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PRIME MINISTER

IRAQ: UK MILITARY OPTIONS

We need to decide this week whether to tell the US that they can assume a predominantly air and maritime contribution or an air, maritime and land contribution from the UK to any military operation in Iraq. In either case, we will need to be more robust in our public posture about the need for essential preparatory steps as these become more visible.

1. US military planning for an operation in Iraq is gathering pace. CENTCOM continues to plan on the basis that the decision to start the operation would be taken on 6 January 2003, with the air campaign starting on 22 January and the ground force action beginning in early February. While this planning timetable could change in the light of the UN process, there are currently no signs that President Bush wishes to relax the pressure on Saddam. Indeed, Saddam has conceded ground so far only because diplomacy has been backed by the credible threat of force. We must maintain and reinforce this effect.

2. Attached is a short paper describing the options for UK participation in such an operation. As before, there are essentially two possible force packages: "Package 2" (a predominantly air and maritime force) and "Package 3" (a significant land force on top of the air and maritime elements). Both packages would subsume UK (air and naval) assets already in the Gulf area and a Special Forces contribution.

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3. The US military are aware of both possible packages. As previously agreed, "Package 2" was presented to the US as a feasible UK military contribution, subject to final political decisions to participate in a US-led military operation. The land element in "Package 3" was presented as a possible additional contribution – for use in an attack launched into Northern Iraq from Turkey – which is not be confirmed, even for planning purposes. The US military have nevertheless been developing two parallel plans, with and without Package 3.

4. There are three reasons why we need to tell the US military this week whether or not they can now assume Package 3:

- A week-long planning conference starts today during which the US military want to finalise their plans for a major command exercise that will be, in effect, a 'mission rehearsal'.
-
- while I recognise the delicate balance between the UN negotiations and the military planning process, we need to start taking soon increasingly visible preparatory steps if we are to retain the option of deploying a land force in time. In particular, we will need to announce on 31 October that we are making preparations for the potential call-up of reserves (although the formal mobilisation process can be delayed until at least mid-November).

This minute highlights some of the key decision factors.

5. First, and whatever is decided with regard to Packages 2 and 3, we could provide a significant Special Forces contribution. We could deploy about the same numbers of personnel as during the height of our military engagement in Afghanistan – squadrons of SAS/SBS (around troops), plus

headquarters, communications and logistic support (about personnel) – to Western and Northern Iraq. Our Special Forces are highly regarded by the US. The risk of casualties must be judged as relatively high. Given our reluctance to discuss Special Forces operations, their contribution is unlikely to attract the public attention, either here or in the US, that it deserves (as in Afghanistan).

6. Either Package 2 or Package 3 would be a viable military contribution:

Package 2. This would be a very significant air and maritime force – about 90 front-line aircraft and 20 warships, with 13000 personnel all told. It would also contribute capability in areas

: air-to-air refuelling, mine counter-measures, intelligence-gathering. Risk of casualties would be relatively low. But the number of visible British "boots on the ground" would be small. This could lead to some criticism here and elsewhere that UK support for the operation was half-hearted. The US military may be disappointed that we are not offering more; the likely political reaction is more difficult to judge (see below).

Package 3. Our land force – over 300 tanks/armoured vehicles and 28,000 personnel, including logistic support – would be a major element of the Northern line of attack which the US now judge as essential. In its absence, CENTCOM is likely to redeploy US forces from the South to the North – increasing risk to the overall operation. The availability of our land force could therefore help both to shorten the campaign and to secure a more decisive outcome. But the risk of casualties among British Forces is much higher than for Package 2.

The provision of either package may encourage other countries to contribute forces and thus help build a broad coalition of support. But Package 3 would have more impact (and it might provide a framework for integrating elements from other countries into a land force).

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7. There is likely to be a substantial and continuing post-conflict stabilisation task in Iraq. If we do not contribute Package 3, we may be more vulnerable to a US request to provide a substantial force for this potentially open-ended task.

*vulnerable
bit anyway.*

8. In terms of visible preparation, both packages require us to get on now with a range of Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs), inevitably fuelling media speculation about a military operation in the near term. In addition:

Package 2. If we are to be sure of identifying the 1100 reservists that will be needed, we will need to announce **no later than 8 November** that we are consulting reservists, although statutory mobilisation would not start until 2 December (with the first reservists reporting to depots some two weeks later).

Package 3. We will need to announce the start of consultation on **31 October** to find the 7500 needed, although statutory mobilisation would not be enacted until 16 November (again, with the first individuals reporting to units some two weeks later).

9. In terms of wider impact, the paper sets out the available cost information: broadly, Package 2 is likely to cost in the order of £1 billion and Package 3 between £1.5-2 billion. The key short term impact will be the effect of the reserve call-out on the NHS:

Package 2. 130 medics (of whom 30 are consultants), with the first departing in mid-December.

Package 3. 1800 medics (of whom 100 are consultants and 800 nurses), with the first departing in early December.

The aim would be to minimize the impact on the NHS by spreading the call-out as widely as possible and by taking into account local factors.

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10. A critical – and the least quantifiable – factor in weighing the two packages must be the impact on our strategic relationship with the US. In principle, both packages should strengthen that relationship: Package 2 alone should easily surpass any other conceivable non-US contribution, except perhaps for that of . But, even though I have sought to dampen Donald Rumsfeld's expectations of any sizeable land contribution, there may be some disappointment at the political level that we were not prepared to put significant numbers of ground troops in harm's way and this may translate into a cooler view towards our privileged links in defence technology, nuclear know-how and intelligence. Equally, none of our traditional serious rivals for US attention currently enjoys much esteem in Washington.

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11. A further factor which cannot be entirely discounted is the negative reaction of many of our own military personnel – particularly in the Army – if we do not provide a land contribution. This could find its way into the media which would be quick to draw unfavourable comparisons between our contributions to this campaign and the Gulf Conflict in 1990/91.

*It is
worried
about this.*

12. If we do confirm the availability of Package 3, it must be subject to conditions (which may themselves not be easy for the US):

- The US must do the heavy-lifting with the Turks.

and we cannot risk Turkish

obstructionism: this would turn our land force deployment into an expensive and highly embarrassing flop (tanks stranded on quaysides etc).



- We must be fully involved in developing the military plan on which a final decision to deploy would be based.

- [The UK would want US help to reconstitute stocks, particularly of smart weapons.]

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13. I am copying this minute to the Foreign Secretary and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and to the Cabinet Secretary.

(G H)

Ministry of Defence

15 October 2002

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IRAQ: UK CONTINGENCY PLANNING

Issue

1. Need for decisions on potential UK contributions to US-led action against Iraq, against the background of continuing strategic uncertainty.

Recommendation

2. That Ministers note the increasing difficulty of maintaining the feasibility of Package 3 (Additional Land Contribution) while it has its current "unconfirmed" status, and agree:

either:

- (a) to rule it out now

or:

- (b) to move it to the same status as Package 2

in order to enable greater clarity in our discussions of planning options with the US (and Turkey) noting that a decision in favour of (b) will:

- (i) lead to commitment of expenditure on a wider range of Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs); and
- (ii) involve an announcement on 31 October of preparedness to mobilise Reserves (though the actual mobilisation decision could be delayed).

Timing

3. Urgent. In particular, if we are going to rule out any Packages, we must let the US know very soon. In addition to pressure from US planners, it is in our interests to be clearer about our level of engagement, against the background of a series of key planning events from mid-October onwards.

Background

4. A key element of the continuing strategic uncertainty is the UN position. At present, it seems unlikely that other P5 and UNSC members will sign up to an all-in-one UNSCR, providing automatic authorisation of force in the event of Iraqi non-co-operation. The US have not yet given up hope of this, but there is as yet no breakthrough on any alternative model. The French have volunteered to draft an alternative formula, and have indicated privately that they would not stand in the way of a second resolution authorising force: but it remains to be seen how high they want to set the bar.

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5. It is difficult to judge what this may mean for the possible timing of military action. Assuming that a UNSCR is passed which at least clarifies the inspection regime, Blix expects to need a further 120 days to be fully operational (ie, at best no earlier than mid-February), and this adds to the potential for delay. On the other hand, Iraqi non-co-operation could occur at any point after the (first) UNSCR is passed, including a refusal to accept the resolution's provisions. So although the most likely scenario is that the potential triggers for military action are moving to the right, we cannot rule out the possibility that matters will be brought to a head very suddenly by Saddam himself.

6. Experience suggests that Saddam only keeps his head down and makes a show of co-operation as long as the spectre of military action is clearly visible. He has only conceded ground so far (in the Vienna discussions with Blix) because diplomacy has been backed by the credible threat of force - the concept of "force on mind". Thus both the need to be ready for the worst case and the strategy of conflict prevention through coercive diplomacy point in the same direction: continuing and visible military preparations.

7. So military planning continues. Our understanding is that the window for a Presidential decision for military action opens in mid-November and will stay open even beyond March when weather implications become more difficult. The main focus of US planning is preparation to allow the start of offensive action in January (with contingency planning for an earlier start should that prove necessary) and this is the basis of our own critical path analysis. In view of all the uncertainties this should be considered illustrative.

8. At military planning level the US is aware of the UK's potential contribution packages. We have presented Package 2 (Maritime and Air, incorporating Package 0 (SF) and Package 1 (in-theatre forces) as a baseline assumption for US planning, if the UK were to contribute to military action against Iraq, and Package 3 (including an additional Land contribution) as an unconfirmed possibility requiring further feasibility work. We have also taken steps, such as the commencement of UOR action and the swap around of units earmarked for Operation FRESCO fire-fighting duties, to ensure that all packages remain available within the main US planning timelines.

9. The Chiefs of Staff now judge that we need to make clear to the US the status of the UK packages, subject of course to the overall caveat that no decision has yet been taken to authorise any military action. This is because of the following factors:

- a) Impact of continuing uncertainty on US planning. Although the US have not yet secured Turkish agreement to the Northern Option, to which it is assumed that Package 3 would contribute, they need to know where we stand. The Northern Option is now seen as fundamental by US military planners, both in the Pentagon and in CENTCOM, so much so that the US seem increasingly likely to commit a full division of their own and exercise overall command in the North. There is an important role for the UK to play if we so wish, possibly including command of a multinational division. But if we decide not to play this role, the US will have to mobilise other US forces (possibly with a Turkish contribution) to do the job. The caveats we have so

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far attached to Package 3 have thus resulted in the US having to work on two separate plans, compounding what is already a complex process. CENTCOM would much prefer to decide as soon as possible on the force composition in the North, and to do this they need a clear statement of the UK commitment, within the overall understanding that all the packages are subject to a general political caveat.

b) Planning Timetable. The need to clarify our position will become increasingly acute as the US progress through a series of key planning events:

15 October - the final planning conference begins for Exercise INTERNAL LOOK - the CENTCOM Command Post Exercise in December which will be the mission rehearsal for possible future operations against Iraq. Ideally the US would like to use this conference to tie down the most likely contributions in planning this key exercise. We need to give the UK participants in the conference guidance on what they can say about the status of the UK Packages. We also need to confirm this week that we are committed to take part in the exercise.

21 October - high-level US/Turkish military talks in Ankara. The US will need to know where we stand on Package 3: indeed, from our own perspective, there would be advantage in getting the US to sound out Turkish views on UK participation in the Northern Option¹. It may even be advisable to send a representative ourselves. At any rate, there is likely to be a need for us to join in US/Turkish talks soon after 21 October.

25/26 October - A CENTCOM Commanders' Conference, at which we will be expected to spell out our contribution.

c) Ensuring UK Readiness. From a purely national perspective, the lead-times for putting Package 2 and Package 3 in place mean that some publicly visible decisions - such as on Reserves (see below) - need to be taken well in advance of any deployment. In the absence of certainty about the timing of military action it is impossible to be absolute about the deadlines for these decisions, and we will seek to avoid premature measures: for instance, provided an announcement on call-out of Reserves is made in order to allow preparatory work to proceed, we can defer actually mobilising them until we are sure that we need to do so. But we do need to be prepared to take these decisions.

10. Against this background, subject to the overall caveat that no political decision has been taken to authorise military action: for Package 2, we need to decide whether or not to maintain its status as a baseline assumption for the US. For Package 3 we need to decide whether to offer it to the US as a firm proposal, offer it

¹ There is a rumour afoot that the Turks may take exception to UK participation. We need to flush this out.

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as a proposal with caveats (eg about timing), or make clear to the US that we are unable to offer it. For the time being, General Franks has said that he will continue to run two plans, in order to preserve the possibility of incorporating Package 3. Clearly, the longer the US work on this basis, the more disgruntled they will be if we subsequently rule Package 3 out.

Packages 2 & 3

11. **Package 2**, in addition to SF (Package 0) and in-theatre forces (Package 1), consists of up to a medium scale Maritime component (including an aircraft carrier, 5 Destroyers/Frigates, 2 attack submarines and a Commando Group based in HMS OCEAN), and a medium scale Air component (including 64 fast jets plus tanker, transport and reconnaissance aircraft). Fuller details of the package are at Annex A.

12. **Package 3** consists of (in addition to Packages 0-2) a land task force including a Divisional HQ, an Armoured Brigade, and a large logistic group. This is judged to be the minimum sensible UK land package for discrete warfighting operations. Fuller details of the package are at Annex B.

Comparison between Packages 2 and 3

13. Deployment timelines. Illustrative deployment timelines – with key dates for decisions on Reserves highlighted – for Package 2 are set out at Annex C, and for Package 3 (including Package 2) at Annex D. The most significant difference for decision-making is that Package 3 would involve calling out a greater number of Reserves (estimated at up to 7,700, of whom some 1,900 would be medical personnel, compared to 1,100, of whom some 130 would be medics). The timing of actual mobilisation can be deferred until we are sure that the developing planning timelines require it, provided that early announcements are made of preparedness to call out Reserves, to allow work to proceed on preparation of call-out papers, immunisation programmes, etc. **Against an illustrative assumption of a US/UK decision to authorise military action on 6 January, Package 3 would require such an announcement by 31 October, compared to 8 November for Package 2.**

14. Costs. We cannot yet calculate some key components of the overall cost of operations. A comparison between Package 2 and Packages 2 and 3 together is shown at Annex E. In broad-order terms, work so far suggests that the **overall cost of Package 2 could be not far short of £1Bn, and the overall cost of Package 3 together could be between £1.5Bn and £2Bn**. Within these totals, expenditure on the procurement of equipment to meet Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs) is likely to reach the initial Treasury ceiling of £150M within the next 4-6 weeks.

15. Scope for contribution from Allies. This does not really arise for Package 2, where the UK will not be in a leadership role, and in any case rests on assumptions about the political basis for action. For Package 3, if the UK exercises divisional-level command, it is in principle possible that other Allies and partners could make some specialist contributions and relieve some of the burden (eg on Reserves), particularly if the timing of military action begins to slip to the right. But we cannot assume such contributions in deciding whether or not to offer Package 3 to the US.

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Discussion

16. In coming to a decision Ministers will need to take into account the following factors:

- a) The impact of visible decisions. Overt preparations on the scale of Package 3 may make an impact on Saddam's perception of the seriousness of coalition intent, and thus improve the chances of continuing Iraqi co-operation. They might also encourage key figures in the Iraqi regime to reflect further on whether their best interests continue to be served by Saddam's leadership. So in addition to their role in ensuring the viability of the UK contribution to military action, these measures would reinforce the coercive "force on mind" approach that has already borne fruit. (The presentational implications are considered below.)
- b) Cost. As noted above, the overall cost of Package 2 could be not far short of £1Bn, and the overall cost of Packages 2 and 3 together could be between £1.5Bn and £2Bn.
- c) US expectations. We have been careful to manage these. But a decision to rule out Package 3 will inevitably disappoint the US, and could have significant knock-on effects (see further h) below). We would have to work hard to minimise these effects. But if we do decide to rule out Package 3, we are clear that we must do so very soon. In the absence of any change in the current status of Package 3, General Franks aims to run two plans – one including the Package, one without us – on the basis that this is a lesser evil than constructing a single plan without us and subsequently having to factor us into it late in the day. It is clear, of course, that running two plans is going to cost CENTCOM considerable staff effort. CDS recommends that we must commit appropriate effort to INTERNAL LOOK, including all the Packages; unless a definite decision is taken to say "no" now to Package 3.
- d) Burdensharing. We can justifiably present Package 2 as a substantial contribution. Package 3 would be significantly more substantial, and the commitment of large ground forces would be a vivid sign of a willingness to share the risks. Although there are some shortcomings in the current US tactical plan for the Northern Option and the role of Package 3, we judge that these could be resolved if we were able fully to engage in planning and to flex resources to make it work. On the other hand, and at our request, the US are working on a plan to mount the Northern Option without us if need be.
- e) Impact on readiness and capability for other tasks. Either Package, but particularly Package 3, would affect our ability to respond to other contingencies, especially whilst Op FRESCO continues. But right now Iraq is the central issue, and there may be a trade-off between

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committing to a military campaign and committing to an enduring follow-up operation – see f) below. In itself, a 6-month warfighting operation would be consistent with Defence Planning Assumptions, although it would be difficult to recover capability in some areas.

- f) Aftermath management and the long term. US thinking on the "Day After" is under-developed at present. But in the aftermath of a campaign requiring serious military action there is likely to be a need for a substantial, potentially long-enduring commitment of forces. Assuming that military action had taken place under a UN umbrella, it is likely that the US would look to Allies and the UK to play a major role in this, perhaps including providing a framework capability through the ARRC. We clearly have an interest in minimising the risk of a long-lasting commitment, particularly another Peace Support Operation PSO in a part of the world that would not be retention-positive for our personnel: in terms of Defence Planning Assumptions, a rouled Medium Scale PSO in Iraq would be manageable only if our commitments elsewhere, including the Balkans, were capped at Small Scale. The more substantial our contribution to military action in the first place, the more plausibly we will be able to argue that we have done our bit.

*Maybe.
 I wouldn't count on
 it. Didn't work
 like that in
 Afghanistan. We
 had to do all the
 difficult business
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Turkey. Turkey's position on the Northern Option is not yet certain. Initial US-Turkish military contacts do not guarantee Turkish political agreement. Given the importance they attach to this, we can assume that the US will do some very heavy lifting to get the Turks on board. But the outcome, including on the Turkish attitude to hosting UK forces, may remain uncertain for some time. In order to flush this out, Franks and Raiston will raise the issue in Ankara on 21 October. Equally, if the Northern Option ceased to be a runner, the US would inevitably review the other elements of their plan, and it is possible that some or all of Package 3 might be able to play a role in the South (although space constraints might impact on timing).

- h) Wider Context. In the context of looking at future force structure changes (the Defence Planning Assumptions work submitted in June), we have been taking soundings of what gives us influence over US campaign planning. It is clear that sharing risk – political and military – is crucial to having a voice in how a military operation is planned; but it also gives a locus to influence the wider overall campaign. There is thus a longer-term and strategic dimension to the issue of Package 3: not joining will reduce the influence we have over planning. But it may also change the US' perceptions of the UK as a partner longer-term, fostering a tendency to see us as a specialist in Peace Support Operations rather than a warfighting ally, with possible knock-on effects on other areas of close bilateral co-operation (intelligence, nuclear, missile defence, equipment and network-centric capability, etc). That said, if we do offer Package 3, the Government would be well placed to press its views more vigorously on better regional handling and "day

*I don't buy
 this.*

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after" planning. Unless these components of the overall campaign are properly planned, a military operation may not offer a worthwhile return. We could and should offer a contribution on the understanding that these dimensions must be better addressed.

- i) Army morale. If the Army does not participate in the biggest combat operation for over a decade, and particularly if it is subsequently committed to a potentially enduring aftermath task, this may foster a perception that it is no longer regarded as a warfighting force (particularly if troops are deployed on Operation FRESCO duties) and may have knock-on effects on recruitment and retention. It will clearly present a leadership challenge. This should not be a critical factor in reaching decisions on Package 3, but it is an issue which Ministers will wish to have in mind.

17. In informing the US of the status of the Packages, we will need to be clear about the timescales in which we are prepared to take subsidiary decisions on issues such as the call-out of Reserves. A firm commitment in principle to Package 3 should give us better involvement in US thinking, especially in Washington, about the most realistic timings for military action. We may find that we have more time than the illustrative dates shown in Annexes C and D, but this is only likely to emerge progressively if at all. So if Ministers wished to place any caveats on the timescales or circumstances in which they are prepared to take the subsidiary decisions, we would have to make these clear to the US at the outset.

Presentation

18. Whichever Package we offer, when specific decisions on Reserves and other critical-path issues are taken they will require careful domestic and international presentation. One option would be to handle them in a low-key way, explaining them as no more than prudent contingency planning. But it will not be easy to make this sound credible to the media and domestic opinion. There would thus be a case for presenting visible deployment decisions more assertively, arguing that they are an essential ingredient of a successful coercive strategy. This might not persuade journalists to present them as anything other than stages in the "countdown to war". But we would be less vulnerable to accusations of proceeding to war by stealth, and would be able to engage the media with a more pro-active handling strategy. A more open approach should also make it easier to manage the internal audience.

Ministry of Defence
14 October 2002

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Annex A

Package 2

Maritime Component

1. The proposed force is as follows:

- *Carrier Group*: HMS ARK ROYAL provides command facilities coupled with the capability to operate 8-10 Harrier GR7 (if available); 6 Harrier FA2; 3 Sea King Mk7 (AWACS); 3-4 Merlin; 2 Sea King 6 (utility) or role change into a Helicopter carrier to support the ARG; 2 Frigate/Destroyer escorts and requisite RFA support shipping
- *Submarines*: 2 Tomahawk capable submarines
- *Amphibious Ready Group*: 45 Commando Group based afloat in HMS OCEAN with 3 landing ships and combat support afloat in 4 support ships with 2 Frigate/Destroyer escorts, with 5 x Chinook, 12 x Sea King, 4 x Lynx and 4 x Gazelle as a TAG
- *Currently Deployed In-theatre Assets*: 1 Destroyer; 1 Frigate; 1 tanker (Op ORACLE/RESINATE/ARMILLA)
- *Mine counter-measures group*: 4 - 6 mine counter-measures vessels; 1 logistic landing support ship; 1 Destroyer escort.
- *Survey*: HMS ROEBUCK.
- *Primary Casualty Receiving Ship*: 1 PCRS (with embarked surgical support team)
- *Maritime Patrol*: 2-4 Nimrod MR2 maritime patrol aircraft

3. **Military Tasks.** The US plan is to minimise their footprint in the Middle East by providing a considerable proportion of their firepower from five to seven Carrier battlegroups split between the Eastern Mediterranean and the North Arabian Gulf. Their tasks will be to generate the majority of the Offensive Air sorties in the first weeks of the Air campaign supplemented by up to 1000 Tomahawk missiles. The US will deploy US marines ashore in the very early stages of the campaign to secure port areas and the sea line of communication into Kuwait.

4. The UK maritime component would be fully integrated with the US effort and meets the early military effect required in current US planning: land forces delivered from the Amphibious Ready Group for discreet precursor tasks in advance of the launching of the southern axis, and Tomahawk fitted submarines (either in the Arabian Gulf or Eastern Mediterranean – the latter position may be constrained by over-flight rights). Additional support to US forces would come from escorts, RFA support ships and critically, the provision of a mine counter-measures group.

5. USMARCENT have identified a number of potential tasks for the Amphibious Forces, if committed, although detailed planning is still to take place. These tasks would see them contributing to early entry and highly visible operations. These tasks could provide impact in the early stages of the campaign (at a time when the UK land effort may be building up in the north).

6. **Military Significance.** The short US timescale between decision and the start of operations is challenging but the UK can contribute with maritime units from the

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outset. Tomahawk submarines can contribute precision munitions at the start of operations. They would complement the mine counter-measures group in their operations to assist in the critical protection of the only military port facility in Kuwait and opening of the Khawr Abd Allah waterway and IRAQI port of Umm Qasr. This is a niche capability to support a smaller US group in negating the most dangerous IRAQI maritime threat.

7. The utility of the Amphibious Ready Group would depend on the assets available when it is used. It would need to be tailored so as not to impact significantly on other potential UK force contributions. A Commando Group level ARG could deploy from the UK as early as November. This could offer a ground contribution of up to 1700 personnel integrated with the US Marine Expeditionary Force for early action in the South.

Air Component

8. The proposed force is up to:

- SF: 8 x C130 Hercules, 9 x CH47 Chinook, 4 x Nimrod MPA in support of SF.
- Essential Enablers: Air to Air Refuelling/Transport: 4 x Tristar; 8 x VC10 Tankers; In Theatre C130 Hercules as required. Reconnaissance/EW: 4 x E3D AWACS; 2 x 9 Photo Reconnaissance Canberras; 2 x Nimrod MR2; 1 x Nimrod R1;
- Offensive Ops: 64 Fast Jets: 8 x Tornado F3, 30 x Tornado GR4, 8 x Jaguar, 18 x Harrier GR7
- Support: 2 x Ground-based Air Defence Sqns; 4 x Field Sqns; 1 x Joint Regiment NBC Regt; 3 x RE Sqn airfield; Royal Engineers Squadron

9. **Military Tasks.** The UK air component would be integrated with the US effort which would be centralised and commanded from CENTAF through a single Combined Air Operations Centre in Qatar (or potentially Saudi). Combat effect would be provided in the earliest moments with the insertion and support of SF, thereafter by the enablers and offensive and support package as the shaping and decisive ops phases commenced.

10. **Military Significance.** The package comprises a balanced force of SF support, offensive and niche support capabilities above and beyond that which could be provided by the US alone. The significance of UK fast jets in the US campaign is considerable. For example, the US has a scarcity of specific aircraft which can directly support battlefield troops, a requirement that the Harrier GR7 can provide. Similarly, Tornado GR4s based in Ali Al Salem in Kuwait can provide precision bombing against hardened targets a important capability in the shaping of the battlefield.

11. UK recce assets are also known to be valued by the US (Canberra PR9, Jaguar and Tornado GR4 in the Tactical recce role). Likewise, the intelligence and co-ordination contribution of the AWACS and Nimrod R1 is a niche capability much in demand by our US counterparts. Finally, as proven in Operation VERITAS, the US Navy have a requirement for probe and drogue air to air refuelling tankers which the USAF alone cannot satisfy.

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Annex B

Package 3

Land Component in addition to Package 2

1. The proposed force is up to:

- Full Divisional HQ with manoeuvre capability
- Divisional troops
- One square armoured brigade (of two armoured Battle Groups and two armoured infantry Battle Groups)
- Integral brigade Combat Support and Combat Service Support;
- Support helicopters
- A Divisional Support Group
- A large logistic group.

2. **Military Tasks.** It is envisaged that the proposed UK land component (with augmentation of a US Armoured formation) could be capable of delivering the tactical tasks required in the CENTCOM Plan. These include:

- Securing the crossings over the River TIGRIS and developing a bridgehead to the south.
- The defeat, in sequence, if necessary of the main Iraqi units in the north (Iraqi Army 1 (Mechanised) Div, Republican Guard.
- Securing the forces own flank against Iraqi attack from East.
- (In conjunction with Special Forces and air assets) fixing Iraqi forces in the north to prevent redeployment to counter the US main effort from the south.
- Isolating TIKRIT.

And with the addition of a third manoeuvre formation:

- Being prepared to secure WMD sites, line of communication and civil infrastructure (including oil facilities) in the north.

3. **Military Significance.** A UK contribution at this level would have very considerable significance to the US. Equally, with a fully functioning divisional HQ in the field, the UK could reap the strategic benefits of taking other multinational formations under command.

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Annex C

Illustrative Deployment Timelines for Package 2

NB these are on the **illustrative** assumption of a Presidential/Prime Ministerial decision on 6 January to authorise military action.

- 4 Nov: Decision needed to allow MCMVs to proceed from Mediterranean through Suez Canal to Gulf to participate in long-planned exercise with US.
- 8 Nov: **Announce preparedness to call out Reserves**
- 11 Nov: RAF & Army airfield enabling personnel deploy forward, with aircraft and equipment being prepared in the UK at the same time
- 15 Nov: Decision needed on whether to prepare HMS ARK ROYAL for deployment (currently due to return to UK on 14 Nov)
- 25 Nov: Deploy Amphibious Ready Group based on HMS OCEAN
- 2 Dec: **Mobilise RNR logisticians (Order before Parliament, followed by reporting to Reserve Centres)**
- 7 Dec: Deploy HMS ARK ROYAL
- 9 Dec: **Mobilise remaining Package 2 Reservists. Deploy RAF Deployed Operating Base enablers. Preposition aircraft munitions.**
- 23 Dec: Deploy second TLAM SSN from UK
- 30 Dec: Final RAF enabling equipment moves forward
- 6 Jan: RAF combat aircraft deploy

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Annex D

Illustrative Deployment Timelines for Package 3 (including Package 2)

NB these are on the **illustrative** assumption of a Presidential/Prime Ministerial decision on 6 January to authorise military action.

- 31 Oct:** **Announce preparedness to call out Reserves**
- 4 Nov:** Cannibalisation and preparation of equipment and force generation. Decision needed to allow MCMVs to proceed from Mediterranean through Suez Canal to Gulf to participate in long-planned exercise with US.
- 11 Nov:** RAF & Army airfield enabling personnel deploy forward, with aircraft and equipment being prepared in the UK at the same time
- 15 Nov:** Decision needed on whether to prepare HMS ARK ROYAL for deployment (currently due to return to UK on 14 Nov)
- 16 Nov:** **Announce mobilisation of Reserves (Order before Parliament, followed by reporting to Reserve Centres)**
- 25 Nov:** Deploy Amphibious Ready Group based on HMS OCEAN
- 2 Dec:** **Mobilise RNR logisticians**
- 7 Dec:** Deploy HMS ARK ROYAL
- 9 Dec:** **Mobilise remaining Package 2 Reservists. All Package 3 Reservists to have reported.** Deploy RAF Deployed Operating Base enablers. Preposition aircraft munitions.
- 13 Dec:** Begin transporting equipment to sea ports of embarkation
- 23 Dec:** Deploy second TLAM SSN from UK
- 30 Dec:** Final RAF enabling equipment moves forward
- 6 Jan:** RAF combat aircraft deploy
- 11 Jan:** First Land elements sail

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Annex E

Cost comparison – Packages 2 & 3

	Package 2	Package 3 including Package 2
UORs	£241M	£462M
Force generation (not including sustainability stocks)	£135-171M	£197-233M
Reserves (120 days)	£18M	£103M
Running costs (90 days for P3)	£70M	£210M
	£464-500M	£972-1008M

These figures are incomplete. We cannot estimate costs of movement (deployment, sustainment and recovery), ammunition, other consumable stocks and post-operational recuperation. Taking this into account, ball-park figures for the overall costs could be in the order of:

Package 2	Package 3 Including Package 2
£1Bn	£1.5-2Bn

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