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IRAQ'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

THE ASSESSMENT OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT

Q&A

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1. GENERAL

Why are you presenting this dossier?

To share with the British people, and the wider world, the information available to the government on Saddam's persistent efforts to obtain weapons of mass destruction. The dossier shows why we need UN weapons inspectors back in Iraq.

Why now?

The Prime Minister has consistently said, before and after 11 September, that the issue of Saddam's WMD needed urgent attention. The dossier shows that Saddam has aggressively pursued his WMD programme. In the 4 years since the departure of the inspectors things have got worse, not better. It would be irresponsible to ignore these facts. So the international community has to act.

What do you want to happen next?

The inspectors must be allowed back in to do their job properly – this means full and unfettered access.

What about the Iraqi offer to allow inspectors back in?

Hans Blix is pursuing this. But Saddam's record – where he has persistently flouted the will of the UN for over a decade - means we must be sceptical that this offer will lead to the full and unfettered access the UN wants.

What is happening on the UN resolution?

Discussions continue in the UN. Our aim is to take this forward as swiftly as possible. Pointless to speculate but you can expect something in the coming days rather than weeks.

What is new in this report?

Material based on secret intelligence which has never been released before. The Executive Summary spells out (paras 5 and 6) the most important areas which go beyond previously published material.

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2. SOURCES

How up-to-date is the intelligence on which these judgements are based?

The Government is confident that the information is both current and reliable.

Does the information in the dossier represent all the intelligence HMG has acquired?

No. The Government has examined all the intelligence available, and – exceptionally – information obtained by the intelligence services has been included where it was considered that publication would not jeopardise the safety of intelligence officers, agents or other sources, or compromise the acquisition of further secret information.

What are the intelligence sources involved?

Mainly the United Kingdom's intelligence and analysis agencies – the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), the Security Service, and the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS). We also have access to intelligence from close allies.

Did you show the Americans the dossier before it was published?

Communications on intelligence issues between HMG and foreign governments are confidential.

What weight does the dossier give to defectors, such as al-Hadiri, who have been extensively quoted in the press?

Quality of the information depends on the position, level of access and knowledge that the defector had. We rarely rely on this type of intelligence if it is the sole source of information but it can be used to support, confirm or strengthen intelligence derived from other sources.

Who provided the imagery?

US national satellite reconnaissance systems.

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3. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

How many casualties would a chemical or biological warhead cause if it landed in a built up area?

There is no simple answer to this question. It depends on a number of factors such as the agent used, the format it is in and the type of system used to disseminate the agent. If the warhead operated to a reasonable degree of efficiency one filled with the nerve agent sarin might cause hundreds of fatalities, whilst one charged with anthrax spores might cause thousands or tens of thousands of fatalities.

The press has recently visited a number of sites named in the dossier and found no traces of chemical and biological weapons related activity. How do you explain this?

Visits were to al-Dawrah Foot and Mouth, Fallujah III, Salman Pak, Tuwaitha, Taji Cold Store, Al Qaim. Such visits can be easily orchestrated and stage managed. Elements of WMD programmes can be concealed. Hence the need for on-site inspection and monitoring by trained and qualified inspectors of the IAEA and UNMOVIC.

You mention mobile production facilities for biological warfare agents. But isn't this old news?

We have reliable intelligence which supports older reporting from defectors.

The dossier states that CBW agent production has continued. Is your evidence just speculation based on the existence of dual use facilities?

No. As the dossier says, we have intelligence relating to continued production.

What do we know about Iraq's military plans to use chemical and biological weapons?

Not prepared to go into the detail of the intelligence, but it is up to date. It is also relevant that Iraq used chemical weapons extensively during the war with Iran in the 1980s and shown that they do not regard these weapons merely as weapons of last resort.

Could Iraq mount a CBW attack on the UK Mainland?

Iraq does not have delivery means with sufficient range to reach the UK. We cannot exclude the possibility of terrorist action involving chemical and biological warfare agents, although there is no evidence of such a threat to the UK.

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4. NUCLEAR WEAPONS

What is the shortest time scale that Iraq could have a nuclear weapon?

If Iraq can buy high enriched uranium and essential components Iraq may be able to make a crude nuclear weapon in between one to two years.

Why did IISS say several months and President Bush a year?

The main point is clear. He could produce a bomb quickly if he had the fissile material. We have given our best judgements.

Does HMG believe the specialised aluminium tubes that Iraq has been procuring are for a nuclear weapons programme?

The specialised aluminium in question is subject to international export controls because of its potential application in the construction of gas centrifuges used to enrich uranium, although there is no definitive intelligence that it is destined for a nuclear programme.

You say that intelligence shows that Iraq has tried to obtain significant quantities of uranium from Africa – why not say which country?

It is not possible to go into specific details in respect of intelligence matters.

What uranium stocks does Iraq already hold?

Iraq has many tonnes of natural uranium in a form known as “yellowcake” (an oxide of uranium) stored near its main nuclear site at Tuwaitha. The IAEA has checked this material every January to show that none of it had been used.

Could Iraq use its safeguarded uranium to manufacture nuclear weapons?

Not in its current form. The safeguarded material is either natural or low enriched uranium, neither of which is suitable for any sort of nuclear weapon.

If Iraq could make a weapon from material on the black market in 1-2 years, could it be delivered by one of Iraq’s ballistic missiles?

Iraq would need a more sophisticated design for a missile warhead than any it had before 1991. It could well have done significant research on this while the inspectors have been away, and may have even produced some parts in anticipation. With the acquired fissile material and specialised parts, a warhead could be made for a missile in about two years, but may well fail. Further time would allow the weapon to be developed and tested to improve its reliability.

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5. BALLISTIC MISSILES

Are the al-Hussein missiles actually in a state to fly?

We judge that Iraq has the expertise and experience via its current missile programmes to be able to maintain these missiles.

Why do we believe they retain any al-Hussein missiles?

Not prepared to divulge the intelligence upon which this assessment is based. But UNSCOM could not account for all missiles imported from the former Soviet Union. UNSCOM discovered that Iraq had understated its indigenous production capabilities in some areas and could not verify that Iraq had melted down key missile components.

Can they put WMD warheads on their missile?

Iraq has admitted in the past making chemical and biological warheads for its al-Hussein missiles. We believe they could do so again.

Which agents could be filled into these missiles?

Any of the agents available to Iraq (listed in the dossier)

Does Iraq have chemical and biological warheads for other types of missiles

Iraq has the capability to have developed them.

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6. PROCUREMENT

What about intelligence on the assistance Iraq is obtaining from other countries to develop WMD?

This is an operational intelligence question. Not prepared to go into detail on the procurement cases noted in the dossier. But our eyes and ears are always open to such possibilities.

Do you have intelligence linking rogue Pakistani or Russian scientists to the Iraqi WMD programme?

Not prepared to comment. But we are alert to such risks.

The dossier names NEC engineers specifically? Why?

The role of this company is a matter of public record. NEC were identified in briefings to the media by German officials some time ago and recent actions taken against them by the Indian authorities have also been reported in the press. We use this as an example of how Iraq has is seeking foreign assistance to enhance its WMD capabilities in contravention of UNSCRs. We welcome the commitment of international partners and the Indian government to preventing the activities of unscrupulous private companies willing to help Iraq acquire WMD production capabilities.

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7. OTHER POINTS

Did British intelligence officers or agents work under UNSCOM cover?

Not prepared to respond to speculative questions relating to possible intelligence operations, no matter how far-fetched or provocative.

The dossier provides examples of dual-use facilities. How can you be sure that work related to WMD is undertaken in these facilities?

We are confident that Iraq has many dual use facilities that could support the production of chemical and biological agents. We have shown in the dossier that the Iraqi regime has admitted that before the Gulf War it adapted civilian facilities for the production of Biological agents. Because dual-use facilities are relatively easy to adapt for proscribed work, the UNSC passed a resolution establishing monitoring of such sites. This is carried forward in UNSCR 1284 which established UNMOVIC, to conduct such activities.

Do we have any evidence to indicate that Saddam uses his Presidential palaces to hide his WMD activities?

In the past when inspectors tried to conduct inspections of Presidential sites they were barred. We believe at those times Iraq was hiding WMD activities, plans, documentation or equipment there. Subsequently Iraq agreed a procedure to conduct inspections of the palaces including exact mapping of their extent. Those inspections, when diplomats accompanied inspectors, were notified well in advance and gave Saddam time to move incriminating evidence away from the sites.

How much money does Saddam actually spend on WMD?

The income generated illicitly outside of UN control is available for whatever purpose Saddam wishes. This will undoubtedly include military/dual-use and WMD-related procurement. We know his programmes are well-funded.

US differences?

It is clear that the British and American governments are in full agreement that Saddam's WMD programme remains significant and growing. We are also in full agreement that the international community must take action. Should not be surprised if different analysts using information obtained in different ways at different times come to slightly different technical conclusions - but the fundamental substantive judgements are identical.

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8. IISS STUDY ON IRAQI WEAPONS

What do we think of the recent IISS study?

The IISS (International Institute of Strategic Studies) dossier is an impressive chronicle of Iraq's chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programmes;

It demonstrates that these programmes continue to this day, that Iraq already has chemical and biological weapons capabilities, and that, if left unchecked, it could develop a nuclear capability at short notice;

It portrays very clearly and succinctly precisely how Saddam had played games with UN weapons inspectors and the International Community during the time they had been inside Iraq.

Key quotes:

"[Iraq] could construct a [nuclear weapon] fairly quickly"

"Iraq most likely has a small force of proscribed ballistic missiles with a range of about 650km, which are capable of delivering CBW [chemical and biological weapons] warheads"

"It has extensive biological weapons capacities and a smaller chemical weapons stockpile"

The IISS is of course a respected, independent body with no political axe to grind.

It has drawn these conclusions after its own expert analysis and without the privilege of the intelligence information which we possess.

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9. WMD - GENERAL

Does Iraq possess WMD?

Yes. Iraq is still hiding weapons of mass destruction in a range of locations. And it has admitted producing large quantities of chemical warfare agents including Sarin, Tabun, Mustard and VX gases.

Surely the sanctions have stopped Saddam getting WMD? Otherwise, what was the point of them?

Sanctions have helped to make Iraqi acquisition of WMD (and the missiles with which to deliver them) more difficult. But there are always those who are willing to breach sanctions. Some equipment has reached Iraq's WMD programmes, particularly in the case of biological and chemical weapons.

Why haven't we tried to pursue the weapons' inspectors option more aggressively?

We have. The UNSCRs are clear. Iraq must comply. The first step is unfettered access for UN weapons inspectors – any time, any place, anywhere.

Surely there are diplomatic options we could try?

We are demanding immediate compliance with UNSCRs. This is no more than what the UN Security Council requires.

Hadn't you better get Afghanistan sorted out before you move on to the next problem?

The UK, US and the international community remain committed to the long-term development of Afghanistan. The UK is part of a huge international effort to rebuild Afghanistan. That will continue. But that does not mean we should close our eyes to the threat that Saddam poses. Not an either/or.

Why does former UN weapons inspector Scott Ritter claim that Iraq has been disarmed?

Mr Ritter's recent statements contradict everything he said while he was working as a weapons inspector for UNSCOM. They also run contrary to the findings in March 1999 of a UN panel of 22 independent disarmament experts who concluded that serious gaps remain in Iraq's declarations on chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles, such as Iraq's failure to tell the truth over its production and weaponisation of VX.

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10. UN ROUTE

UN responsibility?

The UN is the right place to deal with the issue of Iraq and its WMD, because it is the UN's authority that has been consistently flouted. But this must be on the basis that the issue is dealt with, not avoided.

What is the latest on the new resolution?

Work continues in New York – with the UK playing a full part in those discussions.

When will a draft be tabled?

No point speculating while discussions continue. But would expect you will see something in the coming days rather than weeks.

What will it say?

Don't want to pre-empt the negotiations in the Security Council that are yet to take place. But our aim remains to make it clear that Saddam must comply with existing UN Security Council Resolutions, including letting the weapons inspectors back in with full and unfettered access, and securing full Iraqi WMD disarmament.

Will it contain a deadline?

Let's wait until a draft is tabled and the Security Council discussions start. But need an early testing of whether Saddam is serious.

How soon will it be agreed?

As soon as possible. The key is that it reflects the international community's will that Saddam comply with the existing UN obligations to get rid of all Iraq's WMD.

What about the Russians?

They, and other Security Council members, are playing a full part in discussions in New York. But it is crystal clear that the international community wants to see full compliance by Iraq with the existing UN Security Council resolutions.

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11. IRAQ'S HISTORY OF PLAYING GAMES WITH THE UN

Can you give some examples of Saddam's game playing?

Incidents of Iraqi obstruction are too numerous to list in full. But some of the more infamous examples include:

- firing warning shots in the air to prevent IAEA inspectors from intercepting nuclear related equipment (June 1991);
- keeping IAEA inspectors in a car park for 4 days and refusing to allow them to leave with incriminating documents on Iraq's nuclear weapons programme (September 1991);
- announcing that UN monitoring and verification plans were "unlawful" (October 1991);
- refusing UNSCOM inspectors access to the Ministry of Agriculture. Threats were made to inspectors who remained on watch outside the building. The inspection team had reliable evidence that the site contained archives related to proscribed activities;
- refusing to allow UNSCOM the use of its own aircraft to fly into Iraq (January 1993). In 1991-2 Iraq objected to UNSCOM using its own helicopters and choosing its own flight plans;
- refusing to allow UNSCOM to install remote-controlled monitoring cameras at two key missile sites (June-July 1993);
- repeatedly denying access to inspection teams (1991- December 1998);
- interfering with UNSCOM's helicopter operations, threatening the safety of the aircraft and their crews (June 1997);
- demanding the end of U2 aircraft overflights and the withdrawal of US UNSCOM staff (October 1997);
- destroying documentary evidence of WMD programmes (September 1997);
- and refusing access to inspection teams on the grounds that certain areas and even roads were deemed "Presidential Sites" (1997-98).

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12. POSSIBLE MILITARY ACTION

Isn't the rest of the world against military action?

No decision on military action has been taken. But crystal clear that the entire international community wants to see full compliance by Iraq with UNSCRs.

By going after another "Islamic" country you are playing into UBL's hands.

We are determined to ensure the widest international support for the firm line we are taking against Saddam – that is why we want to address this issue through the UN.

Won't Saddam use his WMD if cornered?

No decision has been taken to launch military action. Prime Minister has said repeatedly that military action should only ever be a last resort. We are giving Iraq every chance to comply with UN resolutions. But Saddam should be in no doubt about our determination to remove the threat of his WMD. There are many aspects we would need to take into account in taking a decision to launch military action. This is why we are considering all the options carefully, with our allies.

Wouldn't military action hurt the Iraqi people themselves?

No decision has been taken to launch military action. Prime Minister has said repeatedly that military action should only ever be a last resort.

Unlike Saddam Hussein, we have always tried to minimise the adverse effects of our actions on the Iraqi people, and we will continue to do so.

Wouldn't military action in Iraq destabilise the whole Middle East?

No decision has been taken to launch military action. Prime Minister has said repeatedly that military action should only ever be a last resort. There are many aspects we would need to take into account in taking a decision to launch military action. This is why we are considering all the options carefully, with our allies.

But Saddam should be in no doubt about our determination to remove the threat of his WMD. Nowhere is this threat higher than in the region. President Bush's 12 September call in the UN General Assembly for a new SCR on Iraq has been widely welcomed.

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13. TERRORISM

Has our Iraq policy created a climate for terrorism?

Wrong to suggest there can be any such justification for terrorism. Our Iraq policy is and will remain based on the imperative of containing the very real threat posed by the Iraqi regime to Iraq's people and neighbours.

What evidence is there of Iraqi support for terrorism?

Iraq has a long record of support for terrorism; this includes support for Palestinian terrorist groups (e.g. Abu Nidal) and the activities of the MeK against Iran, as well as the assassination of political opponents.

Was Iraq behind the 11 September attacks/Are there links with Al Qaeda?

We are keeping an open mind about Iraqi links with Al Qaeda. Nothing we have seen so far suggests Iraq was involved in the 11 September attacks. But we are investigating all reports of links.

Manipulation of Palestinian crisis?

Saddam Hussein has consistently sought to exploit the plight of the Palestinians to further his own ends – most recently his sickening encouragement of suicide bombing, his payment to bomber's families and his grandstanding by cutting off oil exports (which can only hurt ordinary Iraqis). But in reality he is only interested in his own survival and his own military ambitions. He certainly was not thinking of the Palestinians when he invaded Kuwait.

Why is terrorism not covered in the dossier?

The dossier focusses on the threat posed by Iraq's WMD programmes – there is no evidence that Saddam has provided materials or expertise to terrorists.

Is there any evidence that Iraq has supplied WMD equipment or know-how to terrorists?

There is no evidence that Iraq has supplied WMD materials or advice to any terrorist organisation. Al Qaida tried to develop a WMD capability in Afghanistan and is probably still trying to do so. It would benefit greatly from support from a state programme. Allowing WMD to remain in the hands of a regime such as Saddam's must involve the risk that these weapons will find their way into the hands of terrorists.

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14. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

What is UK doing to ease humanitarian situation?

UK has been at the forefront of the efforts of the international community to improve the humanitarian situation in Iraq.

Aside from our role in the UN, UK aid to Iraq continues both bilaterally and through the EU. Since 1991 the UK has donated over £100 million worth of aid, making us one of the largest donors.

DFID has allocated £6 million this financial year for humanitarian assistance to Iraqi people, focusing on de-mining, vulnerable groups funding and infrastructure rehabilitation projects for hospitals and water and sanitation facilities.

EU recently agreed 13m of humanitarian aid for the most vulnerable, for clean drinking water and health facilities.

Is Iraq short of funds for the purchase of humanitarian goods?

No. But Saddam Hussein pursues his own priorities not those of the Iraqi people.

While Baghdad claims that "oil for food" cannot meet the health needs of the Iraqi people, it has submitted contracts to the UN for approval in recent weeks for:

- over 2 billion cigarettes
- about 70,000 tons of cosmetics
- 1.5 million tons of perfume
- 750,000 television sets
- 31,000 dishwashers

Instead of buying additional humanitarian goods for the Iraqi people, the regime spends its own illicitly-obtained revenue constructing:

- a 40-hectare film production complex in Baghdad;
- The "Mother of Mosques" outside Baghdad. It is said that it will be the largest mosque in the world when completed. It will contain a 605 page Qur'an allegedly written in Saddam's blood.

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15. HUMAN RIGHTS

What is the human rights situation in Iraq?

Iraq's human rights record is appalling. Human rights violations include harassment of women, persecution on account of religious affiliation, torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment, extrajudicial killings and arbitrary executions, imposition of the death sentence for crimes not serious enough to justify it, persecution on account of political opinion and ethnicity, forced population transfers (Arabisation), arbitrary arrest and detention and lack of fair trial and due process.

Amnesty International's report of 15 August 2001 highlighted systematic torture of political prisoners in Iraq. Methods include knife cuts, sexual attacks, electric shocks, eye gouging, cigarette burns, pulling out of fingernails and mutilation of hands with electric drills.

Anyone found guilty of slandering the President is punished by having their tongue removed.

What is the UK doing to improve the human rights situation in Iraq?

Together with international partners, the UK takes every opportunity to raise this issue in international fora and has, for example, helped to draft and sponsor annual resolutions at the UN Commission on Human Rights and the UN General Assembly.

We also take practical measures to protect those suffering repression by participating in patrols of the northern and southern No Fly Zones which were established in support of UN Security Council Resolution 688 to help prevent Saddam Hussein from once again repressing the Iraqi people in those regions.

What about the UNCHR Special Rapporteur's visit to Iraq earlier this year?

For the last 10 years the Iraqi Government had denied UN Special Rapporteurs on human rights access to Iraq. Welcome the fact that Andreas Mavrommatis was allowed to visit in February 2002. It remains to be seen whether, following this initial visit, he will be able to continue his mission and will be given unrestricted access to enable him to carry out a full, independent assessment of Iraq's human rights situation.

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16. SANCTIONS

UN sanctions have caused death of 1.5 million Iraqis since 1990?

Pure Iraqi propaganda. No evidence for these figures which are published by Iraqi regime and which no independent observer has been able to verify. These figures climb steeply when Iraqi regime feels under most international pressure – have climbed by a million in last year alone.

Haven't sanctions actually strengthened Saddam Hussein's regime?

Aim of sanctions is not to depose or weaken the regime, but to force Iraq to comply with the UN's obligations and prevent the regime from obtaining weapons and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). No doubt that Saddam would much prefer to have sanctions lifted. He has invested a great deal of effort to that end.

But they have no effect on Saddam?

Sanctions deprive him of control of the vast majority of his oil revenue – over \$11 billion last year. Reject the argument that this is a satisfactory situation for him.

Aren't sanctions widely disregarded?

No. They are, for the most part, effectively implemented. There will be leakages in any sanctions regime. But illegal trade is small as a proportion of Iraq's pre-Gulf War trade or trade within "oil for food".

But UN sanctions on Iraq should be targeted?

They are. Full implementation of revised sanctions in July 2002 - under UN resolution 1409 - changes controls on Iraq from the original situation, where all exports to Iraq were prohibited unless approved by the UN, to one where all goods are automatically allowed except for those on a more focused list of military-related goods - the Goods Review List (GRL). The changes have expedited humanitarian exports to Iraq, and made clear the culpability of the Iraqi regime for the people's continued suffering. The United Kingdom is proud we initiated and fought for these changes.

Lifting of sanctions?

UN resolutions consistently make clear that Iraq holds the key to its reintegration into international community by complying with UN resolutions, particularly on disarmament. Iraqi rejection of UN requirements an obstacle to progress.

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17. KURDS/IRAQI OPPOSITION/KUWAITI PROPERTY

Kurdish reconciliation / current situation?

UK remains committed to building peace and stability in northern Iraq. Clear from our co-sponsorship of the Ankara Peace Process, our continuing participation in patrols of the northern No Fly Zone, and our bilateral aid programme for the Kurds in Northern Iraq. Welcome progress made by the PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) and the KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party) on the Washington Agreement, in particular the recent announcement that the two parties have reached agreement on reconvening the joint Parliament.

Break up of Iraq?

Have always supported territorial integrity of Iraq. We wish to see autonomy (not independence) for the Iraqi-Kurds. Kurds have made this clear this is what they want.

What is the HMG's relationship with the Iraqi opposition?

UK maintains contacts with a wide range of Iraqi opposition groups and supports their role in mapping out the future of a post-Saddam Iraq. **We give moral [though not financial] support to the Iraqi opposition.**

Does HMG support the work of INDICT (NGO trying to indict Saddam and other senior officials for war crimes)?

Support INDICT in its aim to bring Saddam Hussein and others senior officials to justice.

Has Iraq accounted for all the Kuwaitis and other foreign nationals missing since the Gulf war?

Iraq has only provided information sufficient to close three Kuwaiti missing files so far. The UK continues to take an active role in the Tripartite Commission to establish the whereabouts of 605 Kuwaiti and other nationals still missing since the occupation of Kuwait. Despite efforts to urge Iraq to recognise the humanitarian nature of this issue, the government of Iraq still refuses to co-operate with the process.

What about missing Kuwaiti property?

Iraq has refused to cooperate with the UN over the issue of returning property stolen during the Gulf War. Despite denying for several years that it had the Kuwaiti national archive, Iraq has now admitted that it does after all have them. Hope that Iraq will now turn words into actions and return the archives to Kuwait as soon as possible

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18. NO FLY ZONES

Why are UK and US planes bombing Iraq?

UK and US planes patrol the No Fly Zones, which were established in 1991 and 1992 to prevent Iraqi regime once again using its air power to repress and terrorise the Iraqi people.

Since late 1998 Iraq has waged a systematic campaign to shoot our aircraft down. There have been over 2,500 direct threats against our aircrew, including missile attacks and heavy anti-aircraft fire.

We only take action to protect our aircrew. Our responses are justified in self-defence.

Absolutely no wish to see this confrontation prolonged. Could end today if Iraq stopped trying to kill our aircrew.

What about civilian casualties?

All targets are military targets, very carefully selected to minimise the risk of civilian casualties.

Precision guided weapons are used where there is any risk of civilian casualties or damage to civilian infrastructure.

Learned long ago to distrust Iraqi claims about casualties. They have claimed civilian casualties on days when none of our aircraft have even been flying. They have claimed that buildings have been destroyed when photographs have later shown them to be entirely intact. Iraq claims that coalition aircraft were responsible for the deaths of some 23 people during a football match on 19 June last year. On that day, coalition aircraft were fired on by anti-aircraft artillery and surface to air missiles but did not respond. We are confident that the incident was a result of an Iraqi missile falling back to the ground.

Legal justification for the NFZs?

The No Fly Zones were established in 1991 (north) and 1992 (south) in support of SCR 688 which called on Iraq to end its brutal repression of the civilian population. They are justified under international law in response to a situation of overwhelming humanitarian necessity.

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19. IRAQ'S BREACHING OF 23 OUT OF 27 UN OBLIGATIONS

REQUIREMENT

IS IRAQ COMPLYING?

UNSCR 661, 6 AUGUST 1990

- Trade embargo on Iraq, except food and medicine

No

UNSCR 686, 2 MARCH 1991

- Iraq must return all stolen Kuwaiti property

No

UNSCR 687, 3 APRIL 1991

- Iraq must respect the border with Kuwait agreed in 1963 Partial
- Iraq must accept destruction, removal or rendering harmless of its WMD No
- Iraq must declare the elements of its WMD programmes No
- Iraq must co-operate with UNSCOM and IAEA inspections No
- Iraq must accept all responsibility for direct damage due to its invasion of Kuwait No
- Iraq must co-operate in accounting for missing Kuwaitis and others missing since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait No
- Iraq must not commit or support international terrorism No

UNSCR 688, 5 APRIL 1991

- Iraq must end repression of its civilian population No
- Iraq must allow access to international humanitarian organisations Partial
- Iraq must co-operate with UN Secretary General on needs of Iraqi civilians Partial

UNSCR 707, 15 AUGUST 1991

- Iraq must complete full, final and complete disclosure of its WMD programmes No
- Iraq must give UNSCOM and IAEA unconditional and unrestricted access No
- Iraq must cease any concealment or movement of its WMD No
- Iraq must fully respond to questions or requests from IAEA/UNSCOM No
- Iraq must allow UNSCOM/IAEA flights without interference No
- Iraq must halt all nuclear activities other than legitimate use of its isotopes No
- Iraq must provide IAEA/UNSCOM with any necessary logistical support No

UNSCR 715, 11 OCTOBER 1991

- Iraq must co-operate with UNSCOM/IAEA monitoring No
- Iraq must enact penal laws to secure enforcement against WMD in Iraq No

UNSCR 949, 15 OCTOBER 1994

- Iraq must not use force to threaten its neighbours or UN operations No
- Iraq must not enhance its military capability in southern Iraq No

UNSCR 1051, 27 MARCH 1996

- Iraq must report to IAEA/UNSCOM shipment of dual-use WMD items No

UNSCR 1284, 17 DECEMBER 1999

- Iraq must co-operate with UNMOVIC No
- Iraq must co-operate with the Tripartite Commission No
- Iraq must co-operate with the 'Oil for Food' programme Partial

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