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D/PIHQ/CIVSEC

7 Jan 03

DG Op Pol

ENCL No.

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Copy to:

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Policy Director  
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Hd of Sec(I)  
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DCJO(Ops)  
ACOS J3  
ACOS J5

**OP TELIC: PREPARING FOR PHASE IV**

1. We spoke briefly on the telephone yesterday on this subject and agreed that it might be useful if I put on paper some thoughts we are developing here to take forward this work.
2. Reporting from our liaison teams attached to CENTCOM and ARCENT indicate that the US military are beginning Phase IV planning in earnest. The work in the US is being undertaken by CJTF/IV working under General Hawkins (so far situated in Norfolk VA but about to move to Tampa and in due course we expect to QATAR). They will be hosting a conference next week in Tampa (in parallel with the Component Commanders Conference). We will be represented by our liaison team (both civilian and military). While I accept that CENTCOM planning may not be the final word on US thinking, my recent experience suggests that in the absence of an interagency position, the US military commander on the ground has a strong tendency to become the prime agent of US policy making.
3. This issue is, of course, likely to be all the more important in the light of this week's rapid turn of events and particularly if, as now appears likely, the UK were to take on the first Phase IV AOR in Southern Iraq. We would, in effect be setting the standard for rest of the Phase IV work. (And, of course, CJO is, in any case, charged in CDS' Directive with planning humanitarian assistance in theatre should it become necessary).
4. From our point of view, therefore, the current turn of events mean that we have to begin thinking very soon about the practical consequences on the ground of taking on the AOR. These include issues such as; food, water, displaced persons, oil (including accounting for its use), potential Iranian incursions, pollution as well as, in the slightly longer term, security sector reform and reconstruction. Some, if not, all of this, will of course either determine, or more properly ought to be determined by, strategic considerations of post-conflict Iraqi structures. I know that the FCO and you have been working with the State Department on aspects of the aftermath issue (although I understand from talking to Peter Gooderham last night that there does not appear to be a prospect for an early resumption of the discussions that you and Edward Chaplin had begun with State).
5. Against that background, we intend to establish here as soon as possible a joint J5/J9 team which will draw support from other divisions and in particular from the J3. On the J9 side I intend to take a close interest but the day to day work will fall to [redacted] - we have now identified augmentees who will start work in the next few days. The team will be charged with developing planning for Phase IV implementation. We will aim to ensure that the lessons of the Balkans and Afghanistan are taken into account. We are in a reasonably good position to link up with US military thinking. But I

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think too that we will need more support from OGDs to help us to produce a fully joined up approach. There has already been some suggestion in Stephen Pollard's discussions with Nicola Brewer that someone from DFID might be seconded (which we would welcome) but we probably ought to go further and would ideally like to include others including the FCO and, on an opportunity basis, individuals (such as the one from DEFRA who recently contacted us about oil management). We would also welcome the opportunity to be involved in discussions with the US beyond the individual HQs - both to maintain coherence and to do what we can to encourage the US in joined-up Government.

6. We will, of course, also need to be kept "on message" and to that extent I think there would be merit in trying to set up a regular Phase IV VTC with MOD/SBMA/SBLA and perhaps with representation from OGDs either as an interim measure while we get through the practical issues of identifying individuals, checking clearances and finding space here, or longer term for those whose involvement might be more sporadic but could nonetheless usefully contribute to the planning work. Perhaps we could then speak later in the week about the best way in which to approach those Departments and to try to identify as quickly as possible individuals who might be available to join the team.

7. I think there would also be merit in the team here visiting over the next two weeks the main centres of current US thinking (ie both Tampa and Kuwait).

PAUL FLAHERTY  
Civil Secretary

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