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SUBJECT: NOSEC: IRAQ: UNMOVIC: 22 APRIL

#### SUMMARY

1. Subdued Council discussion of UNMOVIC. Blix acknowledges UNMOVIC cannot return at present and that its role would need to change. Almost all Council members accept the need for UNMOVIC to return to Iraq and most highlight the link with sanctions lift. But none press the US hard. Sabliere announces French willingness to suspend sanctions for several months renewable with sanctions lift dependent on verified disarmament.

#### DETAIL

2. This records developments on UNMOVIC on 22 April.

Bolton

3. Bolton stressed that the US did not disagree with credible inspections and getting WMD finds into the public domain. But they were concerned about involving UNMOVIC too soon or too extensively. Particularly sensitive would be the Coalition's efforts to find out about WMD activities in other countries. The UNMOVIC issue should be left on the backburner - it would become less of a problem as the Coalition made discoveries. I said the UK was less neuralgic but would not force the issue. We wanted to ensure credible arrangements that left no doubt over Coalition discoveries. And other Council members would play on the link between UNMOVIC and sanctions lift. Bolton said French moves on sanctions suspension were a helpful way of dealing with sanctions without pushing UNMOVIC to a head. He added that the US was open to alternatives to UNMOVIC (e.g. NATO). I said that US reluctance would be seen as a general reluctance to have the UN involved in post-conflict Iraq (this was manageable). We had not identified any credible alternatives. I also stressed that if international verification emerged strengthened from the Iraq issue it could be

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23/04/103 01:32

used in other cases. Bolton said that this was a debate for later.

Council meeting

4. Blix (speaking note at [www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/documents/bxSC22april.html](http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/documents/bxSC22april.html)) said it was evident that the situation in Iraq remained one where civilian inspections could not operate. And some of the assumptions on which the Council had established UNMOVIC had changed: the Coalition authorities would be as eager as UNMOVIC to find WMD and many Iraqis would now be more likely to tell what they knew. It was entirely natural that the Coalition should establish units to search for WMD.
5. As to the potential role of UNMOVIC, the resolutions set out some central points: the need for independence to retain international credibility; the need for full rights of access to any Iraqi sites and persons; the need for assistance and co-operation from any Iraqi authorities and the Coalition (including a new local counterpart to fulfil the role played by the NMD); the need for UNMOVIC/IAEA to report to the Council as a basis for its action related to sanctions; the need for ongoing monitoring and verification to provide longer-term assurances; and the fact that disarmament in Iraq would contribute towards a Middle East zone free from WMD. The draft UNMOVIC work programme could be adapted to assume that UNMOVIC would verify and corroborate Coalition findings; continue to supervise destruction of WMD; and carry out longer-term monitoring.
6. Blix said that an initial inspections team of 30 headquarters staff would be able to return to Iraq within two weeks of a Council decision. Another two weeks would be needed to resume limited operations at their (looted) Baghdad centre. As to inspectors on the roster, until mid-June 85 could be recalled at any time. After that, UNMOVIC would need some 4 weeks to call up new inspectors. Blix said that some recent reports of his comments - translated from foreign languages into English - had contained serious errors. It was true that he had pointed to weaknesses in intelligence provided, but he had also always stressed the need for intelligence and the difficulties agencies faced. He had not suggested that any government had fabricated evidence. In addition, he had indeed said that US patience seemed to run out at the same time as the Iraqis had become more proactive. But if asked about the causal link, his view would be that the Iraqis had become more active when they had seen that time was running out. Blix concluded by saying that he would not want to extend his contract beyond June.
7. Zlaugvinen (IAEA) said the IAEA's findings on Iraq and El-Baradei's views on IAEA's mandate were set out in the 11 April IAEA bi-annual report. El-Baradei's view was that IAEA inspections should resume as soon as possible and he awaited guidance from the Council. IAEA remained the only body with legal powers to verify nuclear disarmament.
8. Lavrov (Russia) underlined that UNMOVIC still had no proof Iraq might have had WMD and was prepared to resume operations as soon as the situation permitted. He hoped inspectors would be able to

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23/04/103 01:32

return rapidly, completing their work as soon as possible. He asked how much of its work UNMOVIC could carry out in New York.

9. Sabliere (France) underlined that no one was pushing for a decision at the meeting. France was interested in the immediate suspension of sanctions for several months renewable. He believed that UNMOVIC/IAEA should verify disarmament, not least as they had the requisite expertise. This would mean pragmatically defining how the inspectors worked with US teams. Its return was also important from the wider non-proliferation viewpoint (and would set a desirable precedent for a WMD free zone). It would also open the way for the final lifting of sanctions.

10. Wang (China) said that UNMOVIC should remain ready to return to Iraq. UNMOVIC verification was necessary for the lifting of sanctions. Pleuger (Germany) supported the return of UNMOVIC/IAEA as soon as possible. They had the experience and institutional memory to assist the Coalition and ensure credible verification. Workable arrangements would need to be found, be it through Council guidance, an MOU, or working on the ground. UNMOVIC should remain independent and have the full rights of access under 1441. He stressed the link with sanctions lift.

11. I said we would very carefully reflect. At the moment it was obvious that conditions on the ground did not allow for UNMOVIC's return and we could not say when the situation would change. We did in due course see a post-conflict role for UNMOVIC/IAEA in verifying disarmament and in long-term monitoring. If and when it did return it would be to an environment where it would finally be able to monitor and verify rather than be a detective agency. In due course we would need to ask UNMOVIC to review its working methods, structures, and numbers. Coalition forces were fully aware of the need to be active, professional, and to treat all relevant WMD evidence responsibly. We would share with the UN any relevant information we uncovered.

12. Negroponte (USUN), in an intervention that did not mention UNMOVIC once (Duffy said the only reference had been excised by Bolton), said that the Coalition had been focussed on re-establishing security. The Coalition would now be intensifying the search for WMD. This would likely take time as hundreds of facilities needed carefully searching, thousands of pages examining, and interviews conducting. The US recognised the need for transparency so that the international community and Iraq could share the assurance that Iraq was disarmed. But we also had to recognise that the disarmament regime needed to be reassessed given the new facts on the ground. In conclusion, the Coalition was still very much in the stabilisation phase and the principle efforts in the search for WMD remained ahead of us.

13. Arias (Spain) asked a couple of harmless questions. All other speakers agreed on the need for the inspectors to return, while most also mentioned the link with sanctions lift. Wehbe (Syria) stressed the need for a WMD free zone. Akram (Pakistan), presumably worried about the wider read-across, questioned whether long-term monitoring was really justified now that there would be an Iraqi government that was not a threat. Should the regular non-proliferation mechanisms apply instead? Zinser (Mexico, President) proposed that we take forward the issue in informal

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23/04/103 01:32

discussions and return to the Council when members were ready to take the next step. He would take a very low key line with the press.

14. Blix, responding to comments made during discussion, said that while some work could be done in New York, most work would have to be done in country. For independent verification UNMOVIC would need access to locations and persons. He noted inspectors would have to return after not too long if we wanted rapid sanctions lift. In response to Akram's suggestion that Iraq might return to more regular non-proliferation structures, he noted that UNMOVIC was the only international body which had a role and expertise in inspections of biological weapons and missiles. If we were moving to a WMD free zone there was a question of whether we should extend rather than dismantle that capability.

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