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ACTION OFFICER FSX, CC FLOAT TELS.

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LNCEDN 1262 MAMIAN 4493

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FFFF PART ONE OF TWO

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OO BUCHA CALCU CANBE DUBLI GEDIS GEMIS GENEV HANOI HELSI HOKON
OO HOSEE ISLAM KAMPA KATHM KINSH KULUM LISBO MADRA MADRI MANIL
OO MILAN MOSCO NAIRO NEDEL NEYOR NYMIS OSLOO OTTAW PARIS PRAGU
OO RANGO ROMEE SANAA SINGA STOCK TOKYO UKFAO UKOEC VIDEL VIENN
OO VIMIS WASHI
FM FCOLN TO ABIDJ
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FM FCO

TO IMMEDIATE ABIDJAN

TELNO 150

OF 191944Z MARCH 03

AND TO IMMEDIATE ALL CLASSIFIED POSTS, MODUK, CABINET OFFICE, DFID
AND TO IMMEDIATE PJHQ, ADMINISTRATOR ASCENSION

PART 1 OF 2

SUBJECT: IRAQ: CORE SCRIPT - PHASE IV

SUMMARY

1. Guidance on Iraq Phase IV ("the day-after").

DETAIL

2. This telegram provides posts with an outline of our thinking on the likely evolution of events following military action - known as Phase 4. Posts may draw on this at their discretion in briefing key contacts, subject to the caveat that this represents the current state of our thinking but not necessarily agreed coalition policy in all respects, that it will evolve in the course of any military action and that Phase 3 (decisive combat operations) and Phase 4 ("day after") may overlap. As Coalition forces advance into Iraq, and begin to assume control of parts of the country, Phase 4 (the 'Day After' phase) will begin to take effect in those areas that have been liberated. At this stage it is impossible to predict for how long this overlap will last, or to how much of Iraq it will apply.

3. Our aim is to disarm Saddam of his weapons of mass destruction. If military action is necessary to do so and it results in the collapse of Saddam's regime, our goal will be to transform Iraq along the lines set out in the UK's "Vision for Iraq and the Iraqi

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People", launched at the Azores Summit Core Script - Phase IV
(www.number10.gov.uk/output/page3280.asp).

4. During and immediately following military action, a high priority will be to mobilise the international community to provide emergency humanitarian relief. DIFD have already committed pounds 20m to immediate preparations, with a further initial pounds 60m earmarked for humanitarian operations. And UK forces will have pounds 30m for humanitarian purposes in the first month, with pounds 10m for quick impact projects.
5. An early priority will be to obtain a UN Security Council Resolution enabling Oil for Food to continue in the absence of a functioning Iraqi government. We envisage a temporary transfer of authority to the UN Secretary General allowing him to reprioritise existing contracts and enter into new contracts for food and essential humanitarian supplies. The purpose of this would be to continue to use the resources and existing supply networks of OFF, where possible, in support of the immediate humanitarian needs of the people of Iraq.
6. We are also discussing with the US the details of a further UN Security Council Resolution providing overall UN authorisation for transitional arrangements in Phase 4. Such authorisation is necessary to provide the framework in which the IFIs, we and other international bodies can participate in Iraq's reconstruction. This might include establishing a UN Assistance Mission for Iraq headed by a UN Special Co-ordinator to bring together the various strands of international and bilateral assistance. We also hope that the UN would, in the same resolution, endorse arrangements for the post conflict administration of Iraq that would involve a rapid but phased transfer of authority from the Coalition to the Iraqis.
7. Having an authorising UN Security Council Resolution is necessary to enable the IFIs, us, and other international bodies to participate in Iraq's reconstruction and would enable us to build a wide coalition of international support for the reconstruction of Iraq, including drawing on the resources and expertise of the EU, IFIs and UN agencies in managing transition. It would also enable us to broaden the pool of countries contributing forces to the coalition, which will remain essential to provide security in what may still be an uncertain environment.
8. This resolution is likely to be more contentious than the OFF resolution. Much will depend on the assurances we are able to give about transferring authority to the Iraqis/the UN. Nevertheless, we believe that provided the UN is given a significant role, there will be support at the Security Council for this approach. We are in close contact with Washington and others over tactics.
9. Events on the ground in Phase 4 are likely to divide into three stages. In the first stage, immediately after the conflict, the coalition military will be responsible for the administration of Iraq. Their first task will be to stabilise the country and, working with the UN inspectors, to find and secure Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. The military's powers to administer Iraq will be limited to our rights as an occupying power under international humanitarian law. We shall also have obligations under international humanitarian law, including the Geneva Conventions, towards the Iraqi people.

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The original
message did not
have a paragraph
10 or 11.

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PART 2 OF 2

SUBJECT: IRAQ: CORE SCRIPT - PHASE IV

12. For ordinary Iraqis, the urgent need in the first weeks is likely to be securing their basic humanitarian requirements such as clean water, sanitation, food, shelter and medicines. We expect the bulk of this work to fall to UN agencies and NGOs: the coalition's task will be to provide the secure environment within which relief can be delivered and to facilitate, though not control, the organisations delivering the aid.

13. After some weeks, the UN should appoint a Special Co-ordinator for Iraq and set out a mandate for the international community's presence in the country. We hope that the final arrangements will authorise the UN Special Co-ordinator, together with the Coalition, to facilitate the establishment of an Iraqi Interim Authority (IIA), an executive body that will operate under his light supervision. In the second stage, responsibility for running the Iraqi ministries will then pass, as soon as conditions permit, from the Coalition/ITCA to the IIA. No doubt, this will start with the transfer of less sensitive areas of public administration first.

14. As well as taking over the executive duties of government, the Iraqi Interim Authority would establish a constituent assembly

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that would work up ideas for a new constitution, along the lines of the Bonn Conference on Afghanistan.

Those ideas would be put to a referendum and ideally would then lead to the third stage, the election of a broad-based, representative government.

15. Meanwhile, the international community will be involved in the overall effort to reform and reconstruct Iraq. Providing the conditions for success exist - a legal basis for action from the UNSC and a secure environment in which to act - we would expect all the traditional nation-builders to take part. The aim will be to introduce widespread economic and political reforms, as well as improvements in the functioning of the public administration.

16. The handling of the oil sector will be under the international microscope. The first tasks will be to repair and renovate existing oil fields. That could be a huge job if Saddam Hussein has sabotaged the oil wells. Even if he has not, Iraq's oil fields will require considerable investment to bring them up to international standards. Any far-reaching decisions about the oil sector, such as privatisation or the exploitation of new fields, will almost certainly be left for a new Iraqi government to deal with.

17. The emergence of a representative Iraqi government, committed to the long term political and economic reform of the country and to peaceful relations with the region, would allow the international community to withdraw much of its presence in Iraq. But the international community would remain engaged in Iraq's future through the IFIs, regional agreements, bilateral and multilateral aid programmes, and other political and practical support.

18. An important objective for HMG is to ensure a level playing field for UK companies to compete for commercial opportunities that arise in the reconstruction of Iraq.

19. Originator: IPU, Laurie Bristow. FCO email:

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