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17 OCT 1983

To: NYMIX - eTelegrams  
From: COMCEN Gateway 1b  
Subject: I:DD:CONF:PERSONAL: NOSEC: IRAQ: FOREIGN SECRETARY'S  
CONVERSATION WITH:FCOLN/PARIS 223:Id=0007569  
Sent: 17 October 2002 09:43:12 GMT

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CONFIDENTIAL  
DD 171200Z NYMIS  
FM FCOLN TO PARIS  
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CONFIDENTIAL  
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TO DESKBY 171030Z PARIS  
TELNO 223  
OF 170927Z OCTOBER 02  
AND TO DESKBY 171030Z WASHINGTON  
INFO DESKBY 171200Z UKMIS NEW YORK  
INFO DESKBY 171030Z CABINET OFFICE

UKMIS TELNO 1983

IRAQ LIMITED  
CABINET OFFICE FOR MANNING, RYCROFT  
FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SUBJECT: PERSONAL: NOSEC: IRAQ: FOREIGN SECRETARY'S CONVERSATION WITH  
FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER, 17 OCTOBER

SUMMARY

1 Villepin pleased with new OP10 language but argues that Chirac would want it strengthened to "consider ... any necessary measures". Foreign Secretary urges him to take Yes for an answer and not to push his luck with the US on this or "material breach" language in OP1. He reminds Villepin of the importance of maintaining American trust.

2 WASHINGTON: Instructions to pass this record to Powell by 171130Z.

DETAIL

3 The Foreign Secretary telephoned the French Foreign Minister, Dominique de Villepin, at 0800Z 17 October. They had a brief discussion of North Korea and Arab/Israel.

4 The Foreign Secretary thanked Villepin for their constructive conversation on 13 October. He reminded Villepin of his undertaking not to veto a second SCR if Iraq were obviously in breach and of his suggestion that France might participate in military action even if someone else had vetoed (following the Kosovo precedent). Villepin

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did not demur

5. The Foreign Secretary ran through the new OP10 language in TUR. He stressed that Powell had moved mountains to accommodate French concerns. The new language had no reference to "all necessary measures" and now referred explicitly to a further meeting of the Council. The US could not accept language requiring a further SCR, but they accepted that a further meeting implied a second SCR whether moved by them or other members of the Council. There was no need to spell this out. He noted that the US had also accepted that OP5 needed revision.
6. Villepin described the new text as very good and a basis for final agreement. He accepted the need for some ambiguity, so was prepared to agree the verb "consider" rather than "decide", which he recognised was too much for the US. But, therefore, the second part of the sentence needed strengthening. He would like language along the lines of: "... consider the situation and any necessary measures to ensure full compliance...".
7. The Foreign Secretary argued that, although this kind of language was not a particular problem for the UK, by pressing the US for more, the French risked making the best the enemy of the good. It had taken a great deal of work with and by Powell to get this far to meet French concerns. He warned Villepin of the risks of pushing his luck with the US. He pointed out that Levitte could use his EOV to explain the French interpretation, even were it not possible to get the exact language they wanted. He explained at some length that, in English political language, "consider" was an active verb implying a subsequent decision. It was a stronger concept than the French equivalent. He also explained that "need" should be read as embracing "measures".
8. Villepin said he was very happy that the UK had no problem with his proposed language, so there was now an agreed European proposal (Comment: his tone implied he was being mischievous). He warned the Foreign Secretary that, although he entirely took the point about the debate within the US Administration, he would have to persuade Chirac, who would probably want the text strengthened. For Chirac, the second step had to have credibility.
9. The Foreign Secretary suggested that Villepin tell Chirac he had achieved a diplomatic triumph by shifting the US as far as he had. He urged Villepin to take Yes for an answer. If France could agree, we should table a draft SCR as soon as possible. Villepin agreed; as soon as he got an answer from Chirac on "measures".
10. The Foreign Secretary raised OP1. He warned Villepin against making an issue of "material breach" language. It was a matter of historical fact and, with the new OP10, no longer permitted the one-stage approach France had feared. He made clear that, whatever the arguments, this was a matter of trust for the UK as well as the US. Villepin's reassurances about France's willingness to support and participate in military action if justified had empowered Powell to get the changes made to OP10. If France now tried to get "material breach" language out of OP1, those in the Administration who opposed the UN route would argue that France could not be trusted on a second SCR. Villepin argued (comment: somewhat half-heartedly) that others in the Council opposed "material breach" language in OP1 and that the SCR should focus on the need for

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inspections rather than looking back. He did not suggest this was a French red line.

11. The Foreign Secretary concluded by suggesting to Villepin that, if Chirac were willing to sign up to the new OP10 language, he would have more negotiating room with Bush should he want to reach a private agreement on how to move forward. Villepin took the point. He would probably call Powell himself later today.

## COMMENT

12. WASHINGTON: Grateful if you would give Powell a copy of this record by 171130Z, in advance of the Villepin/Powell call.

13. Ricketts and Manning will reinforce the Foreign Secretary's message with their French counterparts.

STRAW

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