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From: UND - Other  
Sent: 15 March 2003 00:30  
To:

; Stephen Pattison;

Subject: FW: INFO: PP WASHI/FCOLN 347: NOSEC: IRAQ DAY AFTER: ORHA DEPLOYS TO KUWAIT

Classification: CONFIDENTIAL  
DTGM: 142352Z MAR  
Message To: FCOLN  
MessageFrom: WASHI

From: UND  
Sent: Saturday, March 15, 2003 12:30:03 AM  
To: UND - All Staff  
Subject: FW: INFO: PP WASHI/FCOLN 347: NOSEC: IRAQ DAY AFTER: ORHA DEPLOYS TO KUWAIT  
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From: Swift Incoming Telegrams (Machine 1)  
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The Iraq Inquiry has been notified that the bottom line on each page was lost at the time of original filing.

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HMT FOR KILPATRICK

My Telno 346

SUBJECT: NOSEC: IRAQ DAY AFTER: ORHA DEPLOYS TO KUWAIT

## SUMMARY

1. The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA) prepares to deploy to Kuwait on 16 March. General Garner hopes to move into Baghdad with the first coalition troops. ORHA has gradually coalesced as a unit, with staff from most US agencies. But there is no policy clarity on its relationship with the UN and the proposed Interim Iraqi Council. Inter-agency wrangling, notably between DoD and State, and the lack of firm offers of support from allies or the UN could hamper its operational effectiveness on the ground.

## DETAIL

2. ORHA was set up by Presidential Executive Order on 20 January to provide humanitarian assistance and help reconstruct and administer post-conflict Iraq. It was intended to provide a civilian face for Phase IV, but the decision to locate it in the Pentagon, headed by a 3 star retired general has given it an overwhelmingly military feel. It has also caused resentment from other parts of the USG, notably from State. Half of the approximately 170 staff are serving military personnel, with the remaining staff drawn from within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and other US agencies. After a frantic few weeks drawing up outline operational plans, ORHA is now undertaking two days pre-deployment training, before flying to Kuwait on 16 March. It aims to move into Iraq as soon as the post-war security situation will permit. (Comment: Garner plans to be amongst the first to fly in, despite UK advice that he should hang back, to avoid being seen as part of the US belligerent force).

3. ORHA consists of three "pillars" of operations, covering humanitarian assistance, reconstruction, and civil administration, to be based in Baghdad. It will establish three regional offices covering the North, Central (including Baghdad and Tikrit) and the South. Ambassador Barbara Bodine from State Department (formerly US Ambassador to Yemen) has already been designated to be the Central Co-ordinator. The pillars and the regions will be supported by an Operations Support Group, headed by retired US General Bates, who will be the operational link between ORHA and US/Coalition forces, all of whom will report back through CENTCOM to the Pentagon. It will also place advisory teams in each Ministry. Working alongside these will be a separate team of around 120 Iraqi Americans (still being drawn together by the Pentagon) who will be detailed to each Ministry to oversee their functioning and identify problems. In practice the situation is still chaotic: co-ordination in ORHA is poor, with a refrain of "everything will be resolved in Kuwait".

4. The pillars and regional teams aim to address immediate humanitarian and reconstruction needs, and gradually help the Iraqi Government back on its feet, pending handover to the international community and/or a new Iraqi Administration. Success depends on a number of critical factors including the length of the war, extent of damage to the country's infrastructure, and whether there is a hostile or friendly operating environment. It also depends on getting the support of the local Iraqi bureaucracy, and help from the international community, NGOs and the UN. To help achieve the former ORHA is trying to get the US Treasury to give it up to \$300 million in cash to pay salaries and emergency expenses for the first few weeks. It also plans to draw

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Fond funds to be used for this purpose. They are hampered in setting firm commitments of support while it is still unclear whether there will be a second UNSCR before military action, or what the relationship will be with the UN after any military action. Some of the work envisaged by ORHA could stretch beyond the proper functions of an Occupying Force under the IV Geneva Convention. Even the members of USAID's rapid response "DART" teams are said to be reluctant to work with ORHA unless there is some form of UNSCR covering Phase IV.

5. Garner personally recognises the need for UN cover, and hopes to internationalise the effort and be out of Iraq within 120 days. But the details and timing of any transition remain to be agreed at senior levels within the USG (TUR). Garner pushed for ORHA's deployment date to be brought forward to get away from being drawn into the debate himself. There is also still no clear policy on the future currency for Iraq, who will patrol the borders, how to screen Iraqis on the ground or those who want to return from outside, how to run prisons, what to do with Iraqi diplomats overseas and a myriad other practical issues with long term implications. Despite its best efforts to resolve these, ORHA may end up operating within a policy vacuum, and taking ad hoc decisions on the ground.

6. The UK provided support to ORHA from the outset, initially from the MOD, and then from FCO, DFID and TPUK. (FCO), (FCO) and Graham Rowcroft (TPUK) will be travelling to Kuwait with the US team on 16 March. DfID has agreed to formally second an official to work in the humanitarian assistance division. Maj-Gen Tim Cross and (both MOD) will be travelling via the UK to join the team next week. All hope to make early contact with BE Kuwait.

(FCO) will be staying in ORHA's "reachback" office in the Pentagon (which is itself still the subject of some inter-agency wrangling). The UK's contribution has already helped focus minds within ORHA on some of the broader policy questions and practical matters. The Australians also plan to send three people to join ORHA.

7. Garner and his top staff gave a final briefing to Rumsfeld and Chiefs of Staff on 14 March, covering their plans for the first 30 days (copy of agenda being faxed to Bristow, IPU). UK and Australian support received a positive mention. Rumsfeld was pleased with the operational planning, but concerned about funding issues (how quickly they could get OFF funds; the need to get more support from other countries; and the need for ORHA to be given flexibility on how to spend money on the ground). Rumsfeld agreed with Garner's comment that ORHA should be internationalised as fast as possible. But, tellingly, there was no real discussion of how ORHA's relationship with the UN, or any interim Iraqi Authority, would affect other countries' willingness to contribute.

(Desk Officer for post-conflict Iraq is  
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