


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
**NIGEL SHEINWALD**

cc John Sawers	FCO
Nell Crompton (for Edward Chaplin & Dominic Asquith in Baghdad)	FCO
Rob Fry	MOD
Martin Howard	MOD
William Ehrman	ISS
Richard Kemp	ISS
Jim Acton	Home Office
David Quarrey	No 10
Martin Dinham	DFID
Jonathan Rushforth	HMT
George Fergusson	



**IRAQ: STRATEGY FOR 2005**

As we agreed at your meeting on Monday, I attach a draft paper for submission to the Prime Minister to form the basis for a Ministerial discussion next week. It reflects inputs and initial comments from a number of copy addressees. If there are any further comments, it would be helpful to have them by Monday lunchtime.

  
**MARGARET ALDRED**

4 February 2005

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**IRAQ: STRATEGY FOR 2005**

The elections on 30 January signalled the desire of the majority of Iraqis for democracy, and secured widespread international support. It is vital that we seize the momentum that generated, to engage the new Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) and secure international support to overcome the insurgency and create the conditions in which to pursue the transition to full democracy in accordance with the TAL and UNSCR 1546. This paper sets out the key elements of a strategy to pursue that objective comprising:

- building up the capability of the Iraqi Security Forces (Iraqisation);
- outreach by the ITG to bring in those currently supporting the insurgency;
- drawing in the international community and giving it a new sense of purpose;
- reviewing reconstruction to find ways to make a difference quickly;

together with the contribution that the UK might make.

**THE CURRENT SECURITY SITUATION**

2 The JIC has assessed that the scale and intensity of the Sunni insurgency continues to put the achievement of a unified and democratic Iraq at risk. In Sunni areas, the insurgents may be growing in strength and influence. Foreign Jihadists are a minority, but their efforts to attack the MNF (particularly the Americans) and Shia, Kurds and Iraqis working for the

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Government threaten to destabilise the country and have a disproportionate impact on the political process. The hard core and most effective insurgents are former Ba'athists; but the bulk of those involved in attacks are disaffected Iraqis, most of whom probably have no long-term political objectives. All insurgents have a perceived common enemy: the MNF, particularly the US and those Iraqis associated with supporting the "occupation". The military campaign is not effectively containing the insurgency, which will continue through 2005 and beyond.

3. The failure to bring the insurgency under control is critical. Tackling the insurgency is the key to progress in other areas. Intimidation undoubtedly reduced participation on 30 January, particularly in Sunni areas. Attacks on the infrastructure and those involved in reconstruction have adversely affected daily life for Iraqis, and deterred international organisations and NGOs from establishing a presence. The UN helped with the election but its development agencies do not have an effective presence in MND(SE). And the World Bank and EU, both of whom have a key role to play, have yet to set up a presence in country. The costs of the conflict, in both human and financial terms, have spiralled. Law and order, the pace of economic reconstruction, the availability of jobs, and general quality of life, have not matched expectations. Taken together, this is alienating more and more Iraqis.

#### THE POLITICAL PROCESS

4. The success of the elections has strengthened the political process and offers an opportunity to detach some elements of the insurgency through Iraqi led efforts for national reconciliation. Engaging all sections of the Iraqi population is vital to the legitimacy and success of the transition to democracy. That means having Sunni ministers in the ITG and engaging key leaders, including those in the insurgency, in the political debate and drafting the constitution; but without giving the Kurdish and Shia Arab communities

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cause to complain they have undue influence. A State Department team is currently in Iraq to assess how best to build on the election and help the ITG. A FCO official is with them. Subject to any views that emerge from that visit, we should:

- preserve the authority of the elected TNA to decide the constitution eventually submitted to the referendum and encourage Shia (and Kurdish) leaders to promote messages of national unity; and Sunni Arab leaders to declare willingness to join the political process;
- lobby Iraq's neighbours and the wider international community to deal with the ITG and to encourage Sunni participation in the political process;
- encourage the ITG/TNA to invite UN advice/support to devise an inclusive process for drafting the constitution as early as possible. That might include a set piece event to launch the process; a committee of elected TNA members, which properly represents all elements of Iraqi society, charged with overseeing the drafting process; a sub-commission or "preparatory committee" of Iraqi experts plus the UN to draw on international expertise; regional "town hall events" around Iraq.
- Encourage the ITG to relax the rules on de-Baathification as a way of drawing disaffected former Army officers and officials back into the system (difficult if the Shia list dominate the new government);
- Engage in early discussions with the ITG on a conditions based reconfiguration of the MNF to address the concern that the MNF

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presence is open ended, which the JIC assessed was one driver of the insurgency.

5. These steps will need to be accompanied by a discreet dialogue, led by the ITG, but supported by the US/UK and possibly UN, with figures close to, or involved in, the insurgency with the goal of persuading some to join the political process. That will involve difficult compromises, particularly where key individuals have blood on their hands or have ordered operations. But the stakes are high enough to justify the risks.

6. We also need to increase the international community's engagement in the political process to:

- enhance the legitimacy of the ITG;
- reduce the extent to which insurgents are able to feed off divisions in the international community;
- lock neighbouring countries into a policy of active support (increasing pressure on the Syrians and Iranians);
- create an atmosphere within the UN to facilitate the renewal/revision of the MNF mandate (UNSCR review in June, expiry in December); and
- improve the cohesion of the MNF.

Other measures should include:

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- Sharm el-Sheik follow-up meetings at official level to co-ordinate practical assistance and give participants ownership over the process (cf 6 plus 2 mechanism for Afghanistan);

- identifying niche roles for countries/organisations, through which they can make a distinctive contribution to both the political and security processes, which gives them a stake in success.

(Illustrative list attached at Annex A.)

## GOVERNANCE AND RECONSTRUCTION

7. Apart from improving the security environment, the key challenges for reconstruction and development in 2005 are:

- the weak capacity of Iraqi Government institutions to drive forward reconstruction;
- sustained improvement in fuel and electricity will require difficult reforms and cracking down on corruption and sabotage;
- the ITG will take time to establish and its limited life may discourage early radical reform;
- limited presence on the ground of international bodies and NGOs;
- ensuring that all areas of Iraq see the benefits (the South is not a strategic priority for the US).

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8. In advance of ITG formation, we should be taking action now to:

- prepare key messages to the new Government on reconstruction priorities;
- support the handover using DFID funded capacity building consultants in Baghdad;
- lobby the UN, International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and donors to engage;
- complete the design of a new £40 million power and infrastructure project for the South, and start mobilising the project team;
- decide on ways to expand visible job creation work in the South, and invite other donors to follow suit;

9. Iraqi Transitional Government ownership of the process, building on the IIG's National Development Strategy, will be crucial. It will need to persuade the UN, IFIs, and NGOs to engage in country. To facilitate that we should be:

- offering help to the ITG to develop an action plan;
- encouraging the UN and IFIs to re-engage by: offering life support and security, via the British Embassy and Consulate General, to the World Bank and IMF; lobbying the UN to engage fully in reconstruction; providing a DFID secondee to help

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liaison with the Iraqis; and looking for innovative ways to engage both the political and official level;

- encouraging the US and ITG to: improve planning for immediate post-conflict reconstruction in the cities, building on the lessons learned in Fallujah and Najaf; spread reconstruction funding more equitably; and lobby the UN and IFIs for help.
- seconding a British official into the US Project Contracting Office (PCO);
- lobbying other Europeans to broaden the international reconstruction effort.

10. Subject to agreement with the ITG, the UK's longer-term targets should be:

- improving capacity building, focussing particularly on institutions at the centre of Government (Prime Minister's office, the Presidency and the Council of Ministers' Secretariat); the Ministry of Interior (as part of the wider security policy); and economic advice;
- helping the four southern Governorates to deliver and re-establish links with Baghdad;
- supporting the constitutional process and elections at the end of 2005, through both UK expertise and DFID funding and the UN;

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- improving infrastructure in the South, including a £40 million project focussed on the power sector, and rapid job creation through an enhanced public works programme;
- helping the Iraqi Government to co-ordinate its response to humanitarian demands in Fallujah and elsewhere, including post-conflict expertise, and funding through NGOs or international organisations.

## SECURITY STRATEGY

11. The JIC assessment highlights the need for the ITG, supported by the MNF – and the US and UK in particular, to develop a successful counter-insurgency strategy with both political and security strands.

12. We agree with the broad conclusions drawn by General Luck, but there are a number of concerns:

- - the persistent failure of the US machinery in theatre to:
    - give consistent effect to implementing their security strategy;
    - be prepared to give Washington bad news; or to reflect on their own failures;
- the decisions by a growing number of Coalition members to withdraw their forces;

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- the failure of the wider reconstruction effort so far to deliver, although there are some positive signs in Najaf which might provide a model for other areas, eg Fallujah;
  - a reluctance to consider a date to give effect to Iraqi leadership in practice.
13. Building up the capacity of the Iraqi Security Forces has been limited by:
- the lack of capacity and clear leadership in the IIG;
  - extensive 'de-Baathification';
  - the effective disbanding of former military structures;
  - the historically low capacity and status of the police;
  - too few individuals with knowledge and experience to provide and middle and senior leadership;
  - Coalition delay in delivering the Petraeus plan (slow procurement and a disinclination to acknowledge failures).

The impact of the growing insurgency has also meant that the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) – military and police – have been faced with challenges for which they are not trained or equipped to respond, with a consequential adverse impact on morale. There was too much focus on quantity rather than effectiveness. Allawi announced revised plans for larger and more capable

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Iraqi Security Forces. The ITG will need to take a view on these plans as a matter of urgency.

14. We have particular concerns about whether the police assistance team model, as envisaged by Luck, is a good one. It is not yet clear whether the US will adopt this proposal. By itself it will not address all the problems, it carries a high risk for those embedded with the police in the current security environment, and it does not reflect police working methods. We would not wish to change the practice in MND(SE) or deploy British personnel in that way.

15. To make progress, we need to ensure the ITG is fully engaged with the Coalition. Key elements are likely to be:

- an overarching and visible Iraqi structure responsible for security;
- competent and committed Ministers and senior officials;
- developing proposals on how to make security sector reform work; and secure Iraqi ownership of the plan;
- a clear declaratory plan for MNF drawdown, agreed with the ITG, and in accordance with UNSCR 1546, which includes milestones on the progressive handover to Iraqi control (see Annex C for an assessment of the conditions for handover);
- an Iraqi-led counter-insurgency policy which addresses hearts and minds as well as security;

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- a reorientation of the MNF intelligence effort from "warfighting" to "counter-insurgency" (although detailed proposals will not be developed until the intentions of the ITG are clear), development of Iraqi military and police intelligence capabilities, and co-ordination between them;
- development of a "policing plan" setting out the role of the police, including self-protection, development of a paramilitary capability, its relationship with the military, and areas of police primacy);
- a co-ordinated plan to provide advisers to support the relevant ministries (for both policy development and institutional capacity building).

The US are currently reviewing their policy. A military assessment mission, led by General Luck, concluded that there is no "silver bullet". The existing Petraeus plan is viable, but better execution is required to deliver results. A summary of General Luck's conclusions are at Annex B.

16. The UK should not increase force numbers in Iraq, and we would not anticipate providing personnel for Military Assistance Teams, or operations, outside our current area of operations. We should offer further assistance with:

- development of a strategy for the Iraqi police service (deployment of experienced, senior officers to both the Ministry of Interior and MNF could achieve considerable impact );

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- provision of suitably qualified and experienced advisers to mentor senior Iraqi official and support to build institutional capacity;
- development of Iraqi intelligence capability (once the new Government's intentions are clear) with an emphasis on counter-insurgency operations, [drawing on Northern Ireland/Special Branch experience];
- building on MND(SE) practices (eg fast track procurement) to provide the condition for handover to Iraqi regional control as soon as practicable;
- Helping the Iraqis to co-ordinate international assistance.

In due course, and as the capability of the ISF develops, we may need to consider whether an extension to our area of operation, as part of a wider restructuring of the MNF, would be appropriate.

#### THE WAY AHEAD

17. Successful transition to a unified and democratic Iraq which no longer relies on the MNF for its security depends on defeating the current insurgency and creating the conditions in which political and economic progress can be made. That will require a co-ordinated political, reconstruction and security strategy owned by the ITG; a revised focus for Coalition operations, within a conditions based timetable leading to Iraqi control and drawdown of the MNF; and a renewed focus on building international support and engagement at both the political and practical level.

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18. We propose to share the thinking in this paper with the US to build a common position for dialogue with the ITG and other allies. We would also seek to use the Bush visit to Europe to secure NATO and EU agreement to the strategy, and set in hand the development of more detailed plans to operationalise the support and the contributions individual nations can make. It would be helpful to have Ministers views [this] week, so that a dialogue with the US can take place next week to coincide with a planned visit by CDS.

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## NICHE ROLES: ILLUSTRATIVE LIST

- Egypt (co-ordinate the Sharm el-Sheikh follow up mechanism)
- Canada (election monitoring and the constitution)
- France (police training in the region - Amman or with the Germans in UAE; constitution, using their Sunni Arab contacts;)
- Germany (police training; electricity infrastructure; finance ministry)
- Italy - criminal justice system
- Italians, French, Portuguese, Spaniards, Greeks (police training, particularly para military operations)
- Luxembourg (as Presidency, human rights)
- Scandinavians (human rights)
- India, South Africa, Malaysia, UAE (the constitution/federalism; protecting minority rights)
- EU (make the ESDP package of assistance to Iraq agreed at the 5 November European Council operational; the constitution; Kirkuk; TNA capacity building; engage the Transitional Government on preparatory steps for negotiation of a third country agreement; work with the ITG on GSP preferences; opening of a Commission Office in Baghdad, security conditions permitting)
- NATO (military training mission - Rustimayah Training Academy or in Jordan or in NATO countries - bringing in those withdrawing their contributions to MNF; expansion of the NATO Training Mission to other parts of Iraq (or relocation in Jordan); support for NATO Secretary General's plans to encourage wider participation; donation of equipment from NATO allies, funded through a trust fund)
- Arab League (election monitoring)
- 

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ANNEX B

## RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE LUCK REPORT

To ensure success the Coalition needs to:

- improve ISF capacity to conduct independent counter-insurgency operations, as well as to maintain domestic order;
- establish partnerships between Iraqi and Coalition units, and develop military, special police, border force, and police, assistance teams from the Coalition and embed them within Iraqi forces;
- build the institutional capabilities of the Government (MOD and Ministry of Interior) to plan and direct counter-insurgency operations;
- establish priorities for, and intensify, economic development as a complement to, and enabler for, MNF security efforts;
- develop the concept of bureaucratic assistance teams to help Iraqi ministries establish a Government that functions across all the "lines of operation" needed for the campaign;
- implement a strategy communication plan for Iraq, and the region, to dispel any notion that the MNF is an occupying, rather than a liberating, force.

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## IRAQI REGIONAL CONTROL

### DEFINITION

The MNF-I definition of Iraqi Regional Control is: 'The conditions whereby Iraqi security organisations maintain security with Coalition support in extremis. ISF plan, direct and conduct security operations, and assume responsibility for training, sustaining and conducting personnel administration functions at battalion/provincial level. Coalition forces are postured for regional reinforcement, as well as being prepared to meet external threats. Concurrently the Iraqi Armed Forces begin to develop the capability to plan nationally, and to direct and execute defensive operations against external threats.'

### CAPABILITIES

In practical terms the UK would foresee the following generic Iraqi capabilities being required:

- Governorate
  - IPS ability to conduct routine policing, combat criminality, enforce the rule of law, maintain public order, provide basic force protection and prosecute intelligence-led COIN operations.
  - ING ability to provide enhanced force protection for IPS, re-instate public order, provide quick reaction forces and support IPS-led COIN operations.
  - Regular Army ability to prosecute deterrence and defence operations within Governorate boundaries.
  - Department of Border Enforcement (DBE) ability to maintain territorial integrity, control cross-border movement and prevent smuggling.
  - Intelligence structures capable of collecting, fusing and analyzing all-source intelligence against a given prioritized target list.
  - Nascent, but coherent criminal justice system to process, and where appropriate detain, common criminals and insurgents alike.
  - Governorate level ISF C2 structures which can:
    - Through the provincial security committees, ensure civil primacy and direction of security operations.
    - Through the Provincial Joint Operations Centre, conduct joint, inter-agency, intelligence-led COIN operations
    - Conduct personnel administration, logistic and training support for all ISF units within the Governorate.
    - Draw on and integrate MNF-I fire and manoeuvre support.
    - Draw on and integrate specialist ISF support (e.g. Iraqi Intervention Forces, Public Order Battalions, Special Police Commandos and Special Forces).

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Region.

A regional level of Iraqi command (ING, Regular Army and IPS; though planning for the latter is unclear), which can:

- Allocate regional ISF conventional and specialist assets across the governorates according to agreed priorities.
- Call for, receive, direct and allocate national ISF assets.
- Provide staff guidance to the governorate level of command, if necessary by seeking direction from national C2 structures.
- Call for and integrate MNF-I operational and training support.
- Disseminate intelligence between governorates.

• National.

◦ A national level of operational command, with appropriate communications, capable of providing advice to Iraqi Ministries and, upon receipt of subsequent direction, capable of directing activity (operational, planning, logistic, training and administration) at regional and governorate level. This level of command is required for all the major security elements (IPS, ING, Regular Army, DBE and Intelligence Services) individually; and, of course, mechanisms are required to co-ordinate activity across all these and with the MNF-I. The JHQ is the structure for operational command of the Iraqi Army and ING.

◦ A national level of strategic command capable of receiving advice, directing intelligence collection and analysis, reaching decisions by due consensus and issuing clear and timely direction to operational commands. This level of command needs to be cross-government and close, robust co-ordination mechanisms are required especially between MoI and MOD.

Ultimately, however, these structures and capabilities are for the Iraqis to determine. Historic precedent and cultural considerations will influence the Iraqis final decision and we must be prepared to tailor our support to whatever model the Iraqis judge appropriate for their country and their security challenges. At present there is broad consensus between MNF-I and the Iraqis for the generic capabilities at Governorate and National level; but the arrangements at the Regional level remain in doubt, mainly there is no recent precedent for such a level of Iraqi command.

TIMESCALE

The UK planning assumption is that Iraqi control at Governorate level is MND(SE) should be achievable by late Summer/Autumn 2005. This remains realistic, though it will require continued application of major SSR effort. It is much harder to give a timescale to the regional and national structures, other than to say that generating the right capability will probably take longer. This is important because at least some elements of national capability would need to be in place to result in genuine Governorate control in one or more Governorates in MND(SE) (or elsewhere). A good deal more scoping work needs to be done to define this more closely, including on timescales.

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