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FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SUBJECT: PERSONAL AND NOSEC: IRAQ: FOREIGN SECRETARY'S CONFERENCE
CALL WITH US ADMINISTRATION, 25 SEPTEMBER

SUMMARY

1. Detailed negotiations based on NSC's latest version of a draft Iraq SCR. Powell suggests that, as US/UK get close to agreement, we should send US and UK senior officials to Moscow and Paris to begin the task of selling the text. The Foreign Secretary agrees.

DETAIL

2. On the afternoon of 25 September the Foreign Secretary had a 35 minute conference call (on a secure line) with Colin Powell, Condi Rice and Jim Cunningham. Sir D Manning, Sir J Greenstock and Peter Ricketts also took part. Due to a technical hitch, Manning and Ricketts could listen but not join in.

3. Condi Rice took the chair. After some confusion while everybody found the same version of the NSC's draft SCR, Rice went through that draft paragraph by paragraph.

4. Everyone agreed that there were no problems with the existing preambular paragraphs. Greenstock suggested adding a preambular paragraph to take note of the Iraqi letter to the Secretary General. Rice thought this best left to the Russians and French to suggest in negotiation but she accepted Greenstock's point that the Security Council would insist on such a reference. She agreed to add it at pp10bis.

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5. OP1 was agreed.

6. On OP2, discussion focused on the timeframe for an Iraqi declaration. Rice said that "within 15 days" had been changed to "prior to the beginning of inspections". Greenstock said that Blix would be happy with a time-line: prior to the beginning of inspections left the initiative with the Iraqis who could present their declaration the day before inspections were due to begin. If the Resolution stipulated, say, 30 days, Blix would be able to calibrate receipt of the declaration with the beginning of inspections. After discussion it was agreed to change the language to "prior to the beginning of inspections and not later than 30 days of the date of the Resolution".

7. On OP3, Greenstock pointed out that Blix was reluctant to conduct inspections outside Iraq; he thought the Iraqis would resist this and that the international community would sympathise with Iraq. Greenstock recommended that the US Administration discuss this with Blix before going further. Powell wondered what Blix's problem was. Greenstock said that Blix feared Iraqi officials' seeking asylum would cut across inspections inside Iraq. Rice said the point was important for the US. They did not believe people would pony up information inside Iraq. Blix may not think this necessary but lots of Iraqis did. It was a red line. Powell said that we needed to be sure that we got the people we wanted to speak to, not "every clown who wanted asylum". The Foreign Secretary said that it was very important to get the right Iraqis with the right information on the right terms. Rice suggested changing the last four words of the para to give a precise date. Powell suggested changing one of the "unconditional"s in the first four lines of the para to "unimpeded".

8. On OP4, the Foreign Secretary said that he was very unhappy with the idea that any Permanent Member could designate a site for inspection. This handed the initiative to the Russians and the French who could direct Blix to useless sites and significantly divert inspectors' resources. Powell suggested that the way to solve this was to substitute "recommend" for "designate". Greenstock made the general point that we should not provide openings in the Resolution for the French and Russians to make mischief. Powell concluded that we had more influence on Blix than Russia and France, so we could afford to be flexible on this. "Recommend" was agreed ad ref.

9. Rice said that the US felt strongly about having a person (US or UK) on each team. Greenstock pointed out that this

Powell said that he saw the point that Russia would try to match us, and information needed to go to the central organisation, not individual teams. Rice repeated that it was important that the teams should not be composed solely of UN employees. The Foreign Secretary said that, under UNSCOM, But perhaps each Permanent Member could request representation on each team. Powell was attracted by this idea: we had more influence over Blix; he was more likely to

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listen to our requests. Greenstock said that the Iraqis would represent this as a US/UK attempt to get intelligence for a military strike. Rice said that there was no need to be sympathetic to Iraqi concerns. The aim was to send a strong message that this time was different. We had to insist on this kind of measure. Powell summed up that we could use similar language to the new OP4, so "request" agreed ad ref.

10. The Foreign Secretary asked about force protection for inspectors. Powell said that Blix did not want anything more than gate guards; he did not want to conduct inspections with a combat or police force. Greenstock said that Blix wanted to avoid any suggestion of compelling access or protecting his people from the Iraqis. Rice said that there had been no intention for some time of forcing inspections, rather they wanted to signal that conditions were different. Greenstock pointed out there was no such thing as a UN security force; Member States had to provide. In this case no-one other than the US and UK would provide. Rice said it was important to have things in the Resolution to discard later.

11. On No-Fly/No-Drive Zones (also OP5), the Foreign Secretary said that it looked to him like an attempt to legitimise NFZs, almost an admission that they had not been properly authorised over the last several years. NFZs would continue. This language was not necessary for the future and dangerous for the past. Greenstock suggested adding "for the purposes of this Resolution" to distinguish these zones from existing NFZs. Rice liked the idea.

12. On OP7, Greenstock made the general point that as the Resolution would be scrutinised by the Security Council, it was important that the Council members saw it as a genuine attempt to get inspectors back on the ground. Overall he was concerned that there were many things in the text that looked like trip wires. Our good faith would be questioned. Iraqi statements were not the point; we would do better to judge Iraq by its actions not its words. Rice asked if one week would be better than 48 hours. The Foreign Secretary said yes.

13. On OP10, Rice said that "or" had been changed to "and" and they had dropped reference to earlier paragraphs.

14. Powell said that we were getting close. The US would circulate another draft. If we were ready to shake hands and co-sponsor, he suggested we push things out from New York and send Grossman and Ricketts to Moscow and Paris. It would be better to engage Russia and France at a political level before Lavrov and Levitte got their hands on the text. The Foreign Secretary agreed strongly. He had just heard from Singapore that the French were circulating their own draft there.

15. The Foreign Secretary said that the conference call had been very successful. Perhaps we could repeat the format later in the week.

STRAW

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