

COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION CENTRE

FACTS ABOUT IRAQ SADDAMS GAMES WITH INSPECTORS

Under UNSCR 687 - UN Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency were given the remit to designate any locations for inspection at any time, review any document and interview any scientist, technician or other individual and seize any prohibited items for destruction.

Once UN weapons inspectors had arrived in Iraq in 1991, it quickly became clear that Iraq would resort to any measures (including physical threats and psychological intimidation of inspectors) to prevent UNSCOM (UN Special Commission) and the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) from fulfilling their mandates. Examples of Iraqi obstruction are too numerous to list in full. But some of the more infamous examples include:

- Jun 91:** Iraqi personnel fired warning shots in the air to prevent IAEA inspectors from intercepting nuclear related equipment.
- Sep 91** IAEA inspectors kept in a car park for 4 days and refused permission to leave with incriminating documents on Iraq's nuclear weapons programme.
- Oct 91** Iraq announced that UN monitoring and verification plans were "unlawful".
- Jul 92** UNSCOM inspectors refused access to the Ministry of Agriculture. Threats were made to inspectors who remained on watch outside the building. The inspection team had reliable evidence that the site contained archives related to proscribed activities.
- Jan 93** Iraq refused to allow UNSCOM the use of its own aircraft to fly into Iraq
- Jun 93** UNSCOM were denied permission to install remote-controlled monitoring cameras at two key missile sites. They then attempted to seal the two sites but were again denied permission.
- Mar 96:** A Ballistic Missile inspection of Iraq's deception and hiding of WMD-associated material and documentation was constrained. Entry to 5 sites was delayed by Iraq, possibly to allow them to evacuate incriminating evidence. There was some evidence that one site had been sanitised.
- Jun 96:** A Ballistic Missile inspection was denied access to four of six sites it was planning to search.
- Jul 96:** A Ballistic Missile inspection, searching for illicit materials, attempted to inspect sites where it was believed Iraq had hidden such material. Iraq delayed the team at the first site for 2 hours, probably whilst the material was disposed of, and denied access to the second site. Although other sites had been planned to be visited, the inspection was abandoned.

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- Aug 97:** A Biological Weapons inspection team found that at one site Iraqi site personnel lied about the function of buildings and had failed to comply with UNSCR 715 in reporting movement of equipment at various sites. A member of the Iraqi NMD attempted to dispute whether the facts were reportable.
- 9 – 13 Aug 97:** A Biological Weapons inspection team found that Iraq failed to produce selected personnel for interview.
- 27 Sep – 2 Oct 97:** An inspection team was to investigate the Iraqi concealment mechanism. The team concentrated on the elements of the security and intelligence apparatus close to the Presidency which were implicated in this. All the sites that the team attempted to investigate were declared "sensitive" so that the Iraqis refused to apply the previously agreed inspection modalities.
- 27 Sep 97:** An inspection team denied access to a site which they believed was involved in the concealment of banned material, because the Iraqis declared that even the road there was "sensitive". After a stand-off of several hours the team withdrew.
- 28 Sep 97:** An inspection team tried to inspect two sites associated with the Directorate of General Intelligence which were believed to be involved in the concealment and movement of banned material and documents. Both sites had been swept clean not only of any material relating to UNSCOM's mandate but of any material relating to their core responsibilities.
- 29 Sep 97:** Inspection of a site near Tikrit which included a "presidential palace", and which had been inspected previously, was not allowed by Iraq. After a stand-off of almost seven hours, the Executive Chairman instructed the team to withdraw.
- 1-2 Oct 97:** When an inspection team attempted to inspect the Special Security Apparatus Headquarters during the night they were stopped at gunpoint by a guard. Subsequently the senior Iraqi stated officially that the building was partially derelict. Furthermore, the team could not get access to it since the only way in was via the "presidential area" which was off-limits. The team withdrew on the orders from UNSCOM HQ.
- 29 Oct – 21 Nov 97:** No UNSCOM inspections in Iraq because of lack of Iraqi co-operation.
- 13 Nov 97:** Iraq demanded the withdrawal of US personnel serving with UNSCOM within 24 hours. UNSCOM and the IAEA withdraw all but a skeleton staff from Iraq.
- Dec 97** Iraq created a category of sites from which it claimed authority to bar inspectors. These "presidential palaces" were, in fact, large compounds that had long been associated with Iraq's WMD programme.

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- Dec 97:** A Biological Weapons inspection team found that because of contradictory statements of site personnel, including their directors, no reliable statement could be provided to the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM as to the movement of equipment and the use to which it was put during the period of 29 October to 21 November, where no UNSCOM inspections took place. At some sites, undeclared List 1 and List 2 micro-organisms were found, not related to the site's stated activities.
- Oct 98:** Iraq tried to limit the scope and veracity of UNSCOM Biological Warfare monitors by preventing their access to sites previously designated at having Biological Weapons potential claiming that their ownership had been transferred to other (Government) owners. Also "minders" prevented or limited UNSCOM activities by questioning the need to take photographs, butted-in to prevent site personnel from giving their full names and tried to limit information gathered on legitimate monitoring topics.
- 29 Oct 98:** Iraq refuses access to UN inspectors with US nationality.
- 31 Oct 98:** Iraq announces it will no longer co-operate with UNSCOM.
- 31 Oct – 11 Nov 98:** Complete lack of Iraqi co-operation, no provision of Iraqi "minders" or escorts for routine monitoring or for designated inspections.
- 11 – 17 Nov 98:** UNSCOM and IAEA inspectors and monitors withdraw from Iraq because of Iraqi non-co-operation which meant that neither routine monitoring of sites or inspections could take place.
- Dec 98:** A Biological Weapons inspection team reported that the Iraqi-provided minders attempted to disrupt the inspection with one minder attempting to tamper with the material the team was seeking to inspect. Iraq failed to provide UNSCOM with details of movement (and therefore possible use) of the "tagged" dual-use equipment while monitors were out of the country.
- Dec 98:** A second Biological Weapons mission investigating the material balance of growth media acquisition, consumption, losses and destruction found that the Iraqis did not take the opportunity to resolve the issue.
- On a number of occasions requested Iraqi personnel were not provided for interview in a timely manner and one individual never showed. In the team's opinion this was premeditated by Iraq in order to withhold information. There were several supporting documents which potentially would have gone a long way to resolving the material balance equation. In spite of their importance Iraq failed to provide them. Because of the Iraqi lack of co-operation with respect to provision of relevant personnel, documentation, obfuscation, and attitude, the team was unable to resolve the issue of growth media imports. There is therefore the possibility that the missing media was used to produce additional undeclared agent in the order of many thousands of litres.

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7-20 Dec 98:

An inspection team sought to find proscribed material and documents that had been illegally hidden from UNSCOM and IAEA. Although details of the exact dates of the mission and the locations they intended to visit were only known to the UN, Iraq took a party of international journalists to al-Taqqadam (Habbaniyah) Airbase to cover their expected arrival. In fact the team had decided to fly-in on 7 December some 3 days earlier. At the first site visited, the team was given free access and it was noticeable that the guards who were usually armed as at most military bases, were not, and they waved to the team as they passed.

9 Dec 98:

An inspection team attempted to inspect the Ba'ath Party District Headquarters in Baghdad's Adhamiyah neighbourhood where they believed illicit material and documents were hidden, but were denied access by Iraq. After waiting for over 2 hours, which allowed Iraq time to smuggle the material out of the building, and not having gained access, the team abandoned the inspection of the site.

10 Dec 98:

An inspection team inspected the Special Security Organisation (SSO) Headquarters, whom UNSCOM suspected of organising the concealment and dispersal of illegally retained material. Team entry was delayed and Iraq declared the site "Sensitive" by which specially agreed modalities for the inspection came into force. When the team gained access some 45 minutes later, they found that far from the site being "sensitive" it was found that all activities of the SSO had been evacuated from the site, although the offices of the Director and Deputy Director seemed intact. The evacuation apparently had taken place at least several weeks before the inspection. The Iraqis refused to answer questions about the previous occupants of the site.

12 Dec 98:

An inspection team inspected Military Industrial Commission (MIC) Headquarters. Although the site was declared both "sensitive and sovereign" by Iraq and invoked the inspection modalities, there was little delay on entry. The site appeared to have been sanitised.

13 Dec 98:

In view of the lack of cooperation by Iraq, UNSCOM withdrew from Iraq.

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COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION CENTRE**FACTS ABOUT IRAQ
Saddam's Disclosure Games !**

Under UNSCR 687 - UN Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency were given the remit to designate any locations for inspection at any time, review any document and interview any scientist, technician or other individual and seize any prohibited items for destruction.

UNSCR 687 stated that Iraq had to give "full, final and complete disclosures" to its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a range over 150 kilometers.

To date they have given:

- **3 full, final and complete disclosures** with regard to **ballistic missiles**;
- **3 full, final and complete disclosures** with regard to **chemical weapons**; and
- **5 full, final and complete disclosures** with regard to **biological weapons**.

3 Apr 1991

U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), Section C, declares that Iraq shall accept unconditionally, under international supervision, the "destruction, removal or rendering harmless" of its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a range over 150 kilometers. Requires Iraq to make a declaration, within 15 days, of the location, amounts, and types of all such items.

10 Apr 1991

Iraq accepts Resolution 687.

18 Apr 1991

Iraq provides **initial declaration required** under Resolution 687. This declaration includes some chemical weapons and materials and 53 Al-Hussein and Scud type surface-to-surface ballistic missiles. Iraq declares it has no biological weapons program.

16 May 1991

Iraq submits **revised declarations** covering additional chemical weapons and a refinement of its missile declaration.

COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION CENTRE**FACTS ABOUT IRAQ
Saddam's Disclosure Games !****May 1991**

Through an exchange of letters between U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, Iraq **accepts the privileges and immunities of the Special Commission (UNSCOM)** and its personnel. These guarantees include the right of "unrestricted freedom of entry and exit without delay or hindrance of its personnel, property, supplies, equipment ...".

9 Jun 1991

UNSCOM conducts its first chemical weapons inspection.

17 Jun 1991

The Security Council adopts Resolution 699, which confirms that the Special Commission and the IAEA have the authority to conduct activities under section C of Resolution 687.

30 Jun 1991

UNSCOM conducts its first missile inspection.

2 Aug 1991

UNSCOM conducts its first biological weapons inspection.

15 Aug 1991

The Security Council adopts Resolution 707, demanding that Iraq immediately provide **full, final and complete disclosures** (FFCDs), as required by Resolution 687.

19 Mar 1992

Iraq declares the existence of 89 previously undeclared ballistic missiles, chemical weapons and associated material. Iraq claims that it unilaterally destroyed most of these undeclared items in the summer of 1991, in violation of Resolution 687.

May 1992

Iraq provides its **first FFCDs** for its prohibited biological and missile programs. Iraq says it had only a defensive biological weapons program.

Jun 1992

Iraq provides its **first FFCD** for its prohibited chemical weapons program.

COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION CENTRE**FACTS ABOUT IRAQ
Saddam's Disclosure Games !****Mar 1995**

Iraq provides the **second FFCD** of its prohibited biological and chemical weapons programs.

Aug 1995

Iraq provides the **third FFCD** for its prohibited biological weapons program.

8 Aug 1995

General **Hussein Kamel**, Minister of Industry and Minerals and formerly Director of Iraq's Military Industrialization Corporation with responsibility for all of Iraq's weapons programs, leaves Iraq for Jordan.

Iraq says that Hussein Kamel had hidden important information on the prohibited weapons programs from UNSCOM and the IAEA.

Iraq **withdraws its third biological FFCD** and **admits a far more extensive prohibited biological weapons program than previously admitted, including weaponization.**

Iraq also **admits** greater progress in its efforts to indigenously produce **long-range missiles** than it had previously declared.

Iraq provides UNSCOM and the IAEA with large amounts of documentation related to its prohibited weapons programs which subsequently leads to **further Iraqi disclosures** concerning its **production of the nerve agent VX and its development of a nuclear weapon.**

Nov 1995

Iraq provides **second FFCD** on its prohibited missile program.

Nov 1995

The government of Jordan intercepts a large shipment of **high-grade missile components** destined for Iraq.

Iraq denies that it had sought to purchase these components, while acknowledging that some of them were in Iraq. An UNSCOM investigation concludes that Iraqi authorities and missile facilities have been involved in **acquiring sophisticated guidance and control components for proscribed missiles.**

22 Jun 1996

Iraq provides the **fourth FFCD** of its prohibited biological weapons program.

Jun 1996

Iraq provides **third FFCD** of its prohibited chemical weapons program.

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FACTS ABOUT IRAQ Saddam's Disclosure Games !

Jul 1996

Iraq provides the **third** FFCD of its prohibited missile program.

Sep 1997

Iraq provides a **fifth** FFCD for its prohibited biological weapons program.

Oct 1997

UNSCOM completes the destruction of additional large quantities of chemical weapons, related equipment, and precursor chemicals. Iraq had previously denied that some of the equipment had been used for chemical weapons production. Iraq admitted in May 1997, following an UNSCOM investigation, that some of the equipment had been used in the production of VX.

Early Feb 1998

A group of international experts and UNSCOM inspectors conduct two technical evaluation meetings (TEM) in Baghdad, reviewing Iraq's VX and missile warhead programs.

The report submitted to the Security Council states the group's unanimous conclusion that **Iraq has still not provided** sufficient information for the commission to conclude that Iraq had undertaken all the disarmament steps required of it in these areas. The commission's experts brief the Council on the outcome of these two TEMs in March 1998.

8 Apr 1998

The report of the biological weapons technical evaluation meeting is transmitted to the council. Following this TEM, experts **unanimously conclude that Iraq's declaration on its biological weapons program is incomplete and inadequate.**

5 Aug 1998

The Revolutionary Command Council and the Ba'ath Party Command decide to stop cooperating with UNSCOM and the IAEA until the Security Council agrees to lift the oil embargo as a first step towards ending sanctions.

Source: Derived from an October 1998 UNSCOM document

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FACTS ABOUT IRAQ SCOTT RITTER IN QUOTES

Scott Ritter was a senior member of UNSCOM from 1991 until his resignation in 1998. He took part in 30 inspections inside Iraq, including 14 as team leader.

Mr Ritter's recent statements contradict everything he said while he was working as a weapons inspector for UNSCOM.

Mr Ritter's statements also run contrary to the findings in March 1999 of a UN panel of 22 independent disarmament experts who concluded that serious gaps remain in Iraq's declarations on chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles, such as Iraq's failure to tell the truth over its production and weaponisation of VX. These are not trivial points but potentially horrific capabilities that threaten the security of the entire region.

Each of us will have to make up our own mind why Mr Ritter has changes his views. Certainly his change of heart cannot be accounted for by any disarmament progress since he left UNSCOM. Perhaps we should start by asking ourselves how he now makes a living.

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"Iraq has positioned itself today that once effective inspection regimes have been terminated, Iraq will be able to reconstitute the entirety of its former nuclear, chemical and ballistic missile delivery system capabilities within a period of six months." (Testimony to US Senate Committee, 3 September 1998)

"I think it's imperative that people understand that there are no weapons of mass destruction left in Iraq. That there are no production facilities capable of producing weapons of mass destruction in Iraq." (Australian Broadcasting Corporation interview, 3 August 2000)

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"Iraq, today, is not disarmed, and remains an ugly threat to its neighbors and to world peace. Those Americans who think that this is important and that something should be done about it have to be deeply disappointed in our leadership." (Testimony to US Senate Committee, 3 September 1998)

"The truth is, Iraq is not a threat to its neighbors and it is not acting in a manner which threatens anyone outside its borders. Military action against Iraq cannot be justified." (Address to Iraqi MPs in Baghdad, 8 September 2002)

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The Iraqis opted to play lip-service to compliance. They said that they would accept the provisions of the Security Council Resolution, yet at the same time they accepted it, in April, 1991, there were high-level meetings in which Iraq made strategic plans for concealing the existence of their entire biological weapons program, their entire nuclear weapons program, the bulk of their modern chemical weapons production program, and their entire indigenous missile production capability. (PBS interview, 1999)

"The inspectors were able to do their task of disarming Iraq without any obstruction by Iraq....Let's keep in mind that from 1994 to 1998, the weapons inspectors carried out ongoing monitoring inspections of the totality of Iraq's industrial infrastructure. And at no time did Iraq obstruct this work." (CNN interview, 8 September 2002)

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Richard Butler is an "honest, objective, independent United Nations official" (NBC Interview, 1999)

"Richard Butler on the other hand is contradictable across the board". "Kaidia Hamza and Richard Butler are a fraud and a liar respectively" (Radio 4 Today interview, 16 September 2002)

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FACTS ABOUT IRAQ PERSECUTION OF THE SHIA

The Shia community constitutes a majority of Iraq's population, officially estimated by the Iraqi government as 55 percent. But under Saddam Hussain's regime Shia Muslims, mainly from Baghdad or from Southern Iraq, have been subject to widespread persecution. Many have been arrested and tortured because they were suspected of anti-government activities. Mass arrests and torture have often taken place during the various periods of unrest which southern Iraq has witnessed intermittently over the last few years.

Saddam forced out nearly 350,000 southern Shias for "disloyalty" during the Iran-Iraq war and they are still languishing in Iran. Another 150,000 Shias were expelled from the southern marshlands into Iran during Desert Storm, using tactics like damming rivers, destroying homes and burning crops of Shia minorities suspected of being hostile to Saddam's regime.

The fate of more than 100 Shia clerics and religious scholars taken into custody in 1991 remains unknown.

In 1997 Iraqi troops continued artillery attacks against Shia rebels and civilians as well as the large-scale destruction of their homeland in the marshes of southern Iraq.

In 1998 further Iraqi security forces operations against Shias in the South included mass civilian arrests, burning of crops, houses and marshlands, and artillery bombardment of villages.

In April and June 1998, two leading Shia clerics were assassinated. The UN Special Rapporteur wrote that their deaths were 'most notable because of the Iraq's regimes apparent intent to violate, by means of terror, the freedoms of opinion and expression of particular groups or the population as a whole'. Subsequent events in Iraq reinforce this view.

Eight Shia clerics are believed to have been sentenced to death at the beginning of 1999, four of them for participating in ceremonies commemorating the martyred Imam Hussein.

The office of Grand Ayatollah Sheikh Bashir Najafi was attacked by armed men on 6 January 1999. The attack is believed to have been part of a planned policy aimed at discouraging religious leaders from exercising freedom to express their opinions and religious beliefs.

The UN Special Rapporteur has drawn attention to reports that the Iraqi Government has been involved in staged car accidents causing the deaths of prominent religious or other local leaders, as well as of suspected political opponents. One such case was the killing of Ayatollah Mohammed Sadeq al-Sadr and his two sons on 19 February 1999. According to the Special Rapporteur's information, a peaceful demonstration followed this incident, during which security forces fired into the crowd of protesters, reportedly killing hundreds of civilians, including women and children.

On 16 April 1999 violent clashes were reported between protesters and security forces when the latter attempted to prevent Shi'a Muslims from taking part in Friday prayers at the al-Hikma Mosque in Saddam City in Baghdad. These clashes reportedly left scores of protesters dead.

An eye witness told **Amnesty International** that "when people were prevented from prayers they started shouting slogans against the authorities. The security forces used tanks armed and started shooting at the [Shia] security forces, but latter they were using tanks against the population and many people, including children, were killed. Initially the security forces did not remove the dead bodies. They waited for families and relatives to come and collect them so that they could arrest them. However, the families were too frightened to do so and in the end the security forces had to collect the bodies to clean the streets."

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COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION CENTRE**FACTS ABOUT IRAQ****Saddam's persecution of the Marsh Arabs and destruction of their environment**

Saddam has dramatically increased drainage activities in the Marshlands to cut off the Marsh Arabs' means of subsistence and to improve military access to this border area and to the refugees.

The destruction of the Marshlands of Lower Mesopotamia is now almost complete; and it is an environmental and humanitarian catastrophe of vast proportions and regional implications.

The Marshlands have supported a traditional way of life, maintained by the Marsh Arabs or Madan, which has survived for over 5000 years. The Marshes provide the Madan with the environment for traditional agriculture and for the sustainable use of natural resources-reed gathering, mat weaving, fishing, hunting and grazing of water buffalo.

The Marshlands have also been the home of many endemic and unique species - both birds and mammals -now globally threatened. Already, some species have been entirely lost: spectacular wildlife such as the smooth-coated otter, Indian crested porcupine and grey wolf are thought to have become extinct in the Marshes. In addition they support almost the entire world population of two species: the Basrah Reed Warbler and the Iraq Babbler, which, among many other indigenous species, are threatened.

Thus the Marshlands are:

- Essential for the maintenance of a unique cultural heritage
- Of global importance for wildlife and biodiversity
- Important natural resources for Iraq and for the people beyond Iraq's frontiers
- Significant in the maintenance of environmental equality
- A rare and critically threatened wetland landscape within a desert environment.

The Iraqi regime has employed an ambitious civil engineering project with the aim of deliberately draining the Marshes. This has been achieved by diverting the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. This has not only permitted both military access to the Marshes, oil resources, and greater political control of the predominately Shi'ite Muslim people of the Marshes, but has led to the destruction of their self-sufficient economy, the near-complete atrophy of an entire ecosystem, and to the flight of tens of thousands of refugees, including 95,000 in camps in Iran. It has led to acute suffering, malnutrition and a critical public health situation.

The U.N. has been attempting to monitor the situation in the southern marshes of Iraq. The one piece of legislation applying to the marshlands situation is U.N. Resolution 688, passed April 6, 1991. This resolution calls on the Iraqi government to provide free access to United Nations and non-governmental humanitarian agencies to all parts of the marshes so that essential humanitarian assistance can be provided.

In January 1995, the European Parliament (EP) also passed a resolution "characterising the Marsh Arabs as a persecuted minority 'whose very survival is threatened by the Iraqi Government.' The EP resolution described the Government's treatment of the marsh inhabitants as 'genocide'."

In March 1995, the European Parliament adopted another resolution deploring the continuing attacks on Marsh Arabs. Furthermore, the U.N. Human Rights Commission, in March 1995, passed a resolution calling for an end to military operations and efforts to drain the swamplands.

The worst destruction is located in the southeast sector of Iraq, between the cities of Amara, Nassiriyah, and Basra.

According to a U.N. report, from December 4, 1991 to January 18, 1992 "military attacks were launched against the Marsh Arabsresulting in hundreds of deaths. Animal and bird life was said to have been killed in large numbers, while the marsh waters themselves were allegedly filled with toxic chemicals."

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FACTS ABOUT IRAQ KUWAIT

At midnight on 1st August 1990, Iraqi forces began their advance towards Kuwait. By 2nd August 1990, Iraqi forces were in full control of Kuwait City.

Under the control of Ali Hassan al-Majid, Member of the Regional Command and Sab'awi Ibrahim, head of the Intelligence Directorate in Kuwait (and later Aziz Salih al-Noman as Governor of Kuwait), the Iraqi security forces imposed a brutal security regime on Kuwait.

Around half a million Iraqi documents were captured by Coalition forces after the liberation of Kuwait and they serve to show the full extent of the repression. Among the documents can be found orders to execute owners of houses bearing anti-Iraqi slogans orders to kill on sight any civilian caught on the streets after curfew or anyone involved in any resistance activity and orders to use machine guns, grenade launchers and flame throwers against civilian demonstrators.

The documentation and eyewitness accounts arising from the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait suggest very strongly that the Iraqi regime committed massive violations of humanitarian law and that their actions constituted grave breaches of the Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of War (1949) as defined in Article 147.

The Iraqis were guilty of the systematic use of torture both as a method of extracting information and as a punishment. Suspected members of the Kuwaiti Armed Forces and those suspected of resistance activity were particularly brutally treated. Individuals were subjected to beatings, electric shocks, burns, mock executions and sexual torture including rape (one source cites up to 1000 reported cases of rape and many more may have gone unrecorded).

Other methods of torture reported included cutting off ears and tongues, gouging of eyes and castration. Arbitrary extrajudicial executions were commonplace in Kuwait during the occupation and could result from even the least show of resistance or objection to the Iraqi occupation. Over 600 Kuwaiti and other nationals transferred to Iraq during the occupation have still not been accounted for.

The Iraqis systematically looted Kuwait and destroyed what they could not take with them. They stripped Kuwait of its national archives and stole the contents of museums. In addition, the Iraqis removed Kuwaiti military equipment, including eight Mirage F-1 aircraft, 245 armoured fighting vehicles and 675 surface-to-air missile batteries. Captured Iraqi documents contain orders from Saddam to loot Kuwait of medical supplies, educational supplies, cars and luxury goods and transfer them to Iraq.

Between the date of invasion and December 1991, thousands of foreign nationals were held hostage to dissuade their countries from joining the Coalition against Iraq. In the latter stages of their detention many were moved to industrial and military sites and used as human shields against attack. Coalition prisoners of war were subjected to torture and mistreatment in violation of the Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of prisoners of War (12th August 1949).

Kuwait has had to spend over \$5 billion to repair the damage to its oil infrastructure caused by Saddam's brutal invasion.

Kuwait has a population of just over two million people and an additional 1.1 million non-Kuwaiti nationals also live and work in the small country. It is a small, relatively open economy with proved crude oil reserves of about 94 billion barrels - 10% of world reserves. Petroleum accounts for nearly half of GDP, 90% of export revenues, and 75% of government income.

After Kuwait's liberation, the UN established a five-member boundary commission to demarcate the Kuwait-Iraq boundary in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 687, which reaffirmed the inviolability of the Iraq-Kuwait border. In April 1992, the commission announced its findings, which demarcated the Kuwaiti border with Iraq about 570 meters to the north near the Iraqi town of Safwan.

Sources: CIA Factbook, Kuwait on Line, Library of Congress

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COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION CENTRE*Facts about Iraq***Iraq and UN Security Council Resolutions – further detail****UNSCR 661, 6 August 1990**

Imposes sanctions on Iraq under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, prohibiting trade except food and medicine. Establishes the Sanctions Committee to enforce international compliance with sanctions.

Since 1990 the Iraqi regime's aim has been to have sanctions lifted without first having to meet its obligations to disarm. It has continuously encouraged others to break sanctions in order to erode the UN controls and has persistently tried to buy goods, including weapons, prohibited by the UN.

The Sanctions Committee meets regularly (often weekly) in New York, dealing with all Iraq sanctions issues. Commonly also known as the 661 Committee, it comprises the same membership as the Security Council.

UNSCR 686, 2 March 1991

Acting under Chapter VII, sets out the conditions to permit the end of hostilities. Demands that Iraq accept relevant UNSCRs, cease hostilities, accept liability for compensation, release POWs and return all stolen Kuwaiti property.

Iraq claims that it has accepted responsibility for compensation for those who suffered losses as a result of its invasion of Kuwait, but only under 'forcible conditions'. Baghdad also underlines that it does not accept that the UN can impose any mechanism to settle compensation claims.

Nor has Iraq co-operated with the UN on Kuwaiti missing or stolen Kuwait property. Although the Iraqis occasionally reply to letters from the ICRC about the 605 Kuwaiti and other nationals still missing, they no longer attend meetings on the subject, effectively obstructing any further progress. In 11 years Iraq has only provided sufficient information to close three of the 605 outstanding files.

A variety of Kuwaiti items were taken by the Iraqis. The most significant is the Kuwaiti national archive, which the Iraqis have now admitted they have (after denying it for over 10 years). Although the Iraqis have recently agreed to return it, the mechanism for doing so has not yet been agreed. The Iraqis also still have Kuwaiti military equipment and museum artifacts.

UNSCR 687, 3 April 1991

Acting under Chapter VII, sets out extensively Iraq's international obligations following the Iraq/Kuwait cease-fire, including:

- respecting the border agreed with Kuwait in October 1963;
- accepting destruction, removal or rendering harmless of its Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD);
- declaration of the elements of its WMD programme;
- co-operation with UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections;
- acceptance of all responsibility for direct damage caused by its invasion of Kuwait; co-operation with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); and,
- accounting for Kuwaitis and others missing since its invasion; and
- no commitment or support for international terrorism.

Iraq has periodically contradicted its supposed recognition of the border with threatening statements referring to Kuwait as a part of Greater Iraq. Tariq Aziz has also commented that "Kuwait got what it deserved in 1990".

At the end of 1998, Iraq's persistent obstruction of the work of the UN inspectors during the previous seven years finally forced them to leave, although they were still unable to account for up to 360 tonnes of bulk chemical weapons agent including 1.5 tonnes of VX.

COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION CENTRE*Facts about Iraq***Iraq and UN Security Council Resolutions – further detail**

over 30,000 special munitions for delivery of chemical and biological agents, and large quantities of growth media acquired for use in the production of biological weapons - enough to produce over three times the amount of anthrax Iraq admits to having manufactured. Since 1998 Iraq has maintained its chemical and biological weapons programmes and is developing ballistic missiles to deliver these weapons.

Iraq's response to its obligation to renounce terrorism has been to shelter terrorist groups such as the Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MeK) and increase its bounty payments to the families of suicide bombers from \$10,000 to \$25,000.

UNSCR 688, 5 April 1991

Addressing humanitarian issues, demands end to Iraqi repression of Iraqi civilian population, including Kurds; insists on access by international humanitarian organisations, requests the UN Secretary-General to report on plight of Kurds.

UK and US pilots continue to patrol the No Fly Zones - the only means of preventing the Iraqi regime once again repressing ... civilian population.

Despite the continuing humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, the Iraqi regime will let no more than seven international humanitarian organisations operate at any one time in Iraq.

UNSCR 707, 15 August 1991

Recalling UNSCR 687; acting under Chapter VII, condemns Iraq's serious violations of obligations under UNSCR 687 and safeguards agreements with IAEA. Demands Iraq provide full disclosure of all aspects of WMD programmes and other nuclear programmes and Iraq allow IAEA immediate and unrestricted access to inspect all facilities. Provision of necessary logistical support to IAEA and UNSCOM.

Iraq consistently failed to co-operate with UNSCOM and IAEA.

UNSCR 715, 11 October 1991

Acting under Chapter VII approves, in accordance with UNSCR 687 and 707, plans submitted by UNSG and IAEA Director General (DG) for future monitoring and inspection by UNSCOM. Demands Iraq meet unconditionally all obligations under plans approved by the resolution and co-operate fully with UNSCOM and DG of IAEA in carrying them out.

Iraq consistently failed to co-operate with UNSCOM and IAEA.

UNSCR 949, 15 October 1994

Acting under Chapter VII, demands that Iraq respect Kuwait's sovereignty, immediately withdraw its military units recently deployed to southern Iraq; that Iraq not use its military or other forces in a hostile or provocative manner to threaten neighbours or UN personnel in Iraq; and that Iraq co-operate with UNSCOM.

Iraq uses its military and other forces in a hostile manner.

COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION CENTRE

Facts about Iraq

Iraq and UN Security Council Resolutions – further detail

UNSCR 1051, 27 March 1996

Acting under Chapter VII, approves in detail mechanisms developed by UNSCR 661 Committee with UNSCOM and IAEA for monitoring and verifying export-import sanctions procedures and processes under UNSCRs including 661, 687 and 715. Iraq to report to IAEA/UNSCOM shipment of dual-use WMD items.

Iraq has failed to inform the UN about its attempted import of dual-use items.

Dual-use items are those which have a military as well as a civilian application. Chlorine is an obvious example, with a legitimate use in the water purification process, as well as a military use in the production of chemical weapons. Through careful consideration and by applying monitoring requirements inside Iraq, the Sanctions Committee has been able to allow Iraq to have many dual-use items covered by SCR1051 in order to help the Iraqi people.

UNSCR 1284, 17 December 1999

Acting under Chapter VII, establishes UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) to replace UNSCOM (established under UNSCR 687), reaffirming the provisions of UNCRs including 687, 699, 707, 715, 1051, and 1154, including co-operation with UNMOVIC, with Tripartite Commission and with "Oil for Food" programme. A comprehensive resolution offering the suspension of sanctions for the first time.

Iraq has refused to allow UNMOVIC inspectors into Iraq. It has refused since 1999 to co-operate with the Tripartite Commission on Kuwaiti missing. And it has consistently hampered the humanitarian programme under Oil for Food (established by resolution 986 in 1995), manipulating oil exports and the import of goods to obtain funds for the Iraqi regime's own nefarious purposes.

Resolutions adopted under Chapter VII relate to threats to world peace and are binding, obliging Member states to take action to enforce what follows in the resolution.

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COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION CENTRE

FACTS ABOUT IRAQ Treatment of Women

In a report published by Amnesty International (AI) (2001) - Iraqi law allows male relatives to kill a female relative in the name of honour without any consequent punishment. Women's organizations and human rights activists in Iraq Kurdistan have reported that many thousands of women in the areas controlled by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) have been tortured or killed by relatives and others who claim they are acting to protect the honour of the family. Women who have been raped, as well as those accused of adultery - or any sort of contact with a man who is not a family member - have been among the victims, as have women who have refused to marry the man chosen by their family.

Some women have been raped in custody. They were detained and tortured because they were relatives of well known Iraqi opposition activists living abroad. AI (2001) reported Najeeb Al Salihi, a former army general who fled in 1995 and joined the Iraqi opposition, was sent a videotape showing the rape of a female relative. Shortly afterwards he reportedly received a telephone call from the Iraqi intelligence, asking him whether he had received the "gift" and informed him that his relative was in their custody.

US State Department (September 2002) - report Human Rights organizations and opposition groups continued to receive reports of women who suffered from severe psychological trauma after being raped by Iraqi personnel while in custody.

US State Department (September 2002) - report Iraqi forces allegedly raped women who were captured during the Anfal Campaign and during the occupation of Kuwait.

AI (2001) - In October 2000 dozens of women suspected of prostitution were beheaded without any judicial process in Baghdad and other cities. The killings were reportedly carried out in the presence of representatives of the Ba'ath Party and the Iraqi Womens General Union. Members of feda'iyye Saddam, a militia created in 1994 by Uday Saddam Hussein, the eldest son of the President, used swords to execute the victims in front of their homes.

AI (2001) - A 25 year old woman known as UM Haydar was beheaded in the street without charge or trial at the end of December 2000 after her husband, suspected by the authorities of involvement in Islamist armed activities, fled the country. Um Haydar was taken from her house in al-Karrada district, in front of her children and mother-in-law, by men belonging to Fedaiyye Saddam. Two men held her arms and a third pulled her head from behind and beheaded her in front of the residents. The beheading was also witnessed by the ruling Ba'ath Party in the area. The security men took away the body and the head in a plastic bag and took away the children and mother-in-law.

US State Department (September 2002) - report in May the Iraqi Government reportedly tortured to death a mother of three Iraqi defectors for her childrens' activities.

Human Right Alliance, France (2002) - a young was arrested because her husband had refused to join the war against Iran. Pregnant at the time, she gave birth in prison on 3 December 1989. "I breast fed my son, but they took him away when he was seventeen days old - so that he would not become like me. I am still looking for him. I never had any further news of him". This woman, who was also horribly tortured in prison, says she still suffers endless torture: the torture of not knowing.

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COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION CENTRE

FACTS ABOUT IRAQ

SADDAM HUSSEIN: PERSECUTION OF IRAQI CITIZENS AND FELLOW MUSLIMS

Saddam Hussein is a brutal, secular tyrant. Since seizing absolute power in 1979 he has shown no respect for human life, in particular towards his fellow Iraqis and Muslim neighbours.

The Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) resulted in an estimated 1 million Muslim casualties. Iranian casualties were estimated as between 450,000-730,000. Iraqi casualties were estimated as between 150,000-340,000.

During the 1988 Anfal campaign in Iraqi Kurdistan, Iraqi troops were responsible for the execution of 100,000 Muslim Kurds

On March 16 1988, Iraqi troops killed between 4,000-7,000 Muslim Kurds in a single day in a chemical weapon attack on the town of Halabjah in Northern Iraq.

The 1990 Iraq invasion of Kuwait led to the death of 1,000 Kuwaiti Muslim nationals

Over 600 POWs have remained unaccounted for since 1991, including nationals of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, India, Syria, Lebanon, Iran, Egypt, Bahrain, and Oman. One US pilot is among them (Bush speech to UNGA, 12/9/02)

Between 1 and 2 million Muslim Iraqis living outside Iraq are believed to have a well-founded fear of persecution if they returned. 41,238 Iraqis applied for asylum in the West in 2001

In 2001, there were about 700,000 internally displaced Muslim in Iraq: 600,000 in the northern governorates of Dohuk, Erbil, and Suleymaniyah and 100,000 (mostly Marsh Arabs) in south-eastern Iraq.

U.S. government analysts have estimated that more than 200,000 of the 250,000 former Muslim inhabitants of the marshlands of southern Iraq have been driven from the area since 1991. Experts report that if the marshes continue to be drained at the current rate, they will probably cease to exist in another 50 years.

Thousands of Muslims have been arbitrarily arrested in Iraq in recent years because of their suspected opposition political activities, or because they are relatives of people sought by the authorities. Exact information on the numbers of those held and their whereabouts is not released by the Iraqi authorities.

Sources: US Committee for Refugees Report 2002

Human Rights Watch Country Report

International Alliance for Justice News Service 12/9/2002

The Guardian 26/2/99

Amnesty International Report – Victims of Systematic Repression

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FACTS ABOUT IRAQ

Key Extracts from President Bush's Speech to the UNGA – 12 Sept 2001

{PRIVATE "TYPE=PICT;ALT=Fact sheet"}"Twelve years ago, Iraq invaded Kuwait without provocation. And the regime's . . . were poised to continue their march to seize other countries and their resources. Had Saddam Hussein been appeased instead of stopped, he would have endangered the peace and stability of the world. Yet this aggression was stopped -- by the might of coalition forces and the will of the United Nations."

"To suspend hostilities, to spare himself, Iraq's dictator accepted a series of commitments. The terms were clear, to him and to all. And he agreed to prove he is complying with every one of those obligations.

He has proven instead only his contempt for the United Nations, and for all his pledges. By breaking every pledge -- by his deceptions, and by his cruelties -- Saddam Hussein has made the case against himself.

In 1991, Security Council Resolution 688 demanded that the Iraqi regime cease at once the repression of its own people, including the systematic repression of minorities -- which the Council said, threatened international peace and security in the region. This demand goes ignored."

"Last year, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights found that Iraq continues to commit extremely grave violations of human rights, and that the regime's repression is all pervasive. Tens of thousands of political opponents and ordinary citizens have been subjected to arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, summary execution, and torture by beating and burning, electric shock, starvation, mutilation, and rape. Wives are tortured in front of their husbands, children in the presence of their parents -- and all of these horrors concealed from the world by the apparatus of a totalitarian state."

"From 1991 to 1995, the Iraqi regime said it had no biological weapons. After a senior official in its weapons program defected and exposed this lie, the regime admitted to producing tens of thousands of liters of anthrax and other deadly biological agents for use with Scud warheads, aerial bombs, and aircraft spray tanks. U.N. inspectors believe Iraq has produced two to four times the amount of biological agents it declared, and has failed to account for more than three metric tons of material that could be used to produce biological weapons. Right now, Iraq is expanding and improving facilities that were used for the production of biological weapons."

"United Nations' inspections also revealed that Iraq likely maintains stockpiles of VX, mustard and other chemical agents, and that the regime is rebuilding and expanding facilities capable of producing chemical weapons.

Today, Iraq continues to withhold important information about its nuclear program -- weapons design, procurement logs, experiment data, an accounting of nuclear materials and documentation of foreign assistance. Iraq employs capable nuclear scientists and technicians. It retains physical infrastructure needed to build a nuclear weapon. Iraq has made several attempts to buy high-strength aluminum tubes used to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon. Should Iraq acquire fissile material, it would be able to build a nuclear weapon within a year. And Iraq's state-controlled media has reported numerous meetings between Saddam Hussein and his nuclear scientists, leaving little doubt about his continued appetite for these weapons."

Iraq also possesses a force of Scud-type missiles with ranges beyond the 150 kilometers permitted by the U.N. Work at testing and production facilities shows that Iraq is building more long-range missiles that it can inflict mass death throughout the region.

"In 1990, after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the world imposed economic sanctions on Iraq. Those sanctions were maintained after the war to compel the regime's compliance with Security Council resolutions. In time, Iraq was allowed to use oil revenues to buy food. Saddam Hussein has subverted this program, working around the sanctions to buy missile technology and military materials. He blames the suffering of Iraq's people on the United Nations, even as he uses his oil wealth to build lavish palaces for himself, and to buy arms for his country. By refusing to comply with his own agreements, he bears full guilt for the hunger and misery of innocent Iraqi citizens."

"We know that Saddam Hussein pursued weapons of mass murder even when inspectors were in his country. Are we to assume that he stopped when they left? The history, the logic, and the facts lead to one conclusion: Saddam Hussein's regime is a grave and gathering danger. To suggest otherwise is to hope against the evidence. To assume this regime's good faith is to bet the lives of millions and the peace of the world in a reckless gamble. And this is a risk we must not take."

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COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION CENTRE

FACTS ABOUT IRAQ

Key Extracts from President Bush's Speech to the UNGA – 12 Sept 2002

"The conduct of the Iraqi regime is a threat to the authority of the United Nations, and a threat to peace. Iraq has answered a decade of U.N. demands with a decade of defiance. All the world now faces a test, and the United Nations a difficult and defining moment. Are Security Council resolutions to be honored and enforced, or cast aside without consequence? Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding, or will it be irrelevant? "

"If the Iraqi regime wishes peace, it will cease persecution of its civilian population, including Shi'a, Sunnis, Kurds, Turkomans, and others, again as required by Security Council resolutions.

If the Iraqi regime wishes peace, it will release or account for all Gulf War personnel whose fate is still unknown. It will return the remains of any who are deceased, return stolen property, accept liability for losses resulting from the invasion of Kuwait, and fully cooperate with international efforts to resolve these issues, as required by Security Council resolutions. "

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"If the Iraqi regime wishes peace, it will immediately end all illicit trade outside the oil-for-food program. It will accept U.N. administration of funds from that program, to ensure that the money is used fairly and promptly for the benefit of the Iraqi people. "

"If all these steps are taken, it will signal a new openness and accountability in Iraq. And it could open the prospect of the United Nations helping to build a government that represents all Iraqis -- a government based on respect for human rights, economic liberty, and internationally supervised elections."

"The United States has no quarrel with the Iraqi people; they've suffered too long in silent captivity. Liberty for the Iraqi people is a great moral cause, and a great strategic goal. The people of Iraq deserve it; the security of all nations requires it. Free societies do not intimidate through cruelty and conquest, and open societies do not threaten the world with mass murder. The United States supports political and economic liberty in a unified Iraq. "

"My nation will work with the U.N. Security Council to meet our common challenge. If Iraq's regime defies us again, the world must move deliberately, decisively to hold Iraq to account. We will work with the U.N. Security Council for the necessary resolutions. But the purposes of the United States should not be doubted. The Security Council resolutions will be enforced -- the just demands of peace and security will be met -- or action will be unavoidable. And a regime that has lost its legitimacy will also lose its power. "

"If we meet our responsibilities, if we overcome this danger, we can arrive at a very different future. The people of Iraq can shake off their captivity. They can one day join a democratic Afghanistan and a democratic Palestine, inspiring reforms throughout the Muslim world. These nations can show by their example that honest government, and respect for women, and the great Islamic tradition of learning can triumph in the Middle East and beyond. And we will show that the promise of the United Nations can be fulfilled in our time. "

"We must choose between a world of fear and a world of progress. We cannot stand by and do nothing while dangers gather. We must stand up for our security, and for the permanent rights and the hopes of mankind. By heritage and by choice, the United States of America will make that stand. And, delegates to the United Nations, you have the power to make that stand, as well. "

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