of the CPA, combine to threaten a major discontinuity in resourcing the Security Sector. At its simplest, unless ministries such as the MOI and MOD submit properly costed operating budgets to the Ministry of Finance, and unless the Iraqis have developed internal distribution and pay mechanisms; then elements of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) may not get paid this summer. It is understood that the US led Major Subordinate Commands (MSC) are putting in place back-up schemes to ensure that the ISF get paid. The UK should do the same.
- (6) Information Operations/Strategic Communications (IO/SC). It is axiomatic that a strategy for Iraqiisation must be supported by a comprehensive IO/SC plan. Current evidence, however, is that extant plans have: focused too much on 30 Jun as a watershed; focused too much on external/regional audiences; have dealt too much in promises and have not focused enough on achievements and tangible successes.

e. Timescale. Finally the strategy needs a timescale. Key elements informing that timescale will be:

- (1) Key political milestones.
- (2) Iraqi wishes.
- (3) Local and regional security conditionality.
- (4) The willingness to take operational risk.

It would seem to make sense to attempt to link key political milestones with security conditionality thereby forcing the pace of Iraqiisation and informing the need to take risk where necessary. Accordingly, and acknowledging it will not be the same everywhere, there should be established linkage between;

- (1) The Iraqi assumption of Sovereignty on 01 July and the establishment of local Iraqi control.
- (2) The holding of National Elections in Jan 05 and the establishment of Regional Iraqi Control.
- (3) The establishment of the New Iraqi Government in spring 06 and the establishment of international strategic stand off.

INFLUENCING THE STRATEGY

4. Many of the elements of the above strategy depend upon securing agreement between key IIG, ISF, MNF-I and international diplomatic figures. The time has already passed when a strategy could have been imposed on the Iraqis and there is a danger that we may now be trying to develop one too late. What is clear, however, is that the strategy needs to be authored, owned and executed in theatre. It is at these three elements we should direct our influence.

- a. Ownership. Ownership of the overall strategy will need to rest with the National Security Council (NSC). Specifically they will need to demonstrate public ownership of the vision and the overall Security Sector Architecture. Ideally an outline of these elements should form part of any early public announcements by the IIG. The more that is in the public arena, as an early statement of Iraqi intent, the better. It is important, therefore, that the Iraqi Prime Minister and key departmental Ministers (MOI, MOD) and principal police and military chiefs achieve early consensus. This argues for early engagement with the NSC with coherent policy options for the overall strategy.
- b. Authorship. In order to achieve such early engagement the strategy needs to be negotiated and written. This task best falls to the Office of Security Transition (OST) headed by Lt Gen Petraus. Given the current manning shortfalls in the OST the UK could offer Lt Gen Petraus a strategic planning team, based either on D Strat Plans, UK JFHQ or the Defence Advisory Team (DAT) to take this work forward quickly. The difficult thing will not be the authorship of the plan, but the achievement of consensus regarding the overall security sector architecture. This might best be achieved through some form of NSC 'lock-in' facilitated by the OST and the strategy authors. Separately the UK will need to influence the authorship of sub-elements of the strategy eg:

- (1) Capacity Building: through our two UK one-stars in CPATT and CMATT.
- (2) Interim operational C2: through SBMR-I.
- (3) Militias: through SBMR-I

(4) Legal/Emergency powers: through deploying a legal advisor to the Strategic Planning Team.

(5) Finance: through deploying a specialist team in pay and pensions.

(6) Information Operations: by extending UK support to the HQ MNF-I Strategic Communications Organisation.

c. Execution. The principal means for executing the strategy is the military and police resources committed to the theatre. These are covered in greater detail below but in outline there are two principal choices:

(1) How much operational risk should be taken with current resources?
The key issue here is the extent to which current military resources within the MNC-I should be taken off operational security tasks and put on to training and mentoring tasks. Evidence from within Theatre indicates that the best way to grow genuine capability within the ISF is to embed coalition troops and International Police Advisors (IPA) inside Iraqi units.

(2) How many more resources to send? In a UK context the question of how many new resources to send is intimately tied in with considerations about sending: 40 Cdo RM to replace 1 A and SH in MND(SE). If HQ ARRC and 3 Cdo Bde are deployed, their involvement in achieving greater coherence and generating greater capacity within the ISF will need to be factored in.

UK RESOURCE REQUIREMENT

5. The requirement for the UK to commit, or consider committing, additional resources to Iraqisation of security derives from two principal sources:

- a. The need to author, inform, influence and help execute the strategy.
- b. The need to resolve clear shortfalls in the current and anticipated status of capacity and capability building in the Security Sector. The assessed requirement which follows draws directly from the SSR assessment at Annex A.

For the purposes of this assessment short-term is defined as resources that can be committed prior to 1 Jul 04 and medium-term those that can be committed in the period from 1 Jul to the elections in Jan 05. Notwithstanding any additional resources to be committed is the clear requirement to sustain the current level of military and police staffs, for example in the CPATT, CMATT and Baghdad Police Security Academy.

6. The Short Term. Consideration to be given to:

- a. A Strategic Planning Team, with appropriate legal advisor, to be made available to the OST for up to 4 weeks. (UK MOD to provide).
- b. A small team specialising in pay and pensions issues to be made available to the OST. (DfID).

- c. 40 Cdo RM to be prepared to deploy to MND(SE) to carry out mentoring tasks within ISF (current readiness would allow 40 Cdo to be ready in Theatre by 17 Jul).
 - d. Initial despatch of 6 police mentors to Basra by 30 Jun. (FCO IPU).
 - e. A financial package to be made available, with appropriate authorities, to GOC MND(SE) to ensure continuous ability to pay ISF personnel. (PJHQ to advise on detailed requirement; IPU to advise on funding source).
 - f. More generally the UK needs to determine a more flexible policy framework for the release of resources to fund SSR projects. (Cabinet Office).
7. The Medium Term. Consideration to be given to:
- a. The SSR role of HQ ARRC and 3 Cdo Bde, if deployed. (MOD).
 - b. The balance of 54 police mentors to deploy between 20 Jul and 31 Aug in accordance with the MND(SE) call forward programme. (FCO IPU).
 - c. In the light of OST manning difficulties deploy additional staff support to OST and additional manpower to the MNF-I Strategic Comms Unit. (SBMR-I to scope).
 - d. Take responsibility for selected specialist police courses such as: senior executive leadership; organised crime; post bomb blast investigation. (IPU/Home Office).
 - e. Host visits in UK of Senior Border Enforcement and Customs Officials in order to develop expertise and pass on best practice. (HMCE). Source and facilitate the provision of customs mentors to the DBE. (HMCE).
 - f. Increase UK support for prison management and training. (DfID/FCO).
 - g. Continue leadership of the Iraqi Coastal Defence Force project until FOC in Oct 04. (MOD).
 - h. More widely, scope and provide places for ISF personnel on courses at UK academies.

POSSIBLE SHORT TERM ACTIONS FOR THE PM

8. It was requested that a list of possible short term actions be put to the PM for his consideration:
- a. In respect of POTUS Stress:
 - (1) The need to put pressure on IIG ministers to declare their vision and architecture for the future Iraqi Security Sector as advised by the OST and agreed in the NSC.
 - (2) The need to take operational risk in Theatre to commit additional resources to building capacity/capability in the security

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL - UK EYES ONLY

sector. Specifically this should include embedding coalition forces within ISF units.

(3) The need to close the issue of the interim C2 operational architecture.

(4) The need to ensure funding is made available to make sure the ISF continue to get paid.

b. In respect to the Iraqi PM and IIG Ministers. Stress:

(1) The need for early agreement and announcement of the vision, architecture and legal framework for the ISF.

(2) The need to take operational risk, advised by local commanders, to achieve local and regional control by ISF in accordance with political milestones.

(3) The need for the Ministry of Finance to agree initial operating budgets for key Iraqi ministries such as MOD and MOI.

c. In respect of Lt Gen Petreus. If an office call can be arranged, stress:

(1) The need for a strategy and offer UK support in its authorship.

(2) The need for early NSC consensus on the strategy.

(3) The need to balance operational risk with increased Iraqi control of security.

d. In more general public statements. In support of the strategic IO campaign, stress:

(1) Significant progress already made in capability/capacity building within ISF.

(2) ISF already achieving local control in some areas and already taking part in some high profile and successful operations.

(3) Need to maintain a sensible balance of risk in progressing Iraqisation with the operation realities of the security situation. The relevant time scale is spring 06 for us to assume strategic stand-off.

ACDS(Ops)

Annex:

A. Status of SSR in Iraq as of 25 May 04.

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL - UK EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL UK EYES ONLY

ANNEX A TO
D Cts(Ops) (081-04)
DATED 2 JUN 04


IRAQ'S SECURITY SECTOR STRUCTURE

INTRODUCTION

1. The following provides a summary of Iraq's security sector structure outlining the Ministry to which each element is subordinate and a current 'headline' status of each. Appendices 1 through to 5 provide detail of the training support to date, together with predicted equipment delivery timelines. They also outline next key steps and areas in which the UK could provide resource and training support in the short term (until 01 Jul 04) and medium term (Jul 04 until Jan 05).

2. The current structure of the Iraqi Security Forces is:

THE IRAQI SECURITY STRUCTURES



IRAQI POLICE SERVICE (IPS) (Appendix 1)

3. Ministry. Ministry of Interior.

A-1
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL UK EYES ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL EYES ONLY
DECLASSIFIED

4. Status. Over 80,000 police officers are now operational over Iraq with circa 20,000 having received training to date. Current training of the Iraqi Police Service is progressing, although it has not been as rapid as originally envisaged. Remedial action is now being taken to address this, with an accelerated and focussed training and leadership programme being put in place by the Coalition Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT).

BORDER POLICE AND CUSTOMS (DBE) (Appendix 2)

5. Ministry. Ministry of Interior.

6. Status. The DBE has successfully been reconstituted with over 19,000 Iraqis now in roles as border police, customs officers, immigration officers and nationality and passport officers.

FACILITIES PROTECTION SERVICE (FPS)

7. Ministry. Ministry of Interior (theoretically for functional standards).

8. Status. The FPS was created under the authority of the MOI, but is now managed by each Ministry requiring facilities protection. Training is the responsibility of the MOI. Manpower ceiling of 73,992 achieved. Construction of National FPS HQ with 14 regional co-ordination centres underway.

JUDICIAL AND PRISON SYSTEMS (Appendix 3)

9. Ministry. Ministry of Justice / Iraqi Correctional Service.

10. Status – Judicial. The Ministry came under full Iraqi control on 30 May. The Judiciary operates independently of the Ministry. Higher Judicial Council established in Baghdad and processing up to 3000 cases a week. Buildings allocated in Baghdad to house: Federal Supreme Court, Court of Cassation, the Council of Judges/Higher Juridical Council and the Central Criminal Court of Iraq. The courts are functioning reasonably well.

11. Status – Prisons. 18 prison facilities, with a capacity of 5,500 are operational and under the jurisdiction of the Iraqi Correctional Service (ICS). A further 16 facilities with a capacity of 23,000 are planned (capacity to increase to 11,000 by the end of 04). In May 04 3,269 officers were employed in the ICS. Plans to recruit further 2,000 over the next four months. National training academy for ICS officers under construction.

IRAQI CIVIL DEFENCE CORPS (ICDC) (Appendix 4)

12. Ministry. Final policy decision awaited but likely to be Ministry of Defence

A-2
CONFIDENTIAL EYES ONLY
DECLASSIFIED

13. Status. Policy decision on the future of ICDC awaited. There are 4 options:

- a. Formalise role as a Gendarmerie
- b. Transform to Regular Armed Forces
- c. Transform to Armed Forces Reserve
- d. Reintegrate/retire

It is generally assumed that Option 3 will be taken. ICDC, locally recruited and lightly equipped, working in support of IPS and Coalition. More successful in the North and South compared to the Centre where training effort has suffered because of focus on combat operations and not security sector training.

IRAQI ARMED FORCES (IAF) (Appendix 5)

14. Ministry. Ministry of Defence.

15. Status. IAF originally established for external security only. However, in light of internal security situation it is intended that the Armed Forces will be used internally when a particular situation is deemed to be beyond the capabilities of the IPS/ICDC. Current status of each element as follows:

- a. Army. 5 Bns of planned 27 Bns trained. 3,939 on trained strength with 2,763 in training.
- b. Iraqi National Task Force. Medium term initiative to establish 3 Bdes (9 Bns) of the Iraqi Army optimised for employment on Internal Security (IS) duties beyond the capability of the IPS / ICDC. First Bn ready by 30 Jun; full capability by 30 Oct 04.
- b. Iraqi Coastal Defence Force. 5 Patrol Boats and 5 smaller vessels for boarding operations now based in Umm Qasr. Designed for patrolling and interdiction operations in co-operation with Iraqi Riverine Patrol Service. 10 Commanding Officers trained in UK. 280 personnel out of 410 undergoing training.
- c. Iraqi Air Force. Effort focussed on creating Air Transport capability. 148 (ranging from pilots to Air Traffic Control) out of planned 500 force in training.

Appendices:

- 1. Iraqi Police Service

DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL UK EYES ONLY

2. Border Guards and Customs (DBE)
3. Judicial and Prisons
4. Iraqi Civil Defence Corps
5. Iraqi Armed Forces

DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL UK EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL UK EYES ONLY

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A
D Cts(Ops) (081-04)
DATED 2 JUN 04

IRAQI POLICE SERVICE (IPS) – MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

IN-THEATRE LEAD RESPONSIBILITY

1. OST/CPATT.

SUPPORT TO DATE

2. Coalition:

- Coalition Police Assistance and Training Teams (CPATT) established Mar 04, commanded by UK – Brig A Mackay.
- TIP training established.
- Jordan new entry training academy – increase to 3,000 every 8 weeks from July.
- Baghdad new entry training academy – increase to 2,250 every 8 weeks from July.
- Total of 20,000 IPS trained out of a total strength of 91,276. Redundancies of approx 20,000 required.
- Train the Trainer courses – increasing Iraqi training of Iraqi police.
- Mentoring of Senior Police Chiefs and within police stations.
- 304 out 500 International Police Advisers deployed.

3. UK:

- Over 100 British police officers are involved in training, mentoring and advisory roles of the Iraqi Police Service in Baghdad, across the south of Iraq and at the Jordan International Police Training Academy. UK support to the police effort is one of the major planks of our security sector reform strategy in Iraq and essential to civilian primacy in security matters.

NEXT STEPS

4. Short Term:

- Continuation of the basic recruit and TIP training with an aim to hand over TIP to Iraqi trainers by 30 June 04.

DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL UK EYES ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL UK EYES ONLY
DECLASSIFIED

5. Medium Term:

- Increase in more specialised areas of training e.g. public order, criminal intelligence, organised crime, basic criminal investigation, intelligence, internal controls, fingerprint system, post-blast investigation, drug enforcement, counter-terror/emergency system
- Reconstitution of Police in Western region including replacement equipment and rebuilding of stations recently damaged (\$20M programme).
- Completion of 25 Provincial police HQs
- Completion of 18 Joint Coordination centres.
- Completion of 9 regional training stations.
- Completion of refurbishment and equipping of 435 police stations.
- Development of leadership/ middle management training. Focus on developing and progressing skills acquired in basic training.
- Mentoring/ monitoring of IPS by International Advisors to ensure continued progress and improvement and ensure standards are adhered to.

UK ASSISTANCE

6. Short Term:

- Continued provision of UK Police officers delivering specialist training in Iraq and Jordan. **Action: FCO**

7. Medium Term:

- The UK to take responsibility for selected specialised courses; senior executive leadership courses, intelligence, organised crime and post bomb blast investigation.
- The continuation of the post of Assistant Director of the Baghdad Police Security Academy in Aug 04. **Action: FCO/Home Office**
- Mentoring ArmourGroup under contract from the FCO will deploy in accordance with the following programme:

Advance Party	- 6 personnel (PAX) – Recce/ specialist training.	
Main Body (MB) 1	- 20 Pax – Basra City/Rural	- NLT 30 Jul
MB 2	- 12 Pax – Maysan	- NLT 9 Aug
MB 3	- 11 Pax - Dhi Qar	- NLT 20 Aug
MB 4	- 11 Pax - Al Muthanna	- NLT 31 Aug

Action: FCO/MOD

DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL UK EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED

IPS Equipment

Indiv Equip Fielding (E)

>= 90% 
 70-90% 
 50-70% 
 <50% 

MAY

JUNE

JULY

AUG



































































































































































SEPT

OCT

NOV

DEC

JAN

MNB-N	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 
1 ID	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 
1 CAV	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 
1 MEF	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 
MND (CS) *218% on Ak's	Vehicles  Radios  *Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 
MND (SE)	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 

Items status shown are based on released contracts only.

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL UK EYES ONLY
DECLASSIFIED

APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX A
D Cts(Ops) (081-04)
DATED 2 JUN 04

BORDER GUARD AND CUSTOMS – MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

IN-THEATRE LEAD RESPONSIBILITY

1. OST/CPATT.

SUPPORT TO DATE

2. Coalition:

- Recruitment and training of Border Police Service.
- DBE successfully reconstituted – Border police (12,376), Civil customs 1,800 (total 2900), immigration 400 (total 1000) and Nationality /Passport office 4,144.

3. UK:

- HMC&E has been greatly involved in standing up the Department of Border Enforcement and Customs which is now fully functional. Consequently, the customs department has now successfully begun to collect revenue through established crossing points.
- Royal Navy lead in developing Iraqi Riverine Patrol Service.

NEXT STEPS

4. Short Term:

- Continue training. Equipment delivery is expected in the near future.

5. Medium Term:

- The construction of a National Training Academy is underway.
- Infrastructure programme to complete all class A, B and C posts by end of year
- Ensure a mentoring/ monitoring programme for the DBE.

DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL UK EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL UK EYES ONLY

UK ASSISTANCE

6. Short Term:

- Visit to the UK of Senior Border Enforcement and Customs Officials scheduled for Aug 04. This visit was previously cancelled following the dismissal and subsequent reinstatement of several senior and middle management officials. The visit will concentrate on best practice techniques and developing expertise. **Action: HM Customs and Excise**

7. Medium Term:

- Following the co-operation between the Iraqis and HMC&E, sign a Memorandum of Understanding to ensure continued development between the two countries. **Action: HMCE**
- The UK will also aim to source and facilitate the provision of customs mentors to the DBE in liaison with coalition allies. **Action: HMCE**

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL UK EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED IBP Equipment

Indiv Equip Fielding (E)

>= 90% ●
 70-90% ○
 50-70% ●
 <50% ○

	MAY	JUNE	JULY	AUG	SEPT	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN
MNB-N	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ○	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ○	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ○	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ○	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ○ Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ○ Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ○ Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ○ Radios ● Weapons ●
1 ID	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ○ Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ○ Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ○ Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ○ Radios ● Weapons ●
1 MEF	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ○	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ○	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ○	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ○ Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ○ Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ○ Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ○ Radios ● Weapons ●
MND (CS)	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ○	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ○	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ○	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ○	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ○ Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ○ Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ○ Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ○ Radios ● Weapons ●
MND (SE)	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ○	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ○	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ○	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ○ Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ○ Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ○ Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ○ Radios ● Weapons ●

Items status shown are based on released contracts only.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL UK EYES ONLY

APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX A
D Cts(Ops) (081-04)
DATED 2 JUN 04

JUDICIAL AND PRISON SYSTEMS – MINISTRY OF JUSTICE (MOJ) /IRAQI
CORRECTIONAL SERVICE (ICS)

IN-THEATRE LEAD RESPONSIBILITY

1. OST/CPATT.

SUPPORT TO DATE

2. Coalition:

- Judicial – MOJ established together with independent judiciary
- Prisons - CPA Order 7 (the Penal Code) dated 6 June 2003 and Order 10 (Management of Detention and Prison Facilities) dated 5 June 2003 sets out basic provisions for standards in prisons.
- The CPA has a Baghdad based US Senior Advisor for prisons. The US state they will keep 107 prison advisers within the country until 2006, and are planning a heavy programme of mentoring. **There are no UK staff in Baghdad.**

3. UK:

- The UK responsible for prisons within MND(SE).
- CPA(South) prison strategy is overseen by a Senior Prisons Advisor seconded from the UK Prison Service.
- Monitoring of the prisons in CPA(South) is principally provided by 3 members of the UK Military Prison Service and 2 TA officers who are UK prisons officers in their civilian careers.

NEXT STEPS

4. Short Term:

- 12 Justice specialists will remain attached to the US Embassy after transition.
- Publication of CPA legislation in the Iraqi Gazette required before it can take effect in Iraqi Law. Process still behind schedule. Not all orders will have been published by 30 Jun.
- **Prisons** Suitable buses and vans to transport prisoners to Central Criminal Court from other areas in Iraq to be delivered pre-30 Jun.

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL UK EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL UK EYES ONLY

5. Medium Term:

- Some training of judiciary being provided by US to raise awareness about human rights and international conventions.
- Focus effort on enhancing security of judges.
- Establish centralised computer system for recording detainees.
- **Prisons** – revised training programme for ICS officers implemented 29 May (increase from 2 to 6 weeks) The 3,000 who have already graduated will require additional in-service training.

UK ASSISTANCE

6. Short Term:

- Ensure that the numbers of UK advisors to the Iraqi Correctional Service are maintained at the current levels and replaced on a roulement basis. **Action: Home Office/FCO**

7. Medium Term:

- DFID involved in training elements of **judiciary** alongside the US. It will take time to build the capacity of the judiciary as a truly independent body. **Action: DFID**
- UK's support for **prison** management and training will increase significantly within the next few months. GCPP bid being prepared by FCO/ DFID to ensure the continued support to the Iraqi Prison Service to include:
 - Continued provision of three Senior UK Prisons Advisors and an additional two legal advisers to work in an advisory capacity;
 - Six prison mentors and three correctional services officers to oversee the prisons across MND(SE);
 - Three Military Provost staff in a mentoring capacity.
 - Establishment of train the trainers courses and mentoring of Iraqi Prisons staff.
 - Develop and implement an inspection regime and deploy monitors/ mentors to continue the reviewing of standards within prisons and implementing knowledge acquired through training. Provision of two legal advisors to assist in the management of prisons. Further development of prisons strategy. **Action: DFID/FCO**

A-3-2
DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL UK EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED

APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX A
D Cts(Ops) (081-04)
DATED 2 JUN 04

IRAQI CIVIL DEFENCE CORPS – MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

IN-THEATRE LEAD RESPONSIBILITY

1. CPA/OST/CMATT.

SUPPORT TO DATE

2. Coalition:

- 34 of 45 Battalions manned above 70% (32,484 personnel – target total 40,680)

3. UK:

- MSC's man, train, pay and sustain their ICDC. MND (SE) responsible for 6 Bns.
- Brigade HQ, EOD Company and all 6 Bns have been recruited and trained (total 5,068)
- Specialist training (medical, communications, driver) has commenced but hampered by lack of some specialist equipment, especially communications.
- ICDC capable of planning and conducting ops at Platoon level and progressing at Company level with close mentoring.

NEXT STEPS

4. Short Term:

- **Critical** - Publish long term policy for the ICDC
- Switch the focus of military operations to training and mentoring away from combat operations, particularly in the Centre where only 1 out of 6 Bns trained.

5. Medium Term:

- Complete generation to 45 Bns by Aug 04
- Establish appropriate Command and Control and conform to the IPS boundaries.
- Increase the level of leadership training.
- Complete equipment plan.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL UK EYES ONLY

UK ASSISTANCE

6. Short Term:

- Drive/influence policy decision on the future of the ICDC. **Action: OST/MNF/FCO**
- MND SE - complete ICDC Company level training. **Action: MOD**

7. Medium Term

- Monitor equipment delivery programme, especially communications. **Action: MOD/MNC-I**
- Continue mentoring ICDC. **Action: MOD**






























































































































































































DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL UK EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED

ICDC Equipment

Indiv Equip Fielding (E)

>= 90% 
 70-90% 
 50-70% 
 <50% 

	1-15 MAY	16-31 May	1-15 June	16-31 June	1-15 July	16-31 July	1-15 Aug	16-30 Aug	1-31 Sept
MNB-N 20th BDE	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 
1 ID 30th BDE	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 
1 CAV 40th BDE	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 
MND (CS) 50th BDE	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 
1 MEF 60th BDE	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 
MND (SE) 70th BDE	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 
13CC	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 	Vehicles  Radios  Weapons 

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL UK EYES ONLY

APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX A
D Cts(Ops) (081-04)
DATED 2 JUN 04

IRAQI ARMED FORCES – MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

IN-THEATRE LEAD RESPONSIBILITY

1. OST/CMATT.

SUPPORT TO DATE

2. Coalition:

- Coalition Military Assistance and Training Team (CMATT) established mid-03 to oversee development of Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF).
- Office of Security Transition commanded by Lt Gen Petreus **with a UK Deputy** (formerly DCG CMATT) stood up May 04

MOD:

- MOD building (Phase 1) complete and Minister in post
- Ministry stood up with Joint Headquarters collocated (capacity 200 people total)
- JHQ staff training completed (by UK Joint Warfare Staff)

Army:

- Jordanian Army training majority of officers
- Coalition training NCOs (Kirkush Military Training Base)
- 4 Battalions trained (plus 5th MP Bn) – further 22Bns by Dec 04.
- 3,939 on trained strength with 2,763 in training.

Iraqi Air Force:

- 148 AF personnel in training ranging from pilots to ATC. Initially force will be 500 strong
- Agreement established for transfer of Air Transport and helicopters from Jordan
- Jordanian Air Force training continuing for of aircrew and ground support personnel for air transport and support helicopter force
- Offer of 'gift' of aircraft received from Royal Jordanian Air Force

DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL UK EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED IAF Equipment

Indiv Equip Fielding (E)

>= 90% ●
 70-90% ○
 50-70% ●
 <50% ●

	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	January
Iraqi National Task Force									
1ST Bde Employable Theater Wide	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ○	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ○	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ○	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ●
2D Bde (South) MND CS	N/A	N/A	N/A	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ○	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ●
6TH Bde (West) I MEF	N/A	N/A	N/A	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ○	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ●

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL UK EYES ONLY

Iraqi Coastal Defence Force:

- 8 officers trained in Jordan.
- 10 officers trained at BRNC Dartmouth UK.
- 170 ICDF at Umm Qasr Naval Base for core training.
- 5 x 27 metre Patrol Boats collected by Coalition/Iraqis and delivered to Umm Qasr Naval Base.
- Patrol Boat crews and 9 Boarding Teams formed, undergoing specialist training by the Coalition.
- 5 x 7.2m RIBs (for boarding operations) delivered to Umm Qasr with Yamaha 100cc twin outboard motors on each.
- 110 trainees at Kirkush Military Training Base (KMTB) for initial training 09 May 04

3. UK. Under the auspices of CMATT:

- Training at Kirkush Military Training Base - Major plus 12 NCOs.
- Advising on the establishment of the Iraqi Military Academy - Lt Col
- CMATT C5 (Policy and Plans) - Gp Capt
- Leading the Coalition effort for the ICDF, expected to reach IOC in Jun and FOC by 30 Sep - Capt plus 58 RN/RM personnel.
- Assisting in the development and recruiting into the Iraqi Air Force - 1 Wng Cdr
- Legal Adviser in Baghdad - 1 x Lt Col

Additionally:

- 10 ICDF Commanding Officers completed training at BRNC, Dartmouth in Apr 04.

And outside the auspices of CMATT, UK is:

- Providing a Defence Advisory Team (DAT) to the Iraqi MOD.
- Providing a JFHQ team from PJHQ to train the Iraqi JHQ.

NEXT STEPS

4. Short Term:

- JHQ Initial Operating Capability 15 Jun

5. Medium Term:

- MOD Building (Phase 2) complete 15 Jul (capacity 500)

A5-2
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL UK EYES ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL UK EYES ONLY
DECLASSIFIED

Iraqi National Task Force:

- Establish a force of 9 Battalions by 30 Oct, designed to reinforce the ICDC and recapture urban areas that have been seized by insurgents.
- 1st Bde consisting of Bns 1, 2 and 4. (4th - 30 Jun, 2nd - 15 Jul, 1st - 7 Aug) (National Bde based at Taji)
- 2nd Bde now under training (Bns 3, 8 and 9) - **FOC 30 Sept** - West Bde based at Fullajah
- 6th Bde (Bns 21, 22 and 23) start training 30 Jun - **FOC 30 Oct** - Centre-South Bde based at An Numinayah.
- Complete training of all IAF Battalions by Dec 04

Iraqi Air Force:

- Transfer of 2 C130s from Jordan. This will form nucleus of 12 aircraft squadron to be based at BIAP.
- Transfer of up to 16 UH-1 helos from Jordan to be based at Taji
- Contracting for interim light aircraft capability for border/pipeline/electricity reconnaissance; to be flown by military pilots
- Determine refurbishment requirement and upgrade of avionic equipment; secure spares and maintenance support for C130 and UH1-H ac
- Contract for acquisition of permanent air surveillance platform

Iraqi Coastal Defence Force:

- 130 trainees at KMTB for initial training 25 Jul 04.
- Selection and training of Iraqi RIB coxswains.
- Consolidation of Iraqi Boarding Ops training.
- Intensive training of 5 Iraqi Patrol Boat crews on their respective Patrol Boats.

UK ASSISTANCE

6. Short Term:

- Continue training and mentoring ICDC/IPS in MND (SE).
- Determine policy guidelines for the release of UK funds to SSR. Access to funds is set to become more complex from 01 July. We will in a national context have access to Quick Impact Project money. £20 million, through DfID, although these projects are aimed primarily at reconstruction and not SSR and £17 million, through the GCPP, which is aimed at Governance and SSR.

CONFIDENTIAL UK EYES ONLY
DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL UK EYES ONLY

- The SSR process to date has been stifled by bureaucratic rules of the release of funds. If we are to be serious about sustaining the process of Iraqiisation of the Security Sector we need to take a pragmatic and flexible approach to the allocation of a combined UK source of some £37 million.

Action: FCO/MOD/DFID/HMT

7. Medium Term:

- Increase our commitment to the MNF-I and MNC-I at staff level in the intelligence, operations and planning branches as advised by Theatre.
- Focus on training the leadership cadre of the IAF.
- Continue our commitment to advising the MOD and the JHQ.
- Continue leading the Iraqi Coastal Defence Force project until FOC (30 Sep 04).
- Provide places on courses at UK military academies.

Action: MOD/SBMR-I/OST

DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL UK EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED

IAF Equipment

Indiv Equip Fielding (E)

>= 90% ●
 70-90% ○
 50-70% ●
 <50% ●

	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	January
3D Division Iraqi Army									
4TH Bde MNB N	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ○	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ●
5TH Bde MNB N	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ○	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ●
9TH Bde IID	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ●
5TH Division Iraqi Army									
3D Bde IID	N/A	N/A	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ○	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ○	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ●
7TH Bde MND CS	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ○	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ●
8TH Bde MND SE	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ●	Vehicles ● Radios ● Weapons ●

DECLASSIFIED