


2/43  
~~SECRET - UK EYES ONLY~~  
**DECLASSIFIED**

D/PJHQ/5/12/1102/01

22 Jun 05

**COSSEC**

**OP TELIC: OPERATIONAL TRANSITION IN IRAQ**



**ISSUE**

1. Setting out the plan for Operational Transition in Iraq. How should Op TELIC be transitioned to create the conditions for Coalition disengagement in MND(SE)?

**TIMING**

2. Routine. This paper will shape future Joint Commander's direction and the next Force Level Review, and contribute operational advice to strategic guidance this summer.

**CONTEXT**

3. At the operational level, PJHQ has analysed where we are now and how we transition Op TELIC to a successful conclusion in accordance with UK strategic objectives, while meeting Coalition obligations. A Joint Commander's Planning Directive<sup>1</sup> was issued to GOC MND(SE) posing a series of planning questions. The answers form the basis for this paper, which proposes a clear way ahead for transitioning MND(SE).

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

4. COS should note that CJO plans to deliver Operational Transition in 4 steps<sup>2</sup>:

- a. **Security Assistance.** Ongoing Security Sector Reform (SSR) to create capable Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).
- b. **Transfer to Provincial Security Control, with Tactical Overwatch.** Giving Iraqi provincial control meaning by handing the lead for security to capable ISF, and then acting in local support of that lead.
- c. **Operational Overwatch.** Drawing in to a limited number of MNF bases in order to reduce profile, while providing capable and agile provincial reinforcement to a continued Iraqi lead.
- d. **Strategic Overwatch.** The Coalition posture that will underwrite Iraqi self-reliance and the normalisation of bilateral relationships.

5. COS should note that Operational Transition should result in transfer of Provincial Security Control followed by a period of Tactical Overwatch in:

<sup>1</sup> Joint Commander's Planning Directive for Operational Transition in Iraq, PJHQ/J5/12/1102/01 (22 Apr 05).

<sup>2</sup> These steps correspond in meaning to the MNF-I terms: Implement the Transition Team Concept, Transition to Provincial Security Control and Transition to National Security Control. However, they better reflect the *Coalition* activity required, rather than states of Iraqi control, which can be misinterpreted. Strategic Overwatch is a MNF-I term, yet to be fully defined, and beyond National Security Control

**DECLASSIFIED**  
SECRET - UK EYES ONLY

- a. Al Muthanna and Maysan provinces in Autumn 05.
  - b. Dhi Qar and Al Basrah provinces in Spring 06.
6. COS should note that the following key force posture adjustments could then be made:
- a. A BG Task Force (TF), based at either Basrah Air Station or possibly Tallil, provides Operational Overwatch for both Al Muthanna and Maysan provinces between about Feb and Jul 06.
  - b. An Italian<sup>3</sup> BG(+) provides Operational Overwatch for Dhi Qar province from about May until Nov 06.
  - c. Two UK BGs provide Operational Overwatch for Al Basrah province between Jun and Aug 06, reducing to a single BG until Nov 06.
  - d. Due to the withdrawal of UK BGs, a reduction in enablers will be possible over time although Operational Overwatch is likely to demand significant enabling Combat Support and ISTAR, and base closures will take time to yield Combat Service Support force reductions. This will be a discrete area for examination during the next Force Level Review.
  - e. Operational Overwatch will shift to Strategic Overwatch in about Nov 06, which will in turn create the conditions for normalisation. At this point the current over the horizon reserve can be functionally released and replaced by a Strategic Overwatch force, the size, shape and readiness of which needs to be defined.
7. COS should note that the following reductions in force levels should result from Operational Transition:
- a. UK BGs withdraw from Iraq in about Feb, Jun, Jul and Aug 06.<sup>4</sup>
  - b. The Australian BG and Japanese IRSG<sup>5</sup> withdraw in Dec 05. The Australians contribute by grouping<sup>6</sup> thereafter.
  - c. The Italian Bde reduces to a BG(+) in Apr 06, which can be withdrawn in about Nov 06.
  - d. The Danish BG reduces in Jan 06. The Danes contribute by grouping thereafter.

8. COS should note that:

<sup>3</sup> All references to multinational partners' reductions represent options that make sense operationally and that would play well diplomatically, rather than confirmed national positions.

<sup>4</sup> The Rear Ops BG is withdrawn separately in the earliest stages of Operational Transition, if its tasks can be carried out by other troops. A discrete decision to withdraw the Div Res BG, which will effectively be in Operational Overwatch from the start of Transition, can be made in about Jul 06.

<sup>5</sup> Battalion-size Iraqi Reconstruction Support Group.

<sup>6</sup> Grouping together national contributions to provide a range of capabilities under one (battlegroup) command

a. Operational Transition will produce a gradually reducing base footprint which should see MND(SE) operating from just Basrah Air Station, Umm Qasr and possibly Tallil<sup>7</sup> by about Nov 06.

b. Operational Transition will result in some immediate costs, including the up front costs of base closures, the possible establishment of temporary facilities at Tallil Airbase, and a short-term increase in the size of the aviation and air fleets in order to enhance mobility during Operational Overwatch.

c. This Operational Transition plan is not dependant on the pace of the Iraqi national political process *per se*. The ~~key~~ condition that guides this time-based approach is the relative capacity of Iraqi provinces to assume full responsibility for their security, *although the i itself assumes a degree of continuing political & economic progress at present*. COS are requested to agree that Ministers need to be briefed on the plan for Operational Transition in Iraq and its key strategic consequences, namely:

a. The need to provide clarity of UK operational intent to the US, MND(SE) Coalition partners and the Iraqi Government. This will require the development of a strategic handling plan.

b. The significant reduction of UK force levels in Iraq during 06.

### BACKGROUND

#### UNDERSTANDING OPERATIONAL TRANSITION

10. The conceptual schematic at Annex A explains Operational Transition and associated terminology. A series of consecutive operational steps in each province will require identified actions. Progress will be affected by conditions, but the aim is to introduce the discipline of a time-based approach, without losing sight of the real impact of those conditions. The expected pace of Operational Transition assumes no expansion of the divisional area and is consistent with MNF-I/MNC-I thinking. It can be adjusted according to the judgment of theatre commanders. The dates this paper sets out are achievable aspirations, but *the method allows for adjustments in time*.

#### JUSTIFYING OPERATIONAL TRANSITION

11. Time to Change. Op TELIC needs to change. The generally permissive situation in MND(SE), increasing Iraqi self-reliance, UK domestic expectation of reductions in commitments, and the need to prove operational success, make a bold correction essential. Rather than waiting for the perfect conditions to apply, the UK should force the pace through dynamism in MND(SE). There is decreasing justification for maintaining a Medium Scale Plus (MS+) ground holding commitment in Iraq, but it will perpetuate – beyond current expectations – if the rigour of a clear plan is not imposed. There are parts of MND(SE) where the presence of multinational forces provides a catalyst for instability and our solutions need to be adequate, not perfect. Iraqi consent is finite, and should not be assumed too far into 06. We should adjust our presence while in possession of the initiative, not as a reaction to losing it.

<sup>7</sup> Either Tallil Airbase or Camp Mitica, where the Italians have a presence.

12. Shaping US Thinking. Operational Transition should be presented to the MNF-I as a proactive response to direction already placed on MND(SE) by MNC-I,<sup>8</sup> who judge the 4 MND(SE) provinces as the 'easiest' to transition. The US understand our national 'red lines.' For the moment, they are unlikely to ask the UK to do more in Iraq; indeed, they would welcome a declaration of intent which supports the coalescing view that the MNF-I must draw down to win.<sup>9</sup> We can do this without creating a security vacuum in the Corps 'rear area,' and without creating a sense that the UK is 'deserting' the coalition, but this will need careful handling.

13. Leading MND(SE) Partners. Our MND(SE) partners expect UK leadership. A structured plan will be a positive contribution to coalition management inside the Division. Changes to levels of national contribution should be seen as opportunities to show progress and reinvigorate contributions rather than threats to cohesion, particularly if national contributions draw down gradually. MND(SE) partners will be engaged fully in the detailed planning and implementation of Operational Transition, and most should be invited to maintain a national presence at every step.

14. The 'Dividend.' In accordance with UK strategic intent, force level reductions made as a result of Operational Transition are unlikely to be re-invested elsewhere in Iraq. Initially, the 'dividend' will be absorbed by the need to rehabilitate forces but it will be important to explain to the US that force reductions are linked to an increasing presence in Afghanistan and support to other Global Counter Terrorism operations. A declared contribution to future Strategic Overwatch would also demonstrate the UK's continued commitment to Iraq.

#### SECURITY ASSISTANCE

15. Security Assistance requires a partnership between ISF and coalition units for training, mentoring by embedded personnel mainly at formation level, and the conduct of operations. An element of SSR, which applies emphasis on organisational reform, is also required for less developed institutions, like the Iraqi police. Progress against the SSR line of development will be key to informing GOC MND(SE)'s judgement on when the ISF of a particular province are capable of assuming Provincial Security Control. Operational Transition depends on growing Iraqi capacity, which *must remain the dynamic, coherent and properly funded Main Effort*. Critical to the latter is continued UK direct funding for SSR and military-led reconstruction, especially given the uncertainty of central MNF-I funds in MND(SE).<sup>10</sup> An element of targeted assistance and reform will continue, leading eventually to normalised bilateral defence relations. A careful balance will need to be struck during Transition between driving real self-reliance and reducing MNF profile, and premature disengagement from capacity building. The best way to do this is to get SSR right, by being absolutely sure that we are doing as much as we can, especially in the next critical 6 months.

#### TRANSFER OF PROVINCIAL SECURITY CONTROL AND TACTICAL OVERWATCH

16. Iraqi provincial governments already have Provincial Control. What they lack is credible security forces to give Provincial Control real substance. When this is in place,

<sup>8</sup> MNC-I OPORD Edition 05/02 dated 1 Apr 05.

<sup>9</sup> This expression has entered the MNF-I lexicon: *Iraq Update – Consideration of the Way Ahead*. TANK CONPLAN V6 dated 12 May 05.

<sup>10</sup> A PJHQ ministerial submission makes the case: *Iraq: Funding for a Further Programme of SSR and a Civil Effects Fund for MND(SE)* dated 15 Jun 05.



formal transfer of Provincial Security Control will be implemented, based on a thorough assessment of Iraqi capacity, through:

- a. ISF Capability. The MNC-I Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) – to which MND(SE) contributes – provides a combined objective and subjective measure of ISF operational capability in relation to their ability to assume responsibility for their areas of responsibility. The TRA feeds the Provincial Control Criteria (PCC), which GOC MND(SE) uses to make judgements about each province, fusing Lines of Operation by linking threat, progress of SSR and civil capacity. These metrics support assessments of progress across the security sector, not just for the Iraqi Army (IA). Judgements, and the management of the attendant risk, are for GOC MND(SE) to make, but the process needs to be transparent.
- b. Iraqi Perception. The Iraq Opinion Poll<sup>11</sup> provides independent population polling of perceptions of security confidence in ISF. At present<sup>12</sup> 59% of the MND (SE) population has a great deal of confidence in the Iraqi Army (IA) to improve the situation in Iraq. 47% of the population believe that the immediate departure of the MNF would improve the security situation.
- c. MNF-I Direction. The extant MNC-I Operations Order sets out a time frame for transfer of Provincial Security Control that is more ambitious than the envisaged timelines for Operational Transition.<sup>13</sup>
- d. The Threat. There will be no eradication of insurgent activity by MNF. The insurgency has multiple motivations, including a desire for restoration of the *status quo ante*, nationalism, revenge, sectarianism, alienation, *jihad*, crime and nihilism. Some of these can be tolerated at an 'acceptable level,' as they have been in Northern Ireland for 36 years. Others are not serious drivers in the south, although we should be alert to pan-provincial volatility, especially among the Shia. What is important is the *relative* capacity and will of the ISF to deal with the level of violence and instability, and that the means to re-intervene in support of the ISF is appropriately configured.

17. Tactical Overwatch. Tactical Overwatch lasts for approximately 3 months after Transfer of Provincial Security Control, during which local bases are progressively closed and the visible Coalition profile reduced. Making this step, and its timing, is a tactical decision. The tasks are the same as those for Operational Overwatch (described below) and the protocols for re-intervention will be only proportionately less stringent; the difference between postures is the physical proximity of Coalition support to ISF and the degree of intimate support provided through mentoring. Tactical Overwatch will require a high degree of professional discipline so that the ISF are given the chance to develop self-reliance. Re-intervention will be by careful design.

## OPERATIONAL OVERWATCH

<sup>11</sup> Newly generic name for MNF-I sponsored nationwide polling data, extrapolated for MND(SE) provinces.

<sup>12</sup> These figures trend downwards currently, due to spikes of violence nationally in Apr and May and time elapsed since the last elections. They are likely to continue to fluctuate. Figures are plus/minus 3%.

<sup>13</sup> OPOD 02/5 dated 1 Apr 05 anticipates transfer in MND(SE) in May and Jun; dates which are superseded by those in this plan, by agreement between CG MNC-I and GOC MND(SE).

18. Operational Overwatch requires a presence at core sites inside Iraq, at high state of readiness and with enhanced mobility, to re-intervene in support of ISF and to protect Coalition vulnerabilities. It will last for at least a further 4 months. Making this step, and its timing, is an operational decision. Tasks during this step will be:

- a. Provision of an intelligence architecture to monitor and report on the situation, and measure relative ISF effectiveness.
- b. Mobile protection of LOCs.
- c. Protection of the base closure project and enduring bases.
- d. Protection and sustainment of the residual capacity building effort.<sup>14</sup>
- e. Protection of Other Government Department (OGD) personnel until sufficient alternative means of security are in place.
- f. Re-intervention according to conditions agreed in formal protocols.

19. Force Protection. Operational Transition is built on the taking of measured risks, because the greatest risk of all is to do nothing. Force Protection will, however, be paramount and will require careful analysis, both in terms of posture and force protection measures. Areas for further consideration are the protection of mentors, OGD and UN personnel deployed beyond anticipated completion dates (for the FCO, Jul 06<sup>15</sup>) and interfaces with ISF and contractor-provided security. Of note, the Head of DfID in Southern Iraq has acknowledged that it would be inappropriate to use large numbers of deployed troops to protect small numbers of field officers.<sup>16</sup>

20. Roulement. Although conditions will remain the key drivers for operational change in Iraq, this paper seeks to engender the dynamism of a time-based approach. It is emphasised throughout that military judgement is the final arbiter of when each step is taken in each province. A significant factor will be the interplay between MND(SE) troop rotations and key events, both in Operational Transition and the political process. This factor will influence the scheme of manoeuvre and synchronisation, but not the overall concept of operations.

### SYNCHRONISING OPERATIONAL TRANSITION

21. The graphics at Annex B explain how Operational Transition will be implemented in each province. The coincidence of a reducing threat and increasing ISF capacity, illustrated by markers for the achievement of IA formation or battalion Full Operating Capability (FOC), will initiate a downward, stepped adjustment of MND(SE) force posture. The force posture adjustments, in terms of reducing force levels and base closures, are highlighted. The expected reduction of US brigades is included as a guide, pending clarification by the MNF-I Jun Assessment.<sup>17</sup> The Provincial plans are as follows:

<sup>14</sup> One of the areas we might be required to support for longer, within the re-intervention protocols, is ISF logistics, which can be bolstered from behind the scenes.

<sup>15</sup> Head Political-Military Section, Iraq Directorate, FCO to MOD dated 6 May 05 (Civilian Projects and Force Protection: MND(SE)).

<sup>16</sup> 'Two or three DFID field officers are not an argument for maintaining a battalion of troops in Maysan.' Head of DfID Southern Iraq, 5 May 05. Quoted in GOC MND(SE) Post-Tour Report dated

5 Jun 05.

<sup>17</sup> Due to start to report on 18 Jun, although the Assessment must not be expected yield direction until Jul.

a. Maysan. TF Maysan will transfer Provincial Security Control this autumn, probably by 31 Oct 05. The TF will minimise its footprint, confining itself as much as possible to Camp Abu Naji, whilst concentrating on mentoring, delivering an established IA bde HQ and a new battalion from the Regional Training Centre (RTC), logistic assistance, assisting ISF-led operations and immediate intervention according to protocols established between HQ MND(SE) and the provincial government. This shift to Tactical Overwatch should result in an immediate drop in incidents involving MNF. Maysan will retain its unique 'eco system' beyond Coalition intervention, just as it did under former regime oppression. It will be important for Provincial leaders to be engaged in the political process and denied the opportunity to blame 'occupation' for the province's ills, and that Shia popular consent is maintained. Operational Overwatch will initiate the withdrawal of the TF, either to Basrah Air Station or Tallil, and the closure of Camp Abu Naji in about Feb 06.

b. Al Muthanna. The withdrawal of the Japanese IRSG will be taken as an opportunity to prove mission success in Al Muthanna, a province which accounts for just 0.25% of all incidents<sup>18</sup> in Iraq. The IRSG's work will be complete and its constitutionally innovative deployment will be vindicated, without further extending its risk. The Australians are in Iraq for 2 reasons: to protect the IRSG and to contribute to the SSR task. Both these aims will have been achieved by the end of Tactical Overwatch. The Australians should be invited to contribute to Operational Overwatch by grouping. The UK BG in TF EAGLE<sup>19</sup> can be withdrawn from theatre on the completion of Tactical Overwatch (about Feb 06), with Operational Overwatch being provided jointly for Al Muthanna and Maysan by the relocated TF Maysan.

c. Al Basrah. Al Basrah province holds the greatest degree of risk for Operational Transition. It contains the most complex governmental and social structures, strategic routes, economic infrastructure and points of entry and a third of the population of MND(SE)'s four provinces. It has also produced the highest rate of incidents in MND(SE), at 2% of Iraq's total.<sup>20</sup> Therefore, Operational Transition will start later and be likely to progress at a slower pace than elsewhere. Our force posture will remain more robust and locally-based throughout. Operational Overwatch will be provided by 2 UK BGs, with Danish reinforcement by invitation. The seat of MND(SE) command will remain in Al Basrah. MNF presence in Basrah City will reduce during Summer 06 and thereafter coalesce outside the city, although a residual presence may be required to support diplomatic vulnerabilities. Shaibah Logistics Base should be closed by around Nov 06, although this will be a significant task.

d. Dhi Qar. Like Al Basrah, Dhi Qar straddles the strategic routes running north to Baghdad. These will require particular emphasis during Operational Overwatch. The intelligence picture in this province is less developed than in others. Although the Italians have reaffirmed their intention to remain committed in Iraq, there are strong indications that an opportunity to reduce force levels would be welcome. Accordingly, Operational Overwatch for Dhi Qar should be implemented by an Italian-led BG(+) from Camp Mittica, which would retain a useful alternative

<sup>18</sup> Average MNF-I SIGACTs since Jun 03.

<sup>19</sup> The name given to the UK/Aus BG TF in Al Muthanna.

<sup>20</sup> Average MNF-I SIGACTs since Jun 03.



presence at Tallil. Operational Overwatch for Maysan and Al Muthanna could also be provided from Tallil, in order to shorten reaction times.

22. Summary of UK BG Reductions. The graphic at Figure 1 summarises, by BG only, the sequence of key UK force level reductions envisaged under Operational Transition. A guide to the force levels, expressed as troop numbers, is included as a downward line.




Figure 1 – Summary of UK BG reductions ▲ Decision Points

### STRATEGIC OVERWATCH AND IRAQI SELF-RELIANCE

23. Strategic Overwatch is accepted MNF-I vernacular<sup>21</sup> for the Coalition posture that accompanies Iraqi self-reliance under full Iraqi National Security Control. This posture – which is neither prescribed by this paper<sup>22</sup> nor as yet defined by MNF-I – requires further development. The concept is likely to rely to a large degree on high readiness over the horizon forces, but the conditions for reintervention – both politically and militarily – are complex. Early engagement with the US is essential on this issue.

### MARITIME DIMENSIONS

24. The maritime dimensions of Operational Transition centre on maintaining a presence at Umm Qasr to support the strategic SPOD and further development of the Iraqi Navy (IzN). The IzN's responsibility for the sea gateway to Iraq and oil infrastructure should make it a high priority for investment. Our strategic interest in Umm Qasr Port, the added mobility a maritime dimension offers Operational Overwatch, for example to the Al Faw peninsula and the waterways north of Basrah, are justifications for ensuring that Operational Transition is not exclusively land-centric.

<sup>21</sup> See e.g. the MNF-I Campaign Action Plan for 2005 – Transition to Iraqi Self-Reliance (22 Apr 05).

<sup>22</sup> It is referred to by the working title 'Iraq TF' in Annex B.



## AIR & AVIATION DIMENSIONS

25. Air. The development of the Iraqi AF (IzAF) is still immature. As a consequence, responsibility for the integrity of the Iraqi airspace will fall to the Coalition for some time to come. Initially, the US are likely to meet this requirement using aircraft based in Iraq but over time this could be provided by externally based resources. For the moment, this paper does not advocate reductions in the UK ACC's capabilities. The ISTAR requirements of Operational Transition drive the retention of Fast Jet and Nimrod support,<sup>23</sup> and a Fast Jet CAS capability will also be required to support lighter, more exposed land forces. The intra-theatre AT requirement will continue up to the early stages of Strategic Overwatch, and additional aircraft dedicated to Operational Overwatch are likely to be required. Over the horizon forces – the current reserve and Strategic Overwatch forces – will require AT at very high readiness.

26. Aviation. Although a shrinking force footprint will enable aviation assets to be concentrated, the requirement for mobility will increase during Operational Overwatch. Additional helicopters are likely to be required during this period.

## RISK

27. Although the greatest risk is to do nothing, Operational Transition carries a number of risks. Risks are not reasons to delay progress *per se*, but are factors to consider when making judgements about each step. The rate of progress may be adjusted - up or down - according to 3 key risks:

- a. A failure to build adequate ISF capacity sufficiently quickly, or to misjudge their capability.
- b. A chronic failure in the Iraqi political process and its architecture that precludes any form of Provincial Security Control.
- c. A substantial deterioration in the security environment, especially if it threatens progress in other Lines of Operation.

## INFO OPS

28. Info Ops will be a critical part of Operational Transition. Work needs to begin now to shape local, regional, national and international target audiences, within a framework that synchronises all contributing effects, according to 4 themes:

- a. The attainment of Provincial Security Control is an Iraqi achievement, resulting from the development of capable ISF.
- b. In MND(SE) the Iraqis are taking charge of their lives.
- c. Real Iraqi self-reliance reduces Coalition visibility and influence, seamlessly and as promised.

<sup>23</sup> Clearly the employment of air assets needs to be considered across theatres and, for ISR, the potential capability gap between the decommissioning of Canberra PR9 and the ISD of ASTOR should be noted.

d. The achievement of Provincial Security Control in Southern Iraq could be achieved elsewhere with further development of the ISF and continuing effort to defeat the insurgency.

29. Coalition personnel must understand the intent behind Operational Transition and their role in the plan. An element of the Info Ops plan must, therefore, be focused on this audience.

### BASING

30. The maps at Annex C illustrate a reducing base footprint as Operational Transition develops. The aim is to move from high profile garrisoning to a leaner, more concentrated layout, which will better respond to the demands of a changing operation, while reducing the signature and logistic burden. The basing aspects of Operational Transition will be built on the following principles:

- a. A Deliberate Operation. Drawing down an operation at MS+, with Large-Scale legacies, is a significant logistic and basing challenge, and should be implemented as a defined project, run by a joint co-ordinating headquarters.<sup>24</sup>
- b. Adding to ISF Capacity. MND(SE) base rationalisation needs to be carefully dovetailed with plans for the ISF so that appropriate bases can be transferred to Iraqi control. Iraqi policy states that the ISF have first refusal for existing base ownership. In some cases, it will be cheaper to gift bases to the ISF rather than bear the recovery costs. Early development of a gifting policy will be important.
- c. Reduction of the Logistic Burden. Base closures will gradually reduce the number and length of MND(SE) LOCs and the associated enablers and infrastructure. Responsiveness and careful positioning, rather than scale and spread, will define the future logistic burden where appropriate. The use of Contractor Logistics (CONLOG) will continue to be maximised.
- d. A Multinational Approach. The base closure project must be conceived and implemented as a multinational<sup>25</sup> project, for reasons of speed, economy, presentation and accountability.

31. Base Closures. The basing footprint in MND(SE) should reduce along the following lines:

- a. Chindit Camp and Old State Building closed in Oct 05.
- b. Camp Abu Naji, Al Qurnah, Al Faw, Camp Smitty and As Samawah closed by Feb 06.
- c. Shatt Al Arab Hotel and Basrah Palace as an MND(SE) location<sup>26</sup> closed by about Jul 06.

<sup>24</sup> Separate consideration should be given to this HQ.

<sup>25</sup> Including influencing and taking account of the MNC-I Basing Plan, from the Jun Assessment.

<sup>26</sup> We assume that the Consul General and UN presence will remain at Basrah Palace. Although troops may be required to provide some force protection for some time, the Palace would not after this point be a military base in itself.

- d. Shaibah Logistics Base closed by about Nov 06.
- e. The retention of a presence at Basrah Air Station, Umm Qasr, and possibly Tallil beyond Nov 06 in order to facilitate future Strategic Overwatch, and other point locations required for normalisation.

#### COMMAND

32. This paper does not explicitly propose adjustment to the in-theatre command and control of MND(SE) or the requirement of embedded staff in Baghdad. It is unlikely that changes can be made until about mid-06, although there may be potential for migrating much of the staff effort from divisional to brigade level, while maintaining the 2 star level of command.

#### SUMMARY OF THE WAY AHEAD

33. This paper briefs COS on the plan for transitioning MND(SE) over the next 18 months. Operational action will produce strategic consequences for Coalition relationships and commitments, and these should be briefed to Ministers. Subsequent strands of work are:

- a. Next Force Level Review. The next Force Level Review should make recommendations on in-theatre command and control arrangements for Op TELIC beyond mid-06, on embedded staffs, on adjustments to the enablers required during transition and on the detailed management of force level reductions.
- b. By PJHQ and HQ MND(SE). As well as this Review, there will be a requirement to issue a new Joint Commander's Directive, to assess and adjust the rate of progress of SSR, to develop re-intervention protocols, to contribute to MOD-led Info Ops and the engagement of Coalition and Iraqi partners, to deliver a detailed base closure project with a gifting policy, and to take forward policy direction on our commitment to Strategic Overwatch.


#### CJO

##### Annexes:

- A. Conceptual Schematic – The 4 Steps of Operational Transition (v5)
- B. Operational Transition – Outcomes and Adjustments Graphics (v6)
- C. Operational Transition – MND(SE) Reducing Base Footprint (v4)

# DECLASSIFIED

## CONCEPTUAL SCHEMATIC - THE 4 STEPS OF OPERATIONAL TRANSITION




DECLASSIFIED



CONFIDENTIAL - UK EYES REL MCFI  
DECLASSIFIED

ANNEX B.T.O.  
D/PJHQ/5/12/  
DATED 22 JUN 05


OPERATIONAL TRANSITION - OUTCOMES & ADJUSTMENTS GRAPHIC (MAYSAN PROVINCE)




ISF(A) FOC

- (X) Brigade
- (XX) Division (all 4 provinces)
- (II) Battalion

PROJECTED US  
BDE REDUCTIONS




KEY - ADJUSTMENTS BOX



1. THREAT TREND

Threat Trend is based on Operational Analysis of SIGACT data since Jun 03. MND(SE) incidents have accounted for an average of 2% (Al Basrah) to 0.25% (Al Muthanna) of incidents across Iraq. Spikes have been "smoothed" to show a linear prediction for each province for the next 18 months based on the last two years. These lines are relative, not absolute, but they do provide a feel for the relative capacity that ISF may need to achieve to contain the level of threat they may reasonably be expected to face.

OPERATIONAL TRANSITION - OUTCOMES & ADJUSTMENTS GRAPHIC (AL MUTHANNA PROVINCE)




DECLASSIFIED  
CONFIDENTIAL - UK EYES REL MCFI

# DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL - UK EYES REL MCF

ANNEX B TO  
D/PJHQ/5/12/  
DATED 22 JUL

## OPERATIONAL TRANSITION - OUTCOMES & ADJUSTMENTS GRAPHIC (DHI QAR PROVINCE)




ISF(UA) FOC

- (X) Brigade
- (XX) Division (all 4 provinces)
- (II) Battalion

PROJECTED US  
BDE REDUCTIONS




KEY - ADJUSTMENTS BOX



1. THREAT TREND

Threat Trend is based on Operational Analysis of SIGACT data since Jun 03. MND(SE) incidents have accounted for an average of 2% (Al Basrah) to 0.25% (Al Muthanna) of incidents across Iraq. Spikes have been "smoothed" to show a linear prediction for each province for the next 18 months based on the last two years. These lines are relative, not absolute, but they do provide a feel for the relative capacity that ISF may need to achieve to contain the level of threat they may reasonably be expected to face.

## OPERATIONAL TRANSITION - OUTCOMES & ADJUSTMENTS GRAPHIC (AL BASRAH PROVINCE)




# DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL - UK EYES REL MCF

**OP TELIC OPERATIONAL TRANSITION - MND(SE) BASING FOOTPRINT**

**JUN 05 - NOW**



Camp Ur – Regional Training Centre (RTC)




CONFIDENTIAL - UK EYES REL MCFI  
**DECLASSIFIED**

ANNEX C TO  
D/PJHQ/5/12  
DATED 221 JUN 05

## OP TELIC OPERATIONAL TRANSITION - MND(SE) BASING FOOTPRINT

### FEB 06 - TOWARDS OPERATIONAL OVERWATCH



CONFIDENTIAL - UK EYES REL MCFI  
**DECLASSIFIED**



OP TELIC OPERATIONAL TRANSITION - MND(SE) BASING FOOTPRINT

NOV 06 - TOWARDS STRATEGIC OVERWATCH

