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THE DOSSIER: IRAQ'S RESPONSE

1. On 2 October the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a detailed rebuttal to the evidence presented in the dossier. It has yet to be taken up by the UK media.
2. Together with the intelligence agencies and FCO, we have reviewed the document. In broad terms we find it very weak; long on rhetoric and short on detail.
3. As well as presenting a somewhat rosy picture of their relationship with UNSCOM, the Iraqi document attempts to refute our claim that its WMD programmes have continued post 1998. They categorically state that in Iraq "there are no toxic chemical agents, precursors or chemical weapons", and "no capabilities to produce chemical or biological agents". Iraq is "completely clear of all biological weapons and agents....and does not keep any quantity of those agents". Iraq also "does not possess any missile with a range of more than 150km". This attitude of denial was mirrored in the recent talks in Vienna with Blix.
4. There is nothing in the detail of the Iraqi reply that undermines what is in the dossier. In a number of key areas they have failed to provide any credible response. For example they:
 - claim that accusations that they are seeking uranium from South Africa are a "bogus lie". But the dossier did not mention South Africa.

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- claim the al-Rafah test stand is for horizontal rather than vertical engine testing for the al-Samoud missile. Our experts are clear that the stand is designed for vertical engine testing, and that the al-Samoud missile is not suited to being tested horizontally;
- merely state that accusations of mobile biological agent production facilities are "astonishing";

5. Press lines prepared by the CIC are attached. I do not think we need to offer a fuller reply to any of Iraq's claims.



JULIAN MILLER

4 October 2002

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[PS/Mr Scarlett] - ISS -

Sent: 03 October 2002 10:09 [PS/Mr Scarlett] (E-mail)
To: [PS/Mr Scarlett] (E-mail)
Subject: FW: @cicuk.fco.gov.uk

> -----Original Message-----

- > From:
- > Sent: 03 October 2002 10:09
- > To:
- > Subject:
- >
- > Iraq's reply on Blair's report
- > Baghdad, Oct 2, INA
- > UK prime minister Mr. Tony Blair on 24 Sept. 2002 released a report on the
- > so-called acquisition by Iraq of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear ,
- > chemical and biological).
- > The report was disputed by many governments as well as British sources for
- > being a list of unsubstantiated assumptions and allegations or merely a
- > propaganda sheet.
- > Iraq's Ministry of Foreign Affairs present this report to clarify the
- > points misleadingly addressed in Mr. Blair's report.
- > Blair's Report, long awaited by the world opinion, contains not so much
- > but a series of lies and empty propaganda which are totally inconsistent
- > with the facts and reports made by the Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the
- > International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) teams.
- > What asserts Blair's lies and fabrications is the fact that he has lost
- > sight of Iraq's cooperation with these two international institutions
- > (UNSCOM & IAEA). Indeed he failed to consider the events and activities
- > which confirmed Iraq's full cooperation in the implementation of
- > paragraphs (8,9,10,11,12 and 13) of SCR 687.
- > Iraq's cooperation with UNSCOM & IAEA from 1991 to 1998
- > Following is a statement of the intensive effort made by Iraq in the
- > fulfillment of its obligation as defined by SCR 687
- > Nuclear Activity:
- > What Iraq has achieved in this field, in application of SCR 687, is the
- > product of the on-site operations which continued until an earlier time of
- > the current year, through the annual periodic inspection carried out by
- > the IAEA under the safeguards system (NPT), Document (QE / 002/009) dated
- > 15 March 2002 .
- > According to the well known facts, Iraq submitted all technical and
- > scientific details about the sites involved the previous program together
- > with the quantities and types of Nuclear materials, equipment and devices
- > which were involved in the previous Nuclear Activity with full and precise
- > details.
- > The nuclear file was officially closed by the IAEA in July 1995 and then
- > reopened in Aug. 1995. In Oct. 1997, the Agency submitted its semi-annual
- > report in which it indicated Iraq's implementation of its obligations as
- > regards section (C) of SCR 687 of the nuclear file. The Agency empowered
- > the Security Council to take a resolution to move to the on going
- > monitoring of nuclear program, Document (S/ 1997 / 779).
- > In April 1998, IAEA submitted another report in which it confirmed once
- > again Iraq's commitments to this file, Document (S/1998/312). According to
- > the realities and facts contained in the agency's reports, Iraq undertook
- > to destroy all the buildings and laboratories at Al-Atheer, Al-Tarmiya,
- > Al-Shirqat and
- > Al-Tuwatha sites. Iraq also destroyed all machines and equipment involved
- > in the previous nuclear program including the dual use equipment. In
- > addition other buildings and laboratories with areas of 270,000 square
- > meters were destroyed.
- > Between 1993 and 1994, Iraq handed over to IAEA 127 kgs of enriched
- > uranium used as nuclear fuel for the peaceful research reactor. The Agency
- > transported this quantity outside Iraq. As for the remaining nuclear
- > materials they are at present in the possession of IAEA.
- > According to IAEA reports, Iraq's declarations about its nuclear activity
- > are correct, precise and credible. Iraq also submitted its Full, Final and
- > Comprehensive Disclosure (FFCD), supported by documents.
- > Chemical Activity:
- > As regards the question of chemical weapons, Iraq, after the adoption of
- > resolution SCR 687, made declarations about the quantities, types and the

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- > geographical sites of the filled and empty ammunitions, the produced
- > chemical agents, the raw materials, the production facilities and the
- > supporting facilities.
- > In September 1991, the UNSCOM supervised the destruction of all empty
- > chemical ammunitions at Al-Muthana Establishment which included 12,500
- > pieces of artillery ammunitions and aerial bombs. In February 1992, the
- > UNSCOM destroyed the chemical ammunitions at Al-Khamissiya area which
- > included 400 (122mm) rockets filled with Sarin. From June 1992 to June
- > 1994, the UNSCOM destroyed the empty and filled ammunitions, the
- > production equipment, production sites, stores, liquid and solid materials
- > at Al-Muthana Establishment which included 690 tons of the produced final
- > agents and 38500 ammunition pieces, filled and empty, liquid amounted to
- > 1,800 000 liters, solid intermediate materials, amounted to 1000 tons as
- > well as 150 production equipment and four production sites and stores.
- > Iraq was cooperative in this matter. It provided all assistance for the
- > destruction work at the shortest possible time and under the UNSCOM
- > supervision which appreciated Iraq's cooperation. Iraq also submitted its
- > FFCD in line with the forms prepared by the UNSCOM itself which contained
- > full details of the chemical weapons program.
- > Biological Activity
- > Iraq in June 1991, ratified the Biological weapons Ban Treaty and asserted
- > its commitments under Geneva protocol of 1925 under para 7, section (C) of
- > SCR 687.
- > In 1995, Iraq submitted to UNSCOM the draft FFCD of the biological program
- > in the hope of submitting the final version in June 1996 which contained
- > full information about the program in all its details (date of program,
- > sites involved in the program, research & development, production,
- > weaponization, destruction damaging, material balance, procurements).
- > In this context Iraq fully cooperated with the UNSCOM in its work for the
- > verification and destroying biological weapons, all remaining biological
- > agents stock piles, equipment, devices, materials and culture media which
- > were used in the process of research, development, production and storage,
- > together with the destruction of equipment and material used for pure
- > civilian purpose. The destruction also included the furniture, desks,
- > cooling systems, refrigerators, science book and journals under the UNSCOM
- > supervision.
- > The UNSCOM teams which undertook to follow up the biological file have
- > used highly advanced scientific methods for the detection of any trace of
- > a previous or present biological activity. Moreover, the active and strict
- > monitoring system covered a very wide network of sites and through the
- > surprise and daily inspections the UNSCOM did not find anything that ran
- > contrary to SCRs 687 and 715. While Iraq reiterates this information in
- > response to Blair's lies and fabrications, it asserts such information on
- > the strength of the inspectors reports and the briefings presented to the
- > Security Council as well as on the facts which have become well known to
- > the international public opinion.
- > Ballistic Missiles
- > Iraq had submitted all detailed information about the sites, quantities
- > and types of missiles, launchers, key parts, missiles supporting devices,
- > production and repair sites to UNSCOM. In the light of this information
- > UNSCOM undertook to verify the destruction of missiles and launchers which
- > were in possession of Iraq after 1991. It included 133 missiles and 14
- > combat launchers. The UNSCOM also verified their full destruction and the
- > full accounting of the material balance through the documentary and
- > material proofs. The UNSCOM admitted this fact in its report to the
- > Security Council, Document (S/1997/774). In addition, 75 warheads of the
- > missiles were destroyed, 30 of which were destroyed under the UNSCOM
- > supervision and 45 were destroyed unilaterally by Iraq. The UNSCOM was
- > able to verify their destruction and admitted that in its report to the
- > Security Council, Document(S/1998/920). The missile file was officially
- > closed by UNSCOM in June 1995 (UNSCOM report to Security Council
- > S/1995/para. 30) and was reopened in Aug. 1995 when Iraq submitted its
- > FFCD in accordance with the forms prepared by the UNSCOM in June 1996. It
- > took three years for the UNSCOM to carry out its additional verification
- > which eventually proved that Iraq's previous declarations were true,
- > accurate and credible (UNSCOM report to Security Council S/1997/774).
- > A legal and objective reading of the procedures undertaken by Iraq in its
- > cooperation with the UNSCOM in implementing its obligations under SCR 687
- > relating to the question of disarmament in the missile field proves
- > undoubtedly that Iraq has fail of its commitments under para. 8, 9 and 10
- > of SCR 687.
- > Iraq's Imports
- > The claim that Iraq has imported some materials proscribed by the Security
- > Council Resolutions and the allegation that Iraq has developed its program
- > of proscribed weapons through smuggling with foreign countries and
- > companies, is a claim not supported by any fact. The truth of the matter

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- > is that Iraq, when it agreed to SCR 715, it started the application of a
- > mechanism within the context of the resolution which put the country's
- > imports and exports of dual use materials as defined by the Security
- > Council to the monitoring mechanism by the IAEA and UNSCOM.
- > of them were assigned to specify materials covered by this mechanism.
- > In Feb. 1995 Iraq received the draft of import - export monitoring
- > mechanism plan and implemented it despite remarks made by Iraq about them.
- > Iraq's imports were subject to the UNSCOM monitoring system through
- > checking Iraqi customs measures, visits to all entry points to the country
- > (land, air and sea), as well as checking all documents and correspondence
- > relating to this. The inspection teams made visits by helicopters and
- > vehicles which covered Iraq from the north to the south and from the east
- > to the west. On its part, Iraq gave every possible assistance in the
- > performance of the tasks of those teams and in answering the questions
- > relating to the commercial mechanism. The task of those teams was to
- > collect information about the import to oversee Iraq's implementation of
- > relative Security Council Resolution and no violation was recorded against
- > Iraq in this context whether from IAEA or UNSCOM. So, from where about
- > dose Blair get such deceiving information which says that Iraq has
- > imported some prohibited materials? How did he included countries in this
- > file when he knows, that Iraq has not imported any material prohibited by
- > the Security Council Resolution.
- > The UNSCOM, from 1991 until its withdrawal on 15 Dec. 1998 has sent dozens
- > of teams but they were not able to observe a violation in this regard.
- > Similarly, the import monitoring mechanism, which is in operation since
- > June 1996 under SCR 1051 up to its halting on 15 Dec. 1998 did not
- > indicate any single violation of the resolution.
- > Facts about Iraq's Cooperation
- > The essential question which must be asked is that why have the work of
- > UNSCOM and IAEA is ignored what Iraq has so far achieved? Iraq, since
- > 1994, and as Rolf Ekeus admitted, has implemented 95% of its due
- > obligations under the proscribed weapons file. Another question that has
- > to be posed is that what the inspection teams had done from 1991 up to 15
- > Dec. 1998? The total number of the inspection teams was 276 distributed
- > according to the following table:-
- > * 83 Missile inspection teams.
- > * 62 Chemical inspection teams.
- > * 74 Biological inspection teams.
- > * 40 Nuclear inspection teams.
- > * 5 Import / Export inspection teams.
- > As for the special missions, 12 teams were assigned to them. The number of
- > inspectors was 3845 and the number of inspections carried out by those
- > teams for the sites, covered and uncovered by the monitoring system, was
- > 3392. Iraq extended full cooperation to the discussion and verification
- > teams whose number amounted to 94 out of the total number of the
- > inspection teams. They interviewed 1378 persons. In addition, Iraq worked
- > and cooperated with the monitoring groups whose number was 192 and whose
- > inspectors were 1232. They carried out 10256 inspection. As regards the
- > aerial reconnaissance, transportation and logistic affairs, 1306 sites,
- > covered and uncovered by the monitoring system, were surveyed while the
- > number of sorties was 908. In addition, US spy planes (U-2) carried out
- > 434 sorties with a total flying hours amounted to 1800 hours.
- > The above mentioned facts can never be called in question. They are solid
- > facts contained in the UNSCOM and IAEA reports.
- > The number of the reports written by the UNSCOM from 1991 to 1998 was 24
- > and the number of the reports made by IAEA from 1991 to 1995 was eight.
- > After 1995 and up to 1998, the IAEA reports were incorporated with the
- > UNSCOM reports within the framework of the unified semi-annual reports
- > issued by the UNSCOM.
- > It is important that we refer here to the information contained in a
- > number of the documents of the UNSCOM and of its reports to the Security
- > Council Document (S/1993/26910) issued on December 1993 states:
- > "The Iraqi Authorities were keen to ensure that the inspection proceeded
- > without incident: Iraq provided all the support requested by the
- > inspection teams, access to all sites and areas to be inspected was
- > guaranteed; no problems were encountered by the team in execution of its
- > operational plan"
- > Document S/1994/490 issued by the IAEA states:
- > "A marked improvement has occurred in the working relationship with the
- > Iraqi side. An evident effort is now deployed by the Iraqi authorities to
- > provide promptly the information needed to fulfill the requirements of the
- > different resolutions to remove remaining gaps or uncertainties".
- > (Document S/1994/1138) states
- > "The Commission has received considerable assistance and support from Iraq
- > in its efforts to install sensor and tags."
- > (Document S/1994/1151 issued by the IAEA states!

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- > "The Iraqi attitude has enabled the inspectors work to be conducted effectively and has contributed significantly to expediting the process of establishing ongoing monitoring and verification, as called for in the Security Council Resolutions."
- > (Document S/1995/494) the UNSCOM Executive Chairman says:
 - > "Much had been achieved in the implementation of paragraphs 8 - 10 of Security Council Resolution 687(1991) -indeed, the bulk of what was required."
 - > The same document also says that "Iraq at the commission's request, has provided accurate information about the VX project and has fulfilled its promise as required by the commission."
 - > The Document also says:
 - > "The commission is satisfied that Iraqi's cooperation in carrying out the monitoring plan has been of a degree that satisfies the provisions of paragraph 5 of Scrutiny Council Resolution 715."
 - > (Document S/1995/844) of IAEA says:
 - > "The level of practical cooperation by Iraqi counterparts in facilitating and expediting IAEA field work continues to be high."
 - > (Document S/1995/864) states that:
 - > "Iraq has continued to provide the support requested by the Commission in the conduct of inspection and verification."
 - > The Commission Chairman welcomes this approach by Iraq and of providing the necessary documents.
 - > (Document S/1995/1038) says:
 - > "The Iraqi side accepted all the comments and recommendations made by the commission experts concerning the additional information to be included in the final version of the Full, Final and Complete Disclosures."
 - > Claims about alleged activities after 1998
 - > Proceeding from above and in order to put before the British and world public opinion all the facts that refute the file of lies contained in Blair's report, we shall tackle this in detail through our reply supported by facts.
 - > Nuclear Activity
 - > Blair, in paragraph 19 and 21 of his report claimed that Iraq tries to acquire a local capability for uranium enrichment by centrifuge. In fact the centrifuge constituents consist of dozens of parts including pumps, rotaries and maraging steel but they exclude Aluminum.
 - > Blair in his file attempted to misrepresent this paragraph by saying that there is information which indicates that the purpose of this Aluminum is for a nuclear program. The Aluminum pipes exist in Iraq and the IAEA and UNSCOM check them and they are subject to the monitoring under SCR 715.
 - > As for Blair's allegation that Iraq tried to acquire quantities of uranium from South Africa, this is basically a bogus lie... what indicates this is that he attributed it to an intelligence information without even giving a proof that supports his claim. If we add to this South Africa's denial of Blair's claims in this regard, Iraq's credibility has thus been asserted.
 - > IAEA stated that all nuclear materials in South Africa are subject to its safeguards and inventory system and it has never found any shortage in their number. In the same way, nuclear materiin Iraq are also subject to the same safeguards conditions and are checked every year and this could invalidate Blair's claim. IAEA's Document (QE/002/009) of 15 Feb. 2002 substantiates our argument.
 - > Blair concluded, according to his own assumptions, that Iraq needs (5) years to produce a nuclear weapon if sanctions remained imposed on it. As a consequence Blair went on his fabricated assumption, stating that if Iraq manages to acquire fissile material and other necessary materials from foreign sources, it can produce a nuclear weapon in a course of one or two years.
 - > Blair assumptions are groundless due to the monitoring imposed on importations according to Security Council Resolution (1051) and the strict monitoring on importations implemented through the MOU, and due to periodical inspection implemented by IAEA annually under the safeguards system.
 - > Chemical Activity
 - > Blair has repeated flimsy and deceptive claims in this area, and for the sake of truth we state the following:
 - > 1- There are no toxic chemical agents, precursors or chemical weapons. All that stated by Blair were destroyed by the Iraqi side under the supervision of the Special Commission. In addition, there is a protocol signed by both parties in this concern (protocol of handing over Al-Muthana site to the Iraqi side in June 1994) and as stated in the Special Commission semi annual report. The seventh report of the Special Commission executive chairman in June 1994 "Doc S/1994/750".
 - > Since 1991, the Special Commissions recovered all that related to the past chemical program. The Special Commission inspection team (UNSCOM-17) had made a full inventory at the toxic

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- > chemical agents, precursors, chemical raw materials, dual use and empty
- > munition.
- > All the above mentioned items and all materials
- > and to chemical weapons were destroyed during the period 1991 - 1994.
- > 2- There are no capabilities to produce chemical or
- > biological agents since the specialized equipment required for the
- > production of chemical and biological agents are not available. Iraq's
- > capabilities to produce biological & chemical agents were destroyed during
- > the aggression of 1991.
- > The destruction were extended by the Special
- > Commission inspection teams, to cover all Iraq's stock of toxic agents,
- > filled & empty munition, precursors and production equipment. The Iraqi
- > declarations concerning dual use materials, equipment and various chemical
- > sites, in addition to the activities of the monitoring teams which
- > operated since 1994 till the end of 1998, prove that there are no any
- > prohibited items at these site, which is a certain evidence that there are
- > no capabilities to produce these materials whatsoever.
- > VX agent production require an advanced technology
- > which is not available in Iraq.... All the production equipment possessed
- > by Iraq to develop the VX agent were tested by the Special Commission
- > before destruction in 1997 and it found that those equipment were never
- > used.. This confirms that Iraq was not able to use them, and subsequently
- > it did not obtain any large scale or significant production of VX agent.
- > 3- The Special Commission is fully aware that the
- > chemical agents production was in crude form and there was no chemical
- > agent produced by distillation and purity more than 90%.
- > This aspect was clarified in chemical weapons "Full
- > and Final and Comprehensive Declaration" submitted to the Special
- > Commission in June 1996. That means these agent will be expired and
- > disposed of after a short course of time.
- > 4- Al-Muthana establishment was destroyed totally
- > during the thirty state aggression in 1991, then the Special Commission
- > completed this destruction.
- > The site is now abandoned, and the commission is
- > fully aware of that.
- > The chlorine and Phenol plant at Falluja /2 site was
- > reconstructed after the aggression to produce the Chlorine which is used
- > for civil purposes (water treatment).
- > This site was covered by monitoring since 1994.
- > After UNSCOM departure in December 1998 the site was raided and destroyed.
- > The aerial bombing had also destroyed the monitoring system's cameras and
- > sensors. It is worth mentioning that the Phenol is not a dual use material
- > and was not stated in the second annex which is covered by the chemical
- > monitoring plan.
- > On the other hand, Iraq had included Chlorine in its
- > semi-annual declarations, but lately the Special Commission omitted the
- > Chlorine from the dual use materials in June 2001, (Doc S/2001/860)
- > enabling Iraq of using Chlorine without being subject to export - import
- > monitoring.
- > 5- Ibn Sina company has no relation whatsoever to
- > the past chemical program and its absolutely not specialized in producing
- > any chemical agent. The reconstruction of
- > Ibn-Sina company was carried out according to the
- > IAEA's approval as an industrial site for the production of researches of
- > primary chemical materials which enter in civilian industries, and there
- > are no sites constructed with forgone assistance.
- > Ibn-Sina site is well know for IAEA and UNSCOM. It
- > was subject to the on going monitoring since 1994. The site was
- > periodically visited by monitoring groups to be acquainted with its
- > activities since it contains equipment tagged by UNSCOM. The site, also
- > presenting semi-annual declarations according to the monitoring system.
- > Blair's claim on this site is nothing but
- > exaggeration and distortion of world community opinion against Iraq.
- > 6- Al-Qaqa state company was reconstructed after the
- > destruction caused by the 1991 aggression. This company is specialized in
- > the production of chemical materials and conventional explosives unrelated
- > to the chemical program, and it has no plant to produce Phosgene.
- > The Special Commission had investigated this issue
- > and monitoring groups were inspecting this company on systematic basis.
- > Moreover, Al-Qaqa company has tagged equipment and
- > submitting semi-annual declarations.
- > Hence, Blair's claim that this company was
- > dismantled by UNSCOM is only a false claim because it was under monitoring
- > and had never been dismantled.
- > Blair has referred to the experts and staff working
- > in the chemical industries claiming that Iraq can re-collect them to

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- > restore the chemical program. Actually those labs are working in
- > civilian industries ... and if we put in consideration that Iraq has no
- > raw material or sites specialized in chemical weapons production, how it
- > then be possible for Iraq to utilize the expertise of those people
- > in this field.
- > Biological Activity
- > With reference to what Blair has stated concerning the biological area,
- > Iraq is completely clear of all biological weapons and agents since 1991.
- > Iraq do not keep any quantity of those agents. Furthermore, all the
- > biological experts are sure of the fact that the biological agents, being
- > of a limited shelf life, could not be effective or of high toxicity or
- > effect after such a long period. For instance the Botulinum protein
- > converted to non toxic substance after three years even if it stored in
- > ideal storing conditions.
- > The anthrax spores converted within two years to ineffective vegetative
- > cells also even if it stored under ideal storing conditions, particularly
- > the biological agents produced by Iraq were in slurry state and Iraqi
- > production method made the final product containing a lot of impurities
- > and of a short shelf life. This fact is clearly known by UNSCOM and its
- > experts.
- > The Special Commission, in addition, had severely investigated the issue
- > of biological agents and weapons destruction and disposal by taking
- > samples and swaps and through the supporting documents presented by the
- > Iraqi side.
- > The Special Commission had also destroyed the remaining quantities of
- > culture media imported for the past program purposes, that the destroyed
- > quantities were totaled to (30 Tons). The claim contained in Blair's
- > report that UNSCOM had destroyed only the equipment which directly
- > connected to the biological agents production is untrue, because UNSCOM
- > destroyed in addition to the production equipment, others which were not
- > directly related to the past program that the destroyed equipment were
- > totaled to 926.
- > The produced quantities which Blair claims that they are more than what
- > Iraqi side had declared by 2 times, because he constructed his account on
- > the Special Commission's assumptions that there are undeclared
- > importations of culture media without having any evidence of practical
- > proof. For example, the yeast extract which UNSCOM claimed that there are
- > some undeclared importations of this material, but, factually that
- > quantity was imported for the drugs production plant, later on UNSCOM
- > acknowledged that the other quantity was not imported for the past
- > biological program after verifying the issue with full cooperation from
- > the Iraqi side.
- > The Iraqi side had illustrated the full material balance for the culture
- > media including the imported quantities, and that which were obtained
- > locally and the consumed quantity in addition to the remaining media
- > destroyed by UNSCOM in 1996.
- > The allegation stated in the report which indicated according to
- > intelligence information, that Iraq has started producing biological
- > agents using mobile production sites is much to any body astonishment. It
- > seems that those who prepare Blair's report seek to mislead the world
- > community opinion, simply because the production process requirement and
- > complicated services are not available.
- > Claiming that planning for a project for a mobile biological production
- > site started in 1995 (During the presence of the Special Commission).
- > If it is so, then the Special Commission should have raised this issue at
- > that time and not Blair in 2002.
- > The allegations that Iraq has reconstructed and renewed the sites which
- > were previously used in producing biological agents is a groundless and
- > false claim. Because the Special Commission supervised in 1996 on the
- > destruction at Al-Hakam site totally and turned it to a desolate land.
- > The site is currently abandoned as it is, and there is no construction
- > took place in it whatsoever.
- > The FMD site is also abandoned since 1996, when UNSCOM destroyed some of
- > its equipment and the ventilation system. The site was visited many times
- > by Arab and Foreign press delegations who witnessed that the site is not
- > renewed or rehabilitated or annexed by any new building.
- > Al-Falluja site (Break fluid production plant) is designated to produce
- > break fluid and definitely not Raison as the report claims. Vaccine and
- > sera institute which Blair's reports referred as a store for biological
- > agents and its storing capacity had been increased. This statement is also
- > a lie because the vaccine and sera institute never used for storing
- > biological agents and it's a site for the production of human vaccines in
- > addition to be a storing site for imported human vaccine through MEMO. The
- > site was visited by press media delegations and saw the vaccine stores,
- > noting that the site is regularly visited by UN representatives to check
- > the vaccines. The site also visited by UNICEF and WHO organizations

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- > representatives.
- > Missile Activity
- > The missile area is what Blair has beaten the drum for it. Actually Iraq
- > not possess any missile with a range more than 150 Km, since summer
- > Because all remaining missiles were destroyed either by UNSCOM or
- > unilaterally by Iraq according to SCR 687 requirements.
- > The Special Commission itself reached this fact through verifying the
- > total quantity of missile imported from former USSR and those which
- > consumed during the Iraq - Iran war, the aggression of 1991, and R & D
- > activity and tests. Accordingly, UNSCOM reached what so-called material
- > balance of missiles, depending on a long strict and concentrated
- > investigation. Finally UNSCOM admitted to the Security Council in its
- > report (S/1997/774) the fact which indicate that 817 of 819 missiles have
- > been accounted for "The Commission is now in a position to be able to
- > account for practically all, except two, imported combat missiles that
- > were once the core of Iraq's proscribed missiles force". The Commission
- > has also account for all declared operational missile launchers, both
- > imported and indigenously produced."
- > Actually Iraq also had behaved in high transparency in dealing with the
- > Special Commission concerning missiles permitted under the SCRs 687 & 715
- > and any claims which state that Iraq is exceeding the permitted limitation
- > according to these resolutions are a misleading aim fallacies. Since the
- > effective & efficient operation of monitoring system in 1994 UNSCOM
- > inspection were verifying the missiles which were under research and
- > development through inspection, the cameras installed at the key sites for
- > 24 hr monitoring, the sites concerned with missile activity including key
- > and supporting sites, monthly status for the produced parts at those sites
- > (parts of the produced missiles).
- > Moreover, UNSCOM inspectors were always present at the flight test and
- > static tests for the missiles under development to make sure that none is
- > exceeding the permitted range through recording the coordinates for the
- > firing site and falling site, calculating the range accordingly.
- > The strict monitoring continued at increasing levels until 16 December
- > 1998 when the UNSCOM left Iraq. The sites involved in missile activity
- > were targeted, among other sites, during the aggression which took place
- > on same day. As regards Blair's claim that Iraq has built a new test
- > station for the development of missiles that could reach areas indicated
- > by site (A), they are used for the purpose of Al Sumood missile within the
- > range allowed by SCR 715 and which followed up by the Special Commission
- > to meet the requirements of engine static tests. The strong technical
- > evidence that could not be called in question is that the station is not
- > for the purposes of engines larger than Al Sumood engine. It is a station
- > for horizontal testing, that is, it is so designed to embrace the
- > horizontally tested engine. Experts who are well grounded in this field
- > know that this kind of connection can not be used for engines larger than
- > Al Sumood engine with its known size, and unlike the vertical test
- > stations which can be used for the testing of missile engine of larger
- > sizes. As regard the issue of the RPV (remotely piloted vehicle) project
- > raised by Blair, it is clear that he does not depend on his intelligence
- > but on information disclosed by Iraq with transparency to the Special
- > Commission in the fulfillment of the requirements of SCR 715 related to
- > the ongoing monitoring.
- > The aim of this essential project is to maintain the scientific and
- > research activity through the reliance on local capabilities for the
- > purpose of aerial reconnaissance. The UNSCOM had carried out intensive and
- > strict inspection for this project through a specialized inspection team.
- > That process was accompanied by checking all document relating to that
- > project...
- > The team concluded that the purpose of the project was an aerial
- > reconnaissance and had nothing to do with the requirements of SCRs 687 and
- > 715..
- > As for Al Mamoon plant, this plant, like other sites concerned with
- > missile activities, was covered by the ongoing monitoring. Cameras were
- > installed to transmit pictures for 24 hours for several workshops in
- > plant. The (APC) project was declared to UNSCOM since its design stages
- > and was followed up by the Commission in a strict manner up to its
- > departure on 16 December 1998.
- > The item relative to the previous activity and which were not destroyed
- > during the aerial bombardment of 1991 aggression were destroyed under
- > UNSCOM supervision and were not dismantled as Blair claims. The sever
- > damage done to the equipment has made it impossible for their
- > reconstruction to carry out the manufacturing purposes for which they are
- > made, specially that the solid missile fuel industry requires higher
- > degrees of accuracy.
- > In addition, Iraq was keen to apply the so called import /export mechanism
- > by providing the necessary notifications about the importation of dual use

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- > items that is those contained in the technical annexes of SC 11, until
- > the departure of UNSCOM on 16 Dec. 1998.
- > Now Tony Blair has released his report, which is full of lies,
- > fabrications and fallacies, it has become quite clear why has the British
- > Minister turned down Iraq's invitation to send a delegation of
- > British experts whose number, timing of entry into Iraq and the sites to
- > be inspected, were chosen by him, so that the British media and other
- > international opinion get acquainted themselves with the facts as they
- > really are.
- > Should Blair had accepted Iraq's offer he could have entangled himself in
- > a big political and procedural trap and then those who wrote the report
- > for him could not promote those lies and fabrications. This also applies
- > to the offer presented by Iraq's National Assembly to the US Congress and
- > the US administration which may fall in it.
- >

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IRAQ – Still Playing Games

It its response to the UK Governments Dossier on Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction, the Iraqi's state:

Chemical Activity:

Iraq was co-operative in this matter. It provided all assistance for the destruction work at the shortest possible time and under the UNSCOM supervision which appreciated Iraq's co-operation. Iraq also submitted its FFCD in line with the forms prepared by the UNSCOM itself which contained full details of the chemical weapons program.

Biological Activity

In this context Iraq fully co-operated with the UNSCOM in its work for the verification and destroying biological weapons, all remaining biological agents stock piles, equipment, devices, materials and culture media which were used in the process of research, development, production and storage, together with the destruction of equipment and material used for pure civilian purpose.

In 1995, Iraq submitted to UNSCOM the draft FFCD of the biological program in the hope of submitting the final version in June 1996 which contained full information about the program in all its details

Ballistic Missiles

Iraq had submitted all detailed information about the sites, quantities and types of missiles, launchers, key parts, missiles supporting devices, production and repair sites to UNSCOM.

Iraq's Imports

Iraq gave every possible assistance in the performance of the tasks of those teams and in answering the questions relating to the commercial mechanism

Iraq extended full co-operation to the discussion and verification teams whose number amounted to 94 out of the total number of the inspection teams

Actually Iraq also had behaved in high transparency in dealing with the Special Commission concerning missiles permitted under the SCRs 687 & 715 and any claims which state that Iraq is exceeding the permitted limitation according to these resolutions are a misleading aim fallacies

The facts though, tell a different story

Under UNSCR 687 - UN Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency were given the remit to designate any locations for inspection at any time, review any document and interview any scientist, technician or other individual and seize any prohibited items for destruction.

UNSCR 687 stated that Iraq had to give "full, final and complete disclosures" to its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a range over 150 kilometers.

To date they have given:

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- 3 full, final and complete disclosures with regard to ballistic missiles;
- 3 full, final and complete disclosures with regard to chemical weapons; and
- 5 full, final and complete disclosures with regard to biological weapons.

UNSOM in their reports state:

S/1995/284 of 10/04/1995 Seventh report under resolution 715

The Commission has come to the conclusion that Iraq **has not provided a full and comprehensive disclosure** of its past military biological programme or accounted for items and materials acquired for that programme.

With Iraq's failure to account for the use of these items and materials for legitimate purposes, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that there is a high risk that they had been purchased and used for a proscribed purpose - acquisition of biological warfare agent. The Commission will continue its intensive efforts to elucidate all such outstanding issues arising from this and the other past programmes.

S/1995/864 of 11/10/1995 Eighth report under resolution 715.

Iraq has been misleading the Commission by withholding information that, before the Gulf war, it had secretly produced Scud-type missile engines and carried out research and development on a variety of projects on missiles of prohibited ranges.

Furthermore, **Iraq's efforts to conceal its biological weapons programme, its chemical missile warhead flight tests and work on the development of a missile for the delivery of a nuclear device led it to provide incorrect information concerning certain of its missile activities.** The new revelations cast into doubt the veracity of Iraq's previous declarations in the missile area, including the material balance for proscribed weapons and items. Consequently, Iraq has agreed to provide a new declaration with a full, final and complete disclosure in the missile area.

In the chemical weapons area, the Special Commission's investigations have led to disclosure of activities aiming at the acquisition of a considerable capability for the production of the **advanced nerve agent VX**. Whether Iraq still keeps precursors in storage for immediate VX use has not been fully clarified.

The revelations also shed new light on **the scope and ambition of Iraq's chemical weapons programme.** The Commission must adjust the direction of some of its monitoring activities, especially to prevent Iraq from using its chemical compounds, equipment and activities for secret acquisition of chemical weapons. Further destruction of some Iraqi chemical assets has to be contemplated. The Commission has requested Iraq to provide a new declaration comprising a full, final and complete disclosure of its capabilities with regard to chemical weapons.

The Special Commission has detected and identified a hitherto **secret offensive biological weapons programme** in Iraq comprising a large-scale production of biological warfare agents, the filling and deployment of missile warheads and aerial bombs with agents, as well as biological weapons research and development activities of considerable width and depth. As late as August of this year, Iraq presented to the Commission a formal, but **essentially false, declaration on its biological weapons activities.** Consequently, the Commission has

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requested again and - Iraq has agreed to provide - a full, final and complete disclosure of its biological weapons programme in the form of a new declaration. Much remains to be verified with regard to these weapons, in particular the destruction of munitions and bulk agents.

S/1998/920 of 06/10/1998 Sixth report under resolution 1051.

For half of the eight-year period of the relationship between Iraq and the Special Commission, Iraq declared that it had no biological weapons programme. When that claim was no longer tenable, Iraq provided a series of disclosure statements all of which have been found by international experts, on multiple occasions, to be **neither credible nor verifiable**.

The Commission has worked as constructively as it could, with Iraq, to try to shed light on the biological weapons area, including by suggesting a new approach in June this year. But Iraq failed to take that opportunity, **failed to provide the disclosures** which are essential to the fulfilment of the disarmament mandate in the biological weapons area.

As indicated in the present report, the priority issues in the missile and chemical weapons areas, while important, are not large in number. Co-operation by Iraq, full disclosure, could make it possible for those areas to be considered for transition to long-term monitoring and verification at a relatively early date.

It must be recorded, however, that for this to be the case, a satisfactory resolution of the question of the chemical warfare agent VX needs to be achieved, because of its implications for both the chemical weapons and the missile files. This involves not just the question of VX weaponization, but also the more fundamental question of Iraq's record of VX production. Again, **there can be no substitute for full disclosure by Iraq on this matter**, a disclosure that has **never been made**.

The Security Council may need to consider, at some stage, that these actions by Iraq may have the ultimate effect that the Commission will be obliged to conclude that it is unable to provide 100 per cent verification of the claimed fate or disposition of prohibited weapons.

S/1998/332 of 16/04/1998 Fifth report under resolution 1051.

In particular during the period of crisis, **Iraq repeatedly failed to comply** with the Council's requirements, especially those relating to immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to relevant sites, documents and persons.

There was a significant trend towards substituting consideration of issues of process for consideration of issues related to the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of Iraq's prohibited weapons and systems.

As is evident in the disarmament section of this report, a major consequence of the four-month crisis authored by Iraq has been that, in contrast with the prior reporting period, **virtually no progress in verifying disarmament has been able to be reported**. If this is what Iraq intended by the crisis, then, in large measure, it could be said to have been successful.

Iraq's heightened policy of disarmament by declaration, no matter how vigorously pursued or stridently voiced, cannot remove the need for verification as the key means through which the credibility of its claim can be established.

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