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D/Sec(O)/2/37/7

30 July 2002

PS/Secretary of State

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MA/VCDS

Policy Director

CDI

DCDS(C)

ACDS(OPS)

ACDS(RP)

DG Op Pol


DG RP

DGCC

DOMA

PJHQ - DCJO (Ops)

PJHQ -J9 Hd of Pol/Ops



IRAQ - ENHANCEMENTS REQUIRED FOR POTENTIAL UK CONTRIBUTION

Issue

Equipment and sustainability enhancements needed to optimise the operational effectiveness of UK force package options identified in your MO6/17/15C of 26 July to No. 10.

Recommendation

2. The Secretary of State should note:
 - a. that all of this work is our best estimate of requirements and what they might be and that those requirements might change as US planning continues to develop;
 - b. each package detailed at Annex A has a different lead-time and cost, which is in turn varied by judgements on categories of equipment or activity designated as essential, full operational capability enhancements, and follow on enhancements;
 - c. the earlier decisions are taken to start Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR) and sustainability acquisition, the greater the UK's preparedness and choice;
 - d. the shortfall in essential items for the "in place" and "enhanced support" packages is in respect of * the possible acquisition of which needs urgent staffing;
 - e. the shortfall in essential items for the discrete UK package is in respect of the greater number of * that would be required but

* [medical counter-measures]

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there is a wider shortfall of full operational capability enhancements that will need to be addressed;

- f. we are setting up a medical task group to identify the risks and requirements of deployment to the theatre in respect of the possibility of chemical and/or biological weapon release;
- g. and agree we should widen the net of knowledge within the MOD to include the single Service commands and the Defence Procurement Agency (DPA) and the Defence Logistics Organisation (DLO), in order to refine our estimates at Annex A in respect of time and cost on a need to know basis.

Timing

3. Urgent.

Background

4. In DG Op Pol's submission of 25th July he set out our work on the potential levels of UK military contribution to a US-led operation against Iraq and gave an indication of the time that would be involved in deploying those force packages. The level of capability achieved by those force packages will depend in part upon the time required to procure equipment and sustainability enhancements. This will include the implementation of Urgent Operational Requirements; procurement of stocks, spares and ammunition; and miscellaneous action such as cannibalisation. At Annex A I attach an illustrative breakdown of those enhancements that military planners, at staff level, judge would be required to optimise each of the three potential UK military packages. These enhancements have been put into categories of equipment or activity designated as essential, full operational capability enhancements and follow-on enhancements. In each case we have attached a rating (in brackets) to indicate high confidence (HC) that the enhancement can be achieved within three to six months or in a longer timeframe – low confidence (LC).

5. The shortfall of essential items in respect of packages one and two is in respect of * that would be required to treat casualties post an Iraqi biological attack. The MOD currently has up to * stock (in terms of the in place package, there are around 1150 UK personnel currently deployed in the Gulf on Op RESINATE). One or two phials are required per person, depending on severity of the attack, and it must be administered immediately. Further staff work will be required to determine how quickly we could obtain further stocks to support UK force package two. We have low confidence that they could be obtained within six months. The manufacture process continues in-house (it is an in-house MOD capability which is currently manufactured at the Defence and Science Technological Laboratories at Porton Down) but we need to pin down how long it will take to produce further doses and in what quantity. The scientists advise that it depends on the variable of how long it takes the * 'culture' to develop.

* [medical counter-measures]

Further staff work would also be required to identify if stocks are available from other sources. We know that the Department of Health have some stocks but they are not as up to date as MOD stocks i. e they are not effective against the latest known biological strains that could be used against our armed forces. We believe it may take up to nine months to procure stocks from UK industry, as they currently do not have Porton Down's production method. It is possible that that we might be able to procure stocks from another country but we have yet to explore this avenue.

6. DCDS(C) is establishing a Medical Task Group to advise on the critical issue of the medical preparations required for a possible British contribution for US action against Iraq. The medical risks and requirements need to be identified, and conclusions drawn, in respect of the possible release of chemical and biological weapons. This group's work will need to be dovetailed with the further work on the availability of *

7. In terms of the full operational capability enhancements actions that need to be taken for packages one and two, we have a high degree of confidence that the work can be completed within six months. The sooner we take a decision the sooner we shall have an optimum capability in place. That said none of those enhancement items appear to be a showstopper for deployment. Most of the activity is geared towards improving operational effectiveness, improved communications for Special Forces or to prepare equipment to operate better or more safely in a hostile environment, such as defensive aide suites for aircraft. Much of the need for this work will hang on the role UK forces play and the level of threat we expect them to face.

8. We have lower confidence in achieving the activity and work required for the discrete UK package. The most likely area that will need an early decision is desertisation (for the fully sustained war-fighting role) which we judge would take around ten months. For the more limited capability role set out in DG Op Pol's submission the main shortfall is in terms of the procurement of NBC protection and biological detectors. It would also follow that we shall need * for a far greater number of personnel and as recommended at paragraph 2. d we are carrying out further staff work to determine how quickly it could be acquired.

Funding

9. In terms of funding, some costs will fall within the existing programme, but any UORs that are for the specific purposes of a campaign in Iraq will fall outside the existing main MOD budget and the Conflict Prevention Budget. Additional provision would be required from the Reserve DEL to meet the net additional costs of any operations in Iraq, in FY 02/03 and beyond. We will therefore need both HM Treasury agreement to call on the Reserve and their approval to secure funding for the UOR equipment and sustainability enhancements. In order to begin committing funds following a ministerial decision, we would need as soon as practicably possible to submit a strategic estimate to HM Treasury. This would be along the lines of that prepared for

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Op VERITAS, setting out our objectives, the equipment and sustainability enhancements that are required to meet them, and the expected costs in particular Financial Years.

Way ahead

10. All of this work is no more than our best estimates and it cannot be treated as definitive. In order to refine our work further on the cost and lead times involved we need now to widen the net of knowledge about contingency planning within the Department. This is most pressing where we have low confidence that activity or procurement deemed essential to the UK force packages can be achieved within six months. This will mean engaging the single service commands and the DLO and the DPA. This will be done on a close hold, named list, need to know basis. Rather than being a generic exercise we shall engage those organisations on the basis of identified assets within the packages of work. We shall submit further before we start to open any contact with industry to determine the actual lead-times for the procurement.

Presentational issues

11. There are no presentational issues at this stage as further work will be in-house. The current defensive lines will apply: no decision taken and no action is imminent; prudent contingency planning is normal.

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ANNEX A TO D/Sec(O)2/37/7 dated 30 Jul 0.

ENHANCEMENTS FOR OPERATIONS AGAINST IRAQ (BASED ON A DECISION 6 MONTHS PRIOR TO OPERATIONS)

(LC) Low Confidence = 6 or more months may be required
(HC) High Confidence = 3-6 months should be required

PACKAGE 1 - IN PLACE SUPPORT PACKAGE

	EQUIPMENT REQUIRED FOR CAPABILITY (INCLUDING UOR ACTIVITY)					ACTIVITY TO SUSTAIN OPERATIONS					
	ESSENTIAL NOW	Cost £M	FULL OF CAPABILITY ENHANCERS	Cost £M	FOLLOW ON ENHANCEMENTS	Cost £M	ESSENTIAL NOW	Cost £M	FULL OF CAPABILITY ENHANCERS	Cost £M	
MARITIME	-		-		-		-		-		GRAND TOTAL
LAND	-		Runway testing kits(HC)	1	-		-		-		
AIR	-		Aircraft defensive aids (HC)	100	-		-		Flare stocks (HC) Flying training hours (HC)	2 50	
SF	-		SF communications (HC)	3	-		-		-		
JOINT	* (LC)	1	JFHQ equipment (HC)	20	-		-		-		
TOTALS		1		124						52	
										£177M	

PACKAGE 2 - ENHANCED SUPPORT PACKAGE

MARITIME	-		Task equipment for : DD/FFs (HC) Minehunters (HC)	18 18	-		Reconfigure Fleet (HC) Amend Dockyard Programme (HC)	- -	- -		GRAND TOTAL
LAND	-		Runway testing kits (HC)	1	-		-		-		
AIR	-		Aircraft defensive aids (HC)	267	-		-		Weapon/flare stocks (HC) Flying training hours (HC)	39 100	
SF	-		SF communications (HC)	3	-		-		-		
JOINT	* (LC)	2	JFHQ equipment (HC)	20	-		-		-		
TOTALS		2		327						139	
										£468M	

PACKAGE 3 - DISCRETE UK PACKAGE

PACKAGE 3 - DISCRETE UK PACKAGE											
MARITIME			Task equipment for : DD/FFs (HC)	18			Reconfigure Fleet (HC)				
			Minehunters (HC)	18			Amend Dockyard Programme (HC)				
LAND	CR Tank Desertisation (LC)	26	Additional armour (LC)	14	Additional armour (LC)	3.3	Procure:				
	NBC protection (LC)	6	Minefield breaching (LC)	12	Thermal imaging (LC)	12	Land spares (LC)	287			
	Biological detectors (LC)	36	Electronic warfare (LC)	4.5	Container handlers (LC)	3.5	SH spares (LC)	107			
	Fuel/water tankers (HC)	52	Light Transporters (LC)	?	Minefield breaching (LC)	1	Ammunition (LC)	99			
			Identification (HC)	4	Tactical Comms (LC)	20					
			Runway testing kits(HC)	1	Area Comms (LC)	?	Cannibalisation and workshop programmes (LC)				
AIR			Aircraft defensive aids (HC)	267					Weapon/flare stocks (HC)	39	GRAND TOTAL
			SF communications (HC)	3					Flying training hours (HC)	100	
SF											
JOINT	* (LC)	5	JFHQ equipment	20							
TOTALS		125		361		41		493		139	£1,159M

Note: This table is based on initial staff level planning and will evolve as strategic priorities and requirements become clearer. Subsequent wider consultation within the MOD will increase confidence in these judgements.

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* [medical counter-measures]