

# DECLASSIFIED

**From:** ACPO INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS Mailbox  
@hampshire.pnn.police.uk]  
**Sent:** 11 November 2005 10:41 AM  
**To:**  
**Cc:** Sir Ronnie Flanagan; @homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk;  
@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk; @fco.gsi.gov.uk;  
@fco.gsi.gov.uk; @fco.gov.uk  
**Subject:** UK CIVIL POLICE ASSISTANCE EFFORT IN IRAQ - COMMAND & CONTROL ISSUES - REQUEST FOR CLARITY

**To:** Home Office

**From:** Paul Kernaghan, ACPO International Affairs

**Copy:** Sir Ronnie Flanagan, HMCIC  
Mark Neale, Home Office  
Richard Kornicki, Home Office  
Michael Gillespie, Home Office  
CPA Iraq  
Iraq Directorate FCO  
IPCPT FCO

**Subject: UK CIVIL POLICE ASSISTANCE EFFORT IN IRAQ - COMMAND & CONTROL ISSUES - REQUEST FOR CLARITY**

On 6/10/05 I was advised by Sir Ronnie Flanagan that he had been requested to visit Iraq and conduct an assessment on behalf of the Prime Minister. That development prompted greater liaison between the FCO Iraq Directorate and other interested parties, not least the Home Office and myself [ACPO]. However, it has become apparent that not all parties are operating off the same script. This email is designed to set out the position as I understand it and to seek urgent and authoritative clarification.

My email dated 7/10/05 set out five key questions, I would appreciate answers to them from the Iraq Directorate - they were informally addressed at our meeting on 18/10/05 but a written response would I suggest assist us all in refining our thinking.

At the same meeting reference was made to discussion and decisions emanating from DOP 1 - however, no one present had a record of its proceedings. It was stated that Dr Reid [Sec Def] had assume responsibility for policing in Iraq. I made my concerns clear at any suggestion of altered terms of engagement for the British civil police officers deployed in Iraq, in the absence of discussion with ACPO. I know my concerns were endorsed by Home Office colleagues present.

in his regular weekly report dated 16/10/05 [received by me on 26/10/05] reported that the ministerial lead on development of the IPS has moved from the FCO to MOD.

On 31/10/05, I commented on draft TOR for HMCIC's planned visit to Iraq. In particular I highlighted the loose language and confusion over terms such as 'command and control' and whether that phrase referred to military formations or the British civil police contingent. That response was sent to the Iraq Directorate and copied to you.

I have now had sight of weekly report dated 6/11/05. He specifically highlights a

11/11/2005

# DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

meeting with MG General Dutton. suggests the General wishes to assume control of Civpol and Armorgroup assets, though no written authority for such a development was produced. The General specifically stated that he wanted to see Civpol personnel travel in 'Snatch' vehicles. He even suggested he would review relevant contracts of employment.

It is essential that all recipients of this email read report.

supplied me on 10/11/05 with copy minutes of a meeting held in London on 4/11/05 chaired by Jeremy Bell.

The Cabinet Office is apparently disappointed at the failure to reach agreement - as am I. I am pleased to note that the GOC and Consul General have reached an agreement and that a form of words is needed to be found that would be acceptable to both the military, ACPO and OGDs! Have or I been consulted on whatever the agreement covers?

I will not waste time in going through the minutes line by line but I assume any requirement for military and civil police personnel to travel in the same vehicles means a levelling up of resources, as opposed to a levelling down. The media in the UK have not generally eulogised the protective qualities of 'Snatch' vehicles. I am quite clear that my fellow chief officers would not support any move by me to reduce the protection afforded to civil police officers in Iraq. Any suggestion to the contrary needs to be discussed with me and a rationale put forward. Naturally, I assume any move to uniform theatre transport standards will involve all FCO staff and not just civil police officers.

In essence, I am concerned that mixed messages are circulating in London, Basra and Baghdad. I still await written confirmation that the MOD has lead responsibility for IPS development and what that may mean for British civil police officers deployed in Iraq. I expect to be consulted on such matters not handed a fait accompli. I and are very keen to contribute to the overall UK effort but not in ways which compromise our professional integrity and crucially the safety of our colleagues serving in Iraq.

I should be grateful if you could convene a meeting with relevant officials who can produce documentation referred to above and also enter in to substantive discussions. Until, we achieve clarity we will not maximise the effectiveness of our contribution to reconstructing Iraq. I have not authorised any changes in the employment of, or security arrangements covering, my officers in Iraq in recent months. Therefore, I trust no changes have been unilaterally implemented by the military on the ground. I am sure they have not. General Dutton and DCC deserve a clear framework within which to manage their respective and complementary responsibilities.

Regards,

**Paul Kernaghan**  
**Chief Constable**  
**ACPO International Affairs**

Sent by

Management Assistant to Paul Kernaghan CBE QPM  
Chief Constable

@hampshire.pnn.police.uk

or

chief.officers@hampshire.pnn.police.uk

11/11/2005

DECLASSIFIED

## TORs FOR THE ASSESSMENT BY SIR RONNIE FLANAGAN OF THE UK'S IRAQI POLICE SERVICE (IPS)

The assessment by Sir Ronnie in November should take account of the need for wider reform of the IPS, but concentrate on assessing the resourcing and effectiveness of the UK's IPS Security Sector Reform (SSR) programme in MND(SE) and its linkage to the shape and effectiveness of MNF-I national policing policy in Baghdad.

It will be wise to assume that those elements of IPS reform strategy (notably tackling the influence of the militias on the IPS and rooting out the dead wood in the IPS) which require the close engagement of the Iraqi government, might best be left until after the new Iraqi government has been installed, although the mechanics for such actions need to be determined in advance. This will require continued engagement, both in and out of theatre, informed by the results of the forthcoming assessment.

In particular, it is recommended that Sir Ronnie assess:

- The strategy for the development of the IPS in MND(SE) and confirms that it is aiming for a solution that establishes an IPS which is appropriate for Iraq.
- That the proposals for the UK's IPS SSR strategy in MND(SE) are realistic and workable and to make resourcing recommendations.
- The effectiveness and applicability of the UK's IPS training effort in MND(SE).
- How the Civ/Pol and ArmorGroup contracts can be better managed to make the most effective use of this resource.
- The effectiveness of the International Police Advisers in terms of numbers, rank/quality, conditions of service, unity of command/C2 arrangements and force protection/movement restrictions.
- The effectiveness of the relationship between the CPATT contingent and UK personnel in MND(SE).
- The effectiveness of the relationship between coalition police support structures and Iraqi police structures at the national level.
- The effectiveness of the relationship between US and UK police support structures at the national level within Iraq.
- The effectiveness of the relationship between the UK police assistance team and other elements of the overall British effort in Iraq.

DECLASSIFIED

- The quality of activity reporting.
- Progress in delivering a national policing strategy and the position of MND(SE) in relation to it.
- Iraqi aspirations (especially progress in delivering a national policing strategy for the IPS) and determine the extent to which these are being satisfied by the Coalition and identify any shortcomings in the UK's contribution

DECLASSIFIED