

CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED

D/DOMA/C/15

15 May 03

COSSEC

Copy to:

MA/ DCDS(C)

DNO

DAO

MA/ ACDS(Ops)

DMO

DJW

IRAQ - SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

1. The attached paper sets out our current understanding of the situation with regard to SSR in Iraq, and provides COS:

- a. Our current thinking on how SSR in Iraq should be approached.
- b. Reviews our current understanding of the situation, including US intent.
- c. Sets out extant UK policy with respect to SSR in Iraq.
- d. Outlines options for UK military engagement.

2. With the appointment of Mr Bremer, and the movement to theatre of Mr Slocombe (ORHA adviser for the Iraqi MoD) there is the opening of a window of opportunity to influence and develop US thinking. COS should note that at present

Therefore, we are

developing a conceptual model - summarised in the paper - that is intended to convince US planners that they need to take a more strategic approach.

3. Ministers have recently agreed a cross-government strategy that seeks to influence US thinking by not only placing experts in ORHA, but also seeks to put a small body of experts alongside the senior UK Representative, so that coherent SSR planning can be offered top down.

4. The lack of definition in US thinking, and the need to achieve agreement with the future Iraqi administration on their requirements with respect to external defence, mean that it is likely to some months before we know the full extent of any potential capability and training requirements for the New Iraqi Armed Forces (NIAF). DFD's earlier work, using MoD Force Development methodology, is summarised in an Annex to the paper. This gives some indication of the possible direction the NIAF may take, and provides a guide to the potential resource demands we may face.

5. Within the framework of extant UK policy, and the uncertainties over the direction of the NIAF (and other security structures) we have sought to characterise how we should engage with the US. Currently we recommend that this should be at the minimal level with expert advisers being offered to ORHA to fulfil identified meaningful roles as required. Funding, and other resources, for any subsequent broader engagement will need to be identified in due course.

SPG Leader

CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED

D/DOMA/C/15

15 May 03

IRAQ - SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

A paper by the SPG

INTRODUCTION

1. Security Sector Reform (SSR) is essentially an issue of good governance, it addresses all aspects of the security sector (police, judiciary, penal service, border security, intelligence services, and armed forces) as part of a long term holistic programme of change. The lead department within the UK for SSR is DfID, with MoD - as a major resource provider - the FCO, and Home Office as the other key stakeholders. However, for Iraq the cross-government Iraq Policy Unit (IPU) in the FCO has been given the lead for the development of the UK strategy through the Cabinet Office.
2. In Iraq SSR is an element of both the Reconstruction and Security lines of operation. As such it is competing for MoD resources, along with the other lines of operation in which we are, or may be engaged. Principally, our resources are needed to help deliver the internal and external security lines of operation, and in dealing with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), through our current engagement SSE and our future role in the ISG. There are a number of other lines of operation that MoD supports¹, but for which the lead lies elsewhere in Whitehall, with the provision of secure environment being MoD's principal task in support of these.
3. Ministers have recently endorsed a paper² that outlines the UK's engagement in SSR in Iraq. The paper recognises that the UK is in a supporting role to the US, and that the US has yet to clarify its thinking on this and other related issues. Furthermore, opportunities for UK engagement are limited by our interpretation of the legal requirement for a UNSCR that will enable wider reconstruction to begin. From a policy perspective (top down), our engagement will necessarily be through the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA). Work is ongoing (bottom up), within the military chain of command, to begin the restoration of Iraqi security structures that will support coalition efforts on the ground. ORHA is aware of these developments, and are factoring it into their thinking. It is against this fluid background that this paper has been prepared.

AIM

4. To provide COS with an overview of developments in Security Sector Reform within Iraq and outline options for further UK engagement.

SCOPE

5. This paper sets out:

¹ Humanitarian Aid, Information Operations, Economic and Political reconstruction

² IPU paper "Iraq - Security Sector Reform" Ad Hoc Ministerial meeting on Iraq (8 May 03)

- a. Our current thinking on how SSR in Iraq should be approached.
- b. Reviews our current understanding of the situation, including US intent.
- c. Sets out extant UK policy with respect to SSR in Iraq.
- d. Outlines options for UK military engagement.

UK MOD APPROACH TO SSR

6. The development of a co-ordinated and coherent approach to SSR in Iraq is an area of concern. In order that the UK delivers a clear message on what it is that we anticipate an SSR process to achieve we have developed some conceptual thinking within the MoD, which we are sharing with OGD.

7. The first task has been to determine what we see as the overarching purpose of SSR in Phase 4. SSR will necessarily span a lengthy time frame and will continue after Coalition Phase 4 activity has ceased, but to better focus our current efforts we should concentrate on the purpose of SSR in Phase 4.

Goal of SSR in Phase 4 in Iraq

8. To establish as soon as possible the core elements of a legitimate, accountable, sustainable Security Sector - which safeguards the Rights of Citizens and provides adequate Defence of future Iraqi Sovereignty.




Figure 1. SSR in Iraq

9. A key element will be the agreement of the Iraqis as to the constitution of these core elements and developing their understanding of the strategic security framework within which they will be operating, both within Iraq, and within the

region. Achieving transparency with regional states in this process will be key to threat reduction for the nascent Iraqi state, and help limit the overall resource bill.

Lines of Development

10. In order to fulfil this goal there are a number of Lines of Development that will need to be pursued, these are illustrated graphically at Figure 1. All of the lines shown are interdependent as each line will impinge upon the other in terms of role, missions, tasks and resources. The lines are largely self-explanatory, with the exception of WMD and Security Structures. "Security Structures" refers to the intelligence services and the former state security services. These pose a special but not unique challenge in Iraq. It is how these elements of the security establishment will be placed with regard to the military, the police and the more general law and order lines of development that will need to be resolved. The WMD line is not related to the intelligence or security and safety tasks of finding and making safe any WMD materials, rather it stresses the importance of WMD as a regional factor.

This will be a significant factor that the IIA, and later the Iraqi government will wrestle with. In addition to WMD, wider regional policy, and regional attitudes will shape Iraqi attitudes and shape the requirements of the security sector.

Key Factors

11. SSR cannot proceed unless there is a secure environment, and this is the key short term deliverable of the Coalition. Within the context of this secure environment there are a number of key factors:

- a. De-Ba'athification. There is a considerable amount of debate at present as to which strata of the Ba'ath command the Coalition should rule out for future employment within the Iraqi state. There is an argument that the Security elements of reconstruction are different and there needs to be more rigorous scrutiny and a lower threshold than in the other lines of operation if the Iraqis are to develop new structures, rather than new machinery populated by old practices. This is an area that remains unresolved and will require clear early guidance if SSR is to be successful.
- b. Reconstruction. Without effective wider reconstruction and economic development the SSR process will stall at an early stage.
- c. IIA. The development of the IIA, or at least the genesis of a body capable of indicating policy preferences that will advise or inform the new government as it emerges is essential. The Iraqis will have to own the future of their security structures from the outset. The key risk to implementing this element of the programme is the lack of a UNSCR that will enable any proposed reforms, that exceed the powers vested in the Occupying Powers (which in this case are limited) to proceed.
- d. Information Campaign. Ensuring that there is broad understanding, recognition and agreement to the SSR process will be essential to success.

e. Money. The affordability of any proposed new structures and the money to pay for the early infra-structure, salaries, training, and equipping of the new security forces is clearly a vital ingredient. Afghanistan is a salutary lesson in the propensity of the international community to pledge a lot and deliver a little, and the effect this has on SSR.

IRAQI NEEDS

12. There is as yet no comprehensive statement of what remains of the Iraqi security sector establishment, in terms of people (and what level of competence they had previously attained, and against what standards these will be judged), equipment, or infra-structure. The US have euphemistically described most of the former Iraqi Armed Forces and other security services as having "self-demobilised"; they have melted away into the community. As a result they have concluded that at present there is no significant disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) challenge in Iraq. Disarmament will be an issue, but it is not the large scale disarming of organised armed groups that we have seen in other recent conflicts. There are, however, questions over what to do with security related organisations such as the Military Industrial Commission (MIC); the principal in country source of weapons that also provided significant state funded employment. These are issues that are more akin to economic redevelopment and reconstruction rather than reform of security sector, although the two are clearly related.

13. The ORHA Adviser for the Ministry of Defence of the Interim Iraqi Administration (IIA) the Hon Walter Slocombe is currently engaged in his first reconnaissance to Iraq. The purpose of this visit is to assess what he will need in order to support the new Iraqi MoD, as opposed to a comprehensive needs assessment of Iraqi security.

14. Therefore, the scale of the task the coalition faces remains unclear. However, in terms of internal and border security the likely tasks of the future Iraqi security sector are straight-forward. Clearly the Iraqis must be made to be self-sufficient for all their internal security demands and should be given the appropriate skills and equipment to do so, however, for external security the question is more demanding.

15. In developing a UK approach to the size and shape of the New Iraqi Armed Forces (NIAF) we have made the following assumptions³:

- a. Iraq's territorial integrity will be guaranteed through international treaty/security agreements.
- b. Iraq should be capable of deterring an attack upon Iraqi sovereign territory. This will require them to delay an attacking force long enough to allow international reinforcements to arrive.
- c. Iraq should not be capable of mounting an aggressive attack upon its neighbours.

³ See Annex A for current UK thinking on NIAF.

d. The New Iraqi Armed Forces will not have a primary role in ensuring the internal security of the Iraqi State.

16. The US recognise that these assumptions represent the key issues that will need to be addressed. However, they intend to develop the principal constraints that will guide the development of Iraqi strategic thinking with the goal of ensuring that the new Iraqi MoD develops, and owns, its own strategic concept.

17. One of the principal stated constraints is that the Iraqis will not be permitted WMD. The US has stated that they will provide Iraq with external security guarantees that will deter external aggression, but their intent is with regard to the size and shape of the NIAF within the envelope of these guarantees has yet to be formulated.

US INTENT

18. The United States is firmly in the lead on the development of the security sector in Iraq, but their overall intent is as yet unclear. ORHA is charged with leading the necessary process for change, with a number of groups within it addressing separate Security Sector components (the military, the intelligence services, police and penal system etc). There is no single lead or over-arching policy framework for the development of the Security Sector and the current approach is

We are also aware that other elements of the US establishment are working up their own plans, with for example,

and the US Air Force developing plans for the future Iraqi Air Force. There is currently no clear sense of who is overall charge.⁴

19.

It reveals a continued reluctance to approach SSR as an holistic task, preferring to deal with each of the individual elements selectively, with a heavy reliance on US security industry contractors to deliver both training and policy support. The key risk that UK SSR experts see in this approach is that will leave the Iraqis with illogical and potentially unsustainable security structures. However, there may be changes afoot as Mr Slocombe develops his concept; his views are consistent with those of the UK and he sees a need to emphasise the use of serving military personnel to act as role models for the new Iraqi Armed Forces, with some specialist contractor support.

20. At the Operational Level work is ongoing in theatre to rapidly bring together plans to develop lightly armed indigenous Iraqi forces (of about 40,000)⁵ that can be

4

Annex B sets out a possible model for a Coalition Provisional Authority that could better deliver a winning Phase 4 campaign concept.

⁵ Referred to as the New Iraqi Corps (NIC). This seen as a short term interim measure to "get angry young men off the streets". The aim will be to demonstrate rapid progress and provide manpower for a variety of tasks (under coalition direction) such as cleaning up barracks and battlefields, providing point security at key points (hospitals, schools, coalition barracks etc) and possibly engaging in internal security tasks.

used to assist the Coalition in both internal and border security roles. The highly ambitious plan is open the training pipeline on 1 Jun 03, with a short 4 week basic military skills course to begin the process of sorting the committed and able from the rest. These early lightly armed units will eventually evolve into elements of the New Iraqi Armed Forces (NIAF), but this first initial step is not seen as definitive, and should not prejudice the final shape or size of these forces. It is anticipated that Coalition forces in the UK AO will be expected to assist in the recruitment, training and development of these forces.

Iraqi Defence Forces

21. Early US thinking on the formation of the new Iraqi Defence Forces again reflects their approach in Afghanistan - very ambitious, a high reliance on contractors (MPRI) and a concentration on the purely military aspects at the expense of the wider political, economic and social implications of what is being planned. Though there is intent to reform the Iraqi MoD there are difficulties in pursuing this without the legal cover of a UNSCR or without a wider understanding of the future nature or shape of an Iraqi Government or how the Iraqis would wish their security sector to be constituted. Since Mr Slocombe's team are principally designed to work through an Iraqi MoD, the lack of a UNSCR will constrain UK involvement - and that of other Coalition partners - until the legal situation is clarified. In the long term this could prove to be a crucial failing of the US approach.⁶

22. Other than the NIC there are no other plans for the standing up of the NIAF. However, there is an aspiration to register and track those entering, or volunteering, for the NIC who have had previous naval or air force experience so they can be recovered for these arms later in the reconstruction process. It is likely, therefore, to be some months before plans are developed for all components of the NIAF. With the expressed US intent of waiting until the IIA ministries are functioning and able to give clear strategic direction on the NIAF, it is unlikely that UK will be able to clearly identify where we might best play a role. Against this background of continued uncertainty we should seek to identify an indication of the resource envelope - principally funding - within which UK Defence will be provisioned to offer assistance⁷. The size of such training missions are generally very small scale, such that numbers are become less of an issue in people terms than the continued provision of funding for the people we will be asked to provide outwith our force structure.

Internal Security Forces

23. Currently these will not form part of Mr Slocombe's remit. However, he recognises that there will be a need for the FIAF to be engaged in internal security in some form, at least in the early stages of development, and the NIC will be prepared to conduct limited IS functions. There is some early US thinking on the development of a Gendarmerie (subordinated to the Ministry of Interior(MOI) as opposed to the

⁶ The UK's thinking on the Future Iraqi Armed Forces is at Annex A

⁷ As a guideline a training team of about 100 men costs £14M per year, funded by GCPF, to sustain, based on our experiences in Sierra Leone. At present there is no obvious source of funding for such activity in Iraq.

MoD) which is likely to fall to European paramilitary trainers; however, issues of size, scale, timing, and co-ordination with the development of the police, judiciary and penal service is still some way off.

24. In order to provide a "western" policing model in Iraq a police force of about 77,000 would be required for the country as a whole. However, in the Arab world in general there is a preference for competing internal security forces (typical models include the Police, Ministry of Interior troops, National Guards, and a Royal/ Presidential Guard, as well as the National Defence Forces) to be in dynamic balance. If Iraq were to pursue such a model it would have internal security forces totally some 120,000 (65,000 police and 55,000 "internal security troops"). There is as yet no clarity on which model the US intends to support with its training programmes, or indeed if they intend to prescribe a favoured model, or leave to the Iraqis to decide.

25. The key consideration from an SSR perspective is that whatever the model that is adopted there will inevitably be a competition between the various elements of the security apparatus to attract the brightest, fittest and best to each separate arm. Without central direction this competition for resources can prove at best inefficient and at worst destructive.

CURRENT UK POLICY

26. The Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on Iraq rehabilitation has recently endorsed a number of measures that the UK should take with respect to SSR in Iraq. They are:

- To continue to encourage the US to adopt a broad concept of SSR in Iraq.
- To contribute UK experts to the Office of the Defence Adviser and to police and judicial reform efforts in ORHA.
-
- To establish a small SSR secretariat within our delegation to ORHA to advise on cross-cutting SSR issues in an attempt to create cohesion.
- To facilitate UN, IFI and other donor engagement in SSR as appropriate.

OPTIONS FOR UK MILITARY ENGAGEMENT

27. SSR in Iraq is a DfID lead. Within the terms of the SSR engagement already agreed by Ministers there is obvious scope for a minimal military requirement to provide staff advice to the Office of the Defence Adviser and to the UK SSR secretariat. Beyond this, however, we may face a requirement to provide additional resources. Such a requirement is likely to emanate from one of three sources:

- a. Political intent in the UK to seek deeper UK involvement in Iraq.
- b. US requests to deepen our engagement in SSR (most likely in niche areas).
- c. Necessity - given the likely UK possession of a sizeable portion of Iraq, UK forces will be likely to be faced with a variety of low level military activities

required of coalition forces by the US to enable SSR implementation (e.g. oversight of recruiting procedures, provision of training advice & resources).

28. Against this background we have a choice about the degree of UK military involvement. These choices have implications for both the level resources and the length of time we are likely to be engaged:

a. **Minimal** - contributions to ORHA central offices, minimal in theatre assistance as necessary. Advantages: low cost, limited exposure to US plans that might go nowhere. Allows UK to concentrate in other areas where success is more likely. US retains responsibility for changes wrought without a UNSCR. Disadvantages: Limited UK influence, minimal contribution

b. **Moderate** - as for minimal but with the addition of some dedicated Short Term Training Teams. Advantages: Visible sign of commitment without significant responsibility. Could be achieved within resources already assigned to UK AOR in short term. Disadvantages: Limited real impact despite assuming additional tasks.

c. **Maximal** - taking on a complete military aspect of SSR (eg. training the Air Force, or providing all officer training). Advantages: May increase leverage to influence US thinking. May accelerate development and allow earlier drawdown/exit of UK forces. Disadvantages: Expensive, hard to sustain, good money after bad argument, prejudicing our ability to exit, will lengthen engagement. Overall plan still US driven. Room for manoeuvre without UNSCR limited.

RECOMMENDATIONS

29. It is recommended that:

a. COS note the development of MoD's conceptual approach to SSR in Iraq, and that,

b. We seek clarification of US intent with regard to their assumptions of:

(1) US/ Coalition external security guarantees for Iraq

(2) Roles and missions of FIAF (deter/ defeat vs attack/ defeat)

(3) Internal security role of FIAF

(4) Who will decide size and shape of internal security forces

c. We should proceed on the basis of minimal engagement in SSR in Iraq coherent with current Ministerial intent.

d. We should seek clarification of where the funding for engagement in SSR will be forthcoming.

CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED

ANNEX A
TO D/DOMA/C/15
DATED 15 MAY 03

NEW IRAQI ARMED FORCES (NIAF) – UK PROPOSALS

1. The main external threats are judged to come from Iran and Syria.

The following assumptions were made: air parity (the Iraqi air force is reconstructed sufficiently to prevent hostile airforces operating effectively over Iraq); attacking divisions were at full strength; Iran attacks on a 20 mile frontage in the Basra area against an Iraqi defensive frontage of 100 miles, Syria attacks on a 20 mile frontage towards Kirkuk or Baghdad against an Iraqi defensive frontage of 50 miles; and neither attacking force achieves strategic surprise.

2. Iraq is a large country and while individual attacks could be defeated by a division, geographic considerations require Iraq to have three divisions in the north, two in the central region around Baghdad and two in the south. This means replacing each corps in the current Iraqi order of battle with a division¹. The total armed force equipment levels envisaged for the NIAF are about 1200 tanks, 850 infantry fighting vehicles and 1000 artillery pieces (105 mm or larger) spread over perhaps 7 small divisions or brigade plus formations. It is expected that these could be provided from existing holdings. It is assessed that this is the minimum requirement for the tasks.

3. The current Iraqi army is established at about 350,000 strong, but formations are undermanned and the actual permanent force strength is nearer 220,000. The restructured Iraqi army would be half this size with a need for a permanent manpower force of at least 100,000, with a possible establishment size of between 150,000 and 200,000.

4. Land forces should be re-organized into a unified command structure, eliminating the current separation of the regular army and the Republican Guard. The Special Republican Guard should be disbanded. Some existing personnel will have no place in the new structure and consideration will need to be given to the vetting, selection and training of officers.

5. The IAF must have the capability to defend Iraqi airspace. The requirement is for air defence and not an offensive air capability. An air force based on 72 AD aircraft is proportionate for the size of the country, which could be integrated with a limited ground based AD system. Iraq has no requirement to operate aircraft outside

¹ 1 regular armoured division and 2 Revolutionary Guard mechanised infantry division

² 2 armoured divisions, 1 mechanised infantry division and 1 infantry division

³ It should be noted that the present compositions of Iraqi corps vary.

CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED

its airspace, but it will need a reconnaissance capability to conduct defensive operations so she should have a reconnaissance squadron. Attack helicopters (AH) are powerful defensive assets, but are also excellent for suppressing internal unrest; Iraq should not have sophisticated AH, but could have simple armed helicopters. Support helicopters would also be permitted.

6. The key maritime task is to protect the coastline and port waterways. We assume a continued coalition maritime presence to protect energy supply routes. Given that, an Iraqi Navy only requires patrol boats (armed with guns rather than missiles). The waterways are vulnerable to mining and it ought to have a small counter mine capability. The Iraqi Navy does not require an amphibious capability.

7. Rough costs have been assessed, but more detailed work is required. Initial work suggests an Iraqi Defence budget of about \$1.5 bn pa, which does not include reconstitution or repair to infrastructure costs.

NIAF CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS

Minimum Future Iraq Armed Forces:

Land:

Tanks	1200
IVF	850
Arty	1000
Men:	full permanent manning figure 100,000
	establishment figure 150,00 to 200,000

Navy:

Corvettes	2
300 ton coastal protection	2
100 ton inshore patrol craft	5
auxiliaries	3
LSL	1
Mine sweepers	4
Small coastal craft	several
Coast Guard vessels	several
NO ANTI-SHIP MISSILES	

Air Force:

Air defence aircraft	6 squadrons
Recce aircraft	1 squadron

Costs

Annual Defence Budget	\$1.5Bn
Air Defences reconstitution	\$2Bn minimum

DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX B
TO D/DOMA/C/15
DATED 15 MAY 03

DELIVERING A WINNING CONCEPT IN PHASE 4

- All commentators agree that current Phase 4 structures are dysfunctional.
- Strategy is unclear, and until arrival of Bremer, no sense of unity of purpose, let alone unity of effort, or unity of command existed.
- Arrival of Bremer offers an opportunity to develop new thinking for Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)
- Key outputs of reconstruction effort need to be tied to principal Lines of Operation that will benefit Iraqis, with concentration on those aspects that will deliver most rapid effect:
 - Security, Humanitarian, Governance, Economic, Diplomatic, and Information.
- Key inputs are: intellectual effort, money and those specialist skills that Iraqis may lack.
- Key is to provide organisational structure that:
 - Is capable of processing information on situation, deciding on effects required, ensuring effort is prioritised and focussed on delivery of these effects, then
 - Translating Coalition inputs (intellectual effort, money, training, and skills) into useful output, and,
 - Co-ordinating development of Iraqis to help themselves in development of Iraqi government structures.
- To achieve this clear staffing structure and processes need to be developed that sit above developing Iraqi government Ministries; mimicking Ministries within CPA likely to lead to incoherent development, without established Cabinet structure to prioritise process, to deliver this there are 2 potential alternatives:
- Military staff template⁴ offers one approach, and could be easily invoked, even to extent of deploying a military HQ to provide basic framework on which to build.
 - Advantages: rapid deployment, likely to come with all necessary infrastructure and established processes

⁴ Personnel, Intelligence, Operations, Logistics, Plans, Communications, Policy (Doctrine), Finance, and Legal staff divisions co-ordinated by Chief of Staff, with dedicated life support and infra-structure.

DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL


DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

- Disadvantages: potentially inflexible (one size does not fit all), gives wrong message (military in charge rather than in support), once deployed may prove difficult to extract
- Bespoke organisation that may use military staff structure as an enabler.
- Organisation based on key Lines of Operation that will ensure coherent delivery of effects across newly formed Iraqi Ministries. E.g. Security-oversees SSR effort which is implemented by MoD/ MoI/ Justice.
- Efforts by embedded staff and advisers in each Ministry co-ordinated by CPA Policy branch (IIA Co-ord in diagram)
- Efforts supported by Finance branch (resourcing the CPA effort vice driving new Iraqi Treasury and its policies).
- Will require development of consultative, all-informed approach with COS and Principal chairing Board meetings that decide priorities, and focus efforts.
- Will need extensive Life Support (security, transport, catering, personnel admin etc) and Communications infra-structure
- Communications vital to support information collection, collation and dissemination if decision making is to be informed and effective.
- Communications and Life Support could be delivered by use of elements of deployable Mil HQ (life support and J1, J2, J4 and J6 elements)
- See diagram for illustration of organisation.

DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

ENABLING STRUCTURE FOR GOVERNANCE AND RECONSTRUCTION IN IRAQ



DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL