

Reference

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CHAD OT Information
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Please find below an update to the DFID Basrah Issues Paper, 19 May. The aim of this paper is to provide a brief overview of the current situation in ORHA/CPA SE AOR, potential avenues for HMG/DFID support specific to the ORHA/CPA SE AOR and a recommended end date for the DFID Basrah Team deployment.

2. This overview is followed by more detailed annexes on key issues for the Iraqi population, ORHA/CPA structures (including GSTs, LGTs, USAID contractors), relevant UN agencies, NGOs, and the International Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement.

3. Many of the critical issues facing ORHA/CPA SE are structural/developmental and lie outside the traditional role of CHAD. Achievement of DFID strategic objectives for Iraq will require immediate attention from wider DFID/MENAD specialists and possible action-orientated deployment of a specialist team to support an ORHA/CPA SE upgrade rather than continued oversight of the DFID Basrah Team.

As with the previous issues paper, this paper is drawn up within a fluid situation and some points have been mentioned in previous sitreps.

Current Situation

4. While there is currently no humanitarian crisis in Southern Iraq, provision of basic services is severely degraded and remains, at times, precarious. International agencies, together with the Iraqi directorates, are engaged in 'firefighting' measures until which time more sustainable, structural interventions can take place. Underpinning these issues are concerns around security, the degraded capacity of the Technical Directorates due to the conflict and the subsequent looting, and the slow response by ORHA/CPA SE to stand up Iraqi central administration and civil service functions.

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5. Many of the immediate humanitarian issues facing the Directorates could be substantially alleviated through establishment of law and order, immediate release of initial funding and provision of policy support to Directorates to conduct routine activities including public works (garbage collection, hiring of cleaning staff for hospitals, water tankering, small scale repairs and rehabilitation works, etc).

6. The previous funding channelled through the UN agencies, International Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and NGOs have supported the International Community's ability to address immediate humanitarian needs. The UN's immediate response activities are largely targeted towards urban centres with emphasis on Basrah Governorate with NGOs working to fill gaps in outlying areas and in other governorates. As the needs vary from Governorate to Governorate, the ability to mount a flexible, rapid response has been critical. The UN's ability to mount this required response has varied in part due to security constraints.

7. ORHA/USAID contractors are currently conducting assessments and planning in preparation for more intensive structural infrastructure rehabilitation and local governance strengthening. It is clear that the USAID contractors will not address all needs sector-wide or country-wide. Vital areas such as technical capacity building, training and support to development planning within Technical Directorates will likely not be covered by the USAID contracts.

8. There is a continued vital role for the UN agencies beyond immediate response activities and a need for agencies to begin shifting strategic focus towards medium-long term programmes. The UN now struggles to find its place amidst the plethora of stakeholders currently intending to support Directorates. However, until USAID assessments are completed and plans publicised, it will be difficult for UN agencies to identify and plan to fill gaps. Early engagement between all stakeholders regarding longer-term programming is required and should be reflected in the revised UN Flash Appeal. X

9. Coordination is slowly improving amongst stakeholders as agencies become established and channels of communication develop. Directorate staff are noticeably more involved in sectoral coordination, although they are still not directing the meetings or the assistance provided. ORHA/CPA will need to sit side by side with the Directorates and begin proactively coordinating assistance in line with a developing Directorate strategy (which also requires urgent attention). This will be a challenging task which ORHA/CPA and the Directorates should engage upon immediately.

10. Despite the arrival of a few additional personnel, ORHA/CPA struggles to establish itself, disseminate its mandate and actively undertake in its role as the Authority. This is compounded by continued insufficient policy direction coming from ORHA/CPA Baghdad. There is an urgent need for ORHA/CPA and/or UK plc to support ORHA/CPA SE and for ORHA/CPA SE to proactively engage or the substantial gains achieved by the UK military are at risk of being undermined.

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11. The competent engagement of the UK military has been critical to supporting civil administration tasks (including rehabilitation work through QIPs) until ORHA/CPA is able to take over. ORHA/CPA SE will continue to rely on UK 1 Div G5 and CIMOC personnel until it receives more staff, logistical support and financial resources. However, it remains untested how UK 1 Div will liaise with ORHA/CPA SE and the Local Governance Teams (LGTs) to ensure coherent, comprehensive support to the Governorates. A clear understanding between ORHA/CPA SE and UK 1 Div is required regarding roles and responsibilities as well as channels of communication/information flow. This will develop over the next few weeks and there should be a continuing phased sectoral handover of responsibility as ORHA SE grows.

Key Issues

12. (Detailed elaboration of the key issues for the Iraqi population and activities of the international community to address them can be found in Annex 1.)

DFID Short Term Objectives in Iraq:

13. As noted in the DFID Interim Strategy for Iraq, DFID's short term priorities include:

- **Re-establishing law and order:** police working, courts functioning; minimising Arab / Kurd tensions in the north;
- **Getting public services running again:** workers returning, salaries paid in a fair and transparent manner; Iraqi Ministries functioning;
- **Meeting the needs of the vulnerable:** maintaining food pipeline and distribution; supplying emergency water where needed; resuming oil exports to finance humanitarian supplies;
- **Restoring public infrastructure:** power; water, sanitation and sewerage; transport; telecommunications.

14. Progress against these objectives depends on achieving the mutually interdependent goals of re-establishing a stable security environment, operationalising the technical Directorates and establishing a functioning ORHA/CPA SE. ORHA/CPA, in coordination with the Coalition Forces is authorised and responsible (under Geneva and Hague Conventions and reiterated in CPA Regulation 1) to ensure that the above activities take place. However, ORHA/CPA SE must be supplied with sufficient human and financial resources to undertake its responsibilities together with and in support of the relevant Iraqi structures.

Potential Future Support (DFID or joint UK plc)

Security

15. Support to security sector reform is a niche for HMG/DFID. The need is unquestionable and DFID security sector advice could usefully dovetail into the UK 1 Div security strategy (still not seen in its final form). DFID could consider secondment of

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a security advisor and advisory team (in coordination with potential Danish support in this sector) who could provide technical support to the re-establishment of security structures. Potential avenues for direct financial support could include support to police training initiatives, structural advice on prison administration, justice sector support, provision of equipment, etc. Further discussions with ORHA/CPA SE and UK 1 Div RMP could identify which specific gaps exist in current support, and whether UK 1 Div QIPs will cover them.

ORHA

16. In the immediate term, urgent DFID support could substantially contribute to the efficient and effective functioning of ORHA/CPA SE. **Urgent human resource and financial support should remain the first priority** (see Annex 1 for additional details on ORHA/CPA SE structure).

17. The arrival of additional staff to ORHA/CPA SE has resulted in a slightly increased profile at sectoral meetings and UN fora. ORHA/CPA SE currently has 15 staff (with two additional staff on short contracts. is also scheduled to depart in 4 weeks). Ambassador Ole Olsen Coordinator ORHA/CPA SE has returned to Basrah and is now fully operational. has now established herself as deputy and has worked to reformulate the office structure/functions to maximise current efficiency with the limited human and financial resources available and plan/drive forward expansion to cover responsibilities. In order to carry out the functions of ORHA/CPA SE, (and taking into account the DFID staff expected over the next week, through 1 Div) **there remains an urgent need for further human resource support including (but not limited to):**

- An admin/support team to manage the office, including personnel, procurement, IT and vehicle fleet management;
- Civil governance experts;
- Water experts;
- Infrastructure experts
- Electricity experts
- Justice experts
- Customs (operations officer rather than policy specialist);
- Human Rights Officer;
- Education expert;
- Information/communications officer;
- Media Officer.

18. ORHA/CPA SE will be forwarding a complete list of human resource requirements to capitals by the end of the week. Numbers of staff required are not finalised but there will be a need for more than one expert in each sectoral area in order to cover government functions in the four governorates.

19. DFID should consider direct secondment of staff to ORHA/CPA SE rather than functional (not purely administrative) secondment to UK 1 Div. The objective is to

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strengthen ORHA/CPA SE so that UK 1 Div can disengage from civil administration and local governance functions. The sooner competent staff are placed in ORHA/CPA SE, the sooner this can occur. DFID should work with ORHA/CPA SE to overcome the current issues it sees as constraints to direct secondment rather than wait for ORHA/CPA SE to address them on its own.

20. The office and living conditions remain basic. **ORHA/CPA SE urgently requires an operating budget as well as basic equipment.** This is affecting the office's ability to function. For example ORHA/CPA SE still does not have a full complement of basic office equipment (a relatively easy and cheap issue to overcome). Telecommunications are also problematic. All of these factors are rendering it impossible to disseminate information and effectively function. It is not clear where and when additional funding may arrive to support operational costs.

21. ORHA/CPA SE would benefit from a full office deployment kit including cars with a radio network (including base station) to enhance operational security and efficacy. ORHA/CPA SE is expected to cover activities in four Governorates and currently does not have positive communications during visits. A short-term deployment of operational staff could be useful to set up the offices and systems.

22. The security concerns raised in Baghdad regarding ORHA procedures could be addressed in ORHA/CPA SE. The security situation in Basrah and the South is considerably more stable than in Baghdad. If DFID secondees were supported with adequate equipment (communications, cars, protective gear) and a security plan (derived from the DFID Basrah security plan), they could be covered by an adequate security umbrella. Note: issues such as ORHA/CPA policy on carrying arms would still need to be addressed within any DFID security plan.

Reestablishment of Technical Directorates

23. DFID could have a substantial impact through the provision of advocacy (with HMG), policy and technical support to MoD/UK 1 Div to drive forward the QIPs plan as proposed by UK 1 Div (drawn up by CMHA). The rehabilitation of Directorate structures (Municipality, health, water and sewage, power, agriculture, education, finance, etc) and the overall reestablishment of the Technical Directorates is an urgent task. However, there is a need to avoid overlap with ongoing plans for support from other agencies, in particular OTI as implemented by IOM and the grants of the LGTs.

Information

24. Support for independent media development is required. Previous DFID support to BBC WST humanitarian lifeline programming as well as the BBC WST media review could usefully be followed by further support to the media sector. BBC WST has submitted a proposal to HMG (through various offices) for media strengthening in Basrah. The UNOHCI is currently examining the feasibility of re-starting a Basrah-based newspaper. These proposals should be considered together with other relevant media-sector submissions.

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Recommendation for DFID Basrah Team:

25. has now established herself within ORHA/CPA SE and, provided more support is forthcoming, ORHA/CPA SE will begin to expand to take on more tasks. The DFID secondees will now be based within UK 1 Div or outposted with the Brigades (and liaising with ORHA via UK 1 Div) and will be logistically more difficult for the DFID team (as well as ORHA/CPA SE staff) to engage with. Therefore, the proposed overlap of the DFID Basrah team with new DFID secondees will not have substantial added value.

26. Aside from a quick and short deployment to rapidly upgrade ORHA/CPA SE, the urgent issues to be addressed via ORHA/CPA are structural/developmental issues and are best suited to DFID/MENAD sectoral experts. Additional experts should be deployed as soon as possible to support ORHA/CPA SE.

27. A continued DFID team presence under the status quo will have diminishing returns. Funding decisions continue to be made from London (which is appropriate) and policy issues are more effectively raised from London to the relevant agency headquarters. Additionally, DFID will benefit substantially from the establishment of a Baghdad presence with a country-wide remit. Liaison and advocacy activities as well as overseeing the longer-term implementation of the DFID strategy will be more effective at the central level, especially as the security situation improves in Baghdad.

28. We recommend therefore that the DFID Basrah team deployment ends by 10 June bearing in mind the issues as outlined above. <

29. However, if a support package is deployed or substantial financial support extended to ORHA/CPA SE, an operational DFID presence could be useful for an additional week to facilitate transfer of equipment/funds and general knowledge.

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Annex 1:

Key Issues for the Iraqi Population

Key issues for the Iraqi population remain (not an exhaustive list):

- **Security.**
- **Lack of central guidance (from Baghdad ministries) as well as Governorate top-level management in civil services.**
- **Lack of cash to maintain or in many cases restart civil service functions.**
- **Partially functioning distribution system for humanitarian as well as recovery-related goods (the cause of this is often linked to security-related concerns).**
- **Employment generation/development of business sector.**
- **Land Ownership/Property Rights (especially relating to IDPs and refugees).**

Security

Increasing numbers of shops are open during the daytime and traffic is visible on the streets. More women are walking through the streets although many Iraqi women professionals reportedly arrive at UN meetings with male family members due to security concerns.

Although the UK military has received fewer reports of incidents (including shooting) in the past week compared with previous periods, there is evidence of increased organised crime, including smuggling. Criminality continues to be a concern and while not targeted at the international community, there remains substantial risk of being in the wrong place at the wrong time. Movement during the evening hours remains limited in Basrah and shooting can be heard virtually every night.

The capacity of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the relevant Iraqi structures to restore law and order in Basrah remains limited. The scale down of the military presence continues to be a concern in the UK military AOR. Although the arrival of forces from other countries may offset some of the anticipated gaps, stretch of current force structure will be inevitable.

53 police stations are now functioning within UK 1 Div AOR with a gradually increasing armed police force now patrolling the streets. Telephone numbers for the relevant police stations have been disseminated (although usefulness unknown as large parts of the population have no immediate access to a telephone). DFID Basrah do not have data on whether this has directly impacted on the number of incidents occurring in Basrah. A limited number of courts and prisons are set to open on 1 June which should have an impact on reestablishment of judicial process and serve as a deterrence factor.

The scoping mission of Chief Constable Paul Kernahan is now completed and the subsequent recommendations should be issued imminently. The draft security sector strategy (from the Royal Military Police) is awaiting findings from this mission before final formulation and submission to PJHQ/MoD. A proposal (possibly to be sourced

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from the MOD QIPs funding) has been formulated to revitalise/refurbish police stations, establish blue light services and address urgent rehabilitation of courts, prisons and police training.

Protection of public buildings and municipal service structures continues to be a high priority. Looting is still occurring during evening hours, subsiding slightly perhaps due to the exhaustion of viable looting targets. As rehabilitation starts in earnest, however, this problem will undoubtedly intensify. In support of Paul Bremer's statement prioritising the restoration of law and order in Iraq, a portion of the \$50,000 released to each Governorate Directorate of Trade can be used to hire guards for warehouses and offices. Although this funding has not yet been released, UK 1 Div have begun conducting four hour training courses for public service guards and have completed training of a number of MoT guards for the primary warehouse in Basrah as well as the port.

These are positive developments, however, it is unclear how quickly financial support will be released to pay trained staff and whether such funding will be mirrored within all other relevant Ministries. Despite this uncertainty, the Oil Ministry has been able to hire a guard force to patrol oil pipelines in the Basrah Governorate. However, the Directorate of Water and UNICEF continue to cite looting of sites and damage to water (and sewage) pipelines as some of the key constraints to restoring basic services. WHO has secured agreement from ORHA to secure main warehouses and distribution chains, although specific information on which sites will be secured is not yet available.

USAID contractors, such as Bechtel, have confirmed to the DFID team that while they are responsible for the security of their own staff and immediate offices, security of sites (both immediate and long term) will need to be arranged in coordination with Coalition Forces and Iraqi Police Forces. Stevedoring Services of America (SSA), the company that has received the USAID contract for administration of the Umm Qasr port has hired 200 local security guards.

The recent ORHA directive which provides a two-week amnesty period for the collection of heavy/automatic weapons should have an impact on the security situation. An information campaign will be conducted in UK 1 Div AOR between 1-7 June and the actual collection of weapons will take place between 7-14 June. An improved general security situation would help provide an incentive for individuals to hand in weapons.

An intensified information campaign from the Directorates and ORHA will assist in encouraging stability and reassuring the population that Iraqi systems are being re-established. ORHA is addressing this information gap with the first distribution (30,000 copies in Basrah) of the Baghdad - produced ORHA newspaper this week. ORHA plans to take over the formerly CPA radio 'Nahrain' which should be broadcasting via AM and FM frequencies within the week. A TV station in Basrah is also planned. ORHA plans to have eventually have an Iraqi media team of 59, including Iraqi staff to assist in production of radio programmes as well as production of an insert in ORHA newspaper. NOTE: These initiatives (and the subsequent programming) are ORHA-

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focused and should not be seen as development of independent media channels (of which there still remains a conspicuous vacuum).

Lack of central guidance (from Baghdad ministries) as well as Governorate top-level management in civil services

Information from ORHA Baghdad/relevant Ministries is not being released in a consistent or coherent manner to the relevant Directorates or onwards to the population. A few Baghdad-based conferences are now being held to which the relevant Governorate-level staff have been invited. ORHA Baghdad has not been effective at re-establishing channels of communication between Baghdad Ministries and their Directorates and should urgently address this issue.

The CIMOC has also been tasked to map the structures, capacities and needs of the Directorates as a basis for future engagement and assistance. This process is ongoing and, according to the recent FRAGO should be completed by 12 June. The initial incomplete feedback indicates the urgent need for operating budgets for all Directorates, renovation of some office buildings, basic office equipment, and in some cases, project equipment (garbage trucks, shovels, etc). Some Directorates have been requested to submit their current list of requirements to Ministries in Baghdad, presumably to inform the formulation of new budgets. However, release of initial funds in the interim (perhaps according to last year's budget) would assist Directorates in reclaiming their previous tasks/functions and alleviating some requirements for international community intervention.

The Basrah City Council has now been disbanded and replaced by the functional heads of Technical Directorates. This may empower the existing heads to take required policy decisions while they work with the UK mil to identify top-level management. This is an ongoing process but should be finalised by the end of May.

USAID contractor Research Triangle Institute (see Annex 2) has begun deployment within Iraq and developing support to local governance structures. For example, RTI's Neighbourhood (Hai') Advisory Council project has developed neighbourhood councils in 83 Baghdad neighbourhoods. These councils will elect representatives to the nine Municipal councils who will then elect representatives to the Baghdad City Council. RTI plans to mirror this project in Basrah Governorate once it is fully established.

Lack of cash to maintain or in many cases restart civil service functions.

Although there does not appear to be a lack of funding in the pipeline for restarting civil service functions, minimal amounts have been disbursed to date. As noted above, ORHA Baghdad/Ministry of Trade has issued a directive indicating the release (timing unspecified) of \$50,000 for each Governorate Directorate of Trade to restart civil service functions. This is positive, however, it is still unclear whether this will be mirrored within other Ministries. ORHA should clarify its forward strategy, including timelines for budgetary support to all line Ministries to facilitate planning at the Governorate level.

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However, the DFID team anticipates that if sufficient and timely budgetary support is released from each line Ministry, QIPs are available through UK 1 Div, and grants are available from the Local Governance Teams (LGTs), sufficient cash should be injected into the system in the coming month to restart civil service functions.

UK 1 Div emergency and salary payments are ongoing in Basrah governorate. Where they have been issued, these \$20 and \$30 payments have eased tensions within the civil service. Many staff have returned to work already or would return if habitable workspace were available. X

A solution should be identified for the 400,000 former military personnel country-wide. Although CPA Order #2 notes that a 'termination payment' will be made to staff of 'Dissolved Entities,' the amount and timing is unspecified. Registration of the former armed forces is ongoing this week in Basrah and will address this problem in part. This process is beginning with the former naval officers and if successful will be extended to the army. Part of the naval force is being considered as a future river security force and could potentially be integrated into a future Iraqi Defence Force. An organised and well-funded DDR programme (including job training and/or rehiring some individuals for a vetted new national defence force) should be implemented. Even a minimal DDR package could be beneficial to maintaining stability within this population.

Governorate Support Teams (GSTs – see Annex 2) have been tasked with supporting the regeneration of government structures (priority as reportedly noted by Bremer) and immediate technical directorate activities. Rehabilitation of directorate buildings has been recognised as a priority and is being considered for potential QIPs support (from UK 1 Div, UN agencies, and IOM).

Local governance interventions, including grants (which could be utilised for rehabilitation of civil administration structures) as well as technical/training support, will be made available through the USAID contractor, Research Triangle Institute (upper budgetary ceiling of \$167.9 million - see Annex 2). They have already established a base in Basrah and begun to issue grants to assist in re-starting civil functions.

Multi-agency initiatives such as the ORHA-led garbage collection initiative involving UNICEF, UNDP, HABITAT, IOM, CIMOC, and the relevant Directorates are positive indications that ORHA can grasp an issue and coordinate stakeholders in a proactive manner. It is hoped that the initial clean up will be followed by subsequent direct budgetary support from Baghdad to the Directorates to continue the initiative on a rolling basis.

Partially functioning distribution system for humanitarian as well as recovery-related goods (the cause of this is often linked to security-related concerns).

Due largely to security concerns throughout the distribution chain, many of the main Ministry of Health (MoH) warehouses have not been conducting their monthly distributions to Primary Health Centres and hospitals and have instead been distributing

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weekly supplies. This has resulted in a backlog of supplies at the main warehouses and a subsequent inability to receive additional supplies which are available.

WHO has recently obtained agreement from the CPA to secure main MoH warehouses and also provide security along distribution routes in Iraq. If rapidly implemented, this should assist some of the main distribution problems within the health sector. No timeline has yet been agreed for this, nor have we seen the exact details on which warehouses have been prioritised throughout Iraq.

The lifting of sanctions should ease the bureaucracy related to import of humanitarian/recovery related goods. However, there is an urgent need to clarify OFF goods in the pipeline and facilitate delivery (including those goods which are currently stored in ports around the region but were delayed to allow more urgent supplies/foodstuffs to be imported). Normalisation of customs procedures and import tax issues should be addressed urgently and could assist in control of illegal imports (narcotics, weapons, etc).

) Employment generation/development of local commerce.

Use of local contractors is having a limited, albeit positive impact on Basrah Governorate. UK 1 Div are subcontracting local companies for some QIP rehabilitation works. USAID contractors have expressed the intention to subcontract local firms as well as maximising direct hire of Iraqi nationals (NOTE: the majority of the subcontracting conferences have been located outside Iraq so it is not clear how USAID contractors will open their tendering process to Iraqi businesses). More and more small shops are re-opening in Basrah city and markets are increasingly busy with small-scale trade.

The HOC Kuwait City reports a decrease in attendance of humanitarian agencies and a marked increase in attendance of commercial companies seeking guidance on entry into Iraq. The lifting of sanctions opens the doors to increased investment in the Iraqi business sector. However, ORHA and the relevant Ministries will need to actively support the development of an independent Iraqi business sector, not one that is dependent on or subcontracted to external companies.

FAO is now present in Basrah and has begun assessments with the Directorate of Agriculture and the Danish ORHA agricultural expert (on six month deployment). Initiatives to support poultry farming and the regeneration of the agricultural sector will soon begin on a limited basis (supported by DFID through the UN Flash Appeal).

) Land Ownership/Property Rights.

Land ownership/property rights issues are rapidly emerging as a key complicating factor in IDP resettlement, refugee repatriation and has resulted in retribution attacks. Cases are extremely complex and in some instances will require tracing a piece of land through multiple owners across decades. For example, land seized by Saddam

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Hussein's government and re-allocated for public or private use. In some cases, additional structures have now been built on this land or it has been sold several times since being seized.

Disputes over land ownership combined with a shortage of housing units (HABITAT estimates a shortage of 1 million units) exacerbates the current situation. Construction of new housing units could provide a needed injection into construction companies as well as a solution for housing shortages for returning refugees as well as current IDPs. Note, however that priority should remain for the moment on ensuring adequate services to existing population centres rather than extending overstretched public works to cover new settlements.

ORHA Baghdad has announced via radio that it will establish a property claims commission. However, no specific instructions regarding process or even location of this claims commission has been disseminated. ORHA SE has not yet taken this issue forward in Basrah Governorate. A process should be identified and widely disseminated as soon as possible to avoid the population becoming disillusioned and taking action to reclaim land through violent means.

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Annex 2

Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA)

Approach/Mandate

The ORHA/CPA SE **terms of reference and approach** is still not clear. Ideally this civilian structure would take over the lead role in civilian administration issues (currently supported by the UK 1 Div) as soon as possible. It is clear that they do not currently have the capacity to do so. ORHA/CPA SE continues to focus on the most urgent regional issues and is only just beginning to address specific sectoral issues across its AOR.

The **lack of policy guidance** and general information flow from ORHA/CPA Baghdad continues to affect ORHA/CPA SE's ability to function. ORHA/CPA Baghdad still has not appointed one focal point for each regional office which would assist in facilitating efficient exchange of information.

Information dissemination regarding ORHA/CPA mandate/decisions/intentions has been minimal to date. This is in part due to the lack of local media outlets but more to do with a lack of available information from ORHA/CPA. ORHA/CPA has recognised this weakness and is addressing the current vacuum by taking over the CPA radio 'Nahrain' and issuance of a biweekly newspaper from Baghdad (distributed for the first time this week in Basrah).

Support to local government structures varies from Governorate to Governorate and depends largely on the personalities in situ. ORHA/CPA absence at the Governorate level has resulted in NGOs or the CIMOC taking the lead on supporting technical directorates and coordinating the provision of assistance.

It appears that direct programming will be a function of ORHA/CPA SE at regional office level via the USAID contractors RTI. ORHA/CPA SE should also benefit from the GSTs ability to identify and fund urgent QIP projects.

Governorate Support Teams - GSTs

ORHA/CPA and Coalition Forces are aware of the disconnect between the required ORHA/CPA presence and the current capacity of this structure. Recognising the need to fill this gap, General Garner noted the establishment of Coalition military **Governorate Support Teams (GSTs)** and Local Governance Teams (LGTs) and the establishment of interim local councils as two of his 12 objectives for the next 30 days (stated on 9 May). The current draft FRAGO lays the groundwork for establishing military GSTs to act as focal points, provide technical advice/support to the Iraqi Governorate staff and implement ORHA/CPA directives at the Governorate level. These GSTs will liaise with LGTs (civilian contractors – see below) and the ORHA/CPA Governorate representative to provide direct support to the Governorate structure.

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These GSTs have already been implemented in most of the US controlled sectors of Iraq.

It appears that the UK 1 Div interpretation of this FRAGO will result in a different approach to GSTs. UK 1 Div has indicated that it is already fulfilling many of the tasks of the GSTs through the Brigade level G5 cells and therefore does not plan to form teams as such.

It is untested how well these G5 cells will interact/support ORHA and the activities set out by the recent FRAGO without forming a structure co-located with the ORHA/CPA Coordinator in each Governorate and easily accessible/identifiable to the population.

As UK 1 Div is responsible for two Governorates and ORHA/CPA SE covers four Governorates, ORHA/CPA SE will need to manage two different approaches to the GSTs rather than one cohesive, coherent approach. Directorates should be supported country-wide through standardised structures with a clear mandate to implement ORHA/CPA directives and provide necessary support. It is not clear how this will be managed in ORHA/CPA SE AOR.

Local Governance Teams - LGTs

The Research Triangle Institute has been contracted by USAID to undertake local governance support both to relevant Iraqi structures as well as to emerging civil society groups. Support will be provided by **Local Governance Teams (LGTs)** who will be attached to the ORHA/CPA Governorate structure and provide technical advice, training as well as quick impact grants (which could be utilised for rehabilitation of civil administration structures). The budget for RTI is \$7.9 million initially with up to \$167.9 million over 12 months. Their mandate is broad, encompassing any activity which strengthens civil society and the civil service structures. RTI is now establishing its base in Basrah and has begun assessments throughout ORHA/CPA SE AOR. The staffing structure (including final numbers to be deployed) will be determined based on these assessments. However, undoubtedly these teams and their associated resources will be a substantial asset for ORHA/CPA SE.

USAID contractors

USAID assessments are ongoing in ORHA/CPA SE AOR and the majority of the USAID contractors plan to initiate implementation works within the next few weeks. Communication between contractors and UN agencies varies depending on the sector and should improve once Bechtel and others are permanently based in Basrah.

Daily meetings are held between ORHA/CPA SE, Bechtel, and RTI and efforts are being made to ensure a coordinated approach. ORHA/CPA SE will need to manage this process closely together with the Directorates to avoid overlap with other UN agencies (as seen already with UNDPs activities) and to ensure that tasks are

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prioritised according to need in conjunction with the local authorities. This will be a challenge until ORHA/CPA SE is strengthened.

USAID contracts awarded to date:

Seaport Administration:

Stevedoring Services of America (SSA)

\$4.8 million initially

Umm Qasr Port administration

Primary and Secondary Education (RISE):

Creative Associates International

\$1 million initially with up to \$62.6 million over 12 months

Materials for schools (desks, computers, equipment, etc), social mobilisation to encourage student enrolment and development of education baseline indicators.

Local Governance:

Research Triangle Institute

\$7.9 million with up to \$167.9 million over 12 months

'Strengthening of management skills and capacity of local administrations and civic institutions to improve delivery of essential municipal services such as water, health, public sanitation and economic governance; includes training programmes in communications, conflict resolution, leadership skills and political analysis.'

Capital Construction:

Bechtel

\$34.6 million initially with up to \$680 million over 18 months

'Emergency repair or rehabilitation of power generation facilities, electrical grids, municipal water systems, sewage systems, airport facilities, the dredging, repair and upgrading of the Umm Qasr seaport and reconstruction of hospitals, schools, ministry buildings, irrigation structures and transportation links; goal is to repair or rehabilitate up to 100 hospitals, 6,000 schools (out of 25,000), up to six airports and one southern seaport.' NOTE: Geographic coverage for each section of this contract remains unknown. For example, in the education sector Bechtel has prioritised four Governates for the first 3 and a half months of school rehabilitation work.

Airport Administration:

Skylink

\$2.5 million initially with up to \$15 million

'Assessment of civilian airports and collaboration for the timely repair; management of civilian airports for the expeditious reception and onward processing of humanitarian assistance, reconstruction material and personnel.'

Public Health:

Abt Associates

\$10 million initially with up to \$43.8 million over 12 months

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'Supporting a reformed Iraqi Ministry of Health at the national, regional and local levels; delivering health services; providing medical equipment and supplies; training and recruiting health staff; providing health education and information; and determining the specific needs of the health sector and vulnerable populations such as women and children.'

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Annex 3: UN Agencies (and IOM):

UNOHCI

Despite teething problems and some logistical delays (still ongoing), the UN family is establishing itself in Basrah. **Coordination mechanisms** are in place and the local authorities are now participating in, although not yet leading, the assessment and planning processes. Most of the UN agencies are in the final stages of assessment and, besides immediate life-saving interventions, full-scale needs-based programming is only just beginning. Expectations must be managed to ensure that the population does not become discouraged by this pace.

The UN mandate in the current context is a humanitarian one and much of their activities will not support the rehabilitation of civil governance. Through its longer-term programming, however, it will assist with strengthening civil administration structures/functions through critical capacity building and technical support.

UNOHCI and ORHA have yet to establish a comfortable working relationship although this is starting to improve as ORHA capacity increases and they begin to attend/chair relevant meetings.

The HIC now has all required equipment and is engaging with agencies, UK mil and the Iraqi Directorates on information management issues. Development of information management tools and assistance tracking will need to be done with a view to countrywide systems and eventual handover to Iraqi counterparts. HIC is aware of this issue and is working to integrate these considerations into its approach.

UNHCR

UNHCR currently has eight staff based in Basrah. This will rise to fifteen or more with the planned establishment of two field offices in Najaf and Al Amara. UNHCR Basrah is currently focusing on repatriation issues. There are 7-8,000 Iranian refugees in the Basrah AOR. 4,300 of these (living in Dujaila, Ali Gharbi, Kumeit) were registered by UNHCR and cleared by the Iranian authorities to return prior to the conflict. Approximately 1,000 were actually repatriated prior to the onset of hostilities.

UNHCR is now witnessing movements towards an isolated, mined border checkpoint, Al Sharhani. 185 have crossed but have not been allowed to transport their tractors or livestock with them. UNHCR Iran has not been allowed to monitor the crossing on the Iranian side nor to follow the returnees to their destinations. The UK Embassy Tehran has been involved in discussions with UNHCR on this issue. UNHCR would prefer the main border crossing be changed from Al Sharhani to Khorram Shah, SE of Basra (they could provide transport for refugees if needed) which is more accessible and is lobbying with the Iranian authorities on this issue.

Previously, UNHCR liaised with the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Interior as well as BAFIA and the Iranian Ministry of Interior to arrange repatriation

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activities. UNHCR has only just arrived in Baghdad and will try to establish contacts within the relevant Ministries and ORHA to responsibilise the authorities within the process.

UNHCR has formulated a repatriation plan (DFID Basrah has not yet received a copy). It is receiving requests from various countries that wish to repatriate Iraqi nationals as early as June. Iran has the highest number of Iraqi refugees (approx. 200,000) and it claims that many would like to return to Iraq (Slow unaccompanied returns are currently ongoing through the porous Iran-Iraq border). BAFIA has recently reported to the Iranian Press that these 200,000 Iraqi refugees (now termed 'migrants') will begin returning next week to Iraq. CPA has noted that return of Iraqi refugees will not proceed at this time. UNHCR Basrah would prefer to delay repatriation until the situation in Basrah stabilises and there is some clarity regarding land rights/property issues.

UNHCR currently has sufficient funding to implement its programmes, although it noted concern that its other global operations have received decreased levels of funding from other donors (not DFID).

UNICEF

UNICEF Basrah currently has approximately 20 international staff (including staff from OXFAM and NCA) and 12 national staff. These numbers will change as UNICEF increasingly uses local contractors and support to Iraqi structures (especially within the WES sector). UNICEF will possibly begin rotating UNICEF staff through the governorates, however currently relies on day visits and contacts with NGOs partners.

UNICEF continues to focus on WES, EPI, Nutrition (restarting the CCC system), Education and Mine Risk Education as outlined in the UN Flash Appeal. The majority of activities are on schedule. However, UNICEF Basrah note that besides the emergency phase activities ongoing (water tankering, etc which will be phased out by August/September), they are beginning to shift focus towards medium-term country programmes including capacity building support to technical Directorate staff, teachers, health professionals, etc.

Most of the key issues according to UNICEF include the need for policy direction from the Ministries and the relevant structures to be in place at the Governorate level (supplied by an operational budget). UNICEF Basrah highlighted the need for Bechtel school rehabilitation coverage to be extended to other Governorates and for a country-wide education strategy to be developed.

UNMAS (MACT)

The MACT is now established and fully functioning in Basrah. The expected Mine Tech EOD teams have arrived and together with teams from DCA and FSD, have begun clearance operations through Basrah City. An initial rapid assessment indicates substantially more extensive contamination of the city than previously thought with an estimated 100's of tonnes of UXO requiring disposal.

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There are approximately 20 EOD experts within the Basrah Governorate Civil Defense structures (who conducted UXO clearance in CSI prior to the conflict). These individuals have received their civil service payments. Equipment and training would be required to develop this capacity but UNMAS recognise the need for strengthening the national capacity and will most likely include this element in the revised UN Flash Appeal (see email under separate cover on capacity of EOD Civil Defense).

The UNICEF MRE advisor is co-located with the MACT, supported by a MAG MRE community advisor. Both have been conducting outreach programmes to municipal officials, communities, schools, etc. Three MRE advisors arrived from Lebanon and will each begin training an Iraqi MRE team to intensify outreach capacity. A UXO reporting form has been developed, translated and disseminated to the population. UXO awareness and mine risk education activities must become part of national as well as local structures/networks. The UNICEF MRE advisor is aware of this and is already scoping potential avenues for training/development.

Due to time constraints, the following sections will be sent in the coming days.

WHO

FAO

UNDP

WFP

IOM

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Annex 4: NGOs

Given the current focus on urban centres and Basrah Governorate in particular, and given the geographical coverage required, the UN is unable to provide comprehensive coverage of immediate humanitarian needs throughout ORHA SE AOR. UN Agencies (and IOM) are relying on NGOs, either through formal arrangements such as the Governorate Focal Points or through more informal agreements to undertake interventions in areas they are unable to cover. Given that the UN has not yet established a presence in Hilla (due to insufficient accommodation), this is likely an issue further north as well. In the case of UNICEF WES, they are able to provide direct funding for urgent interventions undertaken by NGOs or local contractors in areas not covered by UNICEF. Other UN agencies are able to provide collaborative assistance to NGOs as in the case of WFP providing monitors to accompany IOM NGO GFP registration visits so that food parcels can be distributed on the spot.

NGOs will continue to play a role in the coming months until Iraqi systems are up and running. However, as the Iraqi systems do begin to re-establish their leading role, UN agencies will likely shift focus from NGOs and either put contracts out to tender for local contractors (as was done by UNICEF prior to the conflict in CSI due to minimal international NGO presence) or support Iraqi systems directly (WHO).

There is a need to encourage NGOs to participate in existing coordination mechanisms. There are a number of NGOs present in Basrah that have yet to attend sectoral meetings or inform UN agencies or the relevant Directorate as to their activities – the potential for overlap is huge. In part, a more central role for the Iraqi Directorates, alongside ORHA, is required to register/approve all projects and therefore track assistance.

Some of the larger NGOs present in ORHA SE AOR (SCF, GOAL) have benefited from cooperation agreements with USAID or direct grants from the DART teams. Flexibility of funding has been critical for some of these NGOs to initiate rapid interventions and have immediate impacts.

A MENAD strategy for future development-related engagement with NGOs will become increasingly useful as Iraq moves from emergency into the recovery phase.

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Annex 5:

International Red Cross/ Red Crescent Movement

The ICRC continues within its traditional activities within Basrah AOR and appears to have been relatively successful at not being pulled into tasks outside its mandate/expertise. This annex will not go into detail of the activities undertaken as a fairly detailed ICRC sitrep for Basrah AOR has been issued within the past 48 hours (available reliefweb).

ICRC is information-sharing with the UN agencies at the Head of Agency level as well as at the operational level. It regularly attends and actively participates in all coordination meetings in relevant sectors.

The capacity of the Iraqi Red Crescent Society is still being assessed but it appears that, similar to civil service structures, the majority of the top-level management is no longer in place. Substantial organisational development activities will be required to re-establish the IRCS and strengthen existing structures. The role and activities of each component of the RC/RC Movement will need to be clearly defined between the ICRC, the Federation and the PNS to ensure coordinated and effective, need-based (rather than supply driven) support to the IRCS.

The uncoordinated interventions of Participating National Societies in Basrah AOR continue to be a challenge to the overall RC/RC Movement response.

