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To:

From: Iraq Policy Unit 1  
Subject: FW: INFO: OO FCOLN/WASHI 251: NOSEC: IRAQ: DISMANTLING THE  
BAATHIST STATE  
Sent: 30 May 2003 17:30:12 GMT

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From: Iraq Policy Unit  
Sent: Friday, May 30, 2003 6:30:11 PM  
To: Iraq Policy Unit - All staff  
Subject: FW: INFO: OO FCOLN/WASHI 251: NOSEC: IRAQ: DISMANTLING THE BAATHIST  
STATE  
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From: Swift Incoming Telegrams (Machine 1)  
Sent: Friday, May 30, 2003 6:30:11 PM  
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WASHINGTON TELNO 759, AMMAN TELNO 107 (NOT TO ALL)

SIC: CAO/A2N/A2M/A2P/INX/LDQ

SUBJECT: NOSEC: IRAQ: DISMANTLING THE BAATHIST STATE

## SUMMARY

1. Debaathification and dismantling the institutions of the Baathist State are clearly necessary if we are to achieve our post-conflict objectives. But so too is maintaining security. We are concerned that some aspects of the first, especially if it includes laying off without pay the regular army, may have an unnecessarily negative impact on the second, rather than the positive effects we need them to have. Some ideas.

## DETAIL

2. We were struck by the references in first TUR to signs of the re-emergence of organised resistance within Iraq, and by the Jordanian Foreign Minister Muasher's comments in second TUR warning of the risk of a serious backlash if de-Baathification is taken too far.

3. We understand why Bremer has felt it necessary to take a tough line on de-Baathification and on dismantling the institutions of the Baathist State. Doing so has sent a strong message to the Iraqi population as a whole that Saddam and his system are history, and that Iraq can and must now look to the future.

4. But there is a downside. First, we are concerned that de-Baathification may be proving to be a blunt instrument. Our secondees working alongside the Ministries are reporting that the De-Baathification Order is catching Iraqi public servants who have shown themselves to be effective and willing to work with us in areas critical to the Coalition's success - the police, for example.

5. Second, there is clearly a link between the security situation on the ground and the existence of a large pool of disgruntled ex-employees of Saddam's security apparatus. One effect of the CPA's decree abolishing the military, the security services etc is to create a very large class of people (several hundred thousand) with no job, no early prospect of one, no income, and probably few skills other than the use of arms - a rich resource from which to draw recruits for a campaign of organised resistance (and/or organised crime). Large numbers of people have been deprived of their anchors by these measures. Even if they are not attracted to crime or opposition they may find new anchors in extremist ideologies that we would not wish to encourage, supported by those organisations' welfare organisations.

6. Seen from here, the answer to the first pitfall is for the Coalition to take a vigorously pragmatic approach to implementing the De-Baathification Order. Work is in hand on the machinery for implementing this Order. We would see merit in the latitude that already exists being exercised - and being seen to be exercised - in

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a way that strongly incentivises those who may have been Party members simply by virtue of their job, to work with the Coalition if they are willing to do so and can demonstrate that they can contribute to what the Coalition is seeking to achieve. Is there scope for ex-Baath Party members to be re-employed on a probationary basis?

7. The second issue is more complex. There will undoubtedly be a hard core of people who must be dealt with through the courts or, where necessary, through vigorous prosecution of the Coalition's right and obligation to maintain security. But there is also a (much larger) group of people - including much of the military - whose first instinct will be survival now that their income and support networks are gone.

8. In the short term, the Coalition needs a policy to reduce the perverse incentives for the second category to drift towards the hard core actively opposing the Coalition. It is not clear to us whether these people will continue to be eligible for support through the OFF programme, or otherwise have access to some form of welfare payments. If this is politically unacceptable, one solution might be to create a workfare scheme - a pool of labour drawn specifically from those left unemployed by the disbandment of the security apparatus, to meet urgent short term requirements.

9. In the medium term, Security Sector Reform (SSR) will make a significant contribution to resolving this issue. With regard to the military US plans entail recruiting new armed forces from the lower ranks of the Iraqi-regular army, with the ceiling at Lieutenant Colonel level. Rapid movement towards establishing new military structures should provide a pole of attraction for many of the ex-military. (There might be scope for early progress to be made with the relatively small number of naval personnel currently unemployed in the south).

10. Slocombe will be outlining his detailed plans at a conference in Washington on 3 June. Unfortunately however it appears that the Americans are not/not looking at the wider SSR picture, and initial hopes that Slocombe would be given responsibility for the complete process (police, judiciary, prisons, intelligence and military) have not materialised. Slocombe also made clear when he saw Ministers in London on 15 May that the US were not planning any Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) process, on the basis that Iraqi forces had, in effect, 'self-demobilised' by disappearing back into civilian society leaving the field clear for the new forces to be built up under SSR. We think this has left a gap, and has contributed to the security problems. We could see a role for some form of DDR, perhaps combining the return of ex-military weapons with a terminal payment to support former military personnel in the transition to civilian employment. This worked well in Sierra Leone and is being pursued in Afghanistan.

11. We should encourage the US to adopt a coherent SSR strategy with an identified lead and co-ordination point. An SSR secretariat within the CPA structure may be one way to achieve this. These points will be raised by attendees at the Washington meeting with Slocombe

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on 3 June.

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CONSULAR D 0

PROTOCOL D//PALACE 0

ADDITIONAL 1

IRAQ/KUWAIT 0

(IRA) 0

ATT GEN//C ADAMS 1

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