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To: CANBX - eTelegrams
From: COMCEN Gateway 1b
Subject: I:PP:CONF:NOSEC: IRAQ: DAY AFTER: UK ROLE IN POST-
CONFLICT IRAQ: WASHI/FCOLN 257:1d=0029387
Sent: 27 February 2003 23:54:12 GMT

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LNCECN 0034 ZILNAN 3176

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PP ANKAR ATHEN BEBER BREEC BREMB BRNAT CANBE DUBLI GEDIS GEMIS

PP HELSI HOSEE LISBO MADRI NYMIS OSLOO OTTAW PARIS ROMEE SANAA

PP STOCK VIDEL VIENN

FM WASHI TO FCOLN

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TELNO 257

OF 272352Z FEBRUARY 03

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SIC: CAO/AZN/AZP/AZM/INX/LDQ

MODUK FOR IAN LEE, DGOPS POL, AND ROLLO, DMO

CABINET OFFICE FOR JIM DRUMMOND

DFID FOR PPS/SHORT, BREWER, MILLER &

HMT FOR

SUBJECT: NOSEC: IRAQ: DAY AFTER: UK ROLE IN POST-CONFLICT IRAQ

SUMMARY

1. The long term success of our action in Iraq depends crucially on the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA). Shouldn't we be giving them more help?

DETAIL

2. It has become quite clear that ORHA will be central to the administration of a post-conflict Iraq at least for the first couple of months, and quite possibly for longer.

3. Brewer's visit to ORHA today (MIPT) confirmed that the organisation remains woefully understaffed (although staff levels are rising rapidly) and underresourced. Garner is visibly exhausted. His meeting with Brewer took place in what looked like a store room, with cupboards being moved in the background. But he saw Rice yesterday and is to see the President tomorrow. Plans are in hand for the whole operation to move to theatre in the next couple of weeks. He made it clear to Brewer that any staff

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assistance we can provide would be gratefully received and effectively used.

4. We have a strong interest in ORHA succeeding. If our likely action in Iraq is to be seen as a success it will be crucial that day after action also works well. And if we do take responsibility for a sector of occupied Iraq we will have an even greater interest in the good functioning of civilian administration in that sector.

5. Both Garner and Abrams made clear to us today that they see, and will act on, our need for a legal basis from the UN for actions taken by the civil administration in post-war Iraq.

6. We have already provided ORHA with some help in the form of General Cross, and (although the latter cannot go to Kuwait). This is a drop in the bucket. You may wish to consider whether, in view of the visible importance of this organisation to our interests, we should be doing more. One possible source of help might be officers earmarked for eventual posting to Baghdad.

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