


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CHIEF POLICE ADVISOR – IRAQ

SITUATIONAL REVIEW OF THE UNITED KINGDOM CIVILIAN POLICE MISSION IN IRAQ

by

ASSISTANT CHIEF CONSTABLE DICK BARTON

Dated 20 Apr 06

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INDEX OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
1 Executive Summary	2
2 Summary of Recommendations	4
3 Methodology	6
4 Acknowledgements	7
5 Strategic Priorities	8
6 Strategic Priority 1	9
7 Strategic Priority 2	10
8 Strategic Priority 3	11
9 Structure – UK CIVPOL Mission Iraq	13
10 Other work required in support of strategic priorities	15
11 Policy Review	17
12 Conclusions	18
Annexes	
A Terms of Reference Review	A-1
B Terms of Reference New Posts	B-1
C UK CIVPOL – I Organisational Structure	C-1

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1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.1 This review was commissioned at a meeting of International Policing stakeholders at the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO), London 21st March 2006, following the appointment of a new Chief Police Advisor to Iraq (CPA-I) Assistant Chief Constable Dick Barton. The Terms of Reference for the review are outlined at Annex A.

1.2 The review focuses on three main areas:

- Strategic Priorities
- Personnel Structure – United Kingdom Civilian Policing (UKCIVPOL) Mission Iraq
- Other work required (in support of Strategic Priorities)

1.3 The review attempts to avoid replicating areas already covered in Sir Ronnie Flanagan's Her Majesties Inspectorate of Constabulary Review.

1.4 It builds on the excellent work of previous UK CPA's – all of whom have surely felt the 'same but different' feeling an experienced police officer gets when put into a different policing environment, be it Brighton, Belfast or Baghdad.

1.5 The review theme is – "*keep it basic*". Many complex policing issues can be viewed in light of basic principles. For instance, police corruption – and legal techniques for dealing with it, look very similar across the globe.

1.6 This review is not undertaken in isolation. It forms only a part of security sector reform, international development, military activity and infrastructure reconstruction. It takes place at a time of great change in the global and local environment.

1.7 "*Keeping it basic*" means that the review teases out some fundamental short, medium and long term options - all of which can be implemented by the CPA-I given the support of FCO.

1.8 I will not outline the strategic aims of the various missions, agencies and stakeholders who have an interest in the policing picture in Iraq. Doing so would only serve to highlight the number of teams playing on this particular pitch – often having very different rules!

1.9 Suffice to say that the UK CIVPOL mission statement '*To assist in the development of an efficient, effective, credible and community supported Police Service*' is affected by many pressures.

1.10 It is clear to me that there are gaps in the justice 'circle'. This concept, favoured by the Cree Indians (the Cree believe that justice is not done until

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the 'circle' is closed) fits the current judicial situation in Iraq, and UK CIVPOL can help to close the circle. The review recommends a joined-up approach to achieve this key strategic aim by recommending greater top-level engagement with the criminal justice system.

1.11 The review outlines a proven personnel structure which moves the mission into the next phase. It advocates a policy review and draws attention to the need for a communications strategy.

1.12 In terms of future engagement, the review acknowledges the changing political landscape which affects the policing response and recommends development of specialist work areas covering major crime and internal affairs. This, coupled with potential 'draw down' activity in two provinces, means that contractor staff numbers could be considerably decreased within a short period of time.

1.13 A specific tactical personnel requirement report will be sent to the International Policing Unit under a separate cover for action.

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2 CPA – I SITUATIONAL REVIEW - SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1

That the mission incorporates a post known as; Assistant to the CPA- I (Major Crime and Criminal Justice), to co-ordinate and advise in this area.

Recommendation 2

That the UK CIVPOL mission engages with the implementation of an Internal Affairs capability linking to the development of Major Crime and NIIA capability. To achieve this, a specific post holder with authoritative experience in 'Internal Affairs' should be appointed.

Recommendation 3

That a thematic review of Internal Affairs project work be undertaken in July 2006.

Recommendation 4

Short Term - 0 – 2 months

Adopt a CIVPOL structure that incorporates Heads of Profession; Intelligence, Major Crime, Internal Affairs, Training. Delivery of Surge, Engagement and Assessment (SEA) Teams on a territorial basis by Senior Police Advisors, (assisted by deputies) directing contractor operations.

Medium Term – 0 – 4 months

Adopt a SEA Team model that is fit for purpose. Headed by Senior Police Advisors or a Head of Profession (such as intelligence and the TIPS project). Reduce contractor numbers – redirect effort into hotspots (Basrah), implement flexible SEA Team working to protocols.

Long Term – 0 – 1 year

CPA – I role to remain in place – with capacity to assign small specialist teams, including access to consultants. Police engagement at Senior Police Advisor level to Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

Recommendation 5

That UK CIVPOL adopt the structure as outlined at Annex C.

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Recommendation 6

The review recommends the continuance of the Military Assistant (MA) role to CPA-I. This role should be a vital consideration in any future military/CIVPOL partnership deployment.

Recommendation 7

Senior Police Advisors to have nominated deputies and current Rest and Recuperation agreements to remain.

Recommendation 8

The mission should have its own Strategic Intelligence Requirement to maximise intelligence obtained by all CIVPOL/Contractor personnel.

Recommendation 9

Contingent Communication Strategy to be adopted.

Recommendation 11

Awards and recognition policy to be developed in theatre.

Recommendation 12

An in-theatre policy review to be undertaken with input from Iraq Policy Unit.

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3 METHODOLOGY

Several sources informed this review:

- Material read in preparation for selection procedure – CPA-I.
- Briefings – obtained in London.
- Briefings, formal, informal, general and specific to Security Sector Reform (SSR), obtained in theatre.
- Visits – to key locations where UK CIVPOL are deployed.
- Meetings with key individuals.
- Focus groups with UK CIVPOL /Armor Group personnel.

I have witnessed the varied working conditions of the UK Contingent and have personally experienced the impact of security considerations that arise on a daily basis.

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4 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am most grateful for the frank and expert input of the various briefing staff - in the UK and in theatre. Your commitment to assist the Iraqi Police Service to become 'fit for purpose' is loud and clear.

I would also like to express my appreciation to General John Cooper and his staff who have literally gone out of their way to facilitate the CPA-I move into MND (SE).

I also acknowledge the support of RMP who has acted at short notice as Military Assistant/Staff Officer to CPA-I. His professional expertise has been invaluable and has prompted a continuing development of the Military/UK CIVPOL partnership (as outlined at recommendation 6).

I recognise the commitment of the Senior Police Advisors undertaking their roles. They are operating as senior police managers in what must be one of the most demanding civilian policing environments in the world.

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5 STRATEGIC PRIORITIES

5.1 The UK CIVPOL mission in Iraq is leaving a legacy of first class work in the areas of basic training, intelligence and forensics. However, there are clear strategic priorities.

5.2 I have drawn heavily on others opinions, - accepting my limited personal experience in the region. I have also balanced academic viewpoints (in particular The RAND publication)¹ alongside personal and anecdotal viewpoints from a wide range of sources – (see Methodology).

5.3 Three strategic priorities emerge:-

- **Priority 1. The mission must focus on building links with the criminal justice system.**
- **Priority 2. The mission must be engaged in developing the new Internal Affairs, Major Crime and National Information and Investigations Agency (NIIA).**
- **Priority 3. The mission must identify a realistic working model which facilitates draw-down and eventual complete handover to the Iraqi Police Service.**

¹ Developing Iraq's Security Sector – The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience ISBN 8330 3823 0.

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6 STRATEGIC PRIORITY 1

6.1 **The mission must focus on building links with the criminal justice system.** UK CIVPOL's many innovative and practical projects will be rendered worthless if they are not bonded to a resilient justice system. Other agencies already work in this area but the link to our mission is in major crime investigation. There is currently no mission lead on this.

6.2 We must use our practical expertise to influence the joining-up of the justice circle (or 'Rule of Law') in a way which is acceptable to the Iraqis. To do this the mission needs to expand leadership capability in this area. Resources to enable this will be drawn up from the current delivery end.

Recommendation 1

**That the mission incorporates a post known as; Assistant to the CPA- I
Major Crime and Criminal Justice, to co-ordinate and advise in this area.**

6.3 The post holder will undertake an audit of engagement throughout the criminal justice sector. Simply put – working out how to get the police service linked across all areas of the criminal justice system.

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7 STRATEGIC PRIORITY 2

7.1 **The mission must be active in developing the new Internal Affairs, Major Crime and NIIA capability.** This has been articulated in various directional documents (including Sir Ronnie Flanagan's Review) and there is a tragic imperative that illustrates the need to engage. Unexplained murders are still being reported in Baghdad and Basrah. It is intimated that ex-internal affairs operatives and Iraqi Police Service (IPS), or people masquerading as IPS, are involved in these killings.

7.2 There is a saying in anti corruption enquiries that "If there are rotten apples in the barrel – change the barrel before putting the green ones back in." (A similar Arabic phrase refers to a 'basket'.) The analogy is very apt – police transitional readiness assessments are coded red to green. Those positive green assessments will be worthless, if elements of the justice system continue to be corrupt. Overt corruption in the police, the most visible agency of the state – is crippling.

7.3 The RAND institute report describes this vital part of post conflict policing reform as having 'languished', but it should be noted that the report pre-dates 'Operation Corrode'- a dynamic Multinational Division (South East) (MND (SE)) initiative which targets police corruption.

7.4 Now is a good time to inject the specialist expertise of CIVPOL officers.

Recommendation 2

That the UK CIVPOL mission engages with the implementation of an Internal Affairs capability (linking to the development of Major Crime and NIIA capability). A specific post holder with authoritative experience in 'Internal Affairs' should be appointed.

7.5 This work is fundamental to ensuring sustainable change in the IPS and there should be an independent specialist review of the IA project after a specified time period (3 months). In the form of a 'thematic' review, it would be appropriate to engage the services of serving or ex-Internal Affairs officers.

Recommendation 3

That a thematic review of Internal Affairs project work be undertaken in July 2006.

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*declassified***8 STRATEGIC PRIORITY 3**

8.3 The mission must identify a realistic working model which facilitates draw-down and eventual complete handover to the Iraqi Police Service.

8.4 This strategic priority is the foundation for the direction of the UK CIVPOL mission in Iraq and it may provide a useful model for future missions. It needs to be nimble enough to cope with the fast changing security dynamics in the country and yet focus on outcomes.

8.5 There will be intense activity in some areas, 'hotspots' such as Basrah, but other areas will benefit from small teams who will undertake an engagement/assessment role. These teams should move from the Training Mentoring and Monitoring (TM2) approach to Surge, Engage and Assess (SEA), an approach which mirrors the engagement of Her Majesty's Inspectorate in the UK. Niche areas of policing (where UK CIVPOL have already made a significant contribution) will benefit from dedicated heads of profession – known as 'Assistants to the Chief Police Advisor' who should also use SEA methodology in their specialist areas.

- **International Police Advisors (I.P.A.s)**

In light of the above – it is appropriate to review the role of the private contractors associated with UK CIVPOL. My perception is that the number of IPAs is overly disproportionate to the task currently available. During potential draw-down in two provinces it is appropriate to review the figure employed. SEA teams could be relatively small in number.

There are three options:

- **Move to UK CIVPOL only surge/engagement teams**

The number of UK CIVPOL applicants has increased since a recent Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) lead advertising campaign. We should maximise this opportunity. SEA teams could be FCO employed CIVPOL on six-month contracts. (To include police support staff)

- **Move to UK CIVPOL/Contractor smaller more defined teams**

This will be a good transitional step - with smaller teams – maybe as small as 6 in Maysan/Al Muthanna with larger engagement teams in hotspot areas - such as Basrah. Smaller teams help to mitigate Force Protection issues and will be led by the Senior Police Advisor for the area and his deputy. Contractor team leaders will be responsible for logistics and co-ordinating the tactical delivery. The team composition will be flexible in accordance with local need.

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(The Assistants to the CPA-I will help determine the team composition)

- **Contractor only Surge, Engagement and Assessment (SEA) Teams**

Employ short term contracted specialist through contractors. This may be difficult to co-ordinate and may expose the mission to being a 'hostage to fortune'.

8.6 To support the model a short, medium and long term plan is to be adopted.

Recommendation 4

Short Term - 0 – 2 months

Adopt a CIVPOL structure that incorporates Heads of Profession; Intelligence, Major Crime, Internal Affairs, Training. Delivery of SEA Teams on a territorial basis by Senior Police Advisors, assisted by Deputies directing contractor operations.

Medium Term – 0 – 4 months

Adopt a SEA Team model that is fit for purpose. Headed by Senior Police Advisors or a Head of Profession (such as intelligence and the TIPS project). Reduce contractor numbers – redirect effort into hotspots (Basrah), implement flexible SEA Team working to protocols.

Long Term – 0 – 1 year

CPA – I role to remain in place – with capacity to assign small specialist teams, including access to consultants. Police engagement at Senior Police Advisor level to Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

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9 STRUCTURE – UK CIVPOL MISSION - IRAQ

9.1 **'Right People - Right Place - Right Time'**. Arguably, some of the impact of UK CIVPOL flagship work is being lost for want of an internal 'structure'. A proposed structure is outlined at Annex A – (police officers will recognise this familiar structure which has proven itself over decades). There is no desire to overlay this structure on the IPS – it merely provides a stable platform for UK CIVPOL.

9.2 The structure bears some explanation;

- **CPA - I** Responsible for all performance matters. Responsible to FCO. Daily line of reporting through GOC MND (SE).
- **Deputy CPA – I** Responsible for Personnel, Professional Standards (Discipline) and Policy maintenance.
- **A Cadre of 'Assistants to CPA – I'** Responsible for implementing key strategic aims (not territorial) within specialist areas. They will automatically become 'project leads' in their own field.
- **A Cadre of Senior Police Advisors – Serving Civilian Police Officers** Responsible for territorial Surge, Engagement and Assessment activity. Assisted by a deputy (CivPol). Surge, Engagement and Assessment team should be staffed by serving or recently retired officers assisted in the first instance by IPA contractors. Close liaison with IPU to succession plan.

9.3 To fulfil the void left by the relocation of the CPA – I to HQ MND (SE), Basrah – a Senior Police Advisor at Chief Superintendent level will be designated territorial lead – Baghdad (but not as deputy CPA – I).

9.4 I wholly advise the use of deputies at Inspector rank to support the Senior Police Advisors – we must provide command resilience.

Recommendation 5

That UK CIVPOL adopt the structure as outlined at Annex 'B'.

9.5 Due to the relocation of CPA-I to MND (SE) the existing arrangements for a Staff Officer did not suit. HQ MND (SE) provided an Army Officer on secondment as a Military Assistant (MA). This arrangement has many collateral benefits and I seek its continuance. The FCO should also commit to a secondary role required, that of Team Support Manager. This role could well be an FCO employee (i.e not UK CIVPOL) attached from Basrah Palace or seconded from UK.

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Recommendation 6

The review recommends the continuance of the Military Assistant (MA) role to CPA-I. This role should be a vital consideration in any future military/CIVPOL partnership deployment.

9.6 Now is a good time to address a concern raised in Sir Ronnie Flanagan's report – that of leave patterns. The military and other partners want a seamless service but clear terms and conditions of service apply to officers' seconded to the FCO. Those conditions of service should remain but there should be a 'deputy' system which will be rigidly enforced.

9.7 This applies to UK CIVPOL and contractors (I have already experienced the frustration of not being able to locate a unit lead, so I see the military viewpoint).

Recommendation 7

Senior Police Advisors to have nominated deputies. The current Rest and Recuperation agreement to remain.

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10 OTHER WORK REQUIRED IN SUPPORT OF STRATEGIC PRIORITIES

10.1 The review identifies work to be carried out in support of the strategic priorities.

- **Strategic Intelligence Requirement (SIR)**

10.2 All staff should receive an intelligence briefing/de-brief and have access to a standardised reporting system as per the National Intelligence Model (NIM) linking to Military intelligence.

Recommendation 8

The mission should have its own Strategic Intelligence Requirement to maximise intelligence obtained by all CIVPOL/Contractor personnel.

- **Communications Strategy** There are major challenges regarding communication between UK CIVPOL units. This may be aided by a strategy to develop a standard communications structure such as:
 - A website on I-Net
 - Newsletter – briefings – internal/external
 - Media Strategy Internal – External as agreed with FCO/Military
 - Meeting cycles

Recommendation 9

Contingent Communication Strategy to be adopted

- **Awards** A bone of contention. Several staff have commented to me that the army receive an 'OP Telic Medal', Police officers and FCO staff do not. At the very least I propose to award every member of staff who serves three months here a Contingent Commanders Certificate of Merit.
 - Contingent Commanders Commendations will be reserved for outstanding commitment or acts beyond the call of duty.

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- Letter to Chief Constable on completion of tour for serving officers.
- Letter of testimonial on completion of tour for retired officers.

N.B. (A small budget should be put aside for admin)

Recommendation 10

Awards and recognition policy to be developed in theatre.

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11 POLICY REVIEW

11.1 Much time and effort (rightly) goes to discussions relating to security policy. However – movements policy, arming policies have all generated much discussion – wasting time better spent on achieving strategic aims.

Recommendation 11

An in theatre policy review to be undertaken with input from Iraq Policy Unit.

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12 CONCLUSIONS

12.1 All of the recommendations outlined can be implemented by the CPA-I with support of the FCO.

12.2 At a time of significant change, (Iraqi Governmental position, Brigade handover and a large tranche of UK CIVPOL postings) the review provides continuity of effort – targeting those areas where we can do the most good. It recognises the need to build command resilience with clear lines of reporting, whilst being able to provide a flexible, specialist service in this challenging environment.

12.3 The review advocates a structure which will keep our 'eye on the ball' using UK CIVPOL expertise to help create an Iraqi Police Service that is fit for purpose, supporting the overall regeneration of the security sector.

Assistant Chief Constable Dick Barton
Chief Police Advisor - Iraq

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TERMS OF REFERENCE (TOR) REVIEW

CIVPOL UK

Chief Police Advisor (CPA)

Introduction

These Terms of Reference guide a review to be conducted by Assistant Chief Constable (ACC) Dick Barton regarding United Kingdom (UK) Civilian Policing assistance to Security Sector Reform (SSR) programme within Iraq.

The Terms of Reference take into account 2 overriding factors¹

- That the policing effort should support the Military objectives
- That there is a continuing requirement to provide CPA support to Baghdad.

Terms of Reference

1. To review the strategic intention of the UK CIVPOL Mission to ensure it is fit for purpose assessed against the dynamic situation in Iraq.
2. To review the tactical application of the UK CIVPOL/Civilian Contractors partnership.
3. Review personnel requirements in light of 1 and 2 above.

Note: Any *other matters arising* will be subject of separate reviews.

¹ As outlined in minutes of meeting FCO London 21 Mar 06.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

POST: ASSISTANT TO THE UK CHIEF POLICE
ADVISOR – IRAQ (INTERNAL AFFAIRS)

ANSWERABLE TO: UK CHIEF POLICE ADVISOR – IRAQ

KEY OBJECTIVES

To provide advice and support regarding the proactive and reactive investigation of offences alleged to have been committed by Iraqi Police personnel in order to assist the Iraqi Police Service to deliver ethical community orientated Policing.

KEY TASKS

- Provide specialist advice on structures relating to 'Internal Affairs'.
- Provide specialist advice on vetting processes related to Internal Affairs.
- Maximise the use of available intelligence systems in order to prove/disprove a persons involvement in offences.
- Be part of the 'Internal Affairs' multinational implementation team.
- Link the project to other Intelligence and Major Crime projects.
- Act as a mentor for the designated head of Internal Affairs.

SKILLS REQUIRED

- Serving or retired Officer
- Up to date knowledge of Professional Standards enquiry techniques.
- Proven investigation of major crime.

KEY INTERPERSONAL QUALITIES

Diversity Aware	Initiative
Resilience	High Level of Interpersonal Skills
Leadership	Management
Professional Effectiveness	

TERMS OF REFERENCE

POST: ASSISTANT TO THE UK CHIEF POLICE
ADVISOR – IRAQ (CRIME)

ANSWERABLE TO: UK CHIEF POLICE ADVISOR – IRAQ

KEY OBJECTIVES

Provide a central point of reference and advice regarding all matters relating to Major Crime Investigation in order to assist the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) to bring serious offenders to justice.

KEY TASKS

- Provide advice on major crime investigation techniques to senior Iraqi investigators.
- Assist in the implementation of a Major Crime Investigation Model.
- Liaise with senior Iraqi Police Officers and judiciary to influence a 'joined up' approach.
- Provide a central point of reference for the UK Forensic Advisor in Iraq.

SKILLS REQUIRED

- At least Detective Inspector level with experience as a Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) within a territorial or centralised unit.
- Accredited SIO or in the process of attending nationally recognised modules.
- Operates to Murder Investigation Manual standards.

KEY INTERPERSONAL QUALITIES

Committed to Human Rights

Initiative

Resilience

Leadership

Professional Effectiveness

Management

TERMS OF REFERENCE

POST: ASSISTANT TO THE UK CHIEF POLICE
ADVISOR – IRAQ (INTELLIGENCE)

ANSWERABLE TO: UK CHIEF POLICE ADVISOR – IRAQ

KEY OBJECTIVES

To provide a specialist input to the Intelligence processes within the UK Civilian Police mission in order to assist the Iraqi Police Service to bring offenders to justice.

KEY TASKS

- Liaise with intelligence partners in CPATT and MND SE.
- Establish intelligence regimes which will withstand the rigours of the Iraqi Transitional process.
- Develop an intelligence model which is fit for purpose in the newly established specialist crime structure; including Internal Affairs.
- Facilitate the provision of specialist advice regarding hostage recovery and other specialist matters relating to serious crime.

SKILLS REQUIRED

- Accredited Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) or currently undertaking SIO modular courses.
- Detailed knowledge of a national intelligence model.
- Experience in managing the Intelligence Cycle.
- Knowledge of specialist intelligence assets including technical and Humint.

KEY INTERPERSONAL QUALITIES

Diversity Aware

Initiative

Resilience

Leadership

Professional Effectiveness

Management

RECOMMENDATION 5 - UK CIVPOL ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE

